1. CSC vs. DBM, (G.R. No.

158791 July 22, 2005)

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for mandamus seeks to compel the Department of Budget
and Management (respondent) to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a
determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.

FACTS: By petitioner’s claim, the amount of ₱215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its Central Office by the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered,
amount to ₱285,660,790.44.1 It complains, however, that the total fund releases by respondent to its Central Office during
the fiscal year 2002 was only ₱279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of ₱5,807,392.30.

To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its "no report, no release" policy
whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents.

Petitioner contends that the application of the "no report, no release" policy upon independent constitutional bodies of which
it is one is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.

Respondent, at the outset, opposes the petition on procedural grounds. It contends that first, petitioner did not exhaust
administrative remedies as it could have sought clarification from respondent’s Secretary regarding the extent of fiscal
autonomy before resorting to this Court. Second, even assuming that administrative remedies were exhausted, there are
no exceptional and compelling reasons to justify the direct filing of the petition with this Court instead of the trial court, thus
violating the hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE:
1. WON the "no report, no release" policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy.
2. WON respondent’s justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner, due to a shortfall in revenues, is valid.
3. WON petitioner’s claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower than that of the previous fiscal year,
as is the case of the Judiciary, is valid.
HELD:

1. YES. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX
(A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.

In Province of Batangas v. Romulo, this Court, in construing the phrase "automatic release" in Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution reading:

Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.

By parity of construction, "automatic release" of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission
which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be
imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited
the enforcement of a "no report, no release" policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by
the Constitution.

2. No. respondent’s justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner, due to a shortfall in revenues, is not valid.
In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming that there was
indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A),
Section 5 of the Constitution.

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs teaches that "[a]n interpretation should, if possible, be avoided
under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory."

Thus, if respondent’s theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release approved
appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month, that there is a shortfall in revenues, thereby
emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering insignificant altogether, such mandate.

Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions
of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of
funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal
autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the
distinction established by the Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of their
approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.

Significantly, the Year 2002 GAA itself distinguished between two types of public institutions in the matter of
fund releases. With respect to government agencies in general, the pertinent General Provisions of the GAA read as
follows:

Sec. 62. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No appropriations authorized in this Act
shall be impounded through deduction or retention, unless in accordance with the guidelines for the imposition
and release of reserves and the rules and regulations for deduction, retention or deferral of releases shall
have been issued by the DBM in coordination with the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance. Accordingly, all the funds appropriated for the purposes, programs, projects and activities
authorized in this Act, except those covered by Special Provision No. 1 of the Unprogrammed
Fund shall be regularly and automatically released in accordance with the established allotment period and
system by the DBM without any deduction, retention or imposition of reserves. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Sec. 63. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or reduction of appropriations
authorized in this Act shall be effected only in cases where there is unmanageable national government
budget deficit.

Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this Section shall be construed to mean that the actual
national government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target
deficit of P130.0 billion as indicated in the FY 2002 Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the
President to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution or there are clear economic indications of an
impending occurrence of such condition, as determined by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee and approved
by the President.

In contrast, the immediately succeeding provision of the Year 2002 GAA, which specifically applied to offices vested with
fiscal autonomy, stated:

Sec. 64. Appropriations of Agencies Vested with Fiscal Autonomy. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized in this Act for the Judiciary, Congress of the Philippines, the
Commission on Human Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Audit and the Commission on Elections shall be automatically and regularly released.

Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally allowed when there is an unmanageable
budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity with the Constitution, excepted from such rule the appropriations for
entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there was a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could
not withhold full release of petitioner’s funds without violating not only the Constitution but also Section 64 of the General
Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.

This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution also states as a guiding principle on the Constitutional
Mandate on the Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy that:

4. After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and regularly
released subject to availability of funds. (Underscoring supplied)

This phrase "subject to availability of funds" does not, however, contradict the present ruling that the funds of entities vested
with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly released, a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding.

What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation where total revenue collections are so low that they are not
sufficient to cover the total appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it would be practically
impossible to fully release the Judiciary’s appropriations or any of the entities also vested with fiscal autonomy for that
matter, without violating the right of such other entities to an automatic release of their own appropriations. It is under that
situation that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed.

Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small portion of the total national budget, only
in the most extreme circumstances will the total revenue collections fall short of the requirements of such agencies.

3. No. Petitioner’s claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower than that of the previous fiscal year
must be rejected.

For with respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly provides:

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.
On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional Commissions, a similar proscription
against the reduction of appropriations below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5
merely states:

Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.

The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations below that for the previous
year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount
appropriated for them for the previous year.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of all the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. Respondent’s act of withholding the
subject funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Accordingly, respondent is directed to release to petitioner the amount of Five Million Eight Hundred Seven Thousand,
Three hundred Ninety Two Pesos and Thirty Centavos (₱5,807,392.30) representing the unreleased balance of petitioner’s
appropriation for its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act for FY 2002.

2. CHREA vs. CHR, (G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004)

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Can the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) lawfully implement an upgrading and reclassification of personnel positions
without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

FACTS: Republic Act No. 8522 (otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998) provided for Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the
appropriations of the CHR.

On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting
an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission.

On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grades of certain
positions in the Commission. It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of some positions.

ISSUE: Can the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of
plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

RULING: No. the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices
accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal
autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of
the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create
positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not
absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System
established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.

