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BERNADITH R.MACARIOLA vs.JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

114 SCRA 77

FACTS:

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola

charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals with “acts unbecoming a
judge.” The complainant filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated
August 6, 1968 alleging that Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5,
of the new civil code in acquiring by purchase of lot no. 1184-E which was one of
those properties involved in the civil case no. 3010 decided by him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the

new Civil Code.

RULING:

Supreme Court held that, for the prohibition to operate, sale or assignment
of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property. When the respondent Judge Asuncion purchased on March 6, 1965 a
portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on
June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an
appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer
subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965,
respondent’s order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated
November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made
pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was no
appeal from said orders.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. THE GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO.!83591, OCTOBER 14 2008

FACTS:

On August 5, 2008 the government of the Republic of the Philippines and

the Moro Islamic Liberation front were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
agreement of the Ancestral domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
on peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia. The GRP-MILF agreement is the
result of a formal peace talks between the parties in Tripoli, Libya in 2001. The
pertinent provisions in MOA-AD provides for the establishment of an associative
relationship between the Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE) and the Central
Government. It speaks of the relationship between the BJE and the Philippine
Government as “associative”, thus implying an international relationship and
therefore suggesting an autonomous state. Furthermore, under the MOA-AD, the
GRP peace panel guarantees that necessary amendments to the constitution
and the laws will eventually be put in place.

ISSUE:
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Whether or not the Proposed Memorandum of agreement on the ancestral

domain is constitutional

RULING:

No, MOA-Ad cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws,
not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely the
associative relationship envisioned between the Government of the Philippines
and the Bangsamoro, are unconstitutional for the concept presupposes that the
assailed entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

Moreover the Supreme Court found Paragraph 7 on Governance of the

MOA-AD inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to propose
constitutional amendments, it being virtual guarantee that the constitution and the
laws of Republic of the Philippines will certainly adjusted to conform to all the
“consensus points” enumerated in the agreement. Hence, it struck down the
MOA-AD as unconstitutional

BJE is indeed a State not only by name as it meets the criteria of a state
laid down in the Montevideo convention, namely, a permanent population, define
territory, a government and capacity to enter relations with other state.

BJE is a sub-state a government or administrative unit that is

constitutionally subordinate to the ultimate sovereignty of its respective central
government that meets the Montevideo standards for legal personality. In other
words, a sub-state is a non-sovereign, non-centrally administered or governed
unit under a sovereign state, the Supreme Court ruled that “the concept of local
autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into ‘mini-
states.’ the Court was moved to emphasize that any step toward fragmentation of
national sovereignty and territorial integrity was not within the purview of the
Constitution: “Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being
so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited
and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
‘decentralization.’ It does not make local governments sovereign within the state
or on ‘imperium in imperio.’”

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA v. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA

G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011
FACTS:
R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with the
terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortened
one baseline, optimized the location of some base points around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories such as the Kalayaan Island
Ground (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as “regimes of islands” whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not R.A. 9522 is constitutional for converting internal waters

into archipelagic waters

HELD:
The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with the
Philippine’s national interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding the
country’s maritime zones, the law also allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental
shelf. The Court also finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic
waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III,
an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed
by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will
not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over
waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein. due to the
absence of its own legislation regarding routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passage, the Philippines has no choice but to
comply with the international law norms. The Philippines is subject to UNCLOS
III, which grants innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic
waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise, thus,
the right of innocent passage, being a customary international law, is
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. If the Philippines or
any country shall invoke its sovereignty to forbid innocent passage, it shall risk
retaliatory measures from the international community. With compliance to
UNCLOS III and the enactment of R.A. 9522, the Congress has avoided such
conflict.
Archipelagic doctrine –which we connect the outer most points of our
archipelago with the straight baseline and consider all the waters enclosed
thereby as internal waters.

The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
Philippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to
the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast.

MELCHORA CABANAS vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL,

58 SCRA 94

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FACTS:

Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the
plaintiff Melchora Cabanas. Millian Pilapil was ten (10) years old at the time the
complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the
brother of the deceased Florentino Pilapil. The deceased insured himself and
instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her
minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. But the mother filed a
complaint that the proceeds must be given to her because the child was living
with her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Melchora Cabanas is entitled to act as trustee of a minor

beneficiary for the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of her deceased
father Florentino Pilapil.

RULING:

The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is

buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the
State as PARENS PATRIAE, is called upon whenever a pending suit or litigation
affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen,
as it did occur here, that family relations may press their respective claims. It
would be more consonance not only with the natural order of things but the
traditions of the country for a parent to be prepared. It could have been different if
the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not a case at all. It is the
mother asserting priority. Certainly, the judiciary as the instrumentality of the state
in its role as parens patriae cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.

The government acting for the State as parens patriae chose the mother
of an illegitimate child as against his uncle to be the trustee of the insurance
proceeds left by the father, who had expressly designated the uncle.

ELISEO SORIANO V LAGUARDIA

GR NO. 164785, APRIL 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 79

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FACTS:

Mr. Eliseo Soriano, the petitioner, was a host in a religious television

program “Ang Dating Daan” which aired on UNTV 37 on August 10, 2004, at
around 10:00 p.m. He made obscene remarks while it was aired. After a
preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of
August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan
program for twenty (20) days, in accordance with section 3(d) of the Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3 Chapter XIII of
the 2004 IRR of the PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of
Procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the suspension of his religious television was unlawful.

Whether or not, his freedom of speech and religion are violated.

RULING:

Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television

broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements
could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use.
As such, the welfare of children and the state’s mediate to protect and care for
them, as PARENS PATRIAE, constitute a substantial and compelling
government interest in regulating petitioner’s utterances in a television broadcast.

DELA CRUZ V GARCIA,

GR NO. 177728, JULY 31, 2009, 549 SCRA 648

FACTS:

For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan
Dela Cruz and the 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Thomas Aquino lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the
house of Dominique’s parents Domingo P. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Thomas
Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dalumbayan, Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, 2005,
Dominique died. After two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who
continued to live with Dominique’s parent, gave her birth to Christian Dela Cruz
Aquino. Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s
surname Aquino, with the office of the civil registrar. In support of which she
submitted the Child’s certificate of Live Birth, affidavit to use the Surname of the
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Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed. On November 11, 2005 the
city civil registrar of Antipolo, Ronald Paul S. Garcia, denied Jenie’s application
for registration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the illegitimate child can use the father’s surname.

RULING:

Supreme Court allowed the registration of an illegitimate child using the

surname of his deceased father, declaring that it is “the policy of the Family Code
to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiations of children
especially of illegitimate children. The state as PARENS PATRIAE affords special
protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to
their development.

Case number 1

CO KIM CHAN, vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON
G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986
FACTS:

The petitioner has a pending civil case initiated under the regime of the
so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the military occupation.
The respondent judge of the lower court refused to take cogniz ance of and
continue the proceedings of the Civil case. He argued that the proclamation
issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all
judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the said government. The
respondent judge argued that the governments established in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation were not de facto government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the governments established in the Philippines under the

names of Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the Philippine Executive Commission, which
was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942 by the Commander
of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces
of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. The
source of its authority comes from the Japanese military, it is a government
imposed by laws of war.

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The so-called Republic of the Philippines, was of the same character of

the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was
the same – the Japanese military authority and government.

Case number 2

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES vs.

PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO

G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986

FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation

No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On
March 25, proclamation No. 3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:

Yes, the government of Aquino is legitimate. The legitimacy of the Aquino

government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people are the judge. The court held that the people have made the
judgment that they accepted the government of Aquino which is in effective
control of the entire country. In so, it is not merely de facto government but it is in
fact a de jure government. Furthermore, the community of nations ha recognized
the legitimacy of the new government. Therefore, the government of Aquino
government has legal title.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
The PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, vs.JOSE YULO TOBIAS,
No. L-17467 April 23, 1963

FACTS:

Appeal taken by plaintiff National Development Company represented by

its agent, The Philippine National Bank, from an order of the court of First
Instance, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint upon the ground of action without
special pronouncement as to costs.

In said complaint plaintiff seeks to recover from dependant, Jose Yulo

Tobias, the sum of P6,905.81 plus interest and attorney’s fees under a
promissory note of said defendant, dated and issued on May 13, 1946 for the
sum of P7,000.00 payable “on demand after date” to the order of said plaintiff.
Upon being summoned, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground
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that the action upon which complaint is based has prescribed long ago. Hence
the aforementioned order of dismissal, which plaintiff assails as erroneous upon
the theory that the statute of limitations does not run against the plaintiff because
the same is an instrumentality of the Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statute of limitations applies on an instrumentality of
the government.

HELD:

Where plaintiff is neither the Government of the Republic nor a branch or

subdivision thereof, but a government owned and controlled corporation which
cannot be said to exercise a sovereign function, it is business corporation and as
such, its causes of action are subject to the statute of limitations.

ANASTACIO LAUREL, VS.ERIBERTO MISA,

G.R. NO. L-409 JANUARY 30, 1947
FACTS:

Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus based on a theory that
a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
defined and penalized by Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason
that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and
consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty over these island upon
the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegiance of a Filipino citizen was suspended the time
he adhere to the enemy.

HELD:

The preservation of the allegiance or obligation of fidelity and obedience of

a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a
positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a
corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of
the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the
inhabitants to their legitimate government or compel them to adhere and give aid
and comfort to him; because it is evident that such control of the inhabitants and
the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically
transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or
sovereign.

Case number 3
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JUSMAG PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS.

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND FLORENCIO
SACRAMENTO, UNION PRESIDENT, JPFCEA
G.R. NO. 108813 DECEMBER 15, 1994

FACTS:

Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance

support personnel working at JUSMAG Philippines. He has been with JUSMAG
from December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992. His service were
terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. He was also advised that
he was under administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the same was
not charged against his leave.

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and

Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from
service by JUSMAG and asked for his reinstatement.

JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss to Dismiss invoking its immunity

from suit as an agency of the United States. It further alleged lack of employer-
employee relationship and that it has no juridical personality to sue and be sued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner, JUSMAG is immune from suite.

HELD:

It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent,

it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States
pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dataed March 21, 1947. Hence,
we agree with petitioner that the suit is in effect, one against the United States
Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the
United States has not waived or consented to the suit the complaint against
JUSMAG cannot prosper.

Case number 4

CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT CORP. V. SANTAMARIA

665 SCRA 189, G.R. NO. 185572 FEBUARY 7, 2012

FACTS:
CNMEG and North Rail entered into Memorandum of Understanding for
the feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to La Union (North Rail
Project). CNMEG and North Rail executed a Contract of Agreement for the
construction of the Phase 1 of Northrail. The respondents filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Contract and Injunction in the RTC of Makati. CNMEG filed a
motion to dismiss. CNMEG filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Trial Court
did not have jurisdiction over its person as it was an agent of the Chinese

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government making it immune from suit, and the subject matter as the Northrail
was product of an executive agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity precluding it from being sued
before a local court

HELD:
CNMEG claims immunity on the ground that the Aug 30 MOU on the
financing of the Northrail Project was signed by the Philippine and Chinese
governments, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor meant that it was
bound to perform a governmental function on behalf of China. However, the Loan
Agreement, which originated from the same Aug 30 MOU, belies this reasoning,
viz: Article 11. xxx (j) Commercial Activity The execution and delivery of this
Agreement by the Borrower constitute, and the Borrower’s performance of and
compliance with its obligations under this Agreement will constitute, private and
commercial acts done and performed for commercial purposes under the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines and neither the Borrower nor any of its assets is
entitled to any immunity or privilege (sovereign or otherwise) from suit, execution
or any other legal process with respect to its obligations under this Agreement, as
the case may be, in any jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Borrower
does not waive any immunity with respect of its assets which are (i) used by a
diplomatic or consular mission of the Borrower and (ii) assets of a military
character and under control of a military authority or defense agency and (iii)
located in the Philippines and dedicated to public or governmental use (as
distinguished from patrimonial assets or assets dedicated to commercial use).
(Emphasis supplied.) (k) Proceedings to Enforce Agreement In any proceeding in
the Republic of the Philippines to enforce this Agreement, the choice of the laws
of the People’s Republic of China as the governing law hereof will be recognized
and such law will be applied. The waiver of immunity by the Borrower, the
irrevocable submissions of the Borrower to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of the People’s Republic of China and the appointment of the Borrower’s
Chinese Process Agent is legal, valid, binding and enforceable and any judgment
obtained in the People’s Republic of China will be if introduced, evidence for
enforcement in any pr oceedings against the Borrower and its assets in the
Republic of the Philippines provided that (a) the court rendering judgment had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action in accordance with its
jurisdictional rules, (b) the Republic had notice of the proceedings, (c) the
judgment of the court was not obtained through collusion or fraud, and (d) such
judgment was not based on a clear mistake of fact or law. Further, the Loan
Agreement likewise contains this express waiver of immunity: 15.5 Waiver of
Immunity The Borrower irrevocably and unconditionally waives, any immunity to
which it or its property may at any time be or become entitled, whether
characterized as sovereign immunity or otherwise, from any suit, judgment,
service of process upon it or any agent, execution on judgment, set-off,
attachment prior to judgment, attachment in aid of execution to which it or its
assets may be entitled in any legal action or proceedings with respect to this
Agreement or any of the transactions contemplated hereby or hereunder.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Borrower does not waive any immunity in
respect of its assets which are (i) used by a diplomatic or consular mission of the
Borrower, (ii) assets of a military character and under control of a military
authority or defense agency and (iii) located in the Philippines and dedicated to a
public or governmental use (as distinguished from patrimonial assets or assets
dedicated to commercial use).

