Democracy & Nature, Vol. 7, No.

2, 2001

The Problem of Ethnicity in a New

(Global) Language
GÖKHAN BACIK

ABSTRACT What is the meaning of ethnic emancipation in the so-called global world? Why do we
have a set of sharp ethnic originated conflicts and problems at this specific period of time? The
basic argument of this paper is that the set of ethnic originated issues has become the concern of
world politics because of the crises of ‘language’ in world politics. There is a very important
language crisis that helps explain what is going on around us. Thus, this crisis has given way to an
invitation for ethnic problems to become increasingly intertwined with world politics. The former
‘language’ has no appropriate vocabulary to depict or to represent several ethnic realities. They
(ethnicities, minorities …) were there but they could not affect the process during the Cold War.
The paper examines the issue of ‘ethnic emancipation’ within the context of language–hegemony
crises.

‘A consciousness of a new era …’

After the end of the Cold War a new wave of expectations has come to the fore-
front.1 Accordingly, many substantial concepts and institutions are, and will be,
changing. Of all discussed concepts and institutions, some of them, such as nation
states, are now part of the ongoing discussions. However, considering the various
sides of these ongoing discussions, one should note that the main discussion
around the concept of identity—identification theory—constitutes a large portion
of the above-mentioned disputation. Why? The difficulty of giving a clear answer
to this question is obvious. However, we may refer to the nature of the same
process. Accordingly, the process that we are talking about includes some contra-
dictions. These contradictions intensify with the definition of the identity
formation. Consequently, the same process and the developments may give way
to some contradicting results. For example, with the same effects of globalizatio n
we are talking about the de-functioning of nation states. At the same time,
however, the role of sub-identities, such as ethnic ones, is increasing paradoxi-
cally. From this stance, we have two independent tendencies: one that increases

1. However, it is apt to mention that the evolutionary background of this so-called shift in the
terminology of political science should be traced back to the earlier periods. The end of the
Cold War was not a kind of event that fostered all these unprecedented developments, but it
was the result of the anyhow incepted process. In fact it is an old well-known reality that
‘social and political theory presents an ongoing problem of conceptualization’. William
Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity And International Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. ix.

ISSN 1085-5661 print; 1469-3720 online/01/02/0331-13 © 2001 Democracy & Nature 331
DOI: 10.1080/10855660120064637
 Gökhan Bacik

the commonalties of the world nations, and the other one that makes much more
clearly the differences of the sub-identities. To re-emphasize the emerging role of
ethnic identity studies as well one can easily read Esnam’s introductory sentences
to his book, Ethnic Politics:1
Glance at headings in the early 1990s: pitched battles between Serbs,
Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri
Lanka, between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria, Read of
IRA bombings in London, of threatened genocide by Arabs against
Dinka in Sudan, of riots involving African-Americans, Whites, and
Koreans in Los Angeles. The ethnically defined successor states of the
defunct Soviet Union contain restive minorities whose competing
claims and status must be confronted and managed. Canada is threat-
ened with the peaceful secession in Quebec, led by the French-speaking
majority, now ‘masters in their own homeland’; India is coping with a
violent Sikh secessionist movement in the Punjab; the minority Sunni
Arab regime in Iraq struggles to maintain control over rebellious Kurds
and Shi’a Muslims; Belgium has periodically tedious negotiation s
between representatives of its Walloon and Flemish peoples; French
and German public affairs are roiled by conflicts over the status of
large immigrant diasporas. The catalog of brutally violent and of more
or less civic manifestations of ethnic conflict includes all continents.
What is the meaning of ethnic emancipation in the so-called global world? Why
do we have a set of sharp ethnic originated conflicts and problems at this specific
period of time? What and where is the magic hand that has provoked the emer-
gence of silent ethnicity after extended durations of time? Since we are sure that
all of the ethnicities/races/minorities have long been ‘there’, if it is not a second
wave of Orientalism, how did these groups quickly become the topic of world-
wide geo-political studies and agendas?
When explaining the effects of the American Revolution upon Europe, R.R.
Palmer noted, ‘there was an expectancy of change, a sense of great events
already begun, a consciousness of a new era, a receptivity to … attempt[s] at
world renewal’.2 Whether tacitly or plainly, a similar ‘consciousness of a new
era’, has been part of the relevant discussions pertaining to globalization from
the very beginning. Especially when contextualizing the issue of globalizatio n
in international relations theory it is obvious that since the end of the Cold War,
a very strong consciousness of a new era has influenced the general under-
standing in the literature of the international relations discipline. For example
Martin Shaw starts his Global Society and International Relations: Sociological
Concepts and Political Perspectives by writing in the first sentence, ‘As the
twentieth century draws to its close, we are becoming aware of historic transfor-
mation of human society. The changes seem, indeed, truly millennial in their

1. Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (London: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 1.

2. Cited in Beverly J. Silver and Eric Slater, ‘The Social Origins of World Hegemonies’, in
Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System
(London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 163

332
 The Problem of Ethnicity

implications.’ Also Martin Shaw writes that we face a global crisis ‘which is
experienced at every level of social relations’. 1 Koslowski and Kratochwil in a
similar vein write, ‘We argue that the international system was transformed by
the rapid succession of mostly nonviolent revolutions that replaced Eastern
European Communist governments in 1989 … [ ]. The revolutions of 1989
transformed the international system by changing the rules governing super-
power conflict and, thereby, the norms underpinning the international system.’2
Yet in the same article they define what fundamental change is. Accordingly,
‘fundamental change of the international system occurs when actors, through
their practices, change the rules and norms constitutive of international interac-
tion … [it] occurs when beliefs and identities of domestic actors are altered
thereby also altering the rules and norms that are constitutive of their political
practices.’ 3 To Barry Buzan and Richard Little, ‘when the Berlin Wall was
breached in 1989 and the Cold War ended, specialists in the field of interna-
tional relations readily acknowledged that it was necessary to take stock and
assess the historical significance of these events. Unsurprisingly, no agreement
has been reached.’4 For Roland Bleiker, ‘entire world systems vanished over-
night’.5 The list of such views among prominent scholars may easily be
extended.
I argue that the cited consciousness of a new era (as associated with the feeling
that one is part of a period of large-scale historical change)6 is strongly related to
some other philosophical questions that are of importance in explaining the rela-
tionship of ethnicity and ethnic identity within the so-called globalizatio n
context.

Hegemony/language crises
In the words of E.J. Hobsbawm, ‘the simplest way to describe the apparent
explosion of separatism in 1992–1998 is thus as ‘unfinished business of 1918–
21’. 7 In other words, as cited above, what we presently observe has also existed
before. During the Cold War these ethnic identities ‘ontologically ’ existed,
nevertheless they were politically not in effect realities. Following Hobsbawm,
1. Martin Shay, Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political
Perspectives (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 3.
2. Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, ‘Understanding Change in International Politics:
the Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System’, International Organization, Vol.
48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), p. 215.
3. Ibid., ‘Understanding change …’, p. 216.
4. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, ‘Beyond Westphalia: Capitalism after the “Fall”’, Review of
International Studies, Special Issue, Vol. 25, No. 5 (1999), p. 89.
5. Roland Bleiker, ‘Retracing and Redrawing the Boundaries of Events: Postmodern Interfer-
ences with International Theory’, Alternatives: Social Transformation & Human Governance,
Vol. 23, No. 4 (October–December 1998), p. 471.
6. Cf. Daniel Little, ‘Explaining Large-Scale Historical Change’, Philosophy of the Social
Sciences, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 89–112.
7. E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 165.

