Constitutional Construction

Verba Legis; wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.

Ration Legis Est Anima; where there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the Intent of its framers.

Ut Magi Valeat Quam Pereat; the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. (Francisco v HoR)

Accountability of Public Officers

Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives. (Art XI Sec 1, Constitution)

Impeachment Process

The power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the
Constitution. (Corona v Senate)

Impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-
third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House.
(Francisco v House of Representatives)

No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year. (Art XI, Sec 3(5))

An impeachment proceeding would be considered as “initiated” upon the filing and endorsement even of a
baseless impeachment complaint. (Political Law, Cruz 2014)

Impeachable Officers

(1) The President,

(2) Vice President,
(3) Members of the Supreme Court,
(4) Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
(5) the Ombudsman.

All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. (Art XI, Sec 2, Constitution)

Grounds for Impeachment

Conviction for culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust are grounds for impeachment. (Art XI, Sec 2, Constitution)

Filing of an Impeachment Complaint

(1) any Member of the House of Representatives;

(2) any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof;
(3) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House.
(Rule II, Sec 2, Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings)

Procedure:

• Verified complaint filed with the Office of the Secretary General

• Office of the Secretary General refers verified complaint to the Speaker
• Speaker includes complaint to the Order of Business w/in 10 session days from receipt

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 • Referred to the Committee on Justice
• The Impeachment Process is deemed initiated at this point
• Committee on Justice determines whether complaint is sufficient in form and substance
• Committee on Justice conducts a hearing and obtains a majority vote of all its Members
• Committee on Justice submits Articles of Impeachment to the House
• 1/3 votes of all the Members of the House is required for it to be endorsed to the Senate
• Senate conducts the trial and either convicts or acquits the public official.

Amendment v. Revision

Amendment refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved
(Lambino v Comelec)

Revision alters a basic principle of the Constitution; it alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as
when the change affects substantial provisions of the Constitution. (Lambino v Comelec)

Amendment refers to isolated or piecemeal change only, as distinguished from revision, which is a revamp or
rewriting of the whole instrument. (Cruz 2014)

Proposal

Any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, as a constituent assembly, upon a vote of ¾ of all its Members;
(2) A constitutional convention; (Art XVII, Sec 1)
(3) People’s Initiative* (Art XVII, Sec 2)

*Through the method of initiative, the people may propose only amendments and not a revision. (Cruz 2014)

The Congress may, by a vote of 2/3 of all its Members call a constitutional convention. (Art XVII, Sec 3)

Amendments to this petition may be directly proposed by the people through initiative. (Art XVII, Sec 2)
However, the foregoing system of initiative is not self executory; although the Constitution has recognized or
granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation. (Santiago v Comelec)

R.A. 6735 only grants the people power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject with respect to laws,
ordinances, or resolutions. It further grants the people power to propose to amend the Constitution; it does
not however, accord them the power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject in whole or in part, the
Constitution. (Santiago v Comelec)

Two essential elements must be present in proposing amendments though people’s initiative. First, the people
must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second,
as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in the petition. (Lambino v Comelec)

A proposal to amend the Constitution should be submitted to the people not separately from but together with
all the other amendments to be proposed. (Tolentino v Comelec)

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Ratification

For Constituent Assembly and Constitutional Commission: Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision. (Art XVII, Sec 4(1))

For People’s Initiative: Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition. (Art XVII, Sec 4(2))

Plebiscite

The electoral process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected
by the people. (Sec 3, R.A. 6735)

To ensure the needed careful study of the proposed amendments, it is now required that the plebiscite be held
not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such proposal. (Almario v Alba)

There is nothing in the provisions of Article XV to indicate that the ‘election’ therein referred to is a ‘special’,
not a general, election. The circumstances that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been
submitted to the people for ratification in special elections obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. (Gonzales v Comelec)

Marbury v Madison

When John Adams lost his re-election bid to Thomas Jefferson in 1800, he convinced the Federalist-controlled
Congress to enact The Judiciary Act of 1801, enabling him to make last-minute judge appointments, among
them is William Marbury. In order for these appointees to be able to take office, then Secretary of State John
Marshall had to deliver the commissions; which he failed to do so. When Thomas Jefferson took office, he
instructed his Secretary of State James Madison to refuse the appointments. Marbury then files an application
with the Supreme Court praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus against Madison to give him his
commission.

The Court found these issues in determining the case.

(1) WON Marbury has the right to the commission he demands, if he has a right, and that right has been
violated, do the laws afford him a remedy.
(2) WON the writ of mandamus prayed for should be granted.

On the first issue, the Court ruled in the affirmative, stating that since Marbury’s commission was signed by

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the President and sealed by the Secretary of the State, he was appointed, and as the law creating the office
gave the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the Executive, the appointment was not revocable,
but vested in the officer legal rights which are protected by the laws of his country. To withhold the
commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the Court not warranted by law, but violative if a vested legal
right. That having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver
which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.

The court dismissed the petition, and ruled, even though Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court
jurisdiction, it ruled that the Judiciary Act of 1789 is an unconstitutional extension of judiciary power into the
realm of the executive. It sought to expand the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction defined in Paragraph 2
Sec 2 Article III of the US Constitution. In writing the decision, John Marshall (now as Chief Justice) argued
that acts of Congress in conflict with the Constitution are not law and therefore are non-binding to the courts,
and that the judiciary’s first responsibility is always to uphold the Constitution. If two laws conflict, Marshall
wrote, the court bears responsibility for deciding which law applies in any given case.

Separation of Powers

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara v ELECOM)

Where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot
and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislative or the executive acts beyond the scope of
its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of of the judiciary to declare what the other branch of the
government had assumed to do as void. (Demetria v. Alba)

The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws and may not enforce or apply them; the executive
to the enforcement of laws and may not enact or apply them; and the judiciary to the application of laws and
may not enact or enforce them. (Bengzon v Drilon)

Political Question Vis-à-vis Justiciable Issue

Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those
questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard
to to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure. (Tañada v. Cuenco 1957)

A purely Justiciable Issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. (Casibang v.

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Aquino)

When an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the
controversy becomes the duty of the Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of
the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act. (La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association Inc. v. Ramos)

Judicial Supremacy

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Art VIII, Sec 1)

Judicial Supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and
is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority. (Angara v. Elecom)

When the Supreme Court mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate
body, what it is upholding is not its own supremacy but the supremacy of the Constitution. (Angara v Elecom)

Judicial Restraint

Judicial Restraint is practiced where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their
sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the
government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. (Aquino v. Ponce Enrile)

7 Pillars of Limitations of the Power of Judicial Review

The 7 pillars of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

(1) that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

(2) that rules of constitutional law shall he formulated only as required by the facts of the case
(3) that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
(4) that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
(5) that the parties are not in estoppel
(6) that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality. (Francisco v HOR)

Requisites of Judicial Review

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy;

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 Prematurity

It merely poses a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. (Mariano v
Comelec)

A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and
imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no
constitutional right or duty. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not
before (Montesclaros v Comelec)

Mootness

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. (Gunsi v Comelec)

As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases; judicial power being limited to the determination of “actual
controversies.” Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable of repetition yet
evading review.” (Sanlakas v Exec Security)

(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;

Legal Standing

A personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. (Joya v PCGG) The question on legal standing is
whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. (Agan v PIATCO)

Transcendental Importance

The rule on standing is a matter of procedure, and hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. (AIWA v
Romulo)

Citizen Standing

The right sought to be enforced is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
(Tañada v Tuvera)

Associational Standing

An association whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage

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from the implementation of questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders. (KMU Labor Center v Garcia)

An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are
affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. (Exec Secretary
v CA)

Taxpayer’s Standing

A taxpayer’s suit is properly brought only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress. (AIWA v Romulo)

Voter’s Standing

A voter’s standing involves the right to suffrage. (Tolentino v Comelec)

Legislative Standing

The requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that there has been a usurpation of legislative power.
(Ople v Torres)

Governmental Standing

If an act violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines has a substantial interest in having it set
aside. The state can challenge the validity of its own laws. (People v Vera)

Facial Challenge

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
“chilling effect” upon protected speech. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. (Estrada v
Sandiganbayan)

Void for Vagueness Doctrine

A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process
of law. (Estrada v Sandiganbayan)

Over breadth Doctrine

A governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms. (Estrada v Sandiganbayan)

(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

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The constitutional question raised must be the very lis mota of the case.

The Legislative Department

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representative, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. (Art VI, Sec 1)

The Senate; Composition

The Senate shall be composed of 24 Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided by law. (Art VI, Sec 2)

Qualifications

No person shall be a Senator unless:

(1) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (see below)

(2) is at least 35 years of age on the day of the election;
(3) is able to read and write;
(4) is a registered voter; and
(5) is a resident in the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately preceding the day of the election.
(Art VI Sec Sec 3)

Term of Office

The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the 30th day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve more than 2 consecutive
terms. (Art VI Sec 4)

12 senators are elected every 3 years, to serve the full term of 6 years, so that unlike the House of
Representatives, the Senate shall not at any time be completely dissolved. One-half od the membership is
retained as the other half is replaced or reelected every 3 years. It is for this reason that the Senate has been
described as a “continuing” institution, as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change
in the composition of its members. (Cruz 2014)

The House of Representatives; Composition

While the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members (297 currently), unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective cohabitants. And those
who as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations. (Art VI, Sec 5(1))

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Every voter shall be entitled to 2 votes: the first for the candidate for member of the House of Representatives
in his legislative district and the second for the party, organization or coalition he wants represented in the
House of Representatives. (Cruz, 2014)

District Representatives

Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each
City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1 representative. (Art VI Sec
5(3)) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. (Art VI Sec 5(4))

This reiterates the guarantee against gerrymandering, which is the arrangement of districts in such a way as
to favor the election of preferred candidates through the inclusion therein only of those areas where they
expect to win, regardless of the resultant shape of such districts. (Cruz, 2014)

The validity of a legislative apportionment measure is a justiciable question, involving as it does certain
requirements the interpretation of which does not call for the exercise of legislative discretion. (Macias v
Comelec)

The 250,000 minimum population requirement for the establishment of legislative districts under Sec 5(3) is
applicable only to cities, not to provinces.

Party-List Representatives

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives*
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (Art VI, Sec 5(2))

*That 20 per centum allocation for the party-list representatives in the Congress provided for in Section 5
Paragraph 2, Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats
in the Congress. (Veteran’s Fed Party v Comelec)

R.A. No. 7941 or the “Party-List System Act” embodies the rules for the selection of the party-list
representatives. Section 2 of which states,

The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of

Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or

coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,

organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the

formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of

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 the House of Representatives.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be followed:

(1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes garnered during the elections.
(2) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
(3) Provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes; *
(4) Provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats. (RA 7941, Sec 11)

*The court ruled to strike down the two percent threshold (see 3rd procedure above) only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats for being an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Art VI Sec
5(2); and it prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.” (Banat v Comelec) Thus, in the same case, the court set:

Good Law Parameters in Determining the Allocation of Seats:

(1) There is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts.
(2) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
(3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
(4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Qualifications

No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless:

(1) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (see below; Natural-Born Citizens)

(2) is at least 25 years of age on the day of the election;
(3) is able to read and write;
(4) is a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, except party-list representatives; and
(5) is a resident thereof for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election
(Art VI Sec 6)

The party-list representatives shall have the same rights and be subject to the same inhibitions and
disqualifications as the district representatives. The sole exception is that, unlike the latter, under section 15
of RA 7941 to wit,

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 Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office

shall forfeit his seat: provided, that if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months

before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or

organization.

Parameters in Determining Who May Participate in the Party-List Elections:

(1) Three different groups may participate in the party- list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
(3) Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections.
(4) Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.” The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented”
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
(5) The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona fide members of such
parties or organizations.
(6) National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
(Panglaum v Comelec)

Term of Office

The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member
of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. (Art VI, Sec 7)

Natural-Born Citizens

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship. (Art IV Sec 2)

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino. (Bengson III v HRET; cited in Poe v Comelec)

Domicile v Residence

Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place”; animus

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manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently; “animus rivertendi” (Marcos v Comelec)

3 Kinds of Domicile:

(1) by birth;
(2) by choice; and
(3) by operation of law.

Domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own
intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage.
(Marcos v Comelec)

Residence implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a
person in a given area, community or country. (Marcos v Comelec)

It is normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have
a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile
of choice. (Marcos v Comelec)

The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. (Aquino v Comelec)

That residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. (Marcos v Comelec)

Domicilium Voluntarium

To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s former domicile with an
intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing. (Marcos v Comelec)

To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

(1) An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

(2) A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
(3) Acts which correspond with the purpose. (Marcos v Comelec)

The rationale of requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to
be elected is to prevent the possibility of a “stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs
of a community and not identified with the latter from seeking an elective office to serve that community”
(Torayno v Comelec)

Salaries

The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase

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in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. (Art VI Sec 10)

The purpose of aforementioned provision is to place a legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural
temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but
with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to
any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt. (Philconsa v Mathay)

General Election

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the 2nd Monday of May (Art VI Sec 8)

Special Election

In case of a vacancy on the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill
such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. (Art VI Sec 9)

Regular and Special Session

The Congress shall convene once every year on the 4th Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law. The President may call a special session at any time. (Art VI Sec 15)

Special Sessions which need not be called by the President:

(1) To canvass the presidential elections (Art VII Sec 4)

(2) To pass a bill calling a special election in case of vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-
President. (Art VII Sec 10)
(3) To determine by two-third votes of both Houses, voting separately, whether the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. (Art XI)
(4) To extend or revoke the existence of martial law or suspension of habeas corpus. (Art VII Sec 18)

Joint Session

Voting Separately:

(1) To declare existence of war (Art VI Sec 23)

(2) Choosing the President in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes (Art VII
Sec 4)
(3) Determining the President’s temporary disability (Ar. VII Sec 11(4))
(4) Amending the Constitution (Art XVII Sec 1(1))

Voting Jointly: To extend or revoke martial law or suspension of habeas corpus (Art. VII Sec 18)

Majority

The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
members. (Art VI Sec 16)

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That the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. (Santiago v
Guingona) Simply put, 50% + 1 of all the members.

Quorum

A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from
day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as
such House may provide. (Art VI Sec 16)

The existence of a quorum in a collective body is an indispensable condition for effective collective action.
(Avelino v Cuenco) Any number sufficient to transact business, which may be less than the majority of the
membership.

Twelve members were sufficient to constitute a quorum, being a majority of twenty-three, not twenty-four;
when one senator was outside the coercive jurisdiction of the smaller number of members who could adjourn
from day to day and compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as
the Senate might provide. (Avelino v Cuenco)

Doctrine of Coercive Jurisdiction

Actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence
from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned
impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to
attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. (Avelino v Cuenco)

Rules of Proceeding

Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with
the concurrence of two-third of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. (Art VI Sec 16(3))

Preventive Suspension

Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution xxx, and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless
in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. (Sec 13, RA 3019)

It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension. (Bayot v Sandiganbayan, cited in Santiago v Sandiganbayan)

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Journal and Record

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record
of its proceedings. (Art VI Sec 16(4))

Journals are a record of what is done and past in a legislative assembly. They are useful not only for
authenticating the proceedings but also for the interpretation of laws through a study of the debates held
thereon and for informing the people of the official conduct of their respective leaders. (Cruz, 2014)

To determine whether the legal requisites to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their right,
as well as their duty, to take notice of the legislative journals.