Thus, despite petitioner’s claim that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance
to Northrail because the bank was mandated by the Chinese government, and
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not because of any motivation to do business in the Philippines,it is clear from

the foregoing provisions that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial
transaction. Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM
Bank and the Philippine government, while the Contract Agreement was between
Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is silent on the
classification of the legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the
Loan Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertaking,
nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the Northrail Project to classify
the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in character. Thus, piecing
together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of
Understanding dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang’s letter dated 1 October
2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct
the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely commercial activity performed in the
ordinary course of its business.
THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT
SALES ENTERPRISES,INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

FACTS:
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City
in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private
respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of
6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the
name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the
name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the
sale to private respondent. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the
lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the
relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana
Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and
specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal
Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the
PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint —
petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and
Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by
private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to
dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering
into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to
us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on
its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations
regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a
foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has
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had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo,
p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely
held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of
the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of
a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it
is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized
as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and
subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired
said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.
The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a
receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic
mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered
into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are
likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for
profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters
living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of
the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the
lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by
private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person
who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own
government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the
Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to
persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of
its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the
impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and
the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States,
Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905,
919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the
latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in
Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
Case number 5

EMILIANO R. DE LOS SANTOS et.al. vs. IAC (INTERMEDIATE APPELATE

COURT)
223 SCRA 1
FACTS:

Petitioners were co-owners of a parcel of land located in Barrio Wawa,

Binangonan, Rizal (19,061 square meters). They filed civil case no. 46800,
against Lorenzo Cadiente, a private contractor and Provincial Engineer

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constructed a road within their property without their consent. Respondents also
constructed, an artificial creek occupying 2906 square meters of their property.
They also filed Civil Case no. 46801 – against deprivation of property without due
process of law and without compensation.The two cases were consolidated and
Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss both cases

ISSUES:

Whether or not the State may be sued being that it has not given its
consent

HELD:

YES. From Amigable v Cuenca: where a governments takes away property from
a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, a suit may properly be maintained against the
government. – The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.

The civil action may be based under Art 32 NCC and the constitutional provisions
on rights against privation of property without due process of law and without just
compensation.

Case number 6
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID AND ELISEA RAMOS
644 SCRA 36 G.R. No. 159402, FEBUARY 23, 2011
FACTS

Spouses Ramos discovered that a portion of their land (somewhere in

Baguio) was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the
Loakan Airport which is operated by ATO. Sometime in 1995, respondents
agreed to convey the subject portion by deed of sale to ATO in consideration of
the amount of Php778,150.00. However, ATO failed to pay despite repeated
verbal and written demands. Thus, an action for collection against ATO was filed
by the respondents before the RTC. ATO’s primary contention was that the deed
of sale was entered into the performance of governmental functions. RTC ruled
in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed RTC. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether ATO could be sued without the State’s consent.
RULING:
SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner (ATO)
because it is an agency of the State engaged in an enterprise that is far from
being the State’s exclusive prerogative. The CA thereby correctly appreciated the
juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a
purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the
exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had
no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. The SC further observes that the
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doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid

claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and
without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the
plaintiff’s property.

Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the
States consent has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No.
9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. R.A. No. 9497
abolished the ATO and u nderits Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established
in place of the ATO the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), which
thereby assumed all of the ATOs powers, duties and rights, assets, real and
personal properties, funds, and revenues. Section 23 of R.A. No. 9497
enumerates the corporate powers vested in the CAAP, including the power to sue
and be sued, to enter into contracts of every class, kind and description, to
construct, acquire, own, hold, operate, maintain, administer and lease personal
and real properties, and to settle, under such terms and conditions most
advantageous to it, any claim by or against it. With the CAAP having legally
succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the ATO had
incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be
enforced against the CAAP.

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO

II
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988

FACTS:

Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval
Station. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base.
Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the
Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game
room attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA.

On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their

employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-
time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the
U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement
of their permanent full-time status.

However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed

with the hearing officer's report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr.
Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and
Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult
employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not
to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where
others not involved in the case could hear."

Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was
sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private
respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages
alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment
of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary
rights.

However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them
in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no

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jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion
was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any
evidence that their acts were official in nature.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?

RULING:

Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA,

undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private
respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being
sued as officers of the United States government because they have acted on
behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that
government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.

It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government

functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove
him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the
doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official
character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act
imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.
These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local
state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a
foreign state, as in the present case.

Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants
have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not
by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States
government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary
amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against
that government without its consent.

The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there
can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the
sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non
habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of
nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II,
Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that
the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Case number 7
MARIANO GARCIA VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-20213JANUARY 31, 1966
FACTS:

Plaintiff, Mariano E. Garcia filed with the Court of First Instance of

Pangasinan an action to collect a sum of money against the Chief of Staff and
Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines , the Chairman of the
Philippine Veterans Board and /or the Auditor General dated December 1, 1961.
Gacia alleged that sometime in July 1948, he suffered injuries while on a military
training camp at Floridablanca, Pampanga . Thereafter he filed his claim fo

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disability benefits and so submitted papers to support it to the Office of the

Adjutant General.

May 2, 1957, plaintiff received a letter from the said Adjutant’s Office
disqualifying his claim. The Adjutant Office denied his claim of disability benefits
alleging that Commonwealth Act 400 had been repealed by R.A. 610 which took
effect on Jan. 1 , 1950. That due to the injuries plaintiff suffered he lost his sight
making him permanently disabled. That by the unjustified refusal by defendants
the latter didn’t enjoyed his supposed disability pension from July 1948.

The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine Veterans Administration filed motions to dismiss the complaint on
grounds that the court has no jurisdiction on the said matter of the complaint. The
court on March 2, 1962 rendered an order dismissing the complaint. However,
motion for reconsideration of the said order has also been denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on the said matter and dismissing
the complaint on ground, it being the money claim against the government.

HELD:

The order dismissing the complaint had been affirmed, without

pronouncement as to costs. The claim for recovery of money against the
government must be filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that
the State cannot be charged without its content as provided by the
Commonwealth Act 327 Sec. 1 that in all cases involving the settlement of
accounts and claims other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor
General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays
and holidays after their presentation.

Also, if all administrative remedies had been made and if superior

administrative officers could grant relief it is not necessary to entertain actions
against the administrative officers as established by the rule.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, et.al. vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON,

STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

On August 30, 1990, UP entered into an agreement with Stern Builders

Corporation for the construction of extension building in UPLB. Stern Builders
submitted three billings but UP only paid for two, the third was not paid due to
disallowance of COA . When the disallowance was lifted, UP still failed to pay. So
Stern Builders sued them. UP failed to file an appeal during the fifteen day

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period. When they appealed on June 3, 2002 arguing that they only received the
copy on May 31, 2002, the Regional Trial Court denied it and issued a writ of
execution on October 4, 2002. UP files with the Court of Appeals for certiorari but
was likewise denied. On December 31, 2002 RTC Judge Dizon orders the
release of the garnished funds from UP. On January 10, 2005, UP files for
certiorari the decision of Court of Appeals. Petition was granted and a Temporary
Restraining Order was filed. After the sixty-day period of the TRO, the RTC
directs sheriff to receive the check from DBP. On july 8, 2005, Dizon ordered the
non-withdrawal of check because the certiorari is pending. On September 16,
2005, UP files for certiorari which was denied on 2005 but UP files for petition for
review. On January 3, 2007, RTC Judge Yadao replaced Dizon, ordered the
withdrawal. On January 22, 2007, UP filed a TRO with the Supreme Court which
was granted. UP files petition for review for RTC’s decision to withdraw funds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the fresh period rule in Neypes v CA can given retroactive
application

RULING:

Yes. The retroactive effect of a procedural law does not come within the
legal conception of retroactivity or is not subject to the general rule prohibiting
retroactive operation of statutes. Rather, its retroactivity is already given since by
the nature of rules of procedure, no vested right is impinged in its application.

ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ and JOSE V. HERRERA vs. HON. SOTERO B.

CABAHUG, Secretary of National Defense

G.R. No. L-9990 September 30, 1957

LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS:

The Secretary of National Defense, defendant Hon. Sotero B.

Cabahug, accepted the bid of Allied Technologists, Inc. on July 31, 1950
for the furnishing of the architectural and engineering services in the
construction of the Veterans Hospital at the price of Php 302, 700. The
architectural requirements were submitted by Allied Technologies through
Enrique Ruiz, Jose Herrera and Pablo Panlillo and were approved by the
United States Veterans Administration and a contract was signed due to
the technical objection to the capacity of the said company in the practice
of architecture and upon the advice of the Secretary of Justice. The
defendants allegedly took 15% of the sum due to Allied Technologies, Inc.
at the time of the payment of the contract price for the reason that Panlillo
asserted that he is the sole architect of the Veterans Hospital, excluding
Ruiz and Herrera, the assertion of which was abetted by defendant
Jimenez (the first cause of action). The plaintiffs were to be deprived of
their share of professional services and their professional prestige and
standing were to be gravely damaged unless the defendants are
prevented from recognizing Panlillo as the sole architect. Furthermore, the
second cause of action is Title II of the contract where at any time prior to
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six months after completion and acceptance of the work under Title I, the
Government may direct Allied Technologists, Inc. to do the services stated
in said Title II yet nevertheless the completion the government declined to
direct the plaintiffs to perform the job.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government can be sued for withholding the

15% of the sum and depriving the plaintiffs of their share

RULING:

The case is a not a suit against the government, which could not be
sued without its consent. It was found that the government has already
allotted the full amount for the contract price; it was the defendant-officials
which were responsible for the allegation. This was to be directed to the
officials alone, where they are compelled to act in accordance with the
rights established by Ruiz and Herrera or to desist them from paying and
recognizing the rights and interests in the funds retained and the credit for
the job finished. The order of dismissal was reversed and set aside and
the case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings with
costs against the defendants.

DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT V.

COURT OF APPEALS/ GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION
V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On 7 September 1971, the governments of the Federal Republic of

Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning
Technical Co-operation (Agreement) in Bonn, capital of what was then West
Germany. The Agreement affirmed the countries common interest in promoting
the technical and economic development of their States, and recognized the
benefits to be derived by both States from closer technical co-operation, and
allowed for the conclusion of arrangements concerning individual projects of
technical co-operation. While the Agreement provided for a limited term of
effectivity of five (5) years, it nonetheless was stated that [t]he Agreement shall
be tacitly extended for successive periods of one year unless either of the two
Contracting Parties denounces it in writing three months prior to its expiry, and
that even upon the Agreements expiry, its provisions would continue to apply to
any projects agreed upon x x x until their completion.

On 10 December 1999, the Philippine government, through then Foreign

Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, and the German government, agreed to an
Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971 Agreement. This Arrangement affirmed
the common commitment of both governments to promote jointly a project called,
Social Health InsuranceNetworking and Empowerment (SHINE), which was
designed to enable Philippine familiesespecially poor ones to maintain their
health and secure health care of sustainable quality. It appears that SHINE had
already been in existence even prior to the effectivity of the Arrangement, though
the record does not indicate when exactly SHINE was constituted. Nonetheless,

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the Arrangement stated the various obligations of the Filipino and German
governments.

ISSUES:

Whether or not any agency of a foreign state may properly invoke the its
sovereign immunity to ward off suits against it

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not present adequate
evidence to establish that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally accorded to
its parent country, th Federal Republic of Germany, adding that assuming that the
characterization is correct, it does not automatically invest GTZ with the ability to
invoke State immunity from suit. The court further added that an endorsement by
the Office of the Solicitor General on the petitioner’s claim of state immunity,
manifested in its comment filed in connection with proceedings, does not inspire
the same degree of confidence as a certification from the DFA would have
elicited.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA

G.R. No. L-36084 August 31, 1977

FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:

FACTS:

These twenty-six Petitions for Review filed by the People of the

Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila,
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor-General,
are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

The respondent-courts are Court of First Instance of Manila, Branches VII

and XVIII and Court of First Instance of Samar

Several information were filed before the abovementioned courts

charging the accused of illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash
said the said information’s on common ground that the information’s did not
allege facts constituting an offense penalized until P.D. 9 for failure to state an
essential element of the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accused
residence of a bladed, pointed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on
occasion of, connected with, or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion,
organized lawlessness or public disorder.

The respondent courts stand that P.D. 9 should be read in the context of
proclamation 1081 which seeks to maintain law and order in the country as well
as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence. The non-
inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other
legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima,
in particular, reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose of
possession of the weapon was intended for the purposes of abetting the
conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness, and public disorder. The
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petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard
because the prohibited act is basically a mallum prohibitum or is an action or
conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fisccal also added in
cases of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of
the act is voluntary is enough.

ISSUE:

Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under
P.D. 9?

HELD:

1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a

criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or
information to be sufficient, it must state the ddesignation of the
offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the
accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly.
3. The Supreme Court says that the preamble of P.D. 9 states that the
intention of such decree is to penalize the acts which are related to
Proclamation 1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion,
subversive acts, and thelike. While the preamble is not a part of the
statute, it implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The preamble and
wheras clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and sanctions provided

The petition is DISMISSED.

Case number 8
VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public
Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

MAKALINTAL, J.:

FACTS:

Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of
the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435)
issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No
annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property
appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated
sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square
meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

ISSUES:
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Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of
the case.

RULING:

In the case of Ministerio vs Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when
the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public
use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale,
the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make
due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine
just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time
of the taking.

Petition Granted.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I.

COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, and ELIGIO DE
GUZMAN & CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for
certain naval projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation
and submitted bids. Subsequently, the company received two telegrams
requesting it to confirm its price. In June 1972, the copany received a letter which
said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects. The
company then sued the United States of America and individual petitioners
demanding that the company perform the work on the projects, or for the
petitioners to pay damages and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the petitioners from entering into contracts with third parties concerning the
project.

