FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159280. May 18, 2004]
AUGUSTO SIM, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
The PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is a Decision by the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
[1]
May 21, 2003 affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial
[2]
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 34, finding petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. and co-
accused Elison Villaflor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, instead of Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) thereof, as well as its Resolution dated August 1, 2003
[3]
denying appellants Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner and co-accused
Elison Villaflor were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prisin correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusin temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the private
complainant Jay Byron Ilagan the sum of P480,000.00 representing the
amount paid for the purchase of the car that was impounded by the
authorities.
Elison Villaflor and Augusto Sim, Jr., were formally charged with the crime
of Estafa in an Information dated September 6, 1999 which reads: [4]
That on or about May 2, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Jay Byron Ilagan in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations which they made to
said Jay Byron Ilagan to the effect that they are selling one (1) colored green Nissan
Pathfinder pick-up with motor number PD27-555735 bearing Plate No. BCF-620 in
the amount of P480,000.00 registered in the name of Henry Austria, and by means of
other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Jay Byron Ilagan to give
and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of
P480,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused
well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent, as the said car is a stolen car
and they are not the owner, and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact they did obtain
the amount of P480,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with intent to
defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
Jay Byron Ilagan in the aforesaid amount of P350,000.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
Private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan is a tire supplier whose store, Marfi
Tire Supply, is located along the highway at San Pablo City, Laguna. He had
been dealing with accused Elison Villaflor for twenty years, as the latter is
engaged in the same business of selling tires and rims at 39 C-3 Road,
Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City.
In March 1998, private complainant talked to Elison somewhere in Tondo,
Manila, and expressed his interest in buying a vehicle. Elison told him that he
knew someone who sells vehicles at a cheap price, and that he had bought a
Toyota Tamaraw FX at lower than the market price. Private complainant then
asked Elison to ask if there was an Isuzu pick-up for sale. A month later,
Elison called private complainant to inform him that he was able to find a 1997
Nissan Pathfinder. They agreed to inspect the vehicle together as private
complainant wanted to buy it before his birthday on May 31, 1998. [5]
On April 30, 1998, only Elison went to Dagupan City to get the Nissan
Pathfinder from his friend, petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. Petitioner told Elison
that the Nissan Pathfinder was given to him by a customer in payment of a
debt and had been used only for a year.
Elison brought the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder to San Pablo City. Private
complainant at first did not like the vehicle since it was not the brand he was
looking for. Elison said that his kumpadre would look at the vehicle as the
latter was also interested in it.[6]
Private complainant decided to buy the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder at the
agreed price of P480,000.00. The amount was paid in five checks issued by
Fe Ilagan under her account at Solidbank-San Pablo Branch. One check was
dated May 6, 1998 in the sum of P350,000.00, and four checks in the sum of
P32,500.00 each was dated June 6, July 6, August 6 and September 6, all in
1998. [7]
Elison gave private complainant photocopies of the Certificate of
Registration (C.R.) and Official Receipt (O.R.) issued by the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) showing the name of the owner as one Henry
Austria. While waiting for the processing of the papers, the vehicle was parked
at private complainants place. After a week, Elison brought the deed of sale
which private complainant signed without the signature of the owner, Henry
Austria. After private complainant signed the deed of sale, he gave it back to
Elison to be brought back to Dagupan City for signing by the owner/vendor
and transfer of registration in the name of private complainant.[8]
On June 7, 1998, Elison returned and delivered to private complainant the
deed of sale signed by the owner/vendor, together with the new C.R. and O.R.
issued by the LTO of Lingayen, Pangasinan in the name of private
complainant. [9]
The checks given by private complainant in payment of the vehicle were
deposited by petitioner in his name at Solidbank-Dagupan Branch. All five
checks were debited in favor of petitioner. After receiving the registration
papers from Elison, private complainant was eventually able to use the Nissan
Pathfinder.[10]
On October 28, 1998, private complainants vehicle was apprehended by
Anti-Carnapping operatives of the Philippine National Police (ANCAR
NCRTMO). The vehicle and its registration papers were inspected and
thereafter brought to Camp Crame. It turned out that the vehicle was a hot
car as it had been reported stolen on November 29, 1997 by its real owner,
Golf Construction of the Philippines, Inc. pursuant to the Alarm Sheet issued
by the PNP Traffic Management Group. [11]
Private complainant accompanied the ANCAR operatives to the residence
of Elison. He went with them to Camp Crame, and named petitioner as the
owner of the vehicle. However, they were not able to locate petitioner right
away. Meanwhile, the vehicle was impounded by the authorities. The
investigation revealed that its original motor and chassis numbers were
replaced and/or tampered but its Production Number remained
intact. Eventually, the real description of the vehicle was fully established and
identified by no less than the manufacturer/assembler of the unit, Universal
Motors Corporation. [12]
Private complainant spoke with Elison about the possible recovery of the
money paid by him for the confiscated vehicle. On November 30, 1998,
private complainant met petitioner for the first time. Petitioner signed a
Promissory Note with Deed of Undertaking whereby he obligated himself to
pay private complainant the amount of P480,000.00 plus attorneys fees of
P50,000.00 in scheduled installments. Petitioner issued a check in the amount
of P75,000.00 but private complainant did not encash it, thinking that if he
does, petitioner would not pay him anymore. Private complainant was unable
to recover the money paid by him to petitioner. [13]
Thereafter, Elison and petitioner were charged with estafa under a criminal
information dated September 6, 1999. Elison was arraigned on September 17,
1999; while petitioner was arraigned on June 1, 2000. Both pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the trial court convicted both Elison and petitioner of the crime of
estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment with the modification that
appellants should be convicted of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, assigning the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT CONSPIRACY IS PRESENT
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE ACQUITTAL OF
HEREIN PETITIONER.
Two issues are presented before this Court: (1) Whether there was
conspiracy between petitioner and Elison Villaflor in defrauding private
complainant Jay Byron Ilagan; and (2) Whether petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code.
On the first assignment of error, petitioner argues that there is no
conspiracy between him and co-accused. He points that it was only co-
accused Elison Villaflor who dealt with private complainant. The latter had not
even met him before he was allegedly forced to sign the amicable agreement.
Petitioner further alleges that contrary to the findings of the appellate
court, there is no convincing evidence to show that petitioner performed any
previous or simultaneous act with Elison in committing the offense against
private complainant. The witnesses presented by the prosecution did not
show or prove that petitioner directly participated in the commission of the
offense or performed an act which would show community of purpose with
Elison.
Petitioners argument is bereft of merit.
Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the
crime, conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before,
during and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a
common design, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments. Conspiracy is deemed implied when the malefactors have a
[14]
common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement
or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of
the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility. [15]
In Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that conspiracy, as a rule, has
[16]
to be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and
shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. However, conspiracy need
not be shown by direct evidence, but may take the form of circumstances
which, if taken together, would conclusively show that the accused came to an
agreement to commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full
cooperation and participation.
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, petitioners actions in
relation to the fraudulent sale of the Nissan Pathfinder to private complainant
clearly established conspiracy as alleged in the information, which acts
transcend mere knowledge or friendship with co-accused
Elison. Notwithstanding the fact that it was only Elison who dealt with or
[17]
personally transacted with private complainant until the time the sale was
consummated, by his own testimony petitioner admitted all the acts by which
he actively cooperated and not merely acquiesced in perpetrating the fraud
upon private complainant. That petitioner is a conspirator having joint
[18]
criminal design with Elison is evident from the fact that as between them, both
knew that petitioner was the person selling the vehicle under the false
pretense that a certain Henry Austria was the registered owner. Petitioner,
[19]
together with Elison, clearly deceived private complainant in order to defraud
him in the amount of P480,000.00, to the latters damage and prejudice. In
addition, the acts of petitioner in deliberately misrepresenting himself to
private complainant as having the necessary authority to possess and sell to
the latter the vehicle so that he could collect from him P480,000.00 only to
renege on that promise and for failure to reimburse the said amount he
collected from private complainant, despite demand, amount to estafa
punishable under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the findings of fact of the trial court,
aptly observed: [20]
That conviction under the afore-cited provision is more proper is evident from the trial
courts finding that appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. from the very beginning was aware that
the subject vehicle was not his nor given to him in payment of debt as he made
appellant Villaflor to believe. Nonetheless, appellant Villaflor was not absolved from
liability, having actively conspired with appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. to convince
private complainant to purchase the Pathfinder upon their false pretense and
representation that said vehicle was being sold by its real owner, Henry Austria, the
name appearing in the registration papers and deed of sale under circumstances clearly
showing their knowledge that the status of said vehicle is dubious or anomalous, as in
fact it turned out to be a hot car or had been stolen/carnapped from its true owner. The
totality of the evidence indicates a common or joint design, purpose and objective of
the accused-appellants to defraud private complainant who parted with his money
upon the belief that there is no problem regarding the ownership of the Pathfinder sold
to him by the appellants.
