The Submission is the Point, Part II

The Rome Pride Parade has banned Keshet, Italy's LGBTQ Jewish organization from having a float in their parade. They say it's because Keshet failed to "distance" itself from the "ongoing genocide in Gaza." Specifically, they did not expressly use the word "genocide" to describe what was happening in Gaza.

Before we proceed further, let's read what Keshet did say while under lying under the gaze of Rome Pride.

They said that, as a Jewish (not Israeli -- Keshet has no affiliation or connection to the Israeli government) organization, "the conflict in the region is not our area of expertise." Nonetheless, they said they "feel close to the suffering of the Palestinian people." However, they also explained their hesitation around using the specific word "genocide", including their experience with how those using that word frequently ended up targeting the entire Jewish, not Israeli, community for culpability: 

We are especially concerned with the sentence that we keep on hearing that ‘the Jewish people are carrying out what they were subjected to,' a sentence that does not just refer to a conflict or a government but ends up connecting what is happening to the whole Jewish people.

Agree with Keshet's stance or not, this hardly seems like the sort of intractable political gap that should make them personas non grata. If it were the case that Rome Pride was hoping to find a mutually acceptable arrangement with Keshet; a way that they could stand together even if they didn't fully agree together, this would seem to more than satisfy that.

This is a critical point to make. I don't doubt that there are differences in how the leaders of Rome Pride and the leaders of Keshet perceive what is happening in Israel and Palestine. And sometimes differences are simply too large, and the gulf is too wide, such that there is no hope for reconciliation. But there is a distinction between how a group acts when it views its interlocutor as a partner whom it hopes to be able to stay in fellowship and community with, with whom it would be terrible and agonizing if it were forced to cut ties with, versus when it sees the other as an enemy, to either be placed under vassalage or  be met on the battlefield. In the former case, you look for how you can harmonize, for how differences and distinctions can be absorbed in the spirit of a broader common ground. In the latter you desire disagreement; you try to throw up as many redlines as possible, you are excited to find a reason to say "no".

And it's very clear how Rome Pride saw its relationship with the LGBTQ Jews. What they wanted out of Keshet was not something that could be mutually acceptable. What they wanted was submission. Knowing why Keshet didn't want to use that specific word, knowing that its demurral had nothing to do with refusing to extend care and concern for Palestinians or even with expressing solidarity with Israel and everything to do with their specific experiences as Jews and how they were being actively marginalized -- that only made the prospect of submission all the more alluring. They wanted Keshet to bend before them, and if they didn't bend, they were happy to see them break. JTA reports that Rome Pride announced Keshet's exclusion within 15 minutes of the end of the two parties' meeting. That is not a timeline that speaks to an organization that was earnestly attempting to find common ground and would only announce exclusion as the last resort of completely irreconcilable differences. That is the timeline of a group that was ready and eager and excited to righteously announce their expulsion.

All of this is familiar. And again, it is not about finding common ground; it is entirely about asserting dominance. Two years ago, I wrote about the Israeli artist showing at the Venice Biennale, who elected to close her exhibit until "a cease-fire and hostage release agreement is reached." You might have thought those protesting her presence would be elated, that she was publicly taking a stand against the war. They were in fact furious. They hated that the artist (a regular presence at Israeli anti-war demonstrations) did this voluntarily, of her own accord, when what they wanted was for it to be wrested from her. Nothing would satisfy them unless they felt that their target was beaten and broken. What might appear to be a mutually agreeable resolution is despised not in spite of but because of its mutuality: "if they agree, then it was not imposed, and if it was not imposed, then there was not truly submission."

Rome Pride says they are "fully capable of distinguishing between the Israeli government and the Jewish community." But they also hold Keshet "responsible for having failed, and continuing to fail, to distance itself from the ongoing genocide in Gaza," Which raises the question: why should they need to "distance" themselves? What makes them so close?

It is, of course, because they're Jewish. Keshet's concern -- that the term "genocide" was being used to demand collective responsibility and collective culpability from Jews, not Israelis -- was entirely vindicated. They understood the game. All Jews understand the game. How many years ago did Steve Cohen write this immortal passage?

Every Jew on the left will know that terrible syndrome whereby, whatever the context and wherever one is, we will be tested by being given the question "what is your position on Zionism?" Wanna support the miners—what's your position on Zionism? Against the bomb—what's your position on Zionism? And want to join our march against the eradication of Baghdad, in particular the eradication of Baghdad—what's your position on Zionism? And we all know what answer is expected in order to pass the test. It is a very strong form of anti-Semitism based on assumptions of collective responsibility. Denounce Zionism, crawl in the gutter, wear a yellow star and we'll let you in the club.

Cohen's insight is that this practice is not about ensuring overlapping values or common interests. It is about domination. That's why Cohen, who is in fact anti-Zionist, is deemed to fail the test -- he does not abase himself enough; he does not make it clear that he acknowledges being beneath those demanding his supplication.

And so too here. Leave aside the fact that last year's Rome Pride march saw the Jewish marchers attacked and harassed in despicable fashion. That is more standard-issue thuggery, albeit thuggery that is rightly viewed as part of the context for Rome Pride's decision this year. This year, Rome Pride demanded a show of self-abnegation from the Jews. The Jews refused to give them one, and Rome Pride deemed that unacceptable. That's what happened. Do not get caught up in thinking that there is some deeper or more essential ideological gap here. The submission was the point.

Will My Child Grow Up To Be a Human?

The other day, Jill and I were playing a common game with our baby -- telling him all the different things he could be when he grows up.

"Are you going to be ... a writer?" "Are you going to be a hockey player?" "Are you going to be an artist?" "Are you going to be a crypto bro?" (we grimaced for the last one).

Our baby is ten weeks old. He isn't much of anything yet. We don't know what he's going to be. And in the present moment, that unknown doesn't just inspire hope and anticipation. It also inspires deep anxiety and worry. We don't know if our child is going to grow up to be the type of person who is under attack by his own government.

For example, we don't know if our baby is going to have a learning disability. And that matters, given the crusade conservative politicians have launched against education programs for disabled children; one conservative commentator on Fox & Friends bluntly described the conservative position on "making sure disabled kids have access to a public education" as "we're against it."

We don't know if our baby is going to have a serious or chronic medical condition. That matters, given the  deep desire by the Trump administration to gut the American healthcare system, coupled with the bloody swath they're already cutting through critical medical research programs.

We don't know if our baby is going to be gay, or trans, or otherwise queer. That matters, given the inhumane attacks on queer personhood that have been promoted over the past few weeks, threatening to undo decades of progress towards actualizing the American promise of equal justice under law.

Of course, he might not turn out to be any of these things. We don't know, just like we don't know if he'll be a writer or a hockey player or an artist or (shudder) a crypto bro.

So we just have to wait and see, and hope that whatever our child grows into, it'll be one of the categories our country still recognizes as fully human.

.... And Getting Worse Roundup

This will not be my cheeriest roundup. But there are a bunch of links burning a hole in my pocket, so here you go.

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Apropos yesterday's post on Fugitive Uterus Laws, a Washington Post article on similar efforts underway to set up checkpoint towns in Texas designed to capture any pregnant women who has designs on leaving the state for freedom.

North Carolina Republicans considering impeaching a state supreme court justice because she talked about racism. While I can't fault Slate for juxtaposing this against the undisclosed largesse heaped upon Justice Thomas, my mind more rapidly went to efforts in Wisconsin to impeach a state supreme court justice because she might vote for democracy.

A politically engaged fifteen year old kid asked a (not even that tough!) question that made Ron DeSantis uncomfortable on the campaign trail. So he sent his goons to rough him up.

You see, the real problem with the "War on Drugs" is that it's too metaphorical.

The latest Fifth Circuit crack-pottery: it's probably illegal for the FDA to tell humans they're not horses (yes, this is the latest conservative institution to burn its remaining dignity in defense of ivermectin conspiracies).

