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Republic of the Philippines

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SUPREME CO(!RT
Manila;l/

RODOLFO C. AQUINO, G.R. No. 209018

Petitioner,

PETitIOI\I FOR REVIEW ON

-versus- CERTIORARI (Cy- G.R. SP No.
02269-MIN)
AMADEA ANGELA
K. AQUINO,
Respondent.
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COMES NOW, the Petitioner, through the unclerst:.Qne

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counsel and unto the Honorable Supreme Court, ig,ost 11. i'

respectfully avers, that:

j' NATURE AND 'fJUVIIIELI-NESS 0-FTHIS-PETETIOl\f _____ ·1

· 1. This is an appeal taken by Petition for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to l1ave the Honorable Supreme Court reverse tile
Decision dated August 23, 2012 and the Resolution
dated August 1, 2013, all issued by the Honorable
Couyt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02269-MIN entitled
Rodolfo C. Aquino versus The Honorable Judge William
M. Layague and Honorable Judge George E. Omelia,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Davao City, 11TH
Judicial Region, and An1adea Angela I<. Aquino for
Certiorari with Prayer for Injunctive Reliefs. Certified
true copies of the Decision dated August 23 2012 and 1

the Resolution dated August 1, 2013 are attachecl

hereto as ANNEXES "An and "IB" while copy of the
Petition for Certiorari in CA-G. R. SP No. 02269-MII\I

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with the Court of Appeals is attached hereto as ANNH:X
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"en .

2. The Decision dated August 23, 2012 wq.s received by

the Petitioner's cou11·sel on September/21, 2012. On
September 25, 20.lz, the Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. On September 4, 2013, the Petitioner
received copy of tl1e Resolution dated August 1, 2013
denying the Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

3. This Petition is being filed within the reglementary

period of fifteen (15) days from date j)•f receipt by the
Petitioner's Counsel on Septembe// 4, 2013 of the
11 11
Resolution dated August 1, 2013 (ANNIEX 8 hereof)
denying the Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
pursuant to Section 2, Ru~e 45 of the Rules of
Court.

THE PARTI!ES -------- _______ --_j

~-----------

1. Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino is of legal age, married,

Filipino citizen, and a resident of J.P. Cabaguio Avenue,
Davao City.

2. Respondent Amadea Angela K. Aquino is of legal age,

single, Filipino citizen, and a resident of Davao City.

1· STATEMENT OF FACTS . _______ I

3. Petitioner Rodoifo C. Aquino is one of the legitin1ate

children of the late spouses Miguel T. Aquino and
An1adea C. Aquino. Spouses Miguel T. Aquino and
Amadea C. Aquino had four legitimate children, namely,
Petitioner Rodol'fo c. Aquino, Arturo C. Aquino, Wilfredo
C. Aquino, and Abdullah C. Aquino.

4. Amadea C. Aquino died on Septen1ber 27, 1977. Her

estate was settled in 1978 in Special Proceeding No.
2159 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, of

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Davao City.

5. Miguel T. Aquino died intestate on July 5, 1999 leaving

several personal and real properties.

6. Petitioner's brothers, Wifreclo C. Aquino and Arturo C.

Aquino, who respectively clied on April 22, 1986 and
January 10, 1978, predeceased their father Miguel T.
Aquino.

STATEMENT Of PERTINENT MATTERS, PROCEEDINGS

AND MATERIAL DATES

7. On May 7, 2003, Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino filed a

Petition entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
the Deceased, Miguel T. Aquino, before the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33. Copy of the
Petition is attached as Annex C of ANNEX "C" hereof.
The case was tl1en re-raffled to Branch 14 ancl was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 6972-2003.

8. In the Petition, Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino

enumerated the nan1es of the surviving heirs of Miguel
T. Aquino, nan1ely:

a. Abdullah C. Aquino, legitimate son from the first

marriage;

b. Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino, legitimate son fron1

the first marriage;

c. Wilfredo C. Aquino, legitin1ate son from the first

marriage who predeceased Miguel T. Aquino but
survived by the following heirs:

c.1. Linda T. Aquino, wife;

c.2. Amparo Milagros T. Aquino, daughter;
c.3. Wilfredo T. Aquino, son;
c.4. Leonardo Miguel T. Aquino, son;
c.5. Leopoldo T. Aquino, son; I

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c.6. Leonor Amadea T. Aquino, daughter.

d. Arturo C. 1l\quino, legitimate son from the first

marriage who _predeceased his parents Amadea C.
Aquino and Miguel T. Aquino;

e. Enerie Bernolo Aquino, Miguel T. Aquino's second

wife.

9. On July 17, 2003, Respondent Amadea Angela I<.

Aquino filed a Motion to be Included in the Distribution
and Partition of Estate (Annex D of ANNEX "(;_::
hereof). Respondent alleged tl1at sl1e is the natural
child of Arturo C. Aquino with Susan Kuan. Respondent
was born in Davao City on October 9, 1978. According
to Respondent, at the time she was conceived, both her
parents were not suffering from any impediment to
marry each other, and the two had already been
planning their wedding but her ~father was killed even
before the wedding could be held and before she was
born.

10. Respondent also ,{1aimed that from the time of her

birth, she has been recognized by the Aquino clan as
the natural child of Arturo C. Aquino, that Miguel T.
Aquino provided for the medical expenses of
Respondent's mother while the latter was still pregnant
with Respondent, that when Respondent was born, she
and her mother lived with the Aquino family at their
ancestral home, that when sl1e was baptized, her
father's brother Abdullah C. Aquino signed in as one of
her godparents" and that she was nan1ed after her
grandmothe1~ Amadea.

