Buenavista v.

Garcia

Facts:

In January 1987, Buenavista filed two complaints for rape in the Municipal Trial Court of
Aborlan Palawan , against Samuel M. Ledesma of having raped Gail Buenavista, the 11-year-
old daughter of the complainant. A no bail was recommended but the judge admitted the
accused to bail and directed that he be released from custody.

On August 5, 1988, based on an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party

on July 26, 1988, the day after she was kidnapped, a Motion to Dismiss the rape cases dated
July 4, 1988 was filed by Atty. Edgardo S. Arias, counsel of the accused. The affidavit was
notarized by First Assistant Provincial Fiscal Sesinio B. Belen who certified that lie had
"personally examined the above-named affiant" and that he was "convinced that she voluntarily
executed the foregoing affidavit and understood the contents thereof'.

The complainant has filed an administrative case against Judge Marcelo Garcia with
gross ignorance of the law for dismissing the rape complaints on the basis of the minor's
affidavit of desistance knowing, as he should have known, that an eleven-year old girl is
incompetent to execute such affidavit.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law and for knowingly
issuing an unjust order or judgment?

Held:

After a careful consideration of the complaint and respondent Judge's comment thereon,
we find merit in the complainant's charge that Judge Garcia acted either in gross ignorance of
the law or with malice and deliberate intent to unjustly dismiss the criminal cases against
Samuel Ledesma. As observed by Mr. Justice Campos.
'To be guilty of 'knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,' it is necessary that the
judgment or order was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent to
perpetrate an injustice And the test to determine whether the judgment or order is
unjust, may be inferred from the circumstance that it is contrary to law or is not
supported by evidence. (In re: Rafael C. Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21,
1974; 55 SCRA 107). Judgment may be said to be unjust when it is manifestly
against the law and contrary to the weight of evidence. (Sec. 1, par. [c], Rule 37,
Rules of Court). An unjust judgment is one contrary to the standards of right and
justice or standards of conduct prescribed by the law. (US vs. Oglesby Grocery
 Co., 264 F. 691; Komen vs. City of St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9; 289 S.W. 838).' (p. 4,
Report and Recommendation.)

In view of Judge Garcia's legal backs round as a former Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan in 1985, the Court cannot imagine that he would be ignorant of the law which penalizes
statutory rape (Art. 335, Par. 3, Revised Penal Code) or that he did not know that as the victim's
consent in statutory rape is invalid, it is not a defense (People vs. Gonzales, 58 SCRA 265;
People vs. Celic, 137 SCRA 166). Being incompetent to give valid consent to the rape
committed against her, her consent to the dismissal of the original charge against her rapist is
likewise invalid.

Judge Garcia's allegation that "ample amount" had been paid by the accused to the
complainant to settle the case "during a sort of a conference between the parties in the
chambers of the presiding judge" (Emphasis supplied; p. 13, Rollo) while evidently intended to
impugn the motives of the complainant in prosecuting the rapist and kidnapper of his daughter
has only succeeded in revealing Judge Garcia's improper and immoral intervention in brokering
a compromise of the criminal cases against Ledesma. It is an admission that he is either
ignorant of the rule that criminal cases are not allowed by law to be compromised, and that an
offer of compromise by the accused is an implied admission of guilt (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of
Court), or that he does not know that his participation in such a transaction is unbecoming of a
judge.

Respondent Judge also admitted that the offended party, Gail Buenavista, has never
appeared before him "even for once" (p. 13, Rollo), That circumstance would have aroused
suspicion in a more alert Judge that she was being sequestered by the accused to prevent her
from disowning the letter she supposedly signed in defense of the accused (Annex B, p. 24,
Rollo) and her affidavit of desistance (Annex B-2, p. 17, Rollo).

For all the foregoing, we find respondent Judge Marcelo G. Garcia guilty of serious
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment.
The last is punishable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as follows:

Art. 204. Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in a case submitted
to him for decision shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual disqualification.
 CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS

The Office of the Ombudsman filed for a petition for the forfeiture of the properties
amounting to PhP143,052,015.29 allegedly amassed by then Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia, his wife
Clarita and two children, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193 (Forfeiture Case 1). Another forfeiture
case was subsequently filed to recover funds amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55 docketed as
Civil Case No. 0196 (Forfeiture Case 2), raffled to the 4th Division.

Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB
charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) which placed the value
of the property and funds plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99, docketed as Crim. Case No.
28107, raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.

As per the Sheriff’s return, the corresponding summons involving Forfeiture 1 were
issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention. The SB subsequently issued a
writ of attachment in favor of the Republic. The Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of SB’s lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The SB denied the Motion to
Dismiss and declared the Garcias in default. Despite the standing default order, the Garcias
moved for the transfer and consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were
respectively pending in different divisions of the SB, contending that such consolidation is
mandatory under RA 8249. This motion was denied by the SB. The Garcias filed another motion
to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the
plunder case ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the
consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements. The SB
merely noted the motion.
As regards Forfeiture 2, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his
return, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP
Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of
the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia
acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: “I’m receiving the
copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy – but these copies will not guarantee it being
served to the above-named(sic).”

ISSUE’s

1. Whether the SB has jurisdiction over petitioner despite improper service of summons.
2. Whether the SB has jurisdiction over the forfeiture case despite the filing of the plunder case.

HELD

1. NO. It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be
bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by
and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person. It
is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos
Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof
by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both
Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the
PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being
irregular and defective. The requirements for a valid substituted service of summons are:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service
(2) Specific details in the return
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or
regular place of business.
 From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons
was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not
comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of
summons.

Also, petitioner’s special appearance to question the court’s jurisdiction is not voluntary
appearance. Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have
appeared voluntarily before the court.

2. YES, Petitioner’s posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder
case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by
the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the
corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB
4th Division in its May 20, 2005 resolution, the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise
from the commission of a criminal offense as such liability is based on a statute that safeguards
the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. Secondly, a forfeiture case under
RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus
negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the
forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the
commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. On the other
hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is
the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to
prove how he acquired said properties.
  Merencillio v People

GR No. 142369-70, 13 April 2007

Corona, J.:

FACTS:

        On 13 Sept 1995, Lucit Estollore went to BIR to ask for the computation of taxes due on
the sale of real property to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc. and to apply for a Certificate Authorizing
Registration (CAR).  She was entertained by revenue examiner Lourdes Fuentes who computed
the documentary stamp tax (P37,500) and capital gains tax (P125,000) which was approved by
petitioner Juanito Merencillo, a Group Supervising Examiner of the BIR.  Fuentes advised
Estillore that the CAR would be released after 7 days.

        At around 10am of the same day, upon a call from Fuentes, Maria Angles Ramasola went
to see Merencillo who demanded P20,000 in exchange for the approval of the CAR.  Cesar
replied that she needed to confer with her 2 business associates. 

        The CAR was approved by Revenue District Officer Galahad Balagon on 19 Sept 1995
and was ready for release but the releasing clerk Susan Cabangon told her that she was still
waiting for the go signal to release the same.  Hence, on 22 Sept, Cesar complained to
Balaganon about Merencillo’s refusal to release. 

        Subsequently Cesar received a call from Merencillo again following up his demand.  Fed
up, Cesar sought the help of the Provincial Director of PNP, Sr. Supt. Dionaid Baraguer who
referred the complaint to the Chief of Police of Tagbilaran City  who latter coordinated for the
entrapment of Merencillo.  Cesar was instructed to prepare 2 bundles of bogus money by
putting one P100 bill on each side of each 2 bundles.

        Merencillo was entertaining the visitor when Cesar arrived.  On seeing Cesar, Merencillo
handed the CAR to her and was cued to follow him downstairs.  Cesar handed the envelope
and was asked, “why is this thick?” Before she could answer, a member of the PNP
photographed them.  The PNP entrapment team then introduced themselves to petitioner and
invited him to go with them to their headquarters.  He was charged in violation of RA 3019 and
Art. 210.

        Merencillo denied the charges during trial and that the allegations only existed in Cesar’s
mind after she was told that there was a misclassification of the asset and additional taxes had
to be paid.   The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer 8 years
and 1 month to 15 years of imprisonment.