ISSUES:

Whether Or Not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity

RULING:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However,
the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing
and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been

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necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure

imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result
is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign &
governmental acts)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to
the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function
of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes. Correct test for the application of State
immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the
act

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. GROUP MANAGEMENT

CORPORATION et.al
G.R. No. 167000 JUNE 8, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

On march 11, 2004 and May 7, 2004 petitioner assails the order issued by the
Lapu-Lapu RTC for being legally unenforceable on GSIS because titles of the &*
lots in Marigodon, Lapu-Lapu City were already in LLDHCs name, due to the final
and executory judgement rendered by the Manila RTC in Civil No. R 82-3429.
GSIS contends that it is legally and physically impossible for it to comply with the
assailed orders as the subject matter to be delivered or performed have already
been taken away. Petitioner asserts that the circumstances which have arisen,
from the judgement of the Manila RTC to the cancellation of the GSISs titles, are
supervening events which should be considered as an exception to the doctrine
of finality of judgement because thy rendered the execution of the final and
executory judgement of the Lapu-Lapu RTC unjust and inequitable. Petitioner
further claims that it should not be made to pay damages of any kind because its
funds and properties are exempt from execution, garnishment, and other legal
processes under section 39 of R.A. No. 8291

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the decision of the Manila RTC constitutes a supervening
event, which should be admitted as an exception to the doctrine of finality
of judgments.
2. Whether or not the GSISs Petition in G.R. No. 167000 are barred by res
judicata.

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3. Whether or not there is a legal and physical impossibility for GSIS to

comply with the March 11, 2004 and May 7, 2004 Orders of the Lapu-Lapu
RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L.
4. Whether or not LLDHC and GSIS are guilty of forum shopping.
RULING:
1.The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some
definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus
setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by
settling justiciable controversies with finality.

The ruling by the manila RTC (GSIS & LLDHC) is evidently not a supervening
event. It was already in existence even before the decision attained finality. Since
the manila RTC decision does not constitute a supervening event there is
therefore neither reason nor justification to alter, modify and annul the Lapu-Lapu
RTC decision and orders which have long become final and executory.

2. The doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties
were litigating the same thing, Evidently, this Court could dispose of this case
simply upon the application of the principle of res judicata.-It is clear that GSIS’s
petition in G.R. No. 167000 and LLDHC’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
84382should have never reached those stages for having been barred by a final
and executory judgement on their claims.

3. This Court, in Rubia v. Government Service Insurance System, held that

the exemption of GSIS is not absolute and does not encompass all of its funds,
to wit: In so far as Section 39 of the GSIS charter exempts the GSIS from
execution, suffice it to say that such exemption is not absolute and does not
encompass all the GSIS funds. The processual exemption of the GSIS funds and
properties under Section 39 of the GSIS Charter, in our view, should be read
consistently with its avowed principal purpose: to maintain actuarial solvency of
the GSIS in the protection of assets which are to be used to finance the
retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of its members. Clearly, the
exemption should be limited to the purposes and objects covered. Any
interpretation that would give it an expansive construction to exempt all GSIS
assets from legal processes absolutely would be unwarranted.

4. This Court already found LLDHC guilty of forum shopping and was
adjudged to pay treble costsway back in 2002.There is forum shopping
whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) from another;two or more
actions or proceedings, other than appeal or certiorari, involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, are instituted either simultaneously or successively
to obtain a more favorable decision. It is undeniable that both LLDHC and GSIS
are guilty of forum shopping, for having gone through several actions and
proceedings from the lowest court to this Court in the hopes that they will obtain
a decision favorable to them

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JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed

OPOSA et.al vs.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.et.al
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by
their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital
Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing
Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of
the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

2. Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
3. Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment
of contracts.
RULING:

1. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a

balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of
the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing
the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192
expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible
for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O.
192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code
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of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to
protect and advance the said right.

2. Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides

for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court
to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature
and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

3. The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by

which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the
due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of

contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment
clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

Case number 9
JESUS C. GARCIA vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, et.al
G.R. No. 179267,June 25, 2013

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a

Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and
of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction
and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due
process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for
being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

ISSUES:

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1. Whether or not court of appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the

theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that, the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the
validity of the law.
2. Whether or not the court of appeals committed serious error in failing to
conclude that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal
protection clause.
3. Whether or not the court of appeals committed grave mistake in not
finding that R.A. 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the
constitution.
4. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in not finding that the law does
violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social
institution.
5. Whether or not the court of appeals seriously erred in not declaring r.a. no.
9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue
delegation of judicial power to the barangay officials.
RULING:

1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have
authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if
not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the
trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to
existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse
to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.

The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the
TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s

contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State
to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution
cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall
not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence
is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
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Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the
laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive,
not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO.
Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent
with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA V SOLEDAD ESCRITOR

A.M. No. P-02-1651 JUNE 22, 2006
PUNO, J.:

FACTS:

Soledad S. Escritor, a court interpreter, admittedly while still married to

another, cohabited to Luciano Quilapio, Jr. since 1980, who was himself married
to another. Escritor and Quilapio had a nineteen-year old son. Alejandro Estrada,
the private complainant herein, was not personally related to Escritor nor did he
personally know her. However, he wanted the Court to declare the relationship of
Escritor with Quilapio as immoral in consonance with the pertinent provision of
the Administrative Code. In her defense, Escritor contended that under the rules
of the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious sect of whom she is a member, the act of
signing a Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, is sufficient to legitimize a union
which would otherwise be classified as adulterous and bigamous. Escritor and
Quilapio's declarations are recorded in the Watch Tower Central office. They
were executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by the Watch Tower
Bible and Tract Society which was lifted from the article, "Maintaining Marriage in
Honor Before God and Men," in the March 15, 1977 issue of the Watch Tower
magazine, entitled The Watchtower. Escritor alleged that in compliance with the
foregoing rules, she and her partner signed the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness
in 1991, and by virtue of such act, they are for all purposes, regarded as husband
and wife by the religious denomination of which they are devout adherents.
Although in 1998 Escritor was widowed, thereby lifting the legal impediment to
marry on her part, her mate is still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their
declarations remain valid. Once all legal impediments for both are lifted, the
couple can already register their marriage with the civil authorities and the validity
of the declarations ceases. The elders in the congregations can then solemnize
their marriage as authorized by Philippine law. In sum, therefore, insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal
arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good
standing in the congregation

ISSUES:

Whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom should carve out an

exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which
government employees are held administratively liable.

RULING:

State cannot interfere with the religious beliefs of the Jehovah's

Witnesses, in the same way that the Jehovah's Witnesses cannot interfere with
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the State's prohibition on concubinage. The free exercise of religion protects

practices based on religious grounds provided such practices do not violate
existing laws enacted in the reasonable exercise of the State's police power. In
De Dios, the Court, in deciding not to dismiss an employee because he finally
terminated his cohabitation with another woman Given the circumstances, it
would deem unduly harsh to penalize Escritor for cohabiting for the last 23 years
with a man she believes is her husband and she knows is the father of her son.
No third party has claimed or suffered injury because of their cohabitation. On the
contrary, suspending or even dismissing her for her continued cohabitation would
only work hardship on her family. Accordingly, respondent Soledad S. Escritor is
suspended for six months and one day without pay for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. However, the suspension shall be lifted
immediately upon Escritor's manifestation to this Court that she has ceased
cohabiting with Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr. Moreover, respondent Escritor is warned
that her continued cohabitation with Quilapio, during or after her suspension and
while Quilapio's marriage with his legal wife still subsists, shall merit the penalty
of dismissal from the service.

EVELYN CHUA-QUA VS. HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, AND TAY TUNG HIGH
SCHOOL, INC.,
189 SCRA 117 G.R. NO. 49549 AUGUST 30, 1990

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the
controversial and unique situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a
classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was
considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her
services.

The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn
Chua in Tay Tung High School in Bacolod City to her 16 years old student. The
petitioner teacher was suspended without pay and was terminated of his
employment “for Abusive and Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified
School Teacher” which was filed by a public respondent as a clearance for
termination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the was dismissal valid?

Whether or not the petitioner’s right to due process was violated

Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent

facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student
constitute immorality and or grave misconduct?

RULING:

1.The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying:

“Private respondent school utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of
her position to court her student [16-year old]. If the two eventually fell in love,
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despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance
to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not
know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so
casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their
marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of
contemporary social mores.”

2. There is no denial of due process where a party was afforded an

opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues are resolved
based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is
recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have insisted
on a hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she did not do so,
obviously because she was convinced that the case involves a question of law.

3.Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral

acts, it follows that the alleged violation of Code of Ethics governing school
teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that
petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. The deviation of
the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be
considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

PETITIONERS ORGANIZATION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 147036-37, APRIL 10 2012, 669 SCRA 49

ABAD.J:

FATCS:

On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that established a Coconut
Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry through
capital financing. Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer the Fund
through the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) whose objective was, among
others, to advance the coconut farmers interests. For this purpose, the law
imposed a levy ofP0.55on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of every 100
kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt
convertible into CIC shares of stock.

In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved the acquisition of a
commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers to enable such bank to
promptly and efficiently realize the industry's credit policy.

In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.)
312, establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate
income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a
sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products.

At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which created an
irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund).This
aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut industry,
and to other agri-related programs.

However, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the suspension of

E.O.s 312 and 313. This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner

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organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-37 to

declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468
unconstitutional .On April 24, 2001 the other sets of petitioner organizations and
individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III,
Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the coco-levy funds are public funds

2. Whether or not (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b) Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s
961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313 are unconstitutional?
3. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to bring the same to court?
HELD:

1The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to
law to support a proper governmental purpose. They were raised with the use of
the police and taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut industry
and its farmers in general. The COA reviewed the use of the funds. The BIR
treated them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut levies
recognize their public character.

The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of
taxes and can only be used for public purpose. Taxes are enforced proportional
contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty for the support of the government and for all its public needs.

2. The Court has already passed upon this question in Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic of the Philippines. It held as
unconstitutional Section 2 of P.D. 755 for effectively authorizing the PCA to utilize
portions of the CCS Fund to pay the financial commitment of the farmers to
acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCS Fund levies with UCPB interest
free. And as there also provided, the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like levies that
PCA is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds
to be transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be
deemed private funds.

Since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of P.D.s755,961 and 1468
as well as those of E.O.s 312 and 313 that remove such funds and the assets
acquired through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate Article IX-D,
Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power
and authority to examine uses of government money and property. The cited
P.D.s and E.O.s also contravene Section 2 of P.D. 898 (Providing for the
Restructuring of the Commission on Audit), which has the force of a statute. And
there is no legitimate reason why such funds should be shielded from COA
review and audit. The PCA, which implements the coco-levy laws and collects
the coco-levy funds, is a government-owned and controlled corporation subject to
COA review and audit.

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3. The petitioner organizations in these cases represent coconut farmers

on whom the burden of the coco-levies attaches.It is also primarily for their
benefit that the levies were imposed.

The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as taxpayers.The
Court recognizes their right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through
the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.This so-called taxpayers suit is
based on the theory that expenditure of public funds for the purpose of executing
an unconstitutional act is a misapplication of such funds.

Case number 10
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES V HEALTH SECRETARY

G.R.NO.173034 OCTOBER 9 2007

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to

nullify Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The "Milk
Code," Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for
Other Purposes (RIRR). Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not valid as it contains
provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to
implement.

ISSUE:

Whether pertinent international agreements entered into by the Philippines

are part of the law of the land and may be implemented by the DOH through the
RIRR

RULING:

Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Treaties become
part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section
21 of the Constitution which provides that "no treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate”. It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute
"soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state
behaviour. "Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law
set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of
Justice.32 It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and
practices that influence state behaviour. ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA
in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the
Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law
in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS.

BAYAN MUNA VS ROMULO NERI

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641 SCRA 17 G. R. NO. 159618, FEBRUARY 01, 2011

FACTS:

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy

Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of
the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA
and the RP.

Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03,
hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and
accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to
and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement
aims to protect what it refers to and defines as “persons” of the RP and US from
frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic
security and defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003,
similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33
other countries.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status

of the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of
October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally
binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said
agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.

In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in

concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RP-US non surrender agreement is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of international law.

RULING:

Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its

threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for
concluding the Agreement.

One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2,

Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity
with all nations. An exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-
governmental agreements,” which is an internationally accepted form of
international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty
Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
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An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement, that has many

similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange
of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed
by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting
State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of
the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its
speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and “executive

agreements” have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being
considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through
executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the
President “sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that
of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As former
US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work,
The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03––be it

viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of
acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound––is a recognized mode of
concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE

679 SCRA 566 G.R. No. 173425 September 4, 2012

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

In the April 2, 2009 Decision, which is what CIR wants to be reconsidered in this
case, the Court struck down Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 for being in conflict with
the law. It held that the CIR had no power to limit the meaning and coverage of
the term "goods" in Section 105 of the Old NIRC sans statutory authority or basis
and justification to make such limitation. This it did when it restricted the
application of Section 105 in the case of real estate dealers only to improvements
on the real property belonging to their beginning inventory.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the RR 7-97 is valid

RULING:

RR No. 7-95 is an Administrative Rule and Regulation based upon the

existing statutes Old and New NIRC. Section 4.100-1 of which made by the BIR
which includes in its enumeration of "goods or properties" such "real properties
held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of
trade or business." Said definition was taken from the very statutory language of
Section 100 of the Old NIRC.

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In order to be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not

contradict, the provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation
cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any
rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void. Thus, RR 7-95,
insofar as it restricts the definition of "goods" as basis of transitional input tax
credit under Section 105 is a nullity.2

The failure to add a specific repealing clause would not necessarily

indicate that there was no intent to repeal RR 7-95. The fact that the afore quoted
paragraph was deleted created an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
between the provisions of RR 6-97 and RR 7-95.

DANTE O. CASIBANG, V.HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO, and REMEGIO

P. YU

G.R. No. L-38025 92 SCRA 642 August 20, 1979

MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS:

On November 9, 1971 respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the

elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections by 501 votes
over his only rival. Herein petitioner, Dante O. Casibang, filed an election protest
with the court of first instance of Pangasinan on the grounds of (1) anomalies and
irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified
electoral precincts;(2) terrorism;(3) rampant vote buying;(4) open voting and
balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violation of the
1971 election code.

The respondent court herein the court of first instance of Pangasinan

branch XIV initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a
justiciable controversy.

On November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and

approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution. On October 10, 1973
respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the
ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the
effectivity of the 1973 constitution by reason of which a political question has
intervened the case.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the cases is within the scope of a political question.