11. Respondent further narrated in her motion that

presently she is residing at the Aquino clan's ancestral
home, which is according to her, was in accordance
with the instruction of Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino, that
Miguel T. Aquino supported ber since her birtl1 and
spent for her education from kinder to college and even
bought a policy with the College Assurance Plan in her
favor, that as operator of a cockpit in Davao City,
Miguel T. Aquino causecl tl1e chairs in the coliseum to
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c.6. Leonor Amadea T. Aquino, daughter.

d. Arturo C. Aquino, legitimate son from the first

marriage who predeceased his parents Amadea C.
Aquino and Miguel T. Aquino;

e. Enerie Bernolo Aquino, Miguel T. Aquino's second

wife.

9. On July 17, 2003, Respondent An1adea Angela K.

Aquino filed a Motion to be Included in the Distribution
and Partition of Estate (Annex D of ANNEX "C'~
hereof). Respondent alleged tl1at sl1e is the natural
child of Arturo C. Aquino with Susan Kuan. Respondent
was born in Davao City on October 9, 1978. According
to Respondent, at the time she was conceived, both her
parents were not suffering frorn any impedirnent to
marry each other, and the two had already been
planning their wedding but l1er father was killed even
before the wedding could be held and before she was
born.

10. Respondent also claimed that from the time of her

birth, she has been recognized by the Aquino clan as
the natural child of Arturo C. Aquino, that Miguel T.
Aquino provided for the medical expenses of
Respondent's mother while the latter was still pregnant
with Respondent, that when Respondent was born, she
and her mother lived with the Aquino family at their
ancestral home, that when she was baptized, her
father's brother Abdullah C. Aquino signed in as one of
her godparents, and tllat she was named after her
grandmother, Arnadea.

11. Respondent further narrated in her motion that

presently she is residing at the Aquino clan's ancestral
home, which is according to her, was in accordance
with the instruction of Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino, that
Miguel T. Aquino supported Iler since her birth ancl
spent for her education from kinder to college and even
bought a policy with the College Assurance Plan in her
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favor, that as operator of a cockpit in Davao City,
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be marked at the back with her name "Maggie", that
the Aquinas fondly call her Maggie, and that the
proceeds from the use of the marked chairs went to her
for·support.

12. Respondent averred that before his death, Miguel T.

Aquino dictated to his son, Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino
and grandson Miguel Luis Aquino or Miko, the
distribution of the rnore valuable properties in his
estate. Among the instruction was to give the lot in
front of LTA to her. She finally claimed that to the
employees of the Aquino clan and as well as in the
community they belong, sl1e was l<nown to be a
member of the family.

13. Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino and Abdullah Aquino filed

separate oppositions to the motion of Respondent.
Respondent filed her Manifestation and Reply (Annex E-
l of ANNEX "C" hereof).

14. On February 22, 2005, Angela filed a Motion for

Distribution of Residue of Estate or for Allowance to the
Heirs (Annex F of ANNEX nc" hereof). Petitioner
Rodolfo C. Aquino filed his Opposition (Annex G of
ANNEX 11 C11 hereof).

15. In the Order dated 22 April 2005 (Annex A of ANNIEX

ncn hereof), the Regional Trial Court presided by Judge
William Layague considered and declared Respondent
Amadea Angela K. Aquino as an acknowledged natural
child or legitimated child of Arturo C. Aquino, who may
inherit from the estate of her grandfather Miguel T.
Aquino in representation of her deceased father. The
court likewise directed the administrator Abdullal1 C.
Aquino to give a monthly allowance of P64,000.00 to
Respondent Amadea Angela K. Aquino. The Orcler
dated 22 April 2005 was issued by the court without
conducting hearings in support of the Respondent's
Motion to be Included in the Distribution and Partition
of Estate and Motion for Distribution of Residue of
Estate or for Allowance to the Heirs.

16. Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino and Abdullah Aquino as

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administrator of the estate, filed their separate motions

for reconsideration (Annexes H and I of ANNEX "Cu
hereof). In the Order dated 06 March 2008 (Annex B
of ANNEX "C" hereof), the Regional Trial Court denied
the rnotion for reconsideration declaring that the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino
was deerned withdrawn per Order dated 15 August
2006 and what was left for determination was the
motion for reconsideration of Abdullah C. Aquino.

17. On April 3, 2008, Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino filed with

the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court (ANNEX "C") which petition is
docketed as CA - G.R . . SP No. , 02269-MIN.
Subsequently on April 4, 2008, ·Abdullah C. Aquino also
filed an Appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 01633.

18. In the Decision dated August 23, 2012 (ANNEX "A"),

the Honorable Court of Appeals denied the Petition for
Certiorari basically on tile following grounds:

a. The Petitioner availed of the wrong ren1edy;

b. Even if the Petition for Certiorari is considered as

one of appeal, the case can not prosper without
trampling upon the long established principle
against forum-shopping and litis pendentia.

19. The Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on

September 25, 2012. The Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by the Honorable Court of Appeals in the
Resolution dated August 1, 2013 (ANNEX "B").

20. Hence, this Petition.

[. GROUNDS-FORAlLCfWAN<;:E_JlF THIS l?fETITIO~----=~=j

The Petitioner n1ost respectfully files tile instant Petition

on the following questions of law: 1~ /
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a. Wl1ether or not Respondent Amadea Angela K.

Aquino can still prove her claimed illegitimate
filiation to Arturo C. Aquino after the death of the
latter·
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b. Assuming tl1at Respondent is an illegitimate child
of Arturo C. Aquino, whetl1er or not sl1e could
represent Arturo C. Aquino in the estate of Miguel
T. Aquino;

c. Whether or not Respondent is entitled to the grant

of a monthly allowance of P64,000.00;

d. Whether or not Certiorari under Rule 65 of tl1e

Rules of Court was the proper ,node of review ot=
the assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court;

e. Whether or not the elen1ents of forum shopping

and litis pendentia are present;

f. Assuming that Certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court was not proper, whether or not tl1e
Honorable Court of Appeals after considering the .
petition as an appeal, could have consolidated the
petition with CA-G.R. CV No. 01633.