The Commission on Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, Resolution No. A98-055
dated 19 October 1998 and Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the Department of
Budget and Management are disallowed.

Indeed, the law upon which respondent heavily anchors its case upon has expressly provided that any form of adjustment
in the organizational structure must be within the parameters of the Salary Standardization Law.

For this purpose, Congress has delegated to the DBM the power to administer the Salary Standardization Law and to ensure
that the spirit behind it is observed. This power is part of the system of checks and balances or system of restraints in our
government. The DBM's exercise of such authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant to the paramount
law of the land, the Salary Standardization Law and the Administrative Code.

In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of "providing equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions," the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough
evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the
CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that "no organizational unit or changes in
key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President."

Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public
Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHR's proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28,
and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would
change the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions.

This view of the DBM, as the law's designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond
cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great
respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.

To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nation's coffers, the Secretary of the DBM, as the President's
alter ego, knows from where he speaks inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects of an unwarranted
upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in particular and in the entire government in general.

The Commission on Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19
October 1998 and Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the Department of Budget and
Management are disallowed.

3. THELMA P. GAMINDE, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, (G.R. No. 140335 December 13, 2000)

PARDO, J.:

The case is a special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set aside two "decisions" of the Commission on Audit
ruling that petitioner’s term of office as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11,
1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as set forth in her appointment paper.

FACTS: At the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the incumbent Chairman and members of the Civil Service
Commission were the following:

(1) Chairperson Celerina G. Gotladera. She was initially appointed as OIC Chairman on March 19, 1986, and appointed
chairman on December 24, 1986, which she assumed on March 13, 1987.

(2) Atty. Cirilo G. Montejo. On June 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed him Commissioner, without any term.
He assumed office on July 9, 1986, and served until March 31, 1987, when he filed a certificate of candidacy for the position
of Congressman, 2nd District, Leyte, thereby vacating his position as Commissioner. His tenure was automatically cut-off
by the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

(3) Atty. Mario D. Yango. On January 22, 1985, President Ferdinand E. Marcos appointed him Commissioner for a term
expiring January 25, 1990. He served until February 2, 1988, when his term ended in virtue of the transitory provisions
referred to. On May 30, 1988, President Aquino re-appointed him to a new three-year term and served until May 31, 1991,
exceeding his lawful term, but not exceeding the maximum of seven years, including service before the ratification of the
1987 Constitution.

Under this factual milieu, it was only Commissioner Yango who was extended a new term under the 1987 Constitution. The
period consumed between the start of the term on February 02, 1987, and his actual assumption on May 30, 1988, due to
his belated appointment, must be counted against him.

ISSUE: whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she
was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02,
2000, as claimed by her.

RULING:

Given the foregoing common starting point (in the facts), we compute the terms of the first appointees and their
successors to the Civil Service Commission under the 1987 Constitution by their respective lines, as follows:

First line : Chairman – seven-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 01, 1994. On January 30, 1988, the President
nominated Ms. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas Chairman, Civil Service Commission. On March 02, 1988, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination. She assumed office on March 04, 1988. Her term ended on February 02, 1994.
She served as de facto Chairman until March 04, 1995. On March 05, 1995, the President appointed then Social Welfare
Secretary Corazon Alma G. de Leon, Chairman, Civil Service Commission, to a regular seven-year term. This term must
be deemed to start on February 02, 1994, immediately succeeding her predecessor, whose term started on the common
date of the terms of office of the first appointees under the 1987 Constitution. She assumed office on March 22, 1995, for a
term expiring February 02, 2001.
This is shown in her appointment paper, quoted verbatim as follows:

"March 5, 1995
"Madam:
"Pursuant to the provisions of Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2, of the Constitution, you are hereby appointed, ad
interim, CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, for a term expiring February 2, 2001.
"By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office, furnishing this Office and the
Civil Service Commission with copies of your oath of office.
"(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS"

Second line : Commissioner – Five-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 02, 1992. On January 30, 1988, the
President nominated Atty. Samilo N. Barlongay Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. On February 17, 1988, the
Commission on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines, confirmed the nomination. He assumed office on March 04,
1988. His term ended on February 02, 1992. He served as de facto Commissioner until March 04, 1993.

On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for a term
expiring February 02, 1999. This terminal date is specified in her appointment paper. On September 07, 1993, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment. She accepted the appointment and assumed office on June 22,
1993. She is bound by the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In this connection, the letter
dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona clarifying that her term would expire on February
02, 2000, was in error. What was submitted to the Commission on Appointments was a nomination for a term expiring on
February 02, 1999. Thus, the term of her successor must be deemed to start on February 02, 1999, and expire on February
02, 2006.

Third line : Commissioner – Three-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 02, 1990. Atty. Mario D. Yango was
incumbent commissioner at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. His extended tenure ended on February 02,
1988. In May, 1988, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed him Commissioner, Civil Service Commission to a new three-
year term thereunder. He assumed office on May 30, 1988. His term ended on February 02, 1990, but served as de
facto Commissioner until May 31, 1991. On November 26, 1991, the President nominated Atty. Ramon P. Ereñeta as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. On December 04, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination. He assumed office on December 12, 1991, for a term expiring February 02, 1997.

Commendably, he voluntarily retired on February 02, 1997. On February 03, 1997, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed
Atty. Jose F. Erestain, Jr. Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 2004. He assumed
office on February 11, 1997.

