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PART VII
Article VII – The Executive Department
Section 1: The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Executive Power: Authority to enforce orders and to ensure they are carried out as intended.
Refusal to enforce a law on grounds of unconstitutionality: No. Otherwise, he will be violating the doctrine of separation of powers
because by doing so, he will be arrogating unto himself the power to interpret the law, not merely to implement it.

43 Phil 38: L.S. Moon & Co. vs Harrison: See book bind

Extent of the executive or administrative orders that may be issued by the President as Chief Executive, under the Administrative
Code of 1987?

GR No. 127685, July 23, 1998

Blas Ople vs Ruben Torres
FACTS: On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V. RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “ADOPTION OF A
NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”.
The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the
National Statistics Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY .

ISSUES: The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds:

1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of
the Philippines;
2. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is unconstitutional since Congress has the exclusive
authority to appropriate funds for such expenditure; and
3. The AO violates the citizen’s right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.

HELD:
1. The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino
citizens and foreign residents and therefore, it is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it, not by an
Administrative Order issued by the President. Administrative Power, which is supposed to be exercised by the President, is
concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the
President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the
foregoing precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an Administrative Order. An administrative
order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of the government. It
must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power.

2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a “common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of the application of
statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of a biological data. It is the confirmation of an individual’s identity
through a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. Through the PRN, the government offices has the chance of
building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. The data, however, may
be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes
a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.
Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not
provide who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to
safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access
to the information. YET, THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF
THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR
PENALTY, CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE, MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE
SYSTEM.
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AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal information gathered about our people will be used only
for specified purposes thereby violating the citizen’s right to privacy.

Section 2: No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.

Section 3: There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the
same manner as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.

Section 4: The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter.
The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than
four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall
be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of
the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof
in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Section 5: Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the
following oath or affirmation:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or Acting
President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to
the service of the Nation. So help me God.” (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)

Section 6: The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law
and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument
from the Government or any other source.

Section 7: The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and
qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the
Vice-President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as
President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-
President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph.
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Section 8: In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both
the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting
President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same
restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.

Section 9: Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President
shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

Section 10: The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-
President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of
such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution
and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged
against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this
Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be
called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

Section 11: Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all
the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with
its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required
to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as the President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers
and duties of his office.

Section 12: In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The Members of the
Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be
denied access to the President during such illness.

March 8, 2016 and April 5, 2016

Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC
FACTS: In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that however, and even
afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and
was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI
granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and
obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced
her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that she cannot
be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The
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COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she
committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices,
however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

ISSUE1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent)
HELD: No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the
qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the election contests, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole
jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized
proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule,
and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures
would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the
same case for cancellation of her COC.

ISSUE2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

HELD: Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she
was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there
would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents’
nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on the finding that the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine
the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles of
international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume
foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

ISSUE3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

HELD: Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225
was approved by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an alien’s stay in the country cannot be counted unless she
acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the
circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.

ISSUE 4: W/N the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material misrepresentations in her COC
HELD: No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and residency
because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a
prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC
may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence,
there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.

November 10, 2010

Macalintal vs. PET
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FACTS: Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4,Article VII of the Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of paragraph 7, Section 4
of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

Whether the designation of members of the supreme court as members of the presidential electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for
being a violation of Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

HELD: (1st Issue) Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court involving constitutional and
election law issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003),cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission
on Elections is that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while
concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
Verba legisd ictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. However, where there is ambiguity or
doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers orratio legis et anima. A
doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the
framing of the Constitution. Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the
Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully
complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the
nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed
simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral court. the PET, as intended by the
framers of the Constitution, is to be an institutionindependent,but not separate, from the judicial department,i.e., the Supreme
Court.

2nd ISSUE: It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case ofAngara v. Electoral Commission,Justice Jose P. Laurel
enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels." In fact,Angarapointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article
VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

2004
Tecson vs. Fernando Poe, Jr.
FACTS: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his
name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage
to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR
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161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
the basic issue on the case.

ISSUE: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines.

HELD: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to
include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had
been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus
soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in
Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by
birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the
marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At
the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

August 31, 2010

Atty. Pormento vs Joseph Estrada and COMELEC
FACTS: Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former President Joseph Estrada for being a presidential candidate
in the May 2010 elections. The petition was denied by COMELEC second division and subsequently by COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections according to the phrase in the
Constitution which states: "[t]he President shall not be eligible for any reelection."

Held: There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent did not win the second time he ran. The issue on the proper
interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a person second election as President.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10,
2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected
President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no
useful or practical purpose.

Joseph Estrada vs Desierto

FACTS: It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of
corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached
by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft
and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the
President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a
snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not
run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned
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his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family
later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also
prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of the people power of revolution which exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
overthrew the whole government. freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of
the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
government that resulted from it cannot be the subject President that it caused and the succession of the Vice
of judicial review President as President are subject to judicial review.

presented a political question; involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of
Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration
of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left
the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada
is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the
press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he
was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past
opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President.
Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both
houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada
is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
 8

ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is
the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of
the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity
of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use
the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The
Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as
to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary
investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be
more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

Section 13: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

140 SCRA 153

Cicero Punzalan vs Mendoza
FACTS: Cicero Punsalan and Estelito Mendoza were the vice governor and the governor of Pampanga respectively. Both belong to
KBL. On 17 May 1984, Mendoza tendered his resignation as the governor but the same should only be “effective at the President’s
pleasure.” On 30 June 1984, Mendoza was appointed as the Minister of Justice by the president. On 14 July 1984, he was
concurrently appointed as a member of the Batasan Pambansa. On 16 July 1984, he filed a request to the Minister of Local
Government (MLG) to consider him as the governor-on-leave of Pampanga while the President was considering his resignation. The
request was subsequently approved by the MLG. Mendoza advised Punsalan to take the governorship temporarily while his
resignation is being considered. Punsalan subsequently took his oath of office not as the acting governor but as the governor and
thereafter assumed office. About 6 months later however, Mendoza resigned from his Batasan Membership and upon the result of
the KBL’s caucus, he returned to Pampanga to assume his governorship. Punsalan denounced Mendoza’s return claiming that he has
already vacated his office by virtue of his resignation which was impliedly approved by the President. Punsalan also pointed out that
when Mendoza was a member of the Batasan, he was barred from holding governorship because there is an inhibition against
Batasan Members from holding two elective positions; this is a constitutional provision which cannot be compromised. Further,
Punsalan claimed that Mendoza had forfeited his right and title to the office when he accepted his appointment as Minister of
Justice and that of “appointive” Batasan Member because of the incompatibility” of the positions with the Governor’s office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza can still return to his governorship.

HELD: Section 10, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution provides:

“A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure except that of Prime Minister,
Member of the Cabinet or Deputy Minister. Neither shall he, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil
office which may have been created or emoluments thereof increased while he was a Member of the Batasang Pambansa.”

Punsalan anchored his contention upon the above provision but he failed to ascertain that the Constitution made a distinction. The
Constitution itself divided the Batasan membership into three categories: The elective provincial/city/district representative; the
sectoral representatives who are either “elected or selected as may be provided by law”; and those “chosen” from Members of the
 9

Cabinet. It is the SC’s opinion that the prohibition in question does not extend to the third group of members, those chosen from the
Cabinet. The prohibitions, undoubtedly, deal with “a Member” who enters the Batasan primarily as a legislator voted into office by
the electorate of his constituency, the “elected” provincial or city or district representative with a “fixed term” (6 years) of office i.e
an elected governor who, while in office, was elected as a member of the Batasan cannot concurrently hold those two elective
positions. Mendoza was elected as the governor but was not elected as a member of the Batasan; he was appointed. Punsalan’s
contention that Mendoza’s resignation was impliedly approved by the president is not tenable. The president in fact needed more
time to consider the validity of the resignation and upon the KBL’s recommendation, he instead chose to approve Mendoza’s return
to his governorship.

135 SCRA 431

Adaza vs Pacana
FACTS: Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office
and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was elected vice-governor for same province in
the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed
his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing
elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas
Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of
office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues
that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on
March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New
Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of
Parliament.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or
not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, taeke the
vacated seat of the governor.

HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during
his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that
when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private
citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul
against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides
that “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering
that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

Opinion No. 155 Series of 1988 by Secretary of Justice

Executive Order No. 284

February 22, 1991

Civil Liberties Union vs Exec. Sec.
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions
subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The
 10

constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the
Constitution which provides:

“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials
should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s
understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

GR No. 184740 February 11, 2010

Dennis Funa vs Executive Secretary Ermita
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of respondent Undersecretary
Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary
of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition
challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President,
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her
duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In fact, there no longer
exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator
effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the
present petition moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is
likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to enjoin.

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or
multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
 11

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers
him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on
ground of mootness. But even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve
the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public. In the present case,
the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution.
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries
Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing, the disqualification was held to be
absolute, as the holding of "any other office" is not qualified by the phrase "in the Government" unlike in Section 13, Article VI
prohibiting Senators and Members of the House of Representatives from holding "any other office or employment in the
Government"; and when compared with other officials and employees such as members of the armed forces and civil service
employees, we concluded thus:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly
imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and
members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class
by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during
their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay
down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the
government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of
Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is
prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to
wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in
those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where
holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an
ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
 12

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the
Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore, NULL and VOID.

Note: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism
is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three
Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a
specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of
tenure on the person named.

Section 14: Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within
ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.

Section 15: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

June 15, 2015

Atty. Velicaria-Garafil/ Dinto Venturaza/ Eddie Tamonding vs Office of the President

4 SCRA 1
Aytona vs Castillo
FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of
the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed
office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments
made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President
Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a
case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the
new President, should be considered void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

RULING: No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration was no more
than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he
should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use
powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to
serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate
action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted.
But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration
of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

140 SCRA 22
Pamantasan vs IAC
 13

FACTS: Dr. Esteban has the background of a competent person able to handle a high post. He used to teach in the Philippine College
of Commerce when he was invited by Dr. Blanco to teach in PLM. Blanco was then the president of PLM. He later assigned Esteban
as the VP for Academic Affairs. His appointment is however merely ad interim. Thereafter, he received notifications of renewal of his
term every time his term would lapse. Until in 1975 when he asked Blanco to appoint him as the permanent VP. Blanco however
refused to appoint him and he assigned Esteban to a lower post instead. Blanco also said that the Board of Regents was not able to
approve his appointment as VP for it was withdrawn. Esteban file with the CSC and the CSC ruled in favor of him. PLM appealed to
the trial court and the court affirmed the CSC. PLM again appealed to the IAC and the IAC ruled in favor of Esteban again.

ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban’s appointment became permanent.

HELD: Esteban had been extended several “ad-interim” appointments which PLM mistakenly understands as appointments
temporary in nature. An officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the
absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent.
But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In referring to Esteban’s appointments, the term is
not descriptive of the nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to denote the manner in which said appointments
were made, that is, done by the President of the PLM in the meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the
University Charter with the power of appointment, is unable to act.
Later, in its Resolution 485, the PLM Board of Regents verified Esteban’s appointment without condition nor limitation as to tenure.
As of that moment, it became a regular and permanent appointment. Note further that “. . . an ad interim appointment is one made
in pursuance of par (4), sec 10, Article 7, of the [1973] Constitution, which provides that ‘the President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’ It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim
appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued.”

298 SCRA 408 (1998)

In Re Judge Valenzuela & Vallarta
FACTS: On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of
RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by
Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.”
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the constitutionality of appointments to the Court of
Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Consultant of the
Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was in the position that “election ban had no application to the CA
based on the Commission’s records”. This hypothesis was then submitted to the President for consideration together with the
Council’s nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting the
appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on March 11, 1998 (day immediately before the commencement of the ban
on appointments), which implies that the President’s Office did not agree with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the “list of final nominees” for the
vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution (from Feb 13, date present vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ
sent the reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled after the May elections for the reason that they apparently did not
share the same view (hypothesis) proposed by the JBC shown by the uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments. However, it
appeared that the Justice Secretary and the other members of the Council took action without waiting for the CJ reply. This
prompted CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ received a letter from the President in reply of the May 6 letter where
the President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive appointments, the whole article being entitled
“EXECUTIVE DEPT”. He posited that appointments in the Judiciary have special and specific provisions, as follows:
 14

Article 8 Sec 4: “The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.”
Article 8 Sec 9: “The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from the list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacañang, the appointments of the 2 Judges of the RTC mentioned. Considering the
pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the Court resolved by refraining the appointees from taking their oaths.
However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It
should be noted that the originals of the appointments for both judges had been sent to and received by the CJ on May 12 and is still
in the latter’s office and had not been transmitted yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the May 7 Malacañang
copy of his appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential elections, Art. 8 shall apply where vacancies in SC shall be filled
within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art. 7 must be considered where the President shall not make any appointments. According
to Fr. Bernas, the reason for prohibition is in order not to tie the hands of the incoming Pres through midnight appointments.

ISSUE: Whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution, the President
is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII; whether he can make
appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of public service.

HELD: The provisions of the Constitution material to the inquiry at bar read as follows:

Sec. 15, Article VII: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII: The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

Sec. 9, Article VIII: The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for, every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.