,- ARGUMEl~TS AND DISCUSSION =]

RESPONDENT AMADEA ANGELA K.

AQUINO CAN NO LONGER PROVE HER
CLAIMED IlLEGXTIMATE FILIATION TO
ARTURO C. AQUINO AIFTER THIE DIEATH
Of THE LATTER

21. There was adn1ission by all parties including

Respondent herself that she was born after the death of
her alleged father Arturo Aquino, that she coulcl not
have been acknowledged by the latter, and that she
sought recognition on the basis of the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitin1ate
child.

22. on the basis or tile estalJlisl1ed facts wl1icl1 are not

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disputed by the parties, it is very clear that Respondent
is already barred from asserting her clain1 of
illegitimate filiation under Articles 175 and 172 of the
Fan1ily Code. The Honorable Supreme Court in the
case of UYGUAIN!GCO versus COURT OIF APP!EAlS
(G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989) applying
Articles 175 and 172 of the Family Code, clearly and
unequivocally stated that an illegitimate child who
seeks to establish his filiation by any other n1eans
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws like his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a fan1ily
Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, or the testimonies of witnesses, can only do so
during the lifetime of the putative parent. Any action
founded on the afore-mentioned pieces of evidence
after the death of the putative parent is already barred
as the latter, being already dead, can no longer be
heard on the claim of his alleged child's illegitimate
filiation, viz:

"The issue before the Court is not the status

of the private respondent, who has been
excluded from the family and inheritance of
the petitioners. What we are asked to decide
is whether he should be allowed to prove that
he is an illegitimate child of his claimed
father, who is already dead, in the absence of
the documentary evidence required by the
Civil Code.

Xxx
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Under the Family Code, it is provided that:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish

their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The following provision is therefore also

available to the private respondent in proving
his illegitimate filiation:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is

establishecl by any of the following:

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(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a

public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the

legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
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(1) The open and continuous possession of r)
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the status of a legitimate child; or
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(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.

While the private respondent has admitted

that he has none of the documents
mentioned in the first paragraph (which are
practically the same documents mentioned in
Article 2 78 of the Civil Code except for the
"private handwritten instrument signed by
the parent himself"'), he insists that he has
nevertheless been "in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," which is now also admissible as
evidence of filiation.

Thus, he claims that he lived with his father

from 1967 until 1973, receiving support from
hin1 during that time; that he has been using
the surname Uyguangco without objection
ti-om his father and the petitioners as shown
in his high school diploma, a special power of
attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea
Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio
Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits
of the copra business of the Uyguangcos,
which is a strictly fa,nily business; that he
was a director, together with the petitioners,
of the Alu and Sons Development
Corporation, a fan,i/y corporation; and that in
the addendum to the ·original extrajudicia/
settlement concluded by the petitioners he

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was given a share in his deceased father's
estate.
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It must be added that the illegitimate child is ,/11

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now also allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by "any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws," like his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been
entered, cornmon reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of
proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.

The problen1 of the private respondent,

however, is that, since he seeks to prove his
filiation under the second paragraph of Article
172 of the Family Code, his action is now
barred because of his alleged father's death
in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article
175 reads as follows:

The action n1ust be brought within the same

period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article 172, in which case the action may
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. (Italics supplied.)

It is clear that the private respondent

can no longer be allowed at this time to
introduce evidence of his open and
continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child or prove his alleged
filiation through any of the means
allowed by the Rules of Court or special
laws. The simple reason is that
Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead
and can no longer be /heard on the claim
of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.

Xxx" (Emphasis supplied)

23. While filiation n1ay be determined in tl1e special

proceeding for the purpose of determining whether a

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person has a share in the estate of tile deceasecl
person, such can no longer be clone in tl7e instant case
when the claimant in the first place is already barred
from asserting recognition or acknowledgment. As
further elaborated in the case of UYGUANGCO versus
COURT Of APPE.AlS, supra:

"Graciano 's complaint is based on his

contention that he is the illegitimate child of
Apolinario Uyguangco, whose estate is the
subject of the partition sought. If this clailn
can no longer be proved in an action for
recognition, with more reason should it
be rejected in the said complaint, where ii

the issue of Graciano 's filiation is being

raised only collaterally. The complaint is
indeed a circumvention of Article 172,
which allo,ws proof of the illegitimate
child's filiation under the second
paragraph thereof only during the
lifetime of the alleged parent."
(Emphasis supplied)

ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT IS AN

JtllEGITIMATE CHILD Of ARTURO C.
AQUINO, SHE IS PROHIBITED UNDER
ARTICLE 992 Of THE NEW CIVIL CODIE
TO REPRESENT ARTURO C. AQUINO IN
THE ESTATE Of MIGUEL T. AQUINO

24. Assuming for tile sake of argument that Responclent is

indeed an illegitimate child of Arturo Aquino, still she
could not represent her father Arturo Aquino in the
estate of Miguel Aquino. It was not disputed that
Arturo C. Aquino was a legitimate child of decedent
Miguel T. Aquino and that Respondent, assuming for tile
sake of argument that she was indeed a child of Arturo
C. Aquino, was born out of wedlock, hence, illegitimate.
This being the case, she is barred to inherit from the
legitimate family of her putative father under the iron
bar rule in Article 992 of the New Civil Code.

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25. In the case of DIAZ, IET. Al. versus INTIERMEDIATIE

APPEL/LATE COURT (G.R. No. IL-66574, June 17,
1987), a similar case where the illegitirnate children
sought to represent their father in the estate of their
grandmother, the Supreme Court declared:

"Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since

the hereditary conflict refers solely to the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, w/10 is the legitimate mother of
Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the
provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which
reads as follows:

'ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no

right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children
or relatives inherit in the same n1anner
from the illegitimate child. (943a)

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not

an illegitin1ate child. On the other hand, the
oppositors (petitioners herein) are the
illegitin1ate children. of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a

barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitirnate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother
of said legitimate child. They n1ay have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between
the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presu,ned to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the family is in
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of

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the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the illegitimate child nothing but the product
of sin, palpable evidente of a blemish broken I
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in life; the law does no more than recognize ,,1

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this truth, by avoiding further grounds of ;,

resentment.

Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent

their father Pablo Santero in the succession
of the letter to the intestate estate of his
legitimate n1other Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, because of the barrier provided for
11
under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

26. The Regional Trial Court tl1rough I-Ion. Judge George E.

Omelio in the Order dated March 6, 2008, ruled that
Article 992 of the New Civil Code cannot be applied in
the case at bench because Respondent is not an
illegitimate child but an acknowledged natural child.
With all due respect, this ruling is in direct contradiction
to the settled jurisprudence that Article 992 of the New
Civil Code applies as well to acknowledged natural
children. The case of PASCUAL versus PASCUAL-
BAUTISTA, ET. AL. (G.R. No. 84240, March 25,,
1992), is instructive, to wit:

"The main issue to be resolved in the case at

bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized natural children from the
inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall
squarely within the purview of Article 992 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized and of the
doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA
645 [1987]) because being acknowledged
natural children, their illegitimacy is not due
to the subsistence of a prior marriage when
such children were under conception (Rollo,
p. 418). q
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Otherwise stated they say the term 1 '?

"illegitimate" children as provided in Article
992 must be strictly construed to refer only
to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419)."

Xxx
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired
by the petitioner may be Inore humane but it
is also an elen1entary rule in statutory
construction that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly
what it says. (Baranda v. Gusti/a, 165 SCRA
758-759 [1988]). The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words (Aparri v.
CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is
clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It
must be applied regardless of who ,nay be
affected, even if the Jaw may be harsh or
onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil.
42). And even granting that exceptions may
be conceded, the same as a general rule,
should be strictly but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exception. Thus, where a
general rule is established by statute, the
court will not curtail the fonner nor add to
the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A.,
145 SCRA 654 [1986]).

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to

both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 1. 76 of the !Family

Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one categon1r
which undoubtedly settles the issue as
to wheth(~r, or not acl<rroowledged natural
children should be treated differently, in
the negative,,
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It may be said that the law may be harsh but

that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX). 11
(En1phasis supplied)
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i
i·
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE i

GRANT OF A MONTHLY ALLOWANCIE Of

1?64,000.00

27. The Regional Trial Court granted allowance to

Respondent purportedly under Section 3, Rule 83 of the ,ii
I

Rules of Court, which is in the nature of a provisional

support pending the settlement of the estate. While a
provisional support may indeed be allowed, such n1ay
be granted only to the surviving spouse and children of
the deceased.

28. Assu111ing that indeed Respondent is a granddaughter

of the late Miguel T. Aquino, tile Supreme Court in the
case of THE IES7rATIE OF HJ.ClARIO M. RUIZ vs.
COURT Of APPEALS (G.lR. No. 11867:L Ja111uanl
29, 1996), held that grandchildren are not entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the decedent's
estate, viz:

11
ft is settled that allowances for support
under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be
limited to the "1ninor or incapacitated"
children of the deceased. Article 188 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive
law in force at the time of the testator's
death, provides that during the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, the deceased's
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of
their age, civil status or gainful employment,
are entitled to provisional support from the
funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the
fact that the right and duty to support,
especially the right to education, subsist even
beyond the age of n1ajority.

15

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Be that as .it map1, grandchildren are not

entitled to provisional support from the
funds of the decedent's estate. The lanN
clearht limits the allowance to "widow
and childreHn" and does not extend it to
the deceas43cJ's grandchildren, regardless
of their minority or incapacity. It was
error, therefore, for the appellate court
to sustain the probate court's order
granting an allowance to the
grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate." (Ernphasis
supplied)

CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE

RULES Of COURT WAS THIE PROPER
MODE OF REVIEW OIF THIE ASSAILED
ORDERS OF THIE REGIONAL TRIAl
COURT

29. The Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the

Court of Appeals on the ground that the assailed orders
(Annexes A and B of ANNEX "Cu hereof) dated April
22, 2005 and March 6, 2008, respectively, granting
Respondent's twin motions to be included in the
partition of the estate of the late Miguel T. Aquino and
for allowance, and denying the Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereon, were both issued with grave
abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction and are not
in accord with the laws and jurisprudence on the
111atter.

30. As held in the case of FEDERAL !BUILDERS, INC. vs.

DAIICHI l?ROPIERTIES AND IDEV!ElOPMIENT, INC.
(G.R. No. 142S25a: febn·uaR"Y 1311 2009):

"Xxx there is grave abuse of discretion where

the court, tribunal, board or officer acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of its/his Judgn1ent as

16

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20
to be said to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. "

31. In the case of AGRARIAN RIEfORM BENIEFICIARIIES

ASSOCIATION (ARBA) vs. NICOLAS (G.R. INo.
168394, October 6, 2008), the Honorable Supreme
Court held that:

"Xxx. The purpose of the remedy of certiorari

is to annul void proceedings; prevent
unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal
authority; and provide for a fair and orderly
administration of justice.

32. The Regional Trial Court clearly acted capriciously,

whimsically, arbitrarily, and despotically in the exercise
of their judgn1ent. Despite the very direct and
categorical provisions of law and the settled and
consistent jurisprudence on the matters in issue, the
Regional Trial Court proceeded to render judgment in
clear disregard of the law.

33. First, despite the admission by Respondent that she

was born after the death of her alleged father and
could not have been acknowledged by the latter, and
that she sought recognition on the basis of the open
and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child which action is already barred upon
the death of the putative father, the Regional Trial
Court granted her motion citing estoppel on the part of
the relatives of the putative father. In support of this
justification of estoppel, the Regional Trial Court cited
the case of Aparicio, et. al. vs. Praguya (G.R. No. L-
29771, May 29, 1987), which, with all due respect, is
not applicable to the instant case and has long been
abrogated by the express provision of the Family Code
and subsequent jurisprudence discussed above.