Georgia school district: saying the word "gay" around fifth graders is like graphically describing the horrors of the Holocaust to kindergarteners. 

A Statutory "Green Book" After 303 Creative

In 303 Creative, the Supreme Court held that at least in some circumstances a business's free speech interest in avoiding producing expression it disagrees with constitutionally must trump the application of anti-discrimination law in areas of public accommodation, notwithstanding the admittedly "compelling state interest" the latter type of law protects.

It was not so long ago that minorities in America had booklets they carried to let them know which businesses it was safe for them to patronize, knowing that in certain places and communities they could not simply assume that a hotel, restaurant, or shop open to the general public would be open to them. The Jewish Vacation Guide was one example, the Negro Motorist Green Book was another. In circumstances where discrimination was lawful, these resources served several important needs. 

First, of course, they let their readers know where certain services simply would be unavailable. One does not want to travel through or move into a town where the only hotel or restaurant will refuse to serve you. 

Second, and almost as importantly, they enabled readers to avoid shops which would refuse to grant them service. This is distinct from the first injury, because there is a severe dignitary harm in being refused service on account of one's identity even if a competing business across the street that will happily take one's dollars. One feature of public accommodations law is precisely that one doesn't have to "run the risk" that in entering a storefront on Main Street you'll endure the indignity of being asked to leave because you're the wrong skin color, religion, or sexual orientation. Absent that guarantee being fully enshrined into law, resources like the Green Book enabled travelers to know in advance which storefronts to avoid so they wouldn't have to face that sort of humiliation.

In keeping with that tradition, I wonder if one way of balancing 303 Creative's First Amendment protections with the again conceded-to-be-compelling interest in robust antidiscrimination protections is via the time-tested policy of disclosure. States can pass laws which require any business that wishes to claim a First Amendment exemption from all or part of an anti-discrimination statute to publicly announce and display that choice; and the state can likewise maintain a list of businesses which make such claims. The law would be a sort of statutory Green Book, letting patrons know what businesses are at least claiming an ability to discriminate (and by extension assuring them that businesses not on the list remain safe to patronize).

Here's my very rough crack at some model legislative language:

Sec. XXX -- Exemptions

(a) Registration. Any business which seeks to claim a First Amendment exemption from all or part of the [this state's anti-discrimination law] ("a business seeking an exemption") must, at least thirty days prior to asserting any claim for such an exemption,

(1) Register with the Secretary of State their intent to claim an exemption, including specifying which portions of the law they assert they will not comply with.

(2) The Secretary shall publish the names and addresses of all businesses who register their intent to claim an exemption under this subsection on a publicly available website, including which provisions of the law they claim exemption from. 

(b) Public display. Within thirty days of receiving a filing under Sec. (a)(1), the Secretary shall issue a notification to the business seeking an exemption stating that "WARNING: THIS BUSINESS HAS FILED FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT EXEMPTION FROM THIS STATE'S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS", including specifying which portions of the law the business claims exemption from. Unless otherwise inapplicable, the text of this notification shall be conspicuously displayed in

(1) The front window or doorway space of any physical location of the business that is open to the general public or the businesses' regular customers; and

(2) The front page of any webpage or social media account controlled by the businesses and through which it advertises its business to the general public;

(3) Notwithstanding any other portion of this subsection, if a business claiming an exemption has neither a physical storefront under subsection (b)(1) or a webpage under subsection (b)(2), the text of the notification shall be displayed in any reasonable location where it will be conspicuous for the average customer considering patronizing the business.

(c) Presumption of sincerity. Any business which complies with the provisions in this section shall be deemed to have established, as a rebuttable presumption, the sincerity of their belief that compliance with [this state's antidiscrimination laws] conflicts with their own expressive beliefs.

(d) No entitlement to, or expansion of the scope of, exemption. Except as detailed in subsection(c), compliance with the provisions of this Section shall not entitle the business seeking an exemption from antidiscrimination law to any relief from the requirements of antidiscrimination provisions beyond that which is constitutionally required under the First Amendment; nor does it immunize the business seeking an exemption from any public or private proceeding seeking to enforce anti-discrimination provisions that would not otherwise violate the First Amendment.

The basic idea of this provision is simple: if you want to claim a First Amendment right to discriminate, you have to claim it publicly, in advance, so that people who would be denied service can plan accordingly. By creating a master list of discriminators, and by requiring businesses who seek to assert a right to discriminate to prominently display their intent on their storefront, it is far less likely that customers who would end up being excluded will on accident patronize the business.

The law would have some other salutary effects as well. By creating a reasonably comprehensive list of businesses asserting a right to discriminate, the state can learn of the existence of any "dead zones" where members of certain marginalized groups may be severely restricted or entirely unable to obtain services -- data that could be very useful for future legislative action. As reflected in subsection (c), the law also I think would aid in dividing the actual true believers from the opportunists -- I assume that only those who really, truly believe in their discriminatory impulses will be willing to announce in advance to the world "I am a discriminator" (as the 303 Creative plaintiff, to her "credit", was willing to do).

What are some potential drawbacks? One possibility is that it will be assumed that a law like this will enable more businesses to discriminate than otherwise would be licensed to do so by 303 Creative; I wrote subsection(d) to try and forestall that risk. Under this statute, registering a claim for an exemption is just that -- a claim, and the claim does not guarantee success. A business that registered but whose activities were not protected under 303 Creative's umbrella would still be liable, notwithstanding their registration.

Another possible problem is the argument that a law like this itself constitutes compelled speech. On face, the requirement that the business post the "WARNING" placard in its store to me doesn't seem any different than requiring a restaurant to display the health inspection notice. But there might be something different here insofar as the broader thrust of the statute would be to force businesses to "go public" with their intention to discriminate. While there's something instinctively odd about claiming a free expression right to avoid expressing one's deeply-held beliefs, there are circumstances where such a claim makes sense -- NAACP v. Alabama is the obvious template here. Alabama in the 1950s sought to require that the NAACP disclose the names and addresses of its members; the NAACP, unsurprisingly, did not wish to make this information public and claimed a First Amendment right to keep their membership data private. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NAACP (incidentally, NAACP was perhaps unsurprisingly a key precedent relied upon by the Griswold Court regarding the existence of a right to privacy). The NAACP had obviously reasonable fears that disclosure of their membership would render them vulnerable to harassment and violence; the discriminating businesses might claim fears of a similar vulnerability.

NAACP is clearly distinct, however, for a simple reason: the NAACP did not simultaneously seek to keep its "expression" quiet and claim that its expressive activity entitled it to a governmental benefit  (I've always found the Little Sisters of the Poor style claim -- wanting an exemption, but also being outraged at being forced to actually ask for the exemption -- to be utterly ridiculous). With regards to its membership information, the NAACP truly wanted nothing more than to be "let alone"; there was never a circumstance where the organization would wield its membership data as a sword against the state. By contrast, by stipulation the discriminators do wish to go public regarding their beliefs when they tell the state "you can't enforce your anti-discrimination law against me because I believe X". At most, what they want is to be able to hide their beliefs until the last minute. But that's a far less pressing claim -- at some point, the business seeking the right to discriminate will have to go public with its claim, and so it does not seem unreasonable to insist that the pivotal moment occur before an unwitting customer is humiliated and denied service.

And on the subject of harassment: certainly, violence and vandalism are never justified. But often in this context, "harassment" means nothing more than a consumer counter-boycott -- the company refuses to do business with certain groups because of its beliefs; many other consumers decide accordingly that they will no longer patronize the business in protest of that discrimination (ex: the Jewish community members who no longer are purchasing from a Kosher bakery that decided it couldn't bake "pride" treats). That is not harassment, that's counter-speech. And in that register, I'd argue that under 303 Creative's logic enabling customers to know "this business asserts a right to discriminate" is free speech facilitative, not chilling.

One of the virtues of public accommodations law is that it dissipates, under normal circumstances, the inference that basic business transactions are expressive. I very much prefer a world where the bakery that bakes a cupcake for a client isn't seen as sending some sort of message of approval towards the client and the client that eats the baker's treat isn't sending a message of approval toward the baker (beyond "this cupcake is delicious"). That, to me, seems a far more pleasant space to live in than one where every turnip and widget we buy or sell can be taken as some sort of sweeping moral approval for our business partners.

But the Supreme Court did not agree. And once we open the door to saying that ordinary business transactions should be perceived as expressive, then customers as well as businesses have a strong interest in knowing the political and social views of who they're transacting with so they can assure themselves that values align, and can redirect their dollars where they do not. This is one reason I think a consequence of 303 Creative will be to supercharge "cancel culture" -- the more businesses are allowed to say "we don't serve your kind", the more customers must be allowed to say in return "well then we don't buy from your kind". The only thing worse than cancel culture is unidirectional cancel culture. If businesses can "cancel" customers for supporting gay rights, then customers should be equally empowered to cancel businesses for asserting a right to discriminate.

Again, the model language I've written above is rough. But I'm curious what First Amendment scholars and other interested parties think of the idea. We may have to tolerate certain businesses asserting a constitutionally-protected right to discriminate. But customers have rights too. One of those rights is to have confidence that one can walk into a storefront and be served as an equal. Another right is to be able to avoid patronizing businesses who insist they have a deeply held commitment to discriminating against you, your family, or your loved ones. This statute, it seems, can help bring these clashing interests into balance.

Post-Conference Roundup

Last week, approximately 35 speakers (and dozens more guests) came to Lewis & Clark Law School for the 2nd Annual Law vs. Antisemitism conference. It was an event I'd been planning for over a year, and I'm pleased to report it was a rousing success. The panels were scintillating, the conversations crackling, and the two keynotes (by the ADL's Steve Freeman and civil rights activist Eric Ward) blew the doors off the joint. I could not be prouder.

Unfortunately, as the conference approached I could feel myself getting a cold, and so I did that deal-with-the-devil bit where I just willed myself to not be sick for the conference, and my body was like "okay, but you're going to pay for that come Tuesday." So the day after the conference I was sick as a dog. But now I'm mostly better -- just some residual congestation.

Anyway, here's a roundup:

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Haven't seen the clip, but apparently a protester held up a "Jews control the USA" sign on the CNN segment reporting on Trump's indictment today. So that's fun.

Iowa school hit with bomb threats over LGBT book after "LibsOfTikTok" sics her goons on them.

In other "is killing students in school controversial?" news, Nashville students walk out of class to protest for gun reform following the Covenant School shooting.

Also in Tennessee: a federal judge has enjoined the state's new draconian "anti-drag" law as likely violating the First Amendment.

As a now-certified Caitlin Clark fan, it's beyond evident that folks calling Angel Reese "classless" for doing the same mugging that Clark had done all season are, well, they're not hiding the ball. And for what it's worth, there's zero evidence that Clark in any way needs or supports y'all white knighting on her behalf -- I guarantee she can take what she dishes out. (Surely, we can all agree that the only thug on the court yesterday was Kim Mulkey).

Israel looks set to give its resident fascist his own personal state-backed paramilitary squad. What could go wrong? Nothing, because "wrong" implies that the the utterly predictable consequences aren't intended.

A beautiful story of a transwoman recounting "coming out" to her 100 year old grandpa. His memory clearly already is a blessing.

Oh, and I published a new article! "Microaggressions as Negligence" is now out in the Journal of Social Philosophy.

On The Ease of Having Friends With Political Differences

One of the feature creatures of the alt-center scare machine these days has been the alleged unwillingness of "certain" people (read: progressive Gen Z-ers and millennials) to make or keep friendships with persons they disagree with politically. 

That truly awful JILV poll generated stories breathlessly claiming that "two-thirds of progressives and 54 percent of 'very liberal' respondents said they have effectively 'cancelled' a friend or family member because of their political views" (the poll actually asked whether one had "lost a friend, stopped talking to a relative, or grown distant from a colleague because of political opinions or differences?", which is a rather far cry from "effective cancellation", but no matter) is one good example. This column from Samuel Abrams and Pamela Paresky, bemoaning the oversensitivity of college students who don't want to date peers who voted for the opposing 2020 election candidate, is another.

I have to say, I find this line of concern a bit perplexing. As a general matter, it seems incredibly easy for people to make and keep friendships across political difference. For example: this past election those of us who lived in Portland had quite a few ballot issues to vote on, including things like local bond issues, switching from run-off elections to ranked-choice voting, and altering the structure of our city government from a "commissioner" model to multi-member geographically zoned districts. As in all elections, I did my best to research these issues and come to a conclusion on them. But -- while I haven't asked any of my Portland friends or colleagues how they voted on any of these questions -- I can't imagine the possibility of losing relationships if they voted differently than I did. These political differences, it seems, are rather easily overcome by the bonds of friendship.

Now, the trumpeters of the "cancellation" epidemic narrative will surely cry foul here. The political differences they have in mind are not local Portland ballot initiatives; it's pedantic to use them as a falsifying example of the larger "problem". And I agree that these examples are obviously not the cases that someone like Abrams or Paresky or David Bernstein has in mind.

Which means it'd probably be useful to be specific about the actual cases one has in mind.

Consider, for instance, a trans college student. A live political controversy, right now, is whether or not they should have been legally prohibited from getting necessary health care in their teenage years and whether they should have been forcibly ripped away from their parents (who, in turn, should be imprisoned as child abusers) if they tried to provide such treatment. If such a student finds out that one of their "friends" believes that all of that should have happened; and will vote in order to make it more likely that this would happen, can we really say with a straight face that the student is wrong if they sever the friendship? If the friendship is indeed distanced -- and it won't always be, people are complex -- it would be both factually incorrect and uncharitable to the extreme to say that the student has shown an inability to tolerate "political differences", generally. The student surely would not make a similar judgment regarding political differences about the proper top marginal income tax rate. It is a specific "difference" that is beyond the pale for them, and with respect to that specific difference it's hard to say that their judgment isn't reasonable.

There are many classes of vulnerable individuals who face such questions as pertain to live political controversies. Gay and lesbian individuals, who learn a peer "differs" on the subject of whether their marriage should be forcibly dissolved and their very identity re-criminalized and subjected to prison time (both live subjects of political dispute, given emergent threats to Obergefell and Lawrence). If they distance from that relationship, is that really evidence of a broader failure to respect political difference? Undocumented "Dreamer" immigrants, who must reckon with the reality that "I may be torn from the only home I’ve ever known at any moment and a sizeable portion of what I thought was my community will cheer as they drag me off." If they react poorly to that difference, are they really engaging in cancellation?

We are not talking about "political differences" generally. We're talking about a subset of specific differences that pose deep, arguably existential, threats to individuals' lives and well-being. And to the extent there's asymmetry in how often progressives find a live political difference that fall into that category, that might reflect nothing more than an asymmetry in which political camp is overwhelming responsible for that particular type of existentially-threatening "difference." There is not any sustained progressive campaign to make it illegal for, say, Southern Baptists, to get married (and if you are a progressive who does support such a policy, any resulting loss of Southern Baptist friends would be entirely on your head!).

"Not every point of political disagreement can be treated as an existential threat to one's very existence." I could not agree more. Moreover, it seems blatantly obvious that nobody -- even the dreaded progressive Gen-Zers -- thinks otherwise. People have absolutely no problem making and keeping friendships and relationships across political difference, generally. They have a serious problem with certain specific political differences. Those who think that problem, is a problem, should do the courtesy of naming the issues. Then we can assess whether the young woman who was impregnated by rape is wrong to cut ties with the "friend" who says she should be forced to give birth on pain of a prison sentence.

Who's Afraid of Jewish Priorities?