Thus, we see the regular interval of vacancy every two (2) years, namely, February 02, 1994, for the first Chairman,
February 02, 1992, for the first five-year term Commissioner, and February 02, 1990, for the first three-year term
Commissioner.

Their successors must also maintain the two year interval, namely: February 02, 2001, for Chairman; February 02, 1999,
for Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, and February 02, 1997, for Commissioner Ramon P. Ereñeta, Jr.

The third batch of appointees would then be having terms of office as follows:
First line : Chairman, February 02, 2001 to February 02, 2008;
Second line: Commissioner, February 02, 1999 to February 02, 2006; and,
Third line: Commissioner, February 02, 1997 to February 02, 2004, thereby consistently maintaining the two-
year interval.

The line of succession, terms of office and tenure of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission may be
outlined as follows:

Chairman Term Tenure

(7-year original)

Sto. Tomas – 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to Mar. 04, 1988 to
Feb. 02, 1994 March 08, 1995
De Leon – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1994 to March 22, 1995 to
(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2001 Feb. 02, 2001
_______ - 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 2001 to
Feb. 02, 2008

2nd Member Term Tenure

(5-year original)

Barlongay – 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to March 04, 1988 to

Feb. 02, 1992 March 04, 1993
Gaminde – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1992 to June 11, 1993 to
Feb. 02, 1999 Feb. 02, 2000
Valmores – 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1999 to Sept. 08, 2000 to
(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2006 Feb. 02, 2006

3rd Member Term Tenure

(3-year original)

Yango - 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to May 30, 1988 to

Feb. 02, 1990 May 31, 1991
Ereñeta – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1990 to Dec. 12, 1991 to
Feb. 02, 1997 Feb. 02, 1997
Erestain, Jr. – 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1997 to Feb. 11, 1997 to
(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2004 Feb. 02, 2004

WHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February
02, 1999.

System of a Regular Rotation or Cycle

in the Membership of the Civil Service Commission

The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as
follows: (seven-five-three year rotational interval)

"Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall
hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

In Republic vs. Imperial, we said that "the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to
its workability:

(1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date; and
(2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the
unexpired balance of the term."

Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987
Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of
the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular
recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms.

Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the
first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the
term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter.

"Term" vs. "Tenure"

In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and "tenure."

"The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The TERM means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another. The TENURE represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not
affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent."

Starting Point of the Terms of Office

of the First Appointees to the Constitutional Commissions

In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the
Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1
(2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a seven-
year term of office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first appointees
terms of seven, five and three years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to
coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02, 1987).

On the other hand, Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions, 1987 Constitution provides:
 "SEC. 15. The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are
sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new
term thereunder. In no case shall any Member serve longer than seven years including service before the ratification
of this Constitution."

What the above quoted Transitory Provisions contemplate is "tenure" not "term" of the incumbent Chairmen and Members
of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, who "shall continue in office
for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term thereunder."

The term "unless" imports an exception to the general rule. Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent
members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution
under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by:

(1) their removal from office for cause;

(2) their becoming incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or
(3) their appointment to a new term thereunder, all of which events may occur before the end of the one year
period after the effectivity of the Constitution.

However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, providing for a seven-five-three year
rotational interval for the first appointees under this Constitution.

4. EVALYN I. FETALINO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 191890 December 04, 2012)

BRION, J.:

Before us is a Petition seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Commission on Elections (Co melee) Resolution
No. 8808 issued on March 30, 2010. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1568, as amended, extends a five-year lump sum gratuity to
the chairman or any member of the Comelec upon retirement, after completion of the term of office; incapacity; death;
and resignation after reaching 60 years of age but before expiration of the term of office.

FACTS: On February 10, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to the petitioners as Comelec
Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Eleven days later (or on February 21, 1998), Pres. Ramos renewed the
petitioners’ ad interim appointments for the same position. Congress, however, adjourned in May 1998 before the
Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later
took effect and the petitioners were no longer re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners. Thus, the petitioners merely served
as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months, or from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998.

Subsequently, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A.
No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the petitioners’ claims pursuant to its Resolution No. 06-1369, granting the request
of petitioner for the payment of retirement benefits.

Thereafter, the Comelec completely disapproved the petitioners’ claim for a lump sum benefit under R.A. No. 1568.
Thus, the case.

ISSUE:

I) Whether the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments amounted to retirement from the service
after completion of the term of office.
II) WON petitioners are entitled to a five-year lump sum gratuity (by virtue of the finality of Resolution No. 06-
1369 and, thus, can no longer be modified by the Comelec.

RULING:

I) No. The petitioners obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the
full seven-year term of office prescribed by Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution; they served as
Comelec Commissioners for barely four months, i.e., from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998. More
importantly, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioners’ service, if any, could only amount to tenure
in office and not to the term of office contemplated by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the Comelec who
has retired from the service after having completed his term of office.

The right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are met:

a) when the conditions imposed by the applicable law – in this case, R.A. No. 1568 — are fulfilled; and
b) when an actual retirement takes place.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that retirement entails compliance with certain age and service requirements
specified by law and jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law.

In the recent case of Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9946, where the Court did not allow Judge Macarambon to retire under R.A. No. 910 because
he did not comply with the age and service requirements of the law, the Court emphasized:

Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of exception remains
to be on a case to case basis. We have ruled that the Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for
certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to grant such exception.

