A CRITICAL ANALYSIS – BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY AND
SEWERAGE BOARD V. A RAJAPPA & ORS.
PROJECT ON
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS -“BANGALORE WATER
SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE BOARD V. A. RAJAPPA”
SUBMITTED TO:
Mr. NITIN TOPPO
Assistant Professor
Labour Law
SUBMITTED BY:
MEENAL SAHU
27, B.A. LL.B. VI Semester
SCHOOL OF LAW
GURU GHASIDAS VISHWAVIDHYALAYA,
BILASPUR (C.G.)
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS – BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY AND
SEWERAGE BOARD V. A RAJAPPA & ORS.
DECLARATION
I hereby, declare that this project is my original piece of work. The project or
any part of it is not being copied from any of the sources without being
acknowledged.
I am highly indebted to the authors of the books and the owners of the articles
and websites, from where the reference is being taken. Through the references, I
have tried to come-up with new conceptual interpretation to present the idea of
all Pros-n-cons of my subject.
(A Critical Analysis – Bangalore Water Supply and
Sewerage Board V. A. Rajappa)
Meenal Sahu
ROLL NO.27
B.A. LL.B. VI semester
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS – BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY AND
SEWERAGE BOARD V. A RAJAPPA & ORS.
CERTIFICATE
I, MEENAL SAHU, 27, B.A LL.B. (VI semester, student of SCHOOL OF
LAW hereby, certifies that I have submitted my project on the subject “A
Critical analysis – Bangalore water supply and sewerage board v. A.
Rajappa”. And this project is being accomplished under the guidance of my
Labour Law Assistant professor, Mr. Nitin Toppo.
The context of the project is not being copied from anywhere without any such
acknowledgment and is the original work of mine.
Meenal Sahu Faculty Signature:
ROLL NO.27
B.A. LL.B. VI semester
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS – BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY AND
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I hereby, not just indebted to the authors and owners from whom I referred but
also thankful to my teacher ‘Mr. Nitin Toppo who actually guided me the way
to accomplish my work on time and made the concept clear to me, so I could
tackle with the exceptions and higher level of theory of the subject. Also, I am
glad that God Almighty is always being there by my side during the duration of
the completion of my work and never let me fallen ill, and thankful to my
Parent who always supported me.
Meenal Sahu
ROLL NO.27
B.A. LL.B. VI semester
School of law
INTRODUCTION
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The Industrial Dispute came into force on April 1, 1947. The object as laid down in the
preamble of the Act is to make provision for the investigation and settlement of the industrial
dispute .The Act aims to bring industrial peace, harmony and economic justice by providing
machinery and procedure for the investigation and settlement of industry dispute by
negotiations.
The industrial dispute Act provides the definition of ‘industry’ in the section to 2 (j) of the
act. The definition and its interpretation has been a contentious issue since years. The act
defines industry as-
“Any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture, or calling of employers and includes any
calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen”.
In the landmark judgment of Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa, the Supreme Court
exhaustively considered the scope of industry and laid down the following test, which is
popularly also known as “the triple test”, to ascertain what an industry is. It was stated that
where there is a
1. systematic activity,
2. organized by co-operation between employer and employee,
3. for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy
human wants and wishes, prima facie, there is an ‘industry’ in that enterprise.
The following points were also emphasized in this case:
Industry does not include spiritual or religious service or services geared to celestial
bliss.
Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be venture in the public
joint, private or other sector.
The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with the
special emphasis on the employer-employee relations.
If the organization is a trade or business it does not cease to be one because of
philanthropy animating the undertaking.1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
1
https://www.gktoday.in/gk/understanding-the-triple-test-issue-with-the-ida-act/
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The definition and interpretation of ‘industry’ in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, has been a contentious issue for over four decades. Considering its “serious and wide-
ranging implications,” a seven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has referred
the issue to a nine-judge bench.
As serious doubts were raised about the correctness of the view taken in the Bangalore Water
Supply’s case, a five-judge bench in May 2005, had referred the matter to a larger bench
which was supposed to give a meaning and effect to the definition clause in the present
context and also keeping in view the amended definition of ‘industry’ which has been kept
dormant for many years since amendment in 1982.