The JTA reported yesterday that the Jewish Federations of North America, the umbrella organization of local Jewish Federations, had removed several prominent issues -- such as gun control, LGBTQ rights, and voting rights -- from its list of "policy priorities". The relevant document now speaks in far vaguer generalities about "policies that ensure justice and equity" and promoting "resources to combat abuse and harassment." Many suspected the change came at the behest of conservative elements in the Jewish community annoyed that our umbrella organizations were tackling issues they view as politically controversial or contested. The document does continue to specifically list "support for Israel" as an ongoing policy priority.

For their part, JFNA officials claimed that the change was meant to permit local federations to be more "nimble" in their approach, and contended that it was "misleading" to suggest it constituted a backtracking on prior commitments to at least LGBTQ and gun control issues. Its decision to speak in terms of more "theme-based priorities" should not be seen as a denigration of the importance of specific issues like guns or gay rights (I actually have not seen, in any of the subsequent commentaries and apologies from JFNA spokespersons, an express mention of voting rights as a continued priority area).

I seem to recall a branch of Jewish public discourse that was positively furious anytime, say, "antisemitism" was left unnamed or held to be subsumed under some generic commitment to "equality". They would call that move "all lives matter-ing" the issue; perhaps we could refer to the JFNA's new approach as one of "all issues matter"? In any event, it seems quite evident that the move away from explicitly naming these issues as priorities is an attempt to decenter them, and that in turn is yet another example of mainstream Jewish organizations kowtowing to right-wing pressure even in the face of an obvious Jewish consensus.

For example, polls indicate that on the matter of guns, Jews have a perfectly robust consensus: 70% favoring a pro-gun control position versus 25% opposed. That 25% figure, incidentally, is about the same as the percentage of Jews who stake out anti-Israel positions that sharply deviate from what JFNA and like organizations would no doubt consider "support for Israel". To be clear, I don't have any objection to the JFNA representing the huge majority of Jews who do care a lot about "support for Israel" over the comparatively small minority that takes the dissident view. But the point is that the "consensus" around the two issues is identical, yet it's no accident which one the JFNA feels comfortable cutting loose. It is part of a long pattern and practice of Jewish communal organizations taking liberal Jews -- the Jewish majority! -- for granted, and thumbing us in the eye as expendable. Our issues can be thrown out, even if they carry huge majority support, based on mewling complaints from the right flank -- a privilege never accorded to liberal Jews objecting to more conservative priority areas.

The issues that JFNA decided they now want to soft-pedal for fear of upsetting delicate conservative feelings are policy arenas which are reaching a crisis point in 2022. After Colleyville and Louisville, can we really say gun violence is no longer a critical area? We're seeing a veritable torrent of state legislative action targeting queer and especially trans youth for ostracism and discrimination, a pattern that has only accelerated over the last year. And of course, on the question of voting rights, following 1/6 and the Supreme Court's laser-like determination to gut the Voting Rights Act, the basic precepts of American democracy may never have been under more direct threat in my lifetime. To deprioritize them now represents an appalling abdication of duty.

The broad point is this: when the JFNA decides to decenter and soft play issues like gun control and voting rights, they are not acting to promote "Jewish priorities". They are afraid of "Jewish priorities". They think "Jewish priorities" are too partisan, too controversial -- frankly, too liberal -- to fit within their comfort level. And so they make the decision to jettison them. That's them selling out the very people they purport to represent. It's outrageous, and they deserve every bit of blowback they've gotten over this.

I wrote a somewhat ... pointed ... email to my contacts at the Portland JFed making these points, and both urging that the local organization continue to be clear it will work in these policy arenas and communicating to the national office that it cannot keep selling out the liberal Jewish majority like this. I received a perfectly nice note back confirming that our local JCRC has and will continue to advocate in all of these areas (though demurring on calling out the national body). But it is important to keep the heat on (and I think it's notable that the JFNA clearly did feel some heat and responded somewhat defensively). These organizations have to come to understand that "Jewish consensus" is not "when the right agrees with the center".

UPDATE: The JFNA has released a new document which adds back in many of these priorities. One can still quibble with the details, and be annoyed at their initial skittishness, but it is a good thing they both felt and were responsive to community pressure on this axis.

Should I PlagueWatch It?: Gentleman Jack

I remember seeing ads for Gentleman Jack when Game of Thrones was ending, and being intrigued. The show is about the real-life Anne Lister, and 18th century British landowner who dressed in masculine clothes and lived relatively openly as a lesbian and is often cited as participating in England's first (non-legally sanctioned) same-sex marriage to her partner Ann Walker.

But I never did see it then, and it was only the rapidly dwindling stockpile of television brought upon by the lockdown that finally caused me to watch it (seriously: I think I've seen every good episode of Community -- which is most of them -- at least a dozen times at this point). Should you join me? Some quick thoughts to help you decide:

• The early episodes (and, as I recall, the advertising), leans pretty hard into a "she's a badass landlady! Look at her collecting rents from the tenants without mercy or tolerating any nonsense!" framing. This is a bit odd to watch in the present political moment.
• It is a sign of how far we've come as a society that this series could even be made -- not because it features a lesbian relationship, but because even ten years ago I think it would've been seen as homophobic the way that she "recruits" (she may even use the word) Ann Walker to be her lover.
• Yes, the two characters are named Anne and Ann. It's not that confusing. Usually. But keeping all the other side characters straight is a nearly impossible endeavor.
• My reaction towards Ann Walker generally took the following arc, occurring over two episode cycles: "Damn, that woman is messed up." "Oh wow, she's had a really tragic life though." "But damn that woman is messed up!" "Oh my gosh, there's just an endless reservoir of tragedy for her isn't there?"
• The show also features Gemma Whelan, aka Yara Greyjoy, as Anne's far more conventionally feminine sister Marian. It's very interesting to see Whelan play a character that is about as far from Yara as possible. But the show does something I very much like in resisting the cliched juxtaposition of the liberated, modern Anne against the straightlaced, intolerant, conservative Marian. They clearly have a somewhat antagonistic relationship, but it seems to have almost nothing to do with Anne's sexuality. Moreover, it is made evident at various points that Marian is in many respects more liberal than her sister -- particularly with regards to class issues and respectful treatment of servants. In all, Anne's family is shown to be pretty well accepting of her.
• My head canon is that this show is the prequel to Downton Abbey, and I refuse to be dissuaded on the point.

Jill and I are a sucker for a good period drama, preferably one without gratuitous violence, and Gentleman Jack scratches that itch. Is it transcendent? No. But it's worth a watch if you're into the genre.

After Bostock, Was It All Worth It?

It's been interesting to watch conservative reactions to the Bostock decision (holding that Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination encompasses anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination, because that discrimination necessarily is also "because of" sex). Some of the usual suspects have been relatively muted -- likely because the outcome the Court reached is actually overwhelmingly popular. But there certainly are some on the right who are very upset. Josh Blackman collects anonymous examples here. Right-wing commentator Josh Hammer urges conservative judges to abandon procedural legal reasoning entirely in favor of an unabashed substantive commitment to social conservative principles. Senator Josh Hawley claimed the decision represents "the end of the conservative legal movement."

It's more than just Joshes, of course. And the theme of this critique is, as Hawley alludes to, the question of whether it was all worth it. The claim is that social conservatives, at least, have been holding their noses and voting Republican for years because "the judiciary". But if the conservative judiciary gives them results like these, is the bargain really worth it? The murmur is that after Bostock, the jig is up, and conservatives will no longer come out to support a GOP whose judges have betrayed them.

If you're a liberal reading this, it's rather striking. The undisguised insistence that judges should vote in alignment with conservative policy objections (up to and including explicitly disavowing neutral legal proceduralism!) is amazing to see -- less because of the content and more because it's being said out loud. But more incredible is the idea that this Supreme Court has represented anything less than a massive triumph for contentious right-wing causes. The Court of Citizens United, of Trump v. Hawaii, of Hobby Lobby, of Janus, of Masterpiece Cakeshop -- none of that registers? Is it really everything or nothing?

