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Case #1 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: The Director of Religious Affairs vs Estanislao Bayot

G.R. NO: AC No L-1117 DATE: March 20, 1944

PONENTE: Azaeta J.

DOCTRINE:
It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism
by advertising his services or offering them to the public.

FACTS:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in the
Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired,
and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
The respondent, initially denied the publication, but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its
publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional
misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by
reason thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent violated the Code which prohibits solicitation of legal business.

RULING:
Yes.It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the prac tice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the
bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah.
"The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one month
for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more
serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so
decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
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Case #2 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

ADELINO LEDESMA vs. HON. RAFAEL CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Negros Occidental, Branch I,
Silay City

G.R. NO. L-23815 June 28, 1974

Fernando, J.

DOCTRINE: To avoid any frustration in the administration of justice, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere
perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger
dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest.

FACTS:
On October 13, 1964, petitioner Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of
Negros Occidental. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge,
he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him
counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time
service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for
reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to withdraw
as counsel de oficio

RULING:
No. Petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As held in the case of People vs. Daban: “There is need anew in this
disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility
to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called
upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any
frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio.
The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the
contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his
practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he
cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be
fulfilled.”

As such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because,
as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to
his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of
social conscience and a little less of self-interest.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.

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Case #3 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI and ROMULO CUI

G.R. NO. L-18727 August 31, 1964

Makalintal, J.

DOCTRINE: Whether taken alone or in context, the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law.

FACTS:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna
Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless
persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial
management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or
designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:

“That in the event of our death or inability to administer, we substitute our legitimate nephew Mariano Cui, if at the time
of our death or disability he is residing in the city of Cebu, and our political nephew Dionisio Jakosalem. If our said nephew
Mariano Cui was not residing then in the city of Cebu, we designate instead our other legitimate nephew Mauricio Cui.
Both nephews will jointly administer the hospicio. Upon the death or incapacity of these two administrators, the
administration of the hospicio will pass to a single person who will be male, of legal age, who descends legitimately from
any of our legitimate nephews Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui and Victor Cui, and who holds the title of lawyer
(titulo de abogado), or doctor, or civil engineer, or pharmaceutical, or in the absence of these titles, the one that pays the
tax or contribution to the General Staff. All other things being equal, the oldest descendant male of whom the
administration will be ultimately preferred. When a person with these qualifications is absolutely missing, the
administration of the hospicio will pass to the Bishop of Cebu or who is the largest dignitary of the Catholic, Apostolic,
Roman Church, who has a seat at the head of this Province of Cebu, and failing that, to the Provincial Government of
Cebu.”

Due to the deaths of Don Pedro (1926), Doña Benigna (1929), Mauricio Cui (May 1931) and Dionisio Dakosalem (July
1931), Teodoro Cui, the only son of Mauricio, became the administrator.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews
of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr.
Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in
a notarial document. The next day, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice
of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.

On 5 September 1960 Jesus wrote a letter to Antonio demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13
September 1960, the demand not having been complied with, the plaintiff filed the quo warranto complaint in this case.
Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the
nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.

The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor
of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred
by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February
1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator.

The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of Jesus Cui, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means
that of a full-fledged lawyer, but considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict
interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed
as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.

ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff, who merely holds a degree of Bachelor of Laws is entitled to become the administrator
of the Hospicio

RULING:

No. The plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator.

The Court ruled that whether taken alone or in context, the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the
practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements,
does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-
law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers
of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities
are devolved by law as a consequence. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission
to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
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"successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of
Education."

The founders of the Hospicio must have established the criterion (that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor,
civil engineer or a pharmacist in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among
those otherwise qualified) due to the work to be performed by the administrator. It is to be presumed that a working
knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

But it is argued that although Antonio Cui is a member of the Bar, he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph
3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of
ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the
defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact,
however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement
is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first
place. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.

The claim of intervenor Romulo Cui is dismissed since he is further in the line of succession than Antonio Cui. Besides
being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the
circumstances are otherwise equal.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed
and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-
appellee and intervenor-appellant.
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Case #4 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: Raul A. Villegas, Petitioner, vs. Assemblyman Valentino L. Legaspi, Respondent.

G.R. NO: 53869 and 51928 DATE: March 25, 1982

PONENTE: Melencio-Herrera, J.:

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: G.R. NO. L-53869 -- On September 27, 1979, a complaint for annulment of bank checks with damages was filed
by Villegas against the Sps. Vera Cruz and Primitivo Canjia, Jr. before the CFI of Cebu presided by Hon. Ceferino Dulay.
An answer was filed by the respondents through their counsel, Assemblyman Legaspi, a member of the Batasang
Pambansa of the province of Cebu. Villegas challenged the appearance of Legaspi as counsel of record on the ground
that he is barred under the Constitution from appearing before the CFI which are essentially trial courts. The case was
transferred to Hon. Burgos. Burgos denied the disqualification as well as the MR.

G.R. NO. L-51828 -- Edgardo Reyes on July 3, 1979 filed a case before the CFI of Rizal against Verenigde
Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas and Eustaquio Acero to annul the sale of Excelsior’s shares in the International
Pipe Industries Corp (IPI) to Acero on the ground that prior thereto, the same shares had already been sold to him.
Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Excelsior. This appearance was questioned
on the ground that it was barred by SEC.11, ART. VIII of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa can appear as counsel before CFI.

RULING: A comparison of SEC.11, ART VIII of the 1973 Constitution prohibiting any Assemblyman from appearing as
counsel before any court inferior to a Court with appellate Jurisdiction and the similar provision of SEC. 17, ART VI of the
1935 Charter is elucidating. The last sentence of the latter provision reads: “... No member of the Commission on
Appointments shall appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of Appellate Jurisdiction.”

The limitation now comprehends all members of the Batasang Pambansa, and is no longer confined to members of the
Commission on Appointments, a body not provided for under the 1973 Constitution. Under the amendment to ART VIII
of the 1973 Constitution, SEC. 11 now reads: “SEC. 11. No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel
before any court without appellate jurisdiction, …”

Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is “appearance as counsel” before any Court without
appellate jurisdiction.”

“Appearance” has been defined as “voluntary submission to a court’s jurisdiction.” “Counsel” means an adviser, a person
professionally engaged in the trial or management of a cause in court; a legal advocate managing a case at law; a lawyer
appointed to engaged to advise and represent in legal matters a particular client, public officer, or public body.” Thus,
“appearance as counsel” is a voluntary submission to a court’s jurisdiction by a legal advocate or advising lawyer
professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of another. This is the common, popular connotation of this
word which the Constitution must have adopted. “Advocate” means one who pleads the cause of another before a tribunal
or judicial court, a counselor.

The question now is: are the CFI, where Assemblyen Legaspi and Fernandez appear as counsel of record, Courts with
appellate jurisdiction?

By law, CFI are Courts of general original jurisdiction. However, under the same statute, their jurisdiction has been stated
to be of two kinds: original and appellate. They have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in City and Municipal
Courts in their respective provinces except over appeals from cases tried by Municipal Judges of provincial capitals or
City Judges.

It is contended, however, that the CFI in these two cases took cognizance of the suits in the exercise of their exclusive
original and not appellate jurisdiction, hence, Assemblymen Fernandes and Legaspi are prohibited from appearing before
said Courts as counsel. There is merit to this contention. The question to be resolved is whether or not Assemblymen
can appear as counsel before CFI in cases originally filed with them.

The Court is of the considered opinion that, to render effective the Constitutional provision, appearance by legislators
before CFI should be limited to cases wherein said Courts exercise appellate jurisdiction. This is true to the time-honored
principle that whatever is necessary to render effective any provision of a Constitution, whether the same be a prohibition
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or a restriction, must be deemed implied and intended in the provision itself. Appellate practice is all that is permitted
because of the admitted predominance of lawyers in the legislature. Their office has always favored them with influence
and prestige that it carried. Today, as before, it is only “appellate practice” that is allowed with the significant difference
that, this time, the Court need not be a collegial body. This is so because with the removal of the legislative power to
review appointments the source of power and influence that members of the National Assembly could unduly exert in the
exercise of the legal profession has been greatly minimized.