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 Gökhan Bacik

‘the main change was that states were now on average rather smaller and the
“oppressed peoples” within them are now called “oppressed minorities”’. 1 In
another approach the ‘emancipation’ of ethnic identity in the so-called global
age is independent of its inherent ontology and even of its political program.
Again citing Hobsbawm, ‘the current phase of essentially separatist and divi-
sive ‘ethnic’ group assertion has no such positive programme or prospect’.2
They existed as they are today. However, what makes them important is the
changing role/meaning of these ‘old’, or known, concepts/values.
So, as I have just asked above, what is the basic logic that makes these ethnic
identities in effect in contemporary world politics? I argue that the basic logic
behind these re-emerging ethnic identities is directly related to the cited
consciousness of a new era. How and why?
The basic argument of this paper is that the set of ethnic originated issues has
become the concern of world politics because of the crises of ‘language’ in world
politics. There is a very important language crisis that helps explain what is going
on around us. Thus, this crisis—I argue—has given way to an invitation for
ethnic problems to become increasingly intertwined with world politics. The
former ‘language’ has no appropriate vocabulary to depict or to represent several
ethnic realities. They (ethnicities, minorities …) were there but they could not
affect the process during the Cold War. Why are they so influential now? In the
words of Ernest Barker:
The self-consciousness of nations is a product of the nineteenth
century. This is a matter of the first importance. Nations were already
there; they had indeed been there for centuries. But it is not the things
which are simply ‘there’ that matter in human life. What really and
finally matters is the thing that is apprehended as an idea, and, as an
idea, is vested with emotion until it becomes a cause and a spring of
action. In the world of action apprehended ideas are alone electrical;
and a nation must be an ideal as well as a fact before it can become a
dynamic force.3
The same line of logic is valid for the current emancipation of ethnic conscious-
ness. Citing David Boucher’s interpretation of the Hegelian internationa l
system, ‘relations among states have developed over a long period of time and
reflect the level of consciousness attained at any particular epoch’, we can say
that ‘the level of consciousness attained at [current] particular epoch’ has
almost changed yet is in a transition .4 Due to the effects of the cited transition, a
new lexicon has come to the forefront. To consolidate my thesis we can read
Arrighi and Silver in their Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System
write as follows: 5
1. Ibid., p. 133.
2. Ibid., p. 170.
3. Cited in Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princ-
eton University Press, 1994), p. 4.
4. David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 341.

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 The Problem of Ethnicity

Our contention has been that since about 1970 we have been living
through yet another one of these [transition from one to a new order]
periods, as witnessed, among other things, by the difficulties observers
have agreeing on the direction and meaning of ongoing transformations
of the global political economy.
I would like to direct the readers’ attention to two words in the above paragraph:
Meaning and transformation . The word transformation again refers to the famous
consciousness of a new era. The other word meaning is very important for our
methodology, since I argue that due to a language problem we have an enormous
concern with ethnic identity issues. It should be noted that similar conclusions are
valid with the opposite reading: Because of this same language problem, ethnic
groups have a new set of opportunities to raise their voices in world politics.
Arrighi and Silver also mention, ‘we are in the midst of a hegemonic crisis’.1 Any
hegemonic crisis means departure from the former language to a new one, and
perhaps the new language of a new type of hegemony. This crisis of language
entails ‘the difficulties observers have agreeing on the direction and meaning of
ongoing transformations of the global political economy’. As is known, any crisis
also brings out dissatisfaction with orthodox approaches. Similarly, there is wide-
spread dissatisfaction with orthodox approaches among contemporary
International Relations theorists. The departure from the former language of
world politics, as I argue, to a new but still undefined language may be shown as
the basic logic of emancipation associated with ethnic-oriented political realities.
One should accept that there is a strong relationship between structure and reality
(produced by it). And how a specific thing can become a ‘reality’ (thingification)2
in a specific ‘structure’ depends on the lexicon of the structure as well.
Within the limits of the former language it was hardly possible for ethnic groups
to raise up their voices. Nor was it possible for them to be represented politically in
the former system/structure. The former language did not recognize their political
existence as an inherent body in world politics. We can summarize this debate by
referring to Immanuel Wallerstein. As Wallerstein succinctly claims, ‘a transfor-
mation of the world of knowledge is intrinsically linked to the process of
transformation of the world-system itself’.3 Thus, the transformation of the world-
system is strongly related to the ethnic questions with which we deal.
‘Mainstream theorists and their critics leave people out’, write a group of
constructivist theorists when criticizing orthodoxy in international relations
studies, yet they suggest, ‘the scope for people in the agent-structure relation
must be enlarged’.4 This enlarging scope for people in world politics also
provides more room for ethnicity. The same enlarging transformation in the

5. Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System
(London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 272.
1. Ibid.
2. Aime Cesaire cited in (and also cf.), Ania Loomba, Kolonyalizm Postkolonyalizm (Colo-
nialism Postcolonialism) (trans. by Mehmet Kucuk) (Istanbul: Ayrinti, 2000), p. 158 (origi-
nally published by Routledge, 1998).
3. Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘From Sociology to Historical Social Science: Prospects and Obsta-
cles’, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, No. 1 (January–March, 2001), p. 34.

