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The Phoney Victory: The World War II Illusion
Was World War II really the `Good War'? In the years since the declaration of peace in 1945 many myths have sprung up around the conflict in the victorious nations. In this book, Peter Hitchens deconstructs the many fables which have become associated with the narrative of the `Good War'. Whilst not criticising or doubting the need for war against Nazi Germany at some stage, Hitchens does query whether September 1939 was the right moment, or the independence of Poland the right issue. He points out that in the summer of 1939 Britain and France were wholly unprepared for a major European war and that this quickly became apparent in the conflict that ensued. He also rejects the retroactive claim that Britain went to war in 1939 to save the Jewish population of Europe. On the contrary, the beginning and intensification of war made it easier for Germany to begin the policy of mass murder in secret as well as closing most escape routes. In a provocative, but deeply-researched book, Hitchens questions the most common assumptions surrounding World War II, turning on its head the myth of Britain's role in a `Good War'.
318 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2018
About the author
Peter Hitchens
19 books288 followersPeter Jonathan Hitchens (born 28 October 1951) is an English journalist and author. He was educated at The Leys School Cambridge, Oxford College of Further Education and the University of York. He has published six books, including The Abolition of Britain, The Rage Against God, and The War We Never Fought. He is a frequent critic of political correctness and describes himself as an Anglican Christian and Burkean conservative.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 58 reviews
April 3, 2020
The Good War Psychosis
Appeasement is the magic word, the killer app, the compelling knell of imminent doom in military policy debate. Use it and armed conflict becomes far more likely. Everyone knows that it was appeasement that started the war of 1939; that appeasement is something the world cannot tolerate faced with a Saddam, or an Khomeini, or a Kim Jong Un; that democratic electorates respond negatively to politicians who are accused of appeasement. The appeasement card is trumps when it comes to national policy.
That the events of Munich in 1939 involving Chamberlain and Hitler should have such permanent mythical significance in so many countries is remarkable. Those events are symbolic of the need for what has come to be called The Good War; and have been used repeatedly to justify armed conflict by democratic leaders ever since.
Hitchens has two central threads in The Phoney Victory. The first is that the narrative of the Second World War, particularly with regard to appeasement of evil but also extending to the ‘moralising’ of the conduct of the conflict itself, is largely mythical. The use of this narrative to justify involvement in subsequent conflicts is reprehensible and no more than manipulative propaganda on the part of government.
Hitchens’s second thread is that the lack of both diplomatic and military skill by several generations of British governmental leadership has been disastrous for the country. At almost every juncture, exactly the wrong decision has been taken. The result has been the loss of many lives and much treasure with no gain whatsoever. To call this outcome ‘victory’ is, for Hitchens, obscene.
Hitchens refers to the attitudes contained in the evolved narrative of war as a theology. As he says, “The theology of the ‘Good War’ demands a great deal of evasion, suppression and forgetfulness.” I think he is right to do so. There is a metaphysical component of this narrative which is obvious once stated. It pervades discussion in debates about NATO, the European Union, national boundaries and the motivations of national leaders.
The Good War is that which has divine approval. Despite the secularisation of society, such approval is still implicitly required for the exertion of armed power. Once such approval is claimed - by George Bush, Tony Blair, or even Vladimir Putin - the mythology of the 1939-45 War is set in motion. Young men and women are sent away to improve the prospects for the world. That such improvement never happens, seems to elude the grasp of the true believers in charge.
Appeasement is the magic word, the killer app, the compelling knell of imminent doom in military policy debate. Use it and armed conflict becomes far more likely. Everyone knows that it was appeasement that started the war of 1939; that appeasement is something the world cannot tolerate faced with a Saddam, or an Khomeini, or a Kim Jong Un; that democratic electorates respond negatively to politicians who are accused of appeasement. The appeasement card is trumps when it comes to national policy.
That the events of Munich in 1939 involving Chamberlain and Hitler should have such permanent mythical significance in so many countries is remarkable. Those events are symbolic of the need for what has come to be called The Good War; and have been used repeatedly to justify armed conflict by democratic leaders ever since.
Hitchens has two central threads in The Phoney Victory. The first is that the narrative of the Second World War, particularly with regard to appeasement of evil but also extending to the ‘moralising’ of the conduct of the conflict itself, is largely mythical. The use of this narrative to justify involvement in subsequent conflicts is reprehensible and no more than manipulative propaganda on the part of government.
Hitchens’s second thread is that the lack of both diplomatic and military skill by several generations of British governmental leadership has been disastrous for the country. At almost every juncture, exactly the wrong decision has been taken. The result has been the loss of many lives and much treasure with no gain whatsoever. To call this outcome ‘victory’ is, for Hitchens, obscene.
Hitchens refers to the attitudes contained in the evolved narrative of war as a theology. As he says, “The theology of the ‘Good War’ demands a great deal of evasion, suppression and forgetfulness.” I think he is right to do so. There is a metaphysical component of this narrative which is obvious once stated. It pervades discussion in debates about NATO, the European Union, national boundaries and the motivations of national leaders.
The Good War is that which has divine approval. Despite the secularisation of society, such approval is still implicitly required for the exertion of armed power. Once such approval is claimed - by George Bush, Tony Blair, or even Vladimir Putin - the mythology of the 1939-45 War is set in motion. Young men and women are sent away to improve the prospects for the world. That such improvement never happens, seems to elude the grasp of the true believers in charge.
October 9, 2018
This is an excellent but troubling read.
If my dad, who was an eighteen year old British Army conscript in 1945, were still alive, I'd have bought this book for him or lent it to him.
Or maybe I wouldn't have. Maybe he'd have found it too sad and upsetting. I found it sad and upsetting, and I was born in the sixties.
My dad would have agreed with Peter Hitchens revised view of Churchill. However, as far as I am aware my dad was always very much aware of Churchill's many flaws, failures and mistakes. My dad was far from alone, it's worth remembering that Churchill and the Conservative Party lost the 1945 general election.
Peter Hitchens is just over 10 years older than me and from a very different background. Peter Hitchens was privately educated, and went to Oxford. I was born in a council flat, grew up on council estates and left school at 16 with no worthwhile qualifications. My dad worked on the buses for London Transport. But like, Peter Hitchens, I grew up building WWII Airfix models, reading Commando Comics, and watching films like The Cruel Sea, The Dam Busters and Reach For The Sky. But unlike Peter Hitchens, possibly because of our Working-class background, my parents were no fans of Churchill and didn't hesitate to say so.
My dad was the occupying British Army in postwar Europe and told a few stories, at least one which, remembering it brings tears to my eyes. So he was aware to some extent of the suffering of the German civilian population. But I'm not sure he knew just how horrific it was, or the scale of the suffering.
I know the most difficult bit for my dad would be acknowledging and comin to terms with what RAF Bomber Command did. I know this because I can recall him becoming emotional and then withdrawing from the conversation when I suggested the bombing of Dresden was a war crime. He got up from the table and with what seemed more like sadness than anger said "well they bloody started it". But as Peter Hitchens points out, this is not actually correct.
I think he would also have found the final chapter depressing - as I did.
Peter Hitchens has been very brave to write this book. I have personally experienced the type arguments and reactions questioning the myths of WWII has amongst my country man. I consider myself a patriot, but like Peter Hitchens, I do not think that means 'my country right or wrong'. There are many things I disagree with Peter Hitchens but with this book he has risen even further in my already high estimation. The man is a national treasure.
Peter Hitchens expresses his concerns that myths of WWII are used as justifications for wars and military actions. In this he echoes Pat Buchanan's book on Churchill. I've read Pat Buchanan's book, and much of it was a disturbing revelation to me. Peter Hitchens mentions Buchanan's book, and although Hitchens states he rejects many of the conclusions Buchanan drew Hitchens writes he was very much influenced by the book.
NB: I apologise for the numerous edits I've been trying to write this using a smart phone.
If my dad, who was an eighteen year old British Army conscript in 1945, were still alive, I'd have bought this book for him or lent it to him.
Or maybe I wouldn't have. Maybe he'd have found it too sad and upsetting. I found it sad and upsetting, and I was born in the sixties.
My dad would have agreed with Peter Hitchens revised view of Churchill. However, as far as I am aware my dad was always very much aware of Churchill's many flaws, failures and mistakes. My dad was far from alone, it's worth remembering that Churchill and the Conservative Party lost the 1945 general election.
Peter Hitchens is just over 10 years older than me and from a very different background. Peter Hitchens was privately educated, and went to Oxford. I was born in a council flat, grew up on council estates and left school at 16 with no worthwhile qualifications. My dad worked on the buses for London Transport. But like, Peter Hitchens, I grew up building WWII Airfix models, reading Commando Comics, and watching films like The Cruel Sea, The Dam Busters and Reach For The Sky. But unlike Peter Hitchens, possibly because of our Working-class background, my parents were no fans of Churchill and didn't hesitate to say so.
My dad was the occupying British Army in postwar Europe and told a few stories, at least one which, remembering it brings tears to my eyes. So he was aware to some extent of the suffering of the German civilian population. But I'm not sure he knew just how horrific it was, or the scale of the suffering.
I know the most difficult bit for my dad would be acknowledging and comin to terms with what RAF Bomber Command did. I know this because I can recall him becoming emotional and then withdrawing from the conversation when I suggested the bombing of Dresden was a war crime. He got up from the table and with what seemed more like sadness than anger said "well they bloody started it". But as Peter Hitchens points out, this is not actually correct.