34. Second, the Regional Trial Court also capriciously,

whimsically, arbitrarily, and despotically disregarded the
very clear and categorical provision of Article 992 of the

17 4~
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2'1
New Civil Code as well as several jurisprudence on the
matter, in holding that Respondent is entitled to a share
in the estate of Miguel T. Aquino as representative of
Arturo C. Aquino. Such disregard cannot simply be
mistaken as error of law inasmuch as this ,natter was jI
f
clearly argued by the Petitioner and Abdullah C. Aquino
in their pleadings, supported by established
jurisprudence. Such disregard could only have been
whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary.

35. Third, the Regional Trial Court acted arbitrarily,

capriciously, whimsically, and despotically in directing
that a monthly allowance of P64,000.00 should be
given to Respondent. Jurisprudence clearly negates the
authority or discretion of the court to grant such an
allowance as the rules only allow a grant of provisional
support to the surviving spouse and children of tile
decedent, clearly and unequivocally excluding
grandchildren.

36. Worse, the Regional Trial Court issued · the assailed

Orders without conducting any hearing for the·
presentation of evidence either as to the question of
filiation or to the grant of allowance to Respondent.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Respondent
I11ay be allowed under the law to present proof of
recognition, the Regional Trial Court in issuing the
assailed Orders, merely adopted all the allegations of
Respondent. Because there was no hearing conducted,
the Petitioner was not even given the chance to cross-
examine Respondent on her allegations. This
haphazard manner of resolving the issues violated the
express provision n1andated in Ru~e 90, Section l. of
the Revised Rules of Court which states:

"Sec. 1. When order for distribution of

residue made. - Xxx. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the
controversv. shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.

18
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Xxx. ' (Emphasis supplied)

37. Furthermore, the Order for the grant of an allowance is

interlocutory as this is merely incidental to the judicial
proceedings. An order for the grant of allowance is not
an1ong the orders or judgrnents expressly enumerated
under Section 1, Rule 109 of tl1e Rules of Court to be
appealable. Such order is not a final order or judgment
rendered in the case as in fact, the estate is not yet
finally distributed.

38. Lastly, it is recognized in jurisprudence tllat tllere are

cases when certiorari may be granted despite tl1e
availability of an appeal. As held in the case of ILOilO
LA filIPINA UVGONGCO CORPORATION vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 170244, November
28, 2007)~

Indeed there are instances when certiorari

was granted despite the availability of appeal
such as: (a) when public welfare and the
advancen1ent of public policy dictates; (b)
when the broader interest of justice so
requires; (c) when the writs issued are null
and void; or ( d) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority. Xxx."

39. Hence, the Honorable Court of Appeals should have

taken cognizance of the Petition for Certiorari as one
such exception on the ground that the questioned
orders in this case clearly amount to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority. As already discussed, the
Regional Trial Court did not n1erely commit an error in
the appreciation of evidence or error of law. Instead,
tile Regional Trial Court deliberately disregarded the
law, rules, and applicable jurisprudence in declaring
that Respondent is an acknowledged natural child
entitled to represent her putative father in the estate of \.ii,
her alleged grandfather, and acted without authority in I
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granting her a monthly allowance.

40. Verily, the assailed Orders having been issued with

grave abuse of discretion and involving an interlocutory
order, there is ground for the Petitioner to assail the
acts of the Regional Trial Court by way of Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

THIE ELEMENTS on= !FORUM Sll-·DOPPING

AND LITIS IPIENDENTIA ARE NOT
PRESENT

41. The Petitioner did not commit the abhorred practice of

forum shopping. As held in the case of CHAVEZ vs.
COURT OF APPEALS {G.R. No. l.74356, Janua,ry
20, 2010):

"By forum shopping, a party initiates two or

more actions in separate tribunals, grounded
on the sarne cause, trusting that one or the
other tribunal would favorably dispose of the
matter. The elements of forum shopping are
the same as in litis pendentia where the final
judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other. The elements of forum
shopping are: {1) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as would represent the
same interest in both actions; (2) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and
(3) identity of the two preceding particulars
such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will,, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration."

42. It is wortlly to note tllat the Petitioner instituted only

one action, that is, the instant Petition for Certiora:ri.
Moreover, he filed the instant Petition on April 3, 2008,
ahead of the filing of the appeal by his brother Abdullah

06
20
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C. Aquino in CA-G.R. CV No. 01633 which was filed on

April 4, 2008. The Petitioner could not have known 11:1

that his brother Abdullah C. Aquino would fife an appeal l

q
which is now CA-G.R. CV No. 01633. The subsequent
institution of appeal by Abdullah Aquino in CA-G.R. cv, i
I
11!,,
,

No. 01633 was beyond the ctontrol of the Petitioner. lIi'i I

:1
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43. There is no identity of parties. Petitioner Rodolfo C. i\

I

Aquino did not institute CA-G.R. CV No. 01633. I-le is

not a party therein, and his brother Abdullah C. Aquino
is not also a party in the instant case. :i
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I
44. Although referring to the same Orders, the purpose of I

the instant Petition is to annul the void proceedings, ti

J/'
prevent unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal
authority; and provide for a fair and orderly
I: I
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administration of justice. On the other hand, the

purpose of the appeal is to review errors in the
appreciation of evidence or errors of law.

45. In the case of JOSE versus JAVELLANA (G.R. No.

158239, January 25, 2012.}, the Supreme Court
recognized that there was no forum shopping when the
same litigant filed a notice of appeal and petition for
certiorari against the san1e orders because the appeal,
,I
and the petition for certiorari actually sought different
objectives. The appeal was a continuity of the civil ,,
t
case decided by the RTC while the petition for certiorari
dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave
abuse of discretion an1ounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. We quote pertinent
portions of the said decision, to wit:

"Sl1ould Javellana's present appeal now

be held barred by his filing of the petition for
certiorari in the CA when llis appeal in that
court was yet pending?