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 Gökhan Bacik

theory of world politics has given way to new theories such as the famous
Constructivism (which rejects the Realist language of international politics) that
is both post-modern and post-positivist .1 In the words of its most famous theorist
Constructivism has two basic tenets: ‘(i) the structures of human association are
determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (ii) the
identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas
rather than given by nature’.2 One can write much more about the details of
Constructivism, however what I would like to emphasize is that this approach’s
struggle amply demonstrates the conflict within International Relations between
Realism and Constructivism over the language used to explain what is going on
in world politics.3 It is obviously another similar effort when Martin Shaw writes;
‘the aim of the book is to reconceptualize this field [international relations] from
the point of view of sociology in general, and the sociology of globalization in
particular’.4
Within the context of the cited language crisis, Cynthia Weber succinctly
depicts the problem as follows: ‘If we continue to speak the same language of
international theory, we will reproduce the same history in and of the field.’5
Now, we are changing our language. But we have a very important question? Is
there a language in International Relations? ‘Among the most important laments
of Wight’s essay is that there is no language of international theory’, writes
Cynthia Weber.6 In other words one can hardly imagine a language for interna-
tional relations theory in which neither text nor classics exist. However, the
simple assertion that there is no text in international relations theory has never
been a problem for many academics. If indeed there are texts, they have produced
many contending languages. Realism is such a language, which like many, I
believe, was shaped by the general structure of the Cold War. Cold War realism
did not spend much time discussing the ideas of small entities such as ethnic
groups.
‘Realism dominated in the Cold War years’, writes Stephen M. Walt, ‘because
it provided simple but powerful explanations for war, alliance, imperialism,
obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomena, and because its
emphasis on competition was consistent with the central features of the Amer-
4. V. Kubalkova, N. Onuf and P. Kowert, International Relations in a Constructed World
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. ix. Also for an effective book that deal with the same
enlarging of the scope in favor of people and culture including identity see: Yosef Lapid and
Friedrich Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (London: Lynne
Rienner, 1996).
1. Kubalkova et al., International Relations in a Constructed World, p. 4.
2. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), pp. 1 and 20.
3. See: Emanual Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, Euro-
pean Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1997), pp. 319–363.
4. Shay, Global Society and International Relations, p. 4.
5. Cynthia Weber, ‘Reading Martin Wight’s ‘Why is There No International Theory?’ as
History’, Alternatives: Social Transformation & Humane Governance, Vol. 23, No. 4
(October–December, 1998), pp. 451–453.
6. Ibid., p. 457.

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ican-Soviet rivalry’.1 This rivalry was the key concept that shaped the general
structure. Yet quoting Caroline Kennedy-Pipe this time, ‘So, if Internationa l
History has had its own limitations in the study of the Cold War, Internationa l
Relations theory in its mainstream form is equally problematic.’2 According to
Kennedy-Pipe, as a result of pure Western sources-based approaches, the Cold
War history studies neglected Soviet perspectives and produced a body of prob-
lematic history. In parallel with her logic, the Cold War international relations
theory, which centered upon a pure superpowers rivalry approach, neglected
many existing facts. In such a structure–language relationship, ethnic reality was
observed of being of limited significance if it was not given importance in the
eyes of the superpowers.3 Unsurprisingly the limits were determined by the
superpowers. For example it is certain that the US did not want to in any way
weaken her important strategic ally (Turkey) in relation to the issue of Kurdish
rights.
The Realist language was very simple and encompassed a few functioning
principles: ‘States are the principle or the most important actors.’ They should be
viewed as a unitary actor. Yet, they are essentially rational. And, finally national
security issues are the most important within the state agenda.4 Theoretically
speaking, realist language depends on the following principle: ‘the world is inde-
pendent of the mind and language of individual observers’.5 On the macro scale
there were two superpowers and they always provided the needed revisions. The
rest of the world should accommodate these two country’s demands within the
terms of the superpowers’ language. Since ‘this specific political identity (i.e.
state=nation) has dominated the development of thinking about international rela-
tions, as least for the past fifty years’,6 it was hardly easy for ethnic groups to
raise their voices. However I do not claim that it was only because of the final
failure of the realist school/language that ethnic groups can now successfully
propose an alternative language. Realism may still explain a lot of ‘things’ after
several adaptations.7 But what should be underlined is that we are not only facing
‘the death of the author’ but though it may seem fantastic, both ‘the death of the