“Pressing demands of the competing sectors of employers and employees and the
helplessness of legislature and executive in bringing into force the Amendment Act compel
us to make this reference,” the five-judge bench had said in its 2005 reference order. This was
after a three-judge bench found an “apparent conflict” between its two decisions of 1996 and
2001 on the issue.
Earlier in 1996, a three-judge bench while relying on a 1978 seven-judge bench verdict had
held that the social forestry department was covered by the definition of ‘industry’. Later in
2001, a two-judge bench took a contrary view on the issue. The definition of industry as
provided in Section 2(j), which came into effect immediately after independence, says that
“industry” means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and
includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation
of workmen.”
In the landmark judgement, Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board versus A Rajappa,
the seven-judge SC bench in 1978, extended the definition from manufacturing units to other
government establishments, irrespective of the functions performed by them. It decided that
Bangalore Water Supply was an industry by a majority vote of 5:2, a stand opposed by the
board itself.
A set of three criteria was developed by Justice Krishna Iyer in the case to determine
conclusively what activity and establishment should constitute an industry. It was stated that
where there is a (i) systematic activity, (ii) organised by co-operation between employer and
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employee, (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to
satisfy human wants and wishes, prima facie, there is an ‘industry’ in that enterprise.
With the 1978 judgement, professions such as attorneys, activities like clubs, educational
institutions, co-operatives, research institutes, and philanthropic enterprises were also covered
in the definition of industry. The top court also held that the absence of profit motive or
gainful objective or whether the venture is public/joint or private or other sector is irrelevant
while deciding whether an enterprise is an industry. It also ruled that welfare economic
activities undertaken by the government or statutory bodies not being sovereign function
Aggrieved by the widened definition, the government amended the Industrial Disputes Act in
1982. Although the new provision is yet to come into force. With this as the background, the
apex court in 2005 in the case of State of UP vs. Jai Bir Singh sought a reconsideration of
the 38-year-old verdict by a larger bench as the verdict carried an “over-emphasis on the
rights of the workers.”
With this as the background, the apex court in 2005 in the case of State of UP vs. Jai Bir
Singh sought a reconsideration of the 38-year-old verdict by a larger bench as the verdict
carried an “over-emphasis on the rights of the workers.”
FACTS OF THE CASE
CITATIONS:
1978 AIR 548, 1978 SCR (3) 207
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CORUM:
Beg, M. Hameedullah (CJ), Chandrachud, Y.V., Bhagwati, P.N., Krishnaiyer, V.R. &
Tulzapurkar, V.D., Desai, D.A. & Singh, Jaswant
PETITIONER:
BANGALORE WATER-SUPPLY & SEWERAGE BOARD, ETC.
RESPONDENT:
A. RAJAPPA & OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
21/02/1978
FACTS OF THE CASE
The respondent employees were fined by the Appellant Board for misconduct and various
sums were recovered from them. Therefore, they filed a Claims Application No. 5/72 under
Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, alleging that the said punishment was imposed
in violation of the principles of natural justice.
The appellant Board raised a preliminary objection before the Labour Court that the Board, a
statutory body performing what is in essence a legal function by providing the basic
amenities to the citizens, is not an industry within the meaning of the expression under
section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and consequently the employees were not
workmen and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the claim of the workmen.
This objection being over-ruled, the appellant Board filed two Writ ‘Petitions before the
Karnataka High Court at Bangalore. The Division Bench of that High Court dismissed the
petitions and held that the appellant Board is “industry” within the meaning ‘of the
expression under section 2(i) of the Industrial, Disputes Act, 1947.
The appeals by Special Leave, considering “the chances of confusion from the crop ‘of cases
in an area where the common man has to understand and apply the law and the desirability
that there should be, comprehensive, clear and conclusive declaration as to what is an
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industry under the Industrial Disputes Act as it stands” were placed for consideration by a
larger Bench.
ISSUES INVOLVED
1. The issue in the case was that whether Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board will
fall under the definition of ‘Industry’ and in fact, particularly the issue was what is an
‘Industry’ under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Dispute Act?