The objective of the prohibition, then and now, is clearly to remove any possibility of undue influence upon the
administration of justice, to eliminate the possible use of office for personal gain, to ensure impartiality in trials and thus
preserve the independence of the Judiciary. The possible influence of an Assemblyman on a single Judge of the Court
of First Instance, though not entirely removed, is definitely diminished where the latter Court acts in the exercise of its
appellate instead of original jurisdiction. The upper hand that a party represented by an Assemblyman by virtue of his
office possesses is more felt and could be more feared in original cases than in appealed cases because the decision or
resolution appealed from in the latter situation has already a presumption not only of regularity but also of correctness in
its favor.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, granting the Writs prayed for, the Order issued on February 27, 1980 by the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. R-18857, is hereby set aside, and Attorneys Estanislao A.
Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi hereby declared prohibited from appearing as counsel before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, in Civil Case No. 33739, and before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II,
in Civil Case No. R-18857, respectively. The Restraining Order issued heretofore in L-53869 is hereby made permanent.
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Case #5 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

SOPHIA ALAWI vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA

A.M. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

NARVASA, C.J.

DOCTRINE:
While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney."

FACTS:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. (EB Villarosa) of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in
Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.

Through the agency of Alawi, EB Villarosa as the seller was able to enter into a purchase agreement (the contract) of
one housing unit with Alauya as buyer. In connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Shortly thereafter, Alauya sent a letter to the President of EB Villarosa expressing his intent to terminate the contract on
the ground that Alawi, as their sales agent, maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured
and pursued the housing loan without Alauya’s authority and against his will. He then proceeded to expound in
considerable detail and in a quite sharply critical language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent.”

Similar or closely similar letters were sent to EB Villarosa’s Vice-President and to officers or employees of the NHMFC
requesting for the cancellation of his housing loans.

Upon learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed a verified complaint before the Supreme Court accusing the former of
"imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith"
and of usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

In his defense, Alauya alleged that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing
only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary. On the second point of complaint, Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or
"counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that
given to local legislators.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Alauya is guilty of misconduct and unethical behavior.

2. Whether or not Alauya has the right to use the title “Attorney”.

RULING:

1. YES. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alauya is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for
the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be
excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

2. NO. The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing. Persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. His ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to
use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
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Case #6 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

SANTA PANGAN vs. ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS

A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979

ANTONIO, J.

DOCTRINE:
The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to
practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his
practice of law.

FACTS:
This case is a motion of Santa Pangan to cite respondent Atty. Dionisio Ramos for contempt for using a different name.

Pangan is the complainant in a case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People
v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906). She alleged that upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in
said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila.”

Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court but avers that he had a right to do
so because in his Birth Certificate, his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and - his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen
Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw”, his other given name and
maternal surname.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is authorized to use the name Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos.

RULING: NO.
A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The
name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record
containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law.

The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. This has to be so because the court
has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead
of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath.

The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means
as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be over emphasized. His high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon
the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates his oath of
office, when he resorts to deception or permits his client to do so.

In using the name of “Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was authorized to practice
law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. This demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with
the courts. The circumstance that this is his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe
penalty.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and warned that a
repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspension or disbarment from the practice of law.
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Case #7 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: In Re: Petition to Sign the Roll of Attorneys, Medado

B.M. No. 2540 DATE: September 24, 2013

PONENTE: SERENO, C.J.:

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
Medado graduated from UP with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 and passed the same year’s bar examination.
He thereafter took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC together with the successful bar examinees. He was scheduled to
sign the Roll of Attorneys on May 13, 1980 but he failed to so because he lost his Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys
given by the Bar Office when he went home to the province for a vacation.

Several years later, rummaging through old college files, he found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys and that what
he signed at the PICC was probably just an attendance record. By this time, he was already working. Mainly doing
corporate and taxation work and was not actively involved in litigation practice. He operated under the belief that signing
the Roll of Attorneys was not an urgent matter nor crucial to his status as a lawyer.

In 2005, in attending an MCLE seminar, he was asked to provide his roll number for his compliance to be credited, not
having signed the Roll, he was unable to provide the same.

7 years later, he filed this petition praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. The Office of the Bar
Confidant recommended that it be denied due to gross negligence and gross misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not Medado should be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

Yes. The petition could not be denied for prohibiting him would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment. A penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

Factual circumstances that justified the granting of the Petition.

- Medado demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he himself filed the Petition. It is not a third
party who called the Court’s attention to the omission. He is the one who acknowledged his own lapse
notwithstanding the passage of more than 30 years.

When asked why he took that long: “Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say?
Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a
combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to
come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.

- He had not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law which is more than what we
could say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Bar.
- Medado appears to be a competent and able legal practitioner having held various positions in Laurel Law
Office, Petron, Petrophil Corporation, Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of law
is not a right but a privilege, this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have
shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

TO THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, A PENALTY IS IMPOSED UPON MEDADO FOR WILLFULLY ENGAGING IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. SUSPENSION CANNOT BE IMPOSED AS HE IS NOT YET A FULL FLEDGED
LAWYER (Tho sabi ni Court pwede ka lang mag sign in the Roll 1 year after the receipt of the Resolution). FINE
ORDERED PAID.
An honest mistake of facts could excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts. However, a mistake of LAW
cannot be used as a justification. Everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. While Medado may
have first have been operating under an honest mistake of fact when he though what he signed at the PICC before the
oath taking was already the Roll of Attorneys, the moment he realized that it was merely an attendance record, he could
no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he
was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the
act of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing
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law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of CANON 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to
impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt
of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit
to fine him in the amount of P32,000.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is
ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED
to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED
to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the
Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
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Case #8 TOPIC: Practice of Law

CASE TITLE: Cayetano v Monsod

G.R. NO: 100113 DATE: September 3, 1991

PONENTE: J. Paras

FACTS:

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86.55%. After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries,
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant
or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s
work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer
and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately
the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a
quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President
of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative."

ISSUE: WON Atty. Monsod is engaged in the practice of law for him to qualify as the Chairman of the COMELEC.
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RULING: YES. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years."

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term
"practice of law."

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA
or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members
of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean
that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective
work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman,
of the Commission on Audit.

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA
or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members
of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean
that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective
work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman,
of the Commission on Audit.

In addition, the Court ruled that “Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer
in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide."

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Dissenting: (Padillla)

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of
his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968). Practice is more than an isolated
appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice
of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term ‘practice of law’ (Ernani Paño, Bar
Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and,
one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing
law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected,
`all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette
Et. Al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359).

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within
the term `practice of law’. (Martin supra).
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4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship.
Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship,
such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer

Dissenting (Cruz)
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping
in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities
accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock
broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters
that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the
Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there
is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and
observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts
involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his
main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service
Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice
of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose
income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
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Case #9 TOPIC: Moral Turpitude

CASE TITLE: Soriano v. Dizon

A.C. No. 6792 DATE: January 25, 2006

PONENTE: PER CURIAM

DOCTRINE:
Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude may be a question
of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances (IRRI v. NLRC).

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly
to their good moral character. Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them
morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court
may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office. 


FACTS:
Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi,
berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the
accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor.

Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by
now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter
caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then
released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a
handkerchief.
The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He
picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by
the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the
accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony
corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."


Dizon was convicted of frustrated homicide but was out on parole and refused to pay the civil indemnity to Soriano.

ISSUE: Whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude

RULING: Yes.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals."


In International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC the court held that Homicide may or may not involve moral
turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of
incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances.

In this case however, Dizon was the aggressor, he shot the victim when he least expects it, there was treachery because
he shot the victim when he was not in a position to defend himself. When the assault was over when Soriano was returning
the glasses he was unexpectedly shot, and wrapped the gun in handkerchief.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly
to their good moral character. Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them
morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court
may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.


The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled by
complainant and two other persons, which was disproved by three doctors who examined Dizon.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys.
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Case #10 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: WELLINGTON REYES vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA

G.R. NO: A.M. No. 1048 DATE: July 14, 1995

PONENTE: PER CURIAM

DOCTRINE: Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on
such grounds.

FACTS: This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, with
malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney. Complainant, WELLINGTON REYES, reported to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila,
who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival. An entrapment was set up by the NBI.
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to the
Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment.

When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So
complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with
respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, complainant
then handed to respondent the marked money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended
respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found
positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the
Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked.
The NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution of disbarment
proceedings against him. ( Two other cases were earlier filed against respondent)

In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked
money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be
disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994

ISSUE: IS THE RECOMMENDATION CORRECT?