I think he would also have found the final chapter depressing - as I did.
Peter Hitchens has been very brave to write this book. I have personally experienced the type arguments and reactions questioning the myths of WWII has amongst my country man. I consider myself a patriot, but like Peter Hitchens, I do not think that means 'my country right or wrong'. There are many things I disagree with Peter Hitchens but with this book he has risen even further in my already high estimation. The man is a national treasure.
Peter Hitchens expresses his concerns that myths of WWII are used as justifications for wars and military actions. In this he echoes Pat Buchanan's book on Churchill. I've read Pat Buchanan's book, and much of it was a disturbing revelation to me. Peter Hitchens mentions Buchanan's book, and although Hitchens states he rejects many of the conclusions Buchanan drew Hitchens writes he was very much influenced by the book.
NB: I apologise for the numerous edits I've been trying to write this using a smart phone.
February 19, 2019
This book is very relevant in the backdrop of the Brexit decision by the British people on 2016. The seeds of the great dissent felt bu the British people started right after VE day when the ‘victors’ were subjected to years of austerity and hardship. Must have been extremely frustrating for the victorious nation when they saw the loser Germans slowly build back a successful and prosperous nation rising like a Phoenix from the ashes. It was expected by the germans to pay for the war damage but why were the victorious British made to pay by the real victors USA?
I think this alternate story of the British standing alone against the Germans is a continuation of the war time propaganda started by the British war time establishment which has never been challenged. And i think now it is far too late to address this historical anomaly, because after Brexit the British establishment will have to prepare its people for austerity all ever again as once again the mighty British are all alone fighting god knows who.
I think this alternate story of the British standing alone against the Germans is a continuation of the war time propaganda started by the British war time establishment which has never been challenged. And i think now it is far too late to address this historical anomaly, because after Brexit the British establishment will have to prepare its people for austerity all ever again as once again the mighty British are all alone fighting god knows who.
June 2, 2019
"Peace, precarious peace, depends now, more than ever, on our casting off these fantasies of chivalry and benevolence, and ceasing to hide the savage truth from ourselves."
This outstanding and morally courageous book is a must read for non-interventionists. The thesis is not that intervention in WW2 was unnecessary. It is instead that the Allies' involvement in WW2 was far more morally complicated than is commonly believed. It also takes an axe to the silly, shallow sentimentalism of the war of good verses evil. No doubt- the National Socialists were more evil than the Allies- that is indisputable- but that does not absolve the Allies of some of their appalling and excessive crimes against innocent women and children, many of whom were German. The book offers a complicated picture of Churchill. He is not the blundering buffoon that some have portrayed him to be, nor is he the gritty, determined savior of the West. Far from it. Hitchens' defense of Neville Chamberlain was particularly interesting. Here Hitchens really channels the contrarian ethic of his elder, late brother Christopher. This book is important because too often WW2 is used to justify reckless, unnecessary intervention abroad. "He who controls the past," as Orwell wrote, "controls the future."
True- Hitchens' writing does have some defects. There is weary nostalgia for the good old days. Like his brother Christopher, Peter does sometimes love going into excessive detail about an Evelyn Waugh novel. Though I am a dedicated reader, this has much less purchase on me as an American.
There are many depressing takeaways from this book- but one that other reviewers probably have not mentioned is the disparity between journalistic writing in the UK and that in the US. I cannot imagine a TV talking head in the US writing such a well-researched and judicious work. The journalists of America are far dimmer and less educated. One thinks of the beady-eyed frat boy Joe Scarborough, whose sole contribution to the public disclosure is an occasional "What would Churchill have done?" (The man has probably never read anything more serious than the lowbrow popular biographies of his frequent guest, the self-loathing Southern dimwit Jon Meacham) If more US journalists were like Peter Hitchens, that is, intellectual, erudite, and not committed to predictable partisan sympathies, we would be far better off.
This outstanding and morally courageous book is a must read for non-interventionists. The thesis is not that intervention in WW2 was unnecessary. It is instead that the Allies' involvement in WW2 was far more morally complicated than is commonly believed. It also takes an axe to the silly, shallow sentimentalism of the war of good verses evil. No doubt- the National Socialists were more evil than the Allies- that is indisputable- but that does not absolve the Allies of some of their appalling and excessive crimes against innocent women and children, many of whom were German. The book offers a complicated picture of Churchill. He is not the blundering buffoon that some have portrayed him to be, nor is he the gritty, determined savior of the West. Far from it. Hitchens' defense of Neville Chamberlain was particularly interesting. Here Hitchens really channels the contrarian ethic of his elder, late brother Christopher. This book is important because too often WW2 is used to justify reckless, unnecessary intervention abroad. "He who controls the past," as Orwell wrote, "controls the future."
True- Hitchens' writing does have some defects. There is weary nostalgia for the good old days. Like his brother Christopher, Peter does sometimes love going into excessive detail about an Evelyn Waugh novel. Though I am a dedicated reader, this has much less purchase on me as an American.
There are many depressing takeaways from this book- but one that other reviewers probably have not mentioned is the disparity between journalistic writing in the UK and that in the US. I cannot imagine a TV talking head in the US writing such a well-researched and judicious work. The journalists of America are far dimmer and less educated. One thinks of the beady-eyed frat boy Joe Scarborough, whose sole contribution to the public disclosure is an occasional "What would Churchill have done?" (The man has probably never read anything more serious than the lowbrow popular biographies of his frequent guest, the self-loathing Southern dimwit Jon Meacham) If more US journalists were like Peter Hitchens, that is, intellectual, erudite, and not committed to predictable partisan sympathies, we would be far better off.
March 29, 2020
I'd heard this book was somewhat controversial as it attempts to dispel some of the heroic myths the British have bestowed on WW2.
I don't know if it's because I'm particularly well versed on this period of history, but I found this not in the least controversial.
However, I'm pretty sure there's still a sizable portion of the public that have a rather rosy image of those catastrophic years, but I can't help but think this was probably necessary to keep the country functioning during a period of rapid decline.
Peter Hitchens writes well and is easy to read. If you are not a student of history and want to understand the real history of WW2 as opposed to the Hollywood version, then I'd recommend this book as a good launching point to widen your knowledge.
I don't know if it's because I'm particularly well versed on this period of history, but I found this not in the least controversial.
However, I'm pretty sure there's still a sizable portion of the public that have a rather rosy image of those catastrophic years, but I can't help but think this was probably necessary to keep the country functioning during a period of rapid decline.
Peter Hitchens writes well and is easy to read. If you are not a student of history and want to understand the real history of WW2 as opposed to the Hollywood version, then I'd recommend this book as a good launching point to widen your knowledge.
March 28, 2024
"The belief that 1914–18 had been the ‘War to End War’ melted away, of course, in September 1939, when it turned out to have been rather emphatically ‘The War that Did Not End War’. Indeed, it could equally have been called ‘The War that Led Directly to Another War’. In its place, there has grown a new belief in the ‘Good War’ of 1939 to 1945...
...This war, we believe, was so good that men constantly seek to fight it again, so that they can bathe in its virtue..."
The Phoney Victory was an interesting contrarian work. The Second World War has become part of Western Civilization's creation myth, and this book runs afoul of many things we've been told about it.
Author Peter Jonathan Hitchens is an English conservative writer, broadcaster, journalist, and commentator. He writes for The Mail on Sunday and was a foreign correspondent reporting from both Moscow and Washington, D.C.
Peter Hitchens:
Sadly, Hitchens writes with a style here that could be described as somewhat stereotypical British prose; tending to be long-winded and flat more often than not. While I did follow the plot, I found the lackluster presentation style losing my attention numerous times...
As touched on above, the topic of the book is a contentious one. Hitchens argues that much of what has come to pass as common knowledge about the war deserves further scrutiny. I'll say right up front that I'm not personally qualified to pick apart the veracity of any of the claims here. So for the scope of this review, I will only comment on the book's presentation, and will not be making claims for or against the case laid out here.
The quote from the start of this review continues:
He says this of the thesis of the book:
The meat and potatoes of the book centers around the following points (among others); each of which could (and have) been examined in volumes all on their own:
• He believes that Britain's entry into World War II led to its rapid decline after the war. This was because, among other things, it could not finance the war and was not prepared. As a result, it had to surrender much of its wealth and power to avoid bankruptcy.
• Hitchens asserts that the Americans did not help Britain with lend-lease programs out of charitable motives. He says that Britain paid dearly for this aid, namely in the form of liquidating many of its assets and turning over ~£26 billion (adjusted to 2018) of gold bullion that would ultimately end up in Fort Knox. This had the effect of completely financially devastating the nation, and it has never recovered its Empire since.
• He argues that the Allies committed war crimes against the German people, namely; their carpet bombing of German civilians. Arthur Harris is singled out for his bombing of civilians; notably in the firebombing of Dresden, although Hitchens mentions many other cities turned into literal fire tornadoes.
Part of this was done to appease an ever-increasingly upset Stalin, who was waiting for the Aliies to launch a second front to the war for years:
• He also rejects the retroactive claim that Britain went to war in 1939 to save the Jewish population of Europe. On the contrary, the beginning and intensification of war made it easier for Germany to begin the policy of mass murder in secret as well as closing most escape routes.
He also asserts that anti-sematism was running rampant in most of Europe and North America at the time, and that the Allied nations did little to help the Jewish refugees.
