Republic of the Philippines by law until said fine should be paid.

From that judgment and sentence the

SUPREME COURT defendant appealed to this court.
Manila
A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the
EN BANC following facts:

G.R. No. 4963 September 15, 1909 That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the
appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of the show
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions, in the
vs. form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature
GO CHICO, defendant-appellant. the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used
during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and
Gibbs and Gale for appellant. identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. On the day
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee. previous to the one above set forth the appellant had purchased the stock
of goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a public
sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in
MORELAND, J.:
question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock
of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public and in so doing
The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of placed in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store the
the Philippine Commission, which reads as follows: medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law
against the display of the medallions in question and had consequently no
Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, corrupt intention. The facts above stated are admitted.
to public view on his own premises, or who shall expose, or cause
to be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:
elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the
late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify
First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal
those in armed rebellion against the United States, or any flag,
intent upon the part of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable
banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by the
doubt.
public enemies of the United States in the Philippine Island for the
purpose of public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against the
authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or any flag, Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the
banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or which is identical banners, devices, or emblems actually used during the Philippine
commonly known as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.
that five hundred pesos for more than five thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than five In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory
the court. enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely
immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent
The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of
on the 8th day of September, 1908. After hearing the evidence adduced execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which
the court adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged and produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those
sentenced him under that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and
currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer subsidiary result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad.
imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place prescribed The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a flag or
emblem used particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the percentage of water more than that permitted by the statute. There was no
Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and dispute about the facts, but the objection made by the defendant was that
insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if made in he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal intent,
the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display or to go the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was condemned
itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite under a charge from the court which made his intent totally immaterial and
different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article whether he knew it or
by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the not and however carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell
corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a the genuine article.
loaded gun and kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends,
not upon B's death, upon the intention with which A consummated the act. The opinion of the court in that case says:
If the gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing
the death of B, then society has been injured and its security violated; but As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the
if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the
speaking, has no concern in the matter, even though the death of B results. crime.
The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society and
institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere
xxx xxx xxx
discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him
so. With those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar,
however, the evil to society and the Governmental does not depend upon It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to
the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect proportions so enormous as to menace the health and safety of the
which that display has upon the public mind. In the one case the public is people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and
affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself. heedless consumers are exposed to increasing perils. To redress
such evils is a plain duty but a difficult task. Experience has taught
the lesson that repressive measures which depend for their
It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that —
efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge or of his intent to
deceive and defraud are of title use and rarely accomplish their
The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make purpose. Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws
its commission a crime without regard to the intent of the doer, and upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness
if such an intention appears the courts must give it effect although of what he sells and compels him to know and certain.
the intention may have been innocent. Whether or not in a given
case the statute is to be so construed is to be determined by the
In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose
court by considering the subject-matter of the prohibition as well as
under a statute which provided that an inspector of elections of the city of
the language of the statute, and thus ascertaining the intention of
New York should not be removed from office except "after notice in writing
the legislature.
to the officer sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth clearly and
distinctly the reasons for his removal," and further provided that any person
In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was who removed such an officer without such notice should be guilty of a
charged with the sale of adulterated milk under a statute reading as follows: misdemeanor. An officer named Sheridan was removed by Gardener, the
defendant, without notice. Gardener was arrested and convicted of a
No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or misdemeanor under the statute. He appealed from the judgment of
exchange any impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of unwholesome conviction and the opinion from which the following quotation is made was
milk. written upon the decision of that appeal. Chief Justice Church, writing the
opinion of the court, says in relation to criminal intent:
It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg purchased at the
defendant's store 1 pint of milk which was shown to contain a very small
 In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a
under legal device. The court ruled out the evidence offered, and criminal intent. But there is a large class of cases in which, on
held that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable without
offense. It is quite clear that the facts offered to be shown, if true, proof that the defendant understands the facts that give character
would relieve the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt intent, to his act.
and, indeed, from any intent to violate the statute. The defendants
made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do not excuse the In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to
commission of prohibited acts. "The rule on the subject appears to ascertain whether his act comes within the legislative prohibition.
be, that in acts mala in se, intent governs but in those mala prohibit
a, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose to be
accomplished, the practical methods available for the enforcement
The authorities seem to establish that sustain and indictment for of the law, and such other matters as throw light upon the meaning
doing a prohibited act, it is sufficient to prove that the act was of the language, the question in interpreting a criminal statute is
knowingly and intentionally done. whether the intention of the legislature was to make knowledge of
the facts an essential element of the offense, or to put upon
xxx xxx xxx everyone the burden of finding out whether his contemplated act is
prohibited, and of refraining from it if it is.
In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed
that in fact notice had been given to the inspector, although it had In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247),
not, they would not have been guilty of the offense, because the the question of a criminal intent arose under a statute, under which the
intention to do the act would have been wanting. Their plea is: defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if any township
True, we intended to remove the inspector without notice, but we committee or other body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement of
thought the law permitted it. This was a mistake of law, and is not public moneys in excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the
strictly a defense. persons constituting such board shall be guilty of a crime. The defendant
was one who violated this law by voting to incur obligations in excess of
xxx xxx xxx the appropriation. He was convicted and appealed and the opinion from
which the quotation is taken was written upon a decision of that appeal.
If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made That court says:
correspondingly nominal; while a rule requiring proof of a criminal
intent to violate the statute, independent of an intent to do the act When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the
which the statute declares shall constitute the offense, would, in defendant, in aiding in the passage and effectuation of the
many cases, prevent the restraining influence which the statute resolution which I have pronounced to be illegal, did so under the
was designed to secure. advice of counsel and in good faith, and from pure and honest
motives, and that he therein exercise due care and caution.
In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N.Y., 437) the court says:
xxx xxx xxx
But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare
In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court an act criminal, irrespective of the knowledge or motive of the doer
says: of such act, there can be of necessity, no judicial authority having
the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such
 knowledge or motive to be shown. In such instances the entire The court says:
function of the court is to find out the intention of the legislature,
and to enforce the law in absolute conformity to such intention. And The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed
in looking over the decided cases on the subject it will be found that in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The statutory definition
in the considered adjudications this inquiry has been the judicial of the offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden act
guide. shall be done knowingly or willfully, and if it did, the designed
purpose of the act would be practically defeated. The intention of
In the case of Rex vs. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25 E. C. L., 611), the prisoner the legislature is plain, that persons engaged in the traffic so
was indicted for unlawfully transposing from one piece of wrought plate to engage in it at their peril and that they can not set up their
another the lion-poisson contrary to the statutes. It was conceded that the ignorance of the nature and qualities of the commodities they sell,
act was done without any fraudulent intention. The court said: as a defense.