1. Stephen M. Walt, ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’, Foreign Policy, No.
110 (Spring 1998), p. 30.
2. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, ‘International History and International Relations theory: a Dialogue
Beyond the Cold War’, International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4 (2000), p. 746.
3. We have also several historical samples, which reflect system–language relationship. In other
words the Cold War is not unique case in world history. For example the European system
after the Napoleonic Wars (after the Congress of Vienna) did also produce a system language
that was strictly conservative in favor of traditional European monarchies. The system’s
masters prohibited revolution and reformation.
4. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism,
Globalism (New York: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 6–7.
5. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 51
6. Roger Tooze, ‘Prologue: States, Nationalisms and Identities—Thinking in IR Theory’, in J.
Krause and N. Renwick (eds), Identities in International Relations (Oxford: Macmillan,
1996), p. xvii.
7. Cf. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, The Perils of Anarchy:
Contemporary Realism and International Security (London: The MIT Press, 1995).

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 Gökhan Bacik

author’ and ‘the death of the object’. The object (i.e. the former structure/config-
uration of world politics) was strongly de-constructed (dead). In other words,
there is now no place for hermeneutic meaning since we have lost the intentions
of the author.1 As I have quoted several scholars above, we are in a transition
period, however there is no agreement on general points. (Who can explain what
is the national interest? What is the national economy? Is there a border for ethnic
groups? How about loyalty?) At this point since the ‘dead’ structure is no more in
effect, we face many new factors such as the emancipation of ethnic identities.
What is worse, since we have a dead object2 we also have two decisive problems:
(i) since we face a newly emerging object and since we have to continue to use
our former languages we cannot understand totally what is happening around us.
One must agree with Berdyaev who says there is, ‘an unknown era upon us’.3 (ii)
Since it is now hardly possible to ‘read’ the emerging structure we should first
construct a new language.
As Paul Renwick writes ‘the death of the author’ produces a ‘de-centered indi-
vidual’ in reading the text. Following Renwick;4
(i) If there is no authoritative meaning or reading of the text, then the
way is open for each reader to read the meaning of the text in different
ways. (ii) The death of the author breaks the direct relationship said to
exist between the author and the author’s text.
The cited two conclusions by Renwick are methodologically important for us,
too. Since there is wide criticism of the former (orthodox) languages, today, we
face many different readings. In the words of Gianni Vattimo we are entering a
world of infinite interpretability .5 All such like readings in one way or another
refer to the cited break of the direct relationship said to exist between the
author and the author’s text. So, what kind of new language exists in a no-text
field?
One cannot discover a new language in a simple article. In this part, I will refer
to some important points to be analyzed. First there is a ‘rupture between
language and the world’.6 To overcome this sizable problem we should first give
up our historical search for certainty.7 A search for certainty in one way or
another fabricates the problem of power. Certainty in politics is almost always
constructed in favor of power. Thus it is an elitist concept. As Hegel wrote,

1. Mark Bevir, ‘The Logic of the History of Ideas’, Rethinking History, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2000), p.
298.
2. However one should keep the fact in mind that ‘those pronounced dead tend to live longer than
expected.’ Klaus Lichtblau, ‘Differentiations of Modernity’, Theory, Culture & Society, Vol.
16, No. 3 (1999), p. 2.
3. Cited in Raymond D. Boisvert, ‘Philosophy: Postmodern or Polytemporal?’, International
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XL, No. 3 (September 2000), p. 314.
4. Paul Renwick, ‘Re-reading Europe’s Identities’, in Krause and Renwick, Identities in Interna-
tional Relations, pp. 158–159.
5. Cited in ibid., p. 159.
6. Patti Lather, ‘Fertile Obsession: Validity After Poststructuralism’, Sociological Quarterly, Vol.
34, No. 4, p. 681.
7. Cf. Roland Bleiker, ‘Retracing and Redrawing the Boundaries of Events …’, p. 471.

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‘Truth is not a minted coin that can be given and pocketed ready made. Nor is
there such a thing as the false, any more than there is something evil.’1 Even
though there has never been a certainty-based relationship between the world and
language, nobody has cared about it. Why? There was a very influential catalyst,
which filled the gap: It was power. Power makes us feel as if there is a certainty
between our language and the world, and fulfills the gap. Yet, as Martin Wight
wrote, ‘power will continue to seek security without reference to justice …’.2
One should remember that the cited security should not necessarily be related to a
kind of physical security. Second, instead of post-theories or anti-text theories we
should prefer intertextualism. I argue that only by ‘reversing a long-standin g
Western philosophical dogma; that of the privileging of epistemological ques-
tions over ontological ones’,3 we can open a new door for intertextualism .
However, one should not think that by reading epistemology as rational and
ontology as actual, my proposition depends upon a right Hegelian interpretation .
I am not claiming that we need a right Hegelian approach to properly understand
world politics. I conceptualize world politics as being very abstract. And as long
as one pays attention to epistemology, one inevitably produces an analytic
language instead of an experienced based language. I defend such an approach in
order to escape from Western-oriented epistemology in explaining non-Western
epistemologies. In sum, my proposition also invites other epistemologies into the
field. Not only their existing bodies but also their epistemological paradigms
should be welcomed. But, ‘it is not a matter of inviting a few more social scien-
tists from Asia or Eastern Europe or Latin America to a colloquium or to teach in
a Western university’, as Wallerstein has noted.4 This may also prevent us from
getting involved in a second Orientalist wave. Political science should take into
consideration so-called Western linguistic Orientalism.5 The ignorance of the
other’s ontology was not a simple political situation; nevertheless it did entail the
lack of knowledge of other epistemologies .
Taking both epistemologies and ontologies of other groups into consideration
may allow us to think about ‘the relationship between mind and matter’.6 It is a
fact that that an elective reading of the structures of these other group’s ideas is
highly problematic. Two famous experts on the Middle East A.S. Sidahmed and
A. Ehteshami write as follows: ‘the term [fundamentalism] was taken from a
particular Christian context and deployed into the Islamic field without due
appreciation for the appropriate differences and peculiarities of the respective
religious contexts’.7 According to another Middle Eastern expert, Dogu Ergil, the

1. Cited in Theodor W. Adorno, Hegel Three Studies (London: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 38.
2. Cited in Roger Morgan, ‘A European “society of states”—but only states of mint?’, Interna-
tional Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3 (2000), p. 563.
3. Leikki Patomaki and Colin Wight, ‘After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism’,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44 (2000), p. 215.
4. Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘From Sociology to Historical Social Science: Prospects and Obsta-
cles’, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, No. 1 (January–March, 2001), p. 34.
5. Kinsgley Bolton and Christopher Hutton, ‘Orientalism, Linguistic and Postcolonial Studies’,
Interventions, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2000), p. 2.
6. Barbara Montero, ‘The Body Problem’, Noûs, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1999), p. 186.