In a bit of controversial writing that I have read elsewhere, he says that the Allies made no efforts to stop the Holocaust. All they had to do was destroy the train tracks. He writes:
• Hitchens also points the finger at the end result of this global conflict: England entered the war ostensibly to protect Poland from invasion. However, after the hostilities seized, the Allies handed over most of Eastern Europe (ironically including Poland) over to Stalin, where it would remain under an Iron Curtain for the next ~50 years:
Stopping short of a full condemnation of British policy circa WW2, he makes this disclaimer:
********************
Unfortunately, my biggest criticism of the book was the overall style it was presented in. It was just too dry and tedious for my finicky tastes. To roughly paraphrase Freddie Mercury: Write whatever you want, just don't make it boring... I place a high premium on how readable my books are, and sadly, this one missed the mark here...
The Phoney Victory was still a thought-provoking read. I would definitely recommend it to anyone interested.
3.5 stars.
...This war, we believe, was so good that men constantly seek to fight it again, so that they can bathe in its virtue..."
The Phoney Victory was an interesting contrarian work. The Second World War has become part of Western Civilization's creation myth, and this book runs afoul of many things we've been told about it.
Author Peter Jonathan Hitchens is an English conservative writer, broadcaster, journalist, and commentator. He writes for The Mail on Sunday and was a foreign correspondent reporting from both Moscow and Washington, D.C.
Peter Hitchens:
Sadly, Hitchens writes with a style here that could be described as somewhat stereotypical British prose; tending to be long-winded and flat more often than not. While I did follow the plot, I found the lackluster presentation style losing my attention numerous times...
As touched on above, the topic of the book is a contentious one. Hitchens argues that much of what has come to pass as common knowledge about the war deserves further scrutiny. I'll say right up front that I'm not personally qualified to pick apart the veracity of any of the claims here. So for the scope of this review, I will only comment on the book's presentation, and will not be making claims for or against the case laid out here.
The quote from the start of this review continues:
"...Its passion and parables, and its characters, are nowadays better known than those of the Bible. Instead of the triumphal ride into Jerusalem, the Last Supper and the betrayal at Gethsemane, the Crucifixion and Resurrection, the Supper at Emmaus and the coming of the Holy Ghost in tongues of fire, we have a modern substitute: Winston the outcast prophet in the wilderness, living on cigars and champagne rather than locusts and wild honey, but slighted, exiled and prophetic all the same. We have the betrayal at Munich, the miraculous survival of virtue amid defeat at Dunkirk and in the Battle of Britain, and the resurrection of freedom and democracy on D-Day."
He says this of the thesis of the book:
"...One day, this dangerous fable of the glorious anti-fascist war against evil may destroy us all simply because we have a government too vain and inexperienced to restrain itself. That is why it is so important to dispel it."
The meat and potatoes of the book centers around the following points (among others); each of which could (and have) been examined in volumes all on their own:
• He believes that Britain's entry into World War II led to its rapid decline after the war. This was because, among other things, it could not finance the war and was not prepared. As a result, it had to surrender much of its wealth and power to avoid bankruptcy.
• Hitchens asserts that the Americans did not help Britain with lend-lease programs out of charitable motives. He says that Britain paid dearly for this aid, namely in the form of liquidating many of its assets and turning over ~£26 billion (adjusted to 2018) of gold bullion that would ultimately end up in Fort Knox. This had the effect of completely financially devastating the nation, and it has never recovered its Empire since.
• He argues that the Allies committed war crimes against the German people, namely; their carpet bombing of German civilians. Arthur Harris is singled out for his bombing of civilians; notably in the firebombing of Dresden, although Hitchens mentions many other cities turned into literal fire tornadoes.
Part of this was done to appease an ever-increasingly upset Stalin, who was waiting for the Aliies to launch a second front to the war for years:
"There is little doubt that much of the bombing of Germany was done to please and appease Josef Stalin. Stalin jeered at Churchill for his failure to open a Second Front and to fight Hitler’s armies in Europe, and ceaselessly pressed him to open such a front – something Churchill was politically and militarily reluctant to do. Bombing Germany, though it did not satisfy Stalin’s demands for an invasion, at least reassured him that we were doing something, and so lessened his pressure on us to open a second front.Curtis LeMay and the firebombing of Tokyo could also be implicated. LeMay himself said: "If we'd lost the war, we'd all have been prosecuted as war criminals."
Pleasing Stalin – or at least avoiding his disfavour – would be one of Winston Churchill’s preoccupations in the years that followed...
...the killing of German civilians, and the disruption of German rule in central Europe, was an effective and practicable way of soothing the Soviet monster’s rages...
...Soon after his first ill-tempered encounter with Stalin, Churchill was pressed by Harris for a commitment to a bombing offensive. Churchill responded that he was committed to bombing, partly because it would look bad to stop such a major part of Britain’s war effort, but he did not expect it to have decisive results in 1943 or bring the war to an end. But it was, Churchill said, ‘better than doing nothing’."
"March 1945. Tokyo hit by Operation Meetinghouse, the single most destructive bombing raid of this or any war. 16 square miles of central Tokyo annihilated, over 1 million made homeless, with an estimated 100,000 civilian deaths. (To put these figures into context, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima some months later killed 70,000, and the one dropped on Nagasaki killed 35,000.)"
• He also rejects the retroactive claim that Britain went to war in 1939 to save the Jewish population of Europe. On the contrary, the beginning and intensification of war made it easier for Germany to begin the policy of mass murder in secret as well as closing most escape routes.
He also asserts that anti-sematism was running rampant in most of Europe and North America at the time, and that the Allied nations did little to help the Jewish refugees.
In a bit of controversial writing that I have read elsewhere, he says that the Allies made no efforts to stop the Holocaust. All they had to do was destroy the train tracks. He writes:
"It is true that nobody could have known at the time that the National Socialist persecution of Jews would end in the extermination camps. Even Hitler had not yet conceived of them. Yet when undoubted evidence of these camps later reached the USA and Britain, these countries took no direct action to prevent the murder, to destroy railway tracks leading to the murder camps or to rescue those who remained trapped in Europe. The Bermuda Conference of April 1943 likewise rejected any plans to relax immigration quotas, either in the USA or in Palestine, or to take special measures to allow Europe’s remaining Jews to escape Hitler. Yet by then many credible reports strongly suggesting large-scale murder had reached the outside world."
• Hitchens also points the finger at the end result of this global conflict: England entered the war ostensibly to protect Poland from invasion. However, after the hostilities seized, the Allies handed over most of Eastern Europe (ironically including Poland) over to Stalin, where it would remain under an Iron Curtain for the next ~50 years:
"And what can we say about World War II’s final settlement, at Yalta? Viewed coldly, this cynical action, a sort of large-scale protection racket in which Stalin played the racketeer and the Western Allies his cowed victims, was a far more disgraceful episode of appeasement than anything even contemplated at Munich in 1938. This unheroic pact meant the handing over of millions of innocent and defenceless people to a cruel foreign conqueror. Some of them – such as the Cossacks – were disgracefully sent in locked railway cars into the custody of Stalin’s NKVD execution squads. They had good reason to fear for their lives, but their frantic pleas to remain in the West were ignored. No doubt the penetration of our establishment by sympathisers of the Communist empire prevented us for many years from admitting the revolting nature of the Soviet state. But perhaps our embarrassment about having had such people as valued allies also played its part in that reticence."
Stopping short of a full condemnation of British policy circa WW2, he makes this disclaimer:
"I am not saying that Britain should have remained neutral throughout the European War that began in 1939. I am saying that we might have done better to follow the wise example of the USA, and wait until we and our allies were militarily and diplomatically ready before entering that conflict. I am suggesting that our diplomacy, especially after March 1939, allowed others to dictate and hasten the timing of that war in ways that did not suit us or our main ally, France.
Above all, I am not saying that the war against Hitler was unnecessary. At some point, for the good of Germany, Europe and the world, Hitler’s career had to be ended, probably by force, from within or without. Even if you do not believe that the internal affairs of other countries are the business of other countries, you may hope that repulsive regimes may be brought to an end. And sometimes the most effective way of doing so is inflicting foreign policy defeats on them, robbing them of prestige at home.
The startling thing is that, as matters turned out, Britain ended up playing a surprisingly small part in the overthrow of Hitler. It was not British troops who stormed Hitler’s bunker or planted their flag on the ruins of the Reichstag. It is still difficult to mention this, or to criticise aspects of our war effort. But it is so."
********************
Unfortunately, my biggest criticism of the book was the overall style it was presented in. It was just too dry and tedious for my finicky tastes. To roughly paraphrase Freddie Mercury: Write whatever you want, just don't make it boring... I place a high premium on how readable my books are, and sadly, this one missed the mark here...
The Phoney Victory was still a thought-provoking read. I would definitely recommend it to anyone interested.
3.5 stars.
October 30, 2018
Excellent book which will not be to everyone's taste because the author, Peter Hitchens, takes a very clear-eyed, non sentimental and mainly myth busting approach to the subject of Britain's role in WWII. He takes aim at several sacred cows: the confused and perhaps wrong-headed pretext for war, the cult that surrounds Winston Churchill, the so-called 'special relationship' between Britain and the USA, the mess of Dunkirk, and the carpet bombing of German cities by the RAF. The book has obviously been well researched and deeply thought through and is full of new information, at least it was new to me. I knew almost nothing about the forced repatriations of ethnic Germans conducted after the end of the war for example and will now find out more, thanks to this book. As I said, some people will really not like 'The Phoney Victory' but I found it to be an enlightening, provoking and, at times, very sad read.
March 12, 2020
Just an audiobook I listened to on long runs. Hitchens is reliable as ever, producing a book with plenty of food for thought and plenty of things that make you want to kick him up the arse.
He sets out to dispel the myth of world war 2 as a manichean struggle of pure good against pure evil, mainly because as such it is used to justify many other, less worthwhile wars, simply by comparing the enemy to Hitler and opponents of war as appeasers. Obviously, in doing this, he is aware of the risk of seeming to downplay the holocaust or engage in moral equivalence, so he starts off by laying down a few pages of covering fire, followed up with occasional extra bursts whenever he gets to an especially controversial bit. There are valuable reminders that for Britain it was a war of national interest, not (at the time) a pure struggle against genocide. He also reminds us of the reluctance of the Americans to join, the dubious morality of siding with Stalin, and the horrendous cost in civilian life inflicted by allied bombing raids.
Of course, in his eagerness to contradict absolutely all received wisdom, (Hitler wasn't planning to invade Britain, Churchill was a bastard, the battle of Britain was no big deal etc etc) he occasionally contradicts himself. So, he laments that Britain didn't wait till later before declaring War to give themselves time to rearm, and also that, having declared it, they waited for so long before attacking. Now, you can believe one of these two things, but they seem mutually contradictory.
Anyway, all good stuff I'm sure. It picks up themes from some of his other books and of course it is well argued, well written and never boring for a single second.
He sets out to dispel the myth of world war 2 as a manichean struggle of pure good against pure evil, mainly because as such it is used to justify many other, less worthwhile wars, simply by comparing the enemy to Hitler and opponents of war as appeasers. Obviously, in doing this, he is aware of the risk of seeming to downplay the holocaust or engage in moral equivalence, so he starts off by laying down a few pages of covering fire, followed up with occasional extra bursts whenever he gets to an especially controversial bit. There are valuable reminders that for Britain it was a war of national interest, not (at the time) a pure struggle against genocide. He also reminds us of the reluctance of the Americans to join, the dubious morality of siding with Stalin, and the horrendous cost in civilian life inflicted by allied bombing raids.
Of course, in his eagerness to contradict absolutely all received wisdom, (Hitler wasn't planning to invade Britain, Churchill was a bastard, the battle of Britain was no big deal etc etc) he occasionally contradicts himself. So, he laments that Britain didn't wait till later before declaring War to give themselves time to rearm, and also that, having declared it, they waited for so long before attacking. Now, you can believe one of these two things, but they seem mutually contradictory.
Anyway, all good stuff I'm sure. It picks up themes from some of his other books and of course it is well argued, well written and never boring for a single second.
October 9, 2018
A stimulating challenge to the pieties of the official British history of World War II, Hitchens argues that Britain's decision to go to war in 1939 was a miscalculation of historic importance; that the so called 'special relationship' between the USA and Britain during the war (and since!) was far more a coldly calculating move by America to squeeze the British dry before taking over their role as superpower; and that Britain's conduct of the war consisted of, in addition to the humiliating defeat at Dunkirk and loss of Singapore, bombing German civilians in a manner that should be considered a war crime. An otherwise stimulating read is somewhat marred by a conclusion that descends into a rant against modern Britain, but is entertaining nonetheless.
Some quotations: "... the clotted, sickly assembly of sentiments which make up the supposed 'special relationship' between the countries.'
"...the continued popularity of bombing was then, and is now, an effect of universal suffrage democracy, whose wars, as we know, are crueller than those of kings"
Some quotations: "... the clotted, sickly assembly of sentiments which make up the supposed 'special relationship' between the countries.'
"...the continued popularity of bombing was then, and is now, an effect of universal suffrage democracy, whose wars, as we know, are crueller than those of kings"
May 5, 2019
Fantastic!
A wonderfully written, as you would expect, masterpiece from Peter Hitchens. So many myths and patriotic bubbles are popped it is hard to count. I will say, as somewhat of a WW2 history buff, this is one of the few books I've read that really challenged my base assumptions. And this is a good thing! You will come away shaken, but better informed. The long sepia-toned, legendary and glorious bender we have all been on has left for one hell of a hangover. This should be required reading for anyone interested in the history of the second world war.
A wonderfully written, as you would expect, masterpiece from Peter Hitchens. So many myths and patriotic bubbles are popped it is hard to count. I will say, as somewhat of a WW2 history buff, this is one of the few books I've read that really challenged my base assumptions. And this is a good thing! You will come away shaken, but better informed. The long sepia-toned, legendary and glorious bender we have all been on has left for one hell of a hangover. This should be required reading for anyone interested in the history of the second world war.
November 22, 2018
Without doubt one of the finest books I've read about World War II, busts the myths and explains in forensic detail the futility of the conflict on all sides. Easily one of the best books I've read all year, it's some reality check.
August 17, 2022
Peter Hitchens has long been one who has not shied away from unpopular truths, and this book is iconoclastic even by his standards. While many "bulldog patriots" find it impossible to imagine a patriotic right-wing commentator criticising Britain's role in World War II, Mr Hitchens shatters the myth that only crazy SJWs or professional race-baiters can be critical of Winston Churchill et al. Admittedly, this book is not a work of original scholarship, yet nor is it a work of propaganda. The author summarises the arguments of established historians in this challenging synthesis.
To briefly summarise the book's thesis, while Mr Hitchens deplores the German National Socialist regime, he rejects the simplistic "goodies vs baddies" narrative, Britain did not join the war to fight tyranny and racism, nor is he convinced that we were at any real threat of invasion from Germany and that our bombing of German cities constituted a war crime. No, he is not saying that the Holocaust did not happen or that the bombing of Hamburg and Dresden was as bad as the former. Still, we cannot overlook the inhumane barbarity that was inflicted on the German population during the war and as a result of the Potsdam Agreement.
I have some disagreements with the author's analysis. I think that Churchill should have accepted Adolf Hitler's offer of peace in 1940 if only to buy us more time. While I agree that Britain did not officially enter the war to save the Jews of Europe, I do wonder if the author gave enough consideration to Jewish agitation for a war with Germany prior to September 1939. I mention this point because the likes of Sir Oswald Mosley complained at the time that the Jews were doing this very thing. Nevertheless, I agree with Mr Hitchens that it is a fundamental mistake to think that we fought the war to stop the Holocaust.
Coming to terms with the mythology surrounding World War II is painful, yet I believe it is essential both for our national good and to understand where we are today. I do not wish to disparage those who fought in it (nor does the author), but there is nothing patriotic about refusing to accept our nation's faults - in fact, a real patriot must be prepared to point them out or else he has become a jingoist.
To briefly summarise the book's thesis, while Mr Hitchens deplores the German National Socialist regime, he rejects the simplistic "goodies vs baddies" narrative, Britain did not join the war to fight tyranny and racism, nor is he convinced that we were at any real threat of invasion from Germany and that our bombing of German cities constituted a war crime. No, he is not saying that the Holocaust did not happen or that the bombing of Hamburg and Dresden was as bad as the former. Still, we cannot overlook the inhumane barbarity that was inflicted on the German population during the war and as a result of the Potsdam Agreement.
I have some disagreements with the author's analysis. I think that Churchill should have accepted Adolf Hitler's offer of peace in 1940 if only to buy us more time. While I agree that Britain did not officially enter the war to save the Jews of Europe, I do wonder if the author gave enough consideration to Jewish agitation for a war with Germany prior to September 1939. I mention this point because the likes of Sir Oswald Mosley complained at the time that the Jews were doing this very thing. Nevertheless, I agree with Mr Hitchens that it is a fundamental mistake to think that we fought the war to stop the Holocaust.
Coming to terms with the mythology surrounding World War II is painful, yet I believe it is essential both for our national good and to understand where we are today. I do not wish to disparage those who fought in it (nor does the author), but there is nothing patriotic about refusing to accept our nation's faults - in fact, a real patriot must be prepared to point them out or else he has become a jingoist.
March 28, 2019
I've read plenty by the author's late brother all of which I found to be really interesting and thought provoking so I had high hopes for this.
The author starts with a warning that he is not denigrating the bravery, sense of duty and honour with which the armed services fought during the Second World War but rather he eschews the myth that this was a good war and asks the question why Great Britain declared war on Germany at the time we did when we intended to do nothing in support of Poland in the same way that we did nothing for Czechoslovakia the year prior.
He also covers the errors of Churchill and Lindemann as well as questioning the efficacy of the RAF's bombing campaign where area bombing proved to have little effect on the wartime economy of Germany.
I had never really thought about it before but Britain fought Germany in Europe and were routed leading to Dunkirk and we never fought the Germans again in Europe until 6 years later.
Similarly I had always believed that we had a special relationship with the United States of America but they effectively took all our gold as it was secretly transported to Kentucky.
For anyone who enjoys the history of the Second World War I do suggest you read this - it is an easy read with excellent notes and bibliography
The author starts with a warning that he is not denigrating the bravery, sense of duty and honour with which the armed services fought during the Second World War but rather he eschews the myth that this was a good war and asks the question why Great Britain declared war on Germany at the time we did when we intended to do nothing in support of Poland in the same way that we did nothing for Czechoslovakia the year prior.
He also covers the errors of Churchill and Lindemann as well as questioning the efficacy of the RAF's bombing campaign where area bombing proved to have little effect on the wartime economy of Germany.
I had never really thought about it before but Britain fought Germany in Europe and were routed leading to Dunkirk and we never fought the Germans again in Europe until 6 years later.
Similarly I had always believed that we had a special relationship with the United States of America but they effectively took all our gold as it was secretly transported to Kentucky.
For anyone who enjoys the history of the Second World War I do suggest you read this - it is an easy read with excellent notes and bibliography
October 22, 2019
A less idealized look at WW2 from the British perspective. Was it really a glorious victory fought in defense of the entire world and for the liberation of jews in concentration camps? Or is this the legend that was contrived afterwards to mask the devastating reality that this war was recklessly started and poorly planned, won only because the Americans entered into it at with the price tag of every liquid asset britain had, and ultimately the reason why the British Empire ceased to exist.
Scathing analysis and somewhat depressing but reliably sourced on every level. A big black pill to say the least.
Scathing analysis and somewhat depressing but reliably sourced on every level. A big black pill to say the least.
September 7, 2019
Peter Hitchens does something unexpected and daring with his “The Phoney Victory” book: he tries his hand in the history field, and the result is intriguing. Full of reminiscences of his childhood, fastidious source criticism coupled with uncritical remarks verging from quirky to uninformed, this must-read book make contemporary reader long for the days of slowpoke steamers and toy soldiers (“My little plastic replica was an object of devotion, even idolatry, though nobody at my cathedral choir school would ever have thought to point it out”). Navy is the subject that is closest to Mr Hitchens's heart and the one about which he is most emotional and nostalgic, to the point of sounding slightly surreal at times; he writes about HMS "Prince of Wales": "Every intricate part of her was made according to traditional measurements of England, feet, inches, pounds and hundredweight" (p.167) - a bit like a loony CDs collector who believes that Japanese record pressings offer superior sound to their German editions.
"These are now abandoned in favour of the metric system" - laments Mr Hitchens - "which was used by our enemies" (ibidem) - I'm not sure if he is aware that the first proposal of a global decimal measurement system came from Britain: James Watt proposed it in 1783 because he had difficulties in communicating with German scientists.
Peter Hitchens gets many things right (that are deliberately glossed over by many historians), for example, “the bullion dispatched through Canada made its way eventually to Fort Knox, the USA’s famous fortified vaults in Kentucky. One calculation of the value of the gold is (in modern terms) rather more than ₤26 billion.” (p.89), only not to get other things right about WW2 history even by accident (e.g. p.46: “Poland was expected to hold against Germany for a few months” – in fact, Poland was expected to hold against Germany for precisely two weeks - and Britain and France did not even wait two weeks to decide against honouring their military obligations resulting from their international agreements with Poland: this decision was made at their meeting at Abbeville on September 12, 1939, five days before Russia invaded Poland; but Mr Hitchens would rather make things up than admit he didn’t have time to research certain things).
Writing on Operation Fish, he rather conveniently chooses to gloss over the fact that earlier, Britain did something much more cynical to Poland than what the U.S. did to Britain (which could be justified by the fact that in 1934, Britain defaulted on its enormous debt to the U.S.), namely Britain confiscated all gold of the Polish state that the Polish army managed to rescue from occupied Poland in September 1939 (he merely mentions that “Britain was even borrowing from the Czech government in exile”, p. 88) - not in exchange for ships or food (like the U.S. did) but to charge Poland for... the planes used by Polish pilots in the Battle of Britain!
Things that Mr Hitchens gets right are mostly related to the Royal Navy, and his reader can benefit a great deal from his book when it comes to some historical details or insights. He is not afraid to debunk some lingering myths, for instance about Winston Churchill as a superb Commander, suggesting that it was due to Churchill’s lack of imagination that “Prince of Wales” and “Repulse” were sunk by Japanese on 10 December 1941: “Germany was on the offensive and we were on the defensive. In the Pacific, Britain could do more than wait to be attacked, and Japan, overwhelmingly superior to Britain in land, naval and air power, could choose its time and place. Britain’s main concern was to wonder when and how Japan would strike against our inferior forces. Sending more major ships into the region only gave Japanese more targets. This idea was naval nonsense”.
While “The Phoney Victory” does not lay claims to be an academic work, it does offer some valuable references; I found it illuminating that Mr Hitchens dug out the obscure fact that “As long as 1936, the Tory politician Duff Cooper, in his then post of Secretary of State for War, had argued for Britain to create a large army capable of facing those of the Continental powers. He had been overruled by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, mainly on the grounds of the cost, an enormous ₤40 million by the value of the time” (p.66). This should be, in my opinion, coupled with the fact that Sir Alexander Montagu George Cadogan (Britain’s Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Sir Harold Orme Garton Sargent (deputy Under-Secretary) and Baron William Strang (leading adviser to the British government) all insisted that no representative of the British Embassy should accompany Beck-Cooper meeting in August 1938 (on August 26, the British Embassy was officially asked not to attend that meeting (C7658/197/55 and Shepherd’s Memorandum, C8603/197/55); as W. Strang said, „Poland is one of the countries we want to cultivate"; during that meeting Józef Beck suggested that for Polish diplomacy, southern direction is less important than northern direction, and he proposed strengthening the Baltic states; Duff Cooper has immediately informed Lord Halifax about Beck’s words (Cooper to Halifax, Gdynia, May 8, 1938; FO 371/21807 and C8719/2168/55); in his opinion, Beck was seeking rapprochement with Great Britain and Cooper was enthusiastic when minister Beck agreed with his opinion that the international status quo should be maintained.
Equally novel is Mr Hitchens’s reminder that British refugees from bombed London met with active hostility and violence in other parts of Britain, notably in Essex (p.126). For a British author, it takes courage to write such things and in fairness, Mr Hitchens, rather courageously, is not afraid of any controversy; also, he is refreshingly unequivocal in calling the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact “the most cynical and devastating stroke of diplomacy in modern times” (p.83); he even admits that “Britain was actively obstructing the largest single escape route open to European Jews who wished to flee Nazi persecution” (p.35).
Still, it isn't like his book is particularly consistent; e.g. on page 120 he notices that Germans “Despite their might on land, they did not at that time posses a single landing craft”; yet on page 124 he notices that “Hitler had noted the severe effects that Britain’s economic blockade had had on Germany in the Great War. He was interested in doing the same to a Britain which was far from self-sufficient”. It is sufficient to say during German blockade of food supplies from Britain to the Channel Islands, tea in the shop cost ₤20 - ₤940 in today’s money.
Outside his (large) area of expertise, “The Phoney Victory” is akin to a tale of a man who walks 30 feet in front of his house with his smartphone and comes back home five minutes later to alert his wife to sensational news that Americans did not land on the moon. Take his “discovery” of Poland’s 1938 annexation of Czechoslovakia as an example: “Like so many such inconvenient facts, this is well known, in the West, to historians, but largely unknown anywhere else.” (p.65) – I’m not sure where that “anywhere else” is, and neither is Peter Hitchens.
Speaking of things largely unknown, Mr Hitchens’s ignorance about Zaolzie (an area disputed between interwar Poland and Czechoslovakia) is encyclopaedic: “The area was quickly subjected to Polish law and language, following the traditional pattern of such forced annexations” (p.65) – Zaolzie could not have been subjected to Polish language as Polish was the indigenous language of the vast majority of its native population: out of 218,000 of Zaolzie’s inhabitants, 200,000 spoke Polish; besides, Mr Hitchens is blissfully unaware that in 1938, Poland regained territories taken by force by Czechoslovakia in 1920 (this is very clearly stated by Prof. Prazmowska, quoted by Mr Hitchens when it suits his Polish “hyena” narrative but not when it does not) - when Poland was invaded by Soviet Russia - and against the wishes of Zaolzie’s native population (14,000 Poles were expelled from Zaolzie by force), although this fact has to be considered separately from taking a positive view Poland’s annexation of Zaolzie (I view it negatively).
Using Peter Hitchens’s inept metaphor, he might as well claim that Britain has, "like a hyena", “dismembered” Channel Islands by taking them from Nazi Germany.
Mr Hitchens is also unaware that in some cases, Czechoslovakian authorities actually insisted that the Polish Army enters Zaolzie (e.g. the date of annexing Bogumin was changed because Czechoslovakia was afraid that it will be taken by Germans), or that Poland was only annexing territories with ethnic Polish majority (that’s why after its annexation of Morawka village, Poland returned it to Czechoslovakia, having ensured that it would not be occupied by Nazi Germany).
When it comes to Polish history, it is not that Mr Hitchens occasionally screws up and fails to make the facts and his revisionist claims agree: he always screws it up. He has an anti-ear for Polish history research, and in his deafness to arguments, he is a Proust or a Flaubert à rebours – he is incapable of rendering even the smallest details of Polish WW2 history without major distortions or omissions.
Occasionally his remarks about Poland oscillate between comical and racialist, e.g. “Indeed, the civilised Eden must have recoiled inwardly” (p.64) meeting General Władysław Sikorski (then prime minister of the Polish government-in-exile); this is because Poland "was deeply anti-Semitic in practice." - Mr Hitchens asserts without qualification and without referenced quotations as if it was just unbridled truth, which is indicative of how these issues have morphed in his mind into a narrative that is almost unfalsifiable and resulted in paranoia; according to Mr Hitchens, “we went to war in defence of a territorially aggressive, anti-Semitic despotism” (he fails to mention that 100,000 Polish Jews - mainly voluntarily - joined the Polish Army in defence of "a territorially aggressive, anti-Semitic despotism"); he stubbornly labours his empty point from the previous page with a slightly psychopathic wearisomeness, as if repeating it over and over again without any supporting evidence could make it true or was, on its own, a sufficient argument in a history book (strangely, in that “anti-Semitic despotism”, Jews had 130 Jewish language newspapers, 15 Jewish language theatres and constituted 40% of students).
It's worth noting that Gen. Sikorski wanted Polish Jews captured in the USSR to join the Polish army which would have saved their lives (a request rejected by Russians on racial grounds); Eden would rather have them killed in NKVD camps than let them emigrate to British Palestine. In his dispatch to minister Raczyński (IPMS, PRM44/1, nr 263, December 26, 1941, p.50.) Sikorski writes about his talks with the Jewish organisations in the U.S. regarding releasing the Polish Jews from the Soviet captivity and allowing them to form the future state of Israel. Sikorski "pestered" Eden about the Jews not in order to block their entry to future Poland but to help them create the state of Israel; Eden informed him (Jan 1942) that Britain would not allow any such release of the Polish Jews (prior to that, the USSR negatively answered the Polish government-in-exile diplomatic note in which Polish government-in-exile protested against the USSR stripping all Polish Jews of the Polish citizenship).
Predictably, Hitchens spends the rest of his “Plucky Little Poland” chapter piling one insane image on top of the other. On page 184 he writes “deliberate bombings of cities in World War II was not a retaliation against Hunnish barbarism, but definitely begun by RAF, on 11 May 1940, long before the Blitz”. He then awkwardly tries to justify his revisionism by triumphally announcing that “This is was not, as some claim, a righteous response to Germany’s notorious bombings of Rotterdam. It cannot have been, because Rotterdam was not bombed until 14 May, three days later.” – and he is right: it was not a righteous response to Germany’s notorious bombing of Rotterdam, it was a righteous response to Germany bombing Warsaw (with casualties comparable to those after bombing of Dresden) and the rest of Poland, with Luftwaffe targeting, among other objects, Red Cross hospitals, enormous evangelical church during church service, and civilian refugees from Warsaw (and even though at the end of WW2, Warsaw was destroyed more than Nagasaki, Germany never paid a red penny for that destruction).
He writes: “In 1939, it was not the martyred hero nation, champion of freedom, justice and democracy, of propaganda myth.”
I’m not aware of any historian – Polish, British or any other – who claims that in 1939, Poland was such “champion of freedom, justice and democracy”; furthermore, it would appear that the more conservative Polish historians are, the more critical they are about Poland in the 1930s (e.g. during his public speech commemorating the centenary of the restoration of Polish independence, historian Leszek Żebrowski excoriated Józef Piƚsudski’s regime: “Unfortunately, this period of independence - independence of the state and freedom of citizens - lasted only a short time. In 1926, a very bloody coup took place, claiming lives of approximately 400 citizens, with over 800 injured. We didn't lose sovereignty, no foreign powers entered as a result of the civil war - but citizens lost their freedom”).
However, this has to be put into perspective – Poland’s “Sanacja” regime was arguably less authoritarian than Roosevelt’s New Deal regime, with its Lame Duck Amendment, National Recovery Administration - unconstitutional cartel-creating agency, and with unconstitutional Agricultural Adjustment Act program aimed at boosting up food prices by reducing food supplies by force (incidentally, Roosevelt political role model was Mussolini; he said that he was “deeply impressed by what he has accomplished.”).
In turn, when on March 27, 1943, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Mr Hitchens’s “civilised” hero, met in Washington with President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, he “expressed his fear that Hitler might actually accept an offer from the Allies to move Jews out of areas under German control” (Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt regarding a meeting with Anthony Eden March 27, 1943); he was also very hostile to Polish government-in-exile idea to bomb tracks leading to Auschwitz (he didn’t want any war refugees, especially Jewish, to end up in Britain).
Would I recommend buying Peter Hitchens’s “The Phoney Victory”? All in all, I would, because after all, it is a great read – even though many arguments used by Peter Hitchens in that book are even more phoney than Britain’s victory.
"These are now abandoned in favour of the metric system" - laments Mr Hitchens - "which was used by our enemies" (ibidem) - I'm not sure if he is aware that the first proposal of a global decimal measurement system came from Britain: James Watt proposed it in 1783 because he had difficulties in communicating with German scientists.
Peter Hitchens gets many things right (that are deliberately glossed over by many historians), for example, “the bullion dispatched through Canada made its way eventually to Fort Knox, the USA’s famous fortified vaults in Kentucky. One calculation of the value of the gold is (in modern terms) rather more than ₤26 billion.” (p.89), only not to get other things right about WW2 history even by accident (e.g. p.46: “Poland was expected to hold against Germany for a few months” – in fact, Poland was expected to hold against Germany for precisely two weeks - and Britain and France did not even wait two weeks to decide against honouring their military obligations resulting from their international agreements with Poland: this decision was made at their meeting at Abbeville on September 12, 1939, five days before Russia invaded Poland; but Mr Hitchens would rather make things up than admit he didn’t have time to research certain things).
Writing on Operation Fish, he rather conveniently chooses to gloss over the fact that earlier, Britain did something much more cynical to Poland than what the U.S. did to Britain (which could be justified by the fact that in 1934, Britain defaulted on its enormous debt to the U.S.), namely Britain confiscated all gold of the Polish state that the Polish army managed to rescue from occupied Poland in September 1939 (he merely mentions that “Britain was even borrowing from the Czech government in exile”, p. 88) - not in exchange for ships or food (like the U.S. did) but to charge Poland for... the planes used by Polish pilots in the Battle of Britain!
Things that Mr Hitchens gets right are mostly related to the Royal Navy, and his reader can benefit a great deal from his book when it comes to some historical details or insights. He is not afraid to debunk some lingering myths, for instance about Winston Churchill as a superb Commander, suggesting that it was due to Churchill’s lack of imagination that “Prince of Wales” and “Repulse” were sunk by Japanese on 10 December 1941: “Germany was on the offensive and we were on the defensive. In the Pacific, Britain could do more than wait to be attacked, and Japan, overwhelmingly superior to Britain in land, naval and air power, could choose its time and place. Britain’s main concern was to wonder when and how Japan would strike against our inferior forces. Sending more major ships into the region only gave Japanese more targets. This idea was naval nonsense”.
While “The Phoney Victory” does not lay claims to be an academic work, it does offer some valuable references; I found it illuminating that Mr Hitchens dug out the obscure fact that “As long as 1936, the Tory politician Duff Cooper, in his then post of Secretary of State for War, had argued for Britain to create a large army capable of facing those of the Continental powers. He had been overruled by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, mainly on the grounds of the cost, an enormous ₤40 million by the value of the time” (p.66). This should be, in my opinion, coupled with the fact that Sir Alexander Montagu George Cadogan (Britain’s Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Sir Harold Orme Garton Sargent (deputy Under-Secretary) and Baron William Strang (leading adviser to the British government) all insisted that no representative of the British Embassy should accompany Beck-Cooper meeting in August 1938 (on August 26, the British Embassy was officially asked not to attend that meeting (C7658/197/55 and Shepherd’s Memorandum, C8603/197/55); as W. Strang said, „Poland is one of the countries we want to cultivate"; during that meeting Józef Beck suggested that for Polish diplomacy, southern direction is less important than northern direction, and he proposed strengthening the Baltic states; Duff Cooper has immediately informed Lord Halifax about Beck’s words (Cooper to Halifax, Gdynia, May 8, 1938; FO 371/21807 and C8719/2168/55); in his opinion, Beck was seeking rapprochement with Great Britain and Cooper was enthusiastic when minister Beck agreed with his opinion that the international status quo should be maintained.
Equally novel is Mr Hitchens’s reminder that British refugees from bombed London met with active hostility and violence in other parts of Britain, notably in Essex (p.126). For a British author, it takes courage to write such things and in fairness, Mr Hitchens, rather courageously, is not afraid of any controversy; also, he is refreshingly unequivocal in calling the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact “the most cynical and devastating stroke of diplomacy in modern times” (p.83); he even admits that “Britain was actively obstructing the largest single escape route open to European Jews who wished to flee Nazi persecution” (p.35).
Still, it isn't like his book is particularly consistent; e.g. on page 120 he notices that Germans “Despite their might on land, they did not at that time posses a single landing craft”; yet on page 124 he notices that “Hitler had noted the severe effects that Britain’s economic blockade had had on Germany in the Great War. He was interested in doing the same to a Britain which was far from self-sufficient”. It is sufficient to say during German blockade of food supplies from Britain to the Channel Islands, tea in the shop cost ₤20 - ₤940 in today’s money.
Outside his (large) area of expertise, “The Phoney Victory” is akin to a tale of a man who walks 30 feet in front of his house with his smartphone and comes back home five minutes later to alert his wife to sensational news that Americans did not land on the moon. Take his “discovery” of Poland’s 1938 annexation of Czechoslovakia as an example: “Like so many such inconvenient facts, this is well known, in the West, to historians, but largely unknown anywhere else.” (p.65) – I’m not sure where that “anywhere else” is, and neither is Peter Hitchens.
Speaking of things largely unknown, Mr Hitchens’s ignorance about Zaolzie (an area disputed between interwar Poland and Czechoslovakia) is encyclopaedic: “The area was quickly subjected to Polish law and language, following the traditional pattern of such forced annexations” (p.65) – Zaolzie could not have been subjected to Polish language as Polish was the indigenous language of the vast majority of its native population: out of 218,000 of Zaolzie’s inhabitants, 200,000 spoke Polish; besides, Mr Hitchens is blissfully unaware that in 1938, Poland regained territories taken by force by Czechoslovakia in 1920 (this is very clearly stated by Prof. Prazmowska, quoted by Mr Hitchens when it suits his Polish “hyena” narrative but not when it does not) - when Poland was invaded by Soviet Russia - and against the wishes of Zaolzie’s native population (14,000 Poles were expelled from Zaolzie by force), although this fact has to be considered separately from taking a positive view Poland’s annexation of Zaolzie (I view it negatively).