I, of course, heartily encourage social conservatives to adopt this reasoning and decide it's not at all worth it. Rise up by sitting down, and showing the Republican Party what's what! But that's because it's obviously self-serving for me: the result of social conservatives staying home and fuming because the Supreme Court only backs them 80% of the time instead of 100% of the time is, in five or ten years, a Supreme Court that backs them 40% of the time.

Indeed, the most important lesson liberals could learn from watching, agape, the social conservative reaction is "if this strategy looks ridiculous to you coming from the right, it's equally farcical when it's threatened from the left." You don't win by staying home, and you're not playing hardball when you insist on everything.

Partial Expression and Anti-Discrimination Law

Today, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, by a 2-1 vote (Judges Stras and Shepherd in the majority, with Judge Kelly dissenting), held that it was unconstitutional to apply Minnesota's anti-discrimination statute (which covers sexual orientation discrimination) to a videography company that wanted to get into the wedding video business but objected to filming gay weddings. Insofar as the statute required the videography company to treat same-sex and opposite-sex marriages alike (i.e., film both of them), it violated the videographer's free speech rights, since it effectively compelled them to express favorable attitudes towards same-sex marriages (which they in fact object to on religious grounds).

In the context of anti-BDS law debates and others, I've been writing a fair bit about how cases like this well-illustrate why liberals should be wary about endorsing sweeping interpretations of the First Amendment as conflicting with (and trumping) anti-discrimination claims. As "First Amendment Lochnerism" swells in influence, there is more and more of a risk of huge swaths of anti-discrimination law being struck down as unlawful discrimination. After all, anti-discrimination law inherently asks that people associate with those they'd rather not associate with, and implicitly register their approval of social relations they might not approve of. If this is interpreted as an affront to their free speech rights, then anti-discrimination law as a whole is in mortal peril.

That said, it is clearly the case that there are genuine and nettlesome free speech problems that can emerge in cases like this. And I do not think they can be ignored just because the plaintiff is engaged in for-profit work. Movie-making is, after all, often a for-profit business, yet it would be catastrophic if the government could say therefore there is no free speech rights available to directors or screen-writers in the content of their creations.

So -- are wedding videographers or photographers different? And if so, how?

The core distinction the majority seems to rely upon is that between "expressive" and "non-expressive" activity. Something like making a movie is an expressive act. It is artistic, it requires editorial judgment, it is the creation of art. Movies are thought of as a reflection of a creator's expressive vision; a medium for them to transmit a particular thought or view about a slice of the world. Contrast that to serving food at a restaurant: this is not typically thought of as a means of sending a message. Compelling someone to make a movie they don't want to make would do violence to their First Amendment rights. Compelling someone to serve food to someone they don't want to feed would not.

To be sure, all activity can be "expressive" in some sense -- for example, a bigot might say that requiring him to serve a black customer at his restaurant implicitly expresses the view that the customer is his equal and worthy of service. But the idea behind the distinction is that most people do not typically view the act of serving food at a restaurant to be expressive, and so requiring restaurants to serve customers in a non-discriminatory fashion doesn't burden speech even if it "incidentally" has certain expressive feature (like "I'm willing to serve this customer").

The court concluded that making a wedding video is an expressive activity. The videographers, in their words, use their "unique skill[s] to identify and tell compelling stories through video." "They exercise creative control over the videos they produce and make 'editorial judgments' about 'what events to take on, what video content to use, what audio content to use, what text to use . . . , the order in which to present content, [and] whether to use voiceovers.'" This is all quintessentially expressive in nature, and so compelling a business to effectively "editorialize" in favor of a wedding they disapprove of is a First Amendment violation -- it forces them to directly, not incidentally, express thoughts they disavow.

There's some force to this. But something about it kept nagging at me, and I was trying to nail down what it was. Here's my best stab at it:

Nobody hires a wedding photographer or videographer for the purpose of expressing their genuine views about the wedding. Their job is to make the bride and groom, and their special day, look and feel great. For all I know, our photographer showed up to our wedding and thought that the decor was tacky and that Jill and I were a disaster for each other and that the Jewishness of it all was an offense to God. But of course, he didn't express any of those views, even in his "expressive" photographs. That's not his job, and he knows it, and everyone who sees his photographs knows it too. The flip side is that, when people look at our (lovely) wedding photographs, nobody says "wow -- your wedding photographer must have really thought your wedding was beautiful" (let alone "he must have really approved of your wedding").

A wedding photographer does engage in expression -- but only partially. There are expressive elements to what our wedding photographer did, that can be directly imputed to him: the virtuosity of a shot, or the way he used lighting, for instance. But note the contrast: if I look at my wedding photos, I do impute to the photographer artistic decisions about the staging of the shot, but I don't impute to him views about the merits of the wedding itself. Photography is expressive, but in this case not comprehensively so. It is, we might say, "partially" expressive, and it seems reasonable to say that First Amendment protections only extend to the part of the expression that reasonably, not incidentally, is imputable to the author of the speech.

Compare this to the words spoken by a wedding officiant. When she delivers remarks at the altar, most listeners would reasonably take them to be an expression of her own views -- if she says "you two make a great couple", that is (with perhaps some latitude for puffery) her own expressive view on the matter. And so if she was uncomfortable speaking positive words about any particular marriage (for religious reasons or otherwise), it would be wrong to compel her to do so.

But the distinction isn't between visual and verbal or textual mediums. On the one hand, a movie (as in one shown at the theater), is fairly thought to represent the vision and expression of the directors (and actors and screenwriters, perhaps collectively) "all the way down" -- not just in terms of technical attributes like how to frame a given scene, but also in terms of the message being communicated. If a documentary filmmaker presents a given subject in a positive light, that's generally imputed to the filmmaker -- they think positively of the subject -- in a way that doesn't track for a wedding videographer.

And on the other hand, if a restaurant serves a dessert that says "happy birthday!" on it (i.e., writes a text), nobody thinks that the chef is actually doing so to express his or her substantive views on the merits of your birthday (I hate to burst anyone's bubble here). That's true even though there may well be expressive elements to the dessert that I do attribute directly to the chef. If I see a beautifully designed cake that says "happy birthday" on it, I view the chef-qua-chef as expressing his or her own message in the design far more than I do in the "happy birthday".

So it's not enough to draw an expressive versus non-expressive distinction. I agree that making a wedding video is expressive, but I disagree that (under normal circumstances) it is expressive as to the merits of the wedding. Along that dimension, the videographer's implicit "endorsement" of the same-sex wedding they film stands on identical footing to the restaurateur's implicit "endorsement" of racial equality with regard to the Black customer they serve. In both cases, it is incidental, and so in neither case should it significant weight.

Indeed, it cannot be the case that any expressive component in a business transaction sufficed to render it entirely expressive and therefore wholly insulated from regulation under the First Amendment. Even in the food service example -- which we've relied upon as our easy case -- very much can incorporate an expressive dimension, for example, in decisions on plating, interpretations of dishes, and so on. A restaurant can say, accurately, that it exercises "editorial discretion" on these matters, and so could potentially have a First Amendment difference if the state tried to regulate its "editorializing" in these domains (I say "potentially" because while a state law which seeks to declare how a veal marsala must be plated would assuredly fail under the First Amendment, one which insists that a "veal marsala" must contain veal -- "interpretation" notwithstanding -- could at least feasibly survive). But surely the expression here is confined to that domain, and it does not mean that the choice in who the restaurant serves is now expressive as well.

Put (sort of) simply, the question is not whether the conduct has any expressive character. It's whether the expressive character of the conduct is what generates the allegedly compelled speech. If it doesn't, then the fact that a given piece of expressive conduct also comes attached to an implicit endorsement of a view that speaker disapproves of is incidental, in the same way that it is incidental where the conduct is not expressive at all.