RULING: The Supreme Court agrees with the recommendation.

In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from
complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing
of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and
retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant.

It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony. When the integrity of a member of
the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
is expected of him.

Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer
or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath, imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The
lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread
on the personal records of respondent.
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Case #11 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES

A.C. No. 5161 April 14, 2004

PER CURIAM:

DOCTRINE:
The Lawyer’s oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of
justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and
hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyer’s oath, they
become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice.

FACTS:
The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina
T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting.
Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of land.

According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and used his
profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or
immoral act. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of land, The respondent participated in, consented to,
and failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late
spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false.

In his Comment, the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did not take advantage of his
profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law. Insofar as Lot 1586 is
concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the
sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement involving Lot 1603 because he
had no part in the execution of the document. All the while he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already
agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever complainant’s signature was affixed on that document, it was done in
good faith.

Investigating Commissioner San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the
respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.

The Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for six years.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be disbarred.

RULING: YES
The SC fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of culpability. The
respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable
fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer.

The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony in court, and he never corrected the same
despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such
false testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony.

Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to
the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice." This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina
to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for
reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.

The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his
part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action
against him.
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Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession.
They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. Verily, given the
peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondent’s gross misconduct calls for the severance
of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation
of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and
his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
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Case #12 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

PER CURIAM:

DOCTRINE:
The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification
is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.

FACTS:
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated
value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales
proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984,
respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued
three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also
for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment
for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders
Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no
arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her
obligations to Ms. Marquez.

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the RTC of Manila: (a) one for estafa and (b) three
(3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

RTC: acquitted the respondent of the charge of estafa and convicted the respondent for the violation of BP Blg No. 22.

CA: affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is
found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her
profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.

Respondent states that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the
lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the
lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the
intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.

ISSUE: WON the respondent violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar, upon the grounds that she issued
checks which bounced, thereby properly suspended from the practice of law.

RULING: YES
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that
is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against
public order.

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude. The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise
of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted
of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires
that she shall be a person of good moral character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to
the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.
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Case #13 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

IN RE: ABAD

B.M. No. 139 March 28, 1983

Abad Santos

DOCTRINE: Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys

FACTS:
Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., charged Mr. Elmo S. Abad of
practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar. In exculpation, Abad gives the following
lame explanation:
● On July 26, 1979, the Clerk of Court of Supreme Court, included him as among those taking the Oath of Office
as Member of the Bar
● At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for his turn to take his Oath as a member
of the Bar, he was made to sign his Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
while waiting there, the Clerk of Court told him that Chief Justice Fernando wants to talk to him. The Chief Justice
told him that he has to answer the Reply of a complainant named Jorge Uy and for which reason the taking of
his Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *
● Later on, he filed his Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable Supreme Court determines
his fitness to be a member of the Bar;
● While waiting for the resolution of the Supreme Court, he received a letter from the IBP informing him of an
Annual General Meeting together with my Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981
● Believing that with his signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and his Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer, the
Supreme Court did not order for the striking of his name in the Roll of Attorneys with the IBP and therefore a
Member in Good Standing, he paid his membership due and other assessments to the IBP.

ISSUE: WON Abad was admitted to the bar.

RULING: NO. Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his
admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature
in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)

The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this
Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
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Case #14 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: Aguirre vs. Rana

B.M. NO: 1036 DATE: June 10, 2003

PONENTE: Carpio, J.

DOCTRINE:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. Rana was engaged in the practice of law when
he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Having held
himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.

FACTS:
Rana passed the 2000 Bar Exam. On 21 May 2001, one day before the oath-taking, Aguirre filed against Rana a Petition
for Denial of Admission to the Bar.

Aguirre charges Rana for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct alleging that the latter, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
(MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.

Aguirre further alleges that Rana filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 that objected to the inclusion of
votes in the canvassing for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and
in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for Bunan.

On the charge of violation of law, Aguirre claims that Rana is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, Rana is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court
or administrative body.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing Rana to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing
the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required him to
comment on the complaint.

In his Comment, Rana claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows
the law. He admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He
explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, Rana claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May
2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox.

In her Reply, Aguirre further alleges that on 19 May 2001 Estipona-Hao filed a petition for proclamation as the winning
candidate for mayor. Rana signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition.

OBCs Report and Recommendation:

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The
OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath. The OBC
believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC
also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The
OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

ISSUE:
Whether Rana should be admitted as a member of the Bar.

RULING: NO
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SC agreed with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Rana called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of
the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession
of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.

True, respondent passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
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Case #15 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon (IBP Administrative Case
No. MMD-1)

A.M. NO: 1928 DATE: August 3, 1978

PONENTE: Castro, C.J.:

DOCTRINE:
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the
Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject
to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual
fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing,
a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.

FACTS:
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon (Edillon) is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. In a resolution by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors, Edillon’s name was recommended to be removed from the
Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latter’s constitution
notwithstanding due notice.

Edillon anchors his refusal to pay the membership dues on the following grounds:
1. That IBP’s Rule of Court 139-A, Section 1 is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of
freedom to associate (and not to associate);
2. That the provision of IBP’s Rule of Court 139-A requiring payment of a membership fee is void;
3. That the enforcement of penalty provisions would amount to deprivation of property without due process,
infringing his constitutional rights;
4. That the Supreme Court has no power to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys.

Note: The Supreme Court discussed these main points in seriatim.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the IBP’s Rule of Court 139-A and IBP’s By-Laws are unconstitutional for being violative of his
constitutional right of freedom to associate;
2. Whether or not the provision of IBP’s Rule of Court 139-A requiring payment of a membership fee is void;
3. Whether or not the enforcement of penalty provisions would amount to deprivation of property without due
process; and,
4. Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to remove respondent’s name in the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:
1. NO. IBP’s Rule of Court 139-A, Section 1, which provides for the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of
membership in the IBP which must be “composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included
in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court”, is valid and constitutional. It does not violate respondent Edillon’s right of
freedom to associate.
The Supreme Court answered that: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already
a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is
to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized group of which every lawyer is already a
member. He is free to associate with anyone. He is free to attend the meetings or vote or refuse to vote in the IBP’s
elections. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers, in order to elevate the quality of the professional legal services. Also, even assuming that
the questioned provision compels a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is an exercise of the
police power of the State.
2. NO. The provision of IBP’s Rule of Court 139-A requiring payment of a membership fee is valid.
There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar, which power the respondent
acknowledges, from requiring members of a privileged class (such as lawyers) to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
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the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. The fee is being imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
3. NO. The enforcement of penalty provisions would not amount to deprivation of property without due process,
infringing his constitutional rights.
It is clear under the police power of the State and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. Also, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognized, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
In addition, the Supreme Court emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court.
4. YES. The Supreme Court has the power to remove respondent’s name in the Roll of Attorneys.
The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision
have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities. Besides, the Court's
jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by the Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to “Promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar”. Hence,
the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly
vested in the Supreme Court.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should
be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
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Case #16 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE:
In Re: Victorio D. Lanuevo, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court
In Re: Ramon E. Galang, 1971 Bar Examinee
In Re: Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr, Members 1971 Bar Examining Committee

A.M. No. 1162; A.C. No. 1163; A.M. No. 1164 DATE: August 29, 1975

PONENTE: Makasiar, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the
exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present,
affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles.

The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same
cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court.

FACTS:
In a confidential letter of one Oscar Landicho (Landicho) asking the Supreme Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of
his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question (who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations), it was
written, “The sterling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one
reason or another, before the bar results were released this year”. Allegedly, this was confirmed to Landicho by the Civil
Law Examiner himself, Hon. Ramon Pamatian (Pamatian) as well as by the Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo (Lanuevo).
Landicho furthered that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other
subjects underwent alterations to raise the grades prior to the release of the results, and this was without any formal
motion or request from the bar candidates concerned.

It appears that, during the time the herein respondents-examiners were checking the 1971 examination booklets, Lanuevo
systematically and individually deceived the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority
from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through Lanuevo, who is simply
the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court. This ultimately led to the re-evaluation and/or recorrection of the
answers of respondent Ramon Galang’s (Galang) booklet.