During the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution — “(t)wo months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end his term” — the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so;
and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time
frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments
comes into effect only once every six years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan
considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar
to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1) Any person who gives, offer or promises money or anything of value gives or promises any
office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause
an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in
general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the
nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. — During the period of forty-
five days before a regular election and thirty days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head,
official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or creates
and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought
 15

unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that
the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election.

The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-called “midnight” appointments. There may
well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the proclamations of a new President. Such
appointments, so long as they are “few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of
the need for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications,” can be made by the outgoing President.
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only “midnight” appointments — those made obviously for
partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making — but also appointments of the Presidential election.

The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing
power of the President during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President’s power
of appointments, it is the Supreme Court’s view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the
latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies
or the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out,
comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation.
But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, their making is
considered an election offense.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the
executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have no
quorum, or should the voting on a particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case,
however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.

GR No. 191032, March 17, 2010

Arturo De Castro vs JBC
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential
elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno
on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However,
the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers
intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department);
and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members
of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as
stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint
a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from
some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section
 16

4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.

HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification
was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification
was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section
15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

Section 16: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.

472 SCRA 587

Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, et al. vs Exec. Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
FACTS: While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed
Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino
Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot
make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2,
 17

Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting
capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an
officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously
appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such power will not be
abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial
appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this also proves that
the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the president’s to make and the
president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the
option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego
of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. That person may or may not be
the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president “may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as
the President deems that person competent.

OTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity

Ad Interim Appointments Appointments in an Acting Capacity

It is a permanent appointment because it takes Acting appointments are a way of

effect immediately and can no longer be temporarily filling important offices
withdrawn by the President once the appointee but, if abused, they can also be a way
Description
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject of circumventing the need for
to confirmation by the COA does not alter its confirmation by the Commission on
permanent character (Matibag vs Benipayo) Appointments.

When Effective Upon Acceptance by Appointee Upon Acceptance by Appointee

When Made When Congress is in recess Any time when there is vacancy

Submitted to the COA Yes No

April 23, 1992

Calderon vs Carale
FACTS: In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division
Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by
 18

the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to
the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not
submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such
an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the
executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7
of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by the President to
government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose
appointments require confirmation by the CoA.

RULING: The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments,
ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional
Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president
(like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights).

156 SCRA 549, December 17, 1987

Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs Salvador Mison
FACTS: Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then President (Corazon)
Aquino. The said appointment made by the President is being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who
are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment is not valid since
the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the
appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the confirmation from COA.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the confirmation from COA is valid.

HELD: Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers that needed confirmation from the
Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups whom the President shall appoint:
Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the
rank of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the appointment made by the President that requires approval from
the COA and the following instances are those which does not require approval from COA:
All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone

April 13, 1989

Mary Concepcion Bautista vs the Commission on Appointments
FACTS: The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the
second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government
"whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to
appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim
appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.
 19

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the
Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the
authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without
confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential
appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.

2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad
interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the
Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to
make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.

September 4, 1989
Teresita Deles et al. vs Commission on Appointments
FACTS: Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral representative for women in 1988.
Their appointment was done while Congress was in session. They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office but the
Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against Deles et al alleging that their appointment must have the
concurrence of the COA.
Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment does not need the concurrence of the COA. This is in
pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to
qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.

ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives should be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

HELD: Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter
refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or the first group abovementioned) are to be
reviewed by the COA, namely, ‘the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution.’ All other appointments by the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase “and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution“. The
provision of the Constitution which provides power to the president in this regard is Section 7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for
sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.

21 SCRA 336
Rafael vs Embroidery and Apparel Control Board
FACTS: In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law created the Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board
(EACIB). Section 2 thereof also provided that the Board shall be composed of:
 20

(1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act as Chairman, to be designated by the Secretary of Finance;
(2) a representative from the Central Bank to be designated by its Governor;
(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce and Industry to be designated by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry;
(4) a representative from the National Economic Council to be designated by its Chairman; and
(5) a representative from the private sector coming from the Association of Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of the Philippines.
Later, in the performance of its duties, the EACIB made certain assessments against Cecilio Rafael but the latter refused to comply.
Rafael sued EACIB and he averred that RA 3137 is unconstitutional for while Congress may create an office it cannot specify who
shall be appointed therein; that the members of the EACIB can only be appointed by the President in accordance with Article 7, Sec.
10 2 of the Constitution; that since the Act prescribes that the chairman and members of the EACIB should come from specified
offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by Congress as to who should be appointed, thereby infringing the constitutional power of
the President to make appointments.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3137 bypassed the appointing power of the president.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that indeed “the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no
limitations maybe imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power to prescribe the qualifications to the given appointive office.”
In the case at bar, the representatives in the EACIB are not appointed by the Department Heads. They are merely going to be
designated hence whoever was designated was merely sitting as an ex officio member. It must also be noted that Congress took care
to specify that the representatives should come from the Bureau of Customs, Central Bank, Department of Commerce and Industry
and the National Economic Council. The obvious reason must be because these departments and/or bureaus perform functions
which have a direct relation to the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof into embroidery and apparel products and
their subsequent exportation abroad. There is no attempt in RA 3137 to deprive the President of his power to make appointments.
The law is not unconstitutional.

58 SCRA 272
Oliveros-Torre vs. Bayot
FACTS: Vicenta Oliveros-Torre and a certain Virginia Barros were both fighting over the position as the Chief Drug Inspector (CDI) of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Both are more than qualified.
Rosario Capistrano was the incumbent CDI. Barros was the next in rank as she was the Supervising Drug Inspector and even at that
point she is also contesting the position with Capistrano. Capistrano went on leave and Torre was appointed as the acting CDI.
When Capistrano’s leave expired the Secretary of Health extended Torre’s appointment until Capistrano’s return. The said office was
given due course by the Office of the President. Barros then filed a protest before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) claiming that
she has the right to the office because she was next in rank. CSC initially declared Barros to be the rightful person to the contested
position. Torre then relinquished her office to Barros but Torre appealed to the CSC and the CSC reversed its earlier decision. Barros
appealed to the CSC and was denied hence she went to the Executive Secretary (Office of the President). Through Under Secretary
Flores Bayot, the Executive Secretary granted the appeal by Barros and the CSC decision was reversed. Torre appealed to the
Supreme Court arguing that the Office of the President cannot review and reverse the decision of the CSC regarding appointments;
she argued that under the Civil Service Act the decision of the CSC Commissioner shall be final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President has appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse decisions promulgated by the CSC
when it comes to appointments.

HELD: Yes, the President can. Under Sec 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code and Sec. 37 of Act 4007, the President as
department head can review, modify or revoke decisions or actions of the chiefs of bureaus, offices, divisions or service under his
department as well as exercise the power expressly vested by law in such chief or head of the bureau, office, division or service. The
appellate jurisdiction of the President on disputed appointments is also expressly affirmed by Sec. 693 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides that
“A disbursing officer, the head of any department, bureau, or office, or the Auditor General, may apply for, and the Commissioner
of CSC shall render, a decision upon any question as to whether a position is in the unclassified or in the unclassified civil service, or
whether the appointment of any person to a classified position has been made in accordance with law, which decision, when
rendered, shall be final unless reversed by the President of the Philippines on appeal.”
But even without such express statutory conferment of appellate jurisdiction on the President, he can at any time by virtue of his
power of control over executive departments, bureaus and offices, expressly vested in him by the 1935 Constitution, review, modify,
 21

alter or nullify any action, or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can
exercise this power motu propio without need of any appeal from any party.
Torre argued that the power of control granted by the Constitution to the President over executive departments, bureaus, offices
and services, should be limited to a review of administrative acts, not to decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service on contested
appointments; this untenable for the law makes no distinction as to what administrative acts and the acts of the CSC – where there
is no distinction made by law, the Court must not distinguish.

May 25, 1994

Tarrosa vs Singson
FACTS: Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1993. Jesus Armando
Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition questioning the appointment of Singson for not having been confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments as required by the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral
as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. The Secretary of Budget and Management was impleaded for disbursing public
funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson. In their comment, respondents claim that Congress
exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the CA of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral.
They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the CA, citing
Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COA’s confirmation.

HELD: No. Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the Governor of
the BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA under Section
16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments
and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16
of Article 7 of the Constitution.

54 SCRA 165
Niere vs CFI
FACTS: La Carlota City (Negros Occidental) was created by Republic Act 4585 in 1965.
In 1966, Rodulfo Niere was appointed by the mayor of La Carlota as the City Engineer.
In 1968, Jose Quiambao was appointed by the President as the City Engineer of the same city (La Carlota). Quiambao’s appointment
was pursuant to the Decentralization Act (effective January 1968). Sec 4 thereof provides that the position of the city engineer must
be filled in by the appointment of the President. Niere relinquished the office but it was in protest and so he filed a quo warranto
case before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Niere lost in that case and so he filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. Nieri asserts that the charter of La Carlota provides that it is the City Mayor who should appoint the City Engineer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nieri was legally appointed as the City Engineer.

HELD: No. It appears that the charter of La Carlota did not have a provision which authorizes the mayor thereof to appoint the city
engineer. In fact, the deliberations in Congress when La Carlota’s charter was being drafted revealed that it was the intention of the
lawmakers to exclude the position of city engineer from among those local officers whom the mayor can appoint.
Since the city mayor, under La Carlota’s charter, is without authority to appoint the city engineer, this prerogative can only be
exercised by the President of the Philippines, who, under Section 10(3) of Article 7 of the [1935] Constitution, shall nominate “all
other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for”; because when a statute does not
specify how an officer is to be appointed, the appointment must be made by the President (residual power of appointment).
The appointing power is essentially the exclusive prerogative of the President. Consequently, any diminution in its scope must be
clear and unequivocal.

Adjournment vs Recess: A session begins when the chamber convenes and ends when it adjourns. A recess, by contrast, does not
terminate a session, but only suspends it temporarily.

Status of Appointment: Congress is in session vs Congress in recess

 22

Section 17: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita et. Al.
FACTS: In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and streamline the country’s id system. Kilusang
Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to enjoin the Director-General from implementing the EO because they
allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for it infringes upon the right to privacy of the people and that the same is a usurpation of
legislative power by the president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to “adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system.” Thus, all government
entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for
their IDs.

Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The President may by executive or
administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and
format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the “President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices.” The same Section also mandates the President to “ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” Certainly,
under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under
existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and
convenience to the public.

The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. Of course, the
President’s power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the
independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing
laws is also authorized to issue voter’s ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because
legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.

April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006

Bayan Muna vs Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita et. Al.
FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the
Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at the time of
the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson,
and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior
and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of
the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police
(PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should prosper

HELD: No. Petitions Dismissed

POLITICAL LAW- Requisites of power of judicial review

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last
two superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
 23

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the
military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their
members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military
build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State. Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported"
surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is
not its function. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the
petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review
for lack of ripeness.
24
 25

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are
rightly excepted.
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that
terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.
Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affectingreallitigants, afacial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also
on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,as grounds
for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal
statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or
imminent charge against them.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful
demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free
speech clause.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an
"unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of
the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch
overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a
limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that
judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the
courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
Petitions Dismissed

Power of Control vs Power of Supervision: Control is defined as “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.” It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a power directly
vested in him by law. Control is a stronger power than mere supervision, which means “overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them, then the former may take
such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

97 Phil 143
Mondano vs Silvosa
FACTS: The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and concubinage against Mondano, duly elected and
qualified mayor of Mainit, Surigao,to Silvosa, provincial governor of Suriga, for immediate investigation, appropriate action and
report. Silvosa issued an Administrative Order suspending Mondano from office. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining
the governor from further proceeding.
 26

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal.

RULING: Yes. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction as provided for in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments
over which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the RAC
are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If “general supervision
over all local governments” is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then
there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision.

Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of
RAC.

April 10, 1992

Santos vs Exec. Secretary Ermita
FACTS: Rosalinda Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for a mission. On her trip, she bought a discounted ticket which
provided that she could bring someone with her so she brought with her her adopted daughter. Some of her co-workers complained
because they thought that Santos used government fund to finance her daughter’s fare. It was later found out that the cost of the
said ticket is actually 50% less than the amount that was given to Santos to be used for her expenses for the trip. Nevertheless,
because of her refusal to appear before the disciplinary board, she was found guilty of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the Office of
the President and after review, then president Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 which declared Santos guilty of
dishonesty. She was then removed from her post and was replaced.

ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should reinstated to her office.

HELD: No. Even though the Supreme Court found evidence which showed that Santos was not guilty of misconduct or dishonesty as
in fact what she did of securing a ticket which was 50% the cost of what was allotted for her travel expense for tickets and thus was
beneficial to the government (for she helped save and lessen the expenses), the SC does not have the power to reverse the recall
done to Santos. She cannot be reinstated by the SC to her position for the removal power of the president is solely her prerogative.
Further, the position held by Santos is primarily confidential. Her position lasts upon the pleasure of the president. When the
pleasure turns into displeasure she is not actually removed from her position or office but rather her term merely expires. Also, her
position involves foreign relations which is vested solely in the executive. The SC cannot inquire upon the wisdom or unwisdom of
the exercise of such prerogative. Thus, the assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for
her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may from time to time dictate.