I don't pretend that I've just offered a simple, knockdown solution to one of constitutional law's thorniest dilemmas. But I do think we live in an era where wildly expansive understandings of the First Amendment are being wielded as a weapon against huge swaths of the regulatory state, and anti-discrimination law is one of the most inviting targets. We need to start thinking more carefully about limiting principles, lest virtually all discrimination become enshrined with constitutional protection.

New Developments in the Right To Discriminate

A new survey measures people's attitudes towards businesses discriminating against various types of customers -- gays and lesbians, transgender individuals, atheists Muslims, Jews, and African-Americans. There are some really interesting takeaways.

• Republicans are -- across the board -- more likely to favor permitting discrimination than Democrats or Independents. This is true across all customer-identities.

• However, Republicans also exhibit considerably more variance across different groups -- tolerating discrimination against certain sorts far more than others. At the top end, circa 45% favor permitting discrimination against gay, lesbian, and trans individuals. At the bottom, only 18% favor it when it comes to African-Americans. Meanwhile, Democrats never stray out of a tight 14% - 19% band for any group -- suggesting a cadre that (perhaps for some libertarian freedom-of-contract reason) supports the "right to discriminate" on principle.

• Given the recent high-profile controversies about businesses serving gay customers and the extent to which GOP politicians have sought to make it into a culture war front (ex: Indiana, Masterpiece Cakeshop), I wonder if the commitment to the right to discriminate against LGBT individuals is having the effect of "dragging up" GOP support for a similar right as against other groups -- people believing that if they don't support a "right to discriminate" against Jews, then there can't be a right to discriminate against gays either. This hypothesis, however, clashes with the willingness of many Republicans (noted above) to just happily accept the double-standard.

• That said, again given the degree to which the GOP has sought to put the right to discriminate against LGBT customers into the news, I'm actually shocked that the figures here are so low. Again, we're talking (slightly) less than half of Republican voters, and less than a third of Americans total. There's actually a pretty strong bipartisan consensus against the position GOP politicians have been staking out.

• In the religion-bowl, Atheists are disliked more than Muslims are disliked more than Jews. The difference is very stark among Republicans (37% support a "right to discriminate" against Atheists, 32% against Muslims, 24% against Jews) but much narrower among the population writ large (24/22/19, respectively).

L'Étoile du Nord Roundup

Greetings from Owatonna, Minnesota. I'm here at my in-laws house in the interregnum between a family wedding on the north shore last weekend and a Carleton Reunion next weekend. The former represented my first trek to the far north of Minnesota, and it was truly gorgeous -- really embodying my favorite type of nature (to wit: very green and very forested).

* * *

Everybody seems to hate the "electability" argument for Joe Biden, but Kevin Drum asks whether anyone is actually making it. My hypothesis is that Biden's stance atop the polls baffles a lot of political observers -- how is he so seemingly popular with Democratic primary electorate, given his many weaknesses -- and so they infer that many of his supporters back him reluctantly as the safe, "electable" choice (for my part, I think it's still name-recognition, and he'll fade as the primary season moves forward).

Corey Robin has interesting-looking book coming out on Clarence Thomas as an Afro-Pessimist -- an outlook which very much coheres with my own.

Fascinating dialogue between Yossi Klein Halevi, author of "‘Letters to My Palestinian Neighbor," and Mohammed Dajani, who decided to respond. It's long but very much worth your time.

Jonathan Adler tracks some non-standard splits in the recent SCOTUS decisions and wonders if a new "pragmatist" axis is emerging.

Lest we were worried that the DC Dyke March's ban on Jewish Pride flags was the start of a trend -- looks like that isn't happening. Most Dyke Marches around the nation are not following their lead.

Botswana Court Decriminalizes Homosexuality

The law, a relic of British colonialism which carried a prison sentence of up to seven years, was tossed by the high court as a violation of the dignity, privacy, equality, and liberty to gay and lesbian:

"A democratic society is one that embraces tolerance, diversity and open-mindedness," Justice Michael Leburu said, according to CNN. Discussing the broad costs of discrimination, he added, "Societal inclusion is central to ending poverty and fostering shared prosperity."

Botswana is Africa's oldest continuous democracy.

The Role of Jewish Activists at the DC Dyke March

One thing that's been bandied about in the controversy about the DC Dyke March's decision to ban Jewish Pride flags (for being allegedly too similar to an Israeli flag) is the role that Jewish members of the DCDM played in proposing the policy, defending it public, and later in enforcing it, as part of the group of bouncers seeking to keep Jewish counterprotesters outside of the event.

But "role" is a vague term, and I'm curious about the specifics. Specifically, I can imagine three potential roles the Jewish members could have played in bringing about the Jewish Pride flag policy.

1. The policy banning Jewish Pride flags was proposed by other members, and the Jewish members agreed to it, ratified it, or otherwise signaled it was permissible.
2. Some policy regarding Jewish symbols was proposed by other members, and the Jewish members modified or modulated it -- possibly to make it more limited (i.e., initially it was a ban on all Jewish symbols), or possibly to make it more expansive (i.e. initially it was solely a ban on the Israeli flag, as such).
3. The Jewish members proposed this policy sua sponte -- it was their idea to have a policy whereby Jewish Pride flags were banned; DCDM wasn't really considering having a policy regarding Jewish Pride flags until the Jewish members brought it up.

In all of these, to one extent or another, the Jewish members might be thought of as having "set up" the DCDM, at least to the extent they presented the policy as a valid compromise that would be viewed as permissible within the Jewish community when anyone could have known it would provoke a furious backlash. But in some they have considerably more agency than others.

On that note, though, the third possibility -- or the "more expansive" iteration of the second -- is the most interesting, because it raises the possibility that the DCDM as a whole viewed itself as deferring to its Jewish members and might have even been taken aback by the strength of the broader communal response. That's hard to process because it's so obvious to us the way in which a policy like this is harmful to Jews, polices Jews, and gatekeeps Jews. But I have to remind myself that most non-Jews don't know that much about Jews, and in particular don't know enough to necessarily realize that the Jews in their little circle who are assuring them "this is fine, this is okay, if anyone gets upset it's just the usual right-wing rabble-rousers" aren't actually representative.

And likewise, remembering that Jews generally pay more attention to Jewish issues than non-Jews means the Jewish DCDM members were among the most likely to have vivid memories of Chicago, and most likely to have strong opinions about what the Jewish Pride flag represents. It strikes me as entirely plausible that they leveraged their "insider knowledge" to present a narrative where this flag was the banner of the infiltrators and the pinkwashers -- a threat that they knew of and were doing the service of warning DCDM about in advance. From their vantage, they were dissipating a threat to Palestinian or Arab safety at the march that otherwise might have gone unnoticed -- like someone who knows a subtle "insider" gesture of White supremacy that, precisely because of its superficial banality, can normally be made in public settings without challenge.

Or maybe not. The Jewish members could have been in reactive role, agreeing with a proposal made by others, and had little to do with placing this issue on their agenda. Most obviously, this could have been a position spearheaded by Palestinian members (or people who identify strongly as "pro-Palestinian" -- though the latter group, of course, overlaps significantly with the Jewish members). As I said, the particular role that the Jewish members played in promulgating this policy is opaque -- other than that they stood (literally) on the front lines to defend it.

But I don't think that it's implausible that their role was a relatively active one -- that at least in part this happened because they wanted it to happen. It is an interesting fact about what I call "dissident minorities" that they often have a material interest in not making the spaces they occupy inclusive to the broader membership of their minority group. A DCDM where more Jews feel comfortable marching is a DCDM where these Jews, in particular, are less influential and less powerful. And so, far from being the brake that prevents the space from going to far, often times they're the accelerator pushing it forward and the bouncers standing between their "compatriots" at the entrance (as was quite literally the case here).

So it's reasonable to wonder if that's what was going on here -- anti-Zionist Jews, in a sense, egging the march on, trying to maneuver it into an antagonistic position towards the broader Jewish community while simultaneously using their own identities to ratify the legitimacy of the posture.