Among others, the respondents-examiners claimed that Lanuevo represented that the latter, being a Bar Confidant, he
makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an
extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned
the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade. With that, Lanuevo was able to persuade the herein respondents-
examiners to re-evaluate and re-correct Galang’s examination booklet. Lanuevo told each bar examiner that Galang has
obtained exceptionally high grades in other subjects, and if such bar examiner would reconsider Galang’s low mark in
such particular subject, Galang would be able to pass. Lanuevo did such representations towards the bar examiners for
the five subjects - Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law. In the
end, Galang passed the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15% (from 66.25%, or a total increase of 8 weighted
points), which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark
for the 1971 bar examinations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents Lanuevo and Galang should be disbarred and the respondents-examiners be held liable for
disciplinary action.

RULING:
YES. Respondents Lanuevo and Galang should be disbarred.
NO. The respondents-examiners should not be held liable for disciplinary action.

As to Lanuevo’s case, the Office of the Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks
are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only
function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general
average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to
a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine
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the passing average. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any
request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone
can validly act thereon.

That he is merely doing justice to Galang without the intention of betraying the trust and confidence of the Court deserves
no credence because of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the
papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully
aware. In trying to do justice to Galang, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations,
especially the said more than ninety candidates.

Lanuevo is guilty of serious misconduct, having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar
Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court.
He should be disbarred.

As to Galang, he should likewise be disbarred. The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination
answers of Galang in five (5) subjects was initiated by Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of
the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled
respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. And whether
or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the
proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

More so, culled from the records is that, Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his
pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969
and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely
representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally
to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

As to the respondents-examiners, they, having acted in good faith, merely relied on the misrepresentations of Lanuevo;
thus, they do not deserve the imposition of disciplinary actions. However, they are reminded that their participation in the
admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of
the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their
duties relative thereto.

NOTES:
1. As to what happened to Landicho, during the proceedings, he was already in Australia and was gainfully
employed. He was not summoned to testify. Landicho is a friend of Hon. Pamatian, to whom he first sought help and
knew about the irregularity of the bar exam results.
2. The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the
properties (i.e., house and car), tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his
passing the Bar.
3. Interestingly, as told by Lanuevo as to why Galang’s booklet #954 was singled out, because due to coincidence,
Lanuevo finds the “954” to have a strange meaning. He saw said number in a MERALCO electrical contribance attached
to a post and the same number appeared as the last number in a sweepstakes ticket he bought. He furthered that when
he added up the six digits in his ticket number, it totaled to “27”, and “27” is likewise a special number to him. November
27, 1941, he was stricken with pneumonia while he was in the Philippine Army and was hospitalized before, and
coincidentally, he was not in the base camp when the Japanese came to bombard their base camp. February 27, 1946,
he was able to get out of the army byway of honorable discharge. February 27, 1947, he got married and since then they
begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957. Weird person.
4. Opted not to discuss the other cases like that of Galang, because the Court said: As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg
and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they
should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED
AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
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Case #17 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: People of the Philippines v. Simplicio Villanueva

G.R. NO: L-19450 DATE: May 27, 1965

PONENTE: Paredes J.

DOCTRINE:
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Section 5, Rule 138) has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services.
The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law.

FACTS:
Defendant Simplicio Villanueva is charged with the crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna. The complainant in the said case was represented by his relative, Atty. Ariston Fule, the City Attorney
of San Pablo City who entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of
Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would
be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services.

The counsel for the accused questioned Atty. Fule’s appearance invoking Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., wherein it was
ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Later, said counsel presented a "Motion to
Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case,” this time invoking Section 32 of Rule 27, now Section
35 of Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court (ROC) which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advice to clients." Said motion was denied, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not inhibiting Atty. Fule.

RULING:
No. The theory of the defense counsel in invoking Section 32, of Rule 27, now Section 35 of Rule 138 of the ROC is that
Atty. Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. The Court, however, clarified
that the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules.

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for
such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law.

Moreover, it has never been refuted that Atty. Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary
of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all
respects, with costs against appellant.
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Case #18 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: CONCEPCION DIA-ANONUEVO V. MUN. JUDGE BONIFACIO BERCASIO OF TABACO ALBAY

G.R. NO: AM NO. 177-J DATE: November 27, 1975

PONENTE: Munoz, Palma J

DOCTRINE: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court proceedings but
also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, giving of legal advice to clients or persons
needing the same, etc. Hence, even if we were to accept respondent's explanation that it was Atty. Berango who
represented Mrs. Añonuevo and her co-plaintiffs in court, respondent's actuations as noted above still fall within the
prohibition.

The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid the evil of possible use of the
power and influence of his office to affect the outcome of a litigation where he is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons
of public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges are expected to conduct themselves in such a manner as to preclude
any suspicion that they are representing the interests of a party litigant.

FACTS: Respondent, incumbent Municipal Judge of Tabaco, Albay, faces this administrative complaint for conduct
unbecoming a judge on two counts: (1) engaging in the practice of law, and (2) failure to return promptly to complainant,
Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, the money deposited with him.

Complainant claims to be a co-owner of an undivided interest of a certain parcel of irrigated riceland situated in Domingo,
Albay. This property was the object of a deed of sale executed by Maximo Balibado, Justo Balibado and Petrona Balibado
de Barrios in favor of Alfredo Ong and acknowledged before respondent herein, as ex-officio notary public. Having been
apprised of the execution of this deed of sale, complainant went to the office of Judge Bercacio to verify the matter. Upon
being shown a copy of the deed of sale, complainant informed respondent judge that the vendors owned only one-third
undivided portion of the property and that she and other cousins of hers owned two-thirds thereof. Respondent advised
the complainant to redeem or repurchase the property from the vendee, Alfredo Ong. Complainant then requested the
judge to intercede in their behalf with the vendee to allow them to redeem the property and for that purpose she gave
respondent the amount of P3,500.00 to be used to pay Alfredo Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount of
P3,500.00 for which he issued a receipt. Respondent judge then sent the corresponding letter to Alfredo Ong but the
latter did not answer. Forthwith a Civil Case was filed with the Court of First Instance which complaint was prepared by
the Respondent Judge as counsel for the plaintiffs.

During the pendency of the civil case, complainant asked respondent judge to allow her to withdraw P1,500.00 from the
P3,500.00 she had deposited with him as she was then in need of money, but no action was taken by respondent. The
verbal request was followed by a registered letter advising Judge Bercacio that complainant herein was withdrawing the
amount of P3,500.00 deposited with him and requesting him to remit the said amount within ten days from receipt of the
letter. There was still no response from respondent Judge, hence, another letter was sent dated February 21, 1973. Still,
as the letter elicited no reaction from the Judge, complainant sought the assistance of a lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo A. Madrid,
who accordingly wrote to respondent Judge, giving the latter a final period of grace within which to return the sum of
P3,500.00, otherwise proper measures would be taken to protect the interests of his client. Respondent finally broke his
silence and answered with a letter, but the money was still not remitted. Atty. Madrid filed with the CFI an urgent motion
praying that Judge Bercacio be directed to consign in court the amount deposited with him by the plaintiff, Mrs. Añonuevo.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and issued an order directing Judge Bercacio to deposit with
the Clerk of Court the amount of P3,500.00 within five (5) days from receipt of the order. After receiving the Order,
respondent Judge turned over the amount to Atty. Rodolfo Madrid.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge should be held liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge

RULING: YES.
1. Respondent violated Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which provides in part: All provisions relative
to the observance of office hours and the holding of sessions applicable to courts of first instance shall likewise apply to
municipal judges, but the latter may, after office hours and with the permission of the district judge concerned, engage in
teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law ...

and which was implemented by Circular No. 37 of the Secretary of Justice dated June 22, 1971 to the effect that: “...no
Municipal Judge shall ... engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients…”
PALE DIGESTS - 3S
Respondent submits that it was Atty. Berango and not he who assisted the complainant, as counsel in the civil case.
Respondent's claim is belied, however, by the active interest he took in the case of Mrs. Añonuevo manifested as follows:
(a) He gave Mrs. Añonuevo legal advice on the remedy available to her and her co-owners with regards to the property
sold to Alfredo Ong. (b) He accepted from Mrs. Añonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the property
from the vendee, plus P100.00 for incidental expenses; (c) He wrote to Alfredo Ong for and in behalf of Mrs. Añonuevo
and her co-owners offering to redeem the land in question (d)He caused the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4591
(e) He was present together with Atty. Berango at the pre-trial, and although, as he claims, it was Atty. Berango who
made an appearance for that pre-trial, the trial Judge nonetheless took note of respondent's presence so that the Order
dictated on that occasion reads: "Attys. Berango and Bercacio are notified of the date of the trial." Moreover, it was
respondent Judge who dealt with her all along in connection with the conduct of her case. This is borne out by the letter
of Atty. Berango asking respondent to collect from Mrs. Añonuevo the amount of P500.00 as his attorney's fees and the
fact that respondent invited Mrs. Añonuevo to a conference in his office to discuss the matter with Atty. Berango. If Atty.
Berango indeed was the lawyer of Mrs. Añonuevo, why did he have to seek the intervention of respondent to collect his
attorney's fees and why did respondent have to call Mrs. Añonuevo to his office for that purpose?

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court proceedings but also includes
preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the
same, etc. Hence, even if we were to accept respondent's explanation that it was Atty. Berango who represented Mrs.
Añonuevo and her co-plaintiffs in court, respondent's actuations as noted above still fall within the prohibition.

The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid the evil of possible use of the
power and influence of his office to affect the outcome of a litigation where he is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons
of public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges are expected to conduct themselves in such a manner as to preclude
any suspicion that they are representing the interests of a party litigant.

2. Respondent's failure to return the amount of P3,500.00 to herein complainant upon her demand is highly reproachable,
to say the least. Mrs. Añonuevo gave to respondent for purposes of redeeming the property sold by Mrs. Añonuevo's co-
owners. When Alfredo Ong refused the extra-judicial offer of redemption, respondent should have either returned the
money to Mrs. Añonuevo or consigned it in court.

Respondent contends that he kept the money because he wanted it ready for payment to the vendee should the complaint
for redemption prosper. The explanation of respondent fails to convince Us of his good faith. Even if we were to concede
that his intention in keeping the money was to have it ready at any time for payment to Alfredo Ong should the civil case
prosper, nevertheless, when complainant herein made demands on him, verbal as well as written, to return the money,
he should have immediately turned it over to complainant to forestall or erase any possible suspicion that he had spent
it; or he could have deposited it in court, anyway, his purpose, as he said, was to keep the money available at all times.

Respondent's obstinate refusal or failure to accede to complainant's request for almost a year led the latter to secure the
services of another counsel. Instead of delivering the amount, respondent still held it putting up the excuse in a letter to
Atty. Madrid that the money did not belong entirely to Mrs. Añonuevo and that the latter had agreed to his keeping the
money during the pendency of the case. That of course was untrue, because, first, there was nothing in the record to
show that the P3,500.00 belonged to persons other than Mrs. Añonuevo from whom respondent received it, and secondly,
it was Mrs. Añonuevo who had personally been asking all along for the return of said amount. It is to the discredit of
respondent that it took a court order for him to return complainant's money to Atty. Madrid. While the Court does not make
a categorical finding that respondent made use of the money deposited with him, nonetheless, We hold that by his
actuations, respondent placed his honesty and integrity under serious doubt.

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself
at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public
that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. To a certain degree, respondent herein failed to meet these
exacting standards of judicial conduct.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, We find respondent Judge Bonifacio B. Bercacio guilty as charged, and hereby
suspend him from office for a period of six (6) months effective immediately upon finality of this decision, with the warning
that commission of other acts unbecoming of a Judge will warrant a more severe penalty from the Court.
So Ordered.
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Case #19 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: RE: ELMO S. ABAD vs. ELMO S. ABAD

A. M. No. 139 DATE: October 11, 1984

PONENTE: Abad Santos, J.

DOCTRINE: A person not authorized to practice law opens himself to drastic disciplinary action in case of any further
practice of law.

FACTS: On March 28, 1983, this Court held respondent ELMO S. ABAD in contempt of court for unauthorized practice
of law.

On May 5, 1983, Atty. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a motion to circularize to all Metro Manila Courts the fact that
Elmo S. Abad is not authorized to practice law. Mr. Abad opposed it. He denied the allegations in the Motion that he had
been practicing law even after the Court's Decision of March 28, 1983.

Because the Motion and the Opposition raised a question of fact, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to conduct an
investigation. The complainant presented the records in Criminal Cases Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086, entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Antonio S. Maravilla, Jr., et al." Complainant also testified that on December 8, 1983 saw respondent
Abad pass by in coat and tie and because he knew that Mr. Abad had been declared as a non-lawyer in its decision of
March 28, 1983, he complainant got curious and followed respondent and saw the latter enter the sala of Branch 100 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; that he saw him there, and after about twenty minutes, he saw respondent in
the place of the said court where the lawyers were supposed to be seated. The Clerk of Court concluded that the
documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the report of the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still
practicing law despite the decision of the Court of March 28, 1983.

The Clerk of Court makes the following recommendations:

a. imposed a fine of P2,000.00 payable within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution or an imprisonment of twenty
(20) days in case of non-payment thereof, with warning of drastic disciplinary action of imprisonment in case of any further
practice of law after receipt of this resolution; and

b. debarred from admission to the Philippine Bar until such time that the Court finds him fit to become such a member.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent should be penalized for improper activities.

RULING: Yes. The Court finds the Report to be in order and its recommendations to be well-taken. However, the latter
are not sufficiently adequate in dealing with the improper activities of the respondent.

The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath, that he signed documents and that he
made appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury.
The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the respondent as counsels for Antonio S. Maravilla
one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Atty.
Jacobe should be called to account for his association with the respondent.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, Elmo S. Abad is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P12,000.00 within ten (10) days
from notice, failing which he shall be imprisoned for twenty (20) days. He is also warned that if he persists in the
unauthorized practice of law he shall be dealt with more severely.

The Court Administrator is directed to circularize all courts in the country that the respondent has not been authorized to
practice law. A copy of the circular should be sent to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to file with the City Fiscal of Manila an appropriate complaint for false testimony against the
respondent.

Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for
collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.
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Case #20 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: CARMEN E. BACARRO v. RUBEN M. PINATACAN

G.R. NO: Adm. Case No. 559-SBC DATE: January 31, 1984

PONENTE: GUERRERO, J.

DOCTRINE:
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of good moral
character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession,
and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are
known to be honest and to possess good moral character.

FACTS:
This is an administrative case filed on September 2, 1975 by Carmen E. Bacarro charging Ruben M. Pinatacan a 1975
successful Bar candidate, with moral turpitude and depravity, and lack of proper character required of a member of the
Bar, preventing the latter from taking the lawyer’s oath.

The evidence for the complainant tends to establish the following: After about a year of courtship, she and respondent
became sweethearts while they were students at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City. They had their first
sexual intercourse on March 21, 1971, after respondent made promises of marriage, and they eloped to Cebu City where
they stayed for about a week. They returned to CDO and respondent left complainant allegedly to see his parents in his
hometown and make the necessary arrangements for their intended marriage. Respondent came back but only to inform
complainant that they could not get married because of his parents' objections. When complainant told respondent that
she was pregnant, he told her to have an abortion. Complainant refused and they had a quarrel. Thereafter, she did not
see or hear from respondent until after the birth of their baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan on December
4, 1971. Complainant had no other boyfriend or sweetheart during the time that she had a relationship with respondent.
In July 1973, she brought the child with her to see respondent in Cavite City and the latter promised to support the child.
However, respondent did not make good his promise of support so complainant went to see him again, and once more
respondent made several promises, all of which were never fulfilled, until he finished his law course and married a singer
by the name of Annie Sarabillo. In a Motion to Dismiss, respondent argued that based on the evidence adduced by
complainant and even assuming her averments to be true, no case had been made out to bar him from taking the lawyer's
oath.

By Resolution of October 11, 1979, this Court required respondent, "as proof of his sincerity and good faith, to
acknowledge and recognize in a public document duly notarized and registered in the local civil registrar's office his
paternity over the child Maria Rochie and send the original thereof to the complainant and a duplicate copy to this Court
within ten (10) days after notice hereof. On October 19, 1979, respondent submitted proof of his compliance with the
above Resolution.

ISSUE: WON respondent should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

RULING: Yes.

One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of good moral
character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession,
and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are
known to be honest and to possess good moral character. "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen". He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law,
but also for his clean living. Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar
examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of becoming a member of the Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which
has the power, jurisdiction and duty to pass upon the qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for admission
to the Bar, that he has measured up to that rigid and Ideal standard of moral fitness required by his chosen vocation.