The journal is only a resume or the minutes of what transpired during the legislative session. The record is
the word-for-word transcript of the proceedings taken during the session. (Cruz, 2014)

Matter Entered into the Journal

(1) Yeas and nays on the last reading of a bill; (Art VI Sec 26(2))
(2) Veto message by the President; (Art VI Sec 27(1))
(3) Yeas and nays on re-passing a bill if vetoed by the President; (Art VI Sec 27(2))
(4) Yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of the Members present; (Art VI Sec 16(4))
(5) Vote of each Member of the House of Representatives in impeachment cases. (Art XI Sec 3(3))

Enrolled Bill Doctrine

An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper
officers of each, approved by the President and filed by the secretary of the state. (Cruz, 2014)

The signing by the Speaker and the Senate President and the certification of the secretaries by both Houses
of Congress are conclusive of its due enactment. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. (Casco v Gimenez)

The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to co-equal and independent departments,” which
requires the judicial department “to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated.” (Astorga v Villegas)

If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. (Casco
v Gimenez)

Journal Entry Rule

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The Court could not look beyond the journal to determine the actual date of the passage of a bill, as it is an
official act of the legislature. As such, it is superior to the recollections or memories of witnesses. To inquire
into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature when they are clear and explicit, would be to
violate the letter and spirit of the official act, to encroach upon the authority of a coordinate and independent
department, and to interfere with the powers of the legislature. (US v Pons)

Enrolled Bill Doctrine Vis-à-vis Journal Entry Rule

Except only where the matters are required to be entered in the journal, the contents of the enrolled bill shall
prevail over those of the journal. (Mabanag v Lopez Vito)

In view of the withdrawal of the signatures of the President and the Senate President, there was actually no
enrolled bill. Thus, the Supreme Court has the authority to verify the real content of the approved bill as
proved in the journal. (Astorga v Villegas)

Privilege from Arrest

A Senator or member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years’ imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. (Art VI Sec 11)

“Session”, as here used, does not refer to the day-to-day meetings of the legislature but to the entire period
from its initial convening until its final adjournment. (Cruz 2014)

This is to ensure representation of the constituents of the members of the Congress by preventing attempts to
keep him from attending its sessions. (Cruz 2014)

Privilege of Speech and Debate

No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof. (Art VI Sec 11)

There are two conditions that must concur in order that the privilege of speech can be availed by a member of
the Congress. First, the remarks must be made while the legislature or the legislative committee is
functioning, that is, in session; Second, they must be made in connection with the discharge of their duties.
(Coffin v Coffin)

Speech or debate refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same
is in session. (Jimenez v Cabongbong)

This is to enable the legislator to express views bearing upon the public interest without fear of accountability
outside the halls of the legislature for his inability to support his statements with the usual evidence required
in the court of justice. (Cruz 2014)

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Incompatible Office

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. (Art VI Sec 13)

This is to prevent him from owing loyalty to another branch of the government, to the detriment of the
independence of the legislature and the doctrine of separation of powers. (Cruz 2014)

Not every other office or employment is to be regarded as incompatible with the legislative position. If it can
be shown that the second office is an extension of the legislative position or is in aid of legislative duties, the
holding thereof will not result in the loss of the legislator’s seat in the congress (i.e. membership in the
Electoral Tribunal). (Cruz 2014)

Forbidden Office

Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected. (Art VI Sec 13)

This is to prevent trafficking in the public office. (Cruz, 2014)

The appointment of the member of the Congress to the forbidden office is not allowed only during the term for
which he was elected, when such office was created or its emoluments were increased. After sucj term, and
even if the legislator is re-elected, the disqualification no longer applies and he may therefroe be appointed to
the office. (Cruz, 2014)

Disqualifications

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office. (Art VI Sec 14)

This is to prevent abuses from being vomited by the members of the Congress to the prejudice of the public
welfare and particularly of legitimate contractors with the government who otherwise might be placed at a
disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the legislator. (Cruz, 2014)

Electoral Tribunals

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole

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judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.

Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members:

(1) 3 Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
(2) 6 Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein.

The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Art VI Sec 17)

The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication
of a senatorial election contest. (Abbas v SET)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction
to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the
Courts. As judges, the members of the Tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions
with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence –even independence form the political party to
which they belong. Hence, ‘disloyalty to party’ and ‘breach of party discipline’ are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. (Bondoc v Pineda)

The HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a
division or en banc. (Codilla v De Vinicia)

The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats
allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. (Pimentel v HRET)

The Electoral Tribunals have the exclusive right to prescribe its own rules of procedure as against those earlier
adopted by the legislature itself, in connection with the election contests under its jurisdiction. (Angara v
Elecom)

Commission on Appointments

There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of:

(1) the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,

(2) 12 Senators and 12 Members of the House of Representatives,

elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days

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of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art
VI Sec 18)

The House of Representatives has the authority to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. (Daza v Singson)

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any
discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation.
(Guingona v Gonzales)

They perform their functions so long as there is the required quorum, usually a majority of its membership.
The Commission on Appointments may perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10)
senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists. (Guingona v Gonzales)

The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded. Thus even legislative acts and
executive orders are not beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. Certainly, there is nothing sacrosanct about a
rule of the Commission on Appointments, especially so, when as in this case, a construction sought to be
fastened on it would defeat the right of an individual to a public office. (Pacete v CoA)

Powers of Congress

The powers of the Congress may be classified generally into legislative and non-legislative. The legislative
power includes the specific powers of appropriation, taxation, and expropriation. The non-legislative powers
include the power to canvass the presidential elections, to declare the existence of a state of war, to give
concurrence to treaties and amnesties, to propose constitutional amendments, and to impeach. (Cruz, 2014)

Legislative Power

Legislative power is the power of lawmaking, the framing and enactment of laws. This is effected through the
adoption of a bill, or a proposed or projected law, which, once approved, becomes a statue. (Cruz, 2014)

Limitations on Legislative Power

The Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws; Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power
to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers
of Congress. (Duarte v Dade)

Constitutional Limitations:

• Art III, Sec 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,

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 or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
• Art III, Sec 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
• Art III, Sec 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
• Art III, Sec 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
• Art VI, Sec 25 and Sec 29(1). Appropriation. (see below)
• Art VI, Sec 28 and Sec 29 (3). Taxation. (see below)
• Art VI, Sec 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. (See below)
• Art VI, Sec 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.

Procedure as to Passing of Bills

1. A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate.

2. The Secretary reports the bill for first reading.
3. First Reading consists of reading the number and title of the bill, followed by its referral to the
appropriate Committee for study and recommendation.
4. The bill may be “killed” in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without
amendments.
5. The Committee may hold public hearings on the proposed measure and submit its report and
recommendation for Calendar for second reading.
6. On Second Reading, the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when
desired. The second reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill.
7. A bill approved on second reading shall be included in the Calendar of bills for third reading.
8. On third reading, the bill as approved on second reading will be submitted for final vote by yeas and
nays.
9. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered into the Journal.
Upon the certification of the President as to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment to meet a

public calamity or emergency, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and

distribution of printed copies thereof three days before its passage can be dispensed with. (Tolentino v

Secretary of Finance)
10. The bill approved on third reading by one House is transmitted to the other House for concurrence,
where it will also undergo the three readings.
11. If the other House introduces amendments and the House from which it originated does not agree with
said amendment, the differences will be settled by the Conference Committees of both Chambers.

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 12. The system of authentication devised is the signing by the Speaker and the Senate President of the
printed copy of the approved bill, certified by the respective secretaries of the both Houses, to signify
to the President that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by the legislature and is
ready for his approval or rejection.
13. Upon presentation to the President of a bill, as required by the Constitution, If the President approves
the bill, he shall sign it; otherwise he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it.
• Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof
(Art VI, Sec 27(1)). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the President
to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (Art VI, Sec 27(2)). In so
doing, the President must veto the entire item. (Philconsa v Enriquez)
• The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to
disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part
of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. (Gonzales v Macaraig) and
(Bengzon v Drilon)

A bill passed by Congress becomes a law in either of three ways, namely

(1) When the President signs it;

(2) When the President does not sign nor communicate his veto of the bill within thirty days after his
receipt thereof; and
(3) When the vetoed bill is repassed by Congress by two-thirds vote of all its members, each house voting
separately.

Requirements as to Bills

As to Title

Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(Art VI Sec 26(1))

[Sec 26(1) of Art VI] of the Constitution contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First, Congress is to
refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second, the title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of
the single subject thereof. (Lidasan v Comelec)

The subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill. Compliance is imperative, given the fact
that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text
of the bill. (Lidasan v Comelec)

It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The

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requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
object.” (Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board)

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself
if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. What remains must express
the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (Lidasan v Comelec)

Purpose of Limitation on Title

(1) To prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation;

Any act containing several subjects dealing with unrelated matters representing diverse interests, the main

object of such combination being to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of the subjects in

support of the whole act.

(2) To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature; and
(3) To fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the
subjects of legislation that are being considered in order that they may have the opportunity of being
heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they should so desire. (Cruz, 2014)

As to Appropriation Laws

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. (Art VI, Sec
29(1))

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments. (Art VI Sec 24)

Under the Constitution, the spending power belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President.