2. Whether Charitable Institutions Are Industries?
3. Do clubs and other organizations whose general emphasis is not on profit-making but
fellowship and self-service fit into the definitional circle?
4. Would a university or college or school or research institute be called an industry?
5. Could a lawyer’s chamber or chartered accountant’s office, a doctor’s clinic or other liberal
profession’s occupation or calling be designated an industry?
6. Are governmental functions, strict sense, industrial and if not, what is the extent of the
immunity of instrumentalities of government?
7. Whether Sovereign or Regal functions will be industry?
8. Whether Municipal Corporations Industry?
9. Whether Hospital is Industry?
10. What is the meaning of the term ‘industry’?
JUDGEMENT
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS – BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY AND
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It held that the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board will fall under the definition of
the industry and by justifying this it gave an elaborating definition of industry.
‘Industry’, as defined in Section 2(j) and explained in Banerjee, has a wide import. (a) Where
(i) systematic activity, (ii) organized by co-operation between employer and employee, (the
direct and substantial element is chimerical) (iii) for the production and/or distribution of
goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious
but inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss e.g. making, on a large
scale, Prasad or food), prima facie, there is an ‘industry’ in that enterprise.
(b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public,
joint private or other sector.
(c) The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special
emphasis on the employer-employee relations.
(d) If the organization is a trade or business it does not cease to be one because of
philanthropy animating the undertaking.
Although Section 2(j) uses words of the widest amplitude in its two limbs their meaning
cannot be magnified to overreach itself.
(a) ‘Undertaking’ must suffer a contextual and associational shrinkage as explained in
Banerjee and in this judgment, so also, service, calling and the like. This yields the inference
that all organized activity possessing the triple elements, although not trade or business may
still be ‘industry’ (provided the nature of the activity, viz. the employer employee basis, bears
resemblance to what we find in trade or business. This takes into the fold of ‘industry’
undertakings, callings and services adventure ‘analogous’ to the carrying on of trade or
business. All features, other than the methodology of carrying on the activity viz. in
organizing the co-operation between employer and employee may be dissimilar. It does not
matter, if on the employment terms there is analogy.
Application of these guidelines should not stop short of their logical reach by invocation of
creeds, cults or inner sense of incongruity or other sense of motivation for or resultant of the
economic operations. The ideology of the Act being industrial peace, regulation and
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resolution of industrial disputes between employer and workmen, the range of this statutory
ideology must inform the reach of the statutory definition.
ANALYSIS
The ruling by a five-judge Supreme Court Bench, recommending the setting up of a larger
Bench to review the definition of “industry” as interpreted in law since 1978, is a wakeup call
to the legislature and the executive. The crux of the issue before the court in State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Jasbir Singh2 taken up along with nine other civil appeals was whether, for
purposes of application of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, the Bangalore Water Supply case
that amplified the definition of “industry” should continue to be the law of the land.
Employers in many service establishments and Government departments, aggrieved by the
ruling in the Bangalore Water Supply case raised demands for their exclusion from the ambit
of the IDA. Parliament subsequently passed in 1982 an amendment to the IDA, which sought
to exclude many kinds of establishments from the definition. However, the amendment was
never notified. The latest order of the Bench headed by Justice N. Santosh Hegde holds that
the Iyer Bench order needs a review in view of the executive’s failure to notify and enforce
the amended restrictive definition of “industry”. The Government had explained before courts
that the 1982 amendment was not notified in view of the fact that no alternative machinery
for redress of grievances of employees in establishments excluded by the amendment had
been provided.
The Hegde Bench itself has pointed out that it was only in the absence of an unambiguous
definition of industry in the IDA that the apex court delivered its ruling in 1978, and that at
the same time, Justice Krishna Iyer had said that “our judgment has no pontifical flavour but
seeks to serve the future hour till changes in the law or in industrial culture occur”.
No doubt, the question of a differentiated piece of industrial relations legislation for service
establishments is becoming ever more relevant because the role of the service sector in the
economy is growing. Services are also becoming a subject of international trade negotiations
and are being opened to foreign capital. Many service activities such as health care,
education, water and power supply, for long either the obligation or the prerogative of
governments, are now undertaken by private entrepreneurs.
