EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-23258. July 1, 1967.]

ROBERTO R. MONROY , petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

FELIPE DEL ROSARIO , respondents.

E. M. Fernando, E. Quisumbing-Fernando and Norberto Quisumbing for petitioner.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Associates for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. ELECTION LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; SCOPE OF POWERS. — Since the

powers of the Commission on Elections are limited to matters connected with the
"conduct of election," necessarily its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers are likewise
limited to controversies connected with the "conduct of elections."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEANING OF PHRASE "CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS." — This phrase covers
all the administrative process of preparing and operating the election machinery so that
the people could exercise their right to vote at the given time (Guevarra vs. Commission on
Elections, 104 Phil., 268) All questions and controversies that may arise therefrom are to
be resolved exclusively by the Commission, subject to review only by the Supreme Court.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE THERE IS NO ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE BEFORE THE
COMMISSION; CASE AT BAR. — In this case there appears to be no decision, order, or
ruling of the Commission on any administrative question or controversy. And even if there
was a controversy before the Commission, the same did not and could not possibly have
anything to do with the conduct of elections. What the parties are actually controverting is
whether or not petitioner was still the municipal mayor after September 15, 1961 when his
certificate of candidacy for Congressman was filed. This purely legal dispute has
absolutely no bearing or effect on the conduct of elections for the seat of Congressman
for the first district of Rizal. The election can go on irrespective of whether petitioner is
considered resigned from his position of municipal mayor or not. Hence, said question
properly fell within the cognizance of the courts.
4. ID.; FORFEITURE OF OFFICE UPON FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. —
Section 27 of the Revised Election Code makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment
and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever
and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.
5. ID.; WITHDRAWAL OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY DOES NOT RENDER IT VOID AB
INITIO. — The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the
certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain
even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.
6. PUBLIC OFFICERS; DE FACTO OFFICER, RIGHTFUL INCUMBENT MAY RECOVER
FROM De Facto OFFICER SALARY RECEIVED DURING WRONGFUL TENURE. — The general
rule is that the rightful incumbent may recover from an officer de facto the salary received
by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office
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 in good Faith and under color of title (Walker vs. Hughes, 36 A 2d. 47, 151 ALR 946).
7. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR DE FACTO DOCTRINE. — It is cogently acknowledged that the
de facto doctrine has been formulated not for the protection of the de facto officer
principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in
the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers
(2 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, 1962, pp. 544-545).
8. ID.; ID.; DE FACTO OFFICER TAKES SALARIES AT HIS OWN RISK. — A de facto
officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to
the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his
wrongful retention of the public office (Walker vs. Hughes, supra).

DECISION

BENGZON , J.P. , J : p

Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on
September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of
Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with the Commission on Elections. Three days
later, or on September 18, 1961, petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of
candidacy. The Commission on Elections, per resolution, 1 approved the withdrawal. But
on September 21, 1961, respondent Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas,
took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the
said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.
Upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting in Pasig, held in the suit for
injunction instituted by petitioner against respondents that (a) the former had ceased to
be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed on September 15,
1961; (b) respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor upon his having assumed
office as such on September 21, 1961; (c) petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages,
the salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to
the time he can reassume said office; and (d) petitioner must pay respondent P1,000.00
as moral damages.
This judgment was, on appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, affirmed in toto except
for the award of moral damages which was eliminated. The same Court reaffirmed its
stand upon petitioner's filing a motion to reconsider. Hence, this petition for certiorari to
review the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner first argues that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals had done what
they had no jurisdiction to do — review a resolution of the Commission on Elections. The
submission is without merit.
The Constitution empowers the Commission on Elections to
". . . decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions
affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of
polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election
officials . . ." 2 (Emphasis supplied)

