Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.

person who files a certificate of candidacy already a “candidate”

G.R. No. 181613 even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to
25 November 2009 the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as
(motion for reconsideration) amended, which states that a person who files his certificate of
candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the
Facts: campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the period.
COMELEC’s decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty Thus, applying said law:
candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in
election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of (1) The effective date when partisan political acts become
Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election unlawful as to a
Code). candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start
of the campaign
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
a candidate at the time of the supposed premature
campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only
(the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated for
election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local words, election
elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of
officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period. the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election
Issue: offenses cannot be
so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse
Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for engaging in but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law,
premature campaigning should be reconsidered. and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the
Legislature.
Holding:
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436,
Granting Penera’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme as amended, does not
Court En Banc held that provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only
thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law
said – state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful
(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or “the assailed upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as
Decision”) considered a envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and
curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
vagueness. The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision
is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-
campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, contradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining the
as the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic constitutionality of the said provision.
principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared
unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an
act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there Quinto V. COMELEC
is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436
that partisan political activities before the start of the campaign COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who
period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that “any filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take their positions.
effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The only
inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done
FACTS:
before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

(D) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a
Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their
ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only
campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of
the legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford
time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended ISSUE:
to preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files
his certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to
HELD:
expressly incorporate the
Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A.
8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be NO.
considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period.
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA.
candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for
election system would be disqualified or penalized for any giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with
partisan political act done before the start of the campaign
appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial
period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court except
distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no
violation of the equal protection clause. The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices,
whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether
However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has
on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental
issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t right involved on such a sweeping scale.
squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and

MIKE A. FERMIN,Petitioner
elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid
classification, the proviso does not comply with the second versus
requirement – that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ALIMUDIN A.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent MACACUA, Respondents.
the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy,
or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the G.R. NO. 172563 : April 27, 2007
electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
En Banc
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would Authority of COMELEC to annul Special Public Hearing
be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare related on local elections.
of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition
that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still This is a petition for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC en
in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the banc acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated May 9, 2006
performance of duty because they would be attending to their
and May 16, 2006.
campaign rather than to their office work.
FACTS:
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding
appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy Petitioner Mike A. Fermin and private respondent
high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in Alimudin A. Macacua were candidates for Mayor in the May
the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned 2004 local elections in the Municipality of Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of
once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This
Kabuntalan proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor of
scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can Kabuntalan. The COMELEC, however, annulled the
use his position in the government to wield influence in the proclamation due to the failure of clustered polling Precinct No.
political world. 25A/26A to function in Barangay Guiawa, Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao. The existence of 264 registered voters in the “Sec. 3. Construction. These rules shall be liberally
clustered precinct would affect the results of the election. Thus, construed in order to promote the effective and efficient
the COMELEC scheduled a special election in clustered implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free,
Precinct No. 25A/26A on July 28, 2004. orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve
just expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition
In the special election of July 28, 2004, private of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.
respondent was proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor.
Petitioner challenged the special election due to alleged Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - - In the interest of
procedural infirmities. In a Resolution dated June 2, 2005, the justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters
COMELEC nullified the special election. Private respondent's pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion
proclamation was set aside and the vice mayor-elect temporarily thereof may be suspended by the Commission.”
assumed the mayoralty post.
A scripted scenario of violence initiated by persons
Despite the Order dated May 9, 2006 setting the date for identified with petitioner and abetted by the PNP contingent
hearing for the parties to argue their sides, the Special Public marred the second special elections on May 6, 2006. Further,
Hearing pushed through on May 14, 2006, and the SMBOC the Chairman of the SMBOC allegedly stopped the election at
proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of Kabuntalan. 2:15 p.m. although there were still voters lined up to vote in the
Private respondent alleged in his Comment4 that he was absent precinct.
during the Special Public Hearing.
Hence, the COMELEC issued the first Order dated May
On May 16, 2006, the COMELEC en banc issued an 9, 2006 requiring petitioner and the SMBOC to file their
Order, which annulled the proceedings of the Special Public respective Comments on the omnibus motion, and to hold in
Hearing conducted on May 14, 2006 and set aside the abeyance the Special Public Hearing set on May 14, 2006.
proclamation of petitioner.
However, despite notice to both parties and the SMBOC,
Hence, this petition. the Special Public Hearing proceeded on May 14, 2006. In its
Order dated May 16, 2006, the COMELEC annulled the
proceedings of the Special Public Hearing and set aside the
proclamation of petitioner therein as the duly elected mayor of
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc gravely abused Kabuntalan, evidently for failure to heed its Order dated May 9,
its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the 2006.
Orders dated May 9, 2006 and May 16, 2006.
Under Section 227 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
HELD: No. COMELEC is vested with the power of direct control and
supervision over the board of canvassers; hence, it took
RULING EXPLAINED cognizance of the complaint in the omnibus motion which
questioned the conduct of the special elections by the SMBOC.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provide:
 Under the circumstances, COMELEC's action is not based its decision solely on very personal and
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. subjective assessment standards, such as the nature
or design and furnishings of the dwelling place in
relation to the stature of the candidate. Abraham
Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
Mitra v. Comelec G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010.