2
ILR 1979 Delhi 571
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There is a need, on the one side, to protect the legitimate interests and democratic rights of
workers in these sectors, and on the other, to minimize the scope for disruption of industrial
peace in these vital sectors to protect the interests of the public. All these reasons are
important enough to warrant a separate law for these services.
However, some observations made by the Hedge Bench in favour of a legal review of the
1978 ruling are on quite different lines and highly debatable. The order says that there is an
“overemphasis on the rights of workers” in industrial law and that this has resulted in
payment of “huge amounts as back wages” to workers illegally terminated or retrenched and
that these awards “sometimes take away the very substratum of industry”.
Justice Krishna Iyer had remarked in his ruling (quoted by the Hegde order itself) that the
“working class, unfamiliar with the sophistications of definitions and shower of decisions,
unable to secure expert legal opinion, what with poverty pricing them out of the justice
market and denying them the staying power to withstand the multi-decked litigated process,
de facto is denied social justice if legal drafting is vagarious, definitions indefinite and court
rulings contradictory”. These remarks were made in support of an expansive definition of
“industry”.
The Hegde Bench ruling attributes what it calls “the inhibitions and the difficulties which are
being exercised by the legislature and the executive in bringing into force the amended
industrial law” to the interpretation of the definition of “industry” in the 1978 judgment. This
also ignores the explanation given by the Government for non-enforcement of the restrictive
amendment.
The apex court says that “an over-expansive interpretation of the definition of industry might
be a deterrent to private enterprise in India where public employment opportunities are
scarce”. However, neither economic theory nor the decades of growth of the market economy
in developed countries testifies to protection of employees’ basic rights being a hurdle to
progress. Thus the remarks on macroeconomic tendencies made by the latest ruling seem to
be no more than assumptions.
Justice Chandrachud, a member of the Bench that delivered the 1978 verdict, had said that
the “problem [of definition of industry] is far too policy-oriented to be satisfactorily settled
by judicial decisions. Parliament must step in and legislate in a manner which will leave no
doubt as to its intention”. These, are wise words.
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In the present case the court by applying liberal interpretation gave a wider meaning to the
definition of industry so as to include all kinds of activities wherein there is an employer and
employee relationship.
TRIPLE TEST
After the Bangalore Water supply case the Supreme Court came up with a working principle
called as ‘triple test’
there should be systematic Activity
Organized by Co-operation between employer and employee,
For the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human
wants and wishes.3
The following points were also emphasized in this case:4
1. Industry does not include spiritual or religious services or services geared to celestial bliss
2. Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public,
joint, private or other sector.
3. The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special
emphasis on the employer- employee relationship
4. If the organization is a trade or business it does not cease to be one because of philanthropy
animating the undertaking
Therefore, the consequences of the decision in this case are that professions, clubs,
educational institutions co-operatives, research institutes, charitable projects and other
kindred adventures, if they fulfil the triple test stated above cannot be exempted from the
scope of section 2(j) of the Act.
3
Bangalore Water-Supply and Sewerage Board V. A. Rajappa, AIR (1978) S.C. 610
4
S.N. Mishra, Labour and Industrial Laws, Ed., 28th, 2018, New Delhi, Central Law Publications, P.31
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WHAT DOES NOT COME UNDER THE DEFINITION OF
‘INDUSTRY?’
In State of Rajasthan v. Ganeshi lal 5, it was held that the law Department was not an
Industry. In accordance with the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in this case, the
respondent was working as a peon for a Public Prosecutor as a temporary employee
on a contract basis. The issue before the court was with regard to his termination. But
the court went on to hold that the accepted concept of an industry cannot be applied
to the Law department of the Government. Though the labour Court and the high
Court did not even go into the details of why a law department cannot be considered
as an industry, but was nevertheless held to not be an industry.
“Forest department is not an industry” was the ratio decidendi of State of Gujarat v.
Pratam Singh Narsingh Parmar.6 The case explicitly mentions that ordinarily a
department of the government cannot be held to be an industry but rather it is part of
the sovereign function and it would be for the person concerned who claims the same
to also prove it.