And the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on these administrative
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 questions are reviewable only by the Supreme Court. 3 Since the powers of the
Commission are limited to matters connected with the "conduct of elections,"
necessarily its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers are likewise limited to
controversies connected with the "conduct of elections." This phrase covers all the
administrative process of preparing and operating the election machinery so that the
people could exercise their right to vote at the given time. 4 All questions and
controversies that may arise therefrom are to be resolved exclusively by the
Commission, subject to review only by the Supreme Court.
However, in this case there appears to be no decision, order or ruling of the Commission
on any administrative question or controversy. There was no dispute before the
Commission. Respondent never contested the filing of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy. Neither has he disputed before that body the withdrawal thereof. And even if
there was a controversy before the Commission, the same did not and could not possibly
have anything to do with the conduct of elections. What the parties are actually
controverting is whether or not petitioner was still the municipal mayor after September
15, 1961. This purely legal dispute has absolutely no bearing or effect on the conduct of
the elections for the seat of congressman for the first district of Rizal. The election can go
on irrespective of whether petitioner is considered resigned from his position of municipal
mayor or not. The only interest and, for that matter, jurisdiction, of the Commission on
Elections in this regard is to know who are the running candidates for the forthcoming
elections, for that affects the conduct of election. So when petitioner withdrew the
certificate announcing his candidacy for Congressman, as far as the Commission could be
concerned, petitioner was no longer interested in running for that seat. The matter of his
having forfeited his present position and the possible legal effect thereon by the
withdrawal of his certificate was completely out of the picture. Hence, that purely legal
question properly fell within the cognizance of the courts.
Now the withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former
position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code providing that —
"Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than
the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office
from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy."

makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the ling of the
certi cate of candidacy for another of ce. Only the moment and act of ling are
considered. Once the certi cate is led, the seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a
new election or appointment can restore the ousted of cial. Thus, as We had occasion
to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro v. Gatuslao, 98 Phil. 194, 196:
". . . The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of ling of
the certi cate of candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make
the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and
unforeseeable, since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner's contention that the certificate of candidacy was filed without his knowledge
and consent and, hence, the Commission's approval of its withdrawal invalidated such
certificate for all legal purposes, is untenable. It nowhere appears that the Commission's
resolution expressly invalidated the certificate. The withdrawal of a certificate of
candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the
permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be
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 subsequently withdrawn. Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals expressly
found as a fact that the certificate in question was filed with petitioner's knowledge and
consent. And since the nature of the remedy taken by petitioner before Us would allow a
discussion of purely legal questions only, such fact is deemed conceded. 5

Petitioner would next maintain that respondent Court of Appeals likewise erred in
affirming a lower court judgment requiring petitioner to pay respondent Del Rosario by way
of actual damages the salaries he was allegedly entitled to receive from September 21,
1961, to the date of petitioner's vacation of his office as mayor. In support of this he relies
solely upon Rodriguez v. Tan, 91 Phil. 724, holding that a senator who had been proclaimed
and had assumed office but was later on ousted in an election protest, is a de facto officer
during the time he held the office of senator, and can retain the emoluments received even
as against the successful protestant. Petitioner's factual premise is the appellate court's
finding that he was a de facto officer when he continued occupying the office of mayor
after September 15, 1961.
However, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Rodriguez case is not applicable
here for absence of factual and legal similarities. The Rodriguez case involved a senator
who had been proclaimed as duly elected, assumed the office and was subsequently
ousted as a result of an election contest. These peculiar facts called for the application of
an established precedent in this jurisdiction that the candidate duly proclaimed must
assume office notwithstanding a protest filed against him and can retain the
compensation paid during his incumbency. But the case at bar does not involve a
proclaimed elective official who will be ousted because of an election contest. The present
case for injunction and quo warranto involves the forfeiture of the office of municipal
mayor by the incumbent occupant thereof and the claim to that office by the vice mayor
because of the operation of Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code. The established precedent
invoked in the Rodriguez case can not therefore be applied in this case.
It is the general rule then, i.e., "that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover
from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful
tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title" 6 that
applies in the present case. The resulting hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule
to the de facto officer who did actual work is recognized; but it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the
de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who
get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being
lawful officers. 7 The question of compensation involves different principles and concepts
however. Here, it is possession of title, not of the office, that is decisive. A de facto officer,
not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de
jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful
retention of the public office. 8
Wherefore, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is, as it is hereby,
affirmed in toto. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C .J ., Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ ., concur.
Arsenio, J ., is on official leave.
Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ ., did not take part.
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 Footnotes

1. The records of this case do not include a copy of this resolution. Hence, it nowhere
appears when this resolution was issued.

2. Philippine Constitution, Art. X, sec. 2.

3. Ibid; see also: Sec. 5, Rev. Election Code.
4. See: Guevarra vs. Commission on Elections, 104 Phil. 268.

5. See: Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967.

6. Walker vs. Hughes, 36 A 2d. 47, 151 ALR 946, 949-950.

7. See: 2 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Phils., 1962, pp. 544-545.
8. Walker vs. Hughes, supra.

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