Using Peter Hitchens’s inept metaphor, he might as well claim that Britain has, "like a hyena", “dismembered” Channel Islands by taking them from Nazi Germany.
Mr Hitchens is also unaware that in some cases, Czechoslovakian authorities actually insisted that the Polish Army enters Zaolzie (e.g. the date of annexing Bogumin was changed because Czechoslovakia was afraid that it will be taken by Germans), or that Poland was only annexing territories with ethnic Polish majority (that’s why after its annexation of Morawka village, Poland returned it to Czechoslovakia, having ensured that it would not be occupied by Nazi Germany).
When it comes to Polish history, it is not that Mr Hitchens occasionally screws up and fails to make the facts and his revisionist claims agree: he always screws it up. He has an anti-ear for Polish history research, and in his deafness to arguments, he is a Proust or a Flaubert à rebours – he is incapable of rendering even the smallest details of Polish WW2 history without major distortions or omissions.
Occasionally his remarks about Poland oscillate between comical and racialist, e.g. “Indeed, the civilised Eden must have recoiled inwardly” (p.64) meeting General Władysław Sikorski (then prime minister of the Polish government-in-exile); this is because Poland "was deeply anti-Semitic in practice." - Mr Hitchens asserts without qualification and without referenced quotations as if it was just unbridled truth, which is indicative of how these issues have morphed in his mind into a narrative that is almost unfalsifiable and resulted in paranoia; according to Mr Hitchens, “we went to war in defence of a territorially aggressive, anti-Semitic despotism” (he fails to mention that 100,000 Polish Jews - mainly voluntarily - joined the Polish Army in defence of "a territorially aggressive, anti-Semitic despotism"); he stubbornly labours his empty point from the previous page with a slightly psychopathic wearisomeness, as if repeating it over and over again without any supporting evidence could make it true or was, on its own, a sufficient argument in a history book (strangely, in that “anti-Semitic despotism”, Jews had 130 Jewish language newspapers, 15 Jewish language theatres and constituted 40% of students).
It's worth noting that Gen. Sikorski wanted Polish Jews captured in the USSR to join the Polish army which would have saved their lives (a request rejected by Russians on racial grounds); Eden would rather have them killed in NKVD camps than let them emigrate to British Palestine. In his dispatch to minister Raczyński (IPMS, PRM44/1, nr 263, December 26, 1941, p.50.) Sikorski writes about his talks with the Jewish organisations in the U.S. regarding releasing the Polish Jews from the Soviet captivity and allowing them to form the future state of Israel. Sikorski "pestered" Eden about the Jews not in order to block their entry to future Poland but to help them create the state of Israel; Eden informed him (Jan 1942) that Britain would not allow any such release of the Polish Jews (prior to that, the USSR negatively answered the Polish government-in-exile diplomatic note in which Polish government-in-exile protested against the USSR stripping all Polish Jews of the Polish citizenship).
Predictably, Hitchens spends the rest of his “Plucky Little Poland” chapter piling one insane image on top of the other. On page 184 he writes “deliberate bombings of cities in World War II was not a retaliation against Hunnish barbarism, but definitely begun by RAF, on 11 May 1940, long before the Blitz”. He then awkwardly tries to justify his revisionism by triumphally announcing that “This is was not, as some claim, a righteous response to Germany’s notorious bombings of Rotterdam. It cannot have been, because Rotterdam was not bombed until 14 May, three days later.” – and he is right: it was not a righteous response to Germany’s notorious bombing of Rotterdam, it was a righteous response to Germany bombing Warsaw (with casualties comparable to those after bombing of Dresden) and the rest of Poland, with Luftwaffe targeting, among other objects, Red Cross hospitals, enormous evangelical church during church service, and civilian refugees from Warsaw (and even though at the end of WW2, Warsaw was destroyed more than Nagasaki, Germany never paid a red penny for that destruction).
He writes: “In 1939, it was not the martyred hero nation, champion of freedom, justice and democracy, of propaganda myth.”
I’m not aware of any historian – Polish, British or any other – who claims that in 1939, Poland was such “champion of freedom, justice and democracy”; furthermore, it would appear that the more conservative Polish historians are, the more critical they are about Poland in the 1930s (e.g. during his public speech commemorating the centenary of the restoration of Polish independence, historian Leszek Żebrowski excoriated Józef Piƚsudski’s regime: “Unfortunately, this period of independence - independence of the state and freedom of citizens - lasted only a short time. In 1926, a very bloody coup took place, claiming lives of approximately 400 citizens, with over 800 injured. We didn't lose sovereignty, no foreign powers entered as a result of the civil war - but citizens lost their freedom”).
However, this has to be put into perspective – Poland’s “Sanacja” regime was arguably less authoritarian than Roosevelt’s New Deal regime, with its Lame Duck Amendment, National Recovery Administration - unconstitutional cartel-creating agency, and with unconstitutional Agricultural Adjustment Act program aimed at boosting up food prices by reducing food supplies by force (incidentally, Roosevelt political role model was Mussolini; he said that he was “deeply impressed by what he has accomplished.”).
In turn, when on March 27, 1943, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Mr Hitchens’s “civilised” hero, met in Washington with President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, he “expressed his fear that Hitler might actually accept an offer from the Allies to move Jews out of areas under German control” (Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt regarding a meeting with Anthony Eden March 27, 1943); he was also very hostile to Polish government-in-exile idea to bomb tracks leading to Auschwitz (he didn’t want any war refugees, especially Jewish, to end up in Britain).
Would I recommend buying Peter Hitchens’s “The Phoney Victory”? All in all, I would, because after all, it is a great read – even though many arguments used by Peter Hitchens in that book are even more phoney than Britain’s victory.
December 16, 2019
War is Hell, and its Glory is all Moonshine
So I can respond to this book in four ways. All of which I am sure Mr. Hitchens would appreciate. This also may be of help to others, because at least you will know my biases. As a fan of Peter Hitchens, an an armchair historian, as an American, and as a Christian.
Peter Hitchens is one of my favorite media personalities. I'm saddened that we do not know more about him here in the United States as I think that we would greatly benefit from his takes. Something I admire about Peter Hitchens is that he is willing to state his opinion no matter what public blowback will come his way. I disagree with him on some things, but in an age where people's careers can be ended quickly I admire his bravado. As a Hitchens fan I enjoyed this book. I do not think it is his best work, but I could feel his sarcasm and dry wit drip through. I think if one appreciates him as an author than this book is worth picking up solely for its tone. If you just happen to be a fan of his work I recommend this.
The book becomes more interesting to wrestle with from a historical perspective. Peter Hitchens is not a historian, a fact he readily admits. While it is full of historical tidbits and facts this is not a historical piece of work, but rather a political treatise on the effects of Britain's entrance and conduct during the Second World War. Many of the negative reviews of this book are more focused on attacking Hitchens' historical claims, rather than his philosophical ones. These are all fair critiques and ones that I am sure Hitchens may even accept. But the primary point of this book is not to lay out history, but challenge prevailing culture thought. If you are a hisorian and you wish to read this book for its historical arguments I would point you to some negative reviews and see if they can help clarify your purchase of this book.
As an American this was a very interesting read. Peter has a quote that I like, "If you do not have an empire, you are living in somebody else's." I am very ready to admit that the American Empire is the large and dominant one right now, even if we do not view it as such. Much of Hitchens' ire towards the British government during the war is their kowtowing to American demands and the breakup of the British Empire due to American interference and demands. I think this has much to say about the current state of Anglo-American relations and what the future could hold for our two countries. However, I believe that the largest critique I have is "hindsight is 20/20." It may have been bad for the British to behave in certain ways during the war, especially towards the USA, but I am less confident than Hitchens is in the British government's knowledge of their choices and their affects at the time. Still worth a read as an American even though it is not aimed at us as much as the UK.
Lastly, and most importantly for me I read this book as a Christian. This book is sprinkled with religious imagery and themes. Hitchens is quick to equate British thinking about the Second World War with religious awe that would be directed towards God. This is similar in the US, and I believe Hitchens' strongest point is that we should be able to question history as it has been taught or perceived. We should not view the past as untouchable and unquestionably holy especially when it bears significance to our current situation. I believe this book hits at the idolatry that many people can form in their hearts about nationality and nationalism and Hitchens' book serves as a good warning to avoid that temptation. Because, as he well points out it could lead us into other troubles. So if you are a Christian who enjoys history, this is worth a read.
Overall, I enjoyed my time with this book. I was impressed with his writing and the general thrust in his arguments.
So I can respond to this book in four ways. All of which I am sure Mr. Hitchens would appreciate. This also may be of help to others, because at least you will know my biases. As a fan of Peter Hitchens, an an armchair historian, as an American, and as a Christian.
Peter Hitchens is one of my favorite media personalities. I'm saddened that we do not know more about him here in the United States as I think that we would greatly benefit from his takes. Something I admire about Peter Hitchens is that he is willing to state his opinion no matter what public blowback will come his way. I disagree with him on some things, but in an age where people's careers can be ended quickly I admire his bravado. As a Hitchens fan I enjoyed this book. I do not think it is his best work, but I could feel his sarcasm and dry wit drip through. I think if one appreciates him as an author than this book is worth picking up solely for its tone. If you just happen to be a fan of his work I recommend this.