We are aware that in Young v. SY,, 1 [31]

in which the petitioner filed a notice of appeal
to elevate the orders concerning the
disn1issal of her case due to non-suit to the I
21

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CA and a petition for certiorari in the CA
assailing the same orders four months later~
the Court ruled that the successive filings of
the notice of appeal and the petition for
certiorari to attain the saI11e objective of
nullifying the trial. court's dismissal orders
constituted foru111 shopping that warranted
the dismissal of both cases. The Court said:

\ 1,·.1
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Ineluctably, the petitioner, by f!
filing an ordinary appeal and a
\.r
petition for certiorari with the )I
'/

CA, engaged in forum shopping. I/,!

'i

Wl1en tile petitioner commenced :·11

1,11
1,11.,
the appeal, only four months had ··1.':

elapsed prior to her filing with the ·1·1

CA the Petition for Certiorari under ; f)

i

Rule 65 and which eventually can1e i: JJ

up to this Court by way of the
instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The
elements of litis pendentia are
present between the two suits. As
the CA,. through its Thirteenth
Division, correctly noted, both suits
are founded on exactly the san1e
facts and refer to the san1e subject
matter-the RTC Orders which
dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703
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(2000) for failure to prosecute. In I,''

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both cases, the petitioner is \
seeking the reversal of the RTC
orders. The parties, the rights
asserted, the issues professed, and
the reliefs prayed for, are all tile
same. It is evident that the
judg111ent of one forun1 may
an1ount to res Judicata in the other.
xxxx
The remedies of appeal and
certiorari under Rule 65 are
I11utually exclusive and not
alternative or cun1ulative. This is a
firm judicial policy. The petitioner
cannot hedge her case by wagering

22

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two or more appeals, and, in the
event that the ordinary appeal lags
significantly behind the others, she
cannot post facto validate this
circumstance as a demonstration
that the ordinary appeal had not
been speedy or adequate enough,
in order to justify tl1e recourse to
Rule 65. This practice, if adopted,
would sanction the filing of multiple
suits in multiple fora, wl1ere each
one, as the petitioner couches it,
becomes a "precautionary
11
n1easure for the rest, thereby
increasing the chances of a
favorable decision. This is the very
evil that the proscription on forum
sl1opping seeks to put right. In
Guaranteed f-lotels, Inc. v. Ba/tao,
the Court stated that the grave evil
sought to be avoided by the rule
against forun1 shopping is the
rendition by two competent
tribunals of two separate and
contradictory decisions.
Unscrupulous party litigants, taking
advantage of a variety of
cornpetent tribunals, may
repeatedly try their luck in several
different fora until a favorable
result is reached. To avoid the
resultant confusion, the Court
adheres strictly to the rules against
forum shopping, and any violation
of these rules results in the
dismissal of the case. 1 [32]

The same result was reached in Zosa v.

1
Estrella, [33] which likewise involved the
successive filing of a notice of appeal and a
petition for certiorari to challenge the same
orders, with the Court upholding the CA's
dismissals of the appeal and the petition for
certiorari through separate decisions.

23
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Yet, the outcon1e in Young v. Sy and

"1
<, '7
Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here even if the
orders of the RTC being challenged through
appeal and the petition for certiorari were the
same. The unjustness exists because the
appeal and the petition for certiorari actually
sought different objectives. In his appeal in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to
undo the RTC's erroneous dismissal of Civil
Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his
judicial dernand for specific performance to
be triecl and detern1ined in due course by the
RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the
ostensible objective "to prevent (Priscilla)
from developing the subject property and
from proceeding with the ejectment case
until his appeal is finally resolved, 11 as the CA
explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 60455. 1 [34]

Nor were the clangers that the adoption

of the judicial policy against forum shopping
designed to prevent or to eliminate
attendant. The first danger, i.e., the
multiplicity of suits upon one and the same
cause of action, would not materialize
considering that the appeal was a continuity
of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent
ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e.,
the unethical malpractice of shopping for a
friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable
ruling or judgment after not getting it in tile
appeal, would not arise because the CA had
not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of
the filing of the petition for certiorari."

46. As pointed out by the Petitioner, although there were

two pending actions directed against the same orders,
such actions sought different objectives. CA-G. R. CV
No. 01633 was an appeal which continued the issues
raised in the RTC while CA - G. R. SP No. 02269-MIN

Q-J
24

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28
dealt with the independent ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
which rendered the assailed orders and the proceedings
leading thereto a nullity.

47. Most importantly, the unethical malpractice of shopping

for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling
or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, did not
arise insofar as the Petitioner was concerned because
when he filed the Petition for Certiorari before the Court
of Appeals, no other similar case was pending therein
and he did not institute any other similar case
subsequent to his filing of tl1e Petition for Certiorari.

ASSUMING THAT CERTIORARI UNDER

RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT WAS
NOT PROPER, THE HONORABLE COURT
Of APPEALS AFTER CONSIDERING THE
PETITION AS AN APPEAL, COULD HAVE
CONSOLIDATED THE PETITION WJl:'fH
CA-G.R. CV NO. 01633

48. Assuming tl1at tile Petitioner availed of the wrong

ren1edy of Certiorari, the Honorable Court of Appeal;s
itself recognized that tile instant Petition could he
treated as one of appeal in the interest of substantial I

justice. There is no in1pediment for such treatn1ent

considering that the instant Petition was filed w~II
within the reglementary period for taking an appeal and
was even filed ahead of CA-G.R. CV No. 01633. In tl1e
case of DEPARTMENT Of AGRARIAN REFORM vs.
BERENGUER (G.R. No. 154094, March 9, 20101,
the Supreme Court clarified:

"Procedural Issue: Treatment of Respondents

Petition for Certiorari as Petition for Review,
Sustainable

I,
25
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29
The petitioner posits that the CA erred in not
dismissing the respondents erroneously filed
petition for certiorari, and in treating the
petition instead as a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and ultimately
resolving the petition in the respondents
favor.