The Census department of Government of India, will not come within the purview of
‘industry’ as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act. The same was held in the
case of Md. Raj Mohammad v. Industrial Tribunal –cum-Labour court, Warangal.
The facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as a Tabulator on a
consolidated pay of Rs. 280.00 per month, and he worked continuously at the office
of the Regional Joint Director of Census, Khammam from April 24, 1981 to February
27, 1982. All of a sudden the Regional Joint Director, Census Operations, Khammam
Region prevented him from attending to his duties thereby violating the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and neither the petitioner was given
notice nor retrenchment compensation, though he worked continuously for a period
of 240 days. After termination of his service, the petitioner approached the
respondent on several occasions to provide him with the job but his efforts went in
vain. Since the date of his termination, the petitioner could not secure any alternative
job and due to unemployment and financial distress he could not approach the
5
(2008)I.LLJ 670 (SC)
6
(2001) I LLJ 1118 (SC).
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Tribunal immediately and as such, there was a delay in approaching the Industrial
Tribunal and same needs to be viewed leniently. He approached to the tribunal for the
reinstatement and the same was delivered. But with regard to the first aspect, the
Labour Court relied upon the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Himanshu Kumar Vidyarathi and others v. State of Bihar and held that the Census
Department is not an industry and disengagement of the petitioner from service
cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act.
An employer, who having installed a Photostat machine in a room of 12’’ x 8’ and
working himself with the help of an operator and the shop itself being small in nature
would not come within the purview of ‘industry’ as defined under the industrial
disputes act. This was held in Soni Photostat Centre v. Basudev Gupta. 7 The brief
facts of the case as they appear from record are that the petitioner had a Photostat
machine installed in a room of 128 square feet. The shop was registered with the
Director of Industries bearing a Registration No. SSI 53612. There were two
electrostatic machines in the shop. One of the machines was used for work and the
other was used for display to secure orders for sale of the electrostatic machine on
commission. It is alleged that the workman required an experience certificate for
applying for job elsewhere and the same was given to him on 8.12.1990 by the
proprietor of the shop. Thereafter the workman worked in the petitioner’s
establishment as helper till 10.12.1990. The petitioner alleged that after taking
experience certificate, he left the job himself for better prospects. The main issue
raised in this case was whether the Photostat Centre comes under the definition of
‘industry’. It was delivered that, “a single lawyer, a rural medical practitioner of
urban doctor with a little assistant and/or menial servant may play a profession but
may not be said to run an industry”. That is not because the employee does not make
a contribution nor because the profession is too high to be classified as a trade or
industry with its commercial connotations but because there is nothing like organised
labour in such employment.
District Literary Samiti, as constituted under a scheme implemented by the
government for eradication of literacy, will not be ‘industry’ as defined by I.D Act
and the same was held in Project Director, District Literacy Samiti v. Ms. Mamta
7
2004 (1) AWC 252
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Srivastava and another. The facts of this case are that a Ms. Mamta Srivastava was
working in the applicant’s establishment. Her services were terminated and,
therefore, an industrial dispute was raised before the Competent Authority.
Conciliation having failed the matter was referred to the Labour Court. The issue
raised was whether the DLS will come under the definition of Industry. Ultimately,
the writ petition was heard and subsequently held that the applicant’s establishment is
not an ‘industry’ and, therefore, the Industrial Disputes Act is not applicable.
The Diocese of Church was held to be not an ‘industry’ in the case of Diocese of
Amritsar of Church of North India and others v Buta Anayat Masih and others. In
the mentioned case the Respondent joined the petitioners’ church as an Evangelist on
a monthly salary and was terminated from the same. The Respondent filed a suit for
reinstatement, continuity of service and back wages before the Labour Court.
According to him the termination of service, notice, charge-sheet and enquiry, were
bad in law and the Labour Court accepted reference and contention of the respondent
on basis of evidence, granted reliefs and passed an ex-parte order. The application for
setting aside the ex-parte award was filed beyond a period of 30 days and after the
publication of award, the application was rejected. And this was the contention of the
current petition – Whether the writ Petition filed by Petitioner was maintainable?
In order to decide whether the petitioner was covered under the term industry in
accordance to the Act and whether the evangelist was a worker, the court sought help
from a judicial precedent in, Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A.
Rajappa and others8, and went onto hold that any systematic activity, organized by
co-operation between employer and employee for production/or and distribution of
goods services to satisfy human wants and wishes was industry as covered under
definition of the Act but those services calculated to serve human wants and wishes
which were spiritual and religious could not be termed as industry and as the
respondent was working for the petitioner for activities that involved spirituality, the
petitioner could not thereby be termed as an industry.
“A ‘temple’ is not an ‘industry”. And it was held in Indravadan N. Adhvaryu v.
Laxmidevnaryan Dev Trust. The facts of this case are that the petitioner, who was
8
1978 SCR (3) 207
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working in Dholera Swaminarayan Temple of the respondent Trust, raised an
industrial dispute before the Labour Court, on the ground that his service has been
terminated without following the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes
Act. But the court observed that such a submission cannot be accepted as the temple
run by the Trust is not involved in any business or undertaking any manufacturing
activity to include it within the definition of ‘industry’.
In Shrimali v. District Development Officer9, wherein there was an undertaking of
famine and draught relief works by State government for introducing certain schemes
to provide relief and some works were also provided to the affected people, instead of
distributing doles. The question that arose was whether such functions were
sovereign functions. It was held that it would be difficult to hold such an undertaking
as an industry.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
After the Bangalore Water supply case, there is still chaotic situation related to the sovereign
functions, as per the previous decisions it is clearly mentioned that sovereign activities are
excluded from the definition. Despite having the working principle there is still problem in
deciding the problem. Such conflict arose in Chief Conservator of Forest v. Jagannath
9
(1989) 1 GLR 396
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Maruti Kondare10 and State of Gujarat v. Pratamsingh Narsingh Parmar 11, where in the
former case forest department of State of Maharashtra was held to be an industry and in the
later case it was held that forest department of State of Gujarat is not an industry.
Constitutional Bench of five judges in State of UP v. Jai Bir Singh 12 in this case it was held
that a caveat has to be entered on confining ‘sovereign functions’ to the traditional so
described as ‘inalienable functions’ comparable to those performed by a monarch, a ruler or a
non-democratic government. The learned judges in the Bangalore Water Supply a Sewerage
Board case seem to have confined only such sovereign functions outside the purview of
‘industry’ which can be termed strictly as constitutional functions of the three wings of the
State i.e. executive, legislature and judiciary. The concept of sovereignty in a constitutional
democracy is different from the traditional concept of sovereignty which is confined to ‘law
and order’, ‘defence’, ‘law making’ and ‘justice dispensation’. In a democracy governed by
the Constitution the sovereignty vests in the people and the State is obliged to discharge its
constitutional obligations contained in the Directive Principles of the State Policy in Part – IV
of the Constitution of India. From that point of view, wherever the government undertakes
public welfare activities in discharge of its constitutional obligations, as provided in part-IV
of the Constitution, such activities should be treated as activities in discharge of sovereign
functions falling outside the purview of ‘industry’. Whether employees employed in such
welfare activities of the government require protection, apart from the constitutional rights
conferred on them, may be a subject of separate legislation but for that reason, such governmental
activities cannot be brought within the fold of industrial law by giving an undue expansive and
wide meaning to the words used in the definition of industry.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has restored judicial discipline and thereby prevented an unnecessary
court-initiated turmoil in the area of labour law by giving a judgment in Bangalore Water
Supply case11. Seven Judges of the Apex Court had given a widely ranging definition of
“industry” under the Act and ever since, the case has been applied as law throughout the
country.
10
AIR 1996 SC 2898
11
(2001) 9 SCC 713
12
2017 (3) SCC 311
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS – BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY AND
SEWERAGE BOARD V. A RAJAPPA & ORS.
The Parliament which had amended the definition of “industry” in 1982 restricted the wide
meaning given by the Bangalore Water Supply case. The new definition sought to exclude
institutions like hospitals, dispensaries, educational, scientific and research or training
institutes, institutions engaged in charitable, social philanthropic services. It was also
proposed to exclude sovereign functions of the Government including activities like atomic
energy, space and defense research. For all these institutions, a separate body was proposed
to be created to address grievances, but after this legislatives mandate, the successive
Governments have been reluctant to bring the said law into force by merely issuing a
notification.
