52

A prequel to
The Desert FOX™
O'Connor vs. Craziani
Game for North Africa
by Steven Copley

On 10 June 1940, Italy declared war on German invasion. The 7th Armored Division to Sofafi and then began work on a metalled
the United Kingdom, thereby opening up had only four battalions instead of its nonnal road up from the frontier. Graziani had no
North Africa and th e Mediterranean as a complement of six; the 4th Indian Division intentions of moving towards Matruh until
theater of operations. Neither side was pre- was short an infantry brigade and an artillery he had a firm base established al Sidi Harrani.
pared for serious warfare. Under Air-Marshal regiment: the New Zealand Division actually The initiative had in effect been given back to
Balbo. the Italians had about a quarter of a amounted to on ly a brigade group. If Grazi- O·Connor.
million men in Libya, far outnumbering the ani was not a man of action. however. O'Connor considered the Italian disposi-
36.0Q0Commonweahh troops in Egypt. How- O'Connor was. On the very first night of the tions. consisting of a fixed forward line con-
(Vcr. many Italian units in Libya were under- war. the I I th Hussars crossed the frontier in a taining a large part of the army at no great
strength. short of equipment (especially trans- raiding oper.ilion. distance from the enemy. to be very unsound .
port) and poorly trained . The artillery. tank From June until August. thc connict Looking at the Italian camps, each out of
units and th e air force had good mordle but consisted primarily of skirmishes. raids. am- supporting distance of the others. O'Connor
much obsolete equipment. Ba lbo planned to bushes and air allacks by Hritish forces . conceived a bold plan: He would penetrate
attack the British in mid-July, but on June Although O'Connor's troops suffered some the gap between the Sofafi and Nibeiwa
28th he was killed shot down by Itulian AA minor reverses. they generally were successful camps. cutting the Italian defenses in two.
gunners as his plane came in to land at and achieved an advantage of initiative over Leaving only Selby Force (a brigade-
Tobruk during a British air raid. To replace the Italians. who more and more felt con- sized formation formed from the Matruh gar-
Balbo, Mussolini appointed Rodolfo Grazi- strained to defend th emselves in tight knots of rison) stand ing between the Italian camps
ani. a soldier with a reputation for offensiye stn:ngth, leaving cont rol of th e open desert to and Matruh. 4th Indian would allad the
spirit. Despite this reputation. won in Italy's the Brit ish patrols. Both generals' efforts were northeastern most camps from behind. while
colonial wars. Graziani became very conscr- meager Graziani's because of his nature. 7th Armored masked Sofafi and then drove
vative when faecd by thc British. He nOI only O'Connor's becausc his resources were so for Buq Huq cutting Italian communications.
postponed the advance into Egypt until Sep- limited. On 2 November. Wavellaccepted O'Connor's
tember. but much worse. he failed to use the Finally in mid-September. under threat plan but only in the form o f authorizing a
three month dclay to any advantage . of sacking unless he took action. Graziani five-day raid. which would be followed by
The Commonwealth forcesalso had their ordered an advance. After a loud bombard- withdrawal to Matruh .
problems. Archibald Wavel1, heading the ment of the empty frontier, the italian Tenth Early on 9 December. the Western Desert
Middle East Command. had appointed Rich- Army began a ponderous march into Egypl. Force fired the opening rounds of the most
ard O'Connor as eommandcrof the Weslern O'Connor did not resis t Gra7.iani. Instead, spectacular offensive the desert was ever to
Desert Force on II June. only two days before the Commonwealth unitsdrewback on Mersa witness. O'Connor rJ.nged the battlefield in
the Italian declaration of war. Besides being Mat ruh. A strong infantry force held the his staff car. encournging and directing his
outnumbered by more than six to one. West- town while the 7th Armored Division pre- su bordinate commanders. The success of the
ern Desert Force was neither organi7.ed nor pared to counterattack from the escarpment British attack was obvious by the end of the
equip ped properly. since most fir~t-line mate- inland. O'Connor was forced to wait for his first day. By the end of I I December, Italian
rial either had been lost in France or was victory. however, for to his disappointment resistance had melted: the men of Gratlani's
being held in Britain pending the expected the Italians SlOpped their advance at Sidi Bar- army were either retreating towards Sol1um
rani. 60 miles into Egypt and still 80 miles or were marching IOwards Matruh as prison-
from theCommonweahh defenses at Matruh. ers. It was on that day that O'Connor learned
Here Graziani spread his army into a semi- that the 4th Indian Division was to be taken
circle of defensive camps reaching inland from his command and scnt to Eritrea . This
raised a problem. The attack had not been a
successful raid. but a major vic tory. O'Con-
nor had ended th e Italian threat to Egy pt .
\. smashed two Italian corps, taken 38.000 pris-
o ners. and captured 73 tanks and 237 guns.
Commonwealth casualties (killed. wounded
and missing) totalled 624. Still. with 4th
Indian Division being withdrawn. sho uld
Western Desert Force. about to be halved in
size. fall back on Matruh per the original
plan? Although this may have been the safe
thing to do, O'Connor was determined 10
pursue the enemy with his remaining forces
- 7th Armored Division and Selby Force.
Using these troops. O'Connor pushed
the Italians across Ihe frontier and on 16
 53