There are no words in the act of Parliament referring to any The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. Gould (40 Ia.,
fraudulent intention. The words of it are, 'Shall transpose or 374); Commonwealth vs. Farren (9 Allen, 489);
remove, or cause of procure to be transposed or removed, from Commonwealth vs. Nichols (10 Allen, 199); Commonwealth vs. Boyton (2
one piece of wrought plate to another. Allen, 160); Wharton's Criminal Law, section 2442;
Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3 Greenleaf on Evidence,
In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated: section 21; Farrell vs. The State (32 Ohio State, 456);
Beekman vs. Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The People vs. Roby (52 Mich.,
It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the 577).
criminal law is an essential ingredient in every criminal offense, and
that where is an absence of such intent there is no offense; this is It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the
especially true as to statutory offenses. When the statute plainly legislature did not intend that a criminal intent should be a necessary
forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no
implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully.
honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he violates. When The wording is plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the
the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to interpretation.
depend upon the positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left
to interpretation. Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent
to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. The accused did
In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an
question arose on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment requiring act, and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself — intent
him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State which provided and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are
that any person would be liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture, inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device
sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to in his window. Nothing more is required to commit the crime.
sell," oleomargarine, etc. At the trial the defendant requested the court to
instruct the injury that if they believed, from the evidence, that the We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that
defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or knew the law is applicable only to the identical banners, etc., actually used in the
of there furnished, to any of his customers any oleomargarine, but, as far late insurrection, and not to duplicates of those banners, can be sustained.
as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then the verdict must be for the
defendant. The court refused to make the charge as requested and that is It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the
the only point upon which the defendant appealed. display of the flag or flags actually used in the insurrection, and, at the
same time, permit exact duplicates thereof (saving, perhaps, size) to be
displayed without hindrance. In the case before us, to say that the display the framers. (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 487; State Bolden, 107 La.,
of a certain banner is a crime and that the display of its exact duplicate is 116, 118; U.S. vs. Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689; Green vs. Kemp,
not is to say nonsense. The rules governing the interpretation of statutes 13 Mass., 515; Lake Shore R. R. Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339;
are rules of construction not destruction. To give the interpretation Delafield vs. Brady, 108 N. Y., 524 Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State,
contended for by the appellant would, as to this particular provision, nullify 330.)
the statute altogether.
The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being the
The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, are to control the literal
designate or identity those in armed rebellion against the United States" interpretation of particular language in a statute, and language
mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in that sense
flag which is of that type. This description refers not to a particular flag, but which will harmonize with such intention and object, and effect the
to a type of flag. That phrase was used because there was and is no other purpose of the enactment. (26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law., 602.)
way of describing that type of flag. While different words might be
employed, according to the taste of the draftsman, the method of Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to sustain this proposition.
description would have to be the same. There is no concrete word known
by which that flag could be aptly or properly described. There was no The preamble is no part of the statute, but as setting out the object
opportunity, within the scope of a legislative enactment, to describe the and intention of the legislature, it is considered in the construction
physical details. It had no characteristics whatever, apart from its use in of an act. Therefore, whenever there is ambiguity, or wherever the