We hold that herein respondent Pinatacan had failed to live up to the high moral standard demanded for membership in
the Bar. He had seduced complainant into physically submitting herself to him by promises of marriage. He even eloped
with her and brought her to another place. He got her pregnant and then told her to have an abortion. When complainant
refused, he deserted her. Complainant had to track him down to ask him to help support their child born out of wedlock,
and during the few times that she was able to see him, respondent merely made promises which he apparently did not
intend to keep. On top of all these, respondent had the audacity and impudence to deny before this Court in a sworn
Affidavit the paternity of his child by complaint.
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These acts taken together certainly do not speak well of respondent's character and are indicative of his moral
delinquency. All the years that he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer were truly well-deserved. Nevertheless,
eight (8) years could be punishment and retribution enough. Moreover, considering that respondent has legally
recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to
give financial support to the said child, We hold that he has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now
prepared to turn over a new leaf.

In allowing respondent to take the lawyer's oath, he must be admonished that his admission to and continued membership
in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria
Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, respondent Ruben M. Pinatacan is hereby allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
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Case #21 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: Re: Petition of Al Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath

B.M. 712 DATE: March 19, 1997

PONENTE: Padilla, J.

DOCTRINE: A bar passer who was previously convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide due to death of a
neophyte in hazing may later be allowed to be admitted to the Bar if he shows sufficient evidence of good moral character
(i.e. Certifications from senators/trial court judges/members of religious orders; establishment of scholarship foundation
in honor of the hazing victim).

FACTS:Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar exams in 1993. But SC deferred his oath taking due to his previous
conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide which arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Al and 7 other accused plead guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. RTC sentenced them to imprisonment of from 2y4m1d to 4y. On June 18, 1993, RTC then granted Al’s
application for probation. On April 11, 1994, the probation officer recommended Al’s discharge from probation. on April
14, 1994, Al filed in SC a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath based on his discharge from probation.

As evidence of good moral character, Al submitted 15 certifications/letters executed by, among others, 2 senators, 5 trial
court judges, and 6 members of religious orders. He also submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been
established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, thru joint efforts of the latter’s family and the 8 accused. SC
required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul Camaligan, to comment on the petition. Atty. Camaligan says that he has
forgiven Al and his co-accused but leaves it to SC’s discretion to determine whether Al is morally fit for admission to the
bar.

ISSUE: Whether Al Argosino may now be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath considering his discharge from probation, the
certifications, and his participation in establishing the scholarship fund.

RULING: YES.
The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for
admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible and uncalled for. But after careful evaluation of the case, we
resolve to allow Al to take the lawyer’s oath. Al is not inherently of bad moral fiber. He is a devout catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and public service. SC is persuaded that Al has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer
should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the CPR, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the
lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
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Case #22 TOPIC: Introduction and Admission to Practice

CASE TITLE: COLLANTES vs RENOMERON

A.C. No. 3056 DATE:August 16, 1991

PONENTE:

DOCTRINE: The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court;), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no
man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action.

FACTS: This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T.
Collantes, counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc., filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of
Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163
pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision.

Although V & G complied with the requirements, respondent suspended the registration pending compliance by V & G
with a certain "special arrangement". Respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163
registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane
ticket for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece.

Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money, respondent imposed additional requirements. Fed up with the
respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter challenging him to act on all pending applications of
V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.

Respondent formally denied registration on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were
ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that
for about 15 years, a sum of more than 2,000 same set of documents have been registered in the office of the register of
deeds and it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same tenor have
been denied registration.

Respondent elevated the matter to the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NLTDRA) (now the [LRA]). The NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. However, respondent
continued to sit on the registration.
Thus, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA administrative charges , against respondent Register of Deeds.

After due investigation of the charges, Secretary of Justice Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct. As
recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President Aquino dismissed the respondent from the government service.
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this
Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent may also be disciplined by this court as a lawyer for his malfeasance as a public
official.

RULING: Yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:

A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He
thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the
proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the
law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as
moral character.
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Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound
servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty
is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader.

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks
(Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees
to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly
having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of
their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for
any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have demonstrated his
unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the
Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
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Case #23 TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duties to Society

CASE TITLE: Montecillo vs. Gica

G.R. NO: L-36800 DATE: October 21, 1974

PONENTE: Esguerra, J.

DOCTRINE: Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the
court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect.

FACTS:
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the
latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo and a case for damages
arising from the same incident. Montecillo was acquitted in the criminal case. In the civil case, the Cebu City Court found
that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered
judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as
compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs. Francisco then appealed from the
decision until it reached the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the decision and ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the
ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail
over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica".
The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as
damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved
for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo
that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration,
iit observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it
abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and
abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration.
Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another
threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines,
particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the
proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines.
The Appellate Court then, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days why
he should not be punished for contempt of court. Respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that
the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of
the course of action he would follow. On the same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the
Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof,
and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the cas. Not content
with that move, respondent then sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded
them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a
decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if
provoked.
The Court then, in its Resolution, directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the
Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for
reconsideration requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need
for further investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be
deemed submitted for decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of suspension of Atty. del Mar from the practice of law should be affirmed

RULING:
Yes. Second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which
he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic
institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. Criminal contempt has been defined
as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing
the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.

We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter conspiracy or
connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of the accused, and
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implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's
acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an
attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a
member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two
highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they
acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of
the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense
cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He
repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without
realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice.
He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not
accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended
from the practice of law until further orders of this Court.
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Case #24 TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duties to Society

CASE TITLE: In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Gutierrez

G.R. NO: L-363 DATE: July 31, 1962

PONENTE: Makalintal, J.

DOCTRINE: Conditional pardon merely remitted the unexecuted portion of respondent’s term and does not reach the
offense itself. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the legal profession.

FACTS:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945.In a criminal
case before the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former
municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. After serving
a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The
unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of
the Philippines."

Subsequently, the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified complaint before
this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Under section 5
of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason
of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude"
includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment
aforecited

RULING:

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of
his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all
offense by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United States." Respondent
Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense.
The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his
official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral
turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral
fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation
but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered
after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in
Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

Note:

Reliance is placed by Atty. Gutierrez squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy
and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held:
"When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment,
it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of
the attorney after the pardon has been granted."

It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court proceeded on the
assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
Pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez
has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
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Case #25 TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duties to Society

CASE TITLE: De Ysasi v NLRC

G.R. NO:104599 (231 SCRA 173) DATE: March 11, 1994

PONENTE: J. Regalado

DOCTRINE: Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.”

FACTS:

Petitioner Jon De Ysasi III is the son of private respondent Jon De Ysasi and was employed by the latter as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucai in Negros Occidental. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation
for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent’s auditor and legal adviser,
as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.

Petitioner thereafter filed a case of illegal dismissal against private respondent which was later dismissed by the
NLRC. It held that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but
ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said
termination of employment to the DOLE.

ISSUE:
WON the counsel of the parties are remiss in their duties as an attorney?

RULING:

YES. The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court
and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients’ respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not
more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in
consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the
useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life.
He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct
of litigation.”

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall encourage his client
to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.” On this point, we find that both counsel herein
fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show
that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their
acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in
the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.

DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. Private
respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or
deduction,[58] and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction
of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
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Case #26 TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duties to Society

CASE TITLE: Pajares v. Abad Santos

G.R. NO: L-29543 DATE: Nov. 29, 1969

PONENTE: TEEHANKEE, J.

DOCTRINE: The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets
with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary
action.

FACTS: Private Respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Petitioner Gloria Pajares before the Municipal Court of Manila
for recovery of a certain sum of money. Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, that defendant ordered from the
plaintiff quantities of ready made goods and delivered to her in good condition and same were already sold, but did not
make the full payment up to the present time and that defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P354.85,
representing the balance of her account as the value of the said goods, which is already overdue and payable. Instead
of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares, however, moved for a bill of particulars praying the inferior court
to require the Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the kinds of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said
company, the respective dates they were taken and by whom they were received as well as their purchase prices, alleging
that without this bill she would not be able to meet the issues raised in the complaint. The inferior court denied the motion
of Gloria Pajares for a bill of particulars. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied too by the said court, she
then brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging in support of her petition that in
denying her motion for a bill of particulars, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion. Udharam Bazar &
Co. filed a motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of certiorari. Convinced that the said motion of the company is well
founded, the lower court accordingly dismissed the petition. Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been
similarly denied by the court below, Gloria Pajares undertook the present appeal to this Court, contending under her lone
assignment of error to maintain her such appeal that the lower court erred in dismissing her petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner-appellant’s lawyer properly performed his duty to the society?