       Merencillo appealed to Sandiganbayan but was denied.

ISSUES:

W/N the Sandiganbayan erred in refusing to believe Merencillo’s evidence over that of the
prosecution.

W/N Sandiganbayan erred in failing to recognize that Merencillo was placed in double
jeopardy

HELD:
        No.  The Court ruled that both the RTC and Sandiganbayan found the testimonies of the
prosecution sufficient and credible enough to sustain conviction.  Questions of fact cannot
generally be raised for the consideration of this Court. The calibration of evidence and the
relative weight thereof belongs to the appellate court. Its findings and conclusions cannot be set
aside by this Court unless there is no evidence on record to support them.  Moreover, findings
and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy the respect of appellate
courts because trial courts have the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses
as they testify.

        The Court ruled that the inconsistencies referred only to minor details that did not detract
from the truth of the prosecution’s testimonial evidence.  Witnesses testifying on the same event
do not have to be consistent in each and every detail.  Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either
the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony.

        Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the

prosecution’s evidence as a whole or reflect on the witness’s honesty. The test is whether the
testimonies agree on essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and
substantially coincide with each other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole. Thus,
inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime
cannot be successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal.

        No, petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy.  Sec 3 of RA 3019 begins with the
following statement, “In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law…”  One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony
under the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or
subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Revised Penal Code.  There is no double
jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA
3019 and the Revised Penal Code.

        The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is
an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other.  An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those

        Elements of direct bribery [PA-CURE]:

1. The offender is a public officer;

2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with
a view to:
1. committing some crime;
2. in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but
the act must be unjust;
3. refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do.
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.
 LINDA CADIAO-PALACIOS, Petitioner, v.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

[G.R. NO. 168544: March 31, 2009]

FACTS:

Victor S. Venturanza and petitioner Linda Cadiao-Palacios were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019. Petitioner was then
mayor of the Municipality of Culasi, Province of Antique. During her administration, there were
infrastructure projects that were initiated during the incumbency of her predecessor which
remained partially unpaid. The contractor was L.S. Gamotin Construction (L.S. Gamotin) to
which the municipality owed P791,047.00. Grace M. Superficial (Superficial), in behalf of L.S.
Gamotin took charge of the collection of the unpaid billings of the municipality. Sometime in
January 1999, petitioner demanded from Superficial the full payment of her total "kickback"
which should be 10% of the project cost. Superficial thus proposed that she would deliver a
check in lieu of cash, to which petitioner agreed. The following day, Venturanza picked up the
check promised by Superficial as payment for the 10% "kickback."

In their defense, petitioner insisted that she only dealt with the owner of L.S. Gamotin,
Engr. Leobardo S. Gamotin (Engr. Gamotin), relative to the infrastructure projects; thus, she
could have made the demand directly from him and not from Superficial. While, Venturanza
claimed that the said amount (P162,400.00) was received by him in the form of a loan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of Violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019

RULING:

Yes. It is within the discretion of the Sandiganbayan to weigh the evidence presented by
the parties, as well as to accord full faith to those it regards as credible and reject those it
considers perjurious or fabricated. That the petitioner, being a public officer made such a
demand is all that is required by Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, and this element has been
sufficiently established by the testimony of Superficial.

Admittedly, there was no direct evidence showing that petitioner demanded and received
the money but the testimony of Superficial, corroborated by the documentary evidence and the
admissions of the witnesses for the defense, sufficiently establishes that Venturanza received
the money upon orders of petitioner.
 People vs Ong
G.R. No. 137348
June 21, 2004

Facts:

Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the afternoon of
July 23, 1998, a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP
Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit
drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per order of Chief
Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. Once, CI confirmed
the meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped packages
rendered of one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance by the accused Ong
and boodle money placed in a “W. Brown” plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the latter
arrested Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming.

The two (2) accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking sheets
and arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug substance, was
referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for
methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

However, the appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a Chinese
citizen from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), claimed that he came to the Philippines in
1997 to look for a job. Initially, he worked in a pancit factory in Quezon City, but later hunted for
another job, was referred by his friend Kian Ling to Ong Sin for a possible job as a technician in
a bihon factory owned by Sin. Subsequently, without any knowledge of his new job, William Ong
was later taken to the police station and there he met the other accused Ching De Ming for the
first time. He maintained innocence to the crime charged.

