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Representation and Reality
Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. Putnam argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality, and knowledge that lie at the heart of the philosophy of mind.
"Representation and Reality is one of the most thorough and careful criticisms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind that we have yet seen, and all future discussions of the computerhuman analogy will have to take account of it." --Richard Rorty, University of Virginia
"This clear, powerfully argued, and thoroughly accessible book is fascinating, and no one with a serious interest in the philosophy of mind or the philosophy of language can afford not to study it." --Stephen Schiffer, City University of New York
Hilary Putnam is Walter Beverly Pearson Professor of Mathematical Logic at Harvard University.
"Representation and Reality is one of the most thorough and careful criticisms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind that we have yet seen, and all future discussions of the computerhuman analogy will have to take account of it." --Richard Rorty, University of Virginia
"This clear, powerfully argued, and thoroughly accessible book is fascinating, and no one with a serious interest in the philosophy of mind or the philosophy of language can afford not to study it." --Stephen Schiffer, City University of New York
Hilary Putnam is Walter Beverly Pearson Professor of Mathematical Logic at Harvard University.
136 pages, Paperback
First published August 1, 1988
About the author
Hilary Putnam
115 books127 followersHilary Whitehall Putnam was an American philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist who was a central figure in analytic philosophy from the 1960s until his death, especially in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of science. He was known for his willingness to apply an equal degree of scrutiny to his own philosophical positions as to those of others, subjecting each position to rigorous analysis until he exposed its flaws. As a result, he acquired a reputation for frequently changing his own position. Putnam was Cogan University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
March 31, 2022
A critique on functionalism as a model of how the mind works.
This is a short philosophical text that argues we cannot assume there is anything like a "common mental representation" for ideas that is consistent between people, then explores the consequences that follow from that. Putnam discusses how vocabulary can't possibly be innate (in contrast to Chomsky's thinking), and how any attempt to provide a mathematical account of the meaning of language or of how that meaning is constructed will lead to unsatisfying results.
I found this book useful because it made two important concepts vividly clear and intuitive for me:
1) Humans do not perceive or talk about reality, only their mental approximation of reality.
2) Interpreting language is an arbitrarily complex problem requiring the fullness of human reasoning.
I quite like Putnam's style which is precise without being too dense or obtuse, and lightly humorous especially when he gets a little sassy critiquing other philosopher's work.
If you're interested in philosophy of mind and language, this book has some useful ideas, but it's probably best understood in the larger context of Putnam's work and the field generally.
This is a short philosophical text that argues we cannot assume there is anything like a "common mental representation" for ideas that is consistent between people, then explores the consequences that follow from that. Putnam discusses how vocabulary can't possibly be innate (in contrast to Chomsky's thinking), and how any attempt to provide a mathematical account of the meaning of language or of how that meaning is constructed will lead to unsatisfying results.
I found this book useful because it made two important concepts vividly clear and intuitive for me:
1) Humans do not perceive or talk about reality, only their mental approximation of reality.
2) Interpreting language is an arbitrarily complex problem requiring the fullness of human reasoning.
I quite like Putnam's style which is precise without being too dense or obtuse, and lightly humorous especially when he gets a little sassy critiquing other philosopher's work.
If you're interested in philosophy of mind and language, this book has some useful ideas, but it's probably best understood in the larger context of Putnam's work and the field generally.
April 20, 2024
Curious how this fits into the broader literature from the time and how it is viewed by the field now. Reading it from a mathematician’s perspective, it is full of dubious assumptions, massive logical leaps (which the author sweeps away using “obviously”, “clearly”, “of course”, etc), and self-contradictions (often with the second part of his argument contradicting the first).
The main issue is that the author operates at an absurd level of abstraction, but then only makes arguments using trivial examples. He heavily implies that these examples suffice to show his ideas apply at the level of abstraction they are introduced, but this is a nasty fallacy to be trapped by. Having been trained to spot this error in mathematical writing, I found this almost impossible to get past.
No doubt the book tackles large, nebulous concepts and there will likely never be a satisfying answer for these. But, rather than come away thinking the author has provided some new insights, I am left thinking (naively, for certain) I could do a better job in many fewer pages with some well chosen notation.
The main issue is that the author operates at an absurd level of abstraction, but then only makes arguments using trivial examples. He heavily implies that these examples suffice to show his ideas apply at the level of abstraction they are introduced, but this is a nasty fallacy to be trapped by. Having been trained to spot this error in mathematical writing, I found this almost impossible to get past.
No doubt the book tackles large, nebulous concepts and there will likely never be a satisfying answer for these. But, rather than come away thinking the author has provided some new insights, I am left thinking (naively, for certain) I could do a better job in many fewer pages with some well chosen notation.
August 16, 2022
I’m sure that this book is historically significant and is probably a great read for those interested in some of the other stuff going on at the time in the philosophy of language and understanding the meaning of ‘meaning’. However, for someone like me who just wanted a critique of functionalism, this book was way too technical on the whole.
There were a few gems along the way but more with respect to semantics and theory change- Putnam argues that meaning survives theory change, e.g. gravity means the same thing, even though theories about gravity have changed over time. He agrees for this view over thinking that each time a theory changes we are simply changing the subject and repurposing the word. So our meaning of gravity persists even when the details change.
There were a few gems along the way but more with respect to semantics and theory change- Putnam argues that meaning survives theory change, e.g. gravity means the same thing, even though theories about gravity have changed over time. He agrees for this view over thinking that each time a theory changes we are simply changing the subject and repurposing the word. So our meaning of gravity persists even when the details change.
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June 17, 2022Putnam fue uno de los grandes filósofos contemporáneos no solo por la brillantes de sus ideas individuales y su prolífica trayectoria, sino por su compromiso con la filosofía como disciplina más allá de las etiquetas y los logros personales. Su capacidad para poner en tela de juicio sus propias ideas y reconocer sus fallos es uno de los rasgos que más admiro en cualquier filósofo o filósofa que conozca. Pero es que además sus críticas y alternativas siempre mejoraban lo presente. Ese es sin duda el caso de su autocrítica al funcionalismo y de su cuestionamiento en general de las filosofías de la mente que creen poder explicar y agotar lo mental a base de estructuras internas, esenciales y unitarias que dan perfecta cuenta de todo lo que pensamos, decimos y hacemos. Además de a sí mismo, en Representación y realidad confronta a grandes elefantes de la filosofía de la mente y las ciencias cognitivas como Noam Chomski o Jerry Fodor y propone un modelo explicativo de lo mental que tenga en cuenta la influencia de las otras mentes y por lo tanto de la sociedad y la cultura, así como del entorno físico. No se trata de una teoría fija, sino de una opción de búsqueda menos encorsetada y con miras más abiertas. No son tanto respuestas lo que Putnam nos da, sino nuevas preguntas, a mi juicio más interesantes y ricas.
May 19, 2013
I hard time connecting some of the dots.
November 5, 2016
Functionalism and stuff
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews