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The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam

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In chronicling the adventurous life of legendary CIA operative Edward Lansdale, The Road Not Taken definitively reframes our understanding of the Vietnam War.

In this epic biography of Edward Lansdale (1908– 1987), the man said to be the fictional model for Graham Greene’s The Quiet American, best-selling historian Max Boot demonstrates how Lansdale pioneered a “hearts and mind” diplomacy, first in the Philippines, then in Vietnam. It was a visionary policy that, as Boot reveals, was ultimately crushed by America’s giant military bureaucracy, steered by elitist generals and blueblood diplomats who favored troop build-ups and napalm bombs over winning the trust of the people. Through dozens of interviews and access to neverbefore-seen documents―including long-hidden love letters―Boot recasts this cautionary American story, tracing the bold rise and the crashing fall of the roguish “T. E. Lawrence of Asia” from the battle of Dien Bien Phu to the humiliating American evacuation in 1975. Bringing a tragic complexity to this so-called “ugly American,” this “engrossing biography” (Karl Marlantes) rescues Lansdale from historical ignominy and suggests that Vietnam could have been different had we only listened. With reverberations that continue to play out in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Road Not Taken is a biography of profound historical consequence.

768 pages, Hardcover

First published January 9, 2018

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About the author

Max Boot

11 books207 followers
Max Boot is a historian and biographer, best-selling author, and foreign-policy analyst. He is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a weekly columnist for The Washington Post.

Max Boot’s biography of Ronald Reagan, Reagan: His Life and Legend, is his third New York Times bestseller. It was named one of the Ten Best Books of 2024 by the New York Times, and also made best-of-the-year lists from The New Yorker, The Washington Post and The Economist. It has been acclaimed as a "landmark work" (The New York Times), the "definitive biography" (The New Yorker), “magisterial" (The Washington Post), and “enormously readable and scrupulously honest” (The Sunday Times). Max Boot’s previous biography, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam, was also a New York Times bestseller and a finalist for the 2019 Pulitzer Prize in biography.

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Profile Image for Steven Z..
636 reviews161 followers
May 26, 2018
The popularity of the new film, “The Post” has refocused the attention of many people on the PENTAGON PAPERS and the Vietnam War. Daniel Ellsberg’s leak of the history of the war commissioned by then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to the New York Times created a crisis atmosphere that was settled by the Supreme Court. In his latest book, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: EDWARD LANSDALE AND THE TRAGEDY OF VIETNAM, Max Boot, a Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations, revisits the war and the life of one of the most interesting figures associated with it. Lansdale, a former advertising executive who strongly believed in capitalism and American democracy. He would join the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, become an advisor and intelligence officer in the Philippines and South Vietnam, and possessed a vision of how to deal with communist advances during the Cold War. His realpolitik rested on winning the loyalty of indigenous people through honesty, respect, and a willingness to work with and treat people with humanity. Boot has written a superb biography of Lansdale who hoped to win the “hearts and minds” of people as opposed to acting as a typical colonial oppressor.

Lansdale first made his reputation in the Philippines as he advised the Philippine army in defeating the Hukbalahap (Huk) Rebellion against then President Elpidio Quirino. Lansdale’s work in the Philippines was a petri dish for his strategies, reputation, concept of nation-building, and counter-insurgency. Working with the Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay he was able to achieve one of the few American successes in nation-building after World War II as he orchestrated his rise to the presidency in 1953. The problem for Lansdale was that he was unable to transfer the strategy and techniques that worked in the Philippines to Vietnam.

Boot begins his narrative with a discussion of Lansdale’s life and career before he was dispatched to the Philippines. After spending roughly a quarter of the monograph on Lansdale’s counter-insurgency education in the Philippines, Boot moves on to his initial exposure to Vietnam and his early relationship with Ngo Dinh Diem. As Boot proceeds he provides a detailed discussion of French colonialism until their disaster at Dienbienphu, and a short biography of Ho Chi Minh and his rise to leadership in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Boot’s overriding theme is that had American policy makers, including presidents, cabinet members, bureaucrats, and other policy makers listened to Lansdale’s advice the course of the Vietnam War might have been different. He does not say that North Vietnam would have been defeated, however the way the United States conducted the war would have been different and at least civilian deaths and American casualties would have been lessened a great deal, and perhaps the United States’ ignominious departure would not have taken place as it did. For Boot the key was the removal and assassination of Diem from power in 1963 as there was no one who could take his place and what resulted was a series of coups by generals who had no political support outside of the military. Diem may not have been the best of leaders, but at least he kept the Saigon government somewhat unified for almost a decade. Boot’s thesis is sound and it is well supported through analysis and his access to materials that previous biographers did not have available.

Lansdale’s view of nation-building can best be summed up in the advice he offered Diem in June, 1954 when he stressed the need to bring the nationalist political parties in an anti-communist coalition, create public forums around the countryside where government representatives could hear from people, and immediately adopt a Philippine style constitution among many suggestions. For Lansdale psy-ops, methods of mental and emotional manipulation and soft propaganda were the key to success, not bombing people back to the Stone Age. Lansdale would take the time to learn about the countries he was assigned to and prepare in depth original analysis that were incomparable. He argued that insurgencies arose from chaotic, impoverished conditions, and any success would only result from meeting the needs of the people by creating functioning state institutions. Washington’s decision to withdraw Lansdale from Saigon in late 1956 and failing to replace him with someone who could have at least a benign influence on Diem was a major error.
Lansdale was a complex individual who may have been the model for characters in two Graham Greene novels, THE UGLY AMERICAN and THE QUIET AMERICAN. Boot examines Lansdale’s character and private life in detail as he had access to recently opened government files, letters, and diaries from Lansdale’s children, in addition to the correspondence with Patrocinio Yapeinco Kelly (Pat Kelly), who was his mistress in the Philippines, and years later became his second wife. Boot describes his relationship with many of the important historical figures of the period. An important aspect is how Lansdale’s personality was an asset to his work throughout the 1950s, but once the Kennedy administration came to power his influence waned, especially since he and Robert McNamara did not see eye to eye. Lansdale may have had the ability to get foreign leaders on his side, but he was not very effective in dealing with the bureaucracies in Washington who ignored his advice and pursued their own agendas. It seems that only Lansdale had the skill and relationship with Diem to get him to reform. Instead of appointing Lansdale as ambassador to South Vietnam, President Kennedy made him assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations.

Boot carries his analysis further as he explains how Lansdale’s second tour in South Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 did not go as well as he had hoped. During the Johnson administration he would once again be marginalized and would leave Saigon as a “beaten man.” Once again resentment from his many critics and his inability to work with people outside of his circle did him in.

Boot does an effective job introducing the major characters Lansdale had to deal with. Each character from Alan Dulles, Ngueyen Cao Key, Ramon Magsaysay, Robert McNamara, Daniel Ellsberg, Ngo Dinh Nhu, to numerous others is presented through a short biography that is integrated into the narrative for the reader. Boot is an excellent writer and has uncovered a great deal of new information. Perhaps one of the most interesting chapters in the book entitled “Waiting for the Second Coming,” explores Lansdale’s second tour in South Vietnam and how Lansdale became irrelevant. It is a shame because by 1966 “Lansdale was generally far more realistic in his assessment of the situation than Westmoreland, Lodge, and other senior officials. And less prone to trumpeting illusionary progress.” (500) There are many other important chapters in the book including one dealing with Operation Mongoose, headed by Lansdale designed to eliminate Fidel Castro once he came to power in Cuba; material that highlighted Lansdale’s testimony in the Senate hearings into the CIA in the mid-1970s; in addition to a discussion of Lansdale’s relationship with Daniel Ellsberg.

What makes Boot’s contribution to the historiography of the Vietnam War important is his examination of events, personalities, and strategies through the world view of someone, who with hindsight, turned out to be quite accurate in his predictions. Lansdale lived a fascinating life and his impact can still be seen in American counter-insurgency doctrine as applied in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lansdale was a believer in “soft power,” not the “Westmoreland approach” as Philip Caputo puts in his memoir, A RUMOR OF WAR, “Our mission was not to win terrain or seize positions, but simply to kill: kill communists and to kill as many of them as possible. Stack ‘em like cordwood.” (475)
Profile Image for Porter Broyles.
452 reviews57 followers
September 10, 2021
30 years ago or so I took a college course on the Vietnam War.

I was finishing a major in History with a concentration on Asia.

To be honest with you, it was a somewhat foregettable course.

The biggest principle I learned was that "modern" history can not be trusted.

My professor stressed that everything that we were learning in his class was probably wrong! He said that enough time had not passed between the actual events and the story being told to really know what happened.

He taugh that modern history (anything within the past 50 years) was still clouded by emotions and secrecy.

This is a principle I believe to this day.

The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tregedy in Vietnam is an absolute example of this lesson.

I still own the books that served as the foundation of the course I took in college.

After finishing this book---wherein Edward Lansdale is the key figure---I decided to look in the indexes of the books used in my college course. In one book, I found 8 whole pages that mentioned Edward Lansdale. In another, there are four consecutive pages dedicated to him.

Those were books published before 1990.

Fast forward to 2018--- roughly 50 years after the events give or take a few years---768 pages about the Vietnam War with Edward Lansdale being the key figure. While this book is not a biography of Lansdale, it might as well have been.

Lansdale, an Air Force General, was a pioneer with the CIA and "counter insurgency."

In the 1950s Lansdale was a pivotal force in the Phillipines. If you've followed my reviews, you know that I just read the book The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War which discussed Arthur MacArthur and Douglas MacArthur's history there. While Douglas MacArthur was a pivotal figure in the 40s and into the Korean War, Lansdale played a significant role in preventing the Phillipines from becoming Communist in the 1950s.

His perception of the Phillipines was swayed by his friendships and long term affair with a Phillipina woman Pat Kelly. Pat helped him to understand the Phillipines and Asian mentality, which served him well in helping to prevent the Phillipines from becoming Communist. Boot points out that the Phillipines was the only place wherein democratic ideals won the day against Communistic ideals without the expenditure of lives or money.

Lansdale then was assigned to Vietnam.

Boot makes a convincing, if not debatable, argument that Lansdale was both over his head AND right in his approach to Vietnam. Lansdale initially misunderstood Vietnam. He blundered. Yet, because of his connections to his mistress Pat and the Phillipines he came to understand Vietnam better than most.

Had Lansdale been listened to in the 1960s, America's experience in the war might have taken a different path.

Reading this book, I couldn't help but reflect on the fact that 30 years ago, Lansdale was merely a footnote in the books we read.

Today, I could not imagine studying the subject and not knowing who Lansdale was.

Personally, this book epitomized why "modern" history cannot be trusted... it takes at least 50 years to begin to understand history.
Profile Image for Mike.
1,199 reviews166 followers
April 22, 2018
I’m not a fan of Max Boot the commentator but I shouldn’t let that affect my view on his book. Giving it 4 Stars, maybe a little generous but it is worth your time to learn more about Lansdale and his impact on the Philippines and Vietnam. I was going to write more of a review but I don’t really think Max Boot is worth time better spent reading something else.
10 reviews
August 23, 2020
Audio book review. If you fought in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq, this book will most likely be thought provoking, bring back memories, and frustrate you — sadly we continue to demonstrate our inability to learn from the past to enable success in counterinsurgency operations. The book highlights the challenges of supporting partner nations and conducting counterinsurgency, while telling the life story of Ed Lansdale.

This is a long biography with a lot of extra details that add to the story of Ed Lansdale, but are not relevant to the thesis of the book that the Vietnam War could have had a different outcome if different decisions had been made.

