Case digested by James Christian S.

Maala
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA
G.R. No. L-48840 EN BANC December 29, 1943 OZAETA, J.

FACTS:

Victorino L. Guevarra died and bequeathed several properties to Ernesto M. Guevarra, his
legitimate son, and Rosario Guevarra, his natural daughter. His last will and testament was never
presented in court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for
the settlement of his estate. It was determined that ever since the death of Victorino, it was
Ernesto who is in possession of the land left by the former. Rosario, on the other hand, appears
to have a copy of Victorino’s will but never presented it in court for probate as well. It was only
during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court and because the will had not
been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in
favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rosario’s argument and legal process undertaken deserves merit.

HELD:

No, the Supreme Court held that the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it
being in our opinion in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard
the last will and testament of the decedent.

The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole
world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Although not contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the
testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under
duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court,
and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance,
signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property,
attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of
deeds of the province in which the land lies.

Further, the Supreme Court ruled that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the
decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial
partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the
estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those
provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the presentation of the will to the
court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-62952 EN BANC October 9, 1985 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

FACTS:

Martin Jugo died and appointed Sofia J. Nepomuceno as the sole executor of his estate. Martin
was legally married to Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and
Carmelita. However, as early as 1952, he had been living separately from his wife, Rufina, and
their children, Oscar and Carmelita. In fact, on December 5, 1952, Martin and Sofia were married
in Tarlac. Martin devised to his forced heir their respective compulsory shares of the estate and
the free portion of which was given in its entirety to Sofia.

Thereafter, Sofia filed a petition to probate the will and asked for the issuance of letters
testamentary. Meanwhile, Rufina opposed said petition alleging that the will was procured
through undue and improper influence; that at the time of the execution of the will, Martin was
already very sick; and that the will expressly admitted that Sofia was living with Marin as a
concubine indicating a lack of integrity and, thus, the letter testamentary should not be issued to
her.

The lower court denied the probate of the will while the Court of Appeals reversed such decision
and declared such will to be valid except that the devise in favor of Sofia shall be invalid pursuant
to Articles 739 and 1028 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding against the probate of the
will by reason of its intrinsic validity.

HELD:

No, the respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the will to be validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will and declared the devise in favor
of the petitioner null and void.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.

The Supreme Court see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified
provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate
of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150206 FIRST DIVISION March 13, 2009 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS:

In complaint before the RTC, Lourdes E. Pacana alleges that she is the sole owner of the said
property and that the property was passed on to her by her deceased mother, Hermogena. She
further argues that Hermogena was the only child of Juan with his wife, Laurena; that the same
property was only entrusted to Teofilo; and that prior to the death of Hermogena, she was trying
to recover possession of the said lot.

The heirs of Teofilo denied the allegations of Lourdes. They maintained that Juan died without
getting married and the only rightful heirs to the property was Teofilo, Macaria, and Justa.
Petitioner added that Lourdes filed a similar complaint but was dismissed for lack of interest.
Finally, the petitioners contended that the case of Lourdes lacks or states no cause of action or,
if there is any, the same has already prescribed or has been barred by laches.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issue of heirship can be passed upon in the same civil action for recovery of
ownership and possession of the property.

HELD:

No. The Lourdes’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and
possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property was owned by the deceased
during his lifetime. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of
the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the
action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong, while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.

In the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending
parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a
separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of Lourdes as the sole heir of
Juan Gabatan, especially since the parties to civil case, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the
RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in the proceeding. Also,
the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
JOSE C. LEE vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 146006 THIRD DIVISION February 23, 2004 CORONA, J.

FACTS:

Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez died intestate leaving behind his wife, Juliana, three legitimate children,
Rafael, Jose, and Antonio, and five illegitimate children, Divina, Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel,
Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez.

Meanwhile, Juliana and Jose, claiming that they owned 1,014 and 1,011 shares of Philinterlife
respectively as their share in the estate, sold such shares with a right of repurchase to Filipino
Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its president, Jose C. Lee. Both failed to repurchase
the shares of stock within the stipulated period leading to its consolidation in favor of FLAG. It
appears that during the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Juliana and her two children,
Rafael and Jose, extrajudicially settled the estate and partitioned among themselves the
Philinterlife shares of stocks.

Ma. Divina and her siblings filed a motion for appointment of a special administrator for the
Philinterlife shares of stock. The court appointed Ma. Divina as the special administratix. She then
sought to have the extrajudicial settlement of the estate and the deeds of sale of Philinterlife
shares of stock be declared void ab initio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale of the shares of stock is valid.