197 SCRA 771

Maceda vs Macaraig
FACTS: Commonwealth Act 120 created NAPOCOR as a public corporation to undertake the development of hydraulic power and the
production of power from other sources. RA 358 granted NAPOCOR tax and duty exemption privileges. RA 6395 revised the charter
of the NAPOCOR, tasking it to carry out the policy of the national electrification and provided in detail NAPOCOR’s tax exceptions. PD
380 specified that NAPOCOR’s exemption includes all taxes, etc. imposed “directly or indirectly.” PD 938 dated May 27, 1976 further
amended the aforesaid provision by integrating the tax exemption in general terms under one paragraph.

ISSUE: Whether or not NPC has ceased to enjoy indirect tax and duty exemption with the enactment of PD 938 on May 27, 1976
which amended PD 380 issued on January 11, 1974

HELD: No, it is still exempt. NAPOCOR is a non-profit public corporation created for the general good and welfare, and wholly owned
by the government of the Republic of the Philippines. From the very beginning of the corporation’s existence, NAPOCOR enjoyed
preferential tax treatment “to enable the corporation to pay the indebtedness and obligation” and effective implementation of the
policy enunciated in Section 1 of RA 6395.
 27

From the preamble of PD 938, it is evident that the provisions of PD 938 were not intended to be interpreted liberally so as
to enhance the tax exempt status of NAPOCOR.
It is recognized that the rule on strict interpretation does not apply in the case of exemptions in favor of government
political subdivision or instrumentality. In the case of property owned by the state or a city or other public corporations, the express
exception should not be construed with the same degree of strictness that applies to exemptions contrary to the policy of the state,
since as to such property “exception is the rule and taxation the exception.”

198 SCRA 577

Echche vs CA
FACTS: Atty. Echeche was employed as Legal Officer II of the Bureau of Mines. In 1975, Letter of Instruction No. 309 was issued by
the president to purge undesirable public officers. Echeche was among the persons listed therein and he was subsequently
removed. He appealed for reinstatement for he claimed that he is good standing; that there were no complaints against him in any
court or tribunal.
After 3 years he was favorably reinstated by the Assistant Secretary of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Natural Resources; it
was also ruled that he is entitled for back wages. He later requested for back pays before the Department of Budget and
Management. The secretary of DBM referred the issue to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.
denied the request for as per another LOI (LOI 647), Echeche is only entitled for reemployment and not reinstatement. He appealed
but the Court of Appeals affirmed the Executive Secretary.
Echeche assailed the decision of the CA. He argues that the Court of Appeals ruled on an order which has already become
final and executory. He reasoned that the order of the Ministry of Natural Resources, reinstating him and ordering the payment of
his backwages, has attained finality. The Secretary of Budget and Management failed to file any motion for reconsideration from the
approval of payment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of Natural Resources may be validly reversed by the
Executive Secretary.

HELD: Yes. The acts of Ministers (now Cabinet Secretaries) are reviewable by the President in the exercise of his power of control.
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.” (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17)
Control means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify, or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” The President can, by virtue of his
power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus or
offices under him. He can exercise this power motu proprio without need of any appeal from any party.
However, the President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions.
The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxillary unit which assists the President. Under our constitutional set-up, the Executive
Secretary acts for and in behalf of the President: and by authority of the President, he has undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify,
or even reverse any order of the Secretary of Natural Resources and other Cabinet Secretaries. Where the Executive Secretary acts
“by authority of the President” his decision is that of the President.
In the case at bar, Echeche was denied by the Executive Secretary for payment of back salaries, allowances and bonuses.
The decision of the Office of the Executive Secretary must be given full faith and credit by the Supreme Court as an act of the Chief
Executive. It does not matter, though, that considering the extensive range of authority of the Executive Secretary, the decisions of
such office which are attributable to the Executive Secretary have been performed by the Assistant or Deputy Executive Secretaries.
So even if it is a deputy who performed such action – it is still valid.
Anent the issue that the decision of the Ministry of National Resources became final and executory (hence already
immutable), Echeche was never able to prove such claim (but regardless, pursuant to the President’s power of control, the president
can still review such decision by a subordinate).

200 SCRA 271

Ganzon vs CA
FACTS: A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, were filed before the Department of Local Government against
petitioner Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon by various city officials sometime in 1988 on various charges, among them, abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, etc. Finding probable grounds, the respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government Luis
T. Santos issued 3 successive 60- day suspensions. The petitioner then instituted an action for prohibition against the secretary in the
RTC of Iloilo City where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. He also instituted actions for prohibition before
 28

the Court of Appeals but were both dismissed. Thus, this petition for review with the argument that the respondent Secretary is
devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials as the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President
to exercise said power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to suspend and
remove local officials.

RULING: The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of
Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is
not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed
her to exercise disciplinary authority.
In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the President
cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the
law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet
we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of
discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents
and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension
permanent.

206 SCRA 290

Carpio vs Exec. Sec
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition, questioning the
constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.

RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution:
“The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered
and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be
provided by law.”

ISSUEs:
1. Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution
2. Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President
of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers”

HELD: Power of Administrative Control

NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.
SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control
over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the
landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of
the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”
As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his
Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive.
Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by
his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”
 29

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster
a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and
public safety agencies.
Power of Executive Control
Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process
during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State.
Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the
preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose
duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other
functions are clearly civil in nature.” His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the
constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”

213 SCRA 640

Malayan vs CA
FACTS: TKC Marketing imported 3,000 metric tons of soya from Brazil to Manila. It was insured by Malayan at the value of almost 20
million pesos. The vessel, however, was stranded on South Africa because of a lawsuit regarding the possession of the soya. TKC
consulted Malayan on recovery of the amount, but the latter claimed that it wasn’t covered by the policy. The soya was sold in Africa
for Php 10 million, but TKC wanted Malayan to shoulder the remaining value of 10 million as well.
Petitioner filed suit due to Malayan’s reticence to pay. Malayan claimed that arrest by civil authorities wasn’t covered by the policy.
The trial court ruled in TKC’s favor with damages to boot. The appellate court affirmed the decision under the reason that clause 12
of the policy regarding an excepted risk due to arrest by civil authorities was deleted by Section 1.1 of the Institute War Clauses
which covered ordinary arrests by civil authorities. Failure of the cargo to arrive was also covered by the Theft, Pilferage, and Non-
delivery Clause of the contract. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the arrest of the vessel was a risk covered under the subject insurance policies.
2. WON the insurance policies must strictly construed against the insurer.

HELD: Yes. Yes. Petition dismissed.

RATIO:
1. Section 12 or the "Free from Capture & Seizure Clause" states: "Warranted free of capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or
detainment, and the consequences thereof or of any attempt thereat… Should Clause 12 be deleted, the relevant current institute
war clauses shall be deemed to form part of this insurance.”
This was really replaced by the subsection 1.1 of section 1 of Institute War Clauses (Cargo) which included “the risks excluded from
the standard form of English Marine Policy by the clause warranted free of capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detainment, and the
consequences thereof of hostilities or warlike operations, whether there be a declaration of war or not.”
The petitioner’s claim that the Institute War Clauses can be operative in case of hostilities or warlike operations on account of its
heading "Institute War Clauses" is not tenable. It reiterated the CA’s stand that “its interpretation in recent years to include seizure
or detention by civil authorities seems consistent with the general purposes of the clause.” This interpretation was regardless of the
fact whether the arrest was in war or by civil authorities.
The petitioner was said to have confused the Institute War clauses and the F.C.S. in English law.
“It stated that "the F.C. & S. Clause was "originally incorporated in insurance policies to eliminate the risks of warlike operations". It
also averred that the F.C. & S. Clause applies even if there be no war or warlike operations. In the same vein, it contended that
subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses (Cargo) "pertained exclusively to warlike operations" and yet it also stated
that "the deletion of the F.C. & S. Clause and the consequent incorporation of subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of the Institute War
Clauses (Cargo) was to include "arrest, etc. even if it were not a result of hostilities or warlike operations."
The court found that the insurance agency tried to interpret executive and political acts as those not including ordinary arrests in the
exceptions of the FCS clause , and claims that the War Clauses now included executive and political acts without including ordinary
arrests in the new stipulation.
“A strained interpretation which is unnatural and forced, as to lead to an absurd conclusion or to render the policy nonsensical,
should, by all means, be avoided.”
2. Indemnity and liability insurance policies are construed in accordance with the general rule of resolving any ambiguity therein in
favor of the insured, where the contract or policy is prepared by the insurer. A contract of insurance, being a contract of adhesion,
means that any ambiguity should be resolved against the insurer.

21 SCRA 895
 30

Lacson Magallanes vs Pano

FACTS:
· 1932 - Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon,
Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao.
· January 9, 1953 -Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land to plaintiff.
· April 13, 1954 - the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as pastureland and
declared agricultural land.
· January 26, 1955 - Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety (90) hectares of the released area.
· March 29, 1955 -Plaintiff Corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was protested
by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their
own sales application.
· July 31, 1956 - The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on giving due course to the
application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.
· July 5, 1957 - the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions —
held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.
· June 25, 1958 -Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of
the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
(1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for
their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and
(2)directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao, with Latian
River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to
the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion.”

Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be rendered declaring:
(1) that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and
(2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the
Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources —yielded an affirmative
answer from the lower court

HELD: Judgment under review is hereby affirmed. Executive Secretary’s act cannot be assailed and therefore has full force and
effect.

RATIO:
(1) The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is,
that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at
pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action
taken by his department secretaries.
In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
(2) Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the
executive departments.
Control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
(3) The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in
behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

(4) The action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot
be successfully assailed. No such disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.

92 Phil 456
Lacson vs Roque
FACTS: The then mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some allegedly defamatory and libelous utterances against a certain
judge (Judge Montesa). Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson. A special prosecutor was assigned to the case. The special
prosecutor recommended the suspension of Lacson to the President. The President, through acting Executive Secretary Mariano
Roque, issued a suspension order against Lacson.
 31

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president from his post.

HELD: No. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal
officials. It is true that the President “shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments,” but supervision does not
contemplate control.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is not well taken. Removal
and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to
constitutional limitations.
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative
Code must be done “conformably to law;” and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he “may at any time remove a
person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the Philippines.” Again, this power of removal must be
exercised conformably to law, in this case, the allege libelous act of Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty.

15 SCRA 710
Villaluz vs Zaldivar
FACTS: Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces
alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz.
Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After
investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz
from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering that he is an appointee of the
president.

HELD: Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and
remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic
Act No. 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and
as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the
principle that “the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” .

There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or
remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the
classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not
with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be
exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that “the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department”.

100 Phil 683

Aljar vs Alba
FACTS: Republic Act No. 603 created the City of Roxas. Section 8 thereof provides that the vice mayor shall be appointed by the
president. Pursuant to the law, Vivencio Alajar was appointed as the mayor. Later on, the president sent communication to Alajar
telling him that he will be replaced by a new appointee, Juliano Alba. Alba was then declared as the acting mayor. Alajar refused to
leave his post and he filed a quo warranto case before Judge Jose Evangelista who ruled in favor of him.
Alba appealed before the Supreme Court. Alba argued that section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Appointment of City Officials. – The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said
officers . . .
Alajar however insisted that the above provision is incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that “no officer or employee in
the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law”, because the two provisions are mutually
repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alajar, an appointed vice mayor, can be removed by the president upon displeasure.

HELD: Yes. The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good behavior, had any vested interest or
contract right in his office, of which Congress could not deprive him.
The act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and fixing the “term” or the period during
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the “tenure” or the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office, is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power. In the exercise of that power, Congress enacted RA 603 creating the
 32

City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-
Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President, so, the logical inference is that Congress can legally and constitutionally make
the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alajar was appointed by the pleasure of the
president and can also be removed when that pleasure ceases.

108 SCRA 757

Free Telephone Workers Union vs Ople

58 SCRA 272
Oliveros Torre vs Bayot
FACTS: Vicenta Oliveros-Torre and a certain Virginia Barros were both fighting over the position as the Chief Drug Inspector (CDI) of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Both are more than qualified.
Rosario Capistrano was the incumbent CDI. Barros was the next in rank as she was the Supervising Drug Inspector and even
at that point she is also contesting the position with Capistrano. Capistrano went on leave and Torre was appointed as the acting
CDI.
When Capistrano’s leave expired the Secretary of Health extended Torre’s appointment until Capistrano’s return. The said
office was given due course by the Office of the President. Barros then filed a protest before the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
claiming that she has the right to the office because she was next in rank. CSC initially declared Barros to be the rightful person to
the contested position. Torre then relinquished her office to Barros but Torre appealed to the CSC and the CSC reversed its earlier
decision. Barros appealed to the CSC and was denied hence she went to the Executive Secretary (Office of the President). Through
Under Secretary Flores Bayot, the Executive Secretary granted the appeal by Barros and the CSC decision was reversed. Torre
appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the Office of the President cannot review and reverse the decision of the CSC regarding
appointments; she argued that under the Civil Service Act the decision of the CSC Commissioner shall be final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President has appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse decisions promulgated by the CSC
when it comes to appointments.