Three simple thoughts for success when working with partner nations are presented at the end of the book:
1. Learn. Learn the culture, people, and the language of the partner nation that we want to influence and support.
2. Like. Truly like the people we are working with and build real relationships with them. Trust and empathy is relevant across all cultures.
3. Listen. Listen to your counterparts. Do not make the mistake of just telling them what you think they should be doing.
Profile Image for Marks54.
1,494 reviews1,202 followers
March 30, 2018
This is a clever and interesting book. I also understand what the author is trying to accomplish by structuring this biography around the “what if” questions around how the Vietnam war might have developed had Landsdale been granted more influence. The policy questions around Landsdale’s approach to what become COIN warfare make this biography of someone who passed away in 1987 important in a world of perpetual war in Afghanistan and Iraq and potentially other places.

The central premise on which the book begins is far from persuasive, however. Could paying more serious attention to Landsdale in late 1963 or afterwards have really changed the course of the Vietnam War? Max Boot is a wonderful scholar and a critical thinker. His own extended story of Landsdale provides many reasons to wonder how serious his premise is. As a suggestive and stylistic tactic, it turns a long biography into a policy case study. Looking more carefully, it is not clear to me how far this “what if” history should be taken.

To start with, it is easy to see the lure of an alternative future for the Vietnam War. It is difficult to see how the war could have turned out worse than it did, short of escalation into the nuclear realm. So given the lousy outcomes, it is reasonable to ask about what mistakes were made and how they could have been avoided and better results obtained. So far, so good.

Now to the alternate futures ... It is relative easy for an individual to imagine the outlines of an alternate future for a given situation. Missed your plane at the airport? Leave earlier and it would not have happened, right? Everybody does this from time to time, but is it really helpful? The problem is that the past is past and the replay is not feasible. More to the heart of the problem, if the past could be changed, it is not logical to think that one’s contingency of interest would be all that would change while everything else stayed the same. Lots of details would change and it is unclear what the accurate replay would look like. There are time travel films about this (Butterfly Effect) and the psychologists even have a name - the simulation heuristic - around which some research has been developing.

But to get into the details more, the are specific issues with Landsdale. To start with, most of his successes seemed to stem from his personal capabilities in working with and becoming friends with national leaders such as Magsaysay in the Philippines or Diem in Vietnam. Neither Landsdale nor the leaders he worked with seemed much interesting in building lasting institutions that transcended personal rule. Landsdale’s success in the Philippines did not last long beyond Magsaysay’s death and the succession of leaders eventually lead to Ferdinand Marcos. The prospect of one individual, even with all of the capabilities that Landsdale brought to his work, changing an endeavor as vast as the Vietnam War is a bit of a stretch.

Just going with Boot’s story, there was an earlier trial of the 1963 coup in Diem’s war against the sects in 1955, with Landsdale advising him. Diem stayed in power and was not replaced by a more corrupt junta, as happened in 1963. But then what happened? The insurgency did not go away but was moderated by Diem’s repression and Vietnam experience a quiet stretch until the war heated up again after 1960. Going from prior history, this suggests that if Landsdale’s advice was taken in 1963 and the coup not promoted by the US, the war may have been drawn out a bit longer but it is not at all clear how the eventual outcome would have been different. The situation deteriorated more rapidly after the coup and the US directly intervened in 1965 rather than later, but I do not see what Boot provides a basis for the fundamental story turning out differently. Boot acknowledges this towards the end of the book in assessing Landsdale’s legacy.

These limitations were also apparent in the applications of COIN in Iraq in the “surge” of 2006, which Boot notes had a limited positive effect on the outcome of the war. There is a fundamental problem in a COIN war that Boot does not discuss. Promoting a regime that gains the support of the people and that the people see as worth fighting for does not mean that the home government will support US policy or choose to maintain itself as a US ally. It is possible for a free and legitimate government to choose contrary to US policy interests. Given the way the Diem developed as a national leader over his nine years in power, it is not clear that his long term course would have been consonant with US policy interest under the best of conditions, making it unclear where “the road not taken” might have eventually led.

Boot clearly likes the subject of his story and there is much to like about Landsdale. The book is valuable in clarifying what Landsdale was all about and how his legacy has been distorted. Having said that, there are some aspects to Landsdale that Boot appears to admire that might have impaired his effectiveness and his legacy. In particular, Boot sees Landsdale as a maverick of sorts and a confirmed anti-bureaucrat who fought against the military and political establishment and refused to compromise his values in trying to influence policy. Fair enough, but in Washington of the late 1950s and early 1960s, being a maverick seemed a foolproof way of guaranteeing that one would be ineffective and leave only a limited legacy. It that suits ones values so be it, but how effective can somebody be when they actively work to avoid getting their ideas adopted by the government actors who must actually implement anything. If one is looking at legacy and results, it is not clear to be how being an active foe of the bureaucracy is a valued capability.

This is a solid biography that prompts thinking on the current situation and the prospects for COIN strategies in Asia and Africa. Max Boot has done a good job at telling the story of Edward Landsdale. Vietnam is not the same as Iraq, however, although Landsdale’s story is still valuable today.


Profile Image for Chris.
1,795 reviews30 followers
June 14, 2018
Don’t let the page count influence you into not reading this book. It just flows and flows. It goes with the flow. Zen warrior motif. An absorbing account of an unusual man who was an atypical soldier.

Robert Lansdale had lots of personal capital with Magsaysay and Diem. It was genuine friendship too. Boot laments that we had no equivalent of Lansdale while dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan. I would disagree as Stanley McChrystal and Karzai were pretty tight until Obama made the easy and wrong decision to fire McChystal over the disrespectful comments of the general’s staff. Boot points out the irony and dichotomy of Lansdale’s success with foreign leaders and inability to do the same with Americans. Just when you thought he had the ear and attention of policy makers Lansdale would fail either through his own strident advocacy or the negative perceptions created by jealous peers. He was a one man show so often yet he could be a team player too. State, CIA, and military bureaucrats were his nemesis and the loathing was mutual.

This book was captivating much like Neil Sheehan’s book, “A Bright Shining Lie.” I learned a lot about Filipino and Vietnamese politics in the 1950’s. Probably the best nonfiction book I’ve read this year.

Profile Image for Jerome Otte.
1,845 reviews
May 21, 2024
A readable and sympathetic work.

Boot begins with Lansdale’s rather mundane OSS desk job in San Francisco before moving on to Lansdale’s CIA assignments in the Philippines, and, of course, Vietnam. In Boot’s judgment, Lansdale’s time at the Saigon Military Mission was mostly successful, arguing that he established a “stable” government. The book mostly focuses on the Americans in Saigon; the Vietnamese themselves often come off as bit players. The book doesn’t really change the standard portrait of Lansdale, though.

The writing is smooth. Boot does, however, annoyingly refer to Lansdale as “Ed” pretty often, and portrays him as bascially infallible. The book also relies mostly on American sources, and heavily on Lansdale’s own version of events. Lansdale, of course, made enemies in the American bureaucracy at the Pentagon, State, and the CIA, as men of his type usually do. Boot, however, never really explores these critical opposing views in detail. When covering US policy in the Philippines, Boot focuses on Lansdale’s partnership with Magsaysay and their rapport, but he doesn’t detail how the US often pressured Magsaysay’s government to implement reforms (by making aid conditional, or by depoliticizing the Philippine constabulary, for example) The book doesn’t even really explain why the Huks were rebelling. At one point Boot notes that Lansdale was an avid reader of Mao and that this made him unique among American military officers (it did?) The book also uses a lot of quotes without always analyzing them.

There is little background in the book on French colonialism in Vietnam. Boot never really makes clear the importance of the Vietcong’s outside support from North Vietnam, and North Vietnam’s aid from China and the Soviet Union. Lansdale certainly never faced those complications in the Philippines, which Boot admits at one point (Filipinos also related better to American culture). At one point in the book, Boot even admits that “counter-insurgency and strate-building—the exercises upon which Lansdale was to be engaged—are inherently context-specific: what works in one location may not apply in another.” Boot never really addresses the communists’ appeal to many Vietnamese peasants. He also doesn’t address the question of South Vietnamese military capabilities.

Boot also never really emphasizes that American strategy in Vietnam did, in fact, include many elements of a counterinsurgency program. He does note the strategic hamlet program and states, correctly, that the communists viewed it as a threat, and uses the program to argue that Diem would have been supportive of a counterinsurgency program. Boot, however, claims that this program didn’t forcibly relocate families, even though it did. Lansdale may have helped Diem expand his control over South Vietnam, but did that translate to winning over South Vietnamese “hearts and minds”? Boot seems to think so, but doesn’t really lay out the evidence. Boot’s coverage of American strategy often relies on clichés about body counts and free-fire zones, and at one point he claims that Westmoreland considered Lansdale an “idiot.” There could have been more on pacification, for sure.

Boot writes that Diem could have stayed in power had Lansdale been allowed to stay in South Vietnam as an advisor. Lansdale, Boot speculates, could have convinced Diem to adopt a conciliatory approach that would have won over Diem’s enemies. This is hard to believe, from studying the history of Diem’s rule. Lansdale’s advice could have just convinced Diem even further that the Americans were ignorant about Vietnam. Sometimes Boot seems to downplay Diem’s unpopularity and heavy-handed rule, though he acknowledges it at other times. Strangely, Boot states that Diem was open to Lansdale’s advice, but also notes the many times Diem rejected it. At one point, when describing Diem’s crackdown on South Vietnam’s Buddhists, Boot laments that he did not have Lansdale around to offer better advice and “to curb his brother Nhu’s dictatorial instincts.” However, in 1955, they had cracked down on the sects and watched as the US affirmed its support. Nhu and Diem knew that the Buddhist crackdown would be condemned in Washington, but they gambled that they would be able to ride out the storm and emerge stronger, like they did in 1955. Lansdale himself eventually concluded that his mission was basically impossible, and Boot himself uses the term “nearly impossible” when describing it, and notes the limits of Lansdale’s influence over Diem. Boot also blames Nhu as a negative influence on Diem (like many defenders of Diem), but doesn’t really explain this in detail, nor does he make clear that Nhu tended to consult Diem before making decisions. Boot also claims that, when Lansdale left in 1956, Lansdale “left a very popular Vietnamese leader running things, a man who was very responsive to the needs of the people.” In other parts of the book, Boot seems to admit that this wasn’t the case. At one point Boot writes that the CIA sanctioned the 1970 coup against Sihanouk in Cambodia, but doesn’t elaborate on this claim.

At one point the CIA’s Albert Haney is called “Richard.” Boot links the leaks around the Hughes Glomar Explorer to the Church Committee, somehow. “The CIA’s capacity for both covert action and intelligence gathering declined,” he claims, but he doesn’t elaborate on this argument. There may have been new reporting requirements and more congressional oversight, and these investigations did touch off a struggle to regulate US intelligence, but the CIA was still in the business in the aftermath of these hearings. The years after the Church hearings would feature some of the Agency’s biggest paramilitary operations, in Afghanistan and Nicaragua, for example.

Towards the end of the book, Boot laments US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, suggesting that America’s key to victory was a new Lansdale whose magic touch could have forged more productive relationships with leaders like Karzai and Maliki and gotten them onto the right track. The other possibility, of course, is that US interests and those of its intended clients often diverge in seemingly intractable ways.

The book also covers Lansdale’s extramarital affair with Pat Kelly. When he describes their marriage, Boot literally writes that “they lived happily ever after.” (I’m not joking) His portraits of Lansdale’s wife and mistress also aren’t very fleshed out, though he does quote liberally from Lansdale’s entertaining letters to her.