The President may propose the budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the

Congress. The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under
the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be. (Philconsa v Enriquez)

An appropriation measure may be defined as a statute the primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the treasury; they may be classified into general and special. (Cruz,

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2014)

General Appropriations

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money
dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. (Philconsa v Enriquez)

The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law. (Art VI Sec 25(1))

But while the Congress may not increase the President’s budgetary recommendation, there is no prohibition
against its reducing such recommendations, which is in fact what it usually does, particularly those realting
to the executive department. However, reduction os not permitted when it comes to the appropriations for the
judiciary. (Cruz, 2014)

No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to
some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to
the appropriation to which it relates. (Art VI Sec 25(2))

Doctrine of Inappropriate Provisions

As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must “relate

specifically to some particular appropriation therein” and “be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which

it relates,” it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its

operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed

separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of “inappropriate provisions” are unconstitutional

provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no

place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate
enactments. (Philconsa v Enriquez)

The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and agencies. (Art VI Sec 25(3))

No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(Art VI Sec 25(5))

a. Executive

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However, transfers of savings in one department from one item to another in the general appropriations act
may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. As long as the transfer made is within a
department and not from one department to another.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1987

Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the

constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution

allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from

savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The
leeway granted was thus limited. (Demetria v Alba)

The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may not be given authority to transfer funds under
this article because the realignment of savings to augment items in the general appropriations law for the
executive branch must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law. (Philconsa v
Enriquez) However, such power could well be extended to the President’s Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos
under the ‘doctrine of qualified political agency’ (see below; Powers of the President). (Nazareth v Villar)

b. Congress

The individual members of Congress may only determine the necessity of the realignment of savings in the
allotments for their operating expenses because they are in the best position to know whether there are savings
available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses that
need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives who
shall approve the realignment. (Philconsa v Enriquez)

Special Appropriations

A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds
actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal
therein. (Art VI, Sec 25(4))

Automatic Re-appropriation

If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the
ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted
and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. (Art VI,
Sec 25(7))

Appropriation for Sectarian Purposes

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any

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priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage
or leprosarium. (Art VI, Sec 29(2))

Special Funds

All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for
such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the
balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. (Art VI, Sec 29(3))

As to Tax Laws

The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation. (Art VI, Sec 28(1))

Uniformity in taxation means that persons or things belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the same
rate. (Cruz, 2014)

Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of

taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not forfend

classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the

categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both

present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same
class. (Tan v Del Rosario)

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. (Art
VI, Sec 28(2))

President may increase tariff rates as authorized by law even for revenue purposes solely. (Garcia v Exec Sec)

Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (Art VI, Sec 29(3))

What is meant by actual, direct, and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes id the direct
and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purpose for which the charitable institution
is organized. IT is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the
property is used for tax-exempt purposes. (Lung Center of the Philippines v Quezon City)

To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements which should be

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 considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purpose, its constitution and by-laws, the

methods of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, the character of the services rendered, the

indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use and occupation of the properties; In the legal sense, a charity may

be fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of

persons, either by bringing their minds and hearts under the influence of education or religion, by assisting them

to establish themselves in life or otherwise lessening the burden of government. The test whether an enterprise

is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose recognized in law as charitable or whether it is
maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage.

No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members
of the Congress. (Art VI, Sec 28(4))

The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed strictissimi juris

against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception.
The effect of an exemption is equivalent to an appropriation. (Lung Center of the Philippines v Quezon City)

As to Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence. (Art VI, Sec 30)

Above provision against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court was intended to
give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court. (Fabian v Disierto)

Legislative Investigation

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or
affected by, such inquiries shall be respected. (Art VI, Sec 21)

This “power of inquiry” is granted not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of
their respective committees. (Sabio v Gordon)

Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, and its power of inquiry extends
to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations. (Senate v Ermita)

Presumption of Legitimacy

The Supreme Court is bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if
it was capable of being so construed, and the Courts have no right to assume that the contrary was intended.

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(Arnault v Nazareno)

The questions that may be raised in a legislative investigation do not necessarily have to be relevant to any
pending legislation, provided only that they are relevant to to the subject matter of the investigation being
conducted. (Arnault v Nazareno)

The materiality of a question that may be propounded to a witness is determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.

Power to Hold in Contempt

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon
reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or
necessary to effectuate said power. (Arnault v Balagtas)

Failure or refusal to attend a legitimate legislative investigation or contumacy of the witness may be punished
as legislative contempt. The punishment that may be meted out includes imprisonment. (Arnault v Nazareno)

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the

proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience to its process may be enforced by the
committee by imprisonment.

The offender could be imprisoned indefinitely by the Senate, it being a continuing body, provided that the
punishment did not become so long as to violate due process. (Arnaut v Nazareno)

There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish. for contempt to the end of every

session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of the

House of Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a continuing

body which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of

Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted.

Requisites

The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that
a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid,
it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and
that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.

(1) Must be in aid of legislation

The legislative inquiry must be in aid of legislation, whether it be under consideration already or still to be

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drafted. (Cruz 2014)

(2) Must publish its rules

It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise
make the published rules clearly state the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are
amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. (Neri v Senate)

(3) Must respect the rights of the person

a. Right to due process

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited.
Thus, the investigation must be “in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure”
and that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected”. It follows then
that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and
the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self. (Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee)

b. Right to privacy

Another right which may validly be invoked is the right to privacy, except, however, if the subject of the
legislative inquiry pertains to the witnesses’ discharge of his official functions. (Sabio v Gordon)

c. Right against self-incrimination

The investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. (Arnault v Nazareno)

d. Rights of co-equal branches of the government

Only one executive official may be exempted from this power—the President (see Executive Privilege) on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. By
the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not
only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the
judiciary. (Senate v Ermita)

Executive Privilege

The power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress; the right
of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts,
and ultimately the public. (Senate v Ermita)

Varieties of Executive Privilege: (1) state secrets privilege wherein the information is of such nature that

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its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. (2) informer’s privilege, or the
privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law
to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. (3) generic privilege for internal deliberations has been
said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
(Senate v Ermita)

Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of
persons. (Senate v Ermita)

Information which fall under Executive Privilege:

(1) Presidential conversations, correspondences, or

(2) Discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings, or
(3) Executive sessions of either house of Congress. (Chavez v PEA)

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation
to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. The extraordinary character of the exemptions
indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Senate v
Ermita)

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power—the President on whom executive power
is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. (Senate v Ermita)

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must be clearly
asserted. Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged.
However, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity
as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. (Senate v Ermita)

Elements of Presidential Communications Privilege:

(1) Quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.

(2) Authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. (see
Operational Proximity)
(3) May be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. (Neri v Senate)

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 The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the legislative body to
overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to enable them to
craft legislation.

Question Hour

The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House
on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session. (Art VI, Sec 22)

A period of confrontation initiated by the Congress to hold the President and the other department heads
accountable for their acts and the operation of the government. (Senate v Ermita)

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question
hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. That
department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the
legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the
absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the
performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. (Senate v Ermita)

Legislative Investigation Vis-à-vis Question Hour

(1) As to Objective

One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Simply stated,
while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.
(Neri v Senate)

(2) As to Subject

Question Hour applies only upon the heads of departments, whereas Legislative Investigation’s scope is
broader in that they may compel any person to appear before them as witness.

(3) As to Appearance

In such instances, Section 22 (Question Hour), in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress
may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their
appearance is “in aid of legislation” under Section 21 (Legislative Investigation), the appearance is

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mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. (Senate v Ermita)

Non-Legislative Powers of the Congress

(1) Canvass the Presidential Elections

The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which
shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of
the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the
same office at any time. (Art VII, Sec 4)

(2) Call a Special Election for Presidency

The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within
seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not
earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special
election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall
become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall
be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,
Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special
election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the
date of the next presidential election. (Art VII, Sec 10)

(3) Decide on the Disability of the President

Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and
until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged
by the Vice- President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of
his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the

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issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within 10 days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within 12 days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President;
otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. (Art VII, Sec 11)

(4) Legislative Veto

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of
the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to
be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. (Art VII, Sec 18)

(5) Concurrence in Amnesty and Treaty

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He
shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress. (Art VII, Sec 19)

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Art VII, Sec 21)

(6) Declaration of Existence of a State of War

The Congress, by a vote of two- thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have
the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. (Art VI, Sec 23(1))

(7) Delegation of Emergency Powers

In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest. (Art XII, Sec 17)

In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry

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out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof. (Art VI, Sec 23(2))

(8) Utilization of Natural Resources

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons. (Art XII, Sec 2)

(9) Constitutional Amendments

Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its Members; or (2) A constitutional convention. (Art XVII, Sec 1)

Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right. (Art XVII, Sec 2)

The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by
at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof. (Art VI, Sec 32)

Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose. (RA 6735, Sec 3(a))

Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the
purpose. (RA 6735, Sec 3(c))

RA 6735 provides for 3 systems of initiative: (1) Initiative on the Constitution; (2) Initiative on statutes; and
(3) Initiative on local legislation.

