SPECIAL ARTICLE

Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’

Gurminder K Bhambra, Victoria Margree

Recent years have witnessed a general backlash against [M]e and you, we got more yesterday than anybody. We need some
kind of tomorrow.
identity politics, both in the academy and the public – Toni Morrison, Beloved, p 273.
sphere. This paper recognises the problems in identity

T
politics as arising from an apparent difficulty in he quotation with which this article begins comes from
conceptualising identity separately from notions the end of the novel where the character Paul D is speak-
of fixity and exclusion. It argues that politicised identities ing to fellow former slave Sethe of the need to move be-
yond the terms of a past disfigured by slavery. We begin with this
could, instead, be premised upon an explicit affirmation
for two reasons. First, it expresses the central problematic ad-
of the provisionality of political identity that is oriented dressed within this article: the question of the place of history in
to a “tomorrow “ in which the identity will no longer the present, and how this helps or hinders the opening up of
be required. future possibilities. Second, the novel addresses how the opening
up of a new future can also be achieved by shifts in understand-
ing which result from allowing alternative interpretations of the
past. Specifically in Beloved, Paul D moves from a condemnation
of Sethe for her alleged inhumanity in having killed her own
child (“you got two legs, not four, Sethe” ((1987) 1997: 165)), to a
new understanding of the “gendered division of labour on which
slavery was built” (Mohanty 2000: 61) and thus to acceptance of
the validity of her claims to have killed as a human being, and as
a mother (to save her own child from becoming a slave like her-
self, to refuse to be a reproducer of slaves). As such, Paul D arrives
at a fuller understanding of their shared historical experience as
slaves, and this new knowledge constitutes the basis for develop-
ing the “tomorrow” of which he speaks.
In what follows we use the metaphor of “tomorrow” in order to
address contemporary debates about “identity politics”. Recent
years have witnessed a general backlash against identity politics
both in the academy and the public sphere (Bickford 1997, Young
1997, Farred 2000, Bramen 2002). Among the various pro-
tagonists of this “backlash”, Bramen (2002) gives particular atten-
tion to work by Wendy Brown (1995) on “wounded attachments”.
This is her term for a condition in which politicised identities,
based upon experiences of injustice and discrimination, begin to
“fetishise” (Ahmed 2004) their own wounding. For Brown, this
results in a reactionary politics aimed at recrimination, instead of
action to redress the injustice. Our intention in the present article
is to situate ourselves within this debate about the value of iden-
tity politics as well as to engage with the specific issues raised by
Brown’s work. We will argue that the objections to “identity”
raised by Brown and others must be taken seriously, but that this
The authors would like to thank John Holmwood and Satya Mohanty for need not lead to a wholesale abandonment of the politics of iden-
their critical engagement in the development of the ideas presented in tity. Rather, we wish to demonstrate that the problem with identity
this article.
politics is the way in which the “identity” very often comes to re-
Gurminder K Bhambra (g.k.bhambra@warwick.ac.uk) is with the place the “politics”. To avoid such a substitution, we argue that
University of Warwick and Victoria Margree (v.margree@brighton.ac.uk) “identity” may be re-theorised as that which is continually pro-
is with the School of Humanities, University of Brighton.
duced and reproduced by political projects in the present, and on
Economic & Political Weekly EPW April 10, 2010 vol xlv no 15 59
SPECIAL ARTICLE