The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons
within or beyond the power of the incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term of an office may
be extended by reason of war.

While we characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo "as a permanent appointment that takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office," we have also
positively ruled in that case that "an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office." We consequently ruled:

However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does
not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is
neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action
could start and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on
Appointments.38 (emphasis ours; italics supplied)

Based on these considerations, we conclude that the petitioners can never be considered to have retired from the service
not only because they did not complete the full term, but, more importantly, because they did not serve a "term of office" as
required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended.

II) No. Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads:

Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. –

a. In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision or resolution
of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.

A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies
and special reliefs. Under Section 5, Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedures, ordinary actions refer to election
protests, quo warranto, and appeals from decisions of courts in election protest cases; special proceedings refer to
annulment of permanent list of voters, registration of political parties and accreditation of citizens’ arms of the
Commission; provisional remedies refer to injunction and/or restraining order; and special reliefs refer to certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and contempt.

Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the issuance of Resolution No. 06-1369 do not fall within the coverage
of the actions and proceedings under Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the Comelec did not
violate its own rule on finality of judgments.

As a last point, we agree with the Solicitor General that the retirement benefits granted to the petitioners under Section 1 of
R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested right over these benefits.

5. ARSENIO ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LA RAINNE ABAD-

SARMIENTO, respondents. (G.R. No. 142527 March 1, 2001)

QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails the Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc, denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of herein petitioner and affirming the Resolution of the Second Division of the COMELEC. Said decision
declared herein private respondent La Rainne Abad-Sarmiento the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Doña
Aurora, Quezon City during the May 12, 1997 elections; directed the herein petitioner to vacate and turnover the office of
Punong Barangay to private respondent upon the finality of the resolution;

FACTS: On May 12, 1997, petitioner was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Doña Aurora, Quezon City. He
received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed
an election protest claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors.
After petitioner answered and the issues were joined, the Metropolitan Trial Court ordered the reopening and recounting of
the ballots in ten contested precincts. It subsequently rendered its decision that private respondent won the election. She
garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount.

On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that private respondent won over petitioner. Private respondent,
meanwhile, filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. Both petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration and private respondent's Motion for Execution pending appeal were submitted for resolution. The
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the Second Division. . It granted the
Motion for Execution pending appeal.

Petitioner brought before the Court this petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC

ISSUE:

I) WON Commission violated its mandate on "preferential disposition of election contests" as mandated by
Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution as well as Section 257, Omnibus Election Code
II) WON COMELEC misinterpreted Section 2 (2), second paragraph, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: NO.

I) In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction might allow
procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in
numerous cases.

It will be noted that the "preferential disposition" applies to cases before the courts and not those before the
COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show.

Further, we note that petitioner raises the alleged delay of the COMELEC for the first time. As private respondent pointed
out, petitioner did not raise the issue before the COMELEC when the case was pending before it. In fact, private respondent
points out that it was she who filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the case when it was before the COMELEC. The active
participation of a party coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action
is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and
will bar said party from later impugning the court or the body's jurisdiction.

On the matter of the assailed resolution, therefore, we find no grave abuse of discretion on this score by the COMELEC.

We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner had a motion for reconsideration
before the Second Division. This pending motion for reconsideration suspended the execution of the resolution of
the Second Division. Appropriately then, the division must act on the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when the Second
Division resolved both petitioner's motion for reconsideration and private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal,
it did so in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

The requisites for the grant of execution pending appeal are:

(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(b) there must be a good reason for the execution pending appeal; and
(c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.

In our view, these three requisites were present. In its motion for execution, private respondent cites that their case
had been pending for almost three years and the remaining portion of the contested term was just two more years. In a
number of similar cases and for the same good reasons, we upheld the COMELEC's decision to grant execution pending
appeal in the best interest of the electorate. Correspondingly, we do not find that the COMELEC abused its discretion when
it allowed the execution pending appeal.

II) We find no such abuse in the instant case.

While petitioner is correct that election cases pertaining to barangay elections may be appealed by way of a
special civil action for certiorari. However, this recourse is available only when the COMELEC's factual determinations
are marred by grave abuse of discretion.

From the pleadings and the records, we observed that the lower court and the COMELEC meticulously pored over the
ballots reviewed. Because of its fact-finding facilities and its knowledge derived from actual experience, the COMELEC is
in a peculiarly advantageous position to evaluate, appreciate and decide on factual questions before it. Here, we find no
basis for the allegation that abuse of discretion or arbitrariness marred the factual findings of the COMELEC. As previously
held, factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive on
this Court, more so in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law in the questioned
resolutions. Unless any of these causes are clearly substantiated, the Court will not interfere with the COMELEC's findings
of fact.
 6. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEVARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS
F. CEZAR, Respondents. (G.R. No. 176162 : October 9, 2012)

FACTS: Respondents (Guevarra) and Cezar) were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for
Administration, respectively, of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) in 2005. On September 27, 2005,
petitioner Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross
dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being
notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713.

On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Resolution No. 060521 formally charging Guevarra with
Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after a prima facie finding that they had
committed acts punishable under the Civil Service Law and Rules.

Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA essentially questioning the
jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative complaint filed against them by Cueva.

ISSUE: Whether the CSC has jurisdiction over administrative cases filed directly with it against officials of a chartered state
university.

RULING: YES.