RULING: NO. The circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to
delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time
that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases.

It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was committed by respondent judge in
denying appellant's motion for a bill of particulars in the collection case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila. It was
improper for appellant, through her counsel, to insist on her motion that appellee as plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars,
specifying therein in detail the goods represented by the alleged amount of P354.85, giving the dates and invoice numbers
on which they were delivered to the defendant, the amount due on each such invoice and by whom they were received.
These particulars sought all concerned evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope of Rule 12, section 1 of the
Rules of Court which permits a party "to move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not
averred with sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable him to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial.”

Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the business of buying and selling merchandise at her stall at the Sta. Mesa
Market, Quezon City, and appellee was one of her creditors from whom she used to buy on credit ready made goods for
resale, appellant had no need of the evidentiary particulars sought by her to enable her to prepare her answer to the
complaint or to prepare for trial. These particulars were just as much within her knowledge as appellee's. She could not
logically pretend ignorance as to the same, for all she had to do was to check and verify her own records of her outstanding
account with appellee and state in her answer whether from her records the outstanding balance of her indebtedness
was in the sum of P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount. The record shows, furthermore, that a month
before appellee filed its collection case, it had written appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her outstanding
account in the said sum of P354.85 within one week. Appellant, through her counsel, wrote appellee under date of March
23, 1962, acknowledging her said indebtedness but stating that "Due to losses she has sustained in the operation of her
stall, she would not be able to meet your request for payment of the full amount of P354.85 at once.

Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven years. Had appellant been but
prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to
discharge her lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of filing fees in the Court of
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First Instance, premiums for her appeal bond, appellate court docket fees, printing of her appellant's brief, and attorney's
fees would have been much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled
with the same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after having spent uselessly much more than the amount in
litigation in this worthless cause.

The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious
cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides
that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly
admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and petitioner-appellant's counsel shall pay
treble costs in all instances. This decision shall be noted in the personal record of the attorney for petitioner-appellant in
this Court for future reference. So ordered.
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Case #27 TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duties to Society

CASE TITLE: People v. Rosqueta

G.R. NO: L-36138 DATE: January 31, 1974

PONENTE: Fernando, J.

DOCTRINE: Respondent should be aware that even in those cases where counsel de parte is unable to secure from
appellants the amount necessary to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his connection with the case.
It has been a commendable practice of some members of the bar under such circumstances, to be designated as counsel
de oficio. In the pursuance of the duty owed this Court as well as to a client, he cannot be too casual and unconcerned
about the filing of pleadings. It is not enough that he prepares them; he must see to it that they are duly mailed.

FACTS: The Supreme Court required respondent Gregorio B. Estacio, counsel de parte for appellants (Antonio
Rosqueta, Jr., Eusebio Rosqueta, and Citong Bringas) to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against
him for failure to file the brief for appellants within the reglementary period. He failed to show cause and was suspended
from the practice of law. He filed a motion for reconsideration wherein it appeared that he did seek to explain his failure
to file the brief on time, but he left it to be mailed with Antonio Rosqueta, Sr., father of appellants Antonio and Eusebio,
who, however, was unable to do so as his house caught fire. He only came to know of said fact until the preparation of
his motion for reconsideration. Estacio also stressed that the appellants informed him they would withdraw the appeal as
they could not raise the money needed for pursuing it. The Court required appellants to comment on a motion for
reconsideration of respondent concerning specifically their alleged desire to withdraw appeal while the two of them were
in the Penal Colony in Davao and the third in the Ihawig Penal Colony in Palawan. Thereafter, there was a motion of
respondent submitting two affidavits, one from Antonio and Bringas, and the other from Eusebio Rosqueta wherein they
indicated their consent and approval to respondent’s motion to withdraw appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent faithfully observed his duty as counsel to his client, and to represent the poor and the
oppressed in the prosecution of their claims or the defense of their rights, to absolve him from his misconduct

RULING: Respondent’s liability is thus mitigated but he cannot be absolved from the irresponsible conduct of which he
is guilty. Respondent should be aware that even in those cases where counsel de parte is unable to secure from
appellants the amount necessary to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his connection with the case.
It has been a commendable practice of some members of the bar under such circumstances, to be designated as counsel
de oficio. That way the interest of justice is being served. Appellants will then continue to receive the benefits of advocacy
from one who is familiar with the facts of the case. What is more, there is no undue delay in the administration of justice.
Lawyers of such category are entitled to commendation. They manifest fidelity to the concept that law is a profession and
not a mere trade with those engaged in it being motivated solely by the desire to make money. Respondent’s conduct
yields a different impression. What has earned a reproof however is his irresponsibility. He should be aware that in the
pursuance of the duty owed this Court as well as to a client, he cannot be too casual and unconcerned about the filing of
pleadings. It is not enough that he prepares them; he must see to it that they are duly mailed. Such inattention as shown
in this case is inexcusable. At any rate, the suspension meted on him under the circumstances is more than justified. It
seems, however, that well-nigh five months had elapsed. That would suffice alone for his misdeed.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the suspension of Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is lifted. The requirement to file the
brief is dispensed with but Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is censured for negligence and inattention to duty. Likewise, as
prayed for by appellants themselves, their appeal is dismissed.
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Case #28 TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duties to Society

CASE TITLE: Felisa P. De Roy and Virgilio Ramos v Court of Appeals, Luis Bernal, Sr. , et. Al

G.R. NO:GR No. 80718 DATE: January 29, 1988

PONENTE: Cortes, J.

DOCTRINE: It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.

FACTS:

The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the
family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
The RTC found the petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. The CA affirmed
in toto, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to le an
appeal, petitioners led a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied
by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

Hence, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari, seeking to declare the resolutions of the CA null and void.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing
to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of
Appeals was promulgated.

ISSUE:
Whether the Habaluyas Decision may be applied in the case at bar

RULING: YES.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in
active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications
as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: The Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.
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Case #29 TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duties to Society

CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE JUDGE HERNAND PINEDA of the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte; and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO and RUFINO BORRES

G.R. NO: L-26222 DATE: July 21, 1967

PONENTE: Sanchez, J.

DOCTRINE: A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal
information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at
hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of
the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work
against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof.

FACTS: Pugaan City, Iligan – While the occupants of the home of Sps. Tefilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de
Mendoza were asleep, guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside
the house. Teofilo died. Thereafter, the assailants entered the house and let loose several more shots killing all the minor
children of the Sps while also wounding Valeriana.

Five criminal cases were filed against defendants (i.e. four murder cases and one frustrated murder case). The
defendants Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo moved to consolidate the cases, which was granted by the trial court
presided by respondent Judge Hernando Pineda. Four of the criminal cases were also “dropped from the docket”. The
following arguments were raised accordingly
· Defense: The acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not
by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse xxx; and that only one information for multiple
murder should be filed”.
o In relation thereto, one of the issues raised was the possibility that the real intent of the culprits was
to commit robbery, and that the acts constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were
committed in pursuance thereof. If so true, the case would fall within the ambit of Art. 48 of RPC
treating complex crimes. Accordingly, the defense claimed that the crime should have been complex
crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide, and not separate cases of murder
and frustrated murder. This claim was based on an affidavit of one of the witnesses.
· Prosecution: The fiscal did not see fit to give weight to the said affidavit. Moreover, the facts that more than
one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed belied the claim that
the said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse.

ISSUE: Should there be one information, either for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex
crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five indictments remain as they are? --
which is determinative of WON the Fiscal gravely abused his discretion

RULING: A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly performed. If the Fiscal has
not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain personal properties (transistor radio and money)
were taken away by the culprits after the shooting, we are not to jettison the prosecutor's opinion thereon. The Fiscal
could have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there is the grave problem of proving the elements of that offense -
robbery. For another, the act could have been but a blind to cover up the real intent to kill. Appropriately to be noted
here is that all the informations charged evident premeditation. With ponderables and imponderables, we are reluctant
to hazard a guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal's action. We are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has
abused his discretion.