HELD:

No. An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under
Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.
However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the
division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all
debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This
means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific
property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties
of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This
they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court
because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what
happened in the present case.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
CASTORIO ALVARICO vs. AMELITA L. SOLA
G.R. NO. 138953 SECOND DIVISION JUNE 6, 2002 QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS:

Amelita L. Sola is the natural daughter of Castorio and the adoptive daughter and niece of Femina.
Thereafter,Fermina, having obtained the approval of the Misscellaneous Sales Application over a
parcel of land in Cebu City, executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and transfer of Rights over such
property in favor of Amelita.

Meanwhile, Castorio filed a civil case for the reconveyance of the property claiming that Fermina
donated the land to him. Amelita, as a defense, argued that the donation to Castorio was void
because Fermina was no longer the owner of the property when it was allegedly donated to
Castorio. Further, she maintained that the donation was void for the lack of approval by the
Bureau of Lands; and that she validly acquired the land as Fermin’s rightful her. She also denied
being a mere trustee of the said land in favor of Castorio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Castorio has a legal standing to assail the validity of Amelita’s title.

HELD:

None, even assuming that respondent Amelita acquired title to the disputed property in bad
faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act.

In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which
would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued
on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain.
Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since Amelita Solas title
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and
the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelitas
title. It follows that he cannot recover the property because, to begin with, he has not shown
that he is the rightful owner thereof.

Anent petitioners contention that it was the intention of Fermina for Amelita to hold the property
in trust for him, we held that if this was really the intention of Fermina, then this should have
been clearly stated in the Deed of Self-Adjudication executed in 1983, in the Deed of Donation
executed in 1984, or in a subsequent instrument. Absent any persuasive proof of that intention
in any written instrument, we are not prepared to accept petitioner’s bare allegation concerning
the donors state of mind
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
PATRIA PACIENTE vs. HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY
G.R. NO. L-58319 FIRST DIVISION JUNE 29, 1982 GUTIERREZ, J.

FACTS:

Leonardo Homeres died and was survived by his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres, and two minor
children, Shirley and Leandro. Leonardo left a parcel of land situated in Tacloban City.

Thereafter, Lilia sold the land to Conchita Dumdum. Subsequently, Lilia filed a petition for
guardianship over the persons and estate of the minors which the court granted. Conchita then
sold the land to Patria Paciente. Patria mortgaged the property in favor of Consolidated Bank and
Trust Corporation.

The court demanded a show cause from the bank as to why the TCT should not be cancelled for
having been alienated without authority from the court. Conchita appeared to the court that she
sold the lot without obtaining the approval of the court because she was not aware of such
requirement. The respondent court again issued an order requiring the petitioner and the
manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to explain why the TCT should not be
cancelled for their failure to first secure judicial authority before disposing of the said property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court has the jurisdiction to order the cancellation of the TCT and
the issuance of a new title in favor of the minors as co-owner.

HELD:

Yes. Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the delivery or return of the
property conveyed are concerned, the Supreme Court find the orders of the respondent court
valid. The petitioner's contentions in this regard are untenable. It was ruled that where title to
any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in question, the determination of
said title or right whether in favor of the ward or in favor of the person said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not
in guardianship proceedings, We also emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the
property is clear and indisputable the court may issue an order directing its delivery or return.

In this present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear and indisputable.
They inherited a part of the land in question from their father. The sale of this land, where they
are co- owners, by their mother without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal. In
issuing the above questioned order and resolution, the respondent court did not exceed its
jurisdiction but merely exercised its duty to protect persons under disability.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. 117209 SECOND DIVISION FEBRUARY 9, 1996 REGALADO, J.

FACTS:

Spouses Van and Regina Munson adopted Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. Further, they also
petitioned for the change of the first name of Kevin to Aaron Joseph. Petitioner opposed the
petition for the change of first name.

Trial court ruled in favor of the spouses.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each
other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for adoption can include a petition for a change of name.

HELD:

No. Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the
province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by
the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state
that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at
least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the
name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with
the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at
such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition
and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that
the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to
the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil
register.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by
its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider
it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role
and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

‘
 Digested by James Christian S. Maala
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON
G.R. NO. 154598 THIRD DIVISION AUGUST 16, 2004 CORONA, J.

FACTS:

Richard and Adelfa are husband and wife. Adelfa gave birth to Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco
Thornton. Adelfa brought their daughter to Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan without Richard’s
consent.

This prompted Richard to file a petition for Habeas Corpus but was later on dismissed. Richard
then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of Adelfa and his daughter, Sequeira.
However, Richard was not able to find his wife and daughter in Basilan and the barangay office
of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan issued a certification that Adelfa was no longer residing there.

