FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-14569. November 23, 1960.]
                BENITO CODILLA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JOSE L. MARTINEZ, ETC., ET
                AL., respondents.
                Teodoro V. Nano for appellants.
                The Provincial Fiscal of Davao for appellee.
                                                 SYLLABUS
           1.     MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; IRREGULAR DESIGNATION OF ACTING
    MAYOR; MAY BE CONSIDERED DE FACTO OFFICER. — Although the designation made
    by a ranking municipal councilor of the third ranking Councilor of a municipal councilor
    of the third ranking Councilor of a municipality to act as acting Mayor was irregular,
    because it was not made in accordance with the provisions of Section 2195 of the
    Revised Administrative Code and Section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code, still he
    was acting under a color of authority, as distinguished from usurper who is one who
    has neither title nor color of right to an office. His acts are therefore official acts of a de
    facto officer. If they are made within the scope f the authority vested by law in the
    officer of the Mayor, such acts are valid and binding.
            2.     ID.; TENURE OF TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT OF POLICEMAN. — A
    temporary appointment is similar to one made in acting capacity, the essence of which
    lies in its temporary character and its terminability at the pleasure of the appointing
    powers.
          3.    ID.; REPLACEMENT OF NON-ELIGIBLES BY NON-ELIGIBLES. — The
    replacement of non-eligibles by non-eligibles is lawful under and pursuant to Section
    6824 the Revised Administrative Code.
            4.     ID.; REPUBLIC ACT 557 DOES NOT PROTECT TENURE OF OFFICE OF NON-
    ELIGIBLES. — Republic Act No. 557 only guarantees the tenure of office of policemen
    who are eligibles. Non-eligibles do not come under its protection. (Orais, et al. vs. Ribo,
    et al. 93 Phil., 985; 49 Off. Gaz., [12] 5386.)
                                               DECISION
    BAUTISTA ANGELO , J :           p
           On January 24, 1956, Hermenegildo C. Baloyo, mayor of Tagum, Davao, left for
    Negros Occidental to attend to a sick brother. Thereupon, he designated the vice-mayor
    to act in his place effective January 25, 1956 until further advice on his part. The vice-
    mayor in turn fell sick of certain lung trouble in view of which he designated ranking
    councilor Macario Bermudez as acting mayor effective January 25, 1956 until notice to
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    the contrary. Councilor Bermudez was not also in good health and so he designated the
    third ranking councilor Jose L. Martinez to act as mayor effective on the same date.
           Martinez accepted the designation and assumed the of ce on January 25, 1956,
    his rst of cial act being to separate from the service the petitioners as policemen of
    the municipality. Petitioners immediately led their protest invoking the right to
    continue in of ce under the provisions of Republic Act 557, but far from heeding their
    protest, Acting Mayor Martinez appointed Eduardo M. Duaso municipal policeman in
    lieu of Benito Codilla who immediately quali ed by taking his oath of of ce. The
    appointment was approved by the President of the Philippines and the Commissioner
    of Civil Service. Martinez also appointed Juanito Redoble vice Perfecto Melendres, the
    appointment having been authorized by the Commission of Civil Service. Redoble also
    assumed of ce soon thereafter. Policarpio Lagura was also appointed vice Leonardo
    Castor, his appointment having been issued by incumbent Mayor Baloyo who in the
    meantime returned to office. He also immediately qualified by taking the oath of office.
          On February 15, 1956, Benito Codilla and his companions led a petition for
    mandamus before the Court of First Instance of Davao against Acting Mayor Martinez
    incumbent Mayor Baloyo alleging that their separation from the service as municipal
    policemen was illegal because being civil service employees their employment cannot
    terminate except for cause, and so they prayed that respondents be ordered to restore
    them to their former positions with payment of their back salaries. They also prayed for
    moral and exemplary damages to the tune of P7,000.00 and for attorney's fees in the
    amount of P1,000.00. They included as co-respondents the policemen who were
    appointed in their places.