The book becomes more interesting to wrestle with from a historical perspective. Peter Hitchens is not a historian, a fact he readily admits. While it is full of historical tidbits and facts this is not a historical piece of work, but rather a political treatise on the effects of Britain's entrance and conduct during the Second World War. Many of the negative reviews of this book are more focused on attacking Hitchens' historical claims, rather than his philosophical ones. These are all fair critiques and ones that I am sure Hitchens may even accept. But the primary point of this book is not to lay out history, but challenge prevailing culture thought. If you are a hisorian and you wish to read this book for its historical arguments I would point you to some negative reviews and see if they can help clarify your purchase of this book.
As an American this was a very interesting read. Peter has a quote that I like, "If you do not have an empire, you are living in somebody else's." I am very ready to admit that the American Empire is the large and dominant one right now, even if we do not view it as such. Much of Hitchens' ire towards the British government during the war is their kowtowing to American demands and the breakup of the British Empire due to American interference and demands. I think this has much to say about the current state of Anglo-American relations and what the future could hold for our two countries. However, I believe that the largest critique I have is "hindsight is 20/20." It may have been bad for the British to behave in certain ways during the war, especially towards the USA, but I am less confident than Hitchens is in the British government's knowledge of their choices and their affects at the time. Still worth a read as an American even though it is not aimed at us as much as the UK.
Lastly, and most importantly for me I read this book as a Christian. This book is sprinkled with religious imagery and themes. Hitchens is quick to equate British thinking about the Second World War with religious awe that would be directed towards God. This is similar in the US, and I believe Hitchens' strongest point is that we should be able to question history as it has been taught or perceived. We should not view the past as untouchable and unquestionably holy especially when it bears significance to our current situation. I believe this book hits at the idolatry that many people can form in their hearts about nationality and nationalism and Hitchens' book serves as a good warning to avoid that temptation. Because, as he well points out it could lead us into other troubles. So if you are a Christian who enjoys history, this is worth a read.
Overall, I enjoyed my time with this book. I was impressed with his writing and the general thrust in his arguments.
March 11, 2020
I heard Peter Hitchens talk about this book on the radio and thought it sounded interesting. My parents are Czech and Austrian and it was always something hinted at home about the nefariousness of Churchill, being betrayed at Yalta and, of course, the fire bombing of German civilians in cities - many more than just Dresden.
My own brother-in-law was not born until after WW2 had ended but his mother pregnant with him and two other children in tow, fled east Germany and was on a train bound for Dresden. Luckily the train broke down before it got to Dresden and she missed the firestorm.
Peter Hitchens examines many myths about the second world war starting with a quote from a speech from the Prince of Wales in 2016
Hitchens then examines every one of those items in the Prince's speech. This was the myth of the Good War that the British had to believe.
The British were also almost bankrupt at the beginning of the WWII. They had defaulted on their WWI debts, had an old insufficient navy and the American would only deal with them on a cash or in kind basis giving away what was left of their Empire. After WWII, the British were no longer a big power as they thought. Churchill the bombastic and verbose Prime Minister managed to hide Britain's desperate straits but after WWII, rationing continued and while Germany rebuilt a new economy, British industry remained in the 19th century.
An excellent book showing that in war there are no goodies and baddies (Sorry Tony Abbott you were simplistic and naive). There was never a "Special Relationship" between the Americans and the British. The Americans were only there for what was good for the USA .
My own brother-in-law was not born until after WW2 had ended but his mother pregnant with him and two other children in tow, fled east Germany and was on a train bound for Dresden. Luckily the train broke down before it got to Dresden and she missed the firestorm.
Peter Hitchens examines many myths about the second world war starting with a quote from a speech from the Prince of Wales in 2016
"I was born in 1948 -just after the end of World War II in which my parents' generation had fought and died in a battle against intolerance, monstrous extremism and an inhuman attempt to exterminate the Jewish population of Europe"
Hitchens then examines every one of those items in the Prince's speech. This was the myth of the Good War that the British had to believe.
The British were also almost bankrupt at the beginning of the WWII. They had defaulted on their WWI debts, had an old insufficient navy and the American would only deal with them on a cash or in kind basis giving away what was left of their Empire. After WWII, the British were no longer a big power as they thought. Churchill the bombastic and verbose Prime Minister managed to hide Britain's desperate straits but after WWII, rationing continued and while Germany rebuilt a new economy, British industry remained in the 19th century.
"In return for these decrepit vessels, the USA received land in the Bahamas, St Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua and British Guiana on 99 year leases rent free. "
An excellent book showing that in war there are no goodies and baddies (Sorry Tony Abbott you were simplistic and naive). There was never a "Special Relationship" between the Americans and the British. The Americans were only there for what was good for the USA .
June 23, 2020
He's probably best known as the brother of the late atheist Christopher Hitchens. Peter is a professing Christian. Most recently, you might have seen Peter walking in the streets of London with dozens of "Black Lives Matter" activists following him and screaming at him because he dared call the fascist movement for what it is. That is who Peter Hitchens is.
And in this book he angers a mass of mainstream historians, politicians and average Joe's by differing with the accepted narrative regarding the World War II effort, specifically as it is presented across the culture in the United Kingdom. He honors those who fought while refuting the fictional narrative of most facets of the war effort. It's a war that need not have happened, yet by the time it did happen... it had to happen.
If you find that comment hard to understand, you need to do more research and reading on the causes of World War II. And this would be a good place to start.
And in this book he angers a mass of mainstream historians, politicians and average Joe's by differing with the accepted narrative regarding the World War II effort, specifically as it is presented across the culture in the United Kingdom. He honors those who fought while refuting the fictional narrative of most facets of the war effort. It's a war that need not have happened, yet by the time it did happen... it had to happen.
If you find that comment hard to understand, you need to do more research and reading on the causes of World War II. And this would be a good place to start.
December 29, 2022
Peter Hitchens examines what I have long suspected to be true, but perception was obscured by prevailing narratives.
As an undergraduate I was always mystified that Britain went to war for Poland only to give it to the Soviets 5 years later. In fact, Britain never actually went to war for Poland, and war could have been avoided.
Peter Hitchens's book certainly is not one for those who wish to avoid painful truths or to cling to romanticized myths. Hitchens examines painful truths that are well known, but rarely publicised, such as the senseless bombing of German civilians, or the even lesser known ethnic cleansing of Germans in European territories after the War.
Hitchens book uses painful truths and presents a very different Narrative. No doubt difficult for many to accept, but a truly compelling read.
As an undergraduate I was always mystified that Britain went to war for Poland only to give it to the Soviets 5 years later. In fact, Britain never actually went to war for Poland, and war could have been avoided.
Peter Hitchens's book certainly is not one for those who wish to avoid painful truths or to cling to romanticized myths. Hitchens examines painful truths that are well known, but rarely publicised, such as the senseless bombing of German civilians, or the even lesser known ethnic cleansing of Germans in European territories after the War.
Hitchens book uses painful truths and presents a very different Narrative. No doubt difficult for many to accept, but a truly compelling read.
July 11, 2019
As a person who tries to advocate non-violent approaches to conflict of any kind, I have been inclined to grant an exemption to WW2 - the "good war". Hitchens has provided an alternative narrative to the good war story i was brought up with.It seems that WW2 has as much ambiguity, deceit, selfish greed and cruelty as all the other wars.
The book is not only well written but extremely convincing.
The book is not only well written but extremely convincing.
August 7, 2019
A very interesting book. It give an insight into why today's English people voted for Brexit.
"Poland was a pretext for war, not a reason. And it was a pretext for an essentially irrational, idealistic, nostalgic impulse. We were a Great Power, after all. We had to do our duty and stand up to Germany, even if we had no serious weapons with which to do so. We may even have feared (with some justification) that Germany would never provide us with any excuse to go to war with it."
"Poland was a pretext for war, not a reason. And it was a pretext for an essentially irrational, idealistic, nostalgic impulse. We were a Great Power, after all. We had to do our duty and stand up to Germany, even if we had no serious weapons with which to do so. We may even have feared (with some justification) that Germany would never provide us with any excuse to go to war with it."
December 16, 2019
Such a powerful book. It explains a great deal of the problems of how us Brits view ourselves and our history since WWII. This country has been hollowed out and left to decay since we sold our souls to the world. And now, I hope, with books like this we will realise this and rediscover the Truth. But as they say, Truth is the first casualty of war. So who knows. Only with the knowledge of what is true and just, can you possibly learn from the past.
February 13, 2020
Very good book. Some of the facts in here should be known by more people in the U.K. to avoid the illusion of what really happened to the country during the war. Especially the nonsense of how it stood alone and ‘won’ the war. In reality it ‘lost’ more than it gained.
December 31, 2018
Interesting read. Confusing at points but an interesting re-examination of conventional narratives surrounding World War II.
February 22, 2019
Very well written and very good. However, it's not detailed enough for my liking. Worth a read.
July 8, 2019
Solid.
August 1, 2019
An interesting read. Full of hard but refreshingly honest truths in typical Hitchens fashion.
August 6, 2019
Interesting, sometimes fascinating, theories. Not sure how much is factually correct, but certainly food for thought.
January 18, 2020
A very thought provoking book; many controversial views, but all well thought out.
July 26, 2020
Really insightful read exposing a lot of truth behind Britains part in ww2.
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