We cannot accept the petitioners position.

The CA did not err in treating the petition for

certiorari as a petition for review. There are
precedents in that regard. In Depart,nent of
Education 11. Cuanan, this Court ruled that
the petition for certiorari filed_ by ·therein
respondent Cuanan with the CA within the
15-day reglementary period for filing a
petition for review could be treated as a
petition for review, for that would be in
accord with the liberal spirit pervading the
Rules of Court and in the interest of
substantial justice. The Court had occasion to
expound on the exceptions to the rule that a
recourse to a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 rendered the petition dismissible for
being the wrong remedy, thus:

The ren1edy of an aggrieved party from a

resolution issued by the CSC is to file a
petition for review thereof under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court within fifteen days from
notice of the resolution. Recourse to a

26

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 !'.if> :-----11i
.,\,✓

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders 3(}

the petition dlsmlssible for being the wrong

remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to
this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and
the advancement of public policy dictates;
(b) when the broader interest of justice so
requires; (c) when the writs issued are
null and void; or ( d) when the questioned

order amounts to an oppressive exercise of

judicial authority. As will be shown forthwith/
exception (c) applies to the present case."

49. Because the Honorable Court of Appeals as well a/s a

number of jurisprudence recognized that a Petition/ for
Certiorari may be treated as an appeal, and considering I

that Petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari ahead of

CA-G.R. CV No. 01633, and Petitioner even file,tl a
Motion for Consolidation dated March 19, 2009 which
was unopposed and an Ex-Parte Motion to Res:olve
Consolidation dated June 29, 2009, the more prudent I

action as weli as the one that would promote judicial I

economy and the better ends of justice was not to
dismiss the Petitioner's petition but to consolidate the
same with CA--G.R. CV NO. 01633 and resolve: the
consolidated cases on the 111erits. Consolidation o;f- the
two cases was proper inasmuch as under Section 3(a),
of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
consolidation of cases may be allowed when the cases
involve the same parties and/or related questions of
fact and/or law.

so. By consolidation, the apprehension of the Hon0rable

I
Court of Appeals that a ruling in either one will :affect
the other would have been effectively resolved.

51. Thus, there was clearly no justifiable reason f~r tile

dismissal by the Honorable Court of Appeals of the
Petition for Certiorari.

27
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..'
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders 30
the petition dismissib/e for being the wrong

.1·' ren7edy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to

this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and
the advancement of public policy dictates; ·
(b) when the broader interest of justice so
requires; (c) when the writs issued are
,.
null and void; or ( d) when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of ·
Judicial authority. As will be shown forthwith,
exception (c) applies to the present case."

49. Because the Honorable Court of Appeals as well c,3s a

number of jurisprudence recognized that a Petition for
Certiorari may be treated as an appeal, and consid~ring
that Petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari ahead of
CA-G.R. CV No. 01633, and Petitioner even filed a
Motion for Consolidation dated March 19, 2009 V\{hich
was unopposed and an Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve
Consolidation dated June 29, 2009, the more pru/dent
action as well as the one that would promote judicial
economy and tl1e better ends of justice was n6t to
dismiss the Petitioner's petition but to consolidate the
same with CA-G.R. CV NO. 01633 and resolvd the
consolidated cases on the merits. Consolidation oif the
two cases was proper inasmuch as under Section IS(a),
of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
consolidation of cases may be allowed when the ¢ases
involve the san1e parties and/or related questions of
fact and/or law.

50. By consolidation, the apprehension of the Honorable

I
Court of Appeals that a ruling in either one will affect
I

the other would have been effectively resolved.

51. Thus, there was clearly no justifiable reason fo;r the

dismissal by the Honorable Court of Appeals of the
Petition for Certiorari.

27

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PRAYER J 31

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is n1ost

respectfully prayed of the Honorable Supreme Court that tl~e
Decision dated August 23, 2012 and the Resolution dated
August 1, 2013, be reversed and that the instant Petition be
I

given due course and granted.

The Petitioner prays for such other reliefs which are

just and equitable in the premises.

Respectfully submitted this 1gti, day of September,

2013, at Davao City (for Manila), Philippines.

The Law Offices of

BYEG lAW BALTAZAR YANGYANG
ESPEJO & GALICIA

2ND FLOOR, ROOM 5, BASISTA BUILDING

PALIVIA GIL STREET, DAVAO CITY

--
TELEFAX NO. (082) 305-9574 /

By:

¥AN~~
cognsel(for the Petif~ne1
IBP OR No. 84433/01-02-20 3/Q1avao City
PTR No. 13 7001/01-04-2013 Davao City
MCLE Compliance No. IV-0015924; April 8, 2013
Roll No. 48006
~·

AT~Y.~~B~O
Counsel for tht,Petitioner
IBP OR No. 912808/01-08-13 Davao City
PTR No. 2446945/01-09-13 Davao City
MCLE Compliance No. III-0014119/04-23-10
MCLE Compliance No. IV-0021943/09-13-13
Roll No. 48929

28
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_Q 11"1l
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Copy furnished:
"'{ Y J.rn CE l.ll)'f 1
'•,~11,,1:,~·vrt?p /
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE H~,'fl' b~~.\

RTC, Branch 14, Davao City

·:,:'.? r~•r:fifrl~r··--:
:age
Registry Receipt No.: 01 Date: Sep. t Dt,>13 ____. .19. \,·-····-·
.