On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in
the RTW business. On that same date of the commission of the crime, while waiting for his
girlfriend and her mother, whose mother Avenlina Cardoz, testified in De Ming’s favor and
corroborated with his story, that he was approached by persons unknown to him. He was
misidentified as one of the accused and dragged him out of his car and brought to the other car,
took his clutch bag, then after a few hours, at Camp Crame, they removed his blindfold. He
denied knowing Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New Manila,
Quezon City.

On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them
the penalty of death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos.
However, the case was on automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim
that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

(a) Whether or not the arraignment of appellants violates Rule 116, Section (a) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure?

Held:

The aforementioned provision on Arraignment and Plea provides that (a) The accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The
arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge of clerk by furnishing the accused with a
copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him,
and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.
The trial court held that the arraignment of appellants violated the above rule. Appellants are
Chinese nationals. Their Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the
accusations against them. It does not, however, indicate whether the information was read in
the language or dialect known to them.

Both accused Ong and De Ming were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, and both entered
a plea of not guilty. From the records, it was clear that appellants only knew the Chinese
language, however the appellants were arraigned on an information written in the English
language. The requirement that the information should be read in a language or dialect known
to the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause the of the accusation
against him. The constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules
necessarily nullifies the arraignment. After the arraignment and in the course of the trial, the
lower court had to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter.

Hence, it is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, and he was likewise
the one who closed the deal with accused William Ong, and set the venue and time of the
meeting. Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the court
held that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the “poseur-buyer” but merely the deliveryman. His
testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone
cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.

The buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a
valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. However, to determine whether
there was valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken by the police
officers, in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that
the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and
competent evidence.

In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The
confidential information who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started
and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by
SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same and not part of the buy-bust
operation.

Although, the court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why confidential
informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. Likewise, once the identity of the
informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the
privilege is no longer applicable.

In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer. The
problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing the state interest in
protecting the people from crimes against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. The
balance must be adjusted by giving due weight to the following factors, among others: (1) the
crime charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) the possible significance of the informer’s
testimony, and (4) other relevant factors.

In the present case, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character and can
result in the imposition of the death penalty. The prosecution has to prove all the material
elements of the alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony
of the informer is indispensable. It should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy
high importance in our scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher
significance. Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the alleged confiscated
methyl amphetamine hydrochloride further shattered the case of the prosecution. There is no
crime of illegal sale of regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on whether the substance
confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be regulated drug.

The court decided to reverse and set aside its former decision. Appellants Ong and De Ming @
Tiu are acquitted of the crime of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
and are ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause. 
 Puyat vs De Guzman

Facts:

After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI)
was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC a quo warranto
proceeding, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which
the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could
appear as counsel before any administrative body and SEC was an administrative body.
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman
Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero.
Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez purchase, he filed a motion for
intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said
10 shares.

Issue:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the

SEC case without violating Sec. 14, Art. VI of the Constitution

Ruling:

Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be

said to be appearing as counsel. Apparently, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although
he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the
protection of his ownership of 10 shares in IPI.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman

Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI,
representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them, after the
contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1
day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he
moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero,
but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he
decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has
been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body. In the opinion of the
Court, that is a circumvention of a prohibition provided by Sec. 14, Art. VI of the Constitution.
The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in
some other capacity.
 Hermoso Arriola and Melchor Radan vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 165711
June 30, 2006
FACTS:

Petitioners Brgy. Capt. Hermoso Arriola and Brgy. Chief Tanod Melchor Radan of
Dulangan, Magdiwang, Romblon were convicted as principal and accessory respectively by the
RTC of Romblon, Romblon, of the crime of Malversation of Public Property thru Negligence or
Abandonment.