A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where
he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a
different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But
we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In
case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily
swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process - the sporting idea of fair play -
may be transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope, this Court made the pronouncement that "it is very logical that
the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be
filed and cannot be controlled by the offended party.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the orders of
respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set and declared null and void, and, in consequence,
the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders;
and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248,
1249 and 1250 as they were commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.
Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rutino Borres. So ordered.
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Case #30 TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duties to Society

CASE TITLE: People vs. Madera

G.R. NO: L-35133 DATE: May 31, 1974

PONENTE: Fernandez, J.

DOCTRINE: The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice
is done.

FACTS: At about 2AM of April 20, 1970, three men barged at the doorstep of the victim’s house Elino Bana in Gabaldon,
Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the first rung of the stairs, fired shots at Elino Bana who was then sleeping on the
floor of his house. Two gunshot wounds were inflicted on Elino Bana, one of which was fatal.

The gunman and the two other men with him were identified as Raymundo Madera, and Marianito Andres and Generoso
Andres, respectively. The victim’s dying declaration positively identified Madera as the gunmen, and testimonies of two
other witnesses categorically declared that Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera at the time,
although no other incriminating fact were alleged to have been done by the latter two, except or their mere presence in
the crime scene. All three were charged with murder, and were all convicted by the lower court.

However, during the appeal stage, the Office of the Solicitor General recommended the acquittal of Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres.

ISSUE: Whether it was proper for the OSG to recommend acquittal.

RULING: YES. The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when the latter fired shots at
Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera did, there being no proof whatsoever of any conspiracy among the
three appellants. They were not armed. They did nothing to help Madera. Their mere passive presence at the scene of
the crime did not make them liable either as co-principals or accomplices. This is good a time as any to emphasize upon
those in charge of the prosecution of criminal cases that the prosecutor's finest hour is not when he wins a case with the
conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when, overcoming the advocate's natural obsession for victory, he stands
up before the Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to
prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,
Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for having correctly recommended the acquittal
of the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the appellant
Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against him; and it is hereby reversed as regards
appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are hereby acquitted of the crime
charged with proportionate costs de oficio. Their immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless they are
held for another legal cause.
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Case #31 TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duties to Society

CASE TITLE: JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE TEOFANIS BONJOC, OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and
MARIANO BARTIDO
vs.
JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban
City, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO: L-41213-14 DATE:October 5, 1976

PONENTE: ANTONIO, J.

DOCTRINE:
[S]ince the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the
private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that
of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal
proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to seek the annulment of respondent’s orders
denying petitioners' motion for respondent Judge to disqualify or to inhibit himself from hearing and acting upon their
Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration and the transfer of petitioners to New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa.

The Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, averred that they are persuaded that there are sufficient
bases to show that respondent Judge "appeared to have been heedless of the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to
trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or
prejudgment" as it was discovered that respondent met (a) kept improper contact with and was illegally influenced by
Larrazabals, the family of the deceased victims Feliciano and Francisco, (b) received two bottles of whisky and another
bottle of wine wrapped in a “thick” and “bulky” newspaper from Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, (c) changing an already prepared
decision after meeting with the mayor and literally copying the memorandum of the prosecution in such decision. The
Solicitor General and recommended that the case be remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision by
another trial judge. Private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the
respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not private prosecutor may have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and
to recommend that the trial should not be remanded to the trial court

(2) Whether or not respondent judge violated his duty to be impartial and appear impartial and thus should be ordered to
desist from further proceeding with the case

RULING:
(1) No. Prosecuting officer "is the representative not of. an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.

The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended parts, with respect to the civil action
for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil action or reserves to institute it separately. [T]he "intervention
of the offended party or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions
of Section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal."

It is evident under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the
Solicitor General", therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People of
the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to
take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction
and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.

(2) Yes. It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and impartially without
regard to persons or their circumstances or the opinions of men. A judge, according to Justice Castro, now Chief Justice
of this Court, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due
process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty, of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity.
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Thus, it has always been stressed that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For
"impartiality is not a technical conception, It is a state of mind" and, consequently, the "appearance of impartiality is an
essential manifestation of its reality.

It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial service, hence, the question as to whether or not
he should be disqualified from further proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases has already become moot.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands the case to the trial court in
order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis
of the evidence. No Special pronouncement as to costs.
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Case #32 TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duties to Society

CASE TITLE: PEOPLE v. SENDAYDIEGO

G.R. NO: G.R. Nos. L-33252-54 DATE: January 20, 1978

PONENTE: AQUINO, J.

DOCTRINE: Private prosecutors may appear in criminal cases “under the direction and control of the fiscal” and that “the
provincial fiscal shall represent the province in any court.”

FACTS: In these 3 cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio P.
Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson, an employee of Carried
Construction Supply Co., and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used 6 forged provincial
vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.

Samson used to be an employee of the provincial treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing
business with the provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co.

The 6 forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by Samson. He delivered
the papers to the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's office, for recording and for her signature. Thereafter, Samson
brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. A laborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the
vouchers and payrolls, recorded the vouchers.

The laborer said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson brought them to the bookkeeper of
the provincial treasurer's office, for processing and for the latter's signature. From the bookkeeper’s office, Samson hand-
carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked a clerk to record the same.

Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer, to initial the vouchers. After Rosete had
initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where the amounts covered by the vouchers were
paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co.

Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph
3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure because the interested
party, Samson, who hand-carried the vouchers, approached Rosete after Samson had conferred with the provincial
treasurer. Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher because it was areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had
already signed the voucher.

In connection with the 6 vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with malversation through
falsification. After trial, the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit, and found Sendaydiego and Samson guilty as
principals of malversation through falsification of public or official documents. Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to the
SC.

In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not necessary to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the
imposition of reclusion perpetua. In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing
private prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case, thereby allegedly subjecting the accused to
proceedings marked by undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political self- interest.
On the other hand, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "in fairness to the accused, in
the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delicadeza" because he had conducted the preliminary investigation (P.I.).

ISSUES:
(1) W/N private prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo are allowed to prosecute the case.
(2) W/N Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself.

RULING: (1) YES. Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board, actually handled the prosecution of
the case from the preliminary investigation up to the termination of the trial.

At the commencement of the P.I., the counsel for the accused auditor inquired whether Atty. Millora was authorized by
the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty.
Millora replied that there was a board resolution designating him as private prosecutor.

At the commencement of the trial, the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal, and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor,
appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the
examination subject to the fiscal's control and supervision.” The trial court granted the motion. At the hearing, the same
city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and
control. The trial court granted the motion.

Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rule that the criminal action
should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that "the provincial fiscal shall represent the
province" in any court (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec. 1683, Revised Administrative Code).
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The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality. The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary.
The unassailable probative value of the documents involved, rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on
which the trial court anchored the judgment of conviction.

(2) NO. Our searching study of the record fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by the fact that
the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the case and convicted him. Judge Bello
tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he had already prejudged their guilt.

Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, in allowing a CFI to conduct a P.I., does not disqualify it from trying the case
after it had found probable cause and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information.
The rule assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the case on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they would invariably be
ironbound by their findings at the preliminary investigation.

The case of a Judge of the CFI, who conducts a preliminary investigation and then tries the case on the merits, is similar
to a situation where an inferior court conducts a preliminary investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within
the concurrent jurisdiction of the CFI and the inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating the
preliminary investigation is not obligated (por delicadeza) to remand the case to the CFI for trial. The inferior court has
the option to try the case on the merits. The assumption is that the inferior court can try the case without any ingrained
bias or undue prejudice.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of 6 crimes of falsification of a public document and 6
crimes of malversation.

The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the sum of
P57,048.23. Samson and the said estate are solidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code).
Samson should pay one-half of the costs.
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Case #33 TOPIC: Lawyer’s Duties to Society

CASE TITLE:Misamin vs San Juan

G.R. NO:A.M. No. 1418 DATE:31 August 1976

PONENTE: Fernando, J.

DOCTRINE:
The law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for
malpractice..

FACTS:
Complainant filed charges against Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar’s Bakery, for violation of Minimum Wage Law.
Respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while
he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from
such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government
position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The
respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to
trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies
giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent be held administratively liable.

RULING: No. The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession
notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor
proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately be referred
to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with
complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal
protection to aliens, it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed
for lack of evidence.

The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law.
As far back as in re Tionko, decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The
serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence
against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his
duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to.

Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the
bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living
true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he
possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent
statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien
interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should
refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by hi m
but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take
care that his honor remains unsullied

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is
dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.