           Respondents in their answer set up the defense that the appointments of
    petitioners having been made under Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code in
    temporary capacity, because they are not civil service eligibles, the same were valid
    only for three months and so their continuance in of ce after the expiration of that
    period was illegal; that even assuming that Acting Mayor Martinez had no authority to
    terminate their employment, his action was validated when incumbent Mayor Baloyo
    endorsed and rati ed the same by his subsequent of cial actuation; and that, not being
    civil service eligibles, petitioners may be separated from the service under the
    provisions of Republic Act No. 557 upon the expiration of the term of three months
    given to them in their appointments.
          On the strength of the stipulation of facts and additional evidence submitted by
    the parties, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that
    the separation of petitioners from the service was made in accordance with law. Hence
    the present appeal.
           One peculiar thing that appears dominant in the present case is the fact that the
    of cial who assumed of ce as acting mayor of Tagum, Davao, by designation made by
    the ranking municipal councilor is Jose L. Martinez who was only then the third ranking
    councilor of the municipality for which reason petitioners argued from the very start
    that their separation was illegal because the designation of Martinez as acting mayor
    w a s not made in accordance with the provisions of Section 2195 of the Revised
    Administrative Code and Section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code under which such
    designation should be made by the provincial governor with the consent of the
    provincial board. Nevertheless, the trial court did not consider the designation of
    Martinez as acting mayor entirely void, or one that would make him a usurper, but at
    most a de facto of cer whose acts may be given validity in the eye of law. Thus, the trial
    court said: "Although his designation was irregular, still he was acting under a color of
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    authority, as distinguished from a usurper who is 'one who has neither title nor color of
    right to an of ce.' . . . The acts of Jose L. Martinez are therefore of cial acts of a de
    facto of cer. If they are made within the scope of the authority vested by law in the
    of ce of the mayor of Tagum, such acts are valid and binding," To this opinion we agree
    it appearing that all the elements constituting a de facto office are here present.
                  "An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer, de Jure, and is
                one how has the reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumed to be
                but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or title to the office he assumes to
                hold. He is distinguished from a mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the
                former holds by some color of right or title while the latter intrudes upon the office
                and assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title or color of right
                to such office." (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 3, 3rd ed., pp. 376-377.)
                        "To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto
                existence, or least one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual
                possession of the office under color of title or authority. State vs. Babb, 124 W.
                Va. 428, 20 S.E. (d) 683." (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, supra footnote No.
                11, p. 383.)
          Another factor that may be invoked in favor of the validity of the of cial actuation
    of Acting Mayor Martinez is the fact that all his of cial acts done under his designation
    were subsequently endorsed and rati ed by the incumbent mayor when he returned to
    of ce. This rati cation served to cure any legal in rmity the acts of Acting Mayor
    Martinez may have suffered because of his irregular designation.
           This brings us to the question whether the termination of employment of
    petitioners as municipal policemen was made contrary to the law which safeguards the
    rights of an employee to his of ce in the government service. While it may be gleaned
    from the surrounding circumstances that the hand of politics has intervened in the
    separation of petitioners who apparently had been for sometime serving the
    government as policemen during the previous administration, we cannot escape the
    fact that they were merely given temporary appointments for the reason that they do
    not have civil service eligibility thus making their status as employees wholly dependent
    upon the grace of the ruling power. And this we say because, as we ruled in a series of
    cases, "A temporary appointment is similar to one made in acting capacity, the essence
    of which lies in its temporary character and its terminability at the pleasure of the
    appointing power." 1 We also postulated that "The replacement of non-eligibles by non-
    eligibles is lawful and under and pursuant to Section 682 of the Revised Administrative
    Code." 2 Petitioners cannot, therefore, invoke in their favor the provisions of Republic
    Act No. 557 because this Act only guarantees the tenure of of ce of policemen who are
    eligibles. Non-eligibles do not come under its protection. (Orais, et al vs. Ribo, et al.,
    supra.) Hence, much as we sympathize with petitioners, our hand is stayed by the
    inexorable provisions of the law.
          Wherefore, the decision appealed from is af rmed, with out pronouncement as
    to costs.
         Parás, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David,
    Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
 Footnotes
    1.          Cuadra vs. Cordova, 103 Phil., 391; 54 Off. Gaz., (35) 8063.
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    2.          Orais, et al. vs. Ribo, et al., 93 Phil., 985; 49 Off. Gaz., [12] 5386.
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