The Constructed Semiotics of Flags

Some Jews are uncomfortable when they see a Palestinian flag.

For some, that's due to naught but raw prejudice.

But there are some Jews -- queer and not -- who have directly experienced violence, harassment, displacement, and even death that has occurred under the auspices of the Palestinian flag, whether literally or, as a stand-in for anti-Zionism, symbolically.

For these Jews, I can imagine how seeing a Palestinian flag might be triggering or traumatic. They see people wave it, and they interpret it as a threat.

And to them, in the interest of sensitivity, I have a simple message:

Suck it up.

I'm not saying your trauma isn't real. But the Palestinian flag is much more than, and means much more than, your particular narrow experience, and there isn't any justifiable way to ban Palestinian flags in deference to these "sensitivities" that is compatible with allowing Palestinians to take pride in their identity and peoplehood. So suck it up.

This, of course, is also my posture towards those who see a Magen David and can only imagine it as a symbol of Israeli state repression. It's not that these associations aren't real. But they also by no means represent the totality of what the Magen David represents, and allowing this particular and narrow interpretation of the symbol to occupy the entire field is incompatible with allowing Jews to take pride in our identity and peoplehood. So suck it up.

The point is, we can say that these negative meanings are extant and say there is no need to privilege this particular, negative interpretation. And so one of the great sins of the DC Dyke March's position on the Jewish Pride flag is that it helps construct and bolster a semiotic meaning of the Jewish Star of David and the Jewish Pride flag as a form of aggression against Palestinians and Arabs. I'm not saying that potential meaning was wholly absent before -- obviously, there are people who really have experienced violence, harassment, displacement, and death under (literally or symbolically) a Magen David.

But in privileging that semiotic interpretation, the DC Dyke March enhances its power. It makes it so that more people are more likely to see this flag as more intensely expressing that message. And it won't just be in the eyes of the beholder. No doubt some people who bring a Star of David pride flag to a LGBT rally now do so not simply to express Jewish Pride, but also as a point of defiance -- "you hate this flag? Well nyah nyah nyah."

In a sense, it's like that time a Texas Republican put out an Israeli flag on her desk to ward off Muslim community members coming to visit her office. The sheer pettiness of the action -- as if an Israeli flag scatters Muslims like Vampires and the cross -- masked a deeper evil: the politician, by using the Israeli flag in this way, was constructing a meaning of the flag where one of its uses is to signal "I don't want Muslims to be comfortable here". That's terrible. But it is not, at the end of the day, much different from what the DC Dyke March is doing -- entrenching and congealing a meaning of the Jewish Pride flag whereby its symbolism is "aggression towards Muslims, Palestinians, and Arabs."

And as it generates this semiotic meaning for the Magen David, it does something similar to the semiotic meaning of a Palestinian flag. It bolsters its symbolic meaning as a gesture of defiance against the Jews, against those who would proudly carry a Star of David. If -- as I suspect is likely -- more Dyke Marchers carried Palestinian flags upon hearing that Jewish marchers were going to insist on carrying a Jewish Pride flag, part of the reason they're doing so is to communicate this reactive, aggressive posture: "You're coming in, with that flag? Well I've got my own flag for you right here!" Again, it's not that these meanings were wholly absent before. But actions like that taken by the DC Dyke March help congeal and entrench them, they create a world where they may well be the primary meaning -- and that's destructive.

Each time this happens, this antagonistic, deleterious meaning gets further amplified, and so each time it becomes harder and harder to say "suck it up".

But that's all the more reason why we have to hold the line now. The more controversies we have like the DC Dyke March, the more difficult it will be to ever extract ourselves and our symbols from these horrible semiotics.

It Wasn't a Bomb Roundup

Unbelievably, this package -- which randomly arrived at the offices of The Jewish Daily Forward for me (I do not work at the Forward, for the record) -- didn't contain a bomb. The truth was actually weirder -- it was (eight copies of) a pamphlet on Jews, marijuana, and prostitution, given to "strengthin [sic] you and your friends."

What a weird world we live in sometimes.

* * *

The Tarrant County, Texas GOP prepares to vote on whether to remove a party official for that most heinous crime of ... being Muslim. Tarrant County is not some tiny speck -- it's where Fort Worth is.

Two Black men have turned up dead in the house of a prominent California Democratic Party donor -- another man who was hired to do drugs and sexual activity shares his story.

Carly Pildis has an insightful column on how to tighten synagogue security while recognizing that a police presence won't necessarily make all congregants feel safe (picking up on a conversation Bentley Addison helped start last November).

Tema Smith has a good essay in the Forward on the history of Jewish Whiteness in America.

Andrew Silow-Carroll does an excellent job parsing the issue of Rep. Rashida Tlaib's "dual loyalty" insinuation from a few days ago.

An ADL staffer reports on a recent interfaith trip he organized with African-American pastors to Israel and the Palestinian territories. Though I think the term "Third Narrative" has already been taken.

The Chronicle of Higher Education reports on the outcome of a significant sexual harassment investigation involving a Michigan State political scientist (though -- lawyer's tic -- the article is incorrect to say that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard used in the investigation wouldn't be used in court. "Preponderance of the evidence" is the normal standard used in non-criminal judicial proceeding).

Senator Kamala Harris comes out in favor of legalizing marijuana and expunging the convictions of non-violent offenders.

And, to complete the "not a bomb" circuit, a Berkeley man was arrested after leaving a fake bomb laced with antisemitic slurs on the UC-Berkeley campus

The Tide Never Goes Out Roundup

I've been relying on roundups more than I'd like recently, but that's the way it goes sometimes.

* * *

Potential blockbuster lawsuit by a former top staffer accuses ZOA chieftain Mort Klein of massive financial improprieties. I don't think I can even cover this story I want it to be true so badly.

Chris LeBron reviews Charles Mills on American liberalism and race.

Robin DiAngelo's article on "White Fragility" has been making the rounds forever (and nearly from the moment I've read it I've wanted to write about "Gentile Fragility"), but now she's turned it into a book.

First explicitly joint Jewish-Arab pride event in Israel held in the city of Lod.

Labour continues its aggressive campaign against antisemitism .... reporters. Meanwhile, another Labour Councilor suggests that the entire antisemitism controversy is a Mossad plot to undermine Corbyn, while Corbyn himself (in 2012 comments) went on Iranian State TV to suggest that a terrorist attack on Egyptian police was actually an Israeli false flag ("I suspect the hand of Israel in this whole process of destabilisation" could, at this point, be Labour's motto). But they did suspend their "Jews are blood-drinkers and should be executed" Councilor, so there's that.

Any time I read one of these "I'm a conservative professor and my students refuse to read any White Male author" screeds, all I think is "Really? Because my students never give me a fuss about reading those same authors you listed. Maybe you're just terrible at teaching?"

On the Necessity of Debating Discrimination

The gods of the internet displayed their sense of humor today. Just as an article titled "Is Anti-Semitism the Only Bigotry That’s Subject to Debate?" crossed my twitter feed, I received an email invite to the Cato Institute's "The First Amendment vs. Anti-Discrimination Law: A Preview of Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission on the Eve of Oral Argument" event (featuring a Cato speaker up against an NAACP appellate litigator).

When it comes to Jews' comparative status as a marginalized group, there seem to be two dueling schools of thought -- completely opposite, yet seemingly unaware of the other's existence. The first will look at a wrong done to Jews and say "they would never say that about any other group." The second will look at a wrong done to someone else and say "they would never say that about Jews." Jews either stand in for perfect protection or unique vulnerability.

Both sides are wrong of course. They would say it about Jews; they'd say it about other groups too. We could all use a dose of humility regarding the pane of glass we cannot see.

The proximate argument, about whether we should "debate anti-Semitism", comes from the fall-out from a left-wing panel at the New School (including several JVP bigwigs and Linda Sarsour) discussing antisemitism, and the university's offer to have Tablet Magazine organize its own panel to provide an alternate perspective (Tablet spurned the offer in sharp terms).