CSC has jurisdiction over cases

filed directly with it, regardless of
who initiated the complaint

The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and
employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. Section 2(1),
Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of the civil service:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341, PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making it a government-
owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to
the provisions of E.O. No. 292.

In Camacho v. Gloria, the Court stated that "under E.O. No. 292, a complaint against a state university official may be filed
with either the university’s Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission." It is important to note that the
Court did not interpret the Administrative Code as limiting such authority to exclude complaints filed directly with it by a
member of the civil service.

In Hilario v. Civil Service Commission, the Court interpreted Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No.
292 as allowing the direct filing with the CSC by a public official of a complaint against a fellow government employee.

CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction

with the Board of Regents over
administrative cases

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (the Uniform Rules) explicitly allows the CSC to hear and
decide administrative cases directly brought before it:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and
shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the
final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service
and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.

Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities
and other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, over their respective
officers and employees.

Moreover, the Court invites attention to the cases of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso and Civil Service
Commission v. Sojor. In fact, Sojor specifically cited the Uniform Rules in support of its ruling allowing the CSC to take
cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against the president of a state university. As the Court,
in the two cases, did not consider Section 5 of the Uniform Rules as a limitation to the original concurrent jurisdiction of the
CSC, it can be stated that Section 5 is merely implementary. It is merely directory and not restrictive of the CSCs powers.
The CSC itself is of this view as it has vigorously asserted its jurisdiction over this case through this petition.
 The case of Alfonso is on all fours with the case at bench. The case involved a complaint filed before the CSC
against a PUP employee by two employees of the same university. We ruled that xxx Admittedly, the CSC has
appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities.
However, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide
the case, although it may opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation. x x x

Thus, based on all of the foregoing, the CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against an
official or employee of a chartered state college or university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private
citizen or a member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of Regents of the school.

In addition to the previously cited case of Alfonso, the case of The Civil Service Commission vs. Sojor is likewise instructive.
In the said case, this Court ruled that the CSC validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints directly filed with it
concerning violations of civil service rules committed by a university president. This Court acknowledged that the board of
regents of a state university has the sole power of administration over a university, in accordance with its charter and
R.A. No. 8292. With regard to the disciplining and removal of its employees and officials, however, such authority is not
exclusive to it because all members of the civil service fall under the jurisdiction of the CSC: When the law bestows
upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case,
both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career
civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or non-career, a civil service official or
employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.

It is therefore apparent that despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8292 giving the board of regents or board of trustees
of a state school the authority to discipline its employees, the CSC still retains jurisdiction over the school and its
employees and has concurrent original jurisdiction, together with the board of regents of a state university, over
administrative cases against state university officials and employees.

7. EDGAR R. DEL CASTILLO, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC), (G.R. No. 112513 August 21, 1997)

FACTS: On August 1, 1990, petitioner, an employee of (PRC), was placed under preventive suspension by the PRC.
Thereafter, he was found guilty of grave misconduct and was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits.

Nevertheless, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to PRC Chairman Hermogenes Pobre requesting not only reinstatement
but payment of back salaries as well. Petitioner was eventually reinstated on July 17, 1995. However, his claim for
backwages was in effect denied by Chairman Pobre in a Letter to petitioner dated November 28, 1995.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner Edgar del Castillo, who is exonerated in the administrative case and later ordered reinstated, is
entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of his preventive suspension on August 1, 1990 up to the
time of his actual reinstatement on July 17, 1995.

RULING: YES.

We are in full accord with the Solicitor General's recommendation.

As we recently held in De Guzman v. Civil Service Commission:

When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement has later been ordered, for all
legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held (Tañada v. Legaspi, 13 SCRA 566 [1965]).

Back salaries may be ordered paid to said officer or employee (City Mayor of Zamboanga v. Court of
Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).

Having been exonerated of the charges against him, petitioner should clearly be awarded back salaries, the silence of the
MSPB's decision notwithstanding.

This Honorable Court in the case of Tan, Jr. vs. Office of the President, 229 SCRA 677, stated:

In Cristobal v. Melcher (101 SCRA 857), it was held that “when a government official or employee in the
classified civil service had been illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal
purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that
accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held.” Such award of backwages, however, has since been limited to a
maximum period of five (5) years (San [Luis] vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258).
 Likewise, in Gabriel vs. Domingo, 189 SCRA 672, this Honorable Court ruled that an employee who is
reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is entitled to back salaries for the period of his illegal dismissal.

It is hereby ordered that petitioner be paid back salaries and other benefits due him at the rate prescribed for the position
he held as a civil servant from the time of his preventive suspension on August 1, 1990 until his actual reinstatement on
July 17, 1995, without deduction.

8. PNB vs. RICARDO V. GARCIA, Jr. (GR No. 141246, September 9, 2002)

FACTS: The Decision affirmed the Resolution of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) exonerating Respondent Ricardo V.
Garcia Jr. from administrative liability.

"Private respondent Ricardo V. Garcia, Jr., a check processor and cash representative at the Buendia Branch of petitioner
Philippine National Bank (PNB), was charged by the latter with Gross Neglect of Duty in connection with the funds it had
lost on August 5, 1994 in the amount of Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00).

"On July 21, 1995, the PNB-Administrative Adjudication Office (AAO) rendered its decision, duly approved by PNB Executive
Vice President Inocencio B. Deza, Jr., finding private respondent guilty as charged and, accordingly, imposing upon him
the penalty of ‘Forced Resignation with Benefits . . . without prejudice to his monetary liability arising from the case.