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 Gökhan Bacik

term nation-state is also highly problematic. Again, Ergil suggests using the
concept of state-nation instead.1 A very strong Weberian model of state in many
developing countries has produced state-based loyalty manners instead of people/
nation-oriented alternatives. The lexicon on state and nation is very different in
non-Western parts of the world. Thanks to the sizable gap between state and
government, an Iranian President may be the leader of the national opposition .2 A
similar case exists in Turkey as the current Turkish President is known as the
‘father of the opposition ’. I think Lahouari Addi’s statement, ‘a political commu-
nity that changes governments through the shedding of blood is not yet a nation,
and neither is one that changes presidents only when one happens to die in
office’, refers to the same question.3 This in other words is to imply a concept of
nationalism without nations. I do not want to keep to this simplistic line of logic
however. As it refers to the same epistemological question of properly reading
structure, it is useful to quote Partha Chatterjee (and Kedourie) here:4
Every part of the nationalist doctrine can be taken apart and shown to
have been derived from some species of European thought. It is totally
alien to the non-European world: it is neither something indigenous to
these areas nor an irresistible tendency of the human spirit everywhere,
but rather an importation from Europe clearly branded with the mark of
its origin. For the non-European word, in short, nationalist thought does
not constitute an autonomous discourse.
In sum, my proposition depends upon a basic logic: The current emancipation of
ethnic and racial identities is an indirect product of the hegemony-language crises
in world politics. This same emancipation does not necessarily require that they
contribute their paradigms and epistemologies to the field. In the following part
of my paper, I will claim that in such a fuzzy political environment, the emerging
local identities also will give up their primordial qualifications. The reasons for
such an expectation are twofold: First, the hegemony–language crisis
surrounding these groups also affects their own perceptions of their own identi-
ties. I claim that these ethnic identities will, within a still developing language
with a such a flexible and transforming structure, become much more constructed
rather than being dependent of any given facts. It is a fact that these groups
should use the same fuzzy language. Second, since the new opportunities for
ethnic groups originate from system-level crises instead of their own political
7. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehtashami, Islamic Fundamentalism (Oxford:
Westview Press, 1996), p. 2.
1. Do u Ergil, ‘Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey’, Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Fall 2000), pp. 43–62.
2. Bülent Aras, ‘Transformation of Iranian Political System: Towards a New Model?’, in
Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Dialogue Between Cultures, IAMES (The
International Association of Middle Eastern Studies) and Free University, Berlin, 4–8 October
2000.
3. Lahouari Addi, ‘The Failure of Third World Nationalism’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No.
4 (1997), p. 111.
4. Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World A Derivative Discourse?
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 8.

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 The Problem of Ethnicity

plans or projects, they will likely choose to harmonize themselves to this system-
level transformation. This process will inevitably entail the re-construction of
their own identities.

Instrumentalism: the story of constructed identity

No matter what my origin is, no matter what my ‘given’ features are, it is my
own right to choose the group in which I would participate. This introductory
sentence summarizes the instrumentalist approach. In other words, the instru-
mentalist ‘school’ claims that there is a strong flexibility in the course of history
about the formation of ethnic identities. Yet according to the instrumentalis t
approach, there is no real other. The boundaries are extremely flexible. There is
a normal interaction with the other groups. The instrumentalist approach rejects
the alleged roles of race, origin, and even language. The instrumentalists say to
us: You are what you feel yourself. Instrumentalism does not reject the subjec-
tive differences. It is noteworthy to remember here De Vos’ definition. He once
wrote, ‘Ethnicity is a sense of ethnic identity that consists of the subjective,
symbolic or emblematic use of by a group of people … of any aspect of culture,
in order to differentiate themselves from the other groups.’ Accordingly, one
should notice the subjective choice rather than determining hard givens. 1 There-
fore, any kind of distinguishing feature of an ethnic group fails to endure, but
this failure does not always mean the failure of the survival of an ethnic group.
We have several historical samples. For example: ‘Despite the fact that Euro-
pean culture, civilization, and science have, for centuries, been dominated
increasingly by the three languages, English, French, and German,’ writes
Brass, ‘this has not prevented the growth of linguistic diversity in Europe from
16 (standard) languages in 1800 to 30 in 1900 and to 53 in 1937.’ 2 It is worth
quoting at length the words of Wicker here to summarize the core approaches of
instrumentalist approach:
... There is no such thing as an ethnic, cultural, or national essence;
formations which appear as ethnic groups, as cultures, or as nations
should no longer be considered as supra-subjective wholes that
generate and determine human action. Instead, they should be inter-
preted as the products of history, therefore as resulting from concrete
acts that are motivated by people’s interests. Such formations are
constructions naturalized by social actors in the interest of their own
social standing; only then are they equipped with a coherent history and
a homogenous, territorial character. What social scientists are expected
to do according to this theoretical canon, then, is to examine which
social actors participate in generating such concepts of ethnicity,
culture and nation, and to locate the strategies and processes of
construction that are used to make such totalities become real. Thus