RULING:

No. the case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No

political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of
the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed
or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term

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“political question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a

question of policy.

The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent

Judge on the ground of political question is who between protestant—herein
petitioner—and protestee—herein respondent Yu—was the duly elected mayor of
Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and
emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and
obligations of the position. If the protestee’s election is upheld by the respondent
Judge, then he continues in office otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner.
That is the only consequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved—a
purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a
remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.

EMILIO A. GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE

PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 196231.SEPTEMBER 4, 2012. 679 SCRA 614

PERLAS – BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery

extortion and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police
District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private
complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a
similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional
Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request
of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said
case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative
adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S
Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office of the
Ombudsman.

The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and

inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by
allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9)
months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules
to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within
five (5) days from submission.

The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The

prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner
was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.

ISSUES:

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Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise

administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.

RULING:

Yes, Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) declares
the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section
8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.—While the Ombudsman’s
authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government
officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such
authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be
solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For,
while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President
express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA V ANIANO DESIERTO

G.R No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001 353 SCRA 452

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:

On May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-
President.

Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis “Chavit” Singson, accused the petitioner, his
family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.the more
detailed revelations of petitioner’s alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon
investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in
the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of
succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon,
petitioner’s powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit
as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker
Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior
economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.As
the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people’s call for his
resignation intensified. On January 20 2001 at12 noon—Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioner alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent

claims she is the President.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent
Arroyo is an Acting President.
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3. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition

precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada
4. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the
ground of prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling
on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a) an intent to resign and (b) acts of

relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence—

bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned
— constructive resignation.

SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as

confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his
final statement:

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due
to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency
as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them
as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support
to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
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subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona

Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment
Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both
houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as
the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada
can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

6. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system,
the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be
easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did
not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally,
the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing
preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no
permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, et.al.

G.R. No. 180643. March 25, 2008

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)

entered into a contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for
the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.

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In connection with this NBN Project, The Senate issued various Senate
Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation regarding
the NBN-ZTE deal. Petitioner, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the
bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by

executive privilege.

RULING:

The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential

communications privilege. It pertains to “communications, documents or other
materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique
constitutional role.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject
of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-

delegable presidential power.”This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a

close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that
an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege

that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - There is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, et.al vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., et.al.
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G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

The controversy arose when several whistle blowers revealed that certain
legislators received “kickbacks” from the PDAF Funds. They declared that JLN
(Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation had swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. While the NGOs were
supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared
that the money was diverted into Napoles’ private accounts. After the NBI
conducted an investigation of the Napoles controversy, complaints for plunder,
malversation of funds, direct bribery and violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act were filed against certain legislators. The Commission on Audit
(CoA) also released a report about its three-year audit investigation covering the
use of legislators' PDAF during the last three years of the Arroyo administration,
which showed anomalies in the disbursement of PDAF funds.

ISSUE:

Whether the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional for violation of the principle of non-
delegability of legislative powers.

RULING:

YES. As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative

power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has
conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. Based on
this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the
people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally
wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power.

The Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in
Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor
(Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by
law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from
such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves

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also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution
does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.

CARPIO, J.:

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.

FACTS:

The COMELEC excluded Atong Paglaum party-list and other aspiring party-list
group from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not
satisfy these two criteria : (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors,
and (2) all nominees must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented”
sector they represent. Petitioner have been disqualified by the COMELEC
because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral
lines and do not represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”. Also,
petitioners’ nominees who do not belong to the sector they represent have been
disqualified although they may have track record of advocacy for their sectors.
Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties have been disqualified because they
do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party have been disqualified because
one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one
remaining qualified nominee

ISSUES:

1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections 49 (BANAT)
should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.

RULING:

1. No, the Supreme Court held that the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in
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disqualifying Petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013

party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new
parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties
under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying Petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision.
2. No, the Supreme court overturned the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v.
COMELEC and BANAT v. COMELEC, and laid down new rules regarding
the Party-list system elections:
1) Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (a)
national parties or organization, (b) regional parties or organization,
and (c) sectoral parties or organizations.
2) National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organization do not need to organize along with the scetoral lines
and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented “sector.
3) Political parties can participate in party-list election provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidate in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not,
that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate
in the party-list system elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and linked to a
political party to coalition.
4) Sectoral parties or organization may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies.” It is enough that principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sector that are
“marginalized and underrepresented “ include labor,
peasant,fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, vetereans, and overseas worker. The sectors that
lack “well-defined political constituencies “include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5) A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must
belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of the sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies “must belong to the sector they represent. the
nominees of the sectoral parties or organization that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or that represent those who
lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to
their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors. The nominees of the national and
regional parties or organization must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6) National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

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ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS ERMITA

G.R. NOS. 168056-168730, SEPTEMBER 1, 2005

FACTS:

Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List

Officer and et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even
have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between
House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the
other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power
generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the
VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-
consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products,
petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in
the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no
conflict because “a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that
does not exist.”

Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates
the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under
Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced
amendments not connected with VAT.

Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a
property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input
VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that
the State cannot remove.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional.

HELD:

No.Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation,

revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President

on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not
acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as
the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon
which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the
means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and
has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to
gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any
of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.

In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property
or a property right, and a VAT-registered person’s entitlement to the creditable
input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right
to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed
provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So
long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means

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through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so
long as it is within constitutional bounds.

AKBAYAN vs AQUINO
558 SCRA 468, July 16, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine
and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free
trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the
event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which
includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading,
trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government
procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy,
mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the
business environment, and general and final provisions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its
power of inquiry and power to concur in treaties, from the negotiation process.

HELD:

No. President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations

since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international
trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article
VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential
Decree No. 1464.
The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to
negotiate treaties and international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates,
import and export quotas, and other taxes.

As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is

Section 21 of Article VII – the article on the Executive Department. While the
power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is
exercised by the President only be delegation of that body, it has long been
recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively
in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of
the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under
P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent
in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its
representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into
treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the
President must still ensure that all treaties will substantively conform to the
Constitution

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RANDOLF S.DAVID VS GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO

G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of
the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 (PP 1017) declaring a state of national emergency. On the same day, the
President issued General Order No. 5 (GO 5) implementing PP 1017.

In their presentation of the factual bases, respondents stated that the

proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among
some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and
some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President
and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

Seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and GO 5

were filed against the respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded
President Arroyo as respondent.

Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its

“overbreadth.” They claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected
and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a
“chilling effect” to the citizens.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the issuance if PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and
academic.
2. Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

Held:

1. No. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an

opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The Solicitor General
refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the
present petitions were rendered “moot and academic” by President Arroyo’s
issuance of PP 1021.

The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not
render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that
PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed
illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or
valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that
must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an
unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it
affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.”

2. Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is

CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not
related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are
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declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring

national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is
CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to
take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest
without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which

the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary
and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and
made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

REGINE ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not
Respondent COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of
Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of
office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her
qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the
HRET exclusive jurisdiction.

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of

petitioner submission. The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be
proclaimed on May 18, 2013

The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of
Filipino citizenship and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013,
cancelling petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner
secured on May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner
went to the Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and
the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18
May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having
been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the
admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of
the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there
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was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the
opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere

to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section
2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in
order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition
of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the
fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate
of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was
properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that

the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of
Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does
not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to
be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to
be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS COMELEC

G.R. NO. 195649, APRIL 16, 2013

FACTS:

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a

consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of
America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. He applied for repatriation under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in
San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 10 July 2008.

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor

of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a
petition for disqualification and cancellation of COC on the grounds that Arnado
has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines and
failed to meet the 1 year residency requirement under the Local Government
Code.

Arnado won the election and after he was proclaimed and took his oath of
office, COMELEC First Division cancelled his COC and annulled his
proclamation. Petitioner Maquiling, another mayoralty candidate who garnered
the second highest number of votes, argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the
Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed
that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest
number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
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ISSUE:

Whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is

applicable to this case?

HELD:

No. Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of

votes from among the qualified candidates. With Arnado being barred from even
becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory

character of the disqualification which Amado possessed even prior to the filing
of the COC. The affirmation of Amado's disqualification, although made long after
the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Amado is
declared to be not a candidate
at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have
been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
(G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410)

FACTS:
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before
the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.

In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules
and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May
elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he
seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for
in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)

qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA
9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is
no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.

HELD:
No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any
norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid
if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the
three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties
of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test” is not tenable as it
enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement
Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs COMELEC

(G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 32)

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari with an application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of COMELEC. The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to
accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Party-List System Act. Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application
for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization definition of the
LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs. ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality.
COMELEC clams that it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual
orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole. The party-list system is
not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or
groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations. What
are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted
public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines
cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such
that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic]into
society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

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Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified

the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not such denial of the COMELEC to recognize Ang ladlad as a
party-list is violative of the constitution

HELD:
YES. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government
neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious
justifications inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as
expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral
disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public
policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to
what some might regard as religious programs government action, including its
proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must
have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct
because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or
Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion
clauses

We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

Case number 12
BONDOC VS PINEDA, ET AL.
(G.R. NO. 97710, SEPTEMBER 26, 1991, 201 SCRA 792)

FACTS:
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional
seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista
Party (NP). Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in

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the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the

protest and he was subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.

Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura,

Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader)
that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He
confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election.
This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that
they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new election
be held and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new
representative will be voting for Pineda in the reopening of the election contest.
Camasura was then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera.
Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).

Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an official act of Congress and
by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the
said act of the HRET without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

HELD:
Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without
encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET.
The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being
complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when
Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made,
members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest
involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw
their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a
decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already
become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their representative to
change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because his
removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid
cause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura
violates his right to security of tenure.

BANAT vs COMELEC
(G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009, 592 SCRA 294)

FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections
which was held in May 2007.In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their
seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

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1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative
districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec.
5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-
list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections
shall be entitled to one seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it

garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6
rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners
more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same
case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency

(BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the
formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of
RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list
election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the
Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory.

If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances
when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the
lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed
in the “HELD” portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions

the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of
whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?

II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a
mere ceiling.

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.

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VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats
allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list
representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not
more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will
be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives.
However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections,
there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1
ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:

(Current Number of Legislative District Representatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) =

Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives

Hence, (220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling –

meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the
total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory
that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no

constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes
cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are
disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to
attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained: “To
illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties
get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.
Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.”

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an

unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the
votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those
party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.

But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

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2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in

paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be

included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every
two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional
seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision
in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In
the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called
the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats
given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for
party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a
total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats.
(Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second
round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-
percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not
garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.

How is this done? Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and
multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be
rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but
the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.

Example: In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of
1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections
(15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) =

number of additional seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.7

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY
is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2
seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes
cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having
more than 3 seats.

Now after all the two-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional
seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the
remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized
until all the seats are occupied.

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V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major

political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-
list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition
either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and
that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately
allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided
that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other
justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the
Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of
the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political
parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one
party shall dominate the party-list system.

ABAYON vs HRET
(G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 375)

Note: These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the
party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress

FACTS:
A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET questioning of
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo
and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House
of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.. They
claimed that Aangat Tayo and Bantay was not eligible for a party-list seat in the
House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of

qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo
and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively.

HELD:

Yes. The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it
insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since
petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by
their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no
jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.

Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not
the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the
“members” of that House are representatives of districts and party list

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Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives
are treated in like manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list
nominees as “members of the House of Representatives,” a party-list
representative is in every sense “an elected member of the House of
Representatives.”

Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in
the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would
eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and
grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941,
echoing the Constitution.It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nominee, the need for him or her to be a bona fide
member or a representative of his party-list organization — in the context of the
facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat
Tayoa nd Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented
interests that they presumably embody.By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member
of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo
party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA VS SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

(G.R. NO. 196271, OCTOBER 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270)

FACTS:

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic
act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of
September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to
November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional
elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been
held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional

elections with national and local elections?

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2. Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153
have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?

3. Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?

4. Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in
ARMM?

5. Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the
elective and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and
executive offices?

6. Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the

President's supervisory powers over autonomous regions?

HELD:

1. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective
more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from
the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even
willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to
meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean
that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
synchronization. The ARMM had not yet been officially organized at the time the
Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a
constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years
but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the
people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of
what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also
the unfolding events of the indefinite future.

Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and

unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a
dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive
and not static.

2. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for
only the first ARMM elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding
regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections,
RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these
laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of
the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.

Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, it is

well-settled that the supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article
XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress
cannot pass irrepealable laws.
Similarly, the petitioners’ contention that the plebiscite requirement applies to all
amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the
plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution is incorrect. Section 18, Article
X of the Constitution provides that the creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose. This means that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of
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autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution

which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a
plebiscite.

3. The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1),

Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to remain in their
positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM
regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until
the May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution
which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a
holdover capacity.The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a
limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their
offices. Since elective ARMM officials are also local officials, they are, thus,
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore,
becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective
officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution,
Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a
holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials
should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be
extended by holdover by Congress.
4. The Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa
Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to
another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances
provided for in the law. Both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address
instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not
occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen
circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous
circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in
furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local
elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.

5. The President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional
government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments
covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the
Presidents appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.

6. There is no incompatibility between the President's power of

supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power
granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint
OICs. The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to
see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is
distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.
The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President's alleged power of
control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President's appointment
power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the
petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President,
and act as representatives of the President and not of the people. This is
incorrect. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly,

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these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly
elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints
that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made.
Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
Case number 13
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v.THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

235 SCRA 630 August 25, 1994,

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

This involves suits for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of
Republic Act (RA) No. 7716 or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. One of the
grounds invoked by petitioners is the violation of Article VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution. Petitioners contended that in enacting the said law, Congress
violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the
House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply
consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee
to produce the bill which the President signed into law. In other words, they
alleged that RA 7716 did not originate in the House of Representatives, as
required by the Constitution, and it has not thereby become a law.