"Private respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but the same was denied by the PNB-AAO in its
Resolution dated September 21, 1995. Aggrieved, private respondent appealed to public respondent on September 28,
1995.

“Meanwhile, on May 27, 1996, petitioner was privatized pursuant to Executive Order No. 80, otherwise known as the 1996
Revised Charter of the Philippine National Bank.

"Thereafter, public respondent issued Resolution No. 967612 on December 3, 1996, granting private respondent’s appeal
after finding that the evidence on record failed to establish neglect of duty on the part of private Respondent. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the appeal of Ricardo V. Garcia, Jr. is hereby granted. Accordingly, he is exonerated of the charges and
the appealed decision of PNB is set aside. Garcia is automatically reinstated to his position with back salaries.’

"Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above resolution, but public respondent, on March 11, 1997, denied the same
on the ground that only the “party adversely affected by the decision" — namely, the government employee — may
appeal an administrative case.." Hence the petition.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner may appeal an administrative decision.

RULING: YES.

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but a mere statutory privilege that may be exercised only
in the manner prescribed by law. Under Presidential Decree (PD) 807, the CSC has jurisdiction over appeals of
administrative disciplinary cases, in which the penalty imposed is suspension for more than thirty days; a fine exceeding
thirty days’ salary; a demotion in rank or salary; or transfer, removal, or dismissal from office.

The CA stated that this provision must be read in congruence with Section 39 of the same law. The latter provision reads
thus:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Sec. 39. Appeals. — (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed,
which petition shall be decided within fifteen days."

In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, the Court said that "we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against
whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion
in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office . . ."

What the law declared as "final" were only those decisions of heads of agencies involving suspensions of not more than
thirty days or fines not exceeding thirty days’ salary. These decisions, he said, involved minor and petty offenses, and to
allow multiple appeals in those instances would overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative systems.

Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously undermined if we bar appeals of
exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in which acquittals are final and
unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy.
Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to prevent appeals
of administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and pervertedly erode this constitutional
grant.

Finally, the Court in Dacoycoy ruled that the CSC had acted well within its rights in appealing the CA’s exoneration of the
respondent public official therein, because it has been mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity
of our civil service system. In the same light, herein Petitioner PNB has the standing to appeal to the CA the exoneration
of Respondent Garcia. After all, it is the aggrieved party which has complained of his acts of dishonesty. Besides, this
Court has not lost sight of the fact that PNB was already privatized on May 27, 1996. Should respondent be finally
exonerated indeed, it might then be incumbent upon petitioner to take him back into its fold. It should therefore be allowed
to appeal a decision that in its view hampers its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and
preserve its name as a premier banking institution in our country.

9. BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007)

GARCIA, J.:

Petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail
the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming
party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess
the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent.

FACTS: Pursuant to Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to
participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May
14, 2007 elections, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these – and ostensibly
subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, herein respondents.

Thereafter, petitioner fled with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees
of certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the
aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner
Rosales, addressed a letter dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting
a list of that groups’ nominees, Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information.

Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales’ requests. The April 13, 2007
issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WON’T BARE PARTY-LIST
NOMINEES", with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented."

ISSUE:

1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups,
has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution;

2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said
nominees.

RULING:

Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.

1. As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees
of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing
the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their
respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And
for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect
and protect that right. By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right
to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship
possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.

The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown
on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the
prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to
the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage
of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended.

As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing
through mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec’s reasoning that a party-
list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-
disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental
right to information. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote
for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of
an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The
ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The
Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo, has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of
the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. So it must be here
for still other reasons articulated earlier.

2. In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the
respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same
petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate
in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections.

10. ANTONIO P. SANTOS vs. CA,. (G.R. No. 139792, November 22, 2000)

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari petitioner assails the decision of 19 August 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 48301, which held that petitioner’s separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 should be limited to the number
of years of his service in the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) only, excluding his years of service as judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City for which he has already been given retirement gratuity and pension.

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City. On 1 April 1992, petitioner optionally retired from the
Judiciary under R.A. No. 910, as amended, and received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the
government service; and five years thereafter he has been regularly receiving a monthly pension.

On 2 December 1993, petitioner re-entered the government service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation
Center of the MMA.

On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7924, which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA).

ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to a separation benefit computed from the years of service as MeTC jugde to Director III
because the retirement gratuity he received under RA 910 is not considered as double compensation.

RULING: The retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do
not constitute double compensation.

For the purpose of computing or determining petitioner’s separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years of
service in the Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the
MMA.

The rule is settled that Congress may abolish public offices. Such a power is a consequent prerogative of its power to
create public offices. However, the power to abolish is subject to the condition that it be exercised in good faith. The
separation partook of the nature of a disturbance of compensation; hence, the separation pay must relate only to the
employment thus affected.

After the approval of his optional retirement on 1 April 1992, petitioner was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under R.A.
No. 910, as amended; and five years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension.

The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which
provides: “Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.” This provision
simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts
another government position to which another compensation is attached.

However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. No. 7924
notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended,
would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would
run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same services. More important, it would
be in violation of the first paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which proscribes additional, double, or
indirect compensation.