1. Cited in Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism (London: Sage, 1991), pp. 18–19.
2. Ibid., p. 19.

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 Gökhan Bacik

like social classes ethnic groups, cultures and nations are thought to
exist not in themselves but only for themselves.1
On the other hand, instrumentalism is not the total rejection of the concept of
given. There may be really a given descent; however, it is not a matter of fact for
the instrumentalist. It may be actually existing or putative. A good example illu-
minates the crux of the problem. ‘Although the French are popularly believed to
be of Celtic descent and the Germans of Teutonic origin there are scientists, like
M. Jean Finot, who maintain that if it is absolutely necessary to attribute Celtic
descent to any European people, that people must be not the French but the
Germans, while the French, on the other hand, are more Teutonic in blood than
the Germans.’2 The crux of the problem is personal/social feeling and perception.
To Weber there may be a subjective belief in common descent, ‘however it does
not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists’. To Schermer-
horn, the belief of common descent may be putative rather than real, but what
must exist is ‘some consciousness of kind among membership of the group’.3
Needless to say, this consciousness may be gained or re-gained again by the
others. Thus, identities can be changed or re-formulated. As Robin Cohen
mentions before, ‘Identities are made and remade, invented and inherited. They
are contingent and situational (one can be Muslim in the mosque, Asian in the
street, Asian British at the political hustings, and British when traveling abroad,
all in a single day.’4

Conclusion
Today, ethnic groups are trying to enlarge their legal environment in order to
enjoy many more cultural rights. This is not surprising. However, these groups
are now using global networks. The pro-independent Kurdish TV, since there is
a ban in Turkey, broadcasts from Europe or America. Local leaders in every
corner of the world ask for various types of assistance from international organ-
izations. And their relations with the ‘system’ are not shaped only according to
their demands. A kind of give and take logic shapes the cited relations. In order
to defend themselves against ‘nation states’, ethnic groups seek internationa l
status. From a different perspective, this provides an analogy to a medieval
system. 5 Thanks to the highly interactive mode of world politics, the former
hard distinction between domestic and foreign domains has become obscured.
Ethnic groups, due to the erosion of nation-states, have become internationa l

1. Hans-Rudolf Wicker, ‘Introduction: Theorising Ethnicity and Nationalism’, in H.R. Wicker,

Rethinking Nationalism & Ethnicity The Struggle For Meaning and Order in Europe (Oxford,
Berg, 1997), p. 1.
2. This paragraph is from Bernard Joseph. Cited in Conner, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for
Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 215.
3. Jack David Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective
on International Ethnic Conflict (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1998),
pp. 12–13.
4. Robin Cohen, ‘Review Article: The Incredible Vagueness of Being British/English’, Interna-
tional Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3 (2000), p. 582.

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 The Problem of Ethnicity

actors. However, they have also given up their many primordial roots. The
international society/system that has produced new opportunities for ethnic
groups also pushes forward several requisites for ethnic groups. The recent
Austrian case is a good example. It is clear that racist or highly primordialist
ethnic identity configurations will clash with this new structure. In order not to
be marginalized, ethnic groups are forced to soften their identity paradigms.
The chaos in world politics has set many new actors free. From several
different points of view this is very positive. However, after the first encounter a
healthy new configuration must be founded. Otherwise, there may emerge new
forms that may easily limit the representations of ethnic groups within politics
after a piece of time. The question is not only whether these groups are struggling
for political and cultural rights, but also whether they can contribute to the newly
emerging language. They will always face this emerging language later.

5. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, ‘Beyond Westphalia: Capitalism after the ‘Fall’, p. 95.
According to Griffiths it was Susan Strange alerted scholars to a ‘new medievalism in interna-
tional relations’. See: Martin Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations (Rout-
ledge: New York, 1999), p. 46.

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