HELD: Yes, the President can. Under Sec 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code and Sec. 37 of Act 4007, the President as
department head can review, modify or revoke decisions or actions of the chiefs of bureaus, offices, divisions or service under his
department as well as exercise the power expressly vested by law in such chief or head of the bureau, office, division or service. The
appellate jurisdiction of the President on disputed appointments is also expressly affirmed by Sec. 693 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides that
“A disbursing officer, the head of any department, bureau, or office, or the Auditor General, may apply for, and the Commissioner
of CSC shall render, a decision upon any question as to whether a position is in the unclassified or in the unclassified civil service, or
whether the appointment of any person to a classified position has been made in accordance with law, which decision, when
rendered, shall be final unless reversed by the President of the Philippines on appeal.”
But even without such express statutory conferment of appellate jurisdiction on the President, he can at any time by virtue
of his power of control over executive departments, bureaus and offices, expressly vested in him by the 1935 Constitution, review,
modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can
exercise this power motu propio without need of any appeal from any party.
Torre argued that the power of control granted by the Constitution to the President over executive departments, bureaus,
offices and services, should be limited to a review of administrative acts, not to decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service on
contested appointments; this untenable for the law makes no distinction as to what administrative acts and the acts of the CSC –
where there is no distinction made by law, the Court must not distinguish.

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency:

472 SCRA 505

Constantino vs Freedom From Debt Coalition
FACTS: During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to reduce the country’s external debt. The
solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts –
they are basically buyback programs and bond-conversion programs. The spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino,
as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their minor children who are Filipino citizens, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition)
averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes were onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or
“guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power, unlike other
powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution
in the person of the President, hence, the respondents herein, Central Bank Governor Josse Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts for the
Philippines or such power can be delegated to them. Constantino argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will
 33

affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior
concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not
respondents but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting
pursuant to the said scheme.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the President may contract or guarantee foreign
loans in behalf of this country with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a
debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the President can delegate this power to her direct subordinates.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts
is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its
risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every
aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of
time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods
that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of
the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place
of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions
and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running
the government. The act of the Cuisia et al are not unconstitutional.

Exception: There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the
President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by
him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such,
for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign
prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension
of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches
of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive
exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that
the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

Sec. 18: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.
 34

G.R. NO. 190259, June 7, 2011

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-GENERALE .VS HON RONALDO PUNO
FACTS: President Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946 on November 24, 2009 a day after the Maguindano Massacre. The proclamation
placed “the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under state of emergency.” The AFP and the PNP
were directed to “take such measures as maybe allowed by the Constitution and the law to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence” in the named places.
On November 27, 2009, the President also issued Administrative Order 273 “transferring” the supervision of ARMM from the Office
of the President to the DILG, but due to terminology issues used in AO 273, she issued AO 273-A amending the former Administrative
Order, by “delegating” instead of “transferring” the supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.

ISSUES: Zaldy Ampatuan et al. raised three issues in this petition.

First, Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the
Constitution and Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act. Zaldy Ampatuan et al alleged that Proclamation 1946 and AO 273 and
AO 273-A empowered the DILG to take over ARMM’s operations and seize regional government’s power. Such acts according to
Ampatuan et al. violate the principle of local autonomy pursuant to RA 9054.
Second, the President invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress
all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City.
Last, the President had no factual bases in declaring the mentioned places in a state of emergency and calling out the armed forces.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A DO NOT violate the principle of local autonomy. The
DILG Secretary, as the President’s alter-ego, did not take over control of the powers of ARMM. The said proclamation and
administrative orders were issued by the President to restore peace and order in the mentioned places and her actions are pursuant
to her “calling out” power as the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The President merely
“delegated’ her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary in order to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.
Second, the deplohyment of the AFP and PNP troops in the subject places is not an exercise of emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, paragraph 2, Article VI of the Constitution. The Supreme Court rules that the President did not proclaim a national
emergency, ONLY A STATE OF EMERGENCY. She did not act pursuant to any law enacted by the Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President, ergo she does not need congressional authority to exercise said power.
Lastly, the President had a factual bases in declaring the state of emergency and calling out the armed forces to suppress or
prevent lawless violence. The President’s call on the armed forces springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution. In addition, the imminence of violence and anarchy springing from the possible armed clash of the Ampatuan
forces (the main perpetrators of the Maguindanao Massacre are members of the Ampatuan Clan) and the Mangundadatu forces (The
principal victims of the Maguindanao bloodshed are members of the Mangundadatu family) was too grave to ignore that the President
had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the mentioned places considering that both clans are armed with arsenals
of high-powered firearms. The President’s calling out power was exercised to pacify the peoples’ fears and stabilize the situation and
was also exercised to control the spread of loose firearms and dismantle the armed group that continue to threaten the peace and
security of the subject places.
Petition is dismissed.

RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS ARROYO, NINEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE CO. PUBLISHING VS ERMITA (consolidated), with 5
other petitions
FACTS: Amidst opposition and signs of impending rebellion, Gloria issued PP 1017 declaring a State of National Emergency. She also
issued G.O. No. 5, calling upon the AFP to suppress lawless violence and acts of terrorism. On 12:20 in the morning of Feb 25, 2006,
the Daily Tribune offices were raided by police, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Police also surrounded other opposition papers
Malaya and tabloid Abante. People were also arrested without arrest warrants, including Prof Randolf David, a petitioner. Petitioners
Ninez Cacho Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. also challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding their offices without search warrants as a
form of censorship, and violation of the freedom of the press, speech and of assembly.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not issuing PP1017 had any factual basis.
2. Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not the raid on Tribune’s offices was legal.

HELD:
1. Yes, issuing PP 1017 had factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned
 35

is the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents,
President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
2. FIRST: PRESIDENT’S CALLING POWER. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call
by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. PP 1017 is not a martial law declaration. It is merely an exercise of the calling out power.
SECOND, PRESIDENT’S TAKE CARE CLAUSE: However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws, not enact laws herself.
THIRD: PRESIDENT’S TAKE OVER POWER (SEC 17, Art 12): The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
the President, in the absence of legislation of emergency powers by Congress, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF G.O. NO. 5:
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President “acting as Commander-in-Chief” addressed to
subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard Ð that the military and the
police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” But
the words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be
deemed deleted from the said G.O. While “terrorism” has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the
military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPÕs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
3. The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and
seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any
time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

Habeas corpus cases:

5 Phil 87, 1905
Barcelon vs. Baker
FACTS: This case was an application for a writ of habeas corpus which it alleged that Barcelon is detained and restrained of his
liberty at the town of Batangas, in the Province of Batangas, and that the detention and restraint of the said applicant is wholly
without legal authority and not under or by virtue of any process issued by any court. Respondents admit that they are detaining the
body of the said Felix Barcelon, but deny the right of the court to inquire into the reasons therefore by virtue of the resolution issued
by the Philippine Commission and the executive order of the Governor-General suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas. The Philippine Bill section 5 provides that the Governor-General is hereby authorized to
suspend writ of habeas corpus in the said provinces because of the fact that certain organized bands of ladrones in said provinces
were in open insurrection against the constituted authorities; and the said bands, or parts of them, and some of their leaders, were
still in open resistance to the constituted authorities.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial department of the Government may investigate the facts upon which the legislative and
executive branches of the Government acted in providing for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
province of Cavite and Batangas

HELD: NO. It is the duty of the legislative branch of the Government to make such laws and regulations as will effectually conserve
peace and good order and protect the lives and property of the citizens of the State. It is the duty of the Governor-General to take
such steps as he deems wise and necessary for the purpose of enforcing such laws. If the judicial department of the Government, or
any officer in the Government, has a right to contest the orders of the President or of the Governor-General under the conditions
above supposed, before complying with such orders, then the hands of the President or the Governor-General may be tied until the
very object of the rebels or insurrects or invaders has been accomplished.IN THIS CASE, Congress had authority to provide that the
President, or the Governor-General, with the approval of the Philippine Commission, might suspend the privilege of the writ of
 36

habeas corpus

in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, when the public safety might require it the conclusion set forth in the said resolution
and the said executive order, as to the fact that there existed in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection against the
constituted authorities, was a conclusion entirely within the discretion of the legislative and executive branches of the Government,
after an investigation of the facts. That one branch of the United States Government in the Philippine Islands has no right to
interfere or inquire into, for the purpose of nullifying the same, the discretionary acts of another independent department of the
Government. The doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by
him upon his own opinion of certain facts, such person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those
facts has been recognized in this case. The authority to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is exclusively vested in the
legislative and executive branches of the government and their decision is final and conclusive upon the Judicial Department and
upon all persons. Therefore, the application for the writ of habeas corpus is denied

G.R. No. L-4221, August 30, 1952, 91 Phil 882

Montenegro vs Castenada
FACTS: October 18, 1950, Maximino, the son of the petitioner, Marcelo Montenegro and others were arrested at Manila for being
involved with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection or sedition.
Oct 21, Marcelo, submitted an application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the release of his son for he is still under the
custody of General Castañeda and Colonel Balao (the respondents).
Oct. 22, President Elpidio Quirino, issued proclamation No. 210, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in some
parts of Luzon in order to stifle the emergence of the Hukbalahap guerillas.
Marcelo then filed before the court to release his son from the respondent’s custody because there was no cause in arresting
him and that the said proclamation should not be applied to Maximino because he had been arrested before the promulgation of the
said proclamation and it would go against the prohibition against bill of attainder.
Castaň eda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling in
Barcelon vs Baker.

Appeal of Montenegro:

1. That proclamation is unconstitutional “because it partakes of bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law; and unlawfully includes
sedition which under the Constitution is not a ground for suspension.
H: the argument is devoid of merit. The prohibition applies only to statutes. A bill of attainder is a legislative act, which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial. The writ was in accordance with the powers vested in the President by the constitution, and it is
deemed an exception to the general prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder (if there’s conflict between prohibition
and suspension).
Although under the constitution, grounds for suspension of the privilege of writ are invasion, insurrection, rebellion or
imminent danger and clearly sedition is not included, it will not invalidate the whole proclamation and is considered immaterial in the
case, because Maximino is confined not only for sedition but for graver offense of rebellion and insurrection. And also, the order of
suspension affects the power of the courts and operates immediately on all petitions therein pending at the time of its promulgation.

2. There is no state of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof,” the only situations permitting
discontinuance of the writ of habeas corpus
H: During this period, there are intermittent sorties and lightning attacks by organized bands in different places” which he argues
(Montenegro) as, “such sorties are occasional, localized and transitory”, which is just overt insurrection and rebellion not cases of
invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger. Here, President concluded in the proclamation, and the other connected
therewith, that “there is actual danger rebellion which may extend throughout the country.” Such declaration implying much more
than imminent danger of rebellion amply justifies the suspension of the writ.

Delegate Francisco: “that it should not be necessary that there exist a rebellion, insurrection or invasion in order that habeas corpus
may be suspended. It should be sufficient that there exists not a danger but an imminent danger, and the word, imminent, should be
maintained. When there exists an imminent danger, the State requires for its protection and for that of all the citizens the suspension
of habeas corpus.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegro’s petition should be granted.

HELD: DENIED.
 37

Proclamation of the President suspending the writ of habeas corpus was held valid and efficient in law to suspend all proceedings
pending upon habeas corpus, which was issued and served prior to the date of the proclamation.

Supported by Barcelon v. Baker: the authority to decide whenever the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension belongs to the
President and “his decision is final and conclusive” upon the courts and upon all other persons.

In the light of this precedent, the constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion under article VII may not correctly be placed in doubt.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS (Regarding this case and Sec15)

What is a writ of HC?

It is a writ or order directed to the person detaining another and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a certain
time and place, with the day and the cause of his detention, to do, submit to and, receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the
writ shall consider in that behalf.

What are the instances when the writ of HC may be availed of?
Sec 1., Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, “may be availed of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.”
There are other instances, however, when the writ of HC may also be availed of. It may be availed where, as a consequence of judicial
proceeding:
1. There has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in a restraint of a person.
2. The court has no jurisdiction to impose the sentence.
3. An excessive penalty has been imposed, in which case the sentence is void as to such excess.

When can a president suspend the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus?
Under Sec. 18, Art7 (1987), the President can suspend the privilege of the writ of HC ONLY ON 2 Grounds,
1. Invasion
2. Rebellion when the public safety requires it.
NOTE: that the grounds of insurrection and imminent danger of invasion or rebellion, as provided in the 1935 and 1973
constitution were DELETED.

What is suspended in case of invasion or rebellion when public safety requires it?
It is the PRIVILEGE itself NOT the writ of HC.

Is the power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of HC absolute?
No, it is subject to limitations refer to ( Sec. 18, Art7, 1987).

What are the implications of the limitations?

1st: The old rulings in Barcelona v. Baker and in Montenegro v. Castañeda to the effect that:
a. The executive Department has the superior competence to assess the peace and order condition in the country.

b. That the suspension of the privilege of writ of HC is a political question are already abandoned.

NOW: the SC does not only have the power to determine the executive arbitrariness in arriving at the suspension but also the
power to determine and review in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the factual basis of the proclamation of Martial Law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof. ( Sec 18, Par3, 1987C)

2nd: Alleged threats of invasion or rebellion can be sufficiently handled by the President by exercising the power granted to
him, thus:
“whenever it becomes necessary, he may call such AF to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.”
It is for this reason: THAT THE GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HC are limited only to ACTUAL
INVASION OR ACTUAL REBELLION, when public safety requires it”. These are the same grounds for placing the PH or any part thereof
under ML.

3rd: the suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons JUDICIALLY CONNECTED WUTH INVASION. The purpose
of this provision is to require all those detained to be immediately turned over to the jud. Authorities, thereby avoiding sad experiences
during ML years when one is detained without charges for a long period of time.
 38

Can the courts inquire on the presidential suspension of the privilege of the writ of HC?
Sec 18, Par 3 of Art 7, 1987C finally settles this issue as the arguments, for or against, in Barcelon v. Baker, Montenegro v.
Castañeda, Lansang v. Garcia, Padilla v. Enrile and in Morales v. Enrile. The suspension of the privilege is therefore subject to judicial
review.

What particularly is the subject of inquiry and judicial review?

The SC may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
ML or the suspension of the writ or the extension thereof.

Can the courts may restrain the President from suspending the writ of HC or place the PH or any part thereof under ML?
The exercise of said power is predicated on the fact that there is an emergency situation, which needs an immediate action of
the president. When the Pres exercises that power based on the intelligence reports gathered and given to him, that is a judgment
call reposed to no one except to him, subject only to the limitation that the SC may review, in an appro. Proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of ML or the suspension of the priv. of HC.
This is what should be the subject of inquiry and judicial review.

Is there right to bail during the suspension of the priv of HC ?

By express provision of Sec 13, Art3: “ the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of HC is
suspended.”
However, this rule is not applicable when the evidence is strong. This shall be determined by the judge based on the evidence
presented.

G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971

LANSANG VS GARCIA , 42 SCRA 448
FACTS: On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades were thrown at the miting the avance of the Liberal Party killing 8 persons
and many more injured, including practically all of the aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as
serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them.
On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889,
dated August 21, 1971 declaring a state of lawlessness and suspended the writ of habeas corpus over several provinces, sub
provinces and cities. Other proclamations were also issued amending provisions of the previous proclamation and on lifting the
suspension on selected provinces or cities
On October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C on selected areas. In view thereof, 18 provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18
cities are still under the suspension of writ of habeas corpus
As a result, several persons were arrested from their homes and thereby detained by the members of the Philippine
Constabulary including:
*TEDORO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANI ALCALA, who were "invited" by agents of the Philippine Constabulary —
which is under the command of respondent Brig. Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia — to go and did go to the headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for interrogation, and thereafter, detained;
*The Lawless Elements were presumed to be composed of: peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass
media personnel

Reasons for detainment: “on reasonable belief” that they had “participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion” that “their
continued detention is justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 888
of the President of the Philippines;
:that there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this country, and that "public safety and the security of the State
required the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus," as "declared by the President of the Philippines in
Proclamation No. 889;
:that the "continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent bona fide precautionary and preventive measure demanded
by the necessities of public safety, public welfare and public interest";

ISSUE: 1) WHETHER THE PROCLAMATION IS FORMALLY VALID 2) WHETHER THE COURT WOULD ADHERE TO ITS PREVIOUS
DECISION IN BARCELON VS. BAKER AND MONTENEGRO VS. CASTANEDA 3) WHETHER THE SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT IS
CONSTITUTIONAL

HELD: First, petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or
rebellion or imminent danger thereof," and that, consequently, said Proclamation was invalid. Proclamation 889-A superseded the
original proclamation and that flaws attributed thereto are formal in nature. Which actually emphasize the actuality of the intent to
rise in arms.
 39

For the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or — pursuant to
paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof"; and (b) public safety must require the
aforementioned suspension. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889-A, that both conditions are present.
The petitioners argue that the New People's Army proper is too small, compared with the size of the armed forces of the
Government, that the Communist rebellion or insurrection cannot so endanger public safety as to require the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need not to be a wide-scale event,
it may be declared even if it only involves a small part of the country.

The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that
it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug
1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on
this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the
members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and
systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously
decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The president decision to suspend the writ was by fact constitutional hence VALID, as he has three available courses to
suppress rebellion. First, to call out the military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and lastly to declare martial law.

*The grant of power to suspend the privilege of writ is neither absolute or unqualified. It is limited and conditional. It is only by way
of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" — or, under Art VII of the
Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" — "when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist."

121 SCRA 472, April 20, 1983

Morales vs Juan Ponce Enrile
FACTS: On April 21, 1982, the petitioners were arrested while riding a motor vehicle in Laong-laan street, Quezon city. They were
charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC. by elements of Task Force Makabansa of the AFP. Since then, they have
been under detention. Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus. Subsequently, on July 20, 1982, they were
charged with rebellion before the Court of First Instance of Rizal which was filed by the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The trial of the
case has yet to be terminated.

Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated(specifically
art. 3 sec 20 of the constitution),among them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial,
and the right to bail. They also air the charge that they were subjected to maltreatment and torture; that they did not have the
opportunity to presenttheir defense before the inquest fiscal and therefore asked this Court to order the reinvestigation of the
charges against them. Acting on such plea, this Court in a resolution
At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein on July 6, 1982, records reveal that they were then
having conference in the dining room of Dr. Parong's residence from 10:00 a.m. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14)
detainees were under surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dr. Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as their
headquarters. Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered towards different directions leaving on top
of their conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationeries, and other
papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student sector (code-named YORK). Also found were one (1) .38
cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty
pesos P l8,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and ready for distribution, a sizeable quantity of
printing paraphernalia, which were then seized.

Respondents countered that the group of Morales were already under surveillance for some time before they were arrested and
that the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was already suspended.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners’ continued detention is legal.
2. Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.
3. Whether the warrantless arrest is valid.

HELD:
 40

1. Yes. Their continued detention is legal for the reason that a proper case of rebellion had been filed against them in the proper
court and the trial has yet to be terminated.
Although martial law was terminated on Jan 17, 1981 by the President, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus continues to be
suspended in all other places with respect to certain offenses such as rebellion or insurrection, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, among others.

2. No, the right to bail is suspended. Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus remains suspended “with respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be similarly
detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith,” the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To
hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was arrested
is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct attacks on the life of the State. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does
the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation
and trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the State’s very existence. For this measure of self-
defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses. However, there is a
difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already
filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his
right to freedom. Thus the right to bail is also suspended.
The petitions are without merit and hereby dismissed.

3. Yes, indeed the petitioners were arrested without a warrant, however, months before their arrest, petitioners were already under
surveillance on suspicion on committing rebellion. From the results of the said surveillance, the evidence then at hand, and the
documents seized from them at the time of their arrest, it would appear that they had committed or were actually committing the
offense of rebellion. Their arrest without a warrant is therefore justified

G.R. No. 54558, May 22, 1987

OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION
FACTS:
 Petitioners Eduardo B. Olaguer, et. al (Othoniel V. Jimenez, Ester Misa-Jimenez, Carlos Lazaro, Reynaldo Maclang, Magdalena De
Los Santos Maclang, Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J. Marciano, Danilo R. De Ocampo and Victoriano C. Amado) were arrested by
the military authorities.
 initially detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City and subsequently transferred to the detention center at Camp Bagong Diwa
in Bicutan except for petitioner Olaguer
 alleged offenses charged to petitioners during the martial law (Olaguer, et. At.):
1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; 2) conspiracy to assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos; 3)
conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; 4) conspiracy to assassinate
Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; 5) arson of nine buildings; 6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo
Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and 7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and
inciting to rebellion
 In the course of the proceedings, August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for
prohibition and habeas corpus.
a. They sought their release from detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus.
b. The proceedings before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of their constitutional right to due
process of law.
 General Oder No. 12 - the military tribunals were vested with jurisdiction "exclusive of the civil courts," among others, over
crimes against public order, violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws on firearms, and other crimes which, in
the face of the emergency, are directly related to the quelling of the rebellion and preservation of the safety and security of the
Republic ...

ISSUES:
1) Whether the petition for habeas corpus could be granted
2) Whether military commissions have jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning

HELD: When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition
for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their
 41

confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for
having become moot and academic.
Military Commission or Tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed during the period
of martial law as long as civil courts are open and functioning. The SC nullified the decisions rendered by the military courts for lack
of jurisdiction.

Rolando Abadilla v Gen. Ramos (1987)

FACTS:
 Jan 27, 1987 – Some officers and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of GMA Channel 7 in Quezon City, for the purpose
of toppling the existing constitutional government. They did not succeed.
 Jan 29 – Mutineers surrendered to the military authorities.
 April 18 – A group of enlisted men staged a mutiny dubbed as “The Black Saturday Revolt” in Fort Bonifacio military facility in
Makati, which also failed.
 Investigations for both mutinies (concluded March 12 and May 27) disclosed that Col. Rolando Abadilla of the PC of the AFP
was one of the leaders of the GMA 7 takeover, and was likewise involved in the “Black Saturday Revolt”, and
recommended that he be charged for violating Art. 67 of the Article of War (mutiny or sedition), in relation to Art. 139 of
RPC, and PD 1866.
 May 4 – Commander General of the PC and Vice Chief of Staff of the AFP, Gen. De Villa issued an order for Abadilla's arrest
and confinement, who was then at-large.
 May 21 – Chief of Staff of the AFP, Gen. Ramos dropped Abadilla from the rolls of regular officers of the AFP (due to his
refusal to report for duty or surrender).
 July 7 – Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed information (slight physical injuries) against Abadilla.
 July 27 – He was arrested and detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and later, at Fort Bonifacio, Makati.
 July 30 – Assistant City Fiscal of QC filed another information (illegal possession of firearms and ammunition).
 July 30 – Abadilla's wife and children filed a petition for habeas corpus, challenging the validity of his detention and
contending that:
o when Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers, he became a civilian no longer subject to military law
o his detention is illegal because he is not charged with any criminal offense before a civil court or court-martial
o the order for his arrest has become moot when he was dropped from the AFP rolls
o even if he was subject to military law, Art. 70 of the AoW states that only those charged with a crime or a serious
offense under the AoW can be detained
ISSUE: Whether Abadilla's confinement was valid

HELD: Yes. The military still had jurisdiction over him, and the charges against him is a “serious offense” under the AoW.
 The Olaguer doctrine (where a military commission or tribunal cannot exercise jurisdiction over civilians as long as the civil
courts are open and functioning) does not apply in this case. The fact that he was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot
and should not lead to the conclusion that he is beyond the jurisdiction of military authorities.
 “Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.” In
criminal proceedings (regular courts), jurisdiction over a person is acquired by his arrest. But in military proceedings, like in
this case, military authorities had jurisdiction over Abadilla at the time the military investigations commenced. The reason
why he was not detained at the time before he was dropped from the rolls of the AFP is because he was at large.
 Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

198 SCRA
People vs. Donato
Crime Committed: Rebellion
FACTS: Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion for the purpose of
overthrowing the present Government.
At the time the Information was filed Salas and his co-accused were in military custody following their arrest. A petition for habeas
corpus for private respondent and his co-accused was filed with this Court. However, it was dismissed on the basis of the agreement
of the parties that Rodolfo Salas "will remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court having custody over his person" But
later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved his application for bail. The prosecution argued that Salas is
estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of
agreement that he will be held in custody.

Contention of the accused: He did not waive his right to bail. And that he shall enjoy the constitutional right to be presumed
innocent and the right to bail
 42

ISSUE: WON Salas can validly file for bail

HELD: We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied It is a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
But the SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for the issuance of the WoHC. The contention
of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not
tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the
government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded
during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they
would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to
an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
Habeas corpus is a writ that is used to bring a party who has been criminally convicted in state court into federal court. Usually, writs
of habeas corpus are used to review the legality of the party's arrest, imprisonment, or detention

THE MARTIAL LAW CASES

59 SCRA 183, 1974
Aquino v. Enrile,
FACTS:
1. In September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos issued General Order No. 2 in the exercise of the powers he assumed
by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country under Martial Law.
2. Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos, issued and ordered the arrest of a number of
individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.
3. Hence, Aquino and some others (like Ramon Mitra, Jr., Jose Diokno) filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s
answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial
Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.

HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when public
safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein
under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear
and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order. The preservation of society
and national survival take precedence.

SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS:

What is the alleged charge against Sen. Ninoy Aquino and the others being arrested in 1974?
The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), “for being
participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over
the Government by force …”

What are the charges alleged against Sen. Ninoy Aquino prior the arrest in 1974?
In the case of Aquino, formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of firearms were lodged against him with
a Military Commission on August 11, 1973.

What is the Writ of Habeas Corpus?

Writ of Habeas Corpus commands an individual or a government official who has restrained another individual to produce
the prisoner at a designated time and place so that the Court can determine whether the prisoner's custody is legal or not. It is
executed without warrant of arrest.