The said accused have under their custody and control approximately 44 pieces of
illegally sawn lumbers of which were confiscated or recovered by the PNP and DENR personnel
and thereafter turned over the same to accused Arriola which he acknowledged to have
received the same and stockpiled at the backyard of accused Radan’s house, and through
abandonment or negligence, they permitted any other person to take the public property wholly
or partially, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA which referred the same to the public
respondent Sandiganbayan on a finding that the latter has jurisdiction over the case.
Sandiganbayan resolved to dismiss the case due to technicalities. Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was also denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition for certiorari
alleging grave abuse of discretion of the Sandiganbayan in dismissing their appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners Arriola and Radan are accountable officers within the purview
of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to the confiscated items.

HELD:

Yes. His claim that the trial court erred in holding him liable for malversation through
negligence or abandonment lacks merit. To find an accused guilty of Malversation, the
prosecution must prove the following essential elements:

a.] The offender is a public officer;

b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.

An accountable officer under Article 217 is a public officer who, by reason of his office is
accountable for public funds or property. Sec. 101 (1) of the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines (PD No. 1455) defines accountable officer to be every officer of any government
agency whose duties permit or require the possession or custody of government funds or
property and who shall be accountable therefor and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity
with law.

In the determination of who is an accountable officer, it is the nature of the duties which
he performs which is the controlling factor.
 Is petitioner Arriola, who signed as custodian in the seizure receipt for the confiscated
lumber an accountable officer with respect to its loss? Chapter IV, I-E, (4), DENR Primer on
Illegal Logging states that:

If the transfer of the seized forest products to the above places is not immediately
feasible, the same shall be placed under the custody of any licensed sawmill operator or the
nearest local public official such as the Barangay Captain, Municipal/City Mayor, Provincial
Governor or the PC/INP; at the discretion of the confiscating officer taking into account the
safety of the confiscated forest products x x x. In any case, the custody of the forest products
shall be duly acknowledged and receipted by the official taking custody thereof.

Here, Arriola signed the seizure receipt for the confiscated articles. By affixing his
signature, he undertook to safeguard the lumber on behalf of the Government, with a specific
provision stating such obligation in the receipt. Although his usual duties as Barangay Captain
do not ordinarily include the receipt of confiscated articles on behalf of the Government, by
virtue of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging, which had for its basis Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, he may be called on to take custody thereof as the need arises. Furthermore,
by affixing his signature in the seizure receipt which clearly enumerates his obligations as a
custodian therein, he effectively becomes an accountable officer therefor.

The lumber curiously turned up at the Magdiwang cockpit structure where he happens to
be a stockholder. Also, Arriola admitted that he already knew about the missing lumber long
before the DENR officers came back to get it but he did not inform them about its loss because
"somebody advised me not to report because the one who got the lumber might panic and
tuluyan na ang lumber."

With respect to petitioner Radan, the trial court erred in judging him liable as an
accessory.

Art. 19, par.2 RPC defines accessories as those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of
the crime or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove Radan’s liability as
an accessory were neither clear nor convincing. His presence during the time when the DENR
officers turned over the custody of the seized items to Arriola is not enough proof of complicity,
nor the fact that the confiscated lumber was placed behind his father’s house.

SC affirms RTC decision finding petitioner Hermoso Arriola guilty of Malversation of

Public Property thru Negligence or Abandonment. Petitioner Melchor Radan is ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence.

ALBERTO v. DE LA CRUZ
98 SCRA 406 (1980)
Concepcion, J. / alo

FACTS:

Orbita was prosecuted for violating Art. 156 of the RPC by helping Denaque, a prisoner,
to escape while working on the guest house of the provincial jailer, Gov. Cledera. During trial,
counsel filed a motion to include the names of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda, Assistant
Provincial Warden, in the criminal charge against Orbita, believing that the two also helped and
connived in the escape of the prisoner. Respondent judge directed the petitioner (fiscal) to
conduct further investigation. Petitioner found no cause to charge Gov. Cledera and Lt.
Esmeralda. However, upon filing of Orbita of an MR, the respondent judge ruled otherwise and
ordered the inclusion of the names of the two in the criminal charges. Petitioner filed for
recourse. The SC held that Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda cannot be prosecuted under Art.
156 of the RPC since offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who
removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. Since Gov. Cledera as
governor, is the jailer of the province, and Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they
cannot be prosecuted for the escape of Denaque under Article 156 of the RPC. Also, the two
cannot be prosecuted under Art. 223 of the RPC since in order to be guilty under this article, it is
necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner
under his custody or charge. Petition granted.