Richard, receiving a telephone bill with calls from different places in the Philippines, filed another
petition for Habeas Corpus in the Court of Appeals which could issue the writ that is enforceable
within the entire country. However, the petition was denied for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue the Writ of Habeas Corpus
concerning the custody of minors.

HELD:

Yes, Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. The
Supreme Court We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.

Further, the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04- SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. - xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
 Digested by James Christian S. Maala
ROGER CHAVEZ vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R NO. L-29169 EN BANC AUGUST 19, 1968 SANCHEZ, J.

FACTS:

Roger Chavez anchored his original and supplementary petitions in his argument that he is
entitled, through a Writ of Habeas Corpus, to be freed from his imprisonment upon the ground
that in the trial which resulted in his conviction, he was denied of his constitutional right not to
be compelled to testify against himself. Further, Roger also prays that should this petition fails,
he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file a brief, and of mandamus to direct the
said court to forward his appeal to the Supreme Court since, as argued, he was raising purely
questions of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Roger’s petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus will prosper.

HELD:

Yes, Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional

remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's
constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental
right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which
precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is
less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his
appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final.

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case
presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of
Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate that: "A void judgment
is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being
worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor
bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties
attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers."
 Digested by James Christian S. Maala
PANFILO LACSON vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ
G.R NO. 147780 EN BANC MAY 10, 2001 MELO, J.

FACTS:

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state
of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National
Capital Region. Thereafter, there were several warrantless arrest effected.

Several petitions were filed assailing the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President and
the warrantless arrests effected as having no basis in fact and in law.

On May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion in

Metro Manila rendering the instant petition moot and academic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aforestated petitions will still prosper.

HELD:

No, the Supreme Court held that in quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may
only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by
petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion.”

Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose
is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a
matter which remains speculative up to this very day.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that "[t]he President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
xxx."

Further, the Supreme Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38
having been lifted.
 Digested by James Christian S. Maala
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO
A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1952 EN BANC DECEMBER 24, 2008 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS:

Due to reports, the Branch 276 was audited by the Office of Court Administrator. The audit team
reported that there is a reason to believe that Judge Perello of Branch 276 was negligent in issuing
the writ of habeas corpus

In her Comment, Judge Perello opined that that the prisoners she released were all convicted
under the old law, R.A. No. 6425, and not under the new law, R.A. No. 9165 which imposes the
penalty of life imprisonment to death regardless of the quantity of the drug involved. Thus,
according to Judge Perello, the provisions of R.A. No. 6425 must be applied to the released
prisoners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the granting of the writs of habeas corpus was proper.

HELD:

No. While the Supreme Court agreed with respondent judge that R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
retroactively applied to the prisoners involved in the cases audited, however, the Court was not
impressed with Judge Perello's justification in granting the writs. Such ratiocination on her part
betrays a lack of understanding of the rule on graduation of penalties. Nowhere in the cited case
of Simon does it state that the maximum penalty shall be six (6) months where the quantity is
less than 750 grams. The Simon case clarified the penalty to be imposed vis-à-vis the quantity of
the drug involved, such that prision correccional shall be imposed if the drug is below 250 grams;
prision mayor if the quantity is from 250 to 499 grams; and reclusion temporal if the drug is from
500 to 750 grams. The same case likewise declared that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty
by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond
or lower than prision correccional.

As found by the audit team, Judge Perello considered only the minimum period of prision
correccional in granting the writs for habeas corpus such that when the prisoners had served
imprisonment for a period of two (2) years, she immediately ordered their release. This is clearly
erroneous because the petition for habeas corpus cannot be granted if the accused has only
served the minimum of his sentence as he must serve his sentence up to its maximum term. The
maximum range of prision correccional is from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. This is the
period which the prisoners must have served before their applications for writs of habeas corpus
may be granted.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS vs. SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO
G.R. NO. 182855 FIRST DIVISION JUNE 5, 2013 REYES, J.:

FACTS:

Adonis was imprisoned for libel. However, the Boards of Pardons and Parole issued an order for
the discharge of Adonis. In view of this, Adonis filed a Motion to Reopen the Case praying for his
immediate release. The motion was granted and an order directing the Chief of Davao Penal
Colony to release Adonis. The said order was served to Tesoro but the release of Adonis was not
effected. Adonis then filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is proper.

HELD:

No. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose
of obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not
issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment.