RA 6735, however, was found to be incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. (Santiago v Comelec; see Amendments
v Revisions above)

(10) Impeachment

The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. (Art XI, Sec

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3(1))

The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose,
the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence
of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Art XI Sec 3(6))

The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
(Art XI, Sec 3(8))

The Executive Department

(1) President

The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art VII, Sec 1)

Qualifications

No person may be elected President unless he is:

(1) a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,

(2) a registered voter,
(3) able to read and write,
(4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and
(5) a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. (Art VII,
Sec 2)

Election and Term of Office

The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which
shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of
the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the
same office at any time.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have
an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all
the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Pursuant to this provision, the Supreme Court promulgated in 2010 its Rules establishing the

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Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, among others, provided for its membership consisting of
members of the Supreme Court.

Oath

Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President
shall take the following oath or affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-
President or Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do
justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of
affirmation, last sentence will be omitted). (Art VII, Sec 5)

Privileges

(1) Presidential Communications Privilege (see above; Legislative Investigation)

(2) Presidential Immunity (see below)

Salaries

The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice- President shall be
determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They
shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source. (Art VII,
Sec 6)

Succession

In case of vacancy at the beginning of the term

The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect
shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President
shall have been chosen and qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become
permanently disabled, the Vice President- elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall
have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been

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chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected
until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability
of the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph. (Art VII, Sec 7)

There are 3 cases contemplated here are:

(1) death or permanent disability of the President-elect;

(2) failure to elect the President, where the canvass of the presidential elections has not yet been
completed, or where for one reason or another the presidential election has not been held; and
(3) failure of the President-elect to qualify, that is, to assume office by taking the oath and entering into
the discharge of his duties. (Cruz, 2014)
In the first case, the Vice-President-elect shall become President. In the other two cases, the Vice-

President-elect shall merely act as President until such time as the President shall have been chosen
and qualified.

In case of vacancy during the term

In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-
President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or
resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been
elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting
President. (Art VII, Sec 8)

In case of temporary disability

Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and
until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged
by the Vice- President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.

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Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of
his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For
that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with
its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within 10 days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within 12 days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President;
otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. (Art VII, Sec 11)

In case both the offices of President and Vice-President are vacated

The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within
seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not
earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special
election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall
become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall
be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,
Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special
election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the
date of the next presidential election. (Art VII, Sec 10)

Prohibitions

The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. (Art VII Sec 13)

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.

Exceptions to the Prohibition

The abovementioned clause ‘unless otherwise provided in this Constitution’ refers to:

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 a. Vice President as a member of the Cabinet

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no
confirmation. (Art VII, Sec 7)

b. Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council

A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Art VIII, Sec 8)

The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.—The
prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials’ office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise “any other office” within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials. (NAC v COA)

The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without
additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of the concerned official’s office. The term ex-officio means ‘from office, by virtue of office’. It refers to an
‘authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but
rather annexed to the official position’. (CLU v Executive Secretay)

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including Government- owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art IX-B, Sec7)

The term ‘primary’ used to describe ‘function; refers to the order of importance and thus means chief or principal

function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. The additional duties must not

only be closely related to, but must be required by the official’s primary functions. If the functions required to be

performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary

function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of ‘any other office’ prohibited
by the Constitution. (CLU v Executive Secretary)

Although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices
or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the

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President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office
or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Thus, while all other
appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during
their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In
other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. This being
the case, the qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII
cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
(NAC v COA)

Powers of the President

(1) Executive Power

The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art VII, Sec 1)

The President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the

grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The

powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. (Marcos v Manglapus)

It is clear, however, that the President does not have the authority to promulgate decrees. (Cruz, 2014)

Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature and neither Martial Law nor a state of

rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify a President’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

However, the President is granted Ordinance Powers under Chapter 2, Book III of the Executive Order 292
(Administrative Code of 1987) and may issue any of the following:

a) Executive Orders – acts of the President providing for the rules of a general or permanent character in

implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers.

b) Administrative Orders – acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental

operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head.

c) Proclamations – acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or

interest, upon the existence of which the operation of which a specific law or operation is made to depend,

and which shall have the force of an executive order.

d) Memorandum Orders – acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or

temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government.

e) Memorandum Circulars – acts of the President on matter relating to internal administration, which the

President desires to bring to attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of

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 the Government, for information or compliance.

f) General or Special Orders – which refer to acts and commands of the President in his capacity as

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. (David v Arroyo)

(2) Control Power

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed. (Art VII, Sec 17)

Control means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officers had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” It has been
held that “the President can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter, or nullify any action, or
decision, of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can exercise this
power motu prorprio without need of any appeal from any party. (Blaquera v Alcala)

Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but
the projection of that of the President. Accordingly, their acts performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively acts of the Chief
Executive. (Villena v Secretary of the Interior)

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive. This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for
under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution. (DENR v DENR Region 12 Employees)

(3) Appointing Power

An “appointment” to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the
authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The
appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with
and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. Appointment necessarily calls for
an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing authority. (Bermudez v Torres)

Categories of officials who are subject to the appointing powers of the President:

a) The heads of the executive departments.

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 b) Ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.
c) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain.
d) Those other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution.
e) All other officers of the government whose appointments are not provided for by law.
f) Those whom he may be authorized to appoint. (Cruz, 2014)

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. (Art VII, Sec 16 (1))

Only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. (Manalo v Sistoza)

In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to

exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments

to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to

use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that

Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in

the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by

law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII. Therefore, a bureau head is not one of those

within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.
(Sarmiento v Mison)

Temporary Appointments

This provision has not done away with the distinction between permanent and temporary or acting
appointments. Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing the requisite eligibility and
are thus protected by the constitutional provision on security of tenure. Temporary appointments, on the other
hand, which are given to those persons without such eligibility, are revocable at will and without the necessity
of just cause or a valid investigation. (Cruz, 2014)

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to

fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in

an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must

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 necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office. (Pimentel v Ermita)

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may
not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will
also be the permanent appointee. (Pimentel v Ermita)

Ad-Interim Appointments

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Art VII, Sec 16 (2))

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be

withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation

by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad

interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. (Matibag v Benipayo)

The term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent

appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary
appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. (Matibag v Benipayo)

An ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of

whether the appointment is temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the
appointment was made. (Matibag v Benipayo)

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is
the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the
adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. (Matibag v
Benipayo)

Regular Vis-à-vis Ad Interim Appointments

• The regular appointment is made during the legislative session; the ad interim appointment is made
during the recess.
• The regular appointment is made only after the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments; the ad-interim appointment is made before such confirmation.
• The regular appointment, once confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, continues until the

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 end of the term of the appointee; the ad interim appointment shall cease to be valid if disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments or upon the next-adjournment of the Congress. In the latter case,
the appointment is deemed ‘by-passed’ through inaction of, and so disapproved impliedly by, the
Commission on Appointments. (Cruz, 2014)
However, an ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the

Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has

not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session

of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent

to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew

the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the

Commission on Appointments. An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission

on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim

appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. (Matibag v
Benipayo)

Temporary Vis-à-vis Ad Interim Appointments

Ad interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress,
whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover, ad interim
appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. (Pimentel v Ermita)

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law (see above), an
appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of
the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how
briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three
independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC. (Matibag v Benipayo)

Prohibited Appointments

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. (Art VII, Sec 15)