ISSUE:

Whether RA 7716 violated Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

RULING:

NO. It is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the
Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo
such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. What is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a
distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute – and not only the
bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law
– must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's
power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments."
It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private
bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives
on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems.
On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are
thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

JOSE BENGZON, Jr. vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

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203 SCRA 767

FACTS:
It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together
with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of
the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office
and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of
the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank,
Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging
that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion
to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee
hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice
a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to
due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his
allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious. Enrile
subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he
insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and
Bengzon’s plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them
and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee,
in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard
of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice
and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition
with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the
SBRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
RULING:
No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile
contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose
of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out
whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy
to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation
involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of
legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the
relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No.
3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more
within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court
may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this
case.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), et al. v. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES
G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007,

NACHURA, J.:
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FACTS:

Because of the privilege speech delivered by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile

regarding the sale of unregistered foreign securities by the Standard Chartered
Bank (SCB) Philippines which is a violation of the Securities Regulation Code,
the respondent Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and
Currencies conducted an investigation, in aid of legislation, of the subject matter
of the speech. Petitioners, who are the officials of SCB, filed a petition for
prohibition against respondent to enjoin the members thereof from compelling the
petitioners to testify before any hearing to be conducted by the respondent.
Petitioners contended that the respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the
inquiry because its subject matter was already the subject matter of the civil and
criminal cases against the SCB pending before the CA and the trial courts.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent may conduct the subject inquiry, in aid of

legislation, and compel the petitioners to testify, despite the pendency of cases
involving the same subject matter of the inquiry.

RULING:

YES. The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a

court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any
intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal
or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component,
cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
Succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno, “[t]he power of
inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to
others who possess it.”

The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to

punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. Such power is sui
generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to
the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government. It is axiomatic that the power of legislative
investigation includes the power to compel the attendance of witnesses.
Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to
ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative
investigation.

FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN v.

LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006,

TINGA, J.

FACTS:
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Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a

public hearing regarding allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of
copies of an audio allegedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the COMELEC. That same day, President
Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of
the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in
any legislative inquiry without her approval.

ISSUE:

Whether the president may prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:

YES. The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief
of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian
supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative
system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority, control and
supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the
armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of
the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil
in nature. Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the notion that
the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such
as conducting warrantless searches and seizures.

The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power

as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies
such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of
Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may
be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the
President has the duty to faithfully execute. The Court’s ruling that the President
could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval
before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a
contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-
in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such
as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on
the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all
the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position

Case number 14
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs.PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL G.R. No. 191618 November 23, 2010

NACHURA,J.:

FACTS:

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Atty. Macalintal claims that the PET is unconstitutional on the ground that
Article 7, Sec 4 of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET
and it violates Art VIII, Sec 12 of the Constitution. The Solicitor General maintains
that the constitution of the PET is valid on the ground that the grant of authority to
the SC to be the sole judge of all electoral contests for the President or Vice-
President is given in Article 7, Sec 4, par 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether the PET is constitutional.

RULING:

YES. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional

Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas
categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the
1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power
granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the
doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and
vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into
effect.

Case number 15
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., vs. the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER

G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004

VITUG,J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking

cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They
asserted that under Section 4(7), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue
of the case.

ISSUE:

As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), does the Supreme Court

have jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates?

RULING:

No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court
on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-

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President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action

against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.It is fair to conclude
that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.

ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO vs. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA

and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010

C.J. CORONA

FACTS:

Former President Estrada won the presidency in the 1998 elections but
was later on ousted by former President Arroyo in which he was not able to finish
his term. He sought to run again in 2010. Pormento opposed such candidacy and
filed a petition for Estrada’s disqualification which was denied by the 2nd division
of the COMELEC. His motion for reconsideration was also denied by the
COMELEC en banc. Pormento filed for certiorari on May 7, 2010 but he did not
file for any TRO or writ of preliminary injunction thus Estrada was able to
participate as a candidate for the position of President in May 10, 2010 where he
garnered the second highest number of votes.

ISSUE:

Whether Estrada violated the Constitution when he ran for president in the
May 10, 2010 elections.

RULING:

NO. Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran
in the May 2010 elections. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the
phrase “any reelection” will be premised on a person’s second (whether
immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be
resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the
parties herein.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation

of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the
same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private
respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion

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of his “reelection” will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no

useful or practical purpose.

JOSEPH ESTRADA v GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO

353 SCRA 452 G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001

Puno, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting

any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office,
until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.
Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for

judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the

Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution.”

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the cases at bar present a justiciable controversy / political

question specifically inregard thelegitimacy of the Arroyo administration
2. Whether or not Estrada merely resigned as President
3. Whether or not Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President
4. Whether or not Estrada enjoys immunity from suit
5. Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined
due to prejudicial publicity
RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution,

are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling
on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a) an intent to resign and (b) acts of

relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence—

bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned
— constructive resignation.

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SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as

confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his
final statement:

7. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

8. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due
to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency
as soon as the disability disappears);
9. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them
as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
10. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
in the same service of the country;
11. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its
support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring
the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear
is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly
clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer
temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada
can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can
these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by
the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful
acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is
not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

C.J. FERNAN

FACTS:

Former President Cory Aquino issued EO 284 which allowed members of

the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to have other
government posts in addition to their primary one. The petitioner assailed that
such law is unconstitutional on the ground that it adds an exception to Article 7,
Sec 13 of the Constitution. It further contends that only the Vice President when
appointed as a Cabinet Member and the Secretary of Justice as member of the
JBC is technically allowed to have more than one offense.

ISSUE:

Whether EO 284 is constitutional.

RULING:

NO. It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the
1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the
general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere
personal opinions which cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the
people' understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section
7, par. (2), Article IXB of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated
July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions
that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually
allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,

691 SCRA 308 G.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS:

On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA

Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge
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(OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC

Undersecretary.On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as
taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the
constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.On January
5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed
Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities
as such on February 2, 2009.Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent
positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA,

concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to
which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against
dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.

RULING:

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with

the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security
of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of
the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the
imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the
case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution,
three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in
the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said
that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise

involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the
common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely
designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only
in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.
In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
Clearly, respondents’ reliance on the foregoing definitions is misplaced
considering that the above-cited case addressed the issue of whether petitioner
therein acquired valid title to the disputed position and so had the right to security
of tenure. It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature
of an acting and temporary capacity, the words “hold the office” were employed.
Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the
appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987
Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices,
refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or
designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in
Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or

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occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and administration,” which implies

nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.

FUNA VS AGRA
691 SCRA 196

FACTS:
Former President Arroyo designated Agra, then Government Corporate
Counsel, as the Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera,
who has been appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Then, Agra was designated
as the Acting Secretary following the resignation of Secretary Devanadera who
vie for a congressional seat. Agra continued to perform the duties of an Acting
Solicitor General.Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra
argued that his concurrent designations were merely in a temporary capacity.
Even assuming that he was holding multiple offices at the same time, his
designation as an Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never
received salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was
appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Agra’s designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid
Whether or not Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the
“hold-over principle”
Whether or not the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice
is in an ex officio capacity in relation to the other

HELD:
1.No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional provision
under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary
capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Cabinet
Members in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or
in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being
held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section
13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and
their deputies and assistants.

2.No. Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an

ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to
concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the
consequence of holding the other.
Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra
cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B,
Sec 7 (2) of the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of
Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice
versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was
“allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.” To claim the exemption
of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, he needed to establish that his concurrent designation was expressly
allowed by the Constitution.

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3.No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither
required by the primary functions nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice
versa. The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as
in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent
and autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor General is now
vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment,
rank, prerogatives, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding
Judges of the Court of Appeals.

MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS

FACTS:
Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions the SC for mandamus and
prohibition asking to order respondents to issue travel documents to him and his
immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of the President s decision to
bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines, in the exercise of the powers granted in her by the Constitution.

HELD:
Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power ". The powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Even the members of the Legislature
has recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the power under the Constitution to
bar the Marcoses from returning, as per House Resolution No. 1342.

MARCOS V MANGLAPUS, ET. AL.

(FACTS: SAME AS ABOVE, EXCEPT THAT FERDINAND HAS DIED.)

Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance

with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare
of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently,
the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances
is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that
she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at
this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

FACTS:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the
court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a "travel
documents "to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family
and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to
the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses "to return "in the
Philippines is guaranteed by "the Bill of Rights, specifically "Sections "1 and 6.
They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode
of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by
law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized
her to do so.
They further assert that under "international law, their right "to return "to
the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human

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Rights and the International Covenant on "Civil "and Political Rights, which has
been ratified by the Philippines.

ISSUE:
"Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by "the constitution,
the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.

HELD:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
"travel from "the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These
are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved
in this case at bar is the right "to return "to one's country, a distinct right under
"international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
"Civil "and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of "movement "and abode
within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is
the "right to freedom of "movement "and residence within the borders of each
state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of
"movement "and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to
leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws
protecting the "national security, public order, "public health "or morals or the
separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be
arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations
to the right "to return "to one’s country in the same context as those pertaining to
the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights "treats only the liberty
of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well-considered view that the right "to
return "may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of "International
Law "and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. "
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his
family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino
has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos
regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore
prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

LAUREL VS GARCIA
GR 92013 JULY 25, 1990.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi
Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the
Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the
former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is
property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men.
Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply
to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle
of lex situs applies.

Issue 1:
Whether or not the subject property cannot be alienated.
Whether or not Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

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Held:
1.The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion
unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This,
the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi
lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2.The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict
of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a
dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to
take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential
validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance,
are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters.
Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is
no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the
State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on
the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the
alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence
in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of
acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which
should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional
limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and
entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

COCOFED VS REPUBLIC

FACTS:
In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to
administer the Coconut Investment Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the
sale of copra. The copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts.
The fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of
coconut producers having the largest membership.
When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were
issued to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the
coconut levy fund:
PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF)
and declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to
subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible
oil.
PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to
finance the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.
In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to
accelerate the growth and development of the coconut and palm oil industry.
Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the
policy to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at
preferential rates. Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755 authorized PCA to
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utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and
deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit
withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its
equity capital. It also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not
be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds
of the government.
Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be
construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund, the stated intention being
that actual ownership of the said fund shall pertain to coconut farmers in their
private capacities.
Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought
from Peping Cojuangco 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In
that contract, it was also stipulated that Danding Cojuanco shall receive equity in
FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for PCA’s buy-
out of what Danding Conjuanco claim as his exclusive and personal option to buy
the FUB shares.
The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of
the said 72.2% equity. It later reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund.
While the 64.98% (72.2 % – 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly
pertained to the farmers, the corresponding stock certificates supposedly
representing the farmers’ equity were in the name of and delivered to PCA. There
were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in the
hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not
covered by any of the agreements.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or
indirectly to various projects and/or was converted into different assets or
investments. Of particular relevance to this was their use to acquire the FUB /
UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of
a large block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares.

ISSUE:
W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the CCSF
shall not be construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund is valid
W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their
private capacities

HELD:
1.No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose
and the balance thereof should revert back to the general fund.
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money
collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special
fund and paid out for such purpose only, and if the purpose for which a special
fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government. Here, the CCSF were
sourced from forced exactions with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut
industry. Therefore, the subsequent reclassification of the CCSF as a private fund
to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755,
961 and 1468 is unconstitutional.
Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose
or policy for which the coco levy fund was created.

2.No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be
used for public purpose. They cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be

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given for free to private individuals. Even if the money is allocated for a special
purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character.
Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to
distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut
farmers under such rules and regulations the PCA may promulgate is
unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because first, it has unduly delegated legislative
power to the PCA, and second, it allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly
private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute ownership of
the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined
“coconut farmers”, which negated or circumvented the national policy or public
purpose declared by P.D. No. 755.
Hence, the so-called Farmers’ shares do not belong to the coconut
farmers in their private capacities, but to the Government. The coconut levy
funds are special public funds and any property purchased by means of the
coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property,
subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.
BLAS OPLE VS RUBEN TORRES

FACTS:

On December 12, 1996, then President Ramos enacted Administrative

Order no. 308, which laid down the ground work for the implementation of a
National ID system. The A.O. mandated major government agencies to pool their
resources together to implement a centralized data bank of all citizens which
shall be used to streamline day to day government transactions and minimize
rampant red taping and corruption among government employees. Herein
petitioner Senator Blas Ople, filed the case at bar questioning the said A.O. on 3
grounds 1) implementation of a national ID system requires a legislative act, as
such A.O. no. 308 is usurpation of legislative functions. 2) that said A.O. tends to
infringe the right to privacy of citizens 3) the appropriation of funds for the
implementation of said A.O. is also an exclusive legislative function. On the other
hand, herein respondent as Executive Secretary refutes all said arguments.

Issue:

Whether or not A.O. no. 308 is a valid exercise of the Executive power.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. In holding the A.O. no. 308 as
an invalid exercise of the Presidents Executive power, the Court provided the
following:
1. As raised by petitioner, A.O. no. 308 does indeed infringe upon the
legislature’s exclusive function as it laid down a system whereby compliance
therewith is a condition to transact with the government.
2. A.O. no. 308 is a potential threat to the Constitutional right to Privacy
as it allows the government to pool various data regarding an individual without
any clear concise direction as to the manner to keeping, safeguards against
improper use, and any definite answer as to what type of information may or may
not be used. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the over
breadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy
in clear and present danger.
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3. A.O. no. 308 failed to substantiate any justifiable reason to allow the
would be infringement. To streamline government transactions and to remove red
taping was not sufficiently shown to be valid reasons to counter act the strict
protection of the individual’s right to privacy.
PICHAY VERSUS OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATION DIVISION, G.R. NO. 196425
FACTS:

On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive
Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office
of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its
newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).On April 6, 2011,
respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as
well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato
Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin,
which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand
Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank,
Inc.On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective
written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero
Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:

Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a

quasi-judicial function through and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by
Congress.

