Light tanks support the 66th Infantry during 3d Army maneuvers at Fort Benning in April 1940, when armor

doctrine was still developing.

Armor History and Operations in 1944

The 6th Armored Division Experience in the European Theater of Operations
A Study in Leadership Development and Execution

by George F. Hofmann, Ph.D.

Introduction looked after his boys,” one veteran and 3d. Within the standard organiza-
stated as he spoke for the group.2 tion, the several components (battal-
The commander of the famous Third ions, companies and platoons) could be
Army in Europe during World War II, The citizen soldiers who composed grouped into a variety of formations
the majority of the division, and the
General George S. Patton, Jr., said that Reserve and National Guard officers designed to carry out prescribed mis-
the 6th Armored Division and its sions with due regard to enemy,
leader, Major General Robert W. who commanded them, proved them- friendly forces, terrain, weather, logis-
selves determined fighters. Grow had a
Grow, was among his best. He wrote very basic philosophy on staff selec- tics, fatigue, combat losses, and tactical
General Grow: “Much of the glory air support. A background analysis of
which the Third Army has achieved tion: he wanted no yes men — only of- the manner in which the operational
ficers who were professionally capable,
has resulted from the gallantry and en- with good, firm personalities to deal skills of the division were grouped into
ergy you and your division have dis- combat commands and task forces will
played from Avranches to the Mulda with commanders. He wanted only re- assist the reader to understand the ac-
serve officers who were not likely to be
River.” Patton’s chief of staff added plucked out by higher commands. tions that have been described. There-
that the “Super Sixth” was one of the fore, the thrust of this paper will be to
most dependable divisions that served When he became division commander evaluate the development of military
in 1943, he had the sad experience of
in the Third Army during the drive losing the Regular Army staff to corps leadership in respect to organization,
across France and Germany.1 There operational skills, and tactics by exam-
was no doubt that the 6th Armored Di- and higher headquarters. Grow did not ining the military education and condi-
vision achieved one of the most splen- want a similar shifting of staff person- tioning process of the 6th AD com-
nel when the division entered combat.
did divisional records of the war. The So it was that his staff remained intact mander.
“Super Sixth” was continuously in ac-
tion since committed to combat on 29 throughout the duration of the Euro-
pean campaigns.3 Leadership Development and
July 1944, except for a period of less
than two weeks. Its history was one of It is the well trained and determined Execution
accomplishment and determination. soldiers, not a set type of organization, On the political side Grow, early in
Very few matched the durability of its that wins battles. However, organiza- his career, came in contact with the fu-
leader and troops. At the U.S. Army tion provides a framework within ture Supreme Court Judge Hugo L.
Armor Conference in May 1971, a which soldiers are able to fight more Black. Both served in the same regi-
number of veterans from the 6th AD effectively by taking advantage of each ment in 1918, Grow as young lieuten-
met as usual with their former com- other’s skills and weapons. The 6th AD ant and Black as a captain and adjutant.
mander. “He meant business, but he was organized like all other armored The controversial Black, a populist
treated us like a father and always divisions, with the exception of the 2d democrat who would join the KKK in

6 ARMOR — September-October 1994

1923, taught Grow by bad example not essary.”6 He was not impressed
to mix politics with military discipline.4 with the School’s bible, R.M.P.
Preston’s The Desert Mounted
A philosophy of life also acts to mold Corps: An Account of the Cav-
leadership. Grow did not believe in the
superstitions and pagan formalities alry Operations in Palestine
and Syria, which argued that
cherished by the churches. He believed the horse-soldier was more
in an all-powerful force, a supreme be-
ing not of human form that was the valuable in “modern warfare as
he had ever been in the past.”7
prime mover of human life. To Grow, The future role of the horse-sol-
life itself was everlasting but the indi-
vidual was not immortal. To be sure, dier, Grow believed, would
change due to advances in
he was not disturbed about the prospect technology, especially with the
of his existence ceasing with death; all
one had to do was his best. Death in arrival of a new mount, the
tank. He did read the works of
combat was a way of life for the pro- Britain’s foremost military his-
fessional soldier. However, this attitude
towards life was not reserved for gen- torians, General J.F.C. Fuller
and Captain Basil Liddell Hart,
erals. Many GIs and officers — as the during the inter-war period, but
death rolls of the 6th Armored Division was not greatly influenced by
indicated — accepted the horrible
death that came with combat.5 them. Grow did admire both
for their heavy emphasis on
General Grow was influenced by tanks and on armored warfare,
George T. Denison’s History of Cavalry but he did not think they un-
From the Earliest Times with Lessons derstand cavalry “as we did” in MG John K. Herr, the last Chief of Cavalry, on
for the Future, especially the last two the American environment. At his private mount, Star Witness, a grandson of
chapters that dealt with morale and that time he began to realize Man O’War.
command. One sentence impressed the value of combined arms in
Grow when he attended the Cavalry the cavalry’s role, which would require that the mission of cavalry was to fight,
School in the 1920s: “A cavalry gen- an adjustment to meet future combat not the generally accepted view before
eral should be possessed of a strong in- situations. The future 6th AD com- World War II that the mission was re-
ventive genius, and be self-reliant mander believed that the function of connaissance and security. For a caval-
enough to strike out a new line and cavalry was to fight mounted, dis- ryman who was not mesmerized by the
adopt reforms where he sees them nec- mounted, or both at the same time, and horse, it allowed for greater flexibility
not act purely as a screening or recon- of mind and opened the window to
naissance force until the main branches fresh ideas that only the more fore-
of infantry and artillery came up and sighted military man, not engrossed in
disposed of the enemy, as professed by military traditionalism, could apply.9
the U.S. Army General Staff at the Grow professed to be a “cavalryman”
time.8 not a “tankman” nor a “horseman.”
Grow was even more heavily influ- During the 1930s the cavalry was un-
enced by the teachings of Major Gen- dergoing a more fundamental change,
eral Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., known as due to the inability of the horse to sus-
“The Father of Armor.” Unfortunately tain itself on the battlefield, and be-
his untimely death in August 1941 pre- cause it was an ineffective mount for
vented Chaffee from seeing the results modern weapons, a fact not accepted
of his labor. His foresight and experi- by many older cavalry officers. Briga-
ence in organization and employment dier General Daniel Van Voorhis, a
of the mounted soldier were created on cavalryman with foresight and imagina-
paper and then brought into being as tion who commanded the Mechanized
the Armored Force in 1940, an integra- Force in 1930-31, and Chaffee, plus
tion of branches and services that was many younger open-minded officers,
organized into a new integrated combat believed the cavalry had to develop a
arm, Armor. Its origins early can be better horse. The tank offered one
traced to the 1930s at Fort Knox, means for a soldier to fight mounted,
where the first U.S. mechanized cav- but that was not enough, since a caval-
alry went through numerous growing ryman must be able to fight both
pains. Out of the early chaos of ideas, mounted and dismounted. Therefore,
doctrine, and obsolete equipment there must be a mount or mounts that
emerged a team capable of fighting on would enable the cavalry to carry out
new mounts. It was during those lean all its missions. This demanded a vari-
years that the future CG of the 6th AD ety of mounts of which the tank was
came under the influence of Chaffee, one, an essential one, but not the sole
and later applied his doctrine of organi- one. The Army needed an Infantry arm
MG Robert W. Grow saw himself as a caval- that could fight dismounted and a Cav-
zation and command skills to the divi-
ryman, rather than a horseman or a tank-
sion. Like his mentor, Grow believed alry arm (Armor) that could fight
man.

ARMOR — September-October 1994 7

mounted as well as dismounted. Com- failed.13 Even the head of the Army by his actions, good and sometimes not
mand headquarters were not to be ad- Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Les- so good, but who got results — vic-
ministrative with fixed units but func- ley J. McNair, became a critic of the tory.”15
tional in order to mix units as the com- armored organization and found its me-
bat situation required. This was the ba- chanical and personnel composition too Grow was basically a cavalryman, but
he realized, as did many of his peers
sic thinking at Fort Knox that influ- much of an expensive military invest- struggling through the “lean years” at
enced Grow.10 Also during the 1930s, ment.14 It was quite evident that, in
Van Voorhis, Chaffee and another cav- spite of the changes brought about by Fort Knox, that a new mount had ar-
rived. Coupled with a young cavalry-
alryman, Bruce Palmer, were involved advanced technology and its effects on man’s flexibility of mind and a phi-
in bringing artillery to the mechanized tactics, the opponents and the traditional
cavalry. It was not until Major General chiefs were rejecting any fresh ideas losophy on life, a new mount, and
Jacob L. Devers, an artilleryman, re- that threatened their parochial thinking. Chaffee’s influence, the mold was set.
placed the deceased Chaffee in 1941 Because of their fixation on tradition In the advance across Brittany to
that the Army achieved the high state and branch bureacracy, their military Brest between 1-8 August 1944, the
of development of self-propelled artil- perceptions became archaic. 6th AD proved the soundness of cav-
lery. At first, Devers had considered
the tank as actually a form of artillery.

So, the main thrust at Fort Knox dur-

ing the lean years was aimed at devel-
oping an arm capable of fighting
mounted, independently. Unfortunately
there was such a diversity of opinion
that the basic problem was obscured by
horse-oriented soldiers and the tradi-
tional branch chiefs. The last Chief of
Cavalry, Major General John K. Herr,
had initially supported the estab-
lishment of a mechanized cavalry divi-
sion. Strangely, after the 1940 German
blitzkrieg, he had changed his mind
and refused to mechanize the horse
units. These were very difficult times
in developing a handle on a perceived
mission because of branch opposition
to the establishment of an armored
force. The Chief of Infantry, Major
George A. Lynch, argued that the Ar-
mored Force had only asked for a field LTG Patton greets MG Grow as he arrives at a meeting at Nancy, France in late 1944.
force headquarters and not a separate
arm; that the infantry and tank battal-
ions in Chaffee’s Armored Force There is no doubt that peer influence alry tactics of maneuver, firepower,
should be returned to infantry control. had an effect on molding Grow’s lead- daring, and speed; only the mounts
General Herr argued that there was ership. During the 1920s and 1930s, the were different. The successful exploita-
nothing in the accomplishment of an Army was small and provided the op- tion was due in no small part to the
Armored Force that “could not have portunity for officers to become well planning and support of supply, ord-
been accomplished equally well or bet- acquainted and learn from one another. nance, and evacuation service. The
ter through established agencies of the At the Command and General Staff speed of the division prevented the
War Department.” He based his argu- College and War College many of the Germans from coordinating their de-
ment on the 1920 National Defense leaders of World War II developed fenses, except in Brest. When possible,
Act that denied the establishment of a peer union. “When you play bridge, the division bypassed centers of resis-
separate tank corps.11 Eventually, the golf, softball, handball, and ride horses tance; this tactic was effective because
pseudo-separate arm was called the Ar- with people, as well as see them in the 6th AD was more mobile than the
mored Force because of an apparent class, you get to know them pretty Germans, and it was a waste of men
objection by General Lynch to using well.” “My class,” Grow said, “turned and time to engage a strong defense.
the word “mechanized” in the title. A out a large number of general officers. The rapid movement of the 6th AD
similar objection was raised by General This was very important in World War usually provided automatic flank pro-
Herr; he objected to the word “tank” in II — now it is not as easy with the tection and only when the division
the title.12 General Devers, who re- large Army.” One of the results of this halted was flank protection required.
placed Chaffee, believed tanks carried close peer union was that it threw him The deployment of the division was
too much dead weight because of their into contact with the officers who fast and wide, and the combat com-
component parts, maintenance, weap- would develop and lead the armored mands were positioned according to the
ons system, and ammunition. He opined and infantry divisions of World War II. tactical situation. For example, based
“that we should go to wheels if possi- He viewed Patton as “the leader who upon the principle of reinforcing suc-
ble.” It was tried, but the experiment summed up the principles of leadership cess, Grow several times shifted his

8 ARMOR — September-October 1994

Reserve Command from the route of a combat mission of limited extent, ied anywhere from one to six battal-
one column to another, depending upon usually defensive. However, its main ions, depending upon the mission. In
which combat command was making role was to furnish combat units to re- order to make flexibility work, it was
the greatest forward progress. Since the inforce one or both combat commands. necessary that both combat commands
Brest campaign was the 6th’s first cam- An exception to the use of the Reserve work exactly under the same SOP, and
paign, and the commanders and units Command as an attack unit was during that both combat commanders be
lacked combat experience, Grow pre- the Gremecey Forest counterattack on equally well acquainted with all battal-
ferred to keep organization simple by 1 October 1944. Both combat com- ion commanders. A combat command
utilizing a standard organization of mands were in the line and Grow, on any one day might consist solely of
three balanced combat commands with heavily pressed by Patton, had to use its headquarters and headquarters com-
no switching of tank, infantry, or artil- the reserve offensively. Artillery was pany, as one extreme, while on the fol-
lery battalions to meet tactical situ- not assigned to a combat command un- lowing day it might have two, three,
ations. The assignment of artillery bat- less it was on a de-
talions to columns had the effect of re- tached mission.
stricting the artillery commander’s abil- After Brittany it
ity to direct massed fire support. In was kept under the
general, the Brest campaign did not Division Artillery
give a true picture of the best way to Command, with
use a flexible armored division, acting armored field bat-
alone in exploitation deep in enemy talions in direct
territory.16 support of combat
commands or in
Usually all armored divisions were general support,
used as three striking forces: CCA, thus enabling the
CCB and CCR, each having its own division to mass
tactical headquarters. Generally, each fires when neces-
command had one tank, one infantry, sary. This was par-
and one field artillery battalion, plus ticularly important
supporting units. Most of the armored for fire direction
division commanders set up a perma- control since addi-
nent or semi-permanent combat com- tional artillery bat-
mand (in the heavy armored divisions, talions were usu-
the 2d and 3d, the regimental organiza- ally attached to the
tion was retained). This resulted in a division.17
fixed organization, in contrast to Chaf-
fee’s concept of a flexible organization According to
consisting of a combat command head- Grow, many of the
quarters to which could be attached armored division
any number of battalions or other units commanders of
required for a particular mission. The World War II did
combat command was never designed not understand BG George W. Read, Jr. commanded CCA of the 6th Armored. He
for administrative control, or to have Chaffee’s concept. attributed the unit’s success to training, teamwork, and good leader-
permanent or fixed units assigned. The But the important ship.
6th was the only armored division that fact remains that
conformed completely to Chaffee’s ba- American divi- six, eight, or any number of battalions,
sic idea. Only during the Brest cam- sions, both armored and infantry, had separate companies, or even platoons
paign did the 6th adhere to a stereo- success; thereby proving that the type assigned to accomplish a specific mis-
typical organization; each command of organization is not the deciding fac- sion. Thus it can be said that, even
having one tank, one infantry, and one tor, but rather the degree of training though both systems — CCA, CCB,
field artillery battalion plus supporting and the degree of understanding that and CCR vs. CCA, CCB, and Reserve
units. exists between the combat commands Command — proved successful, the
The 6th Armored Division adhered to and their commanders. Years later, Lieu- flexibility inherent in the 6th AD pro-
Chaffee’s concept of two striking tenant General George W. Read, Jr., vided a more prompt and effective re-
forces (CCA and CCB), a reserve com- who commanded CCA and later was sponse than did a more rigid form.
mand (sometimes referred to as CCR), made assistant division commander, First, full advantage was taken of the
an artillery command, a trains com- would say: “Our success was due pri- situation (weather, terrain, enemy posi-
mand, and a reconnaissance squadron. marily to the fine training we had un- tion, strength and action, plus the dis-
The Reserve Command, as Grow pre- dergone, aggressive leadership and the position of friendly units) by assign-
ferred to call it, was charged with con- all-around team effort from top to bot- ment of appropriate units to each com-
trol of all combat units not assigned to tom....”18 bat command. Second, individual bat-
CCA or CCB, with the exception of After the 6th AD moved to the Lor- talions and smaller units were readily
the Recon Squadron. Although not raine area at the end of September relieved when suffering from fatigue or
manned or equipped to carry out exten- 1944, greater flexibility in organization combat losses. Third, elements of the
sive combat missions, the Reserve was developed. No regular assignments Reserve Command were used to rein-
Command had the ability to undertake were made and combat commands var- force success; and finally, the Reserve

ARMOR — September-October 1994 9

Command was utilized as a combat mander, their aides and, from time to vision’s success in exploitation and
command if the situation so indicated, time, officers from the G-2 and G-3 pursuit was due to traditional planning
as occurred in February 1945 at the 6th sections, constituting an advance party, that dictated equal positioning of the
AD’s Our River crossing. The Reserve kept in close personal touch with the two striking forces, Combat Command
Command also assumed the defensive main effort during combat. At the same A and B, with R in reserve, each hav-
after the two striking forces reached time Grow or his assistant CG kept in ing its own tactical headquarters. Usu-
their objectives. radio touch with the division command ally, each command had one tank, one
post where the chief of staff, in touch armored infantry, and one armored
The organization could also cause
disadvantages. All units, down to the with all units through radio, wire, or field artillery battalion. During the Brit-
liaison personnel kept the commander tany campaign, the divisional com-
platoon, had to be well trained to work informed and issued orders as directed. mander preferred to keep the traditional
together with other units under a single If necessary, the chief of staff could is- organization, three balanced combat
standard operating procedure. The or-
ganization also required exceptionally sue orders on his own, in accordance commands with no switching of tank,
with the plan. The magnificent commu- infantry, and artillery battalions or
well trained and active staff at all lev- nication facilities provided by the other organic units from one combat
els to avoid confusion and assure that
each element was in the proper place at 146th Armored Signal Company rarely command to another. In general, the
failed to keep all commanders and staff drive to Brest did not give a true pic-
the proper time with full understanding personnel in touch. ture of the best way to use a flexible
of its mission. Due to the pre-invasion
training and lessons learned in combat, The headquarters commander, with armored division, acting in exploitation
and pursuit deep into the enemy’s terri-
plus excellent staff work, many of the the security platoon, was charged with tory. This type of organization was in
disadvantages were avoided. Also, it moving, locating, and protecting the di-
goes without saying that, in addition to vision command post as directed by the contrast to Adna Chaffee’s idea of a
flexible organization, consisting of a
an able command, staff organization chief of staff. During rapid advances, combat command headquarters that
and training, success demanded that this frequently took the party under fire
each soldier know his job and that of as they sought a forward position in an- could have attached any number of bat-
talions or other units required for a par-
his immediate superior. All had to be ticipation, usually proven justified, of ticular tactical mission. Grow, who was
imbued with the highest degree of con- continued advance. influenced by Chaffee, developed
fidence, comradeship, and the will-to-
win. This the 6th AD had in abun- The rear echelon was under control of greater flexibility in organization after
the division trains commander for the Brittany operation. No regular as-
dance. The division never had a morale movement and security. The latter duty signments were made, and each combat
problem.
often fell to the band, as well as the command became a striking force that
A brief description of the charac- military police platoon. In addition to varied in strength from one to six bat-
teristics and method of operations of headquarters and headquarters com- talions, depending upon the tactical
the division staff, battalions, and sepa- pany of division trains, the following mission and its constraints. In order to
rate companies will help to understand sections of division headquarters, con- make the flexibility work, Grow made
the part each played in the success of stituting the rear echelon, were nor- sure that the three combat command
the 6th Armored Division.19 mally present: the adjutant general, in- commanders worked under the same
spector general, division chaplain, spe- operational procedures and were
The division headquarters company cial services officer (including graves equally well acquainted with all the
provided the administrative, supply,
and service personnel and the local se- registration), postal officer, finance of- battalion commanders. Though both
ficer, provost marshal and, when not systems proved successful, the flexibil-
curity for both forward and rear eche- with the forward echelon, the military ity inherent in the 6th AD provided for
lons of division headquarters. The for- a more prompt and effective response
ward echelon included the division government officer and chemical offi-
cer as well as attached specialty teams to the conditions of combat than did
commander, assistant division com- and Red Cross field directors. There the rigid form. The result was that the
mander, their aides, the liaison officers was, obviously, constant interchange 6th AD became one of two of Patton’s
from subordinate and adjacent head-
quarters, chief of staff, assistant chiefs between forward and rear echelons, most dependable and effective combat
particularly between G-1 and G-4 sec- divisions during operations in the ETO.
of staff G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, divi- tion personnel. The rear echelon moved
sion surgeon, Signal and Engineer offi- General Grow realized that there
cers. (The latter also commanded the less frequently than the forward and were many differences in the method
was billeted in more permanent shelter
25th Armored Engineer Battalion and whenever practicable, as was fitting to of organization; however, the 6th AD
was usually represented by an assistant was the only one in which Chaffee’s
division engineer.) The division chemi- their duties. basic ideas on organization, tactical
cal officer and military government of- planning, and operational skills were
ficer joined the forward echelon when completely followed. The essence of
appropriate. G-1, G-4, and the division Conclusion Chaffee’s ideas and Grow’s leadership
surgeon rotated between forward and allowed complete flexibility in execu-
rear echelon as the situation demanded. The doctrinal point held by the tion. During exploitation missions,
Forward echelon was located, both on United States Army Ground Forces which the 6th AD frequently carried
the march, in combat, or in bivouac, as during most of World War II was that out, it was Grow’s established rule that
far forward as practical to facilitate the primary role of tanks was for pur- rapid deployment be initiated by a
communication and personal contact suit and exploitation. During its drive mounted column, followed usually by
with combat units. The division com- through the Brittany Peninsula during combined mounted and dismounted ac-
mander or the assistant division com- 1-8 August 1944, the 6th Armored Di- tion supported by artillery.

10 ARMOR — September-October 1994

 To Grow, there was no substitute for 7
Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps (Lon- 17
Ltr., Grow to Editor of Military Review, 12
battlefield mobility because it allowed don: Constable and Company Ltd., 1921), pas- Sep 45, Grow Files, and Grow, “Mounted Com-
the commander to retain the initiative. sim. bat: Lessons from the European Theater,” The
His early tactical philosophy, which 8
Ltr., Grow to author, 19 Feb 72, Grow Files. Cavalry Journal (Nov-Dec 45): pp. 35-36. The
began at the Cavalry School, was the 9 4th Armored Division, with rare exception,
An interesting life’s sketch depicting Grow’s
beginning of a background of profes- fought with two Combat Commands as striking
role in the development of cavalry mechaniza-
sional development and judgment that tion can be found in his “The Ten Lean Years:
forces. Interviews with COL Jimmy Leach,
was open to new ideas. This provided USA, Ret.
From the Mechanized Force (1930) to the Ar-
mental resilience, allowing him to mored Force (1940),” Unpublished MS, 1969. During World War II, armored divisions went
adapt quickly to changing military cir- Copies of the MS are on file at the USAMHRI through six reorganizations, however, the estab-
cumstances. and the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor, lishment of light armored divisions in 1943 was
Fort Knox, Ky. In 1987, ARMOR Magazine fi- one of the most efficient. This type of organiza-
nally produced a four-part edited book-length tion was employed by the 6th, 4th, and the
other armored divisions, with the exception of
Footnotes series of “The Ten Lean Years,” which de-
scribed Grow’s account of the cavalry’s decline the 2d and 3d. The Reserve Command was
and the creation of the Armored Force. Also see originally intended “as a means of controlling
Note: The majority of historical information George F. Hofmann, “Tactics vs Technology: the division reserve while on the march.” How-
presented above was taken in part from George The U.S. Cavalry Experience,” ARMOR (Sep- ever, in the European Theater of Operations, ar-
F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth. History of the 6th Oct 1973): pp. 10-14, and Mildred H. Gillie, mored divisions “habitually utilized the division
Armored Division in World War II and Its Post- Forging the Thunderbolt. A History of the De- in three combat commands.” See “Organization
War Association (Louisville: 6th Armored Divi- velopment of the Armored Force (Harrisburg, and Tactics,” in The Armored Force Command
sion Association, 1975). The copyright is held Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Co., and Center, pp. 29, 35-36.
by the 6th Armored Division Association, Pub- 1947), pp. 20-40. 18
Ltr. Read to author, 5 Feb 73, USAMHRI.
lisher. Permission has been granted. 10 19
Ltr., Grow to author, 15 Apr 73, Grow The methods of operations are covered in
1 Files; “Prelude to Armor” in The Armored Hofmann, The Super Sixth, pp. 437-443.
“Organization and Tactics” in The Armored Force Command and Center; and Grow, “The
Force Command and Center, Study No. 27, Role of Armor,” ARMOR (Jan-Feb 62): pp. 30-
Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946, 31.
Record Group 407, National Archives, p. 42; 11
Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940- “Redesignation of Armored Force” in The
1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), pp. Armored Force Command and Center, p. 108, Dr. George F. Hofmann is a busi-
421, 425, 610, 773; Ltr., Patton to Grow, HQ and John K. Herr, “Editorial Comment,” Cav- nessman, historian, lecturer, educator,
Third United States Army, 25 Apr 45, Grow alry Journal (May-Jun 46): pp. 35-40. As late and author who served in the U.S.
Files in possession of author; and Hobart (Hap) as 1953, retired General Herr nostalgically Army (Armor). He holds a BS degree
Gay in Verbatim Record of Trial, Grow Files, called for remounting one horse cavalry divi- in business administration and a Mas-
p. 240. sion. See John K. Herr and Edward S. Wallace, ters degree in education from Xavier
The Story of the U.S. Cavalry, 1775-1942 (Bos- University in Ohio, and a masters in
The records of the 6th Armored Division are ton: Little Brown and Company, 1953), pp.
located at the National Archives in the Adjutant American history and a Doctorate,
258-259. concentrating in diplomatic and mili-
General’s Files, Record Group 407, Suitland, 12
MD. There are approximately 130 boxes. These “Initial Structure” in Armored Force Com- tary affairs, from the University of Cin-
documents served in part for Hofmann, The Su- mand and Center, p. 9. cinnati. In addition, he completed a
13 postdoctoral research program at the
per Sixth. In addition to the numerous docu- Remarks by General Jacob L. Devers, Ret.,
ments that were copied from the archives, cor- 64th Annual Meeting of the United States Ar- University of Cincinnati College of
respondences from veterans, and other docu- mor Association, 30 Jan 53, Fort Knox, Ky., Law, concentrating on U.S. constitu-
mentation pertaining to the 6th Armored Divi- p.12. tional history and military law and jus-
sion’s history was placed with the U.S. Army 14
Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, tice. He is a field faculty advisor for
Military History Research Institute (USAM- and Bill I. Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: Norwich University’s graduate pro-
HRI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa. The units’ histories The Organization of Ground Combat Troops gram in American and Modern Euro-
prepared shortly after the war are now located (Washington: GPO, 1947), pp. 334-335. pean History at Fort Knox, Ky. Cur-
in the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor, McNair’s solution to combat German tanks and rently, he is a lecturer in History at the
Fort Knox, Ky. the blitzkrieg was to develop an antitank doc- University of Cincinnati. A number of
The other armored division that had an out- trine, which by the end of the war proved inva- his articles and book reviews have ap-
standing record and considered by Patton one of lid. See Christopher R. Gabel, Seek, Strike, and peared in ARMOR, Army, Marine
his best was the 4th. Destroy: U. S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine Corps Gazette, Military Affairs, Journal
2
Author’s notes, 14 May 71, Fort Knox, Ky., in World War II. Leavenworth Papers No. 12, of Military History, and the Journal of
Grow Files. Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command the Royal United Services Institute for
3 and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Defense Studies (RUSI). He is a con-
Ltr., Grow to author, 26 Jan 73, Grow Files. Kan., Sep 85, passim.
4
tributing author to the Dictionary of
Ltr., Grow to author, 19 Feb 72, Grow Files. 15
Ltr., Grow to author, 2 and 19 Feb 72, American Biography, and Volume III of
5
Interviews, author with Grow, 5 May 72, 6 Grow Files. the Marine Corps University Perspec-
May 73, and 27 Aug 73. 16
Ltr., Grow to Blumenson, 26 Apr 45, tive on Warfighting; and the author of
6
Denison, A History of Cavalry (London: USAMHRI, p. 4. In this correspondence Grow The Super Sixth: A History of the 6th
Macmillan and Co., 2nd ed. 1913), p. 447. comments on Blumenson’s manuscript dealing Armored Division in World War II and
Denison, a Canadian, won Czar Alexander II’s with the Brest campaign that eventually evolved Its Post-War Association, and the Cold
award in 1877 for producing this best book on into chapter XX in Breakout and Pursuit War Casualty: The Court-Martial of
the history of cavalry. (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 343-347. Major General Robert W. Grow.

ARMOR — September-October 1994 11