“Midnight appointments” that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution applies only to
presidential appointments. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments
during the last days of his or her tenure. (De Rama v CA)

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The prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so—they
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. (De Castro v JBC) *(see: In Re Valenzuela)

Removal Power

From the express power of appointment, the President derives the implied power of removal. (Cruz, 2014)

Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This is in line

with the well settled principle that the “power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” conferred to the
President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. (Larin v Executive Secretary)

However, it is not correct to say that all officials appointed by the President are also removable by him. (Cruz)

No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. (Art
IX-B, Sec 2(3))

This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. The fact that one is a

presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure,

those who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in
accordance with procedural due process. (Larin v Executive Secretary)

(4) Executive Clemency

Pardon

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. (Art
VII, Sec 19)

Pardons may be classified into absolute or conditional and plenary or partial. An absolute pardon is one
extended without any strings attached, so to speak, whereas a conditional pardon is one under which the
convict is required to comply with certain requirements. A plenary pardon extinguished all the penalties
imposed upon the offender, including accessory disabilities whereas a partial pardon does not. (Cruz, 2014)

Absolute Pardon

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction. (Cristobal v Labrador)

And that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left
of the consequences of conviction. Thus, the legal effect of a pardon is to restore not only the offender’s liberty

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but also his civil and political rights. (Pelobello v Palantino)
However, the Court modified this, stating “Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to the public office

necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his

eligibility for appointment to that office.” (Monsanto v Factoran)

Where proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute

making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe

out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been

granted. On the other hand, where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct

involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the effect of

the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequence of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment
proceeding. (In re Lontok)

Furthermore, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him

a new man and as innocent, as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. When a person is given

pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences

of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation, and unstained character prior to the

finding of guilt. Thus, the reinstatement to public office is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon, he is
restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency. (Garcia v Comelec Chairman)

In summary, when the President grants a pardon to an offender, this does not only restore his liberty, but also his civil

and political rights i.e. his right and eligibility to run for public office. In the event, however, that the one pardoned has

relinquished or forfeited a position in consequence of the conviction, the grant of a subsequent pardon does not

automatically reinstate him to said forfeited position. This being the general rule, the exception is when the pardon was
granted on the basis of the innocence of the one pardoned, in this case, he shall be entitled to automatic reinstatement.

Conditional Pardon

Where the pardon is conditional, the offender has the right to reject it since he may feel that the condition
imposed is more onerous than the penalty sought to be remitted. Unlike in the case of an absolute pardon,
where the pardonee has no option at all and must accept it whether he likes it or not. (Cruz, 2014)

The condition of the pardon shall be coextensive with the penalty remitted unless otherwise indicated. Hence,
if the condition is violated after the expiration of the remitted penalty, there can no longer be any violation of
the conditional pardon. (Cruz, 2014)

Guidelines on conditional pardon:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

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 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences
of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where
the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for
which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted
with a constitutional vice. (Torres v Gonzales)

Amnesty

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress. (Art VII, Sec 19)

It was a rule before that admission of guilt was not necessary to the enjoyment of amnesty, upon the theory
that amnesty looks backward and obliterates not only the penalty but the offense itself. In the case of Vera v
People, however, this doctrine was reversed. The present rule requires a previous admission of guilt since a
person would not need the benefit of amnesty unless he were, to begin with, guilty of the offense covered by
the proclamation. (Cruz, 2014)
The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader

admits the allegations against him, but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved,
would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation. (Vera v People)

Pardon Vis-à-vis Amnesty

1. Amnesty is usually addressed to crimes against the sovereignty of the State to political offenses,
forgiveness being deemed more expedient for the public welfare than prosecution and punishment;
pardon condones infractions of the peace of the State.
2. Amnesty is usually generally addressed to classes or even communities of persons; pardon is usually
addressed to an individual.
3. In amnesty, there may or may not be distinct acts or acceptance, so that if other rights are dependent
upon it and are asserted, there is affirmative evidence of acceptance; in pardon, there must be distinct
acts of acceptance.
4. Pardon does not require the concurrence of the Congress; amnesty requires such concurrence.
5. Pardon is a private act of the President which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned
because the courts do not take judicial notice of it; amnesty is a public act of which the courts take

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 judicial notice.
6. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does “not work
the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon,” and it “in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence” (article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty
looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense. (Barrioquinto v Fernandez)

Limitations

a) That the power be exercised after conviction; and (Art VII, Sec 19)
b) That such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. (Art VII, Sec 19)
c) That the power cannot be exercised for the violation of any election law, rule, or regulation without
the favorable recommendation of the Commission of Elections. (Art XI-C, Sec 5)
d) That the power cannot be exercised for persons convicted of legislative and civil contempt. (Cruz, 2014)
e) That the power cannot be exercised for the purpose of absolving the pardonee of civil liability, including
judicial costs. (Cruz, 2014)

(5) Military Power

The President shall be the Commander- in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period
not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

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A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall
be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Art VII, Sec 18)

The military power enables the President to: (1) command all the armed forced of the Philippines, otherwise
known as the “calling-out power”; (2) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (3) declare martial
law. (Cruz, 2014)

a) Calling-Out Power

The President shall be the Commander- in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. (Art VII, Sec 18)

The “calling-out power’ of the President involves ordinary police action, which would ordinarily not entitle him
to invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. (David v Arroyo)

The conditions for the other two military powers of the President (see below) are not required in the case of
the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the
President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” The
implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call
as compared to the two other powers. (IBP v Zamora)

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the
framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the
President’s wisdom or substitute its own. (IBP v Zamora)

Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and
provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. (IBP v Zamora)

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The President cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as custom laws, laws
governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. He can only order the
military to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. (David v Arroyo)

Military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply instrumentalities
of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in
properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or
those of his authorized military representatives. The power and the duty of interpreting the law is primarily
a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the
military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as
they do so today and as they did during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try
and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by
the civil courts. Consequently, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil
offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. (Olaguer v MC No. 4)

b) Habeas Corpus

In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus xxx. (Art VII, Sec 18)

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it. (Art III, Sec 15)

The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.

For a valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there must be “invasion, insurrection or rebellion” or—
– pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution—– “imminent danger thereof”; and (b)
public safety must require the aforementioned suspension. (Lansang v Garcia)

The writ of habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to
do, to submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf. It is a
high prerogative common law writ of ancient origin the great object of which is the liberation of those who
may be in prison without sufficient cause. (Cruz citing Moran, Rules of Court)

As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.
Further, the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged
before any court or quasi-judicial body. (Navales v Abaya)

It should be stressed that what is permitted to be suspended by the President is not the writ itself but its

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privilege. (Cruz, 2014)
This means that when the court receives an application for the writ, and it finds the petition in proper form, it

will issue the writ as a matter of course. If the return to the writ shoes that the person in custody was apprehended

and detained in areas where the privilege of the writ has been suspended or for crimes mentioned in the executive
proclamation, the court will suspend further proceedings in the action. (Cruz citing Ex parte Milligan)

Justiciability

It was earlier held that the determination by the President of the Philippines of the existence of any of the
grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the habeas corpus should be
conclusive upon the courts. (Montenegro v Castañeda)

However, the doctrine in the above case was subsequently abandoned, where the Supreme Court declared that
it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
by the President and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established (Lansang v Garcia)
The Supreme Court has the authority under the Constitution to inquire into the existence of a factual basis for

the issuance of a presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose
of determining the constitutional sufficiency thereof.