Clearly, at least some of the sturm und drang here stems from a pretty naked obfuscation about what it means to have a "debate" on anti-Semitism. Obviously, debating "is anti-Semitism bad" would be offensive. But it's absolutely necessary to debate "what is anti-Semitism -- what is its definition, what are its contours, what effects does it have, what falls in and out of its ambit?"

The latter form of debate is obviously perfectly valid -- I do it all the time. And, it should be unnecessary to add, such debates are had about other forms of bigotry all the time. We know this precisely because sometimes we do see attempts to suppress such debates under the guise that even recognizing the existence of a debate is tantamount to justifying the bigotry itself. And I'm hardly confident about how certain issues of importance to the Jewish community will fare if we are too quick to run to "even having a debate with the likes of you legitimizes bigotry."

From my vantage, we live in a world where a great many people have the wrong idea about "what is anti-Semitism" (and, for that matter, "what is racism", "what is sexism", "what is transphobia", and so on). Consequently, I want people to change their perspective on those issues -- and a great way to do that is by having and promoting debates and discussion. It strikes me as a spectacularly misconceived appraisal of the status quo vantage to think that people's default assumptions about anti-Semitism -- formed without debate, discussion, or deliberation -- are well-formed and in-line with what we take to be necessary to facilitate Jewish equality in social and political life.

Not Knowing "Zio" is a Slur is an Indictment, Not a Defense

The Chicago Dyke March, an alternative to Chicago Pride that is meant to have a more "social justice" orientation, caught a heap of bad press when it expelled several Jewish marchers for carrying rainbow Jewish pride flags featuring a Star of David on them. The march has defiantly resisted any and all calls to apologize, and insisted that it was only being "critical of Israel" (isn't everything?).

Yesterday, it popped back into the antisemitism news beat by posting a tweet: "Zio tears replenish my electrolytes!" "Zio" is an antisemitic slur popularized by David Duke; even the milquetoast Chakrabarti Inquiry into antisemitism in Labour agreed it was a racist term (and St. Jeremy Corbyn himself agreed: "'Zio' is a vile epithet that follows in a long line of earlier such terms that have no place whatsoever in our party.").

The March is defending itself from renewed antisemitism allegations by saying it "Definitely didn't know the violent history of the term."

They mean this as a defense. It's actually an indictment. Let me explain why.

I'll accept, for sake of argument, that the Chicago Dyke March did not "know" the term "Zio" was antisemitic. Nonetheless, the March almost certainly did not stumble across the term "Zio" by accident. It got it from somewhere, from sources it felt confident enough in that it felt comfortable emulating. In other words, one of the ways the Chicago Dyke March learned to speak about matters of Jewish concern was from people who think it is okay to toss around terms like "Zio." The odds that everything else it learned about those matters from this same social network was magically uninfected by this obvious antisemitism is incredibly scant. It's the thirteenth (or in this case fourteenth, or fifteenth, or seventieth) chime that calls into question the other twelve.

There are many places in this country where people grow up hearing racial slurs that they don't "know" are derogatory -- they're "just what people say." When they move into the wider world and use such terms, they sometimes claim ignorance -- and in some sense, they might be right. But the implication of their apologia is that not that they are free from racism -- far from it. It's that they grew up in an environment where racism was so normalized that they didn't even know how to recognize it. Such a situation demands some very hard work of unlearning, of radically questioning one's own presuppositions and acknowledging that one needs to acquire substantial new information before one can feel confident in one's ability to relate to the other group in an ethical manner.

But let's give the Dyke March even further benefit of the doubt. Suppose they somehow magically stumbled upon "Zio" through entirely innocent means -- nobody in their social network was using it, they came up with it all by their creative selves. Even still, all that would demonstrate is that they don't know crucial information about a subject they nonetheless feel fully confident to opine on. Put another way, if they didn't "know" that "Zio" was antisemitic, shouldn't the next question be "what else don't we know?"

I've long thought that the heart of oppression as a discursive practice is a perceived entitlement to talk about a group without knowing about the group. The Chicago Dyke March pleads ignorance about Jews and antisemitism, but that ignorance in no way dissipates their belief that they are absolutely entitled to talk about Jews and Jewish institutions however they want and be treated as credible and legitimate entrants to the discussion. It's not a valid move. If you don't know enough about Jews or antisemitism to know that "Zio" is an antisemitic term, then you don't know enough to be confident that any of your other opinions about Jews or antisemitism are worthwhile.

The Dyke March, in short, wants the innocence of ignorance without the responsibility. It wants to be able to say, on the one hand, "we didn't know that this term we used was a prominent antisemitic slur", while on the other hand it equally wants to say "we do know that in all other cases everything else we've said or done vis-a-vis Jews is entirely above-board and not antisemitic." They can only have the first if they're willing to disturb the second.

That's Funny, This Story About Anti-Semitism Keeps Repeating Itself

One more post on the expulsion of Jewish marchers carrying a rainbow flag with a Star of David on it from a "Dyke March" in Chicago. In a statement, the March organizers defended their actions, in part, by saying that the Jews in question "repeatedly expressed support for Zionism during conversations with Chicago Dyke March Collective members." On this, I could not agree more with Jaz Twersky:

It is not reasonable or fair to interrogate every Jew about their views on Israel just because they're Jewish https://t.co/9wpaSvo2Rv

— Jaz Twersky (@WordNerdKnitter) June 25, 2017

But this also made me think of a passage from Steve Cohen's seminal "That's Funny, You Don't Look Anti-Semitic." (this is from the 2005 introduction, recounting reactions to the original publication in 1984):

That's Funny You Don't Look Anti-Semitic did create ripples. It managed to split the JSG [Jewish Socialist Group] whose then dominant leadership thought it might offend the Socialist Workers Party. It resulted in some pretty dreadful correspondence over many weeks in journals like Searchlight and Peace News. A pamphlet was written denouncing me as a "criminal".  

There was a particular review—in Searchlight—one sentence of which I will never forget. Every Jew on the left will know that terrible syndrome whereby, whatever the context and wherever one is, we will be tested by being given the question "what is your position on Zionism?" Wanna support the miners—what's your position on Zionism? Against the bomb—what's your position on Zionism? And want to join our march against the eradication of Baghdad, in particular the eradication of Baghdad—what's your position on Zionism? And we all know what answer is expected in order to pass the test. It is a very strong form of anti-Semitism based on assumptions of collective responsibility. Denounce Zionism, crawl in the gutter, wear a yellow star and we'll let you in the club. Which is one reason why I call myself an Anti-Zionist Zionist—at least that should confuse the bastards.  

Anyhow this particular review, noting that my book actually did attack Zionism, said "It is not enough to trot out platitudes, as he does, about being against Zionism and in support of the Palestinian struggle". So I'm not allowed into the club even though I fulfil the entry requirements. I'm not allowed in because I recognise and oppose the existence of anti-Semitism on the Left—and this therefore renders all support for Palestinians a "platitude". Well it ain't me who's here confusing anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism.

Wanna support the miners--what's your position on Zionism? Want to be a gay person--what's your position on Zionism? There's nothing new under the sun here. The story didn't change from 1984 to 2005, and it didn't change from 2005 to 2017.

As should be obvious, I don't think one should have to "attack Zionism" to be part of the club (though I've always loved Cohen's "Anti-Zionist Zionist" descriptor -- "that should confuse the bastards" indeed!). The point, rather, is that the Zionism or anti-Zionism rarely is the point. The point is the tight regulation of Jewish political activities, under which Jewish access to progressive political spaces is always provisional. Having a Star of David shouldn't be a license for an interrogation on one's views about Zionism, and if the issue does come up Jews should not have to engage in ritual self-abasement to pass the test. When those requirements are in play -- and for Jews, they're always in play -- antisemitism is alive and well.