The trial court rejected the argument of the defense that it was private complainant
who supposedly had the vehicle and its registration papers checked at Camp Crame
before buying the same. It pointed out that verification would have been difficult
considering that the motor and chassis numbers in the registration papers are correct
but the name of the owner appearing therein is false.
Elisons false pretense in holding out that he had authorization from the
owner to sell the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder was made in conjunction with
petitioners fraudulent misrepresentation that he was legally entitled to possess
the aforesaid vehicle. The evidence shows that petitioner and Elison acted in
conspiracy to deceive private complainant into buying a stolen Nissan
Pathfinder, thereby defrauding the latter in the amount of P480,000.00, and
upon their false pretense and representation as to the real status of the
vehicle, i.e., that said unit is in fact being sold by its true owner Henry Austria
and that Augusto Sim, Jr. in whose name the checks were issued had the
authority or right to sell the same. After a few months, the vehicle sold was
apprehended and impounded by police authorities for being stolen or
carnapped which resulted in pecuniary damage to private complainant who
had demanded the return of his money from petitioner and Elison. The [21]
evidence of the prosecution satisfactorily established the fraudulent acts and
representations which induced private complainant to part with his money for
which he suffered damage and loss when the vehicle sold to him by petitioner
and Elison was recovered by its true owner through operatives of the police
anti-carnapping group. [22]
On the second assignment of error, petitioner contends that the evidence
is not sufficient to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners contention is untenable.
While the trial court charged and convicted petitioner and his co-accused
of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the appellate
court modified the lower courts decision by convicting them of the same crime
under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
Regardless of whether petitioner is charged or convicted under either par.
1 (b) or par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, he would still be
guilty of estafa because damage and deceit, which are essential elements of
the crime, have been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. False
pretenses or fraudulent acts were committed prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud by falsely pretending to possess property. In this
case, false pretenses or fraudulent acts were employed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud by falsely pretending to
possess the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder, where damage and deceit have been
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to
deceive, including all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage
to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of
another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human
ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an
advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and
includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which
another is cheated. Deceit is a species of fraud.
[23]
Swindling or estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud is
committed [b]y using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by other similar deceits.
[24]
The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) are: (1) There must be a
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) Such false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) The offended party must
have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is,
he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (4) As a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage. [25]
These four elements are present in the instant case: (1) False pretenses
were employed by petitioner and his co-accused to deceive private
complainant into purchasing the stolen Nissan Pathfinder; (2) False pretenses
were employed prior to, and simultaneously with, the fraudulent sale of the
Nissan Pathfinder; (3) Private complainant relied on false pretenses of
petitioner and co-accused, inducing him to part with his money due to the
misrepresentation employed by the perpetrators of the fraud; and (4) As a
result of false pretenses and misrepresentations by petitioner and co-accused,
private complainant suffered damages in the amount of P480,000.00.
Furthermore, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court, which is in the best position to make an assessment of the witnesses
credibility and to appreciate complainants truthfulness, honesty and
candor. Factual findings of trial courts, as well as their assessment of the
[26]
credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court
more so when these are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. As against the
[27]
positive and categorical testimonies of the complainant, petitioners mere
denial cannot prevail.
The proper imposable penalty for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2
(a) is prisin correccional in its maximum period to prisin mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed
P22,000.00, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty (20) years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed prisin
mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the
[28]
Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of
the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the
Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum
penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and can be anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods
into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.
In the present case, petitioner defrauded private complainant in the
amount of P480,000.00. The fact that the amount involved in the case at bar
exceeds P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of
the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as
analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term
of the full indeterminate sentence. This legal interpretation accords with the
rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. [29]
The maximum penalty to be imposed on petitioner should be taken from
the maximum period of the penalty under Art. 315, which is reclusin temporal,
since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, adding one year for each
additional P10,000.00, but the total penalty which may be imposed should not
exceed twenty (20) years.
Since the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of estafa under Art.
315 is prisin mayor in its minimum period if the amount of the fraud exceeds
[30]
P22,000.00, the minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense, which is prisin
correccional in its maximum period. Hence, the minimum period of the penalty
should be from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and can be anywhere within the range of the penalty
next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided.
We are convinced that the appropriate penalty in accordance with law that
can best serve the ends of justice in the case at bar should range from four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisin correccional, as minimum, to
twenty years of reclusin temporal, as maximum, for the crime of estafa under
Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the May 21, 2003 Decision and August 1, 2003 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty
imposed. Appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. is sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisin correccional,
as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusin temporal, as maximum, for the
crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a). He is further ordered to indemnify
the private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan, jointly and severally with Elison
Villaflor, the sum of P480,000.00 with interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum until fully paid.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Working Chairman), Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.