The doctrine in Lansang was expressly constitutionalized in Sec 18 of Art VII, to wit,
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual

basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

However, judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct,
but that the President did not act arbitrarily. (Lansang v Garcia)

c) Martial Law

In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may for a period not exceeding
sixty days, xxx place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. (Art VII, Sec 18)

Martial law in the strict sense refers to that law which has application when the military arm does not
supersede civil authority but is called upon to aid it in the execution of tis civil function. (Cruz, 2014)

Powers that can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration
of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus:
• Arrests and seizures without judicial warrants;
• Ban on public assemblies;
• Take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and
• Issuance of Presidential decrees. (David v Arroyo)

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To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify a President’s exercise if legislative power by issuing decrees. (David v Arroyo)

The President cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws
governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order
the military to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. (David v Arroyo)

Limitations on the Military Power

As summarized by Associate Justice Isagani Cruz,

1) He may call out the armed forces when it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion only.
2) The grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the habeas corpus and the proclamation of martial
law are now limited only to the invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
3) The duration of such suspension or proclamation shall not exceed sixty days, following which it shall
be automatically lifted.
4) Within forty-eight hours after such suspension or proclamation, the President shall personally or in
writing report his action to the Congress. If not in session, the Congress must convene within 24 hours
without need of a call.
5) The Congress may then, by a majority vote of all its members voting jointly, revoke his action.
6) The revocation may not be set aside by the President.
7) By the same vote and in the same manner, the Congress may, upon initiative of the President, extend
his suspension or proclamation for a period to be determined by the Congress if the invasion or
rebellion shall continue and the public safety requires the extension.
8) The action of the President and the Congress shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court which
shall have the authority to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of such action.
9) Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the operation
of the Constitution. The civil courts and the legislative bodies shall remain open. Military courts and
the agencies are not conferred jurisdiction over civilians where the civil courts are functioning.
However, implicit in a state of martial law is the suspension of the said privilege with respect to
persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objectives of the proclamation, which
is to suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger
thereof. The preservation of society and national survival take precedence. (Aquino v Enrile)
10) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons facing charges
of rebellion or offense inherent in or directly connected with invasion. Any person arrested for such
offenses must be judicially charged therewith within three days. Otherwise he shall be released.

Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. The
President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive
and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.

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 (6) Emergency Powers

In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof. (Art VI, Sec 23(1))

In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest. (Art XII, Sec 17)
While the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power

to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide

whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business

affected with public interest. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State
under Section 17, Article XII (sic) in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. (David v Arroyo)

(7) Borrowing Power

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The
Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the
Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
Government or government- owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the
foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. (Art VII, Sec 20)

(8) Diplomatic Power

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate. (Art VII, Sec 21)

While the concurrence of the Senate is required by the Constitution in the making of “treaties”, “executive
agreements” may be validly entered into without such concurrence. (Com. of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading)

The deportation of an undesirable alien may be affected (1) by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner
of Immigration, upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the Immigration
Law.
That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive when he deems such action necessary for the peace and

domestic tranquility of the nation. there is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens

because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien’s

residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security, welfare or interest of the state. The

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 adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is

final and executive. This is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case. (Go Tek v Deportation
Board)

(9) Legislation
a. Budgetary Power

The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as
the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including
receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. (Art VII, Sec 22)

The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law. (Art VI, Sec 25(1))

b. Informing Power

The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it
at any other time. (Art VII, Sec 23)

The President usually discharges the informing power through what is known as the state-of-the-nation
address, which is delivered at the opening of the regular session of the legislature. He may also appear before
it at any other time for the same purpose. (Cruz, 2014)

c. Veto Power (see above; Procedure as to passing bills)

d. Emergency Power (see above; Emergency Powers)
(10) Immunity from Suit

There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision
that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. (Beltran v Makaisar)

The doctrine of presidential immunity has no application where the petition for prohibition is directed not
against the President himself but against his subordinates. (Gloria v CA)

(2) Vice-President

There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with,
and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the
President.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.

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(Art VII, Sec 3)

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for
which he was elected. (Art VII, Sec 4)

Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately. (Art VII, Sec 9)

The Judicial Department

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law. (Art VIII, Sec 1)

“Lower courts” as here used is to be understood as referring to all other courts below the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court is the only constitutional court, all the lower courts being of statutory creation. The different
lower courts under the Judiciary Reorganization Law are the Court of Appeals, the regional trial courts, the
metropolitan trial courts, the municipal trial courts, and the municipal circuit trial courts. Not included in the
reorganization were the Court of Tax Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, as well as the Sharia courts for the
Muslims. Together with the Supreme Court, the aforementioned tribunals make up the judicial department
of our government. (Cruz, 2014)

Judicial Power

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Art VIII, Sec 1)

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political doctrine when it expanded the power of
judicial review of the court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
(Estrada v Desierto)

Furthermore, judicial power may be exercise where there are serious allegations that a law has infringed the
Constitution, in which case, it becomes not only the right but the duty if the Court to look into such allegation
and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy of the Constitution. (Organization v Executive Secretary)

(see above; Judicial Review)

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The Supreme Court

Composition

The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof. (Art VIII, Sec4(1))

Mode of Sitting

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until
they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. xxx (Art
VIII, Sec 11)

En Banc

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall
be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence
of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon. (Art VIII, Sec 4(2))

Significantly, as few as five members of the Court can declare any of the measures mentioned above the
unconstitutional, this number being a majority of the quorum of eight of the fifteen-member Court. (Cruz)

Only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en
banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of
the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine
of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division. (People v Gacott)

Division

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained,
the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. (Art
VIII, Sec 4(3))

When the case shall be referred to the Court en banc:

1. Where the necessary vote cannot be had in division; and

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 2. Where the doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court en banc or in division is sough to be
modified or reversed. (Cruz 2014)

The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed.
A decision of a Division of the Court is a decision of the Supreme Court. (MMDA v Jancom)

Appointments

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments
need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of
the list. (Art VIII, Sec 9)

The seemingly conflicting provisions of Art VIII, Sec 4(1) and Art VII, Sec 15:

The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in

its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof. (Art VIII, Sec4(1))

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, xxx. (Art VII, Sec 15)

Initially, in the case of Valenzuela, the Court ruled that, “during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution—two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term—the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so.” On the
ground that, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling
up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. And that Constitution must be construed in its entirety
as one, single instrument. (In Re: Valenzuela)

However, in De Castro v JBC, the Court reversed itself, stating that the prohibition against presidential
appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. On the ground
that had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII, which is dedicated
to the Executive Department, to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so—they could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. (De Castro v JBC)

If midnight appointments were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive
in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for
partisanship, the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBC’s prior processing of candidates. The
intervention of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary

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can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan
considerations. (De Castro v JBC)

Judicial and Bar Council

A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector. (Art VIII, Sec 8)

The Congress may have only one representative in the JBC, and not two representatives, or one from each
House, with each having only one-half vote. (Chavez v JBC)

Qualifications

No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless:

(1) He is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

(2) A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and
(3) Must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines. (Art VIII, Sec 7(2))

No Non-Judicial Work for Judges

The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions. (Art VIII, Sec 12)

The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform
any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction as a court and this jurisdiction does not include the exercise of
jurisdiction by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators. (Meralco v Pasay
Transportation Co)

The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices
or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously
observed. (Garcia v Macaraig)

Salary

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
courts, shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Art VIII,
Sec 10)

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Abandoning the doctrine set out in Perfecto v Meer and Endencia v David, the court held that salaries of
Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that
the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection
against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. (Nitafan v CIR)

Tenure

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
(Art VIII, Sec 2(2))

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until
they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme
Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon. (Art VIII, Sec 11)

Removal

The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not
by impeachment. (Art XI, Sec 2)

(see above; Accountability of Public Officers)

A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification
for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with
disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency,
cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries
with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment
under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice
be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by
disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate
proceedings. (In re Gonzales)

Fiscal Autonomy

The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically
and regularly released. (Art VIII, Sec 4)

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The judiciary’s fiscal autonomy entitles it to levy, assess and collect fees. (Bengzon v Drilon)
Under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court

En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when, and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to

justices, judges, court officials, and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power; they
determine the terms, conditions, and restrictions of the grant as grantor. (Re: COA Opinion xxx)

Jurisdiction

The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. (Art VIII,
Sec 2)

No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence. (Art VI, Sec 30)

Thus, although the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be increased by law, this may not be done
now except upon advice and with the concurrence of the Supreme Court itself; on the other hand, no law may
be passed depriving it of the power to review life sentence (Art VIII, Sec 5(2)(d)), for example, as this come
under its minimum appellate jurisdiction, which may not be reduced. (Cruz, 2014)

Before a tribunal, board or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a
law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are
made. (Santiago v Bautista)

The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter
it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions. (Felipe v Lueterio)

Original Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court shall have the power to exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus. (Art VIII, Sec 5(1))

The court’s possession of original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, which it shares with lower courts, does not give to parties the complete liberty
or discretion to file their petition in any of these courts. In the absence of special reasons, they cannot disregard
the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite
the fact that the same is available in the lower tribunals in the exercise of their original concurrent jurisdiction.
(Garcia v Miro)

