G.R. No.

130003 October 20, 2004

JONAS AÑONUEVO, Petitioner.

Facts: At the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city).
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing the opposite
lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and
Gamble Inc., the employer of Aonuevos brother, Jonathan. Aonuevo was in the course of making a
left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries
as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo
four (4) operations.

Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo
before the RTC of Pasig City. He also filed criminal complaint against Anonuevo before MTC
Mandaluyong but he was acquitted on the criminal charge. Trial on the civil action ensued, and in a
Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and
Anonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia.

The Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto- that his vehicle struck
Villagracia; his vehicle hit Villagracia’s left leg; that he speeds up as he made a left turn; likewise as
narrated by witnesses. However, Anonuevo points out that Villagracias bicycle had no safety
gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance. Nor was it
duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same ordinance.
Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes.

Issue:Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor
vehicle negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap, should
apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles.

Ruling: A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle,
which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A
motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion.is capable of greater speeds
and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more
capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a
combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater
bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels that they use.

There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor vehicle.

The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures and attached responsibilities
of motorized and non-motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure
obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied
or guarded against, then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to include
non-motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need
arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road
travel. The fact that there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on
motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher
standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other
types of vehicles.

Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even
if by analogy.

The applicability of Art. 2185 is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to
presume that the law intended a broader coverage.

NEGLIGENCE PER SE:

The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence,
negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se. The mere fact of violation of a statute is not
sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury
complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the
statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the
injury.

The non-observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to
observe that care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the state regards
certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden
act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been
otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard
is negligence, negligence per se, or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal excuse.
According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has been violated, whether the act or
omission constituting such violation would have been regarded as negligence in the absence of any
statute on the subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury
would result from such violation.

WHEN THERE IS AN ORDINANCE:

But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by exceeding
the speed limit, for example, we do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably
dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety
is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about
the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm.
xxx
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the
cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the
manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to
prevent.

QUALIFICATION:

Causal connection between the injury and the violation of the traffic rule should be established for
liability to attach.