What are the grounds to Supend the Writ of Habeas Corpus in 1975 Constituion compared to 1987 Constitution?
 43

In 1973 Constitution, Article VII, sec. 9, In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when
the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law.
In 1987 Constitution, Article VII, sec. 18, In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law.

Is there an Existing State of Rebellion?

Yes, Supreme Court was convinced that a state of rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation No. 1081 was issued.
It was a matter of contemporary history within the cognizance not only of the courts but of all observant people residing here at the
time.

What are the Situations and Circumstances which proved that a State of Rebellion exist when Proclamation no. 1081 was issued?
1. Armed hostilities go on in several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon.
2. Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers; recruitment of armed and
ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material, fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence
— all these are part of the rebellion which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts.
Does the State of Martial Law Suspend the operation of the Constitution?
A state of Martial Law does not Suspend the Operation of the Constitution.

To whom shall the suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus applies?
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with evasion.

What is the test in the President’s Decision in Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus?
The test is not whether the President’s decision is correct but whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily.
Applying this test, the finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the President Marcos’ proclamation
of martial law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution;

What is the Political Question?

In the previous 1972 constitution, the Acts of the President to declare Martial Law, not being reviewed by the Court are
considered a Political Question.

What happened to the Political Question?

The political-or-justiciable question controversy in the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of
martial law — has become moot and purposeless. The question is “Do you want President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish
the reforms he initiated under Martial Law?”
Is the State of Martial Law in the Philippines Original or just Copied from foreign Authors in Political Science?
The present State of Martial Law in the Philippines is peculiarly Filipino and fits into no traditional patterns or judicial precedents.

63 SCRA 546
Aquino vs Military Commission
FACTS: In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under custody. He was brought
Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Aquino then questioned the
validity of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2]
created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before
the military court. Aquino argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational and that being a
civilian, his trial by a military commission deprives him of his right to due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino was afforded due process in a military court.

HELD: YES. According to Schwartz, “The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must, however, give way in areas governed by
martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public safety, legal processes can be superseded and military tribunals authorized to
exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in court.”
Neither are We impressed with petitioner’s argument that only thru a judicial proceeding before the regular courts can his right to
due process be preserved. The guarantee of due process is not a guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A
military tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial
 44

tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due process of law does not necessarily means a judicial proceeding in the
regular courts. 14 The guarantee of due process, viewed in its procedural aspect, requires no particular form of procedure. It implies
due notice to the individual of the proceedings, an opportunity to defend himself and “the problem of the propriety of the
deprivations, under the circumstances presented, must be resolved in a manner consistent with essential fairness.” It means
essentially a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.
Here, the procedure before the Military Commission, as prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 39, assures observance of the
fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due notice, an essentially fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for
the preparation of the defense Section 11 of the Manual for Courts-Martial specifically provides that the “rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the courts of the Philippines shall be applied by courts-martial.” This is applicable to trials
in the military commission . There is, therefore, no justification for petitioner’s contention that such military tribunals are concerned
primarily with the conviction of an accused and that proceedings therein involve the complete destruction and abolition of
petitioner’s constitutional rights.

96 SCRA 402
Gumaua vs Espino
FACTS: In 1972, a Chinaman was kidnapped by allegedly the group of a certain Sgt. Cordova. Gumaua, an ex – PC aided Cordova as
he even sheltered them in his sari-sari store. After surveillance, Gumaua’s house was raided and he was arrested. Since martial law is
being imposed at that time, Gumaua was held under the custody and trial of the military court [No. 2]. Gumaua then petitioned for
prohibition and mandamus with restraining order and preliminary injunction against Major General Romeo Espino as Chief of Staff
of the AFP and Military Commission No. 2, challenging the validity of the creation and jurisdiction over him as a civilian of
respondent Military Commission No. 2. He filed for habeas corpus and averred that (a) military tribunals cannot try civilians if civil
courts are open; (b) the President cannot deprive the civil courts of their jurisdiction to try criminal cases involving civilians; (c) as a
civilian, he is entitled even during Martial Law to his constitutional right to counsel during the preliminary investigation, to be
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts only upon his arrest or voluntary submission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gumaua can be validly tried before the military court.

HELD: The SC first and foremost affirmed that the declaration of martial law is valid. The 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified
by the sovereign people and is now in full force and effect. Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country under martial law is
valid. That the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus. That the President of
the Philippines, “as Commander-in-Chief and as enforcer or administrator of martial law, . . . can promulgate proclamations, orders
and decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political
and social liberties of the people, and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession
or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens
all nations including highly developed countries . . .” . That the President of the Philippines, as legislator during the period of martial
law, can legally create military commissions or courts martial to try, not only members of the armed forces, but also civilian
offenders, for specified offenses including kidnapping.

And finally, there is likewise ample proof that Sgt. Aguinaldo Cordova and Sgt. Barbelonio Casipi, co-accused of petitioners in the
kidnapping charge, belonged to the armed forces at the time of the commission of the crime, in much the same way that the
evidence demonstrates that petitioner Gumaua himself is a retired PC non-commissioned officer. Consequently, the trial of
petitioners Gumaua and Halasan before the respondent Military Commission No. 2, along with the two other accused who are
members of the Armed Forces is valid under General Orders Nos. 8

115 SCRA 418

Legaspi vs Minister
FACTS: Legaspi contended that said decree was issued by the President under supposed legislative powers granted him under
Amendment No. 6 of the Constitution proclaimed in full force and effect as of October 27, 1976 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595
and which is quoted as follows:
Whenever in the Judgment of the President, there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the
interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in
his judgment requires immediate action, he may in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land.
That said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution "the legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang
Pambansa" (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 11, Art.
VII); and That Amendment No. 6 is not one of the powers granted the President by the Constitution as amended in the plebiscite of
April 7, 1981; that while Section 16 of Art. VII of the Constitution provides:
 45

All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein
provided for on conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa
provides otherwise.
Such re-confirmation of existing powers did not mean to include the President's legislative powers under Amendment No. 6: by "the
laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official" only those laws that have been passed by the
existing and/or prior legislature are intended. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since
Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment
No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the Martial Law.
Sec 19

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties withouto the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa.

HELD: YES, SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan.
He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution which provides that –
‘The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and
with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.’
The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar,
what the president did by issuing P.D. 1840 is exercise in his legislative power under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable
that when the President acts as legislator in this case, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan, rather, he exercises
concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.
NB: On the possible option available to the president in case of lawful violence. ( Legaspi Vs. Minister)
Truth to tell, martial law is generally unwelcome anywhere in the world. And when it is prolonged without anyone knowing when it
would be lifted, the feeling of discontent grows and spreads. Indeed, it is difficult to describe fully in an opinion like this all that
many consider obnoxious in martial law. Suffice it to say that the New Society that came out of it did have its laudatory features
appreciated by large segments of the people, but with many cases of abuses of the military marring such receptive attitude, the
clamor for the early lifting of martial law became more and more audible.
We can definitely say that no one more than President Marcos was aware of those feelings and sentiments and, in fact, even of the
undercurrents of resistance. And as We visualize the situation he found himself in, he was faced with no less than a dilemma. He was
convinced of the advantages, not personally to him, but to general welfare of martial law, but at the same time he was also
conscious that martial law, in any form — call it Philippine style, smiling, benign or with any other euphemistic adjective — was
growing to be more and more distasteful. Even the New Society it was supposed to bring about was slowly losing its splendor.
Backsliding was creeping in some ways, discipline was loosening. But over and above all such adverse developments, the perils to
national security and public order still remained, if in a slightly lesser degree.
It was in the light of the above circumstances and as a means of solving the dilemma aforementioned that the concept embodied in
Amendment No. 6 was born. In brief, the central Idea that emerged was that martial law may be earlier lifted, but to safeguard our
country and people against any abrupt dangerous situation which would warrant the exercise of some authoritarian powers, the
latter must be constitutionally allowed, thereby to obviate the need to proclaim martial law and its concomitants, principally the
assertion by the military of prerogatives that made them appear superior to the civilian authorities below the President. In other
words, the problem was what may be needed for national survival or the restoration of normalcy in the face of a crisis or an
emergency should be reconciled with the popular mentality and attitude of the people against martial law.
We have said earlier that the Constitution has four built-in measures to cope with crises and emergencies. To reiterate, they are: (a)
emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan; (b) call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the
barracks; (c) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (d) martial law. Of these four, the people dislike martial
law most and would, if possible, do away with it in the Constitution. And the President who first conceived of what is now
Amendment No. 6 knew this. Thus, Our understanding of the development of events and attitudes that led to the adoption of
Amendment No. 6 is that in addition to the four measures authorized in the body of the charter, this amendment is supposed to be
a fifth one purportedly designed to make it practically unnecessary to proclaim martial law, except in instances of actual surface
warfare or rebellious activities or very sophisticated subversive actions that cannot be adequately met without martial law itself.
Very evidently, the purpose of Amendment No. 6 is that the Philippines be henceforth spared of martial law unless manifest extreme
situations should ever demand it.

Sec. 19: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Reprieve: This is the temporary postponing of a criminal sentence, particularly a death sentence.
Commutation: The president may substitute a less severe punishment in place of the punishment originally imposed. A sentence
may be commuted when facts become known that were not known at the time of sentencing, or that came to light and were
 46

developed after. Commutation is rarely granted but can occur in cases of old age, illness, and when the sentence is unusually harsh
compared with similar cases. When a sentence is commuted, the recipient doesn’t get back the rights of a citizen (only a subsequent
pardon can do that, which sometimes happens).
Pardon: Government decision to allow a person who has been convicted of a crime, to be free and absolved of that conviction, as if
never convicted.
Remission: This type of clemency involves relief from a forfeiture, penalty, or restitution order.
Amnesty: An official pardon for people who have been convicted of political offenses

Article IX-C, Sec. 5: No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall
be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission. (COMELEC)

GR No 206666 vs January 21, 2015

Atty Alicia Vidal vs COMELEC
FACTS: In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification cases against him
prospered but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective
post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to
run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual
absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and
sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of
Manila.

ISSUE: May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which
carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?

HELD: Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The
only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually
specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines
possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be
granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
 47

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon
remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of
election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can
be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person
who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter
alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the
conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the
term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this
case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate
to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to
limit the scope of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the
origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again,
the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this
an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted
as a condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada.

82 Phil 642
Barrioquinto v. Fernandez
FACTS: Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. The defendants Jimenez and
Barrioquinto decided to bring their case before the Guerilla Amnesty Commission, to avail amnesty in accordance with Proclamation
No. 8 (enacted by Pres. Manuel Roxas), dated September 7, 1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged
with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the
war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the
Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation
The Amnesty Commission said that the petitioners cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty, because they haven’t admitted their
guilt in the commission of the offense

ISSUE: WON the petitioners are entitled for the benefits of amnesty
 48

HELD: In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence
either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance."
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions
entitled to the benefits. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the
complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as
a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty
Proclamation. since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby
should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or
jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented show that the
accused is entitled to said benefits.

Distinctions of pardon and amnesty as held in the case:

1.Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned,
because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress,
and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
2.Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of
political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.

3. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ""nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the
right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from
the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

4. Pardon is complete with the act of the president while amnesty is valid only with the concurrence of the majority of the
members of all the members of the Congress.

G.R. No. L18184, January 31, 1963 7 SCRA 152

Vera vs People
FACTS: Petitioners were convicted at the Trial Court of Quezon. They were invoking the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation
of the President. Their case were referred and tried at 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission. During the hearing, the defendants did not
admit the commission of the crime. The Commission did not take cognizance of the case since Amnesty can only be invoked if the
defendants had admitted their crime. As per the petitioners, their motive for the crime was grounded on the pursuance of the
resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the war. Furthermore, facts show it is personal
motives and the rivalry between the guerilla units which led to the crime. The Commission returned the case to the trial court due to
lack of jurisdiction and that the invocation of amnesty cannot be given to the defendants. After this decision of the Commission, the
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. Appellants, when in the 8 th Guerilla Commission, said that they had impliedly admitted
their participation in the killing of Lozanes. Implied admission per the Commission is not sufficient. To benefit from Amnesty, they
must allege of claim verbally or in writing that he committed the acts charged against him. Petitioners also claimed that admission of
the crime is not a requirement for amnesty. They cited the cases of
1.Barrioquinto vs Fernandez,
2. Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte vs Delos Santos
3. Viray vs Amnesty Commission

ISSUE: Whether or not the benefits of Amnesty may be invoked

HELD: These cases were decided in accordance to Amnesty Proclamation (No. 8) of September 7, 1946:
in order to entitle a person to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation (No. 8) of September 7, 1946, it is not
 49

necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with
which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused,
shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation."
But these were superseded by
1. People vs Llanita
2. People vs Guillermo
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he
cannot have any use for amnesty.
The SC find no merit in the petitioners’ claim

71 Phil. 34
MIGUEL CRISTOBAL v. ALEJO LABRADOR, et al.,
FACTS: On March 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found Teofilo C. Santos, guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him
to six months of arresto mayor. He was confined in the provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal, from March 14, 1932 to August 18, 1932.
Notwithstanding his conviction, Teofilo C. Santos continued to be a registered elector in the municipality of Malabon, Rizal, and
between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipal president of that municipality. On August 22, 1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357,
otherwise known as the Election Code, was approved by the National Assembly, section 94 (b) of which disqualifies Santos from voting
for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property." In view of this provision, Santos forthwith applied
to the President for an absolute pardon. The President, on December 24, 1939, granted the said petition, restoring the respondent to
his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility."

Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Santos from the list of voters in precinct No. 11 of Malabon,
Rizal, on the ground that the latter is disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357. Cristobal contends
that the pardon granted by the President to the respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, did not restore the said respondent to the full
enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b)
the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function; and (c) the respondent
having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. All these propositions involve
an inquiry into the primary question of the nature and extent of the pardoning power vested in the Chief Executive of the Nation by
the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the pardoning power of the President restoring Santos’ full civil and political rights amounts to unlawful exercise by
the Chief Executive of a legislative function.

HELD: No, it is not an unlawful exercise of legislative function.

There are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the
power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the
sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only
blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result
of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which
the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise
extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he
will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility,"
it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights." While there are cases in the United States which
hold that the pardoning power does not restore the privilege of voting, this is because in the United States, the right of suffrage is a
matter exclusively in the hands of the State and not in the hands of the Federal Government. The suggestion that the disqualification
imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the
Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, and would lead to the result that there
would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.

75 Phil 612
People vs Jose

72 Phil 441
Pelobelo vs Palatino
 50

FACTS: In 1912, Gregorio Palatino was convicted of a crime (atendado contra la autoridad y sus agentes) for which he was sentenced
to imprisonment for 2 years, four months and one day, disqualified from voting and being voted upon, such disqualification not
having been removed by plenary pardon.
In 1915, however, he was granted a conditional pardon by the Governor General and on Dec 25, 1940, an absolute pardon
by President Manuel L. Quezon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights
Pellobello instituted quo warranto proceedings questioning his right to hold office as mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque
province. It was based on sec 94 (a) of the Election Code.

ISSUE: Whether the absolute pardon granted exempted him from the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under
paragraph (a) of sec 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for
assuming office.
HELD: The court adopted the broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, that the pardoning power cannot be
restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction, and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon
removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had
already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was
elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three
times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940.
Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position
in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in
section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office.
The court sees no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to
the Chief Executive. The Supreme Court, therefore, gives efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical
objection.
(Palatino is eligible for being the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque province because he was granted a conditional pardon by the
then Gov-Gen but such pardon was converted into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The
pardon was already after Palatino’s election but prior to him assuming office. Since there is an absolute pardon, all the former
disabilities imposed and attached to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public
office in question.)
14 SCRA 694
People vs Pasilan
FACTS: Pasilan was a former guerilla fighting against the Japanese. In 1944, while cleaning his gun outside the house of one Justina
Miguel, a certain Ciriaco Abarra passed by. Pasilan ordered Abarra to wait for him. Abarra waited and after cleaning his gun, Pasilan
interrogated Abarra. Abarra was alleged to be supporting the Japanese cause and he was one of the persons who accompanied the
Japanese troops in raiding the barrio where Pasilan lived. After interrogating, Pasilan inflicted upon Abarra 2 stab wounds on
Abarra’s chest. Abarra run away towards the river. Ten days later, the decaying body of Abarra was found. About 10 years after the
incident, Morales, an agent, was sent to the barrio to investigate crimes committed during the war. He conducted some
investigation and was also able to have Miguel testify against Pasilan and he later found Pasilan to be guilty for the murder of
Abarra. On July 29, 1964, Pasilan moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which allegedly would reverse
the decision of the lower court. Alleged as newly discovered evidence are sworn statement attesting to Justina Miguel’s recantation.
Pasilan likewise seeks to avail of Proclamation No. 8 by President Roxas granting amnesty to persons who during the war committed
any act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance against the enemy or against person aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pasilan is eligible to be admitted for amnesty.

HELD: Not every recantation of a witness entitles the accused to a new trial. Otherwise, the power to grant a new trial would rest
not in the courts but in the witnesses who have testified against the accused. Recanting testimony, furthermore, is exceedingly
unreliable. Since Justina Miguel’s alleged recantation has already been passed upon by the trial court, new trial is uncalled for.

Neither can the additional ground of amnesty entitle appellant to a new trial. In the first place, Proclamation No. 8 of President
Roxas is not a newly discovered evidence, for it was already known when the case was tried. Secondly, availing of the benefits
granted by the amnesty proclamation would be inconsistent with the plea of not guilty which appellant entered upon his
arraignment. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when the accused maintains that he has not committed a crime,
he cannot avail of amnesty.
115 SCRA 418
Legaspi vs Minister
 51

FACTS: Legaspi contended that said decree was issued by the President under supposed legislative powers granted him under
Amendment No. 6 of the Constitution proclaimed in full force and effect as of October 27, 1976 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595
and which is quoted as follows:
Whenever in the Judgment of the President, there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the
interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in
his judgment requires immediate action, he may in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land.
That said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution "the legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang
Pambansa" (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 11, Art.
VII); and That Amendment No. 6 is not one of the powers granted the President by the Constitution as amended in the plebiscite of
April 7, 1981; that while Section 16 of Art. VII of the Constitution provides:
All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein
provided for on conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa
provides otherwise.
Such re-confirmation of existing powers did not mean to include the President's legislative powers under Amendment No. 6: by "the
laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official" only those laws that have been passed by the
existing and/or prior legislature are intended. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since
Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment
No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the Martial Law.
Sec 19:

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties withouto the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa.

HELD: YES, SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan.
He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution which provides that –
‘The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and
with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.’
The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar,
what the president did by issuing P.D. 1840 is exercise in his legislative power under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable
that when the President acts as legislator in this case, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan, rather, he exercises
concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.
NB: On the possible option available to the president in case of lawful violence. ( Legaspi Vs. Minister)
Truth to tell, martial law is generally unwelcome anywhere in the world. And when it is prolonged without anyone knowing when it
would be lifted, the feeling of discontent grows and spreads. Indeed, it is difficult to describe fully in an opinion like this all that
many consider obnoxious in martial law. Suffice it to say that the New Society that came out of it did have its laudatory features
appreciated by large segments of the people, but with many cases of abuses of the military marring such receptive attitude, the
clamor for the early lifting of martial law became more and more audible.
We can definitely say that no one more than President Marcos was aware of those feelings and sentiments and, in fact, even of the
undercurrents of resistance. And as We visualize the situation he found himself in, he was faced with no less than a dilemma. He was
convinced of the advantages, not personally to him, but to general welfare of martial law, but at the same time he was also
conscious that martial law, in any form — call it Philippine style, smiling, benign or with any other euphemistic adjective — was
growing to be more and more distasteful. Even the New Society it was supposed to bring about was slowly losing its splendor.
Backsliding was creeping in some ways, discipline was loosening. But over and above all such adverse developments, the perils to
national security and public order still remained, if in a slightly lesser degree.
It was in the light of the above circumstances and as a means of solving the dilemma aforementioned that the concept embodied in
Amendment No. 6 was born. In brief, the central Idea that emerged was that martial law may be earlier lifted, but to safeguard our
country and people against any abrupt dangerous situation which would warrant the exercise of some authoritarian powers, the
latter must be constitutionally allowed, thereby to obviate the need to proclaim martial law and its concomitants, principally the
assertion by the military of prerogatives that made them appear superior to the civilian authorities below the President. In other
words, the problem was what may be needed for national survival or the restoration of normalcy in the face of a crisis or an
emergency should be reconciled with the popular mentality and attitude of the people against martial law.
We have said earlier that the Constitution has four built-in measures to cope with crises and emergencies. To reiterate, they are: (a)
emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan; (b) call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the
barracks; (c) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (d) martial law. Of these four, the people dislike martial
law most and would, if possible, do away with it in the Constitution. And the President who first conceived of what is now
Amendment No. 6 knew this. Thus, Our understanding of the development of events and attitudes that led to the adoption of
Amendment No. 6 is that in addition to the four measures authorized in the body of the charter, this amendment is supposed to be
a fifth one purportedly designed to make it practically unnecessary to proclaim martial law, except in instances of actual surface
 52

warfare or rebellious activities or very sophisticated subversive actions that cannot be adequately met without martial law itself.
Very evidently, the purpose of Amendment No. 6 is that the Philippines be henceforth spared of martial law unless manifest extreme
situations should ever demand it.

February 1989
Monsanto vs Factoran
FACTS: • In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was accused of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50
representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
• She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
• Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant, she also asked
for the backpay for the entire period of her suspension.
• Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment
• The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the
period of his suspension pendente lite.
• In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position. And
a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
• Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was extended executive
clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited.
• The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still
be the same

ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former
position without need of a new appointment.

HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction,
from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him,
as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence (which is
rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered
by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of
estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment
to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for
estafa thru falsification of public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go
beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a
new appointment.

Rodolfo Llamas vs Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos and Mariano Un Ocampo III
FACTS: Tarlac Board Members Marcelino Aganon and Arnaldo Dizon filed a copmplaint with the Department of Interior and Local
Government against Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III for executing a loan agreement with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc., in
which he is concurrently the chairman of the Board. The Foundation was controlled by his brother-in-law as executive director, trustee
and secretary. The Governor claims that he has already resigned from the foundation and the loan agreement was made as the best
alternative as a matter of judgement.
Governor Ocampo was found guilty by the DILG of violating the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act and was imposed a
penalty of suspension for 90 days. After several appeals, Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos issued Resolution dismissing the Governor’s
appeal on February 26, 1991.
Accordingly, Rodolfo Llamas, as Vice Governor of the Province of Tarlac, took over the Governorship of the province on March
1, 1991 and will act as such until May 31, 1991. On the same date (March 1, 1991), Ocampo filed a motion for reconsideration on the
 53

resolution of the executive secretary. He also issued an “Administrative Order” indicating that he continues to serve as the Governor
of Tarlac and will hold office in his residence because the Motion for reconsideration is still pending.
In resolving the Motion for Reconsideration on May 15, 1991, Exec. Sec. Orbos issued a resolution which states that “Governor
Ocampo is hereby granted executive clemency in the sense that his 90-day suspension is reduced to the period already served.”
Petitioner Vice Gov. Llamas assails the Resolution because the executive clemency can only be granted by the President in criminal
cases and there is nothing in the statute books or the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. This is
because Article VII Sec 19 states that:
“Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.”
The last phrase should be construed to denote criminal cases because the word “conviction” refers only to criminal cases.
On the other hand Gov. Ocampo contends that the Constitution grants full discretionary authority to the president in exercising his
Executive Clemency.

ISSUE: Can Executive Clemency be granted by the president in administrative cases?

HELD: Yes. What the law does not distinguish, the courts must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish as to which kind
of convictions the president may exercise his power of executive clemency. It is also evident from the intent of the framers of the
constitution that the President’s clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage except as provided by the constitution,
that is “no pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted
by the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC.”
Also, the disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend or remove local government officials is vested with the DILG, and ultimately,
the President. Implicit in this authority is the “supervision and control” power of the president to reduce or modify the penalty imposed
by the DILG, even in the sense of granting executive clemency. Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the president, by
virtue of his power to control, may substitute her own judgement to that of the executive departments.

152 SCRA 272

Torres vs Gonzales
FACTS: Original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at National
Penitentiary in Muntilupa. (*Note: Habeas Corpus is a writ (court order) that commands an individual or a government official who
has restrained another to produce the prisoner at a designated time and place so that the court can determine the legality of
custody and decide whether to order the prisoner's release.)
In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was given a conditional pardon by the President --- to not violate any
penal laws again. If this condition is violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved
to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon. The evidence before the board showed that on March 22, 1982 - June
24, 1982, petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, which cases were then pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal (Quezon City). It also showed that on June 26, 1985, he had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of the crime of sedition.
The said conviction was then pending appeal before the Appellate Court. There also letter report from the NBI that a long list of
charges had been brought against the petitioner for the last 20 years.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested
and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of
his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act,
not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of
violation of a conditional pardon.
Where the President chooses to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt
of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. Under article 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the
penalty prescribed. In the present case, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. When
the person was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The
acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carries with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a
condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government (has) such power been
entrusted.
 54

Sec. 20: The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence
of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from
the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be
contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of
increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.

Sec. 21: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.

Art XVIII, Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

January12, 2016
Saguisag vs. Ochoa
FACTS:
1. On March 14,1947 Agreement between US and Philippines concerning military bases was signed(president roxas and US)
2. In 1987, the Phil constitution was ratified which explicitly prohibits foreign military bases, troops and facilities in the country
beyond the year 1991,except under a treaty concurred by Senate Thereafter, Phil Senate voted not to renew the MDT.
3. However, On May 27, 1999 Phil Senate ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement Bayan challenged the Constitutionality of VFA
but the agreement was upheld as valid.
4. In 2012, President Obama announced its strategic pivot towards Asia as laid down in sustaining US global leadership
priorities for 21st century defense seeking to deploy 60% of its warship to Asia. Thereafter the dialogues were made in Washington.
The dialogue ended with the Phil Delegation clearly upon the instruction of Pres Aquino agreeing to adopt a policy of increased
of rotational presence of US troops increased military exercises and more frequent port calls by the US ships.
5. In 2013,US-Phil began negotiations for the Framework Agreement for increased rotational presence and enhanced defense
cooperation which sought to give US military access to the Phil facilities The framework was in the form of EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
NOT NEEDING SENATE’S CONCURENCE.The negotiators the changed the name of the framework agreement to EDCA ( enhanced
defense cooperation Agreement)
6. Finding EDCA grossly one sided and greatly disadvantageous to the Philippines, petitioners then filed petitions before the SC
questioning the constitutionality and or legality of EDCA.
7. These consolidated petitions before the Court question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and US. Petitioners alleged that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with the US claiming that EDCA violated multiple
constitutional provisions, while respondents argued that petitioners lack standing to bring the suit. To support the legality of their
actions respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution treaties and judicial precedents.