11. CSC vs. DR. AGNES OUIDA P. YU, (G.R. No. 189041, July 31, 2012)

FACTS: In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160,
otherwise known as the ―The Local Government Code of 1991,” which affected the Department of Health (DOH) along
with other government agencies.

Prior to the devolution, Dr. Fortunata Castillo held the position of Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) of the Department of
Health (DOH) Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City. Respondent Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu (Dr. Yu), on the other hand,
held the position of Provincial Health Officer I (PHO I). Upon the implementation of the devolution program, then Basilan
Governor Gerry Salapuddin (Governor Salapuddin) refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II position
that was to be devolved to the local government unit of Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain Dr. Castillo at the Regional
Office No. IX in Zamboanga City where she would serve the remaining four years of her public service. She retired in 1996.

Meanwhile, in 1994, or two years after the implementation of the devolution program, Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr.
Yu to the PHO II position.

On February 23, 1998, Republic Act No. 8543, was passed into law whereby the hospital positions previously devolved to
the local government unit of Basilan were re-nationalized and reverted to the DOH. The Basilan Provincial Health Hospital
was later renamed the Basilan General Hospital, and the position of PHO II was then re-classified to Chief of Hospital II.

While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted to the DOH with the re-nationalization of the Basilan General Hospital, she
was made to retain her original item of PHO II instead of being given the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II.

Aggrieved, Dr. Yu filed a letter of protest dated September 30, 2003 before the CSC claiming that she has a vested right to
the position of Chief of Hospital II.

ISSUE:

I. WON THE PHO II POSITION PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED BY RESPONDENT YU IS A DEVOLVED POSITION.

II. May Dr. Castillo be considered to have abandoned her position for consistently failing to assert her rights
thereto?

RULING:

I. As defined, DEVOLUTION is the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the
various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

Specifically, Section 17(i) of The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) prescribes the manner of devolution,
as follows:

(i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local government units of the records,
equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers,
functions and responsibilities.

A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall be
allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the
employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal,
the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.

To ensure the proper implementation of the devolution process, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 503, which laid down the following pertinent guidelines with respect to the transfer of personnel:

Section 2. Principles and Policies Governing Transfer of Personnel. -

a. Coverage, Tenure, Compensation and Career Development. —

xxx
2. The absorption of the NGA personnel by the LGU shall be mandatory, in which case, the LGUs shall create the
equivalent positions of the affected personnel except when it is not administratively viable.
3. Absorption is not administratively viable when there is a duplication of functions unless the LGU opts to absorb the
personnel concerned.
4. The national personnel who are not absorbed by the LGUs under no. 3 above, shall be retained by the NGA concerned,
subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.
xxx
12. Except as herein otherwise provided, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local
chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992.
xxx

On the basis of the foregoing, it was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the position of PHO II, as well as its
incumbent, Dr. Fortunata Castillo. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the use of the word ―shall‖ both in Section 17
(i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section 2(a)(2) of E.O. No. 503, which connotes a mandatory order.

The only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption is not
administratively viable, meaning, it would result to duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be
retained by the national government.

However, in the absence of the recognized exception, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed
Section 2(a)(12) by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30,
1992.

Be that as it may, Governor Salapuddin's refusal did not prevent the devolution of Dr.Castillo which, together with that of
the PHO II position, took effect by operation of law. Clearly therefore, the drawing of Dr. Castillo's salary from the LGU of
Basilan which Governor Salapuddin claimed to have allowed simply ―to accommodate her (Dr. Castillo)" was, in fact, a
necessary consequence of her devolution to the LGU and subsequent detail to the DOH. Officials and employees on detail
with other offices shall be paid their salaries, emoluments, allowances, fringe benefits and other personal services costs
from the appropriations of their parent agencies and in no case shall such be charged against the appropriations of the
agencies where they are assigned or detailed, except when authorized by law. Had Dr. Castillo felt aggrieved by her detail
to the DOH Regional Office, she was not without recourse. The law afforded her the right to appeal her case to the CSC,
but she had not seen fit to question the justification for her detail. Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position PHO II.

II. No. Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder with the intention of
terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and
under such circumstance as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. There must be a complete
abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is
a voluntary act; it springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. There are, therefore,
two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or 'external' act by
which the intention is carried into effect."

By no stretch of the imagination can Dr. Castillo's seeming lackadaisical attitude towards protecting her rights be construed
as an abandonment of her position resulting in her having intentionally and voluntarily vacated the same. Governor
Salapuddin's tenacious refusal to accept Dr. Castillo negates any and all voluntariness on the part of the latter to let go of
her position.

We rule, therefore, under the attendant circumstances of the case, that with Dr. Castillo's re-absorption by the DOH which
appears to bear the former's approval, her devolved position with the LGU of Basilan was left vacant. Thus, we hold that
Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the position of PHO II in 1994 and, consequently, acquired a vested right to its re-classified
designation – Chief of Hospital II. As such, Dr. Yu should have been automatically re-appointed by Secretary Dayrit in
accordance with the Guidelines for the Re-Nationalization of Personnel, Assets and Appropriations of Basilan Provincial
Hospital.

Considering, however, that Dr. Yu had already retired on August 24, 2004, we uphold the following findings of the appellate
court, to wit:

xxx ln as much as a re-appointment is no longer feasible due to her retirement, petitioner should at least recover her salaries
for the services she had rendered. However, petitioner admitted that she received her salary as PHO II converted to Chief
of Hospital for the period August to November 2001. Therefore, she should receive her salary and benefits as Chief of
Hospital from December 2001 up to her retirement in August 24, 2004.

12. ROSALINDA A. PENERA, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, (G.R. No. 181613,
November 25, 2009)

FACTS: The COMELEC’s decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del
Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.

In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:
1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by Section
13 of RA 9369.
2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against Penera for violation
of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has consistently disputed the charge
of premature campaigning.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she engaged in premature
election campaigning.

Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate
of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long
before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate
of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature
campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is disqualified to run for Mayor.

RULING: No.

In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436. The
original provision in RA 8436 states —
x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.

In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads —
x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed
by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period,
such election offenses cannot be so committed.

When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these provisions of law
do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period.
There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.

We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:

x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read
together with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "‘candidate’ refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party,
aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate of candidacy for a
person to be considered a candidate because "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing]
period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy."

Any person may thus file a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a
certificate of candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining one’s possible
violations of election laws, only during the campaign period.

Indeed, there is no "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of
prior to the start of the campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law does
not consider Penera a candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the
start of the campaign period. x x x

The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her certificate of
candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On
29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots.

Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a "candidate," even if constituting
election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Such acts are within the realm of a citizen’s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the campaign
period are not covered by Section 80 because Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period. Obviously, it is
only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous
advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit.

Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan
activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The only inescapable and
logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

What the law says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period." Thus, the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the
campaign period starts.

Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period.
This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed
his certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."
WHEREFORE, Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.

13. QUINTOvs. COMELEC

14. MENDOZA vs. COMELEC
15. TALAGA vs. COMELEC
16. ABUNDO vs. COMELEC
17. JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC
18. SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC
19. ARATEA vs. COMELEC
20. DELA CRUZ vs. COMELEC

21. FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, (G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013)

FACTS: Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital) appropriating to the hospital the
amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent
patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program).

Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the
availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. On December 14, 2004, petitioner Filomena G. Delos Santos
(Delos Santos), who succeeded Dr. Alquizalas, created, through Hospital Order No. 1112, a fact-finding committee to
investigate the matter.

Within the same month, Beatriz M. Booc (Booc), who was assigned to audit the hospital, came up with her own review of
the account for drugs and medicines charged to the PDAF of Cuenco. Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee created by
Delos Santos submitted its Report16 dated January 18, 2005 essentially affirming the “unseen and unnoticeable”
irregularities attendant to the availment of the TNT Program.

Consequently, a special audit team (SAT), was formed to conduct a special audit investigation with respect to the findings
of Booc and her team. Examination by the SAT of the records and interviews with the personnel involved showed that the
purported patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was no actual procedure followed
except for the mere preparation of payment documents which were found to be falsified.

Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008, the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado, issued ND No. 2008-09-01, disallowing the
amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified prescription and documents,
and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily liable therefor.

The Commission on Audit maintaining petitioner’s solidary liability involving the amount of P3,386,697.10. Hence, the case.

ISSUE: whether the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners solidarily liable for the disallowed
amount of P3,386,697.10.

RULING: No. Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated.

Duty of CoA

It must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its
general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our
form of government. Corollary thereto, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains
a petition questioning its rulings. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on
law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism.

In Reyna v. CoA (Reyna), the Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered claims
of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines’ Manual on Lending Operations. In
similar regard, the Court, in Casal v. CoA (Casal), sustained the liability of certain officers of the National Museum who
again, notwithstanding their good faith participated in approving and authorizing the incentive award granted to its officials
and employees in violation of Administrative Order Nos. 268 and 29 which prohibit the grant of productivity incentive benefits
or other allowances of similar nature unless authorized by the Office of the President.
In Casal, it was held that, even if the grant of the incentive award was not for a dishonest purpose, the patent disregard of
the issuances of the President and the directives of the CoA amounts to gross negligence, making the [“approving officers”]
liable for the refund [of the disallowed incentive award].

Just as the foregoing public officers in Reyna and Casal were not able to dispute their respective violations of the
applicable rules in those cases, the Court finds that the petitioners herein have equally failed to make a case justifying their
non-observance of existing auditing rules and regulations, and of their duties under the MOA.

Verily, petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office on the ground
that Cuenco always reminded them that it was his money. Neither may deviations, from the usual procedure at the hospital,
such as the admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in the qualification of the indigent-beneficiaries, be justified as
“a welcome relief to the already overworked and undermanned section of the hospital. Records clearly reveal that she, in
fact, admitted that when she was installed as the new Medical Center Chief of VSMMC sometime “in the late 2003,” Antoni
disclosed to her the irregularities occurring in the hospital specifically on pre-signed and forged prescriptions. Hence, having
known this significant information, she and Antoni should have probed into the matter further, and, likewise, have taken
more stringent measures to correct the situation. Instead, just the same, the falsification and forgeries continued, and it was
only a year after, or in December 2004, that Delos Santos ordered a formal investigation of the attendant irregularities. By
then, too much damage had already been done.

THEREFORE, petitoners failed to faithfully discharge their respective duties and to exercise the required diligence
which resulted to the irregular disbursements from Cuenco’s PDAF. In this light, their liability must perforce be
upheld. Truly, the degree of their neglect in handling Cuenco’s PDAF and the resulting detriment to the public cannot pass
unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability be loosely protected and even rendered illusory.

22. MAQUILING vs. COMELEC