League of Cities v.

Comelec fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed
to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set
Facts: forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. NOTE: The November
During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component 18, 2008 ruling already became final and executory and was recorded in the SC’s Book of
cities were filed before the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)
33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the
12thCongress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local August 24, 2010 Ruling
Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of
city from P20 million annual income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the the Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring
13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities
individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common into cities. “Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision
provisionexempting the particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en bancResolution of 31 March 2009
imposed by R.A. No. 9009. denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the
same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision,” the Court said.
Issue: In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that the
Whether or not the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities are Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that “no
constitutional city…shall be created…except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code.” It stressed that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be
Held: embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided
an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec.
November 18, 2008 Ruling 450 of the LGC. “The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that
No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution….
because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood
into the LGC and not into any other laws. “The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Laws void for being violative of the Constitution,” the Court held.
Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local The Court further held that “limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates
government units.” “The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities
followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the “just with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities,
share” of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes.” (League of Cities of the while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision
Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008) found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
December 21, 2009 Ruling clause.”
Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as
constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into April 12, 2011 Ruling
cities. It said that based on Congress’ deliberations and clear legislative intent was that Yes! It’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not ever lose sight of
the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills
requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would pending during the 11th Congress but have also complied with the requirements of the
not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009.
of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play
as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the of Congress,” the SC said.
enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after
what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. “Thus, the imperatives of
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units Ocampo v Enriquez
covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which
imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities. FACTS:
Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a
“The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R.
well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in
covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, reference to the Verbal Order of President Duterte.
when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt
the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine
House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Army (PA) Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President
Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 Marcos.
from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said
Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:
Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the 1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in
Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents their capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined
were individually filed in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation
unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were and Recognition Act of 2013).
also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the 2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as
exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.
articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, 3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal
from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were capacity, as member of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of
amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation
exemption clauses.” and organization of victims and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the
martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others, in their official
SC declared that the following Cityhood Laws are Constitutional: capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the
1. R.A. No. 9389 (Baybay City in Leyte) Philippines.
2. R.A. No.9390 (Bogo City in Cebu) 4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the
3. R.A. No.9391 (Catbalogan City in Samar) Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned
4. R.A. No.9392 (Tandag City in Surigao del Sur) human rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.
5. R.A. No.9393 (Lamitan City in Basilan) 5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of
6. R.A. No.9394 (Borongan City in Samar) the Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and
7. R.A. No.9398 (Tayabas City in Quezon) several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
8. R.A. No.9404 (Tabuk City in Kalinga) 6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several
9. R.A. No.9405 (Bayugan City in Agusan del Sur) others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
10.R.A. No.9407 (Batac City in Ilocos Norte) 7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of
11.R.A. No.9408 (Mati City in Davao Oriental) the Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by
12.R.A. No.9409 (Guihulngan City in Negros Oriental) himself and on behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial law
13.R.A. No.9434 (Cabadbaran City in Agusan del Norte) regime of Marcos.
14.R.A. No.9435 (El Salvador City in Misamis Oriental) 8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the
15.R.A. No.9436 (Carcar City in Cebu) Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.
16.R.A. No.9491 (Naga City in Cebu)

*June 28, 2011 Decision + Dissenting Opinion*

ISSUES: Locus standi
1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that
the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy. a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions. concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
and hierarchy of courts.
4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result
violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws. of an act complained of, such proper party has no standing.
Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
RULING: in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the
Justiciable controversy Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
for judicial inquiry are present:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
subject act or issuance; funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and case, what is essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the President
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely
claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing that
In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders
the discussion of the last two superfluous. An “actual case or controversy” is one which Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies paramount public interest.
carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of
government.cralawred As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure, political questions used machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
to be beyond the ambit of judicial review. opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.
Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the
Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public case.
domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President
Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
healing and forgiveness. petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.
Hierarchy of Courts
In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary FACTS:
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which granted the
are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of declaratory relief prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the constitutionality of the
courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not just Texas Criminal abortion laws; but denied issuing an injunction against enforcement of
a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and such statutes.
concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has
the power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary. In 1970, Norma L McCorvey (“Jane Roe” ), a pregnant single woman (allegedly a result of
rape), filed a suit against the defendant, District Attorney Henry Wade questioning Texas
Constitutionality State Laws which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice
for the purpose of saving the mother’s life. She argues that said laws are
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the unconstitutionally vague and that they abridge her right of personal privacy as
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. guaranteed and protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it Later, she amended her complaint as to represent or sue “ on behalf of herself and all
has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting other women similarly situated;” thereby becoming a class suit.
against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the
Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a ISSUE:
“post-dictatorship charter” and a “human rights constitution.” For them, the ratification Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected by the constitution includes the
of the Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To right to abort her child.
support their case, petitioners invoke Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II,
Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the HELD:
Constitution. There is no merit to the contention. Yes. The “right of privacy x x x is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. We therefore conclude that the right of
As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective personal privacy includes abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must
history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles be considered against important state interests in regulation.”
to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed
Marcos burial at the LNMB. “A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that exempts from criminality
only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage
Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not and without recognition of the interests involved (such as liberty interests), is violative of
self-executing. Thus: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state
policies.” The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic Hacienda Luisita v PARC
political creed of the nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They FACTS:
are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY
and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda
state policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not “self-executing provisions, the Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody (CARP) of the government.
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
xxx The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted
The petitions must be dismissed. that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot
Roe v Wade validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be
qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine
explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not
choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock
the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether
their printed names.” they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court 2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
decision.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of
ISSUES: Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case? the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional? rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in
full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was
Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue
SDP? of constitutionality.]
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable
to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP? 3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.
lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage
through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be [Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP,
allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court
fully paid for the lands or not? is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless,
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from
FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered? subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by
Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA
RULING: 6657.
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et
al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears
Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of
and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the
distribution to the qualified FWBs.] Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area
that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per
qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of
since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will
or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the be awarded.
administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have
been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita [The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an
Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain
acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The
resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus,
sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders,
be distributed to the FWBs.] which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the
majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP. shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will
constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP
1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs
considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, to acquire control over HLI.]
these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989.
Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory
acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice
of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative
of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that
none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme.
Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is
not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an
original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just
compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657
has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed
to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after
10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate
of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been
issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not
even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not
the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be
immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then
all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day,
these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under
CARP.]
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option
to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.