December invested the town of Bardia. Bar- and tactics used wcre similar to those at Bar- 6 February was gray and rainy. By this dismal
dia was garrisoned by clements of four Italian dia. With less men to cover more perimeter, light. the Italians tried to break through the
divisions commanded by General ~Electric Manella was faced with an impossible task. British roadblock. They were stopped by the
Whiskers" Bergon701i. whose message to Within 36 hours of launching the assault, the guns ofthe Royal Horse Artillery. The Italian
Mussollnl had been ~ I n Bardia we are and Allies had captu red Manella, 25.000 prison- forces included 100 tanks but these were
here we slay." Wavell, fond of using hunting ers. and more than 200 gu ns. Once again. the defeated piecemeal by the British forces.
me taphors in telegrams 10 England, had sig- 7th Armored Division was sent west. For Throughout the 6th, only four Italian tanks
na!led " Hunt is still going but first racing O'Connor, use of Tobruk as a supply base escaped past the British defende rs. Early on
burst over, hounds brought to their noses, and source offrcsh \"Iater( I0,(0} tons were stored)
huntsmen must cast and second horses badly was vital to further offensive action.
wanted. It may be necessary to dig this fo;>;.·· Italian defenses now consisted of the
For the assault on Bardia, Wavell had 60th Division at Oerna and General Babini's
given O'Connor the understrength 6th Aus- tank group at Mechili. O'Connor planned to
tralian Division, a fruit perhaps of O'Con- envclop Babini's tanks with armor and then
nor's daring in continuing the pursuit. Al- destroy him with infantry. But on the night of
though supply was a primary concern, O'Con- 26 January, Babini withdrew northwest into
nor was confident of success. By utilizing the Jebel Achdar. O·Connor was very disap-
captured supplies and transport, O'Connor's pointed and annoyed at the setback. Yet it
troops, renamed 13th Corps, were ready to created an opportunity - the way was now
attack Bardia by January. Early on 3 Janu- open for a drive south of the Jebel Achdar to
ary, a coordinated attack was launched. using the Gulf ofSi rte. Time was runningoU\, how-
artille ry. naval guns, air power, Matilda ever. On 2 February. aerial reconnaissance the 7th of February. the Italians made a last
tanks and infantry. Within 2~ days the posi- confirmed that the Italians were evacuating effort headed by 30 tanks. Coordinated de-
tion had fallen and the 7th Armored Division the remainder of Cyrenaica. On 4 February, fensive work by British infantry, guns and
was sent to El Adem to cuI off Tobruk. The the 7th Armored Division was ordered west tanks des troyed the attacking force . By 9
Italians had lost 40.000 men and 450 guns. Of of Mechili. In crossing the desert, the 7th a.m., Tenth Army was finished . Italian pris-
more value to O'Connor was the capture of Armored faced no significant opposition from oners numbered 25,000 and included General
700 trucks. the Italians - their forces were situated along Bergonzoli.
the coast road. The strongest resistance to the O'Connor had achieved a complete vic-
First Tobruk Brit ish advance was provided by the elements tory. The message sent to Wavell was ~Fo;>;
Again. victory led to a dilemma. Al- and the fiendish country they were attempt- killed in the open ... "The message was radioed
though the offensive had been most success- ing to cross. At midday on 5 February, lead to Cairo in clcar for Mussolini's benefit.
ful. 13th Corps was experiencing supply diffi- units of the 11th Hussars were at Beda Fomm When O·Connor visited the captured Italian
culties as well as wear and tear on Iheir tanks and the coast was within sight. The retreating senior officers on 8 February. he apologized
and transport. In addition. Churchill was Italians had yet to arrive. O·Connor's mcn saying that proper arrangements would oc
deeply moved by Greek resistance to Italy had won the race for Beda Fomm : the next made as soon as possible. The Italian replied
and wanted 10 reinforce Greece (at O'Con- contest would be the Battle of Beda Fomm. politely: "Thank you very much. We do real-
nor's e;>; pense). Lastly, Germany had decided Early in the afternoon Ihe first column of ize you came here in a very great hurry."
to send German ground forces 10 Libya. Italian trucks appeared from the north. The
Unless O'Connor could occupy the whole of Hap had closed with little time to spare. The O'Connor's Victory
Libya by the end of January, the British British guns opened fire and the annihilation Indeed, it wasa com plete victory. In ten
would be faced with a German invasion of battle of Beda Fomm bcgan. Groups of weeks, O'Connor had advanced almost 500
North Africa. trucks appeared throughout the afternoon. miles. destroyed an Italian army of ten divi-
By 7 January, Tobruk faced its first and for the most part they were destroyed, sions, taken 130.000 prisoners. 400 tanks,
siege. Inside. under General Petassi Manella. captured orturned back. Late in thedaya few approximately 1000 guns and two fortresses.
were Ihe 61st Italian Division plus fortress tanks from the 4th Armored Brigade man- all with a force never exceeding 2\.7 divisions
troops (approximately 25,000 mcn). The as- aged to arrive to reinforce the guns and and with only minimal casualties. How had
sault was scheduled for 21 January. The plan armored cars of the advance guard. Dawn on this been accomplished? The reasons arc sev-