the insurrection, by which it could, in such enactment, be identified. The words of the act have more than one meaning, and there is no
great and the only characteristic which it had upon the which the doubt as to the subject-matter to which they are to be applied, the
Commission could seize as a means of description and identification was preamble may be used." (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U.
the fact that it was used in the insurrection. There was, therefore, S., 72; Platt vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U. S., 48;
absolutely no way in which the Commission could, in the Act, describe the Myer vs. Western Car Co., 102 U. S., 1; Holy Trinity Church vs. U.
flag except by reciting where and how it was used. It must not be forgotten S., 143 U. S., 457; Coosaw Mining Co. vs. South Carolina, 144 U.
that the Commission, by the words and phrases used, was not attempting S., 550; Cohn vs. Barrett, 5 Cal., 195; Barnes vs. Jones, 51 Cal.,
to describe a particular flag, but a type of flag. They were not describing a 303; Field vs. Gooding, 106 Mass., 310; People vs. Molineaux, 40
flag used upon a particular field or in a certain battle, but a type of flag used N. Y., 113; Smith vs. The People, 47 N. Y., 330; The
by an army — a flag under which many persons rallied and which stirred People vs. Davenport, 91 N.Y., 547; The People vs. O'Brien, 111
their sentiments and feelings wherever seen or in whatever form it N.Y., 1)
appeared. It is a mere incident of description that the flag was used upon
a particular field or in a particular battle. They were describing the flag
The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such
not a flag. It has a quality and significance and an entity apart from any
strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant and
place where or form in which it was used.
at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the legislature.
If the language be plain, it will be construed as it reads, and the
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of words of the statute given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the
being used in more than one sense, and the literal interpretation of court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would
a statute may lead to an absurdity or evidently fail to give the real if the statute were remedial. In both cases it will endeavor to effect
intent of the legislature. When this is the case, resort is had to the substantial justice." (Bolles vs. Outing Co., 175 U. S., 262, 265; U.
principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so that a thing S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76, 95; U. S. vs. Reese, 92 U. S., 214)
which is within the intention of a statute is as much within the
statute as if it were within the letter, and a thing which is within the
It is said that notwithstanding this rule (the penal statutes must be
letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the
construde strictly) the intention of the lawmakers must govern in
intention of the makers, and the statute should be construed as to
the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, but
advance the remedy and suppress the mischief contemplated by
 this is not a new, independent rule which subverts the old. It is a
modification of the known maxim and amounts to this -- that though
penal statutes are to be construed strictly, they are not be
construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious purpose of the
legislature. (U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76;
Taylor vs. Goodwin, L. R. 4, Q. B. Civ., 228.)

In the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty
for "furiously driving any sort of carriage" a person could be convicted for
immoderately driving a bicycle.

It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its

enactments such a meaning as will render then operative and
effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them.
Accordingly, in case of any doubt or obscurity, the construction will
be such as to carry out these objects. (Black, Interpretation of
Laws, p. 106.)

In The People vs. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the court said:

The occasion of the enactment of a law always be referred to in

interpreting and giving effect to it. The court should place itself in
the situation of the legislature and ascertain the necessity and
probable object of the statute, and then give such construction to
the language used as to carry the intention of the legislature into
effect so far as it can be ascertained from the terms of the statute
itself. (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72, 79.)

We do not believe that in construing the statute in question there is

necessity requiring that clauses should be taken from the position given
them and placed in other portions of the statute in order to give the whole
Act a reasonable meaning. Leaving all of the clauses located as they now
are in the statute, a reasonable interpretation, based upon the plain and
ordinary meaning of the words used, requires that the Act should be held
applicable to the case at bar.

The judgment of the court below and the sentence imposed thereunder are
hereby affirmed. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur.