India and Africa: Maritime Security and India’s

Strategic Interests in the Western Indian Ocean

Denis  Venter
p. 131-167

ABSTRACT
In the 2010s, in conjunction with an expansion of India’s naval capabilities, there has been a
significant extension of India’s maritime security relationships throughout the Indian Ocean region.
Much of the emphasis has been on developing relationships with small states (Mauritius, the
Seychelles, and Oman) at, or near, the key points of entry into the Western Indian Ocean. Arguably,
the extreme asymmetries in size have made the development of such relationships relatively easy, as
there is no question of competition or rivalry. Some of these states have long seen India as a benign
security provider and have maritime policing needs that India can usefully fulfil. In some cases, India
may effectively act as a security guarantor, as is arguably the case with Mauritius and the
Maldives.But gaps inevitably remain in India’s strategic posture and New Delhi needs to further
strengthen its hand in coastal Africa and on the Arabian Peninsula. Also, littoral states on the African
seaboard look towards regional power centres for assistance in maintaining maritime order and
addressing security challenges. Countries with enhanced maritime capabilities like India, South
Africa, Australia, and the US could assist by not only co-operating amongst themselves, but also by
taking other littoral states on board as part of multilateral efforts towards the maintenance of
maritime order. A challenge for New Delhi is to maintain perceptions of India as a benign and non-
hegemonic power in the Indian Ocean region as it moves towards achieving great power status.

INDEX TERMS
Keywords :
 maritime security, naval strategy, strategic interests, sphere of influence, India, Western Indian
Ocean, Somali piracy

FULL TEXT
1There are a number of the critical issues that are likely to play a
major role in the western Indian Ocean region over the next 10 to
15 years. But first the region has to be defined.

Defining the Western Indian

Ocean
2Covering an area of some 68.5 million km² and bounded by land
masses on three sides (Africa, Asia, and Australia), the Indian Ocean
is the world’s third-largest ocean. The greater oceanic region,
though complex, forms a distinct geographical area. In comparison
to the world’s other oceans, defining the exact boundaries of the
Indian Ocean has been something of an imprecise science and has
been a long-standing source of disagreement (Luke & O’Loughlin,
2010, p. 9). Sithara Fernando (2011, p. 23) adds a fourth land mass,
Antarctica, in which case the total ocean area increases by several
million square kilometres.
Figure 1: Parameters of the Western Indian Ocean

 For the purposes of this chapter, the ‘Western Indian Ocean’ can be
delimited by the following maritime points and boundaries:
 latitude 60°S (the northern-most limit of the Southern Ocean)
 Cape Agulhas (the southern-most point on the African continent) at
longitude 20°E
 the east coast of the African continent from South Africa in the
south to Somalia and Djibouti in the north
  the Bab-el-Mandeb, which separates Djibouti and Yemen, on the
southern-most reaches of the Red Sea
 the east coasts of Yemen, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE)
 the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman on the Arabian
Peninsula, on the eastern-most reaches of the Persian Gulf
 the southern coasts of Iran and Pakistan
 the west and east coasts of India and
 longitude 88°E, running roughly through Kolkata (Calcutta) on
India’s east coast, down to latitude 60°S.

3According to this delimitation, the Western Indian Ocean region

comprises the following countries (littoral and island states): the
Comoros, Djibouti, India, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, the Maldives,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Pakistan, the Seychelles, Somalia,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates, and
Yemen.
 1 The broader Indian Ocean ‘Rim’ consists of 29 littoral countries and
6 island states. The Indian Oc (...)

4On the basis of this conceptual framework, the Western Indian

Ocean region (hereinafter referred to as the Indian Ocean, or the
region) is comprised of 18 littoral and island states, as well as three
territories in an entirely different category, controlled by extra-
regional states: Réunion and Mayotte (both France) and the British
Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), including the Chagos archipelago and
the atoll of Diego Garcia (United Kingdom). Moreover, the region
also includes numerous other island territories, such as
Lakshadweep (India), Socotra (on the entrance to the Gulf of Aden,
Yemen), and Tromelin Island, the islands of Juan de Nova, Bassas da
India, and Isle de l’Europa (in the Mozambique Channel, France),
which constitute valuable exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and
strategic outposts (Schofield, 2007, p. 3).1

Maritime Security and the Threat of Somali Piracy in the

Western Indian Ocean
5The Indian Ocean is, once again, becoming an arena for
geostrategic rivalry of some sort (see Brewster, 2014, pp. 5-11;
Shambaugh, 2009, pp. 137-157). In fact, the region is emerging as
one of the 21  century’s leading strategic theatres, as a stage for the
st

pursuit of global strategic and regional military and security

interests.
6Relations between the three major powers of the region, India,
China (the People’s Republic of China, PRC), and the United States,
continue to evolve in complexity, heightened by the rise of India and
China and a possible decline in US power in the region. However,
the perception of US strategic decline warrants caution and should
not be taken too literally. Of the three powers, indeed of all the
world’s leading powers, the US alone has the ability to project
significant and sustained force into the region. It is a capability
which, to 2020 at least, other powers can only aspire to.
Furthermore, the US presence is viewed positively by India, which
recognises it as a bulwark against Chinese expansion and
assertiveness. In the broadest possible sense, while a rising China
seeks to counter the dominance of the US and assert itself as the
regional hegemon, an emerging India seeks, in turn, to act as a
counter-balance against China. This is a situation which can serve
US interests well, as the two regional rivals are left to compete and
take all or most of the risks involved. India’s naval expansion is a
case in point, as it adds additional weight to the US naval presence
(Luke & O’Loughlin, 2010, pp. 12-13).
 2 For overall GDP figures and GDP figures per capita, see World Bank
(2015), and IMF (2015).

7At the same time, there is a burgeoning concern over an array of

non-traditional security threats, especially energy security. Without
any doubt, the Indian Ocean is critical to global trade and economic
growth, as well as food and energy security (Chaturvedi & Okunev,
2012, p. 1; Hartley, 2012, p. 5).2 However, now the world’s most
important route for international maritime long-haul cargo, the
Indian Ocean remains vulnerable to piracy and highly unpredictable
potential acts of maritime terrorism. Maritime security can no longer
be conceptualised only in terms of a composite of sea power and
naval arms build-ups, island and maritime boundary disputes,
navigational regimes, activities in EEZs, competition over resources,
and the maintenance of law and order at sea, including the
protection of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). The concept of
human security also needs to be revisited with reference to some of
the most pressing environmental issues: land degradation, access to
fresh-water resources, the exploitation of fishing stocks, climate
change, the illegal disposal of nuclear waste, environmental
refugees and urban expansion and deterioration (Chaturvedi &
Okunev, 2012, p. 1; see Hughes, 2011, pp. 41-45; UN Secretariat,
2008; UNEP, 2005).
Figure 2: Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-
ARC)
Zoom in Original (jpeg, 1,2M)

8Of the three temperate oceans of the world, the Indian Ocean is
probably the most problematic for security management. Despite
this reality, however, the ocean seems bereft of any collective
maritime security arrangements. The lack of maritime security
around the Horn of Africa, in particular, causes a great deal of
concern as it not only threatens commerce, but also peace and
regional stability, international trade and global energy flows. From
whichever direction, entry into the Indian Ocean is constrained by
geographical imperatives. The routes through the Gulf of Aden and
the Strait of Hormuz have been used since antiquity for purposes of
trade and communication and, naturally, a huge proportion of this
trade is carried by sea. It raises the important question of what the
strategic responses of regional navies are, ensuring the safe and
efficient passage of these cargoes. Indeed, there are also countries
outside the immediate region depending on secure shipping and
they, too, have a legitimate interest in fostering a regime of co-
operation. Some do not see a threat to shipping because of the
interdependence of all in the region on maritime trade, but reliance
on such a notion has obvious shortcomings. Rather than leave
security management to chance it is axiomatic that it is in the
interests of all to build a maritime security mechanism to promote
an ocean-wide sphere of peace and tranquillity (Cozens, 1998, p.
1).
9In determining particular strategies, regional navies have a vital
role to play, but it should also be appreciated that “maritime
strategy has a [clear] peace-time dimension” (McCaffrie, 1996, p. 7;
see also Groenewald, 1997, p.1). Maritime strategy is idiosyncratic;
in fact, it is fundamentally and significantly different from any other
purpose -- it is unique. To quote Jack McCaffrie (1996, p. 4) again:
10Navies have always been noted for their versatility and, in
particular, their utility in situations short of conflict. This versatility
comes from the characteristics of reach (including sustainability),
adaptability (including the capacity to threaten and apply force in a
finely graduated way), and acceptability (in that warships are
diplomatic instruments unlike any other kind of armed force).
11Maritime security, on the other hand, can be a rather broad,
unfocussed and somewhat amorphous concept (Potgieter, 2012, p.
1) as it is both multi-dimensional and multi-faceted and involves
both military and non-military issues. In the world of today,
however, the luxury hardly exists of making clear-cut distinctions
between traditional ‘military’ security issues (naval threats and
challenges), hard, ‘non-military’ security issues (arms, narcotics and
human trafficking, piracy and terrorism at sea and the protection of
shipping, SLOCs, fishing stocks, sea-bed minerals and offshore oil
and natural gas resources) and soft, ‘non-military’ security issues,
such as providing energy security, safeguarding port and ship-
building facilities, delimiting extended maritime spaces (EEZs),
enforcing legal and regulatory mechanisms in maritime zones
(maritime management), protecting the maritime environment,
preventing pollution and dumping of toxic waste and securing dual-
purpose oceanographic data (Roy, n.d., pp. 1 & 2). Thus, maritime
security basically deals with the prevention of illicit activity in the
maritime domain, covering national, regional and international
efforts to enforce such security. Current global realities have
introduced a range of maritime security challenges in the Indian
Ocean region as the roles of non-state actors have direct and
fundamental effects on the evolving situation. This is a serious
development as the rich Indian Ocean maritime trade, which
includes much of the world’s energy shipments and almost half of
global container traffic, traverses the ocean and is crucial to the
world economy (Potgieter, 2012, p. 1).
Figure 3: West-East-West SLOCs Traversing the Indian Ocean
Zoom in Original (jpeg, 1,4M)

12Recent economic turbulence worldwide suggests that a prudent

and cautious approach to the matter of maritime security is required
everywhere. Indeed, when economic growth is charging along and
prosperity seems assured for all, voices of protest and disquiet
usually tend to fade, especially in authoritarian regimes (Lingle,
1997, p. 55). But the present political discord in some countries is
symptomatic of the converse of that contention. It is difficult, of
course, to predict what the next stage in the world economy will
have in store, but it is fairly obvious that economic growth will, of
necessity, rely to a very large extent on the use of SLOCs (Cozens,
1998, pp. 1-2). What, then, are the latent and potential areas of
friction which could surface to threaten freedom of navigation or
otherwise impede the free flow of trade in the SLOCs of the Indian
Ocean area? The following represent some areas of insecurity (see
Valencia, 1998):
 Transnational disputes may arise from perceived irregularities by a
littoral state in the practice of the right of ‘innocent passage’ through
territorial waters by foreign ships. A littoral state may merely suspect
‘activities inimical to its interests’.
 Marine pollution is a major source of concern. An estimated 25,000
tonnes of washed-out crude oil per day are being jettisoned into the
sea anywhere between the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab-el-Mandeb, the
Mozambique Channel, and longitude 88°E. The effect on local
communities and traditional fishing villages could be catastrophic and
thus has political and security consequences.

 3 Underwater oil exploration and production in the north-western
Indian Ocean takes place in an offsh (...)

Undersea exploration for oil and gas (and minerals, although presently
unlikely) pose not altogether unforeseen problems and security
challenges.3
 Piracy has been evident in and around the waters of Somalia, in the
Arabian Sea, and down the coast of East Africa.
 Maritime territorial disputes and inter-regional tensions could be
exacerbated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) which now permits littoral states to impose national
development interests in the ocean arena (EEZs), an extension of
jurisdiction that has opened up a Pandora’s Box of volatile issues.

13There are also some tasks not readily appreciated or understood,

grouped under the collective title of ‘maritime confidence-building
measures’ (see Grove, 1996, Chapter 5): (1) transparency measures,
such as visits by naval vessels, sharing general information on
doctrine, policies and force structures, joint publishing of tactical
and operating doctrines (that is, replenishment at sea, RAS),
exchanging of personnel, and joint observation of naval exercises;
(2) co-operation measures, more generally search and rescue (SAR)
and humanitarian operations; and (3) incidents-at-sea agreements,
addressing particular regional concerns, such as surveillance,
fisheries, anti-piracy, anti-narcotic and illegal migration traffic, and
dealing with activities usually tending to be bilateral in nature, but
could also be extended to a multilateral forum such as the Indian
Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).
14The fact that these measures are suggested as necessary
illustrates a degree of ‘uncertainty-based planning’ in the Indian
Ocean. This is not to suggest the beginnings of an arms race, but
rather the convergence of at least two important motivators. First,
since the ratification of UNCLOS III, governments are acutely aware
of the importance of their rights and sovereignty over their
respective ocean territories and EEZs. Second, in order to exercise
these responsibilities countries need ‘sea-securing resources’; in
other words, ships capable of exercising sea power. It is into this
arena that Indian Ocean navies and others need to insert sea-
control platforms as a contribution to reducing insecurity at sea,
thus demonstrating a firm resolve to maintain and preserve good
order at sea. The costs of disrupted trade flows are probably
incalculable, but nevertheless enormous, and the effects are
unpredictable, but nonetheless deleterious to all in the Indian Ocean
region and beyond. As the impact of the provisions of UNCLOS III
takes effect, and as the changing strategic landscape of the Indian
Ocean comes into sharper focus, the need for a stable and secure
environment increases. Undoubtedly, there is a pressing need for a
system of collective maritime security in the Indian Ocean (Cozens,
1998, p. 3).

India’s Strategic Interests in the Western Indian Ocean

 15In recent times, India has adopted an expansive maritime strategy.
Driven by great power aspirations and by strategic rivalry with
China, India is expanding its naval capabilities and security
relationships throughout the Indian Ocean region. It is paying
specific attention to developing relationships at the key points of
entry into the Western Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2010a, p. 1), i.e. the
Strait of Hormuz (from the Persian Gulf into the Arabian Sea), the
Bab-el-Mandeb (from the Red Sea into the Gulf of Aden), and
through the Mozambique Channel northwards into the south-
western Indian Ocean along the shores of the Southern and East
African littorals.

The Maritime Dimension in Indian Strategic Thinking

 4 However, this is not to suggest that the Ottoman (Turkish),
Portuguese, Dutch, French and British m (...)

16Among the changes in Indian strategic thinking in recent years

has been a partial reorientation in India’s strategic outlook in the
maritime domain. Clearly, Indian strategic thinking has traditionally
had a continental outlook. For thousands of years, military threats
to India have been perceived as coming primarily from the
northwest,4 reinforced by the country’s experience in the 20th
century when any direct military threats (from Japan, Pakistan, and
China) were land-based. The continuing threats on India’s western
and northern borders and from domestic insurgencies has led to the
Indian Army holding an undisputedly dominant position within the
Indian military establishment. However, there is a developing view
among some Indian strategists of India as a maritime power: that
India’s peninsular character and geographic position gives the
Indian Ocean a preponderant influence over the country’s destiny
(see Brewster, 2014, pp. 11-15 & 23-35; Brewster, 2010a, p. 1;
Menon, 2009). As Subhash Kapila (2012, p. 1) points out:
17The Indian Ocean stands aptly named because India’s peninsular
geographical configuration… places [it in a] unique commanding
position on the Bay of Bengal on the eastern flank of the Deccan
Peninsula and the Arabian Sea on the western flank. In strategic
maritime terms, India is in a position to dominate the vast expanse
of maritime waters from … the Gulf of Aden … all the way down
south to the outermost extremities of the … [Southern Oceans].
18Some Indian leaders have also drawn a close connection between
India’s maritime ambitions and its destiny as a great power. As
former Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee (2007) noted:
19… after nearly a millenni[um] of inward and landward focus, we
are once again turning our gaze outwards and seawards, which is
the natural direction of view for a nation seeking to re-establish
itself, not simply as a continental power, but even more so as a
maritime power, and consequently as one that is of significance on
the world stage.
20Thus, one could argue that any significant geographical
expansion of Indian influence can only take place in the maritime
domain. As Rajiv Sikri (2009, p. 250), a former Secretary in the
Indian Ministry of External Affairs, commented: “If India aspires to
be a great power, then the only direction in which … [its] strategic
influence can spread is across the seas. In every other direction
there are formidable constraints.”
21India’s standing as the most populous state in the Indian Ocean
region and its central position in the northern Indian Ocean have
long contributed to beliefs about the country’s destiny to control its
 eponymous ocean (the ocean to which its name was given).
According to some, there is now a well-established tradition among
the Indian strategic community that the Indian Ocean is, or should
be, ‘India’s Ocean’. Many in the Indian Navy see it as destined to
become the predominant maritime security provider in a region
stretching from the Bab-el-Mandeb to the Malacca Strait, and also
having a significant security role in areas beyond (Scott, 2006, p.
99). This view was amplified by former US Secretary of Defence
Robert Gates affirming that the US was “… look[ing] to India to be a
partner and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and
beyond” (Murphy, 2009). And, according to Donald Berlin (2006, p.
60):
22New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and deems it
both natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the
leader and the predominant influence in this region – the world’s
only region and ocean named after a single state. This is what the
United States set out to do in North America and the Western
Hemisphere at an early stage in America’s ‘rise to power’.
 5 A slightly different version of this quotation is: “Whoever controls
the Indian Ocean controls Asia (...)

23Many Indian maritime strategists see predominance in the Indian

Ocean as potentially also delivering significant influence in East
Asia. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the 19th century American naval
strategist, is frequently cited by Indian strategic thinkers, including
a statement (incorrectly) attributed to him: “Whoever controls the
Indian Ocean dominates Asia. In the 21st century, the destiny of the
world will be decided on its [the Indian Ocean’s] waters”.5
 6 For a general discussion of India’s maritime strategy and
capabilities, see Buzsynski (2009, pp. 73 (...)
24During the Cold War, India’s ability to pursue its maritime
ambitions was severely constrained and for decades following
independence the Indian Navy was known as the ‘Cinderella’ of the
Indian armed forces. However, increased enthusiasm for maritime
power has been accompanied by an expansion in India’s naval
capabilities;6 since the mid-1990s the country has embarked on a
major programme to develop a ‘blue-water’ navy with significant
increases in naval expenditure. India’s armed forces budget grew at
an annual rate of 5% from 2001-2005, at around 10% from 2005-
2008, and to a massive 17.63% in 2012/13, but fell back to a rather
modest 5.31% in 2013/14, primarily due to economic constraints.
Yet, under the new Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of Prime
Minister Narendra Modi, the defence budget has again been boosted
by 12% for 2014/15. At the same time, the Navy’s share of the
increasing defence budget has risen from 11% in 1992/93 to 18% in
2008/09, and now seems to have stabilised at 17.8% for 2013/14.
Still, in relation to the overall defence budget it faced a resource cut
of 2.6% in real terms. Nevertheless, initial increased capital
expenditure had encouraged plans for significant changes in the
Indian Navy’s force structure, with an emphasis on sea-control
capabilities (see Miglani, 2014; Brewster, 2014, p. 13; Behera,
2013a; Behera, 2013b; Brewster, 2010a, pp. 2 & 3). Already, the
Navy is undergoing substantial expansion with 40 ships and
submarines, including two nuclear submarines and two aircraft
carriers, either on order or already commissioned. The target is to
have a 165-ship fleet by 2022, consisting of 60 surface combat
craft, submarines and three aircraft carrier groups with a total of
400 MiG-29K aircraft and attack helicopters (Potgieter, 2012, p. 3).
As some India observers are keen to point out, with two aircraft
carriers in operation by as early as 2012/13, “the balance of power
 in the Indian Ocean … [would have] tilt[ed] decisively in India’s
favour” (Rai, 2009, p. 7). And, according to Admiral Arun Prakash,
the former Indian Chief of Navy Staff, India aims to exercise
selective sea control of the Indian Ocean through task forces built
around the projected three aircraft carriers that will form the core of
separate fleets in the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean, and the
Arabian Sea. The rapidly expanding Indian Coast Guard may also
play an important complementary role to the Indian Navy,
particularly in circumstances where there are reasons to emphasise
policing functions over those of the military (Brewster, 2010a, p. 3).
 7 Invitees to the naval symposium include France (which India
recognises as a littoral state by virtu (...)

25In conjunction with an expansion in naval capabilities over the last

decade or so, India has been quietly expanding its influence
throughout the Indian Ocean. The Navy has been active in
developing security relationships that are intended to enhance
India’s ability to project power and restrict China’s ability to develop
similar security relationships in the region. Given that the Indian
Ocean is in many ways an enclosed sea, the Indian Navy has placed
particular emphasis on the ‘choke points’ at entrances to the ocean
around southern Africa (including the Mozambique Channel), the
Arabian Peninsula (including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab-el-
Mandeb) and the straits connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans
through the Indonesian archipelago (the Malacca, Sunda and
Lombok straits). According to the Indian Navy’s 2004 Maritime
Doctrine, “… [control] of the choke points could be useful as a
bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency
of military power remains a stark reality” (IMOD-N, 2004, p. 64).
The Navy has also sought to institutionalise itself as the leading
 power in the Indian Ocean through such initiatives as sponsoring
the multilateral IONS, to which the navies of all Indian Ocean littoral
states are invited (Brewster, 2010a, p. 3).7
26But India’s naval ambitions have not been without its critics. Given
the longstanding lack of co-ordination in strategic planning in New
Delhi, the Indian Navy’s activist role in the Indian Ocean has often
been way ahead of the views within the other armed services and
the government. There is long-running tension between the Indian
Navy and the Ministry of External Affairs over the Navy’s assertive
regional policy, including over the 2008 decision to participate in
anti-piracy operations off Somalia (Unnithan, 2008; Thaindian News,
20 November 2008). According to some, the Ministry of External
Affairs repeatedly turned down requests from the Indian Navy to
conduct naval interceptions. It is not clear to what extent these
tensions merely reflect bureaucratic caution or a more fundamental
disagreement over the Indian Navy’s regional strategy (Brewster,
2010a, p. 4; Maitra, 2005). Others are sceptical about the ability of
India to transform itself from a continental to a maritime power.
Varun Sahni (2005), for example, warns that the Soviet Union’s
failed attempts to become a naval power in the 1970s and 1980s
should act as “a cautionary … [note] for India’s Mahanian navalists
… [and] a grim warning of what happens to a continental state that
harbours overly grandiose maritime ambitions”.
 8 In 2007, the US Navy released a maritime security strategy that still
stressed the Atlantic and Pac (...)

27However, over the last decade or more the US has actively

encouraged India’s strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean region.
In March 2005, the Bush Administration announced that it would
“help India become a major world power in the 21st century”,
adding that “… [we] understand fully the implications, including the
military implications, of that statement” (US Department of State,
2005). In fact, the US has focused on assisting in the expansion of
India’s power projection capabilities and its role as a security
provider in the Indian Ocean, with the former US Secretary of the
Navy Donald Winter stressing that Washington welcomes India
“taking up … responsibility to ensure security in this part of the
world” (Dikshit, 2008). US encouragement for the development of
India as a regional naval power in the Indian Ocean has been
compared to Britain’s strategy in the late 19th and early 20th
century when it found itself challenged by the growth of German
naval power. Britain then forged partnerships with emerging naval
powers, the US in the Western Hemisphere and Japan in the Pacific,
allowing them a measure of regional hegemony, while the UK
concentrated its resources in the North Atlantic against Germany
(see Holmes, Winner & Yoshihara, 2009, Chapter 3). This analogy,
while far from perfect, does capture some of the facets present in
current US thinking, particularly its perceptions of the growing
Chinese maritime threat and its desire to see India grow as a
regional balancing power against China (Brewster, 2010a, pp. 4-5;
see Chellaney, 2008, pp. 23-36).8

India’s ‘Emeralds’ in the Indian Ocean

28Over the last decade or so, India has developed good security
relationships with many states throughout the Indian Ocean, with
particular emphasis on the maritime choke points of the
Mozambique Channel in the south-western Indian Ocean and the
entrance to the Persian Gulf in the northwest, as well as the Malacca
Strait in the northeast. India is also developing a security presence
 in the central Indian Ocean, astride the east-west SLOCs across the
Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2010a, p. 7).
 9 Between April 2000 and January 2010, Mauritius was the largest
source of foreign direct investment (...)

29To be sure, the south-western Indian Ocean is the gateway

between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. India’s security
relationships in the region are anchored by its close relationship
with Mauritius (see Brewster, 2014, pp. 69-76), the island state that
lies around 900km to the east of Madagascar. India has
longstanding and close political, economic and security associations
with Mauritius. Some 70 per cent of the Mauritian population is of
Indian ethnic origin and for several decades Mauritius has acted as
the primary gateway for international investment into India
originating from the US, Europe and elsewhere, largely due to
favourable tax arrangements.9 Former Mauritian Prime Minister Paul
Bérenger described the bilateral relationship as “umbilical and
sacred” and security relations as “intense” ( The Hindu, 2 April 2005;
Baruah, 2003), while former President Sir Anerood Jugnauth referred
to the connection in terms of “blood relations” ( The Hindu, 3
December 2009). Consequently, the Mauritian élite regards India in
largely benign terms and appears to have accepted India as having a
special role in Mauritian security.
30Indian-Mauritian co-operation was formalised in a 1974 defence
agreement under which India has transferred patrol boats and
helicopters to Mauritius (including the supply of a patrol vessel in
2010) and provides training to Mauritian personnel and officers for
the Mauritian National Coast Guard and Police Helicopter Squadron
(effectively, the Mauritian navy and air force). Since 2003, the Indian
Navy has provided maritime security through periodic patrols of
 Mauritian waters, including anti-piracy patrols in 2010 ( Deccan
Chronicle, 24 November 2009; Ramachandran, 2007b). India also
backs Mauritius’ territorial claims to Diego Garcia which was
separated from Mauritian administration in the 1960s (Vyas, 2001).
Mauritian political leaders have publicly indicated on several
occasions that India would be permitted to establish naval facilities
on Mauritius if it so wished (Harrison & Subrahmanyam, 1989, p.
263) and there are claims that India already operates a signals
intelligence station (India Defence, 7 July 2007). In 2006 and 2007
there were reports of discussions between the Mauritian and Indian
governments over the long-term lease to the Indian government of
the Agalega islands (which lie between the island of Mauritius and
the Seychelles), ostensibly for tourism (Sidhartha, 2006a; Sidhartha
2006b). It has been speculated that India’s intention was to upgrade
the Agalega airstrip to service Indian manned and unmanned
surveillance aircraft (Forsberg, 2007). Discussions over the proposal
reportedly ended due to political sensitivities concerning the local
Creole population - contemplating, perhaps, the complaints of
Diego Garcians who were dispossessed of their islands following a
deal between the British and Mauritian governments (Brewster,
2010a, p. 8).
 10 The US also provides anti-piracy maritime surveillance through
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) stat (...)

31India also has growing security relationships with Madagascar,

Mozambique and the Seychelles, littoral states in and around the
crucial Mozambique Channel, the SLOC used by shipping transiting
the Cape of Good Hope (Brewster, 2010a, p. 9). The security of the
Seychelles was highly contested during the latter half of the Cold
War as the US and the Soviet Union competed to maintain or
 establish a security presence in the islands. At the same time, India
was seen by the Seychelles as a benign regional protector. In the
early 1980s, Seychelles’ leftist former President Albert René sought
commitments from then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to
intervene in case of an attempted coup. Although Gandhi declined
to provide any public assurances, India did contribute two
helicopters and training for the Seychelles security forces (Harrison
& Subrahmanyam, 1989, p. 263). The Indian Navy has also assisted
with maritime security in the Seychelles EEZ under a 2003 defence
co-operation agreement in terms of which it provided anti-piracy
patrols in early 2010 (see Brewster, 2014, pp. 76-79). 10 Moreover,
in 2005 India donated a patrol boat to the Seychelles, reportedly in
a hurried effort to pre-empt offers of Chinese assistance
(Ramachandran, 2007a). Also, in July 2007 the Indian Navy opened
an electronic monitoring facility in northern Madagascar at the head
of the Mozambique Channel (Ramachandran, 2007b; India Defence,
7 July 2007) and apparently had been granted ‘limited’ berthing
rights in the island for Indian naval vessels (Pubby, 2007).
 11 For a wider discussion of India’s strategic ambitions and role in
south-eastern Africa, particularl (...)

32The Indian Navy has also acted as a maritime security provider for
Mozambique, including taking responsibility for maritime security
during the 2003 African Union (AU) and 2004 World Economic
Forum (WEF) summits held in Maputo (Ramachandran, 2007b). And,
in 2006, India and Mozambique entered into a defence co-operation
agreement that envisages joint maritime patrols, supply of military
equipment, training and technology transfer in repairing and
assembling military vehicles, aircraft and ships (Brewster, 2010a, p.
9; People’s Daily, 7 March 2006).11
 33What is more, India’s maritime security relationships in the south-
western Indian Ocean are buttressed by growing maritime security
relations with France (Brewster, 2014, pp. 79-80) and South Africa.
Since 2001, the Indian Navy has conducted annual exercises with
the French Navy, which operates out of Réunion and Djibouti. India
has sponsored the ‘IBSA Trilateral Security Dialogue’ between India,
Brazil and South Africa, pursuant to which trilateral naval exercises
(IBSAMAR) have been held in 2008, 2010, 2012, and in 2014 off the
Cape of Good Hope in South African waters (Cape Times, 21
October 2014; Brewster, 2014, pp. 96-98; Brewster, 2010a, p. 9).
Further south, India also has a growing presence in Antarctica, with
one active research station and a second that was scheduled for
commissioning in 2012.
 12 This includes an announced US$700 million investment by China in
a special economic zone in Mauriti (...)

34While some might see India as having a strong security role in the
south-western Indian Ocean, there are fears in New Delhi that China
might try to undermine or pre-empt Indian’s relationships. Again,
according to the former Indian Chief of Navy Staff Admiral Arun
Prakash (2007b, p. 7), India “cannot afford to have any hostile or
inimical power threatening the island states in this region”. Political
and economic relations between China and Mauritius and Seychelles
are closely watched by New Delhi (Lamont, 2010), 12 and it has been
claimed that a so-called Chinese ‘thrust’ towards these island states
presages Sino-Indian naval rivalry in the Western Indian Ocean
(Mohan, 2009). While China may seek to develop its economic and
political interests in the area, it seems unlikely that it would be able
to dislodge India as the dominant security provider to Mauritius, and
there are no indications at present that it would be able to seriously
 challenge India’s maritime security role elsewhere in the south-
western Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2010a, p. 10).
 13 This perception is reinforced by the fact that the US military
relationship with India is the respo (...)

35India historically exercised a special political and economic role in

the north-western Indian Ocean. During the 19th and early 20th
centuries, British India was the dominant economic, political and
military force in the region. The Trucial States (now the United Arab
Emirates) and Aden (now Yemen) were administered from British
India and British Indian Army garrisons were stationed throughout
the Persian Gulf until 1947. However, India’s influence in the region
diminished significantly following independence and, although New
Delhi generally adopted a pro-Arab foreign policy, its ties in the
region were regularly strained as a result of the India-Pakistan
conflict. Pakistan’s close political, economic and military ties with
many states in this region continue to this day. Some argue that the
ability of India to extend its security presence in the north-western
Indian Ocean has also been constrained by the US predominance in
the Gulf, leaving little room for New Delhi to develop its own
relationships, and that the US has not encouraged an increased
Indian security presence there (Brewster, 2010a, p. 10).13
 14 As at April 2010, Pakistan had led CTF-150 on four occasions.

36Despite these constraints, India is developing security

relationships in the region, particularly with Oman (which sits on the
Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf). Oman may see
India as partially balancing its security relationship with the US and,
since 2003, India has entered into several defence agreements with
the Sultanate dealing with training, maritime security co-operation,
and joint exercises (India Defence, 6 April 2010; Jha, 2009). The
Indian Air Force uses the Thumrait air base for transit purposes and
Oman has offered the Indian Navy berthing facilities in support of
anti-piracy patrols (Dikshit, 2009). The Indian Navy has also sought
to play an active role in the containment of Somali-based piracy and
since October 2008 has one or two vessels in anti-piracy patrols off
Somalia. However, India’s contribution has been made separately
from the US-sponsored Combined Task Force-150, in which
Pakistan has played an active role (Brewster, 2010a, p. 11).14
37The two island chains that dominate the central Indian Ocean are
the British-administered Indian Ocean Territory (which hosts the US
air and naval base at Diego Garcia), and the Maldives, both sitting
north-south astride the major east-west SLOCs between the Middle
East and East Asia. India has long regarded the Maldives as falling
within its South Asian sphere of influence. In 1988, with the
apparent blessing of the US and Britain, India sent troops and naval
forces to the Maldives to support former President Maumoon Abdul
Gayoom against an attempted coup by Sri Lankan mercenaries.
Since that time, India has supplied the Maldivian armed forces with
equipment and training and the Indian Navy has provided maritime
security. In August 2009, a security agreement was formalised that
will significantly enhance India’s capabilities in the central Indian
Ocean. India has been granted use of the former British naval and
air base at Gan Island, part of the southern-most group of islands in
the Maldives lying around 1,000 km south of India and around 700
km north of Diego Garcia (Brewster, 2010a, p. 11). India is
reportedly planning to base Dornier aircraft and helicopters at Gan,
although it is unclear to what extent the Indian Navy will establish a
permanent presence at the associated Gan naval facilities. India also
 reportedly plans to station aircraft and naval vessels at Malé in the
central Maldives and at Haa Dhalu atoll in the north (Dutta, 2009).
As part of the agreement, India is building a system of 26 electronic
monitoring stations across the Maldives archipelago, apparently to
protect the Maldives’ large EEZ from illegal fishing activities
(Chandramohan, 2009).

An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean?

 15 On an Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean, see Brewster
(2014, pp. 35-37).

38To what extent should India’s maritime security relationships in

the Indian Ocean be seen as the beginnings of an Indian sphere of
influence in the region?15
 16 This included the creation of territorial buffer areas to insulate
direct contact with other empire (...)

39The discourse on an Indian sphere of influence beyond South Asia

is sometimes identified with Lord Curzon, the former British Viceroy
of India who, at the beginning of the 20th century, advocated the
adoption of a ‘forward policy’ to secure India’s strategic position.
Curzon’s so-called ‘forward school’ argued that India’s security
demanded, amongst others, control of maritime routes and key
ports en route to India, including Aden and Singapore. 16 In many
ways, the policies of the British Raj represented a significant
departure from Indian traditions which had little history of territorial
expansion or military and political adventure beyond the limits of
the sub-continent. George Tanham’s (1996, p. 73) study of India’s
strategic culture in the early 1990s characterised Indian strategic
thinking as being “defensive” and “lack[ing] … an expansionist
military tradition”. Indeed, any affirmation of an Indian security
sphere beyond South Asia largely ceased following independence.
After 1947, India effectively withdrew to the Indian sub-continent
and asserted what has been called ‘India’s Monroe Doctrine’
according to which New Delhi would not permit any intervention by
any ‘external’ power in India’s immediate neighbours in South Asia
and related islands (Brewster, 2010a, p. 15). While India’s attempts
to exclude other powers from South Asia had only limited success,
New Delhi’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ was used to justify military
interventions in Sri Lanka and the Maldives in the 1980s (see
Holmes & Yoshihara, 2008, pp. 997-1011).
40Several decades earlier, Kavalam M. Panikkar (1943, pp. 100-
101), India’s most famous maritime strategist, argued that the
Indian Ocean should remain “truly Indian”, advocating the creation
of a “steel ring” around India through the establishment of forward
naval bases in Singapore, Mauritius, Yemen (Socotra), and Sri Lanka.
Towards the end of World War II, he wrote that “… to India … [the
Indian Ocean] is the vital sea”, asserting that “Indian interests have
extended to the different sides … of the Indian Ocean [and], based
as they are on the inescapable facts of geography, have become
more important than ever before” (Panikkar, 1945, pp. 84 & 94). In a
similar vein, Keshav Vaidya (1949, pp. 91, 101 & 130) talked of
India’s oceanic destiny needing around half a century to come to
fruition. And nearly seven decades later, his hopes that India “…
must, at least, rule the waves of the Indian Ocean” and “… must be
the supreme and undisputed power over the waters of the Indian
Ocean .… well on the path to becoming a mighty sea power … which
alone can ensure national greatness” are, perhaps, about to be
realised.
41Since the end of the Cold War there has been a revival in
discussion in India about a ‘natural’ sphere of influence extending
well beyond South Asia. This is related to a desire to move beyond
India’s traditional strategic preoccupations in South Asia and re-
engage with its extended neighbourhood; in other words, to rectify
what former Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh called
India’s unnecessary acceptance of “the post-Partition limits
geography imposed on policy” (Mohan, 2003, p. 205). Eric Margolis
(2005, p. 70) perceptively remarks that what is “driving India’s naval
strategy is the concept that the vast Indian Ocean is its mare
nostrum …. that the entire triangle of the Indian Ocean is … [its]
rightful and exclusive sphere of interest”. As David Scott (2006, p.
120) emphasises, “… [to] shape the Indian Ocean as India’s ocean is
India’s ‘Grand Strategy’” for the 21st century. Thus, from the turn of
this century, the Indian Ministry of Defence began describing India’s
‘security environment’ as extending from the Persian Gulf in the
west to the Strait of Malacca in the east (IMOD, 2001), an area which
Jaswant Singh called India’s “sphere of influence” (Rajghatta, 2001)
and what former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2004) has
somewhat more diplomatically referred to as India’s “strategic
footprint” (Brewster, 2010a, p. 16).
42While there is obviously an aspiration in New Delhi to develop an
expanded Indian strategic space, it is not at all clear what this might
mean in practice. There is little doubt that India’s approach to
spreading its influence in the region differs significantly from Lord
Curzon’s, and it seems unlikely even in the long term that India will
regain the regional hegemony exerted by British India. However,
short of hegemony, India could express regional dominance through
the development of a more hierarchical regional order or seeking to
exclude other powers from the region. To date, the Indian Navy has
taken a co-operative approach in developing security relationships,
an approach that has been relatively successful. The failure of India
to project military power beyond the limits of South Asia during the
Cold War has placed New Delhi in good stead in much of the Indian
Ocean region.
43New Delhi has a noticeable lack of historical baggage in many of
its dealings in the region, with the exception of the Islamic factor
arising from the Pakistan conflict. India is often perceived as
essentially a benign power and not a would-be hegemon, in
contrast with other external powers such as the US. While India is
not in a position to exert significant power through military
predominance or ideological means, it may be able to do so as a
provider of public goods. This is certainly the current approach of
the Indian Navy, which emphasises its ability to provide maritime
policing, anti-piracy, and anti-terrorism functions. However, there
are sometimes also noticeable overtones of hierarchy in India’s
dealings with the region, particularly in New Delhi’s overt opposition
to regional relationships with China (see Brewster, 2014, pp. 194-
196; Brewster, 2010a, pp. 16-17).
44In the longer term, India’s role in the Indian Ocean will likely be
determined (and limited) by the extent to which its naval expansion
plans come to fruition. Drawing on the experience of the US in the
Western Hemisphere in the 19th and 20th centuries, James Holmes
(Holmes, Winner & Yoshihara, pp. 50-52) identifies three basic roles
which the Indian Navy could play: first, a ‘free-rider’ navy, in which
the Indian Navy can play a growing role in maritime policing and
humanitarian functions, while the US continues to play a dominant
role; second, a ‘constabulary’ navy, in which the Indian Navy would,
sparingly and with tact, intervene in littoral countries to advance the
common interest of South Asian states; and third, a ‘strong-man’
navy where it seeks to establish hegemony in the Indian Ocean and
has the capability to mount a forward defensive posture beyond the
Indian Ocean. Holmes concludes that the ambitions represented by
the Indian Navy’s expansion programme in the coming decades
would give it the capability to act somewhere between a ‘free-rider’
navy and a ‘constabulary’ navy (Brewster, 2010a, p. 17).
Undoubtedly, challenges in the maritime domain call for more
effective law enforcement and the maintenance of maritime order.
These challenges are, essentially, part constabulary, part economic,
and part human welfare. And as crime on the high seas has
increased, various avenues have opened up for maritime security
co-operation (Ghosh, 2004, p. 1).
45It should be noted that the potential for an Indian sphere of
influence in the Indian Ocean is also subject to some important
caveats: although India has ambitions to expand its strategic space
in the Indian Ocean, there are real questions as to whether these
aspirations will be achieved. India has a long history of its strategic
ambitions surpassing its capabilities, of strategic goals and military
expansion plans going unfulfilled. The planned expansion of India’s
naval capabilities is probably years away from being achieved and is
highly contingent upon the sustainability of India’s high economic
growth rate. India’s security partners in the Indian Ocean (with the
possible exception of the Maldives) will likely maintain other
important security relationships as well and will not easily grant an
exclusive security role to India. And, most importantly, the US has
every reason to maintain a major regional security presence,
 particularly in the north-western Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2010a, p.
17).
46Nevertheless, India’s aspirations to expand its strategic space in
the Indian Ocean region are clearly related to its broader ambitions
to be recognised as a great power, ambitions that may, if anything,
grow in coming years. Certainly, many would see a sphere of
influence as a natural appendage of great power status. One study
on India’s regional plans (Pardesi, 2005, p. 55) concluded that:
47… a rising India will try to establish regional hegemony in South
Asia and the Indian Ocean Region … just like all the other rising
powers have since Napoleonic times, with the long-term goal of
achieving great power status on an Asian and, perhaps, even global
scale.
 17 For an incisive analysis of India as the natural centre of gravity and
its leadership role in a reg (...)

48From a geopolitical perspective, spheres of influence are seen as

a normal part of ordering the international system. According to
Saul Cohen (1973, p. viii) “… spheres of influence are essential to
the preservation of national and regional expression … the
alternative is either a monolithic world system or utter chaos”. The
key feature of a sphere of influence is not just the ability to project
power, but an acknowledgement of a hierarchical relationship in
which the great power provides security to lesser powers in return
for an acknowledgement of its leadership role (Brewster, 2010a, pp.
17 & 18).17 Many Indian strategists see China’s political and security
relationships in South Asia and its putative ‘String of Pearls’ strategy
as part of a cohesive policy of ‘encirclement’ or ‘containment’ of
India that justifies the development of a ‘defensive’ sphere of
 influence by India. As Arun Prakash (2006, p. 11) argued: “The
appropriate counter to China’s encirclement of India is to build our
own relations, particularly in our neighbourhood, on the basis of our
national interests and magnanimity towards smaller neighbours.”
 18 For an insightful discussion on US-Indian co-operation in the Indian
Ocean region, see Brewster (20 (...)

49As it expands its influence in the Indian Ocean region, India also
has had to accept the continuing role of the US in the region. The
US, particularly with its base at Diego Garcia and its naval facilities
in Singapore and the Gulf, seems likely to remain the predominant
naval power in the Indian Ocean region for many years to come.
However, there are indications that the US is willing to cede to and,
indeed, encourage a major regional naval role for India, particularly
in the north-eastern Indian Ocean. For its part, India’s willingness to
co-operate with the US in achieving its ambitions is not as
paradoxical as it may seem. As former US Secretary of State Dean
Acheson (1955, p. 64) once conceded, the US (in developing its
sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere in the 19th century)
relied on Britain, the then superpower, to enforce the Monroe
Doctrine until the US was sufficiently strong to do so itself. Similarly,
India may have good reason to co-operate with the US while it
builds its own naval power (Brewster, 2010a, p. 18).18
 19 For a perceptive analysis of a new security partnership between
India and Australia in the Indian O (...)

50Yet, with the exception of the US, India will likely wish to co-
operate with extra-regional navies in the Indian Ocean only as long
as they recognise India’s leading role in the region (Pardesi, 2005,
p. 53). The apparent willingness of Japan to recognise India’s role as
the ‘leading’ maritime security provider west of the Malacca Strait
forms a not insignificant element in the developing India-Japan
security relationship (see Brewster, 2010c, pp. 95-120). How
Australia fits in this picture is also not entirely clear. Australia’s
naval power ranks second only to India’s among the littoral states.
There is no suggestion that India is seeking to expand its strategic
space into the south-eastern Indian Ocean and there is little reason
for it to do so as the junction of the Southern and Indian Oceans is
not a maritime choke point (Brewster, 2010a, p. 19). Nevertheless,
there is a ‘strong mutual interest’ for Australia and India to enhance
maritime security co-operation (Australian Government, 2009, p.
96), particularly in areas such as maritime policing (piracy, maritime
terrorism, illegal fishing, human trafficking) and disaster
management (see Brewster, 2010b, pp. 1-9).19

A Brief Outline of Security Threats in the Western

Indian Ocean Region
51Multiple sources of insecurity afflict many of the countries that
rim the Indian Ocean. These challenges include terrorism in
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and India; state failure, civil war and insurgency
in Yemen and Somalia; high-volume drug-trafficking via Pakistan
and Iran; and piracy and armed robbery at sea around the Horn of
Africa and in the Arabian Sea. Not all of these security concerns
have occurred at peak intensity at the same time, and thus it is
arguable that they have been addressed ‘insufficiently’ and on an
‘if-and-when’ basis. Even so, these risks threaten one of the most
critical strategic and trading spaces in the world. The Persian Gulf
remains the global market’s most important source of crude oil,
while the northern Indian Ocean constitutes a key sector of the
globe’s ‘West-East-West’ trading belt. For this reason, it is all the
more remarkable that these issues have not previously caused a
greater holistic security breakdown in the Indian Ocean region.
52As trends that have particularly worrisome security implications
continue to evolve, it is conceivable that the conflated pressures of
political insecurity, insurgent conflict, terrorism, illicit trafficking of
all kinds, and piracy and vessel hijacking outstrip the international
and regional community’s ability to effectively respond to such
issues in a sustained manner. Decision-makers should now confront
the logic of adopting a ‘management’ approach to these challenges.
Yet, successful management of security challenges of this
magnitude, complexity, and inter-connectedness requires policy
coherence, imagination, sustained participation, and considerable
resources. Amidst the existential pressures of geopolitical fragility,
internal political upheaval, insurgency, famine, and inter-state
tensions, there is now a growing danger that the specific threats
from terrorism, human trafficking, arms smuggling, and piracy will
not get the resources and policy attention they require, and could
therefore increase further in the near-term and beyond.
53As offshore oil and gas exploration and production evolves along
Africa’s east coast from Mozambique northwards to Somalia,
improved private and government maritime security have to be put
in place, especially in the coastal waters of northern Mozambique,
Tanzania, and Kenya. And as offshore industries expand,
infrastructure, port facilities, and support shipping will likely be
tempting targets for armed robbery, piracy, kidnappings, and
sabotage for a range of actors, including organised criminal gangs,
terrorists, and insurgent groups (some of which have yet to emerge
or be identified). Also, historically, the settlement of territorial
disputes has been one of the most protracted areas of geopolitical
 conflict. In most instances, disputes are benign, rendering them
virtually dormant but, even so, they have the potential to become
flashpoints in the coming years.
 20 These parts of the Indian Ocean region are categorised by Lloyd’s
Market Association of London, whi (...)

 21 For various perspectives on the piracy conundrum, see Herbert-

Burns (2012b, pp. 23-39); Luke (2012a (...)

54There appear to be a daunting number of maritime security

threats and challenges in the Indian Ocean region, both extant and
potential,20 and insufficient resources to address them. Indeed, the
mere fact that the Indian Ocean region constitutes the world’s
largest swath of maritime space that is prone to piracy and
terrorism of some sort, signifies that the region will arguably remain
the maritime area with the greatest array of security challenges for
the foreseeable future.21 However, while the resources that a very
large and diverse group of states have devoted to addressing these
challenges have never been adequate to the task, the largely
successful coalition-building measures (CBMs) and joint task-force
deployments have been impressive. With appropriate leadership
from the US and the European Union, these multilateral efforts can
be built upon in future. Other key states such as Australia, India, the
UAE, Oman, Pakistan, Iran, and South Africa should come forward to
forge regional multilateral solutions to address piracy, hijacking,
human trafficking, terrorism, illegal fishing, and the integrity of
EEZs. While not all these states and powers will be (or can be)
grouped to address every challenge, opportunities for security co-
operation and confidence-building in the region do exist (Herbert-
Burns, 2012b, pp. 23 & 38-39).
 Figure 4: The Somali Piracy Threat in the North-Western Indian Ocean

Zoom in Original (jpeg, 1,3M)

 22 India’s National Ship Owners’ Association, figuring that piracy costs

the global shipping trade som (...)

55The oceanic area now threatened by Somali pirates is vast (more

than 2.5 million square miles) and security of this space can never
be assured, even with hundreds of warships. The 35 to 45 warships
collectively provided by many states that are routinely deployed in
the international recognised transit corridor (IRTC) and in parts of
the Somali Basin are woefully inadequate. However, most of the Gulf
Co-operation Council states, including the UAE, have decent-sized
naval forces and patrol craft. The Gulf States rely heavily on
shipping for their economic prosperity, especially to secure the flow
of crude oil exports. This reality should be matched with far more
robust and sustained naval patrolling by Oman and the UAE, while
Western powers that have replenishment capabilities could provide
the necessary logistical support. On the north-eastern and eastern
side of the high-risk area (HRA), India 22 and Pakistan could likely
 provide more sea and air surveillance resources. Additional maritime
patrol aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles based in Oman, the
Seychelles, Kenya, Tanzania, and Madagascar could further enhance
current levels of maritime domain awareness. Those states with
sufficient warships, such as the US, the UK, China, France, Germany,
Japan, and Turkey, could provide additional frigates and destroyers
to extend the patrolling footprint deeper into the high-risk area,
guided by improved maritime domain awareness and intelligence.
56Ever since the piracy threat began to grow in 2008, maritime
domain awareness has improved considerably due to the efforts of
the UK Maritime Trade Organisation (UKMTO), the Maritime Security
Centre-Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA), and various combined task
forces. Even so, more could be done to harness the surveillance and
threat-reporting capability of all the merchant vessels in the high-
risk area, which could potentially expand the intelligence-gathering
capacity for military forces by an order of magnitude. In the longer-
term, an internationally supported financial programme to boost the
naval and coastguard capacity of countries such as Kenya, Tanzania,
Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles would
enable these states to provide far better maritime security and
counter-piracy operations in their own waters (Herbert-Burns,
2012b, pp. 35 & 36).

Conclusion
 23 In 2010, the growing share of trade in India’s economy stood at
around 43%. Rapid economic growth, (...)

57Without any doubt, for India the Indian Ocean has huge and
growing strategic significance, as it is most concerned with the
ocean as a geostrategic space as opposed to a regionally significant
 one. India’s traditionally land-oriented strategic vision has
expanded in the past two decades to place greater weight on its
maritime environment, and the Indian Ocean is now looked on as
part of the inner ring of India’s security environment. Being the
pathway to international trade, the Indian Ocean is strategically and
economically more important than ever before (Schaffer, 2011, pp.
1 & 2).23 Quite evidently, India is dependent on substantial
seaborne trade and, consequently, its security interests have an
important maritime dimension. Security and trade (commerce) have
long been linked, and navies have long ago ceased to be military
platforms only and have become tools for the protection of trading
vessels and the policing of SLOCs (Pandya, Herbert-Burns &
Kobayashi, 2011, pp. 2 & 4).
 24 For a penetrating analysis of the expansion of Chinese influence in
the Indian Ocean, see Brewster (...)

58But, the Indian Ocean is also a potential arena for competition

with a rising China and a setting for security co-operation with the
US. In the past, India regarded with suspicion any country or
development that challenged its ability to dominate its maritime
space. As India’s economy has grown, and as it has become more
integrated with the world economy, this perspective has shifted. For
the past decade, New Delhi has recognised that it cannot dominate
on its own, and has come to regard the US presence as neutral or
even beneficial to its interests. However, India’s big strategic
concern in the Indian Ocean is China, and New Delhi has been
watching China’s growing presence with great suspicion. 24 This
includes not just the ‘String of Pearls’, places along the littoral
where China is arranging for preferential access (including the new
ports of Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka), but also
 the political links that China is building with these two countries and
with Myanmar (Burma) and Bangladesh. In internal government
deliberations in New Delhi, these factors enhance the strategic
importance and bureaucratic clout of the Indian Navy, which has
been consistently built up since 1990. Although the Navy accounts
for a relatively modest share of Indian military spending (18% for
2012/13), it gets a significantly larger share of new procurement,
some 72%. However, Indian officials speak of its mission in language
reminiscent of their American counterparts: ‘naval diplomacy’, also
with a focus on humanitarian operations like tsunami relief
(Schaffer, 2011, pp. 1 & 2). Clearly, the rendering of assistance
during natural disasters (tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions,
flooding) have spawned a multitude of additional ‘out of area’
operational roles for regional navies, and these have dramatically
increased transnational maritime security challenges in the Indian
Ocean region (Ghosh, 2004, p. 10).

Figure 5: Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean

Region
 25 Somali piracy has dropped off dramatically in recent times and
there has been no attack on a commer (...)

 26 For a detailed discussion on the IOR-ARC and the IONS, see Oman

Tribune, 4 November 2012; The New D (...)

59Other security threats in the Indian Ocean have also achieved a

higher profile in the past decade. Piracy in the Arabian Sea and
around the coast of Somalia in the Horn of Africa, to India’s west,
has become the major menace.25 However, almost paradoxically,
India’s approach to the Indian Ocean is primarily as a solo player,
and so far it has been wary of direct involvement in multinational
enterprises such as international anti-piracy operations. It has
sought other ways to co-ordinate with the other nations concerned:
co-operation rather than joint operations. Anti-piracy ought to be
the major arena for international organisations to shape regional
policy-making, but it has thus far been a relatively ineffective one as
far as India is concerned. Nevertheless, India has been the driving
force behind the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Co-
operation, IOR-ARC (dedicated to strengthening economic co-
operation among the Indian Ocean littoral states) and a consultative
group for the navies of the countries bordering the Indian Ocean,
the IONS.26 Because of the naval focus of the IONS, it is likely to
attract a greater degree of attention, but it is noteworthy that the
Indian government has emphasised its responsibility not just for
security but also for disaster management, ocean resources, and
environmental issues, signalling New Delhi’s desire to build a
broad-based set of relationships around this vital waterway. Neither
of these organisations, however, alters the basic judgement that
multilateral organisations have had a relatively modest impact on
how New Delhi addresses Indian Ocean issues, and that India’s
absence from the multinational anti-piracy task force limits the
impact of that multilateral effort (Schaffer, 2011, pp. 1 & 2).
60To sustain its current economic growth and achieve its great
power ambitions, India sees the Indian Ocean region as critical to
securing its strategic interests. India’s interests in the Indian Ocean
region are heavily focused towards improving trade, investment and
economic growth, while it also attempts to secure access to
hydrocarbon reserves and arable land in order to strengthen its
energy and food security. Due to its heavy dependence on inbound
seaborne trade, India has placed a premium on developing its naval
capabilities to safeguard and project its influence across the Indian
Ocean. Given that India sees itself as a major power with strategic
interests across the Indian Ocean, and that its requirements for
access to natural resources are set to grow, it is likely that New
Delhi will aim to significantly expand its influence across the Indian
Ocean in the coming years (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2011, pp. 1 & 10).
Undoubtedly, maritime strategy is playing an ever-increasing role in
Indian strategic thinking (see Prakash, 2007a, pp. 157-176). As
India reaches for great power status, it is turning more and more to
the Indian Ocean as a means of expanding its strategic space.
Although it currently co-operates with the US, India has long-term
aspirations towards attaining naval predominance throughout much
of the Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2010a, p. 19). Also, the rise of India
will play a key role in the gradual co-operative integration of the
various countries and peoples of the Indian Ocean basin. The long-
term result will be a more prosperous and globally more influential
region (Berlin, 2006, p. 84).
61In the 2010s, in conjunction with an expansion of India’s naval
capabilities, there has been a significant extension of India’s
maritime security relationships throughout the Indian Ocean region.
Much of the emphasis has been in developing relationships with
small states at or near the key points of entry into the Western
Indian Ocean (including Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Oman).
Arguably, the extreme asymmetries in size have made the
development of such relationships relatively easy: there is no
question of competition or rivalry, for example. Some of these
states have long seen India as a benign security
provider and have maritime policing needs that India can usefully
fulfil. In some cases, India may not only be a co-operative security
 provider, but may also effectively act as a security guarantor, as is
arguably the case with Mauritius and the Maldives (Brewster, 2010a,
p. 20). But gaps inevitably remain in India’s strategic posture and
New Delhi needs to further strengthen its hand in coastal Africa and
on the Arabian Peninsula (Berlin, 2006, p. 84). Also, littoral states on
the African seaboard look towards regional power centres for
assistance in maintaining maritime order and addressing security
challenges. Countries with enhanced maritime capabilities like India,
South Africa, Australia and the US should assist by not only co-
operating amongst themselves, but also by taking other littoral
states on board as part of multilateral efforts towards the
maintenance of maritime order (Ghosh, 2004, p. 10).
 27 It was reported at the time that the South African Navy’s
capabilities remained rather limited; tha (...)

 28 Although the South African Navy has since commenced limited

anti-piracy operations, it is restricte (...)

62But, in reality, things look slightly different. India is by far the

dominant littoral naval power in the Indian Ocean. Australia has the
next most powerful Navy, but it can only feasibly aspire to be a
middle power (Gordon, 2012, p. 2). In such company, South Africa is
the naval midget amongst maritime giants. Despite being the best in
the southern African region, if not in Sub-Saharan Africa, the South
African Navy is grossly under-resourced (Van Rooyen, 2012, p. 13).
The urgent need to re-equip the Navy was seemingly addressed by
acquiring four corvettes and three submarines for delivery by 2007,
as part of an arms deal package of some R70 bn concluded in
1998/99 (Engineering News, 23 November 2005). As late as 2010,
however, Vice Admiral Refiloe Mudimu, Chief of the South African
Navy, expressed apprehensions about the ability of the Navy to
effectively “patrol and protect” even South Africa’s territorial waters
(Heitman, 2010, p. 10).27 Although a senior naval officer tried to put
a positive spin on the situation by noting that maritime security
around the African continent “… is being addressed by means of the
AU 2050-African Integrated Maritime Security Strategy” (Teuteberg,
2012), this is in all likelihood yet another paper tiger – given the
AU’s poor track record and the strategy’s extensive projected
timeline. Given continued limited maritime resources and the fact
that a dramatic positive change in terms of maritime resource
allocations in the near to medium-term is rather remote, the
situation ‘in the water’ is not likely to change soon (see Van Rooyen,
2012, pp. 13-14; Van Rooyen, 2011, pp. 22-23).28
63In the coming years, therefore, India needs to develop much
stronger co-operative security relationships with the larger littoral
states, particularly South Africa and Australia. There is much scope
for security co-operation, especially in the maritime domain.
However, the implications of India’s strategic ambitions in the
Indian Ocean still need to be worked through. To what extent, for
example, might India expect implicit acknowledgement of a
leadership role in Indian Ocean security and/or support in any
attempts to exclude China from the region? In future, a challenge
for New Delhi is to maintain perceptions of India as a benign and
non-hegemonic power in the Indian Ocean region as it moves
towards achieving great power status. A strong and influential India
means a more multipolar world, and this is consistent with Chinese
interests. However, as China increasingly regards India as its main
Asian rival, Beijing sees India’s power projection in the Indian Ocean
as a disconcerting development.
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indicator/MS.ML.XPND.GD.ZS; and http://globalfirepower.com/country-
military-strength-detail.asp?country_id/

NOTES
1 The broader Indian Ocean ‘Rim’ consists of 29 littoral countries and 6
island states. The Indian Ocean ‘Region’ can either be limited to the Rim
countries, or it can be expanded to include landlocked countries
dependent on the Indian Ocean. Thus, the number of states that
comprise the Indian Ocean ‘Region’ can vary from a minimum of 35 Rim
countries to a maximum of 52 states; see Fernando (2011, p. 23); Roy-
Chaudhury (1998, note 4).

2 For overall GDP figures and GDP figures per capita, see World Bank
(2015), and IMF (2015).
3 Underwater oil exploration and production in the north-western Indian
Ocean takes place in an offshore oilfield, Bombay High (65km long, 23km
wide, 75 metres deep), 176km off the coast of Mumbai in the Gulf of
Khambhat off the Indian west coast, opposite the shores of the Indian
states of Gujarat and Maharashtra (Rao & Talukdar, 1980, p. 487). British
Petroleum (BP) joined India’s Reliance Industries in a partnership on 23 oil
and gas production-sharing contracts. This includes the KG-D6 block,
spread across more than 50,000km² in the Krishna and Godavari river
basins, off the east coast of India’s Andhra Pradesh state in the Bay of
Bengal (Reuters India, 22 February 2011; Reuters, 13 August 2012).
Naturally, in order to safeguard these vital national assets, India has to
maintain a very strong naval presence in both these maritime theatres.

4 However, this is not to suggest that the Ottoman (Turkish), Portuguese,

Dutch, French and British military presence in India, from around the
1490s and during the course of the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th centuries,
did not also include a major maritime component.

5 A slightly different version of this quotation is: “Whoever controls the
Indian Ocean controls Asia. The ocean is the key to the Seven Seas.” This
quotation is often attributed to Admiral Mahan but, in reality, is of
doubtful provenance. The earliest reference to this quote in English
appeared in an article, “Will the Indian Ocean Become a Soviet Pond?”, in
the Atlas World Press Review magazine of November 1979 – an article
originally written by Italian journalist, Guido Gerosa, entitled La flotta
sovietica presidia nuovi mari, and translated from the Italian
publication l’Europeo (Milan) of 6 August 1970.

6 For a general discussion of India’s maritime strategy and capabilities,

see Buzsynski (2009, pp. 73-93); Holmes, Winner & Yoshihara (2009);
and Naidu (2000).

7 Invitees to the naval symposium include France (which India recognises

as a littoral state by virtue of its colonial territories), but not Britain or the
US (notwithstanding their presence in the British Indian Ocean Territory,
BIOT), or China.

8 In 2007, the US Navy released a maritime security strategy that still
stressed the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as the principal centres for
regular US military presence – but now, the Indian Ocean was added as a
key strategic focus. This reflects in part the importance the US attaches to
the Gulf, but it also illustrates how central the integrity of sea lanes and
their multifaceted connections have become to US strategic planning. In
the past ten years, India-US security co-operation has expanded
markedly, and naval co-operation centres on the Indian Ocean is its most
active component. In the same period, India’s attitude towards a
permanent US presence in those waters has shifted from deeply sceptical
to supportive (Schaffer, 2011).

9 Between April 2000 and January 2010, Mauritius was the largest source
of foreign direct investment (FDI) into India, comprising 43% of total
investment, with the second largest investment source being Singapore;
see IMCI (2010).

10 The US also provides anti-piracy maritime surveillance through

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) stationed in the Seychelles.

11 For a wider discussion of India’s strategic ambitions and role in

south-eastern Africa, particularly in Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya,
see Brewster (2014, pp. 85-89 & 92-93).

12 This includes an announced US$700 million investment by China in a

special economic zone in Mauritius.

13 This perception is reinforced by the fact that the US military

relationship with India is the responsibility of US Pacific Command, based
in Hawaii, while the US security presence in the north-western Indian
Ocean is administered by US Central Command, based in Qatar (which
also has responsibility for the US military relationship with Pakistan). For
a discussion on India’s role in the north-western Indian Ocean and its
attempts to develop a strategic relationship with Iran, see Brewster (2014,
pp. 112-118).

14 As at April 2010, Pakistan had led CTF-150 on four occasions.

15 On an Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean, see Brewster

(2014, pp. 35-37).

16 This included the creation of territorial buffer areas to insulate direct

contact with other empires, including Afghanistan in the west, Tibet in
the north, and Thailand (Siam) in the east, and for British India to take an
active role in managing the affairs of these buffer zones.

17 For an incisive analysis of India as the natural centre of gravity and its
leadership role in a regional security order in the Indian Ocean, see
Brewster (2014, pp. 199-200 & 202-206).

18 For an insightful discussion on US-Indian co-operation in the Indian

Ocean region, see Brewster (2014, pp. 171-179).

19 For a perceptive analysis of a new security partnership between India

and Australia in the Indian Ocean region, see Brewster (2014, pp. 154-
159).

20 These parts of the Indian Ocean region are categorised by Lloyd’s

Market Association of London, which provides professional and technical
support to Lloyd’s underwriting (insurance and, specifically, shipping)
community, as ‘Piracy, Terrorism, and Related Perils Listed Areas’,
enclosed by the following boundaries: on the north-west by the Red Sea,
south of latitude 15°N; on the west of the Gulf of Oman by longitude 58°E;
on the east by longitude 78°E; and on the south by latitude 12°S; see IMO
(2013), and IMO (2009).
21 For various perspectives on the piracy conundrum, see Herbert-Burns
(2012b, pp. 23-39); Luke (2012a, pp. 31-33); Luke (2012b, pp. 35-
39); Oman Tribune, 4 November 2012; Potgieter & Schofield (2010, pp.
86-112); Middleton & Quartapelle (2010, p. 5, note 11); Tsvetkova (2009,
pp. 44-63); Harper (2009); Middleton (2008); Associated Press, 12
October 2008; Murphy (2007, Chapter 3).

22 India’s National Ship Owners’ Association, figuring that piracy costs

the global shipping trade some US$10 bn annually, has formally urged
the Indian government to back the creation of a maritime anti-piracy
force under UN command (Washington Post, 3 October 2011).

23 In 2010, the growing share of trade in India’s economy stood at

around 43%. Rapid economic growth, exceeding 8% per year since
2003/04, depends on a steady and secure supply of energy. Imports of
oil and gas represent some 70%, and about two-thirds of this cargo has
to come in by sea. Crude oil is India’s largest import, about US$100 bn
per year and one-third of all imports, while refined oil is its largest
export at about US$29 bn per year.

24 For a penetrating analysis of the expansion of Chinese influence in the

Indian Ocean, see Brewster (2014, pp. 182-196).

25 Somali piracy has dropped off dramatically in recent times and there
has been no attack on a commercial vessel in over two years. Piracy
seems to have been suppressed, but not stopped – it may well return at
some stage in the future. Therefore, the international maritime presence
remains vital to maintaining this welcome reduction in pirate attacks;
see Agence France Press (Paris), 8 April 2016.

26 For a detailed discussion on the IOR-ARC and the IONS, see Oman

Tribune, 4 November 2012; The New Delhi Post, 4 November 2012; The
Hindu, 2 November 2012; Rumley & Chaturvedi (2012); Fernando (2011,
pp. 23-27); Luke (2010c, pp. 19-22); McPherson (2002, pp. 251-261);
Roy-Chaudhury (1998, pp. 258-282); Jayawardene (1994).

27 It was reported at the time that the South African Navy’s capabilities
remained rather limited; that it would have difficulty in contributing to
anti-piracy operations off Somalia; that budgetary constraints would
allow for only one frigate and support ship to be put to sea at any given
time; and that such a deployment would deplete the entire 2011 annual
operational budget (allAfrica.com, December 2010 & January 2011).

28 Although the South African Navy has since commenced limited anti-
piracy operations, it is restricted to the Mozambique Channel, in
pursuance of South Africa’s commitment to the Southern African
Development Community (Mail&Guardian, 15 November 2011).