A well-written and engaging work, if a bit simplistic.
405 reviews
February 27, 2018
Any Goodreads member knows something about Ed Lansdale as he is thought by many to be the model for Graham Greene’s “Quiet American” (not true), Colonel Hillandale in “The Ugly American” (probably true) and even the inspiration for General Y in Oliver Stone’s “JFK.” This is a terrific biography which spends a lot of time connecting the dots and providing context for what has to be seen as an amazing life. In the same way that one can ask, “How might our country been different if Lincoln hadn’t been shot? (just watched the old Spielberg film Lincoln last night), one could ask, “How might the Vietnam situation been different had Lansdale’s philosophy and methods been adopted rather than shunted aside?”

Lansdale had this incredible talent. It was simple. He liked Asians, respected them and was able to establish friendships and trust. He made his reputation as friend and advisor to President Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines at the end of WWII. He guided Magsaysay to the Presidency and advised him successfully on how to defeat the HUK guerrillas. In the mid-fifties he was posted to Vietnam and, as with Magsaysay, became friend and advisor to President Diem who was later overthrown by the CIA which turned out to be a huge mistake.

This is an objective but admiring look at a complex life of a man who is a legend in intelligence circles. He was an Air Force officer who role to the rank of major general, a significant feat in the Air Force by an officer without wings or an Academy degree. As a history it is a tour de force which covers geopolitics from the end of WWII through the Nixon administration with a vast list of familiar characters like Daniel Ellsberg who was on Lansdale’s team when Lansdale returned to Vietnam in 1965. Lansdale was the “hearts and minds” guy, a man who understood that people would not rebel against a government they believed in. He understood counter insurgency and the use of special forces. He argued against a military buildup.

Unfortunately, his ideas could not gain traction in a system run by former WWII officers, number crunchers like Defense Secretary McNamara and idiot generals like Westmoreland who gravitated toward their comfort zone—firepower.

This book proves that history is a series of accidents and it is the rare situation where the great man is in the right place at the right time to gain and keep the power to affect decision making. Lansdale had it early on but it slipped away.

It's long, it's detailed, it's personal (much on his affair with the Filipina Pat Kelly who he married 26 years after the beginning of the relationship) and well-written. If you want to gain a new understanding of the Vietnam War (which the Vietnamese call "The American War") this is the book. I came away liking Lansdale a lot and, personally, enjoyed the connections I shared with the General. Both Air Force officers. He was an instructor at the Joint Forces Air Intelligence School which I attended (post Lansdale), he lived at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines for awhile as did I, and he arrived for his second tour in S. Vietnam a couple months before I showed up (as a 2nd Lt) in 1965. His was a name I was vaguely aware of. I probably learned of him originally at COIN (Counterinsurgency) school at Hulbert Field, FL.

As good as Lansdale was in making friends and establishing relationship with Asian leaders he couldn't translate that talent into forging sound relationships with his own superiors in the defense establishment. He was considered an outlier, a guy who thought up goofy ideas and, sadly, his ideas where marginalized and discounted.

It's ultimately a tragic but entertaining and extremely enlightening story of a unique American.
Author 4 books126 followers
July 7, 2018
More Vietnam War-related reading. This time, a sprawling biography of CIA operative Edward Lansdale, a "creative and unpredictable maverick" and "expert in counterinsurgency." His career started in WWII but he gained fame afterward for his work in the Philippines, where he developed the philosophy of winning the hearts and minds of the people, not overwhelming them with military power and troops. He advocated that policy in Vietnam but was ignored; Ho Chi Minh followed it with better results than the US policy achieved. Though certainly not an ideal husband, Lansdale was a man of great charisma but also one often at odds with his superiors, a maverick who keep his covert work from his supervisors as often as from foreign governments. Lots and lots of details--biographical on Lansdale and other important figures of the time as well as historical details from mid-20th century on--mean that the book doesn't speed along, but the details are intriguing and the pace never lags. Well-researched based on interviews and "never before seen documents." Interesting reading, excellently narrated by Henry Strozier.
Profile Image for David C Ward.
1,717 reviews38 followers
January 30, 2018
Quite good. A biography of the legendary counter insurgent Lansdale that is also a history and critique of American foreign policy. Could the war in Vietnam have ended differently if Lansdale had had a more central role, and hearts and minds emphasized over big unit military ops? Maybe but Lansdale was defeated not just by being a lone voice in the bureaucracy (which stifled him) but also by the forces on the ground. The political instability after the coup against Diem (the key turning point), the corruption of ARVN leadership, the morale and fighting power of the north are all structural problems that even one man could not overcome - however appealing the thought is. Boot's title is from the Frost poem whose sense is that it is up to us to make a choice when roads diverge. It's our commitment that makes all the difference. That the US made its choice without listening to people like Lansdale, whose basic humanity and decency in an indecent time shines through, is a deafness that continues to this day.
Profile Image for Chad Manske.
1,139 reviews33 followers
August 19, 2018
An exceptional and fresh look at Vietnam (and the Philippine) wars through the prism of Maj Gen (ret) Ed Landsdale’s life. I served at CFR with Max Boot while a military fellow, and though I am not always a fan of his commentary, he is undeniably a thorough, compelling and extremely credible researcher and book author. Readers are treated to recently released and declassified documents, letters and other source material into a compelling historical narrative with a surprising love story wrapped in the middle—uncommon for Boot. As always, Boot leaves the reader to examine the arguments and logic to personally decide and debate the issues herein. A fantastic piece of scholarship!
Profile Image for Tomlikeslife.
223 reviews2 followers
January 4, 2023
Long read, but a good read. Author liked to use some words I've never seen before. Words like encomia, oleaginous, patina, and imbroglio. I started writing them down after awhile.
Profile Image for Jud Barry.
Author 6 books20 followers
September 26, 2018
This is what might be called a situational biography of Edward Lansdale, an influential actor in American foreign policy -- primarily in the Philippines and Vietnam -- in the 1950's and the 1960's. "The road not taken" refers to Lansdale's favored policy path, which he referred to as "civic action," and which involved supporting efforts by native politicians to shore up democratic practices and infrastructure as the best hedges against insurrection and communism. The road taken was of course the ultimately disastrous one of seeing a small foreign country in turmoil only as a battlefield to be won by force of arms.

I say "actor" because Lansdale is difficult to pigeonhole in a meaningful way. Technically -- ultimately -- an Air Force major general, he was no pilot; the assignment to the Air Force appears to have been almost an act of Pentagon whimsy. Mustered into the World War II effort, he had experience as an advertising man that qualified him for the "psy-ops" of the OSS and for its successor, the CIA. But he was not a stereotypical spook either, even though the pages of the book are littered with cloak-and-dagger bombardier colleagues who were. Lansdale neither believed in nor practiced the standard practice of paying or blackmailing foreigners to spy on their own countries. He believed in forming bonds based on mutual trust and "the awakening of unselfish patriotism on ideals or principles we ourselves cherish." Nor was he a typical foreign service officer of the bureaucratic type, yet a more effective diplomat may never have existed in the annals of American foreign policy. His personal approach accomplished real successes in stabilizing Filipino democracy in the early 50's, but in the face of bureaucratic opposition among fellow Americans met with only limited, temporary success in Vietnam.

Author Boot (a military historian with other books on guerrilla warfare and the technology of war) presents an even-handed account of Lansdale, who was something of a celebrity in his day as an advisor to Presidents, an influential author of think-pieces in such policy pubs as Foreign Affairs, and perhaps most characteristically as the model, at least in part, of the fictionally enshrined "ugly American" and "quiet American." There is plenty of contemporary criticism of Lansdale, mostly from the military and foreign service establishment, who saw his cultural-friendly activities and methods (Lansdale compiled a study of Vietnamese folk songs) as both bizarre and naive. Boot himself -- who excels at providing essential context for the book's large cast of characters that includes JFK, LBJ, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Daniel Ellsberg, not to mention numerous Filipino and Vietnamese leaders central to the story -- occasionally evaluates Lansdale's notions and does not pull punches, e.g. calling Lansdale "delusional" at one point.

But Lansdale emerges as a hugely sympathetic character. One aspect of Lansdale's positive image is his practical belief in democracy, which formed the foundation for his signature "civic action" policy. This is tellingly contrasted with the shocking cynicism among Americans at the highest reaches of political power and influence. Working to engineer honest, clean elections at the national level for Vietnam (and, against the odds, largely succeeding), Lansdale triggered a "lengthy diatribe" by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge -- a Republican who had been Nixon's running mate in the 1960 presidential election, yet who had been appointed ambassador by Democrat JFK -- "about how he and Lyndon Johnson had spent most of their lives rigging elections." According to Lodge's aides, he wanted only the "appearance of a democracy," Lansdale wanted the real thing.

Mostly though the positive image of Lansdale that emerges from this book has to do with his advocacy of "humanity" as the basis for policy and personal behavior. He sympathized with and related well to the peasants in the countryside of the Philippines and Vietnam. His lack of language skills was no barrier; body and sign language were apparently enough to convey a bond knotted in common humanity (although the invaluable assistance of linguists is also part of the story). His core principles, as outlined by Boot, were "learn, like, and listen;" the book is a chronicle of his indefatigable efforts to acquire the best kind of "intelligence" and of his application of loyal friendship to every level of personal contact. His advice, late in his career in Vietnam, to incoming US war leader Creighton Abrams about how best to work with the Vietnamese leaders is an example: "Be a human being. … It's about time we got this thing on the basis of humans talking to each other."

The wisdom of Lansdale's approach is sharply contrasted with the fleshless, numbers-driven approach that ruled the American military-diplomatic roost in Vietnam, best represented by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Called into McNamara's office in 1962 and presented with a list of "factors" that could help "computerize" (Lansdale's word) the war, Lansdale told McNamara he had left out the most important one: the "X" factor, which was "what the people out on the battlefield really feel." McNamara didn't get it; after Lansdale persisted in suggesting ways to gather that information, he told Lansdale not to bother him anymore.

[I was re-acquainted with a favorite anecdote of mine about McNamara: trying to speak in support of a short-lived Vietnamese president suspected of being a US puppet, McNamara used Vietnamese words meaning "Vietnam 10,000 years," but his garbled pronunciation rendered it, "Ruptured duck wants to lie down."]

The final, positive judgment of Lansdale is that his ideals made him in some sense a prophet. (The word "Cassandra" had already sprung to my mind by the time Boot uses it.) In 1957 he knew that the US military was too dependent on "mechanical means of warfare," even when it was engaged in unconventional war. His advice at the time was for military personnel to "make friends among the people." While his advice had some effect in the development of training for special forces, it was more generally ignored. In 1958 he said, "We don't want to be like the French," who had millions of dollars worth of modern weaponry, ample bravery, and numbers, but who were "licked by a local army wearing tennis shoes and pajamas." He argued against building up a huge American military presence and against bombing North Vietnam. He argued in favor of rules of engagement by the South Vietnamese military -- who would be doing the fighting rather than Americans -- that would protect non-combatants. Boot comments ruefully, "The US military would not recognize the utility of such restrictive rules of engagement, designed to avoid alienating the populace, until decades later in Afghanistan and Iraq." And one suspects that drone warfare has enabled them to forget it once again. Lansdale's 1964 article in Foreign Affairs warned in no uncertain terms that ignoring such basic rules only helps "defeat the cause of freedom."

Unfortunately for the US and for Vietnam, Lansdale was pissing into the wind. "How long do you guys want to see the shit kicked out of the US to serve the career ambitions of a handful of Americans?" he asked one visiting diplomat. "You don't seem to understand that, if the US bureaucracies had done their work, we wouldn't have over 2,000 American kids killed in combat so far." That was in 1966; most of the deaths were yet to come. In his frustration at being ignored, he spent one July 4th party at Lodge's embassy in Saigon "trying to teach 'some four-letter Anglo-Saxon words, ending in 'Cabot,' to the ambassador's red-feathered parrots."

When Nixon and Kissinger sought later to wind down the war and exit with honor, according to Boot "in their haste to disengage, they would set in place the conditions for the very bloodbath -- and the mass exodus of refugees -- that Lansdale had predicted. But just as Lansdale had been ignored when he warned about the consequences of toppling Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, so a decade later he was ignored when he warned about the consequences of a peace treaty that would render meaningless the sacrifice of fifty-eight thousand American lives."

Boot's final analysis: "Lansdale had a good point in arguing that the American authorities, from Eisenhower to NIxon, had erred in disregarding his advice to strengthen the accountability and reduce the corruption of the South Vietnamese regime. He may have been overly idealistic in imagining that democracy could blossom in the tropical soil of South Vietnam even as a war raged all around, but his critics were overly cynical in imagining that the unpopularity and the corruption of the regime did not matter or that there was absolutely nothing the United States could do to constructively influence a regime so dependent on American aid. Unfortunately, Lansdale's attempts to use his patented methods of friendly persuasion were effectively stillborn after 1956 in large part because he was persistently undercut by bureaucratic rivals -- and after 1965, all other considerations were subordinated to the military imperatives of the American war machine." Of course Lansdale's approach was not guaranteed to succeed either -- "North Vietnam would have been a tough and determined adversary under any circumstances, with more will to win than the United States had. … But his approach, successful or not, would have been more humane and less costly."
Profile Image for Gavin.
547 reviews39 followers
February 27, 2018
I very much enjoyed this. Edward Lansdale's life is a tale of what might have been in Vietnam. The US off and on tries counter-insurgency or COIN, but Lansdale showed what was possible.

It's too bad that the establishment has to go its own way and won't listen to those who have another way.

Kudos to Max Boot for this. A lot of details and research here.

The afterword where Max breaks down Lansdale's gift to us is "the three L's":

1. Learn
2. Like
3. Listen

Read the book and this gift will make sense, plus the L's will help anyone in life, anywhere they live or work.
Profile Image for Bob H.
463 reviews38 followers
January 24, 2019
This is, first off, a comprehensive biography of Edward Lansdale, his origins and upbringing, his career in advertising and as a US gov't operative and adviser, and his involvement with US counterinsurgency efforts in the mid-20th Century, first in the Philippines and later in Vietnam. It's a sympathetic portrayal, and his life certainly was adventurous, and against a background of war and diplomacy. Max Boot makes much of his "Quiet American", hearts-and-minds approach in confronting Communist insurgencies in the two countries, and his friendships with Presidents Magsayay and Ngo Dinh Điem. Boot hints that Lansdale's approach, rather than the massive firepower the US would later apply in Vietnam, might have produced better results -- or at least avoided the loss of over 50,000 US lives and 2 million Vietnamese.

Boot does, at book's end, try to summarize Lansdale's approach, which he summarized as the "3 Ls", Learn (about the country you're working with, and better yet, their language); Like (befriend leaders there); Listen (to them -- don't lecture).

The author laments that Lansdale's example was not followed, was ignored, by later US commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's somewhat speculative, certainly the book title conveys a sense of possibility, but the book does make a point.
Profile Image for Joseph Fuller.
42 reviews
March 12, 2018
The most complete biography of an iconic, if misunderstood figure most often (if incorrectly) identified with the Vietnam War. In some ways is a homage to A Bright Shining Lie by Neil Sheehan. John Paul Vann offered a somewhat better platform for discussing Vietnam, but Lansdale's career allows Boot to tell a story of greater breadth, especially about Magsaysay and the ultimate success of what came to be known as counter-insurgency in the Philippines. Blows the media provided shining armor off of the egomaniacal if talented Daniel Ellsberg. An important contribution to the growing revisionist literature on the war.
Profile Image for Dean.
Author 6 books9 followers
January 21, 2018
Just more confirmation of the tragedy of wasted blood and treasure in Vietnam. Lansdale another dissenting voice ignored about how to fight and win a counter insurgency. Think we still would have lost in Vietnam even if Lansdale had been listened and followed but lost a lot less blood and treasure. Note to present and futute practitioners from Lansdale can't bomb an idea into oblivion. Need a better competitive idea.
Profile Image for Dale Pearl.
461 reviews30 followers
November 13, 2024
Max Boot's "The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam" offers a compelling narrative about the life of legendary CIA operative Edward Lansdale. Boot's biography masterfully reframes our understanding of the Vietnam War, highlighting Lansdale's pioneering "hearts and minds" diplomacy approach, first in the Philippines and then in Vietnam ¹.

The book begins with Lansdale's humble beginnings in the OSS in San Francisco, followed by his CIA assignments in the Philippines and Vietnam. Boot argues that Lansdale's time at the Saigon Military Mission was largely successful, establishing a "stable" government. However, the book's focus on American perspectives often relegates the Vietnamese to secondary roles.

While Boot's writing is engaging, he portrays Lansdale as nearly infallible, relying heavily on American sources and Lansdale's own accounts. This limited perspective overlooks opposing views and critiques of Lansdale's approach. For instance, Boot doesn't fully explore the complexities of US policy in the Philippines, including the pressure on Magsaysay's government to implement reforms.

Key Critiques:

- Lack of Context: Boot doesn't provide sufficient background on French colonialism in Vietnam or the Vietcong's external support.
- Overemphasis on Lansdale: The book relies too heavily on Lansdale's perspective, downplaying opposing views and critiques.
- Simplistic Portrayals: Boot's depiction of Diem and Lansdale's relationship oversimplifies their complex dynamics.

Despite these limitations, "The Road Not Taken" remains a well-written and engaging work. Boot's thesis – that the US might have achieved better outcomes in Vietnam by adopting Lansdale's approach – is thought-provoking. However, it's essential to consider multiple perspectives and critiques to gain a more comprehensive understanding of this pivotal moment in history.