In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17. Since his detention was
by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his
sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on December 11, 2007.
While it is true that a convict may be released from prison on parole when he had served the
minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground
for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole. Notably, at the time he
was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14. In fact, even
when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance
of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the
respondent to deny his immediate release at that time.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
LT. SG. MARY NANCY P. GADIAN vs. AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. VICTOR IBRADO
G.R. No. 188163 EN BANC October 03, 2017 BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

Nedina Gadian-Diamante, sister of Mary Nancy P. Gadian filed a petition for a writ of amparo on
behalf of the latter due to threats and an alleged shoot-to-kill order against Mary Nancy Gadian.
Nedina Gadian-Diamante impleaded various officers of the AFP but the latter denied any
allegations thereof. In its decision, the Court of Appeals concluded that Gadian had presented
substantial evidence to prove the existence of a threat on her life, liberty, and security but had
not established the source of the threats, granting the writ of amparo.

The parties respectively appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuance of the writ of amparo was proper.

HELD:

Yes, A writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy to provide immediate judicial
relief for the protection of a person's constitutional right to life and liberty. When a person is
consumed by fear for her life and liberty that it completely limits her movement, the writ may be
issued to secure her. Note, however, that the source of this fear must be valid and substantiated
by circumstances, and not mere paranoia. Thus, in resolving the necessity of issuing a writ of
amparo and the corresponding protection order, the courts must look at the overall circumstance
surrounding the applicant and respondents. Moreover, the writ of amparo is both preventive and
curative. It is preventive when it seeks to stop the impunity in committing offenses that violates
a person's right to live and be free. It is curative when it facilitates subsequent punishment of
perpetrators through an investigation and action. Thus, the writ of amparo either prevents a
threat from becoming an actual violation against a person, or cures the violation of a person's
right through investigation and punishment.

Gadian sufficiently established the threat to her life, liberty and security. Threat or intimidation
must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the commission of the
crime, not by any hard and fast rule.

While it is conceded that Lt. SG Gadian's life was in actual danger, the possibility of danger must
be acknowledged to exist. The reason, as she claims, was her expose of the Balikatan Funds
anomaly. Consequently, she has hereby sought a preventive writ of amparo.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC vs. ERLINDA T. CADAPAN
G.R. Nos. 184461-62 EN BANC May 31, 2011 CARPIO-MORALES, J.

FACTS:

Sherlyn Cadapan was abducted by armed men in Bulacan. Thereafter, Erlinda Cadapan filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac. The court granted the petition.
However, Lt. Boac denied that the victim is in their custody. The Court of Appeals then dismissed
the habeas corpus petition for lack of evidence. Subsequently, the spouses filed a petition for a
writ of amparo. The Supreme Court ordered that the petitions for the two writs be consolidated.
The motion for reconsideration for the writ of habeas corpus was then granted. However, the
writ of amparo was not issued since the appellate court believes that it will be superfluity to issue
the latter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in rendering a decision that the writ of amparo or
habeas corpus needs a motion for execution.

HELD:

Yes, contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution
for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person
is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must
be expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very
rights that these writs seek to immediately protect. The Solicitor General’s argument that the
Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only
find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken,
the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of
the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that
a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being
offered by an amparo proceeding.

Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to

further appeals that may be taken therefrom.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
INFANT JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY
CARAM vs. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C.
YANGCO
G.R. No. 193652 EN BANC August 5, 2014 VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS:

After giving Julian, being an illegitimate child, for adoption, Christina changed her mind and
wanted to stop the adoption proceedings already initiated. The DSWD opposed her motion and
recommended that Christina file before a regular court a petition to reacquire her parental
authority over Julian since the reglementary period for her to regain her parental rights had
already elapsed. Thereafter, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo arguing
that the life, liberty, and security of Julian is being violated by the DSWD officers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is proper.

HELD:

No, The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances
or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances"
are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by
a government official or organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of
the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing
the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to
qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but
asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant
from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of
parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward
of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
VICTORIA SEGOVIA, ET AL. vs. THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 211010 EN BANC March 7, 2017 CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:

Segovia filed for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan against the Climate Change Commission
alleging the failure and refusal of the Climate Change Commission to perform an act mandated
by environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage
of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos. Segovia contends
that the failure of CCC to implement the foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the
continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the Segovia’s
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a writ of kalikasan should issue.

HELD:

No, The petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for.

For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

(1.) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology;

(2.) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or private individual or entity; and

(3.) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.

A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule
or regulation was violated or would be violated. Segovia failed to show that CCC is guilty of any
unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY
G.R. No. 181174 FIRST DIVISION December 4, 2009 CARPIO MORALES, J.