HELD:

No. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive

Department under E.O. 292. In the case of BuklodngKawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court
affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or
agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of
Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject
to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the Office of the President."

The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of
every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency."
The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and
policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President.
(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially
created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his
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continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.
292.

The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the
Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3)
of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President
Proper but still within the Office of the

President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the
President to Departments or gencies, and vice versa.

The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the
one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects
employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the
reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the
limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it
was composed of a Chairman and two(2) Commissioners who held the ranks of
Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the Office of
the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC
havenow been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper.11 Since
both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by
way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable
under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

GENERAL VERSUS URRO, 646 SCRA 141

FACTS:

On September 20, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA)

appointed Imelda C. Roces (Roces) as acting Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM,
representing the civilian sector. On 2006, PGMA reappointed her to the same position.
When Roces died in 2007, PHMA appointed petitioner on July 2008 as Acting
NAPOLCOM Commissioner. On the same date, PGMA appointed Escueta as acting
NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as Vice- Chairman.
Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P.
de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM
Commissioners. Urros appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010; while the appointment
papers of De Guzman and Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010. On March 9, 2010,
Escueta took his oath of office before Makati Regional Trial Court Judge AlbericoUmali.

After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory letters on March 22, 2010,the
petitioner filed the present petition for quo warranto, questioning the validity of the
respondents appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional
prohibition against midnight appointments.

On July 30, 2010, the newly elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, His
Excellency Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling,
Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in
Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments."

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The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years counted
from the date of her appointment in October (should be September) 2004. Since she
failed to finish her six-year term, then the petitioner is entitled to serve this unexpired
portion or until October (should be September) 2010.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointments were valid

HELD:

The petitioner asserts that contrary to what appears in his appointment paper, the
appointment extended to him was really a regular appointment; thus, he cannot be
removed from office except for cause.

Appointments may be classified into two: first, as to its nature; and second, as to the
manner in which it is made. Under the first classification, appointments can either be
permanent or temporary (acting). A basic distinction is that a permanent appointee can
only be removed from office for cause; whereas a temporary appointee can be removed
even without hearing or cause.

Under the second classification, an appointment can either be regular or ad interim. A

regular appointment is one made while Congress is in session, while an ad interim
appointment is one issued during the recess of Congress. In strict terms, presidential
appointments that require no confirmation from the Commission on Appointments
Cannot be properly characterized as either a regular or an ad interim appointment.

Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make
temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the
Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of
the office involved.

The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the

discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions
pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of
an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on
the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is
made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lismota of the
case.

Lismota literally means "the cause of the suit or action." This last requisite of judicial
review is simply an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and
legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government. In the present case, the
constitutionality of the respondents appointments is not the lismota of the case. From the
submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a
cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition a quo warranto against
respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for quo warranto, a
discussion of the constitutionality of the appointments of the respondents is rendered
completely unnecessary.

The resolution of whether a cause of action exists, in turn, hinges on the nature of the
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petitioner's appointment as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and whether petitioner

has a clear right to be reinstated to his former position and to oust respondent Urro as
NAPOLCOM Commissioner.

In the present case, the petitioner does not even allege that his separation from the
office amounted to an abuse of his temporary appointment that would entitle him to the
incidental benefit of reinstatement.60As we did in Pangilinancase,we point out that the
petitioners appointment as Acting Commissioner was time-limited. His appointment ipso
facto expired on July 21, 2009 when it was not renewed either in an acting or a
permanent capacity. With an expired appointment, he technically now occupies no
position on which to anchor his quo warranto petition.

The petitioner's appointment paper is dated July 21, 2008. From that time until he was
apprised on March 22, 2010 of the appointment of respondent Urro, the petitioner
faithfully discharged the functions of his office without expressing any misgivings on the
character of his appointment. However, when called to relinquish his office in favor of
respondent Urro, the petitioner was quick on his feet to refute what appeared in his
appointment papers.

Under these facts, the additional circumstance of estoppel clearly militates against the
petitioner. A person who accepts an appointment in an acting capacity, extended and
received without any protest or reservation, and who acts by virtue of that appointment
for a considerable time, cannot later on be heard to say that the appointment was really
a permanent one so that he could not be removed except for cause.

BINAMIRA VERSUS GARRUCHO, 188 SCRA 154

FACTS:

In pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the Minister of

Tourism, the petitioner assumed office on on April 7, 1986.

On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of
the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as
Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General Manager, approved by the President
on the same date.

Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA
General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors.
On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as
the new Secretary of Tourism.

On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a

memorandum designating him concurrently as General Manager, effective
immediately, until the President can appoint a person to serve in the said office in
a permanent capacity.
Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with
this memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title.

Subsequently, while his original petition was pending, Binamira filed a

supplemental petition alleging that on April 6, 1990, the President of the
Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional respondent.

ISSUE:
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Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation.
Whether or not , petitioner should be reinstatement to the office of General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority

HELD:

Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority,
provides as
follows: SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The
General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall
serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That
upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor shall
have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)

Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that
he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will
by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an
acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the
person named.
The petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The
reason is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of
the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of
discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it
was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion
as an alter ego of the President.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the

presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and
competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to
substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his
duties to another.

In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of
the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was
chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and
discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to
him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. “

The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the
President of the Philippines when “performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business,” which was true of the designation made by Minister
Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be
considered valid only if not ‘disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,”
as also happened in the case at bar.

With these rulings, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to
the ground. His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential
prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question.
Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation
signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally
withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason).i•t•c-aüsl In
either case, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must be rejected.

The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith
that he was being extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of Tourism.
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After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do so at the time the
designation was made. This belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino
later approved the composition of the PTA Board of Directors where the petitioner
was designated Vice-Chairman because of his position as General Manager of
the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the categorical appointment
required to be made by the President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism,
under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.

The Supreme Court rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title to
the disputed position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner

PIMENTEL VERSUS ERMITA, G.R. NO. 164978

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session.

Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad

interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which
they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.

Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert

that “while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether
regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.

Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an

acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments even while Congress is in session.

EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s power of appointment.

Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:

SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise the power to
appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.

SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. — (1) The President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch,
appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly
appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness,
absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity

to department secretaries while Congress is in session.

HELD:

Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary

nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until
the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an
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office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a

department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in

session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the
acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence.
Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President
must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is
in session.

Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon

acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way
of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad

interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year

SARMIENTO VERSUS MISON, 156 SCRA 549

FACTS:

Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and

Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional
by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:

Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for
confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office
and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other

public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;

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4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the
accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of
subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to
positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head)
is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded
the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA versus THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A. VILLAR

G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 579

FACTS:
On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Macapagal-Arroyo) appointed Guillermo N. Carague (Carague) as Chairman of
the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years. Carague’s term of
office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. Meanwhile, on
February 7, 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar
(Villar) as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting
February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.Following the retirement of Carague on
February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner,
Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April
14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed
as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission
on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of
COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Villar,
insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of
seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of
office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from
February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position. Now, Dennis Funa
(Funa) assails the constitutionality of Villar's appointment as Chairman of COA on
the ground that an appointee of a vacant office shall only serve the unexpired
portion of the term of the vacated office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Villars as Chairman was
unconstitutional.

RULING:
YES. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional
commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of
commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing
authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the
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expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain
causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot
be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of
terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). Members of the Commission, e.g.
COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years and
who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in
the Commission. Corollary, the first appointees in the Commission under the
Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment. A
commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven
years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered
by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor
will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the
position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. The Court clarifies that "reappointment" found in Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to
Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment
involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to
Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal
sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution. Any member of the
Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Thus, Villar’s appointment as chairman ending February 2, 2011 which
Justice Mendoza considers as valid is likewise unconstitutional, as it will destroy
the rationale and policy behind the rotational system or the staggering of
appointments and terms in COA as prescribed in the Constitution. It disturbs in a
way the staggered rotational system of appointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of
the 1987 Constitution.

MATIBAG versus BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 492 SCRA 554

FACTS:
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad
interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC
Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2,
2008. However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said
appointments. Consequently, On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and
for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. Congress
adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their
appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed
again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same
positions. Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag filed the instant petition
questioning the appointments. Matibag claims that the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the prohibitions on temporary appointments
and reappointments of its Chairman and members.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and

Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President
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amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of

the Constitution.

2. Whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and

subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on
reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:
1. NO. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once
the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress. Thus, the ad interim appointment remains
effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no
longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can
withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is
utterly without basis.
Here, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent
appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which
authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments
that take effect immediately.

2. NO. An ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on

Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is
a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its
checking power on the appointing authority of the President. On the contrary a
by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim
appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee
serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments
because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous
confirmed appointment. The same ad interim appointments and renewals of
appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the
appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. Any delay in their confirmation will
not extend the expiry date of their terms of office. The continuing renewal of the
ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of
office expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on
reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

DE CASTRO versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 666
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

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In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners De Castro, with the exception

of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that the incumbent President can appoint
the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 (just 7
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010) on the ground that
the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII
does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. In support thereof, the OSG
contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to the
Judiciary.

RULING:
NO. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department,
and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President.
The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of
the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the
duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others.
Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing
for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states
that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the
President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC;
Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90
days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section
15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of
the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents
or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

KULAYAN versus TAN

G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA 482

FACTS:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) were kidnapped in Sulu. A task force was created by the ICRC and the
PNP. The local group convened under the leadership of Governor Abdusakur
Mahail Tan. He organized the Civilian Emergency Force, a group of armed male
civilians coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to
surrounding areas of Patikul. Later on, Governor Tan issued Proclamation 1-09
declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. In the same
Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up
checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Jamar M. Kulayan,
et. al filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, claiming that Proclamation 1-
09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not Tan can exercise the calling out powers of a President.

RULING:
NO. A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises
operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-
day operations. Moreover, in the discussions of the Constitutional Commission,
the framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control
over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority
over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to
seek assistance from the police in day to day situations. But as a civilian agency
of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within,
and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.
Here, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon
the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The
calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive,
is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the
Local Government Code.

BIRAOGO versus THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78
FACTS:
This is a consolidated petition assailing Executive Order No.1 dated July
30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, a separate
body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration.
Petitioners Louis Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the
legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and
to appropriate funds therefor. In addition, Biraogo claims that it is unconstitutional
for it is not under the President’s continuing authority to reorganize the Office of
the President. Finally, E.O. No. 1 accordingly, violates the equal protection clause
as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel
of the previous administration
In defense, the Office of the Solicitor General claims that, E.O. No. 1 does
not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the
Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent
power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. Also,
E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress. And that the Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection
clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of the Truth Commission of 2010’s basis is the
President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws under Section 17, Article VII.

RULING:
YES. While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on
the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC
finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon
the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The

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Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful

execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That
the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes
does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. Indeed, the Executive is given
much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-
mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the
obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of
Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say
that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated.

Garcia versus Executive Secretary

677 SCRA 750

FACTS:

On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of
the
Philippines (AFP), Col. Henry A. Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los
Reyes, issued a Restriction to Quarters containing the following: (1) Pursuant to
Article of War 70 and the directive of the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP to the
undersigned dtd 12 October 2004, you are hereby placed under Restriction to
Quarters under guard pending investigation of your case; (2) You are further
advised that you are not allowed to leave your quarters without the expressed
permission from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP; (3) In case you need immediate
medical attention or required by the circumstance to be confined in a hospital,
you shall likewise be under guard. Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27,
2004 was filed with the Special General Court Martial NR 2 presided by Maj.
Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.), and charging petitioner violation of the
96th and 97th Article of War. Petitioner, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty and
upon reaching the age of 56, compulsorily retired from military services. The
Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in- Chief of the AFP and
acting as the Confirming Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed the
sentence imposed by the Court Martial against petitioner. Petitioner was
sentenced to be dishonourably [discharged] from the service, to forfeit all pay
and allowances due and to become due and to be confined at hard labour at
such place the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. On
September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and detained, and continues to be
detained at the National Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City. Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for
certiorari and petition for habeas corpus which was denied. Petitioner filed a
motion for but was also denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition of his case was

violated.

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RULING:

No. The Court finds the issue to be without merit. No less than our
Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy
disposition of cases. In determining, whether or not the right to the speedy
disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the following
guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice
caused by the delay. It noted that Garcia did not allege any delay during the trial
only the delay in the confirmation of the sentence by the President. The Court
found such delay to Garcia’s advantage because his sentence could not be
served absent such confirmation. Basically, the case has already been decided
by the General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by the proper reviewing
authorities without any delay. The only thing missing then was the confirmation of
sentence by the President. The records do not show that, in those six (6) years
from the time the decision of the General Court Martial was promulgated until the
sentence was finally confirmed by the President, petitioner took any positive
action to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case. This is akin to what
happened in Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, where, in spite of the lapse of more
than ten years of delay, the Court still held that the, petitioner could not rightfully
complain of delay violate of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his case,
since he was part of the reason for the failure of his case to move on towards its
ultimate resolution.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines versus Zamora

388 SCRA 81

FACTS:

Invoking his power as Commander-in-Chief under sec.18, art. VII of the

Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of
Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of

calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. Whether or not the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. When
questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question

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must be raised at earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the

civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation
of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of
the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the
Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it
cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian
authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
“insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of
Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora et al. case brief summary

IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora et al. case brief summary

G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

FACTS: President Joseph Estrada ordered the deployment of the Philippine Marines to
join the Philippine National Police (PNP) in visibility patrols around Metro Manila to stem
the tide of rising violence and crime. In response to such order, the PNP through Police
Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay issued Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 02/2000 which
detailed the joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan. This was confirmed by a
memorandum Pres. Estrada issued dated 24 January 2000. On January 17, 2000, the
IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000 arguing that the deployment of the Marines is
unconstitutional and is an incursion by the military on the civilian functions of
government as embodied in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the 1987
Constitution.