Certificate of candidacy; residency requirement. Nature: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
- The Omnibus Election Code provides that a canceled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of petitioner
certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he is
cancelled if there is any false representation of a a resident of the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan
material fact. where he ran for the position of Governor. Mitra came to this
- The critical material facts are those that refer to a Court to seek the reversal of the cancellation.
candidate’s qualifications for elective office, such as his
or her citizenship and residence.
- The false representation must be a deliberate attempt
to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would Facts:
otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
- Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be - When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan
made with the intention to deceive the electorate as was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent
to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public Representative of the Second District of Palawan.
office. - This district then included, among other territories, the
- Thus, the misrepresentation cannot be the result of a Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City.
mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation - He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto
where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for
no deception on the electorate results. three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.
- The foregoing are the legal standards by which the - On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second
COMELEC must act on a petition to deny due course or term as Representative), Puerto Princesa City was
to cancel a certificate of candidacy. reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased
- Thus, in considering the residency of a candidate as to be a component city of the Province of Palawan.
stated in the certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC - The direct legal consequence of this new status was the
must determine whether or not the candidate deliberately ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting
attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact about his for candidates for elective provincial officials.
or her residency that would otherwise render him or her - On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the
ineligible for the position sought. position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his
- The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720
case when, in considering the residency issue, it of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio
 Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC
of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the correctly invoked, requires the following:
position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan. (1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
- Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and (2) an intention to remain there; and
Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC. - Mitra, presented sworn statements of various persons
(including the seller of the land he purchased, the lessor
of the Maligaya Feedmill, and the Punong Barangay of
Issue: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of the site of his residence) attesting to his physical
Palawan. residence in Aborlan; photographs of the residential
portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he resides, and of his
Held: YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and
of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not cock farm; the lease contract over the Maligaya Feedmill;
misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement and the deed of sale of the lot where he has started
as mandated by the Constitution. constructing his house. He clarified, too, that he does not
claim residence in Aborlan at the house then under
construction; his actual residence is the mezzanine
portion of the Maligaya Feedmill building.
RATIO: - Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest
and has therefore the mandate of the electorate to serve
- The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of
Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a NOTES:
vote of 11-3.
- The respondents were not able to present a convincing - The minimum requirement under our Constitution and
case sufficient to overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective election laws for the candidates’ residency in the political unit
transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his they seek to represent has never been intended to be an
representation on this point in his COC. empty formalistic condition; it carries with it a very specific
- Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s]
acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community"
COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation." from seeking elective offices in that community.
- Mitra’s domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa - The purpose of the residency requirement is "best met by
City. For him to qualify as Governor – in light of the individuals who have either had actual residence in the area
relatively recent change of status of Puerto Princesa City for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same
from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose area either by origin or by choice."
residents can no longer vote for provincial officials – he - Read and understood in this manner, residency can readily
had to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a new be appreciated as a requirement that goes into the heart of
one within the local government unit where he intended our democratic system; it directly supports the purpose of
to run; this would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a representation – electing those who can best serve the
 community because of their knowledge and sensitivity to its 1. Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
needs. It likewise adds meaning and substance to the voters’ 2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant
freedom of choice in the electoral exercise that characterizes case.
every democracy. 3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial
- To acquire a new domicile – a domicile by choice – the duty.
following must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence
in a new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) HELD:
an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words,
there must be an animus non revertendi with respect to 1. The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that
the old domicile, and an animus manendi at the domicile the case against petitioner had not yet been disposed of
of choice. The intent to remain in or at the domicile of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the
choice must be for an indefinite period of time and the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for
acts of the person must be consistent with this intent. being violative of due process and for want of substantial
- factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second
CASE DIGEST: CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not
represent the electorate’s choice.
G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, 2. Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been
ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the
Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the
Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L. order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus
LOCSIN Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case
Facts: pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral
Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions
representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against respondent or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto
Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the
Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s issue.
proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order,
petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on 3. The facts had been settled by the COMELECen banc,
resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter, that
consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its
proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution (Comelec’s) Decision be obeyed by all officials of the
was however reversed and a new resolution declared land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to
respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made the office which merits recognition regardless of personal
his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly judgment or opinion.
known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.
Issues:
 TALAGA V COMELEC name remained printed on the ballots and votes in his favor
were counted for Barbara Ruby, who won against Castillo.

FACTS
But it was only on May 13, 2010 when the Comelec gave due
course to Ruby’s COC to include her in the official list of
In focus are the disqualification of a substitute who was candidates. Ruby was proclaimed newly elected mayor.
proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election and the
ISSUES
ascertainment of who should assume the office following the
substitute’s disqualification.
The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by
Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena
City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.
Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo filed their certificates of
candidacy (COC) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City for the Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among
2010 elections. the contending parties should assume the contested elective
position.

Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel the COC of RULING
Talaga on the ground that he has already served as mayor of
1. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid
Lucena for three consecutive terms (2001, 2004, 2007) without
candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate
interruption. under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be
clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may
not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC
Talaga countered by saying that the Sandiganbayan had is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.
preventively suspended him from office during his second and
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he
third terms, which he claims to have amounted to an
had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if
interruption.
the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably
filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at
all.
Thereafter, Talaga withdrew his candidacy. On May 4, 2010,
Barbara Ruby filed her own COC to substitute Talaga. Talaga’s 2. A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City
thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the
law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:67
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the
Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. – If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. x x x