J. .oLr.c-l.i;istcirc-dJmuii i:
ATTY. BIENVEN.IDO D. CARIAGA ,mcc but the sendc1
ic:, of addrc:5~cc ou bad
Counsel for Respondent
Cariaga Law Offices
2 nd Floor, Cariaga Bldg., Mt. Apo St., Davao Cit)
~i])t in cu~if
11t.ificatiou, ljrcscn•r,; a11
iuquiry.

Registry Receipt I\Jo.: o:~ Date: Sep. Poslmn,i, j_

ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION REGALA & CRL
1tj,1i1.1i11:1~v ltR,~Jr
JJJ'J.' ___
l'"Jll ·}i•··-f,l:;,t lf,- fl"/l ·.
Counsel for Abdullah Aquino Hl!.. ~~l;tJ
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HRS. OF WILFREDO C. AQUINO _Jt al: the post onicc hut '.the scndc1
c/o Mrs. Linda T. Aquino ,ould write IlllUlC of nddl'Ci:i~CC on bucl
J.P. Cabaguio Ave., Davao City crcof as im identification. Brcscrvo mi
mbmil: f.hiri rnccipt in cnse oJftuquiry.
Registry Receipt No.: 04 Date: S _,,,
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MRS. ENERIE B. AQUINO -:r :- .,
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J.P. Cabaguio Ave., Davao City d'A mCfJ:1:1f.
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kept al: the post onlcc bu~ ·111e scnqcr

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- - - -- - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- ---- ---· - -- { - ,L_. --1 3'u

V)

I, RODOLFO C. AQUINO, Filipino, of legal age, married,

and a resident of J.P. Cabaguio Ave., Davao City, after
having been sworn to in accordance with law, hereby dep0se
and say that:

1. I an1 the Petitioner in the above-entitled case;

2. I have caused the filing and preparation of tl1e

foregoing Petition for Review on Certiorari;

3. I have read the contents of the foregoing Petition, and

the allegations therein are true and correct of Jli1Y
personal knowledge and based on authentic records;

4. I have not heretofore commenced any action or fil~d

any claim involving the same issues in any cour:t,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of nny
knowledge, aside from CA-G.R. CV No. 01633 filed QY
Abdullah C. Aquino, no such other action or claim is
pending therein;

5. If I would thereafter learn that the sarne or sin1ilar

i
action or claim has been filed or is pending, I shall
report such fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
Honorable Court.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hat~d

this _ _ day of SEP 1 8 2013 , 2013, at Davao City,
Philippines.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me at Davao Ci~y,

this _ _ day of Sf P 1 8 20"13 , 2013, affiant RODOLFO ~-
AQUINO exhibited to me his Senior Citizen Identification
Card No. 53869, issued on June 20~.QQ)petent proof of
identity.

~
✓-
4; ~l RS:~
Doc. No.
Page No.
~-::; ;
/2 ;
Nat2
Jt=s
o/~1 ~~14
P-t1~c/Unti11
RoliNo.48~~
Book No. I ; IBP No. 91280B/01-0B•13 D.C
PTR No. 2446945/01-09-13D.C.
Series of 2013. SN: 238-2013 Palma Gil St., D.C.
MCLE Cdmplimnce No. lll-0014119/04-23-10
JO Mct../i Co11JjJ/1'atJa /Jo. 1,J -l(),J;q41 I <fl· la,µ
 {(I
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t"'f)$
t\t:1)',!l/
1 (~.;
Hep.:ublic of the Philippines S.S.} 3 41
,Cityiof Davao
·x-~--::-------------------------x
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE /

,: I, ELAINE C. HINGPIT, Filipino, of legal age, single, and a resident of

0av~o City, after having been sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose
: and ;say that:
', II ,
1. I am the Legal Clerk of the Baltazar, Yangyang, Espejo, and Galicia Law
Offices;

, 2.
I

On 18 September 20-13, I served a copy of the Petition for Review 0n

Certiorari to the following by registered mail due to tim and distance 7
constraints:

, Hon. Presiding Judge Registry Receipt No.: 01

RTC, Branch 14, Davao City
· Atty. Bienvenido D. Cariaga Registry Receipt No.: 02
Counsel for Respondent
Cariaga Law Offices
2nd Floor, Cariaga Bldg., Mt. Apo St., Davao City

Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz Registry Receipt No.: 03

Counsel for Abdullah Aquino
11/F, Pryce Tower, Pryce Business Park
J.P. Laurel Ave., Davao City

Hrs. of Wilfredo C. Aquino Registry Receipt No.: 04

c/o Mrs. Linda T. Aquino
J.P. Cabaguio Ave., Davao City

Mrs. Enerie B. Aquino Registry Receipt No.: 05

J.P. Cabaguio Ave., Davao City

3. On the same date, I likewise filed the Petition for Review on Certiorpri
before the Honorable Supreme Court, Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila by
registered mail due to time and distance constraints under Registry
Receipt No. 06;

4. I am executing this Affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts, arcl
for whatever legal purpose this may serve.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I ~ve ~reunto set my hand this 18u1 day of

September, 2013 at Davao City, Ph/I/AP.J}!fes.
~1/

· SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN ¥0 before me at Davao City, Philippines, tl~is

111
18 day of September, 2013, affiant_E.LAIN::: C. HINGPIT exhibited to me her
, Post<:1I ID No. 2991855, valid until 1/25/2016 as co pet~roof
of identity.. .--

Do N
· Pa~~ No~
t·~ '.
'---_ ,/
'JESS·~ HAEL B. pSPi<, v ~
.

Notary Public/Until o~....s-f. 2014

·,?/

Book No: ! Roll No. 48929

·. •Series of 20·13 IBP No. 912808/01-08-13 D.C.
. PTR No. 2446945/01-09-13 D.C.
SN: 238-2013 Palma Gil St., D.C.
MCLE Compliance No. lll-0014119/04-23-10
MCLE Compliance No. IV-0021943/09-13-·t 3