ISSUE: (1) Does the IBP have legal standing in the case at bar?

(2) Is the president’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces
subject to judicial review?

(3) Is the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character
of the PNP?

RULING: In the first issue, the IBP has failed to provide the requisites for legal standing in the
case at bar in that it has failed to conclusively prove that such deployment would harm
the IBP in any way. It’s contention that it is fighting to uphold the rule of law and the
constitution is insufficient, too general and too vague. As to the second issue, the Court
disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor-General that the president’s act is a political
question beyond the authority of the Court to review when the grant of power is qualified
or subject to limitations, the issue becomes whether the prescribed qualifications have
been met, then it becomes a question of legality and not wisdom, so is not a political
question. It is then subject to the Court’s review power. As to the third issue, the Marines
only assist the PNP, the LOI itself provides for this. In fact, the PNP Chief is the leader of
such patrols and in no way places the over-all authority in the Marines.

Petition is dismissed.
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RODRIGUEZ VERSUS MACAPAGAL – ARROYO

660 SCRA 84
FACTS:

Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti

Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an
enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Rodriguez was abducted by
military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his
membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders,
Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The
petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but
the CA dropped Pres. Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in
any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

ISSUE:

Whether former Pres. GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis

of presidential immunity from suit

RULING:

No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of

administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings,
courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the
enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As was held in the case of
Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit,
even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look with
disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes
the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that
presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his
term. (The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for
reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres.
GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would
assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible
or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

MONSANTO VERSUS FACTORAN

170 SCRA 190

FACTS:

In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.

Monsanto was accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents and sentenced them to imprisonment and to indemnify the
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government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount

defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the
entire period of her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position
without the necessity of a new appointment The Office of the President said that
that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries,
benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension
pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment
before he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case
exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by
reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her
conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There has been no final
judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer
could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. The court viewed that is
not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction,
for the result would still be the same

ISSUE:

Whether or not a public officer’s who has been granted an absolute

pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment.

RULING:

No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the

pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing
power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a
poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. The
absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

BENGZON VERSUS DRILON

208 SCRA 133

FACTS:

Republic Act No 1797 provided that pensions of Justices of the Supreme

Court and the Court of Appeals who served for 20 years shall be adjusted. In
1979, Presidential Decree 644 repealed RA 1797 but was not published. In 1991,
the Court issued a resolution adjusting their pensions in accordance to RA 1797.
The General Appropriations Act authorized the Chief Justice to use savings for

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the adjusted pensions. The president vetoed all portions containing references to
the adjustment of pensions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the selective veto of the President is valid?

RULING:

Petition granted. The veto power is not absolute. The Constitution

provides that only a particular item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant
the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the
same item.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, vs. JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS

JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,
676 SCRA 579 GR no. 202242 April 16, 2013
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior
decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more than one
member of the congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional Respondent
contends that the phrase “a representative of congress” refers that both houses
of congress should have one representative each, and that these two houses are
permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral
system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance
of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the
JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate
and the House of Representatives to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII
Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD:
The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a
representative of congress” should be construed as to having only one
representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of
the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative. The motion was denied.

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, vs.HON. MANUEL ALBA

148 SCRA 208 G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
FERNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of
PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977)—as concerned citizens, members of
the National Assembly, parties with general interest common to all people of the
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Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes

upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys,
amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President
to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal
standing of the petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be
enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its
sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become moot and
academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration
was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President…may by law
be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive
act
HELD:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under
Sec16(5) by empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department of the Executive Department to any program of any department
included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only
disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an
undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure
of public funds to naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.

2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the
other branches of the government has assumed to do as void, as part of its
constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say that the judicial power
is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the judges claim
no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS COMELEC

628 SCRA 819
VELASCO JR. J.:

FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting
33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24
other municipalities into cities.

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During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The
rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a
larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th

Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint

Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through
their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills
contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007,
except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine

whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of
their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws

unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as
for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing
cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

HELD:
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution,
and are thus unconstitutional.

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First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the

present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009
took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear,
plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never
written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills
or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

NACIONALISTA PARTY vs. BAUTISTA

85 SCRA 101

FACTS:
Petitioner Nacionalista Party alleges that it is organized and registered
under the laws of the Philippines, brought this action praying that a writ of
prohibition issue commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist forever
from acting as acting member of the Commission on Elections under the
designation rendered to him by President Quirino, unless he is legally appointed
as regular member of the said Commission on Elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, a political party is entitled to bring an action in
the courts of justice.
HELD:
It may be organized and registered as a political party in or with the
Commission on Elections for the purposes of the Revised Election Code
(Republic Act No. 180), but for the purpose of bringing an action in the courts of
justice such organization and registration are not sufficient. It has to be
incorporated under Act 1459 for only natural or juridical persons may be parties
in a civil action, but this technical defect may be cured by allowing the
substitution of the real parties in interest for the petitioner.
The petitioner is granted five days within which to amend its petition so as
to substitute the real parties in interest for it (the petitioner) or to show that it is a
juridical person entitled to institute these proceedings. Otherwise, or if the
petitioner does not amend its petition or does not show that it is a juridical entity,

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the petition will be dismissed. After the amendment or showing referred to shall
have been made, the writ prayed for will issue.

BRILLANTES vs. YORAC

192 SCRA 358, 1990
FACTS:
The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of
the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had
been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the
December 1989 coup d’ et at attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the
President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the
independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional
body and the specific provision that “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the
Commission on Elections)be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.” Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the
members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines
violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the
President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of
“administrative expediency,” to prevent disruption of the functions of the
COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the
COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman.

HELD:
NO. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
“independent.” They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines
in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions
conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in
the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject
only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The
choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes
under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its
consent, by the President of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering
the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the
void by extending the temporary designation in favour of the respondent. The
situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on
Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however well-
meaning. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission
on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they
themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis
thereof were for them and not the President to make.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, vs. PILILLA WATER DISTRICT,

G.R. No. 190147 March 5, 2013

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VILLARAMA, JR, J.:

FACTS:
Paulino J. Rafanan was first appointed General Manager (GM) on a
coterminous status by the Board of Directors (BOD) of the Pililla Water District
(PWD). On June 16, 2004, the BOD approved a Resolution for the extension of
service of Rafanan- who is reaching his age 65 on that month of 2004. The CSC
denied the request of PWD for the extension of service of Rafanan and
considered the latter "separated from the service at the close of office hours on
June 25, 2004, his 65th birthday. However, On April 8, 2005, the PWD
reappointed Rafanan as GM on coterminous status. Said reappointment was
signed by Chairman Paz and attested by the CSC Field Office-Rizal. Pililla Mayor
Leandro V. Masikip, Sr. questioned Rafanan’s coterminous appointment
as defective and void ab initio considering that he was appointed to a career
position despite having reached the compulsory retirement age. Said letter-
complaint was treated as an appeal from the appointment made by the BOD
Chairman of respondent. Three years later, the CSC invalidated the coterminous
appointment issued to Rafanan as GM on the ground that it was made in
violation of Section 2 of R.A. No. 9286-which in effect placed the position of GM
of a water district in the category of career service. It posits that this can be
inferred from the removal of the sentence "Said officer shall serve at the pleasure
of the Board," and replaced it with the sentence "Said officer shall not be
removed from office, except for cause and after due process."
The CA reversed the CSC and ruled that the position of GM in water
districts remains primarily confidential in nature and hence, BOD may validly
appoint Rafanan to the said position even beyond the compulsory retirement age
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it ruled that the position of
general manager of a local water district is primarily confidential in nature.

2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it ruled that the april 8,
2005 appointment of rafanan in a co-terminous capacity was valid.
RULING:
Yes. In the case of the General Manager of a water district, Section 24 in
relation to Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended, reveals the close proximity of
the positions of the General Manager and BOD.
“SEC. 24. Duties. – The duties of the General Manager and other officers
shall be determined and specified from time to time by the Board. The General
Manager, who shall not be a director, shall have full supervision and control of
the maintenance and operation of water district facilities, with power and
authority to appoint all personnel of the district: Provided,That the appointment of
personnel in the supervisory level shall be subject to approval by the Board.” (As
amended by Sec.10, PD 768). It is established that no officer or employee in the
Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
However, this admits of exceptions for it is likewise settled that the right to
security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are
contractual and coterminous in nature. Since the position of General Manager of
a water district remains a primarily confidential position whose term still expires
upon loss of trust and confidence by the BOD provided that prior notice and due
hearing are observed, it cannot therefore be said that the phrase "shall not be
removed except for cause and after due process" converted such position into a

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permanent appointment. Significantly, loss of confidence may be predicated on

other causes for removal provided in the civil service rules and other existing
laws. In fine, since the position of General Manager of a water district remains a
primarily confidential position, Rafanan was validly reappointed to said position
by respondent's BOD on April 8, 2005 under coterminous status despite having
reached the compulsory retirement age.

CESAR Z. DARIO, vs. HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME

and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
G.R. No. 81954 August 8, 1989
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3 providing for
an orderly transition to a government under a new constitution. Subsequently, the
President promulgated an executive order providing for the reorganization of the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) and prescribing a new staffing patter. During the said
period, the Filipino people adopted the new constitution. The problem arose
when incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a
Memorandum prescribing the procedure in personnel placement.
On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization
Appeals Board charged with adjudicating appeals from removals under the
above Memorandum which issued notices to the petitioners for their separation.
A total of 394 officials and employees of the BOC were given individual notices of
separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement with the Reorganization
Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The
first thirtyone mentioned above came directly to the SC. The petitions under the
CSC where granted ordering the reinstatement of the employees. All the petitions
were consolidated in this case.
ISSUES:
Whether Commissioner Mison acted in good faith in issuing the notices of
separation.
RULING:
NO. The Court finds that Commissioner Mison did not act in good faith
since after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs
hierarchy - except for the change of personnel - has occurred, which would have
justified the contested dismissals. There is also no showing that legitimate
structural changes have been made or a reorganization actually undertaken at
the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office, which would have validly
prompted him to hire and fire employees.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394
Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. This
betrays a clear intent to "pack" the Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in
defiance of the President's directive to halt further layoffs as a consequence of
reorganization. Finally, he was aware that layoffs should observe the procedure
laid down by Executive Order No. 17.

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SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), et.al. vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON.
CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
CORTES, J:
FACTS:
On june 11, 1987 SSS filed with RTC Quezon City a complaint for
damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. Alleging
that on 9 June 1987, officer and member of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
barricaded the entrances to the SSS building, which prevented non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting with SSS.
SSEA went on strike after SSS failed to meet the following demands:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining
agreement on check off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temp or contractual employees
with 6 months or more of service into the regular and permanent employees and
their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other
regular employees of SSS; payment of the children’s allowance of php 30.
Public sector Labour Management council ordered the strikers to return to
work. SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the employees of SSS have the right to strike.
RULING:
, constitution is silent as to whether it recognizes the right to strike of the
government employees. Records of the constitutional commission show that in
recognizing the right of the government empoyees to recognize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of the unions only,
without the inclusion of the right to strike. In the absence of any legislation
allowing govement employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so or
regulating the excircise of the right, they prohibited from stirking, by express
provision of memorandum circular no. 6 and as implied in E.O. no. 180.

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER

MERLIN ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG .et.al. vs. THE HON. PERFECTO
LAGUIO JR
G.R. No. 95445 August 6, 1991
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
A "mass action" was undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among
them members of the petitioning associations to "dramatize and highlight" the
teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act
upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
The petition alleges in great detail the character and origins of those grievances
as perceived by the petitioners, and the attempts to negotiate their correction.
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ISSUES:

Are employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and
holding strikes?

RULING:

Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector,
do not have the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to self-organization,
to petition Congress for the betterment of employment terms and conditions and
to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such
working conditions as are not fixed by law.

Public school teachers have the right to peaceably assemble for redress
of grievances but NOT during class hours, for then this would be a strike, which
is illegal for them.

RODANTE D. MARCOLETA vs. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA AND ROMEO A.

BRAWNER
A.C. No. 7732 March 30, 2009
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
During the 2007 National and Local Elections, the warring factions of
Borra together with Brawner and Diogenes S. Osabel (Osabel) each filed a
separate list of nominees for the party-list group Alagad.
With Alagad winning a seat in the House of Representatives, the two
protagonists contested the right to represent the party. By Omnibus Resolution of
July 18, 2007, the dispute was resolved by the Comelec’s First Division in favor
of Osabel. Commissioner Borra wrote the ponencia while Commissioner Brawner
concurred.
The dispute was elevated to the Comelec En Banc which, by Resolution of
November 6, 2007, reversed the First Division Resolution and reinstated the
certificate of nomination of complainant’s group. For failing to muster the required
majority voting, however, the Comelec ordered the re-hearing of the controversy.
Notwithstanding the conduct of a re-hearing, the necessary majority vote could
not still be obtained. The Comelec’s First Division’s Omnibus Resolution was
eventually affirmed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not canon 3 of the new code of judicial conduct for the
Philippine judiciary applicable to officers of comelec exercising quasi-judicial
duties.
RULING:
. The Court takes notice that Borra retired from the Comelec on February
2, 2008 while Brawner passed away on May 29, 2008. As regards Brawner then,
the present case is already moot. As for Borra and Brawner’s invocation of
Section 58 of Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code reading:

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The chairman and members of the Commission shall be subject to the

canons of judicial ethics in the discharge of their functions.
The same relates to the quasi-judicial function of the Comelec, which
function rests on judgment or discretion, so that while it is of judicial nature or
character, it does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge.
The same provision thus directs that in the exercise of the Comelec’s
quasi-judicial power, the chairman and members should be guided by the canons
of judicial ethics. However, it bears emphasis that the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary applies only to courts of law, of which the
Comelec is not, hence, sanctions pertaining to violations thereof are made
exclusively applicable to judges and justices in the judiciary, not to quasi-judicial
officers like the Comelec chairman and members, who have their own codes of
conduct to steer them.