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The Commonwealth Advance

o =ttatiancamp
9 Dec 40-8 Feb 41

----. Commonwealth IKMlI"lee

eral and include: I) superior mobility, 2) a panzer division in Apri1. Nominated to com- es to Greece ended O·Connor's conquest of
secure logistical base. 3) secure lines of com- mand this small armored corps would be Libya . The rules cases which follow arc for-
munication, 4) material superiority in weap- Erwin Romme1. With 13th Corps disbanded matted for use with the existing rules of the
onry. especially lanks, 5) a solid intelligence and replaced by a static area command under DFgame in that Ihe same numbering system
system. and 6) superior training and disci- General Neame (O'Connor was transferred to has been used. All rules of DF apply unless
pline. Perhaps mOSI important was leader- a command in Egypt). the Commonwealth noted o therwise. There are twO scenarios of
ship. l n Wave]] and O·Connor.the Allies pos- forces were in no position to resist a deter- FOX KILLED: a short, six-turn game, re-
sessed two outstanding leaders. WaveJl's con- mined Italo-German attack. creating the connie! in Northeast Africa from
tributions were: 1) the selection orO'Connor, Of course, the Allies did not expect any Gral.iani·s advance to O'Connor's offensive,
2) strategic juggling of thc various Middle attack before May. or at the very earliest. and until the Allied invasion of Nonhwest
East campaigns (as many as four simuhanc- mid-April. Hitler had in fact ordered Rom- Africa in late 1942. Thanks go to Daniel Yee
ously) and 3) protection of O'Connor from mel not to move beyond Agadabia before the and Robert Grab who were most hclpful in
the pressures exerted by the higher military arrival of the 15th Panzer Division. But play testing this variant.
and civil echelons. particularly Churchill. RommeL like O'Connor, was an unconven-
O'Connor's role was. of course. critical tional commander and one who considered [2.0) Game Equipment
and he is deserving of a large share of the the enemy's estimate of t he possible as a CASES:
cred it for thc success of the campaign. Apart major ingredient in his own sllccess. As
from the tactieal success of his plans for thc detailed in Strategy & Tacticse Magazine nr. [2.1] GAME MAP
battles of Sidi B<mani, Bardia and Tobruk. 87. Rommelattacked at the end of March. As The game map from D F is used whe n playing
he consistently displayed imagination. bold- the news of Rommel'sadvancc reached Wav- FOX KIL LED. Optionally. players may treat
ncss and unorthodoxy combined with a driv- ell. O'Connor was sent back to Libya to the road from Sollum toSidi Barrani as track
ing personal leadership at the front suggestive advise Neame. O'Connor arrived on 3 Apri1. in all respects until it is ·'built ." Either side
of the style Erwin Rommel was to use for the On 6 April, O'Connor and Neame were driv- may build the road using the procedure for
next two years. O'Connor. like Rommel, had ing in a staff car when they lost their way in railroads outlined in Case S.64 of the DF
the knack of being where he was most needed the dark and were captured by a German rules. T he track from Charing Cross to Siwa
at critical moments. He was ti reless in main- detachment behind British lines. O'Connor (via Bir cl Gcllaz) also mily be converted 10
taining control of the battle. By engaging in spent the rest of the war in an Axis prison road in this way. '"Road Ends" counters
offensive actio n whenever possible, he kept camp. T he match-up of O'Connor versus should be prepared if this rule is used.
the initiative out of Graziani's hands. By Rommel ne~'er took place. [2.2J PLAYING PIECES
pushing his tired troops towards the limit, he
never allowed any relaxation in pressure on References In general. the playing pieces from DF are
Barnett. Corelli. The Desert Genera/s. New em ployed in FOX KI LLED. However, some
the enemy. Because of this. the Italians large-
ly were either paralY1.ed with inactivity or York: Ballantine Books. Inc .• 1960. additional counters arc necessary. Players
anxious only to make good their escape. The will need to make facsimiles of the .counters
Ciano, Count Ga leano. Diaries, /939- / 943. depicted in Figure [. Note that the deploy-
Australians called O'Connor "the little terrier New York: Heinemann, 1946.