FACTS:

 Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, escaped while working at the Guest
House of Governor Cledera (Provincial Jailer) on September 12, 1968
 The Governor’s residence at that time is being rented by the province and its
maintenance and upkeep is shouldered by the province of Camarines Sur
 The detainee worked at the Governor’s residence by virtue of an order of the Governor
which was implemented by Lt. Esmeralda (Assistant Provincial Warden). It was the
accused, Eligio Orbita (Provincial Guard), himself who handpicked the group of
prisoners to work at the Governor’s residence on September 12, 1968
 Neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda was charged or entrusted with the
duty of conveying and guarding the detainee from the jail to the residence of the
governor
 In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Orbita, was
prosecuted for the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and punished
under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code
 In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the cross-examination of
Esmeralda, the defense brought forth and confronted the witness with a note purportedly
written by Gov. Armando Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in
the construction of a fence at his house. Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could
not remember who handed the note for him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of
the signature appearing therein and that he was not preszent when the note was made
and signed by Gov. Cledera.
 Believing that the escape of Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to
Esmeralda and that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for which
that accused Eligio Orbita had been charged, the defense counsel filed a motion in court
seeking the amendment of the information so as to include Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda
as defendants therein.
 The respondent Judge, Hon. Rafael Dela Cruz, directed the office of Edmundo Alberto
(Fiscal), within 15 days from date, to cause the further investigation of the case, taking
into consideration the provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the
Revised Penal Code in order to determine once and for all whether the Governor as
jailer of the Province and his assistant have any criminatory participation in the
circumstances of Denaque's escape from judicial custody.
 Since no additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested in Court on January
2, 1970 that "after conducting a reinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and
intelligent analysis of the facts and law involved, no prima facie case against Governor
Cledera and Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be charged.”
 On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for Reconsideration"
praying "that the Order of this Honorable Court dated December 11, 1969 be, in that
instead of ordering the Fiscal to reinvestigate this case, on the basis of the evidence
already adduce during the trial of this case, he be ordered to amend the information on
to include Cledera and Esmeralda it appearing the on record that their inclusion is
warranted.
 Respondent Judge ruled to let the charges be so amended by including in the
information the author or writer of the said note containing orders and the person or
persons who carried out the said orders considering the provisions of Article 156 in
relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal Code.
 The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, 10 but the motion was
denied on February 18, 1970. Hence, the instant recourse.

ISSUE/S:
 1. WON Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda may be prosecuted for the escape of Denaque
under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code (NO)
2. WON Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda may be prosecuted for the escape of Denaque
under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code (NO)

HOLDING:

1. NO. Offenses under Art. 156 of the RPC may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing
a person confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to
escape. To remove means to take away a person from the place of his confinement, with
or without the active compensation of the person released. To help in the escape of a
Person confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished that person with the
material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape.

The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who removes from
jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer
who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of
prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov.
Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the province, and Esmeralda is the assistant
provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under
Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code.

2. NO. In order to be guilty under Art. 223 of the Penal Code, it is necessary that the public
officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or
charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an
essential condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the
prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with
the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime.

For sure no connivance in the escape of Denaque from the custody of the accused
Orbita can be deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five
men to work in the guest house, it appearing that the notes does not mention the names
of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was the accused Orbita
who picked the men to compose the work party.

Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and Esmeralda under
Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code. This article punishes the public officer in whose
custody or charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in
evasion is definite amounting to deliberate non- performance of duty.

DISPOSITIVE: The orders issued on January 26, and February 18, 1970 in Criminal Case
No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, entitled: "The People of the
Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita, accused are hereby annulled and set aside.
The respondent Judge or any other judge acting in his stead is directed to proceed with
the trial of the case. Without costs.