FACTS:

Cristina and Pablo were husband and wife. Subsequently, Pablo died and during his wake, Lucille
Titular introduced Patrick Alvin Titular Braza as Pablo’s son. Cristina was able to verify his birth
certificate and Lucille and Pablo’s marriage Certificate. She then filed a petition for the correction
of Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation and the declaration of Lucille and Pablo’s
marriage as void the same being bigamous. The court denied the motion holding that a Family
Court in a special proceeding for correction of entry is bereft of jurisdiction over an action to
annul the marriage, and impugn the legitimacy of Patrick.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court may rule upon the validity of Lucille and Pablo’s marriage and
answer questions regarding Patrick’s legitimacy.

HELD:

No, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated
therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding that is made by a clerk or a transcriber in copying or writing resulting in a harmless
change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent. In contrast thereto, substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.

In the case at bar, the allegations of the petition clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s
filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA
test. As such, the petition must fail because in a special proceeding for correction of entry under
Rule 108, the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
These are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Art. 1718 of the Family
Code which provides that the corresponding petition should be filed in a Family Court. Moreover,
it is well- accepted principle that the validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack such as the petition filed in the present case.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY
G.R. No. 198010 THIRD DIVISION August 12, 2013 PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

Dr. Norma filed a petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live birth impleading only
the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. Further, she alleged that an earlier petition was granted
but the National Statistics Office records did not bear such changes. The RTC then issued an order
in favor of respondent and directed the City Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the correction
or change of the entries. The CA affirmed the same, finding that the respondent’s failure to
implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.

HELD:

Yes, The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and
notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court mandates 2 sets of notices to different potential
oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons
who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties. Summons must be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but
to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process in order to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. In the case at bar, respondent
seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate"
and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Considering the foregoing, she should have
impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as they
have interest in and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.

It must be noted that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation and legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected
or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other
mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE
G.R. No. 157043 FIRST DIVISION February 2, 2007 CORONA, J.

FACTS:

Trinidad R.A. Capote petitioned the court to change the name of her ward, Giovanni from
Gallamaso to Nadores. It was alleged that Giovanni was an illegitimate child and that he used the
surname of his father since he was born prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code. The RTC
granted the petition but the Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal questioning the
decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.

HELD:

Yes, A petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding unlike in petitions
for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court which may be decided through a summary proceeding. A proceeding is
adversarial if the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the
latter an opportunity to contest.

There is no doubt that the present petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that
the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly
goes beyond correcting erroneous entries although by granting the petition, the result is the
same. In this regard, Capote satisfactorily complied with the requirements of an adversarial
proceeding by publishing in a newspaper of general circulation the notice of the filing of the
petition. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered
bound by the judgment therein. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. The fact
that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same
nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. In any case, considering that the OSG
did not oppose the petition when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that
the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN.
G.R. No. 166676 SECOND DIVISION September 12, 2008 QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS:

Jennifer B. Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in her birth certificate alleging
that she was born as a female but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia. Further, she argued
that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. The RTC granted her
petition but the Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal seeking for the reversal of the RTC’s
ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.

HELD:

No, Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate"
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too
much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia
often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female
reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some
features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested
that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who
are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’." The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled
by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
 Case digested by James Christian S. Maala
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 178933 THIRD DIVISION September 16, 2009 VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS:

Ricardo S. Silverio, Sr. was appointed as the administrator of the estate of Beatriz Silverio. Ricardo
S. Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo, Sr. as the administrator of the estate. The RTC
granted Ricardo, Jr.’s petition and appointed him as the new administrator. On May 31, 2005,
the RTC issued an Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying private
respondent's motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo
Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order and immediately exercise his duties as administrator of
the subject estate. However, on December 12, 2005, the RTC recalled its previous order and
reinstated Ricardo, Sr. as the administrator. On January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the
December 12, 2005 decision. Ricardo, Jr. opposed such appeal arguing that it was filed beyond
the reglementary period. The CA granted the appeal applying the fresh rule period as enunciated
by the case of Neypes vs. Ca.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an interlocutory order.

HELD:

Yes, the court a quo’s ruling clearly constitutes a final determination of the rights of the petitioner
as the appealing party. As such, the Omnibus Order, dated May 31, 2002 (the predecessor of the
Order dated December 12, 2002) is a final order; hence, the same may be appealed, for the said
matter is clearly declared by the rules as appealable and the proscription does not apply.

In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured
from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had
any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As
such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not
subject to an appeal.