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS JR. V. COMMISION ON ELECTIONS AND

AGAPITO J. CARDINO

G.R. NOS. 193237 AND 1935369, OCTOBER 2012

CARPIO, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Dominador Jalosjos and Agapito Cardino were candidates for

Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 Elections. Cardino
file a petition to deny due course and to cancel the candidacy of Jalosjos on the
grounds that Jaolos made false material representation in his certificate for
candidacy when Jalosjos declared under oath that he was eligible to run for the
Office of the Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos files his certificate
of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgement for robbery
and sentenced to prison mayor. Jalosjos admitted the conviction but asserted
that he has been granted probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004
elections the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied a petition for
disqualification filed against him on the same grounds.

The COMELEC granted Cardinos petition and cancelled Jalosjos’

certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has indeed
committed material misrepresentation when he declared under oath that he is
eligible for office he seeks to be elected when in fact he is not by reason of final
judgement in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served.
Jalosjos then filed this petition for certiorari challenging the Resolutions.

ISSUES:

1. Is Jalosjos qualified to run as Mayor on the May 10, 2010 elections?

2. Should Cardino be proclaimed as the newly-elected Mayor?

HELD:

The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his

criminal conviction by final judgement is a material fact involving eligibility which
is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
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A sentence of prision mayor by final judgement is a ground for disqualification

under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a
candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The penalty of prision mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of

law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual
special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary
absolute disqualification produces the effect of “deprivation of the right to vote in
any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The
duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code
special disqualification means that “the offender shall not be permitted to hold
any public office during the period of his disqualification” which is perpetually.
Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification
constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these
ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false
material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is
eligible to so run. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to
hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time his judgement of
conviction became final.

Cadino should be proclaimed as the newly-elected Mayor

Jalosjo’s certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not
eligible to run for any public office at the time e filed his certificate of candidacy.
Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray
votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio,
Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of
votes for the position of Mayor. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his
certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
retroacted to the day he filed it. Whether his certificate of candidacy Is cancelled
before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such
ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void ad initio. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There
was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections-Cardino-
who received the highest number of votes.

Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be

proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be
limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid
at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of
law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally
the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in
the elections at any time.

All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be
counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If
a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day,
of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are

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stray vote. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more
after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes
because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the
more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy
void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for
the same position.

ABAYON VS. COMELEC

FACT:

Respondents Lucaban, jr. et al. filed a petition for quo warranto with
respondent hret against aangattayo and its nominee, petitioner abayon, in hret
case 07-041. They claimed that aangat tayo wasnot eligible for a party-list seat in
the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. further, they pointed out that petitioner abayon
herself was not qualified to sit in the house as a party-list nominee since she did
not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife
of an incumbent congressional district representative. she moreover lost her bid
as party-list representative of the party-list organization called an waray in the
immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.

Petitioner abayon pointed out that respondent hret had no jurisdiction over
the petition for quowarranto since the registration of aangat tayo as a party-list
organization was a matter that fell withinthe jurisdiction of the comelec. it was
aangat tayo that was taking a seat in the house of representatives, and not
abayon who was just its nominee. all questions involving her eligibility asfirst
nominee, said abayon, were internal concerns of aangat tayo.

On July 16, 2009 respondent hret issued an order, dismissing the petition
as against aangat tayo butupholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of
petitioner abayon. She moved for reconsiderationbut the hret denied the same on
september 17, 2009, prompting abayon to file the present petitionfor special civil
action of certiorari

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent hret has jurisdiction over the question of

qualifications of petitionerabayon as nominee of aangat tayo party-list
organization, who took the seat at the House of Representatives

HELD:

R.A. 7941, the party-list system act, vests in the comelec the authority to
determine which parties’ organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list
seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the hret
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as theysought the
disqualifications of aangat tayo. Since petitioner abayon was not elected into
office but was chosen by its organization under its internal rules, the hret has no
jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate her qualifications as nominee.but,
although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not
the organization that sits and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives.
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Section 5, article VI of the constitution clearly shows the constitution’s

point of view that it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office,
not their parties or organizations. Petitioner abayon points out that the authority
to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or
organization that nominated him.
This is true, initially. but where an allegation is made that the party or
organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-
list representative in the lower house and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with
the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. Section 17,
article VI of the constitution provides that the hret shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the
house of representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are
"elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the hret has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications.

GUTIERREZ VS THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE

643 SCRA 198
FACTS:

To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral

of two impeachment complaints as they were actually referred to the committee
"separately, one after the other "is to dismantle her own interpretation of
Francisco that the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the filing of the
impeachment complaint. Petitioners Motion concedes that the Francisco doctrine
on the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes the Houses initial action
on the complaint. By recognizing the legal import of a referral, petitioner
abandons her earlier claim that per Francisco an impeachment proceeding is
initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment complaint.

Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in propping her

position that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from
the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not
"constructive initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna in his
separate opinion in Francisco.

In Justice Azcunas opinion which concurred with the majority, what he

similarly found untenable was the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to
the time that the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report reaches the floor
of the House.Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th
Congress that were successfully challenged inFranciscoprovided that an
impeachment proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committees
finding of sufficiency of substance or upon the Houses affirmance or overturning
of the Committees finding,which was clearly referred to as the instances
"presumably for internal purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its
internal action on certain relevant matters."Definitely, "constructive initiation by
legal fiction" didnotrefer to the aspects of filing and referral in the regular course
of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist ofFranciscoin pronouncing what
initiation means.

The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war

between those who want to stretch and those who want to shrink the term
"initiate," either of which could disrupt the provisions congruency to the rationale
of the constitutional provision. Petitioners imputation that the Courts Decision
presents a sharp deviation from Francisco as it defers the operability of the one-
year bar rule rings hollow.

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Petitioner urges that the word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary
and technical meaning, for it is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to
reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or conclusion.

Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision
been worded as "no initiation processof the impeachment proceedingshall be
commencedagainst the same official more than once within a period of one year,"
in which case the reckoning would literally point to the "start of the beginning." To
immediately reckon the initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start
of the initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.

In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be

initiated" means, the Court closely applied Francisco on what comprises or
completes the initiation phase. Nothing can be more unequivocal or well-defined
than the elucidation offiling-and-referralin Francisco. Petitioner must come to
terms with her denial of the exact terms of Francisco.

Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the

initiation of impeachment proceedings, in case of a direct filing of a verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House.

ISSUE:

Whether the period of one year to file impeachment complaint is

mandatory.

HELD:

The decision is sustained. The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an

impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting bar. To refer an
impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is to commit
the apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment
proceeding, which may be struck down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of
discretion. It bears recalling that the one-year bar rule itself is a constitutional
limitation on the Houses power or function to refer a complaint.

Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly

constitutionally-prohibited second impeachment complaint on the matter of
whether to make the appropriate referral goes precisely into the propriety of the
referral and not on the merits of the complaint. The House needs only to
ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year, without
any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint.

To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever
completes the initiation of an impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating
the influx of successive complaints since allowing multiple impeachment charges
would result to the same harassment and oppression. She particularly cites
Constitutional Commissioner Ricardo Romulos concerns on the amount of time
spent if "multiple impeachment charges"are allowed. She fails, however, to
establish whether Commissioner Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not
more than one complaint or charge.

In sum, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing
andreferral in the present case, with Franciscoas the guiding light. Petitioner
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refuses to see the other half of that light, however.

The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively
promulgate its Impeachment Rules. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal
branch of government on how to do so when such prerogative is lodged
exclusively with it.

Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that "to require
publication of the House Impeachment Rules would only delay the impeachment
proceedings and cause the House of Representatives to violate constitutionally
mandated periods" She insists that the Committee, after publishing the
Impeachment Rules, would still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-day
period within which to finish its business.

Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political

exercise. Petitioner thus cannot demand that the Court apply the stringent
standards it asks of justices and judges when it comes to inhibition from hearing
cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provision
regarding the inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member from
participating in an impeachment proceeding. The Committee may thus direct any
question of partiality towards the concerned member only. And any decision on
the matter of inhibition must be respected, and it is not for this Court to interfere
with that decision.

Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged

precipitate haste with which the impeachment proceeding against petitioner is
conducted is beyond the Courts control. Again, impeachment is a highly
politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to operate, subject
only to the constitutionally imposed limits.And beyond these, the Court is duty-
bound to respect the discretion of a co-equal branch of government on matters
which would effectively carry out its constitutional mandate.

Denied for being bereft of merit.

FRANCISCO V. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE

415 SCRA 44

FACTS:

22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private
respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel
group) filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-
List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen
transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed
the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business3Aug2010: private
respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre
Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment
complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by Representatives Colmenares, Casiño,
Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De JesusHOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure
on Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the
complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the Committee
on Rules to include it in the Order of Business,11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously
referred the two complaints to the House Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)After
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hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in

form2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the
15th Congress was publishedAfter hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010
found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance

Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging Resolutions of

September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these violated
the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings

Issues:

1. Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy

2. Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due process to the Petitioner

3. Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the

Constitution

Ruling:

Petition DISMISSED.

Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the judiciary– the
1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power
to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.-the Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for
certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, “judicially discoverable
standards” for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review

ENRIQUE ZALDIVAR VS RAUL GONZALEZ

FACTS:
Zaldivar was the governor of antique. He was charged before the
sandiganbayan for violations of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. Gonzales
was the then tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with
the supreme court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing
the authority of the tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987
constitution. The supreme court, acting on the petition issued a cease and desist
order against gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating
and filing informations against zaldivar.

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Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal

informations against zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where
he proudly claims that he scored one on the supreme court; that the supreme
court’s issuance of the tro is a manifestation theta the “rich and influential
persons get favorable actions from the supreme court, [while] it is difficult for an
ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course”.
Zaldivar then filed a motion for contempt against gonzalez. The supreme
court then ordered gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the
statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom
of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the court, to point out where
he feels the court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes,
that not less than six justices of the supreme court have approached him to ask
him to “go slow” on zaldivar and to not embarrass the supreme court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD:
Yes. The statements made by respondent gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the supreme
court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the supreme court
betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of
disrespect for the supreme court. Such statements very clearly debase and
degrade the supreme court and, through the court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What
gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a special
prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the republic and to the
supreme court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the
government of the republic. The responsibility of gonzalez to uphold the dignity
and authority of the supreme court and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must
be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he
alleged that members of the supreme court approached him, are of no relation to
the zaldivar case.
The supreme court suspended gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC CASE DIGEST

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 174153 OCT. 25 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA
6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals
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fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes
the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7
and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral-
presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied
the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked
the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the
initiative petitions.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through a people’s initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying due course to the Lambino Group’s petition.

HELD:
According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the
COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed
at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive
and misleading” which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution

Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between

“amendment” and “revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2
art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution.
Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a
constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because
the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply
with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

MANUEL IMBONG V. COMELEC,

G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970
35 SCRA 28 (1970)

J. Makasiar

FACTS:
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These are two separate but related petitions, filed by petitioners Manuel
B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, who are running as candidates for the [1971]
Constitutional Convention. Both parties are questioning the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6132, (Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law, as well as the
particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and Par. 1 of 8; while
Imbong impugns only Par. 1 of Sec. 8), alleging that it prejudices their rights as
candidates for the Constitutional Convention.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the rights of the petitioners to run for candidates for the
Const-Convention are prejudiced by RA No. 6312.

Whether RA No. 6312 is unconstitutional.

HELD:
No. Prayers of both petitioners are denied, provisions assailed by
petitioners are constitutional.

Sec. 2: The Court held that the apportionment provided cannot conflict with
its own intent expressed therein, because it merely obeyed and
implemented the intent of the Congress, as a Constituent Assembly, in Res.
No. 4

Sec. 4: The Court held this provision’s validity since it is merely an

application of, and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the
Constitution, and that it does not constitute a denial of due process or of the
equal protection of the law.

Sec. 5: The Court held that the State has the right to create office and the
parameters to qualify or disqualify its members. It further reasoned that the
function of a delegate is far-reaching and has a more enduring effect than that of
any ordinary legislator —shaping the fundamental law of the land, which makes
the classifications repugnant to the sense of justice.

Par. 1, Sec. 8: The Court held that the ban against political parties /
organizational groups is constitutional because, as also discussed by the
amica curiae, it serves as an appropriate response to the clear and
present danger of the debasement of the electoral process. It provides for
the equal protection of the laws wherein the candidates must depend on their
individual merits and not the support of their political parties or organizations.

The Court sustains the constitutionality of the enactment of RA No. 6312

by the Congress, as a Legislative body, exercising its broad lawmaking
authority.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

FACTS:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for

Reforms,Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to
amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s
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Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution,

which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued
an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and
thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator
Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is
cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the elfin petition rising the
several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on
people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to
be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s
initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of
people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.

(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence
in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the
lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an
amendment of the Constitution.

HELD:

Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without
implementinglegislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has
recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does
not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule thatwhat
has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari
potest). Thedelegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter
cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the
right to people’s initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a
revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the
synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A
revisioncannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in
the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or
amendment has become academic.

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SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. L-34150
APRIL 2, 1981

FACTS:
Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting
proceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions
(Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2
dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the
amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2
with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the
constitutions in proposing amendments:

ISSUE:
Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD:
In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and
how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to
propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the
majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on
Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When,
therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and
Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue
of such impotence.

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to

amount to a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the
court held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose
amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and
propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the
people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument
against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the
moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."

3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments
as well as the standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution
supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa,
sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the
three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when
it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be
proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is
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concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as

follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later
than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The
three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa
Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-
day period provided by the Constitution.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702

FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress approved in its capacity as a
constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on
November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inauguralsession on June 1, 1971.
In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic
Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1
OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING
AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the
mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the
senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .

Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being
that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions
subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide
for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the
ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a
power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be
exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the
1935Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to
the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be
drafted and proposed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of
the1971 Constitutional Convention violative to the Constitution.

HELD:
NO.
All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be
submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a
plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it
must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent
appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the
other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In
the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the
merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to
present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with
this requirement.

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