ALFREDO RODILLAS Y BONDOC v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-58652, May 20, 1988
Article 224. Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners

Facts: Alfredo Rodillas is a policeman specially charged with the duty of keeping under his
custody one Zenaida Sacris Andres, a detention prisoner being tried for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
After the hearing, Rodillas allowed Zenaida to have lunch with her husband. While eating,
Zenaida’s husband asked Rodillas if he could accompany his wife to the comfort room as she
was not feeling well and felt like defecating. The accused accompanied Zenaida and a lady
companion to the ladies’ comfort room while he stood guard along the alley facing the door,
without first ascertaining for himself whether said comfort room is safe and without any egress
by which the said detention prisoner could escape.

Not long after, the lady companion of Zenaida came out and told him that she was going to buy
sanitary napkins for Zenaida. After ten minutes elapsed without the lady companion of Zenaida
coming back, the accused entered the comfort room. To his surprise, he found Zenaida no
longer inside the comfort room. He noticed that the window of said comfort room was not
provided with window grills.

Rodillas formally reported the matter to his superior officer at the City Jail. The Sandiganbayan
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner
Thru Negligence under Article 224 of the RPC.

Issue: W/N Rodillas is liable for Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner

Held: Yes. The elements of the crime under Article 224 are: a) that the offender is a public
officer; b) that he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention
prisoner or prisoner by final judgment; and c) that such prisoner escapes through his
negligence.

There is no question that the petitioner is a public officer. Neither is there any dispute as to the
fact that he was charged with the custody of a prisoner who was being tried for a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The only disputed issue is the petitioner’s negligence resulting in the escape of detention
prisoner Zenaida Andres. The negligence referred to is such definite laxity as all but
amounts to a deliberate non-performance of duty on the part of the guard.

It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted negligently and beyond the scope of his
authority when he permitted his charge to create the situation which led to her escape. As a
police officer who was charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation
from his duty was clearly a violation of the regulations.

In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch with the prisoner and her family
when he was supposed to bring his charge to the jail. He even allowed the prisoner and her
husband to talk to each other at the request of a co-officer.

It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary
precautions to assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these
precautions will make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate
non-performance of duty.

The arrangement with a lady friend should have aroused the petitioner’s suspicion because the
only pretext given by the prisoner was that she was going to answer the call of nature. It was,
therefore, unnecessary for her to be accompanied by anyone. Despite this, the petitioner
allowed the two to enter the comfort room without first establishing for himself that there was no
window or door allowing the possibility of escape. He even allowed the prisoner's companion to
leave the premises with the excuse that there was a need to buy sanitary napkins. And he
patiently waited for more than ten minutes for the companion to return. This was patent
negligence on the part of the police officer.
The petitioner further contends that he cannot be convicted because there was no connivance
between him and the prisoner. However, the petitioner is not being charged with conniving
under Article 223 but for evasion through negligence under Article 224. It is, therefore, not
necessary that connivance be proven to hold him liable for the crime of infidelity in the
custody of prisoners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the

Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.

Note: Article 224 of the RPC provides,

“ART. 224. Evasion through negligence. If the evasion of the prisoner shall have taken place
through the negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or custody of the escaping
prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification.”

ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN CASE DIGEST

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:

On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558,
finding probable cause that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the
Philippines has committed the offense of plunder, and that he be prosecuted under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The petitioner contended that RA 7080
was unconstitutional, on the grounds that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable
doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, thus violating the fundamental rights of the
accused. The said law allegedly suffers from vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly:
‘combination’, ‘series’, and ‘unwarranted’. Based on this, the petitioner used the facial challenge
to question the validity of RA 7080.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

2. WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate
crimes of plunder leads to its violation of the right of the accused to due process.
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is
within the power of Congress to classify it as such.
RULE:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.
The over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of a possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.
ANALYSIS:

1. NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the employment of
general terms or the failure to define the terms used therein. The validity of a law is
sustained, so long as that law provides some comprehensible guide as to what would
render those subject to the said law liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on
the void-for-vagueness doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely
consist of imprecise language.
2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Thus he is entitled to an acquittal unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the accused with proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The contention that Sec. 4 of RA 7080 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each and every criminal
act done, it is enough that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the crime as a whole.
3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The legislative
declaration in RA No. 7659 (which has been declared as constitutionally valid in a
previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.

CONCLUSION:

Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.