It remains a debatable point as to what the Apex Court would do if a petition moved for the
enforcement of this definition in terms of A. K. Roy v. Union of India12 where it was held
that a legislative mandate cannot be held in abeyance by the ruling politicians for an
unreasonable period. In 1998, when a two-Judges Bench of the Kerala High Court sought a
reconsideration of the 1978 judgment in the Coir Board case, a three-Judges Bench of Chief
Justice A. S. Anand, Justice S. P. Bharucha and M. K. Mukherjee said that the two judges
were bound by the judgment of the larger bench in Bangalore Water Supply. In the opinion of
the three judges, the said judgment did not require any reconsideration and they also sent out
a silent but clear message that they will not step in where political executive has thought it
wise to keep off.
The wide definition of “industry” has given opportunity to both the employer and the
employee to raise issues i.e. one trying to pull out of this definition, to be out of the clutches
of the said Act, and the other bringing within it to receive benefits under it. Due to the width
of the periphery of the word “industry”, there is a tug-o-war between the two, in spite of the
various decision of the Court.
The law in force presently is the interpretation of the original Section 2(j) by Rajappa’s Case.
Focusing solely on the merits of the case it is a super judgment which has taken into
consideration the social and economic culture of our country. The decision is distinctly pro-
labour as it seeks to bring more activities within the fold of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947.
In practical terms, the labour forces of the country are much better position now, than they
would have been had the amended S. 2(j) been notified. This is because the amended S. 2(j)
excludes some categories of employment which squarely comes within the fold of Rajappa’s
case.
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS – BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY AND
SEWERAGE BOARD V. A RAJAPPA & ORS.
But at the same time, a glance at the judgment would suggest that it is actually a different law
altogether as compared to the original S. 2(j). The question really is whether the judiciary is
entitled to embark on such an expedition. Even in a democracy, following the theory of
separation of powers, the judiciary has implied authority to fill in the gaps left by the
legislature. But, a glance at Rajappa’s case and the decisions preceding it would suggest that
the judiciary went far ahead than merely filling the gaps left by the legislature.
In the current scenario industries’ have become one of the most vital parts of the society’s
smooth run, when there is no harmonious relation between workmen and employee it leads to
dysfunction. When the law itself is not clear regarding the term ‘industry’ it will definitely
affect the industry on a large scale. The law in force presently is the interpretation of the
original Section 2(j). Focusing solely on the merits of the case it is judgment which has taken
into consideration. The decision is distinctly pro-labour as it seeks to bring more activities
within the fold of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947. In practical terms, the labour forces of the
country are much better position now, than they would have been had the amended S. 2(j)
been notified. This is because the amended S. 2(j) excludes some categories of employment
which squarely comes within the fold of Rajappa’s case. But at the same time, a glance at the
judgment would suggest that it is actually a different law altogether as compared to the
original S. 2(j). The question really is whether the judiciary is entitled to embark on such an
expedition. Even in a democracy, following the theory of separation of powers, the judiciary
has implied authority to fill in the gaps left by the legislature. After the Jai Bir Singh case
there is no such astonishing judgment, which has altered the definition. A crucial step should
be taken to clear the lacunae.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
S.N. Mishra, Labour and Industrial Laws, Ed., 28th, 2018, New Delhi, Central Law
Publications, P.31 ,32,33,34,36,38,40,41,45.
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS – BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY AND
SEWERAGE BOARD V. A RAJAPPA & ORS.
WEBSITES
http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/533/Bangalore-Water-Supply-
Case.html as on 25/03/19
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1149369/ as on 25/03/19
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/bangalore-water-supply-case-sovereign-
functions/ as on 26/03/19
https://www.livelaw.in/sc-revisit-justice-krishna-iyers-landmark-judgment-
bangalore-water-supply-case-thursday/ as on 26/03/19
http://ijldai.thelawbrigade.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ as on 24/03/19
ARTICLES
Bangalore Water Supply Case Analysis -By Parita Goyal
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