ISSUE: Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities

HELD: Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly
limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities. The initial limitation is found in
Section 21 of the provisions on the Executive Department: "No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The specific limitation is given by Section 25 of the Transitory
Provisions, the full text of which reads as follows:
SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
The President may generally enter in to executive agreements subject to limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in
furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the Senate. We discuss in this section why the President can enter into executive
agreements.
The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements without Senate concurrence is already well-established in
this jurisdiction. That power has been alluded to in our present and past Constitutions, in various statutes, in Supreme Court
decisions, and during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. They cover a wide array of subjects with varying scopes
and purposes, including those that involve the presence of foreign military forces in the country.
As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally assigned chief architect of our foreign policy, the President is
vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the country's interface with other states and governments. Being the
 55

principal representative of the Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the nation; initiates, maintains, and develops
diplomatic relations with other states and governments; negotiates and enters into international agreements; promotes trade,
investments, tourism and other economic relations; and settles international disputes with other state.

Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon vs Alberto Romulo, et al

GR 175888, February 11, 2009
FACTS: LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. were charged
for rape because of having carnal knowledge with Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman inside a Starex Van with Plate
No. WKF-162, owned by Starways Travel and Tours, with Office address at 8900 P. Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City.

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), the US was granted the custody of Smith during the proceedings. In December 4,
2006, the RTC of Makati acquitted S/sgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. for
insufficiency of evidence presented by the prosecution. DANIEL J. SMITH, also of the US Marine Corps, was found guilty and sentenced
to suffer penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail until further orders.

On December 29, 2006, Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by law enforcement agents who are claiming to work under DILG. He
was brought to a facility for detention controlled by the US Government, in accordance with new agreement with US entered
December 19, 2006 which states:

“The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America agree that, in accordance with
the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned
to U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.”
(Sgd.) Kristie A. Kenney (Sgd.) Alberto G. Romulo
Representative of the United States Representative of the Republic of America of the Philippines
DATE: 12-19-06 DATE: December 19, 2006

And also another Romulo-Kenney agreement dated December 22, 2006 which states that:
“The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy of the United States of America agree that, in
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the two nations, upon transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United
States Marine Corps, from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound
in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and
jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have access to
the place of detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with the terms of the VFA.”

ISSUE: WON the Philippines should retain custody of Smith because the VFA and Romulo-Kenney is void and unconstitutional due to
the following reasons:
1. The VFA does not comply with the provisions of the Constitution, Art XVIII, Section 25
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military
Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
Ø Petitioners contend that the VFA is not duly recognized by the other state because it was not ratified by the US Senate
2. It violates the equal protection clause, because it allows transfer of custody to a foreign power which is a different procedure.

HELD: The VFA is constitutional. Romulo-Kenney Agreement are not in accordance with VFA and should be modified.

Validity of the VFA, First Issue

The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice
and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by
the said State because it is a mere implementing agreement of the RP-USA Mutual Defense Treaty of August 31, 1951. The earlier
treaty was signed and ratified by both RP and US Senates. The VFA, being a mere an implementing agreement, no longer needs the
consent of the US Senate, but only of the US Congress. This internationally known practice of US is based on the provisions of the
CaseZablocki Act.

Validity of VFA, Second Issue:

It is not violative of equal protection, there being sufficient basis for the difference in treatments. The rule in international law is that
a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The
 56

difference in treatment between the local and foreign members of armed forces is because of the recognized immunity for the foreign
armed forces.

Validity of the Romulo-Kenney Agreement

The VFA provides that:
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on
by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the
right to visits and material assistance.

The custody of a US personnel during detention should be by Philippine Authorities, but the place where they could be detained
should be agreed upon by both RP and PH. Thus, the Romulo-Kenney Agreement which provides that Smith’s custody is to be turned
over to US is a violation of the VFA agreement. (Nota Bene: Detention: after the judicial proceedings convicting the accused)

However, during the judicial proceedings, the custody shall be based on the agreement of RP and US as stipulated in the VFA, Article
5:
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United
States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings…..

Related questions:
1. Is the VFA a self-executing treaty that can be implemented without ratification of by the US Senate though ratified by the
Philippine Senate:
The VFA is a self-executing Agreement, because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the
Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact,
the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before
the court during the trial.

9 SCRA 280
RAMON GONZALES v. RUFINO HECHANOVA, et al.,
FACTS: Former President Macapagal entered into two Executive Agreements with Vietnam and Burma to import rice without
complying with the requisite of securing certification from the National Economic Council showing a shortage in cereals. Rufino G.
Hechanova (Executive Secretary) authorized importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to the disadvantage of our local producers.
Ramon A. Gonzales, petitioner, a rice planter and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed a case
alleging that respondents acted without or with excess jurisdiction. RA 3452 is the policy of the government to engage in purchase of
such products from tenants, farmers, growersm producers and landowners in the Philippines. It also explicitly prohibits the
importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
Respondent alleged that the said acts prohibit ‘government agencies’ but they are the “Government” so it will not be
applicable to them. Furthermore, they also argued that the said importation was in done in the capacity of the President, under Sec 2
of Commonwealth Act No. 1, as the Commander-in-Chief for military stock pile purposes.

ISSUE: WON RA 3452 invalidates the 2 executive agreements entered by former President Macapagal

HELD: Yes,, RA 3452 invalidates the 2 executive agreements.

Under American jurisprudence, in case of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the latest in the point in time will prevail.
But this theory is not applicable to the case at bar since Hechanova, not only admits, but, also insists that the contracts adverted are
not treaties.
Assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and
void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative
authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing
for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, our Constitution authorizes
the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

104 Phil 868

 57

Tan Sin vs. Deportation Board

FACTS: Tan Sin was a Chinese residing in Pasay. In December 1953, he was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was sentenced to jail.
When he finished serving his sentence, he learned that an order to detain him was issued by the Deportation Board because
apparently, a special prosecutor filed with the Deportation Board an action to deport Tan Sin because by reason of the crime he had
committed, he became an undesirable alien. The Deportation Board after hearing, recommended to the President of the Philippines
that Tan Sin be deported. In his defense, Tan Sin averred that he cannot be deported by the Deportation Board (an entity under the
executive department) or by the President because only Congress has the absolute and inherent power to deport aliens.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tans Sin can be deported by the President.

HELD: Yes. The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President. As an act of state, it is vested in the Executive by virtue of his office,
subject only to the regulations prescribed in Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code or to such future legislation as may be
promulgated on the subject. There is no provision in the Constitution nor act of the legislature defining the power, as it is evident
that it is the intention of the law to grant to the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien’s residence in the
country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security, welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which
deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory.
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated
to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation conducted by said Executive or his authorized
agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the, person concerned shall be informed of the charge or
charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right
to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.

3 SCRA 51
The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading (1961)
FACTS: Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic which arrived at the Port of Manila from
August 25 to September 7, 1954. Some shipments came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. Inasmuch as none of the shipments
had the certificate required by the Central Bank Circular Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized
and subjected to forfeiture proceedings for alleged violation of Section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation to the
aforementioned circulars of the Central Bank.
Eastern Sea Trading contends that the seizure and forfeiture of the goods imported from Japan cannot be justified under Executive
Order No. 328 not only because the same seeks to implement an executive agreement – extending the effectivity of our Trades and
Financial Agreements with Japan – which (executive agreement), it believed, is of dubious validity, but, also, because there is no
governmental agency authorized to issue the import license required by the executive order.
The additional discussion in this case delves on the legality of the executive order sought to be implemented by Executive Order No.
328, owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the making of said executive agreement. The concurrence of the Senate
is required by our fundamental law in the making of “treaties”, which are, however, distinct and different from “executive
agreements”, which may be validly entered without such concurrence.
**E.O. 328: The implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the
Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the
Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Central Bank has no authority to regulate transactions not involving foreign exchange; that the shipments in
question are in the nature of “no-dollar” imports; that as such, the aforementioned shipments do not involve foreign exchange; and
Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence of the Senate.
HELD:
Yes, the Central Bank has the authority to regulate no-dollar imports and the validity of the aforementioned Circular Nos. 44 and 45
have already been passed upon and repeatedly upheld by this Court. The broad powers of the Central Bank include maintaining our
monetary stability and preserving the international value of our currency. As such, the Central Bank is authorized to issue rules and
regulations as it may consider necessary for the effective discharge of responsibilities and the exercise of the powers assigned to the
Monetary Board and to the Central Bank. This connotes the authority of the Central Bank to regulate no-dollar imports, with the end
result expected to be the stability of the peso and its international value.
No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties. Treaties are subject to the concurrence of at least ⅔ of the members of the Senate,
while Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are
no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes
take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.
 58

“x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has
been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such
subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal
and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.

101 Phil 1155

ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
FACTS: A Chinese businessman named Lao Ichong came into the Philippines to benefit from the business opportunities, especially in
the retail business, formerly thriving in the aforesaid country. In Pasay, Ichong and his Chinese businessmen colleagues enjoyed a
“monopoly” in the local market. In June 1954, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 1180 which is the “Retail Trade
Nationalization Act”. The objective of the law is to reserve to the Filipinos the right to engage in retail business. Ichong, being a Chinese,
filed a petition to nullify the said law basing on the ground that it [RA No. 1180] infringed a number of treaties settled by the Republic
of the Philippines. According to Lao Ichong, the said infringement violated the equal protection clause. As stated by him, Chinese
businessmen like him must be given equal opportunity since they contribute in the income generation of the country.

ISSUE: W/N a law or municipal law may invalidate treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes. Municipal law may supersede treaties or generally accepted principles in the exercise of police power. In the case at bar,
there is no clash of any kind between the grown generally accepted principle and the law passed or R.A. No. 1180. The equal protection
of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause
“is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the ***statute must be
upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered
through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Lao Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the city market of
Pasay.

Sec. 22: The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the
general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue
measures.

Section 23: The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other
time.

Article VII, Sec. 17 of the 1973 Constitution:

80 SCRA 538
Hidalgo vs Marcos
FACTS: In December 1977, a referendum was scheduled to be held. The purpose of which was to merge the office of the Prime
Minister and the Office of the President. At that time, Marcos was serving as the president and at the same time he was wielding
legislative powers. The referendum was to ask the people whether or not they still want Marcos to serve as the president (and at the
same time Prime Minister) after an interim Batasan Pambansa will be organized. Ernesto Hidalgo filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus before the Supreme Court to enjoin COMELEC and the president from proceeding with the said referendum as he
averred that the referendum will effectively amend the C0nstitution, which he says is unconstitutional and improper.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can be sued and compelled through a mandamus by the SC.

HELD: The Supreme Court did not pass upon the issue of the suability of the Presisent in thsi case considering that the COMELEC, the
body tasked to implement the referendum, was impleaded.
The SC however ruled that the referendum is valid and that the same will merely ask the people if they want Marcos to stay in
power or not and that the referendum will not amend the Constitution as Hidalgo avers.

April 6, 1981
Carillo vs Marcos

Nov. 15 1988
Maximo Soliven* vs Judge Makasiar
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FACTS: A libel case was filed by President Corazon Aquino against Luis Beltran and the other petitioners in these 3 consolidated
cases (MAXIMO SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS).
*Soliven stated that Aquino had hidden under the bed during the coup d'etat

ISSUES:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

First Issue: They have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law.

HELD: Moot and academic for the following events:

On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal’s finding of a prima facie case against petitioners.
On April 7, 1988, a second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran, but was denied by the Secretary of Justice.
On May 2, 1988, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988.
On May 16, 1988, The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary.
With these developments, petitioners’ contention is without factual basis.

Second issue: Beltran thinks that the addition of the word “personally” after the word “determined” and the deletion of the grant
of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to “other responsible officers as may be authorized by law” means that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
The constitutional provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

HELD: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be
sustained.

Third issue: A suit cannot be filed against the President. However, if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of
her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court’s
jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she
would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran argues that “the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit.”

HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
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exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.

489 SCRA 160

Randolf David vs President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate
the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be
implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to
bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits
issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated
anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day,
Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and General Order No. 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition
Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for
such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law.

Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such
is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.

The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative
because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar.
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled
in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the
Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the
growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed
was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech
cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims,
if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

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On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power
as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.
The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever
it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And
such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the
president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated
legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar
to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017
is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out
of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any
authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities
but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her
exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority
from Congress must be based on the following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

· The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it.

· It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.