- because he neve r lets go." ment codes for Ihese unilS use letters to indi-
Macksey, Kenneth. Bella Fomm: 1711' Classic cate their turn of appea rance. Units with a
Even afte r destroying Tcnl h Army. deployment code of "A .. begin on the map at
O'Connor still did not want to let go. He Victory. New Yo rk: Ballantine Books. Inc ..
proposed to Wavell a plan fo r an advance to 1971. the locations listed in 15.32 and 15.33.
Sirte and t hen T ripoli. Unfonu na tely for the Madej, W. Victor./lalian Army Order of p.3] CHARTS AND TABLES
Allies, Churchill o n 12 February had instruct- & 1111'. 1939-1943. Allentown. Pa.: Game Modified charts requi red for this variant are
ed Wavell to give all possible support to Marketing Company. 198 1. provided in this article. These modified charts
Greece. including those elements of 13th Nofi, A.A. ·'Pa nzer Armee Afrika and the and tables include Commonwealth Reinforce-
Corps no t necessary for defense against the War in the Desert." 5& T Magazi ne nr. 40. me nt/ Withdrawal Schedule (5. I 7), Axis Rein-
demoralized remnan ts of the Italia n force in New York: Simulations Publications. Inc" forcement Sehedulc (5. IS) and iln extension
Nonh Africa. Some generals would have 1913. to the Turn Record Track (Figure 2).
been tempted to advance without orders and [2.4] GAME SCALE
Nofi.A.A. -Campaign Analysis: North Africa
force government support via a fait accompli
1940-1942, Part I;' 5& T Magazine nr. 19. No changes.
victory. Such covert disobedience was repug-
New Yo rk: Simulations Publications, Inc"
nant both to O'Conno r's character and his [2.5] UNIT DESIGNATIONS
sense of public duty. Suppressing his strong 1969.
RommeL Erwin. 7111' Rommel Papers(ed. by The uni t type abbreviations used in the initial
feelings, he obeyed with outward composure. set-up and in the reinforcement sehedules are
The aid Britain was capable of giving B.H. Liddell Hart). New York: Collins, 1953.
identical to those detailed in section 2.5 of the
Greece merely delayed the inevitable con- Strawson. J ohn. 711(' &lIll'for North Africa. DF rules.
quest of that nation. On the Greek mainland New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1969.
and later on Crete. Commonwealth forces These abbreviations are used in individual
unit designations on the new counters: Au s
were overwhelmed by the advancing Ger-
mans and escaped only after heavy loss of life
and equipment. Even Rommel was to agree
FOX KILLED (Australian); Ca t (Catan7.aro): CCNN (Ca-
mieie Nera - i.e .. Blackshirts); Cir (Cirene):
with O'Connor that an armored striking O'Connor's Campaign Cv (Cavalry): Hus ( H ussars): KDGD s (Kings
force. drawing from the 2nd and 7th Armored Dragoon Guards): LB (Libya): Mlttl (Ma Iet-
Division s and supported by air and naval for Libya: Ii): Mrm (Marm,lrica): Srt (Sirte).
bombardment (and possibly infantry land- Sept. 1940-Feb. 1941 [3 .0) Sequence of Play
ings at Tripoli or along the coast). could have
pushed thedemoralized Italians out ofTripo- • 1983. TSR I-IobbIes. n;. All R'lIh[s Rese....oo. CASES:
litania . Therefore the diversion of Common- p.IJ SEQUENCE OUTLINE
wealth resources to Greece easily may have [I .0) Introduction
No changes.
lengthened the campaign in North Africa by FOX KILLED is an extrapolation of 7711'
two year.;. Deser/ Fox'~ game appearing in S&T~ Mag- [3.2) AXIS INITIAL SURPRISE TURN
While Churchill was stripping O'Con- a1ine nr. 87. Using the following sections with There are no special first t urn rules for either
nor's forces of troops. Hitler, who doubted the DFgame system, FOX KIL LED simu- FOX KI LLED seenario. However. if the
Mussolini's ability to survive politically the lates war between Britain and Italy in North extended campaign scenario is played. then
loss of Tripoli, ordered X Fliegerkorps to Africa from the start of Graziani's offensive effects 2. 4. 5. and 6 outlined in case 3.2 of the
attack the British in Cyrenaica while the 5th into Egypt in September of 1940 up to Fcbru- DF rules apply during March 194 1 (Game-
Light Division was shipped to Tripoli. The ary 1941. when the arrival of German forces Turn G). Case 5 applies during April 1941
5th Light Division would be followed by a in Tripolitania and the transfer of British forc- (Game-Turn 2).