Appellate Jurisdiction

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The Supreme Court shall have the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed
in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. Xxx (Art VIII, Sec 5(2)

The right to appeal is not embraced in due process of law. As long as the parties have been given the
opportunity to be heard in the lower court, they cannot demand the right to appeal of the legislature sees fit
to withhold it. But this rule is not absolute, in the cases enumerated in the above provision, an aggrieved party
may, on appeal or certiorari, question the judgments or decrees of a lower court before the Supreme Court,
which may review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm the same. (Cruz, 2014)

It should be noted that the appeals allowed in this section are form the final judgments and decrees only of
lower courts, or judicial tribunals. Administrative decisions are not included. Review of these decisions by the
courts of justice, including even the Supreme Court, is not guaranteed by this provision. On questions of facts,
it is entirely up to the legislature to determine whether or not appeals from such administrative decisions may
be allowed. (Cruz)

Deliberations/ Consultations

The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be
reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record
of the case and served upon the parties. Any Members who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a
decision or resolution, must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower
collegiate courts. (Art VIII, Sec 13)

The certification is intended as an added guarantee that the consultation requirement will be complied with
by the court. (Cruz, 2014)
However, the certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very

beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal

certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very

nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court. (Prudential Bank v
Castro)

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 Also, in a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente, although any member of

the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.
(Prudential Bank v Castro)

The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision had
not been reached in consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the
Court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed. The lack of certification at the end of the
decision would only serve as evidence of failure to observe the certification requirement and may be basis for
holding the official responsible for the omission to account therefor. Such absence of certification would not
have the effect of invalidating the decision. (Consing v CA)

Voting

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained,
the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. (Art
VIII, Sec 4)

Where the votes in the Court en banc are equally divided and the necessary majority is not obtained, the case
is re-deliberated upon, but if after deliberation, the voting remains the same, the petition is dismissed
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. (Cruz v DENR)

Requirements as to decisions

No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. (Art VIII, Sec 14(1))

This rule is applicable only to a decision, which is described as a judgment rendered after the presentation
of proof or on the basis of a stipulation of facts. The only exception is an order of dismissal on the merits.
A "Resolution" is not a "Decision" within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is

applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda
and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. (Nunal v COA)

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other
things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can
point out to the appellate court the findings of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees.
More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,

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preventing him from deciding by ipse dexit. (People v Bugarin)

A trial or appellate judge may occasionally view a party’s memorandum or brief as worthy of due consideration
either entirely or partly.
The constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no

proscription made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own
words. Precisely briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the courts in the writing of decisions.

(Hernandez v CA)

Section 14 does not apply to decisions in administrative proceedings,

The Constitutional provision requiring that decisions of court must contain a statement of facts and the

conclusions of law upon which it is based applies only to courts of record, not to the Ministry of Labor. Proceedings

in the NLRC (Nat’l Labor Relations Commission) are non-litigious and summary in nature w/o regard to
technicalities obtaining in courts of law. (Valladolid v Inciong)

A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issue for resolution;
otherwise, the appeal would be pointless – while brevity in the writing of decision is an admirable trait, it
should not and cannot be substituted for substance. (Yao v CA)

The Supreme Court already expressed its disapproval of the practice of rendering "sin perjuicio" judgments.
which is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by
the final judgment. (Dizon v Lopez)

A valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the
underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity
for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid
and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of
regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. (Asiavest Merchant Bankers v CA)

Petition for Review with Motion for Reconsideration

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or
denied without stating the legal basis therefor. (Art VIII, Sec 14(2))

In appellate courts, the rule does not require any comprehensive statement of facts or mention of the applicable
law, but merely a statement of legal basis for denying due course.
There is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a collegiate appellate court, after

deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the question raised are factual or have already been passed

upon; or cites some other legal basis. There is no need to explain fully the court’s denial, since the facts and the

law have already been laid out in the assailed Decision. (Tichangco v Enriquez)

This requirement is fully complied with when the Court of Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its decision,

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stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything
new. (Martinez v CA)

Period for deciding cases

(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice
or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or
matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not
been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such
responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay. (Art VIII Sec 15)

The Sandiganbayan should decide its cases within 3 months because it is a trial court like the regional trial
courts and the municipal trial courts. Regardless of that reason, the period of 12 months prescribed by the
Constitution for lower collegiate court may be further reduced by the Supreme Court. (Re: Problem of Delays
in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan)

Although decision within the maximum period is now mandatory, failure to arrive at the same will not divest
the court of jurisdiction, without prejudice to any responsibility that may attach to the judge. The court must
still resolve the case without further delay (Cruz, 2014)

Presidential Election Tribunal

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Art VII, Sec
4(7))

Administrative Powers

Temporary Assignment of Judges

The Supreme Court shall have the power to assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned. (Art VIII, Sec 5(3))

Change of Venue or Place of Trial

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The Supreme Court shall have the power to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. (Art VIII, Sec 5(4))

A change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. "The
interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is
necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his
crime" (Mondiguing v Abad) However, hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a
justification for transfer of venue. (People v Pilotin)

There may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but
the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent
of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of
venue. (People v Sola)

Administrative/ Rule-Making Powers

The Supreme Court shall have to power to promulgate rules concerning:

(1) the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

(2) pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
(3) the admission to the practice of law,
(4) the integrated bar, and
(5) legal assistance to the under-privileged.

Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Art VIII, Sec 5(5))

Limitations on the Rule-Making Powers of the Supreme Court:

1. The rules must be uniform for all courts of the same grade.
2. The rule must no diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Protection and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights

Pursuant to this constitutional authority, the Supreme Court promulgated on October 24, 2007 the Amparo
Rule (AM No. 07-9-12-SC) in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It was
an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people’s
constitutional rights. (Secretary of National Defense v Manalo)

Pleading, Practice, and Procedure

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Rules of Procedure may be modified at any time and become effective at once, so long as the change does not
affect vested tight. There are no vested rights to rule of procedure, which may be given retroactive effect.
(Cruz, 2014)

Admission to the Practice of Law

In the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. (In Re Cunanan)

The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to
the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. The disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court over attorneys is an inherent power incidental to its proper administration of
justice and essential to an orderly discharge of its judicial functions. (Zaldivar v Gonzales)

Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of
justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in
any manner with a case before the Court. (Zaldivar v Gonzales)

Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does
not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary
power on the matter. (In Re Cunanan)

Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. The two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still has to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by the Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Aguirre v Rana)

Integration of the Bar

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Organized by or
under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required
to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar. (In Re
Edillon)

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a

member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an

official national organization for the well- defined but unorganized and in cohesive group of which every lawyer

is a ready a member. Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of

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 the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. (In re Edillon)

Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. (In Re 1989 IBP Elections)

Legal Assistance to the Underprivileged

RA 9999 or the Free Legal Assistance Act of 2010 provides that the State shall guarantee free legal assistance
to the poor and ensure that every person who cannot afford the services of a counsel is provided with a
competent and independent counsel preferably of his/her own choice, if upon determination it appears that
the party cannot afford the services of a counsel, and that services of a counsel are necessary to secure the
ends of justice and protect of the party. (Sec 2)

Appointment of Court Personnel

Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law. (Art VIII, Sec
5(6))

Supervision of the lower courts

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. (Art VIII
Sec 6)

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness that a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety
should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society
cannot be preserved. There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting
standards of judicial conduct and integrity. (In re Demetria)

Annual Report

The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit
to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary. (Art VIII,
Sec 16)

Lower Courts

Qualifications and Appointments

The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge
thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar. (Art VIII, Sec 7(2))

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of
the list. (Art VIII, Sec 9(2))

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 Tenure

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until
they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme
Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon. (Art VIII, Sec 11)

Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can
be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there
is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint
of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists
between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a
member of the judiciary. (De la Llana v Alba)

However, the aforementioned doctrine of De la Llana has been rendered obsolete with the adoption of the
second paragraph of Section 2, Article VIII:
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.

Sources:

• Cases from Atty. Butch Jamon’s Constitutional Law 1 Syllabus

• Cruz, Isagani A., & Cruz, Carlo L. (2014). Philippine Political Law (2014 ed.)

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