Recommendation: For readers interested in a nuanced exploration of the Vietnam War and Lansdale's role, supplement "The Road Not Taken" with additional sources and perspectives to gain a more balanced understanding.
Profile Image for Diana X. Moga.
Author 1 book2 followers
April 21, 2020
The central thread running through this book lies in the question, can one man change the course of history? In this case, that one man is Edward Lansdale. This biography of Ed Lansdale is told through this lens, with the milestones of Lansdale’s military career culminating with his final, disappointing tour in Vietnam just before the fall of Saigon. Boot admits that the question of whether Lansdale could have changed the course of events must be left to speculation, as the answer is of course, unknowable. Boot does go so far as to argue that Lansdale was perhaps the only American in a late 60s who’s-who of policy heavy-weights, with the perspicacity to recognize that success in Vietnam boiled down to ideology and relationships, not tactics and attrition. Perhaps Ed Lansdale is not that epic. One man cannot change the course of tens of thousands American KIA. But Lansdale was right about a thing or two. Maybe heeding his advice would have precipitated a different kind of domino effect.
Profile Image for Stuart Miller.
310 reviews3 followers
July 30, 2018
A sympathetic but objective examination of the life and times of Edward Lansdale, the "T.E. Lawrence of Asia". Boot believes that Lansdale has been unfairly dismissed by journalists and historians as either naive or crazy in his approach to combating Communist insurgencies in the "third world" countries founded in the aftermath of World War II and the demise of European colonial empires. Boot makes the argument that Lansdale was one of the few who believed these conflicts were as much political as they were military, if not more so. Despite Lansdale's success in applying his ideas in both the Philippines and initially in South Vietnam, his inability to work smoothly with his superiors and other bureaucrats made him a pariah to many in powerful government positions and helped to ensure that he was eventually ignored. Whether Lansdale's "hearts and minds" approach could have prevented the eventual Communist victory in Vietnam is certainly debatable, but Boot argues that had the U.S. followed Lansdale's ideas, the destruction, loss of life, and national trauma might have been far less. A thoughtful treatment of this still controversial subject.
Profile Image for Gerry Connolly.
600 reviews35 followers
July 9, 2021
Max Boot’s biography of US counterinsurgency expert Edward Landsdale The Road Not Taken is a cautionary tale of American hubris. Landsdale is credited with beating the communist-inspired Huk rebellion in the Philippines in the 1950’s by inspiring civic engagement, reforming the military and identifying a leader who inspired (president Ramon Magsaysay). He tried similar approaches in Vietnam but could not overcome the endemic corruption and distant leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem and a resistant bureaucracy in Saigon and Washington. Boot soft pedals Landsdale’s rogue style that alienated powerful folks at State, Dod and the CIA. If his ingratiating ways in the field had been deployed with US government officials he might have had more success in Vietnam. Boot also spends inordinate attention to Landsdale’s unhappy marriage and longtime relationship with his Philippine paramour.
Profile Image for Jeffrey (Akiva) Savett.
620 reviews34 followers
August 6, 2019
Yet another compelling history of the Vietnam War. At one point, I’d read too many in a row: A Bright Shining Lie, The Best and The Brightest, Dispatches. All amazing. But I needed a break for a bit.

Boot takes a similar road as Sheehan’s monumental accomplishment in A Bright Shining Lie, looking at the lead up to war and thereafter through the eyes and life of one interesting individual. Although I can’t say I found Boot’s book as page “turningly” fascinating as Sheehan’s, I “liked” reading this very much.

My next book on the subject will look at the war, not from a person’s perspective, but one particular battle/city’s: Mark Bowden’s Hue 1968.
Profile Image for Matthew Gleason.
30 reviews
July 24, 2018
A phenomenal look at the life of an extraordinary American whose work in the Philippines and Vietnam must not be lost in the expansive writings on those regions. Max Boot expertly weaves his narrative of Lansdale’s career with the political machinations of the time, and delivers a thought provoking read that is germane to the low intensity conflicts of today. I rank this alongside Bernard Fall’s seminal work, “A Street With No Joy,” in its ability to define the nature of the Indochina/Vietnam Wars. This book leaves one wondering what might have been, and produces a blueprint for understanding current and future friction points in Asia.
Profile Image for Alan Chrisman.
5 reviews1 follower
January 11, 2025
Ed Landsdale, CIA operative who could have changed Vietnam War if US government had listened to him. He believed way was to win the hearts and minds of Vietnamese people, not just military means which resulted in failure. His methods had worked in Philippines and Malaysia. Interesting too, he'd previously been advisor to Kennedys whom after embarrassment of Bay of Pigs fiasco wanted to overthrow Castro even more. South Viet president, Diem, was assassinated, with US government approval, just the month before JFK assassinated.
Profile Image for Thomas Terence.
107 reviews1 follower
August 21, 2019
A sad story of a person who had a different approach to Vietnam. Based on this book, Edward Lansdale should have been listened to more.
Profile Image for John .
45 reviews1 follower
March 12, 2018
Great book

Great allot history lessons we should have learned and followed after Vietnam and would helped in Iraq and Afghanistan you wonder why are leaders don’t read more history
Profile Image for Jack.
332 reviews
July 18, 2018
This book is a dense historical account of the life of Edward Langsdale, post WWII Operative in the Philippines and later in South Vietnam. It is a clear, compelling and interesting tale of a real spy in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s.

It bothered me that through the entire account of this liberal interventionist, the author never asks the basic questions posed by the consistent failure of modern imperialism. The CIA was an arrogant group of whacky spies with little restraint and a seeming lack of judgement. The weren’t creative free thinkers, they were dangerous nincompoops. The American exploits and the war that followed were one of the darkest in a period of fruitless attempts to “help” a group by supporting them against the general will of the people.
Profile Image for Tom.
450 reviews6 followers
March 8, 2018
I found this book to be quite interesting and informative. I had no idea that Ed Lansdale actually existed and had the influence that he had. Although it wS not always followed, his strategy if implemented in Vietnam May have caused a different outcome. We will never know.

Quite detailed and an exhaustive treatise, this book is not a quick read.
42 reviews
July 21, 2018
Long but very good. Hearts and minds, Civic action. Godfather of counterinsurgency.
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