the basis of a shared vision of the future. The argument of this arti- Jewish suffering, only formerly colonial subjects can understand
cle is thus that politicised identities might instead be thought of in colonial experience (Said 1993: 35).
terms of an explicit affirmation of the provisionality of a political The idea of a politics underpinned by solidarities based on
identity that is oriented to a “tomorrow” in which the identity will “sameness” has a long history in the critical tradition. Marx’s ini-
no longer be required. In this way, the power of “identity” as a site tial conceptualisation of the standpoint of the proletariat (albeit,
of resistance is maintained, while ameliorating the conservative significantly different from those of subsequent developments of
effects of the entrenched identities that Brown criticises. standpoint epistemology) has been used by feminist theorists as
As such, this article also addresses the wider contemporary well as those arguing for a post-colonial perspective in terms of
debate in emancipatory politics, which concerns the proper the subaltern, and, more recently, for a dalit standpoint (Hart-
orientation of radical politics in terms of the tense of political dis- sock 1984, Guha 1983, Rege 1998, 2000). However, while using
course. The key issue here is that of the extent to which political identity as the basis of political action has been seen to be power-
discourse should be focused around the past – on origins, memory, ful (and effective), it has also increasingly become seen as prob-
history, trauma and so forth – or the extent to which it should be lematic. The exclusionary politics of movements such as black
future-oriented. Critics such as Brown (1995) and Grosz (2000) power, much radical and lesbian feminism, and latterly, move-
have expressed a fear that too great a weight upon the past has ments for ethnic purity and/or religious integrity, for example,
proved constraining for radical movements, and that an emphasis have yielded a deep concern with the programme of separation
upon the future – the (more) just future that political action and isolationism that such movements are often seen to be based
intends to bring about – is required as a corrective to this (Ahmed upon. For many critics, more troubling still has been the usually
2004). However, such a demand brings with it the vexed question accompanying claim that only women can be feminists, or only
of the place of memory, and specifically, the memorialising of pain black people can work against racism, or only dalits against caste
and exclusion. As Brown’s own equivocation on the issue suggests, oppression, and so on.
“the counsel of forgetting [...] seems inappropriate if not cruel” A position which states that only those who have experienced
(p 74) for many oppressed groups who have yet to have their pain an injustice can understand and thus act effectively upon it seems
recognised, or to understand themselves the deferred effects of a to rest upon an essentialist theory of identity which assumes that
traumatic past (Kilby 2002). the possibility of knowledge about particular situations is res-
The arguments presented in this paper are threefold. First, we tricted to one’s possession of the relevant (seemingly) irreducible
argue for a rethinking of “politicised identities” in terms of a com- traits (being female, black, dalit, and so forth). Arguably, one
mitment to a desired future, as a corrective to the conservative consequence of these separatist tendencies is that they perpetu-
effects that frequently accompany “identity” (here identified as ate the individualist fallacy that oppressive social relationships
“exclusionary politics” and “reification of identities”). Second, we can be reformed by particular subjects without the broader
argue, however, that such an emphasis upon the future need not agreement of others who, together, constitute the social relations
and should not entail an abandonment of the commitment to within which the injustices are embedded. But even where the
address traumatic pasts. Third, we argue that a productive identity limitations of a purely exclusionary form of identity politics are
politics is one which understands the identity of the political group- recognised, many theorists continue, nevertheless, to argue for a
ing as provisional, since it is based on the need to respond to an form of “strategic essentialism” (Fuss 1989, Spivak 2003) sug-
existing injustice, and therefore, oriented to a future in which that gesting that where structures of inequality overlap with catego-
injustice, and hence, the need for the identity claim, is no longer pre- ries of identity, then a politics based on those identities is both
sent. Central to the development of our thesis will be an engagement liberatory and necessary (Bramen 2002).
with work on experience and identity by Satya Mohanty, and com- In our view, however, the claim for a “strategic essentialism”
munities and knowledge by Lynn Hankinson Nelson. remains fraught with problems, for at least three reasons. First, it
This is, then, a primarily theoretical argument; however, we establishes an epistemological division between those who assert
will make reference to examples of particular forms of emancipa- a particular identity in advancing political claims and the
tory politics from the long-standing feminist movements and the observer who is sympathetic to those claims but “recognises” the
more recent struggles against the oppression of dalits. Finally, limitations of basing such claims on a putative identity.1 There is
the article will take an interdisciplinary approach to the issues of something highly problematic in claiming to support a political
identity, interpretation, politics and community. As researchers movement from the basis of being able to “see” something that
in sociology and literary studies respectively, we are committed the individuals constituting the movement do not see, and in
to the view that these disciplines are mutually informing, and then not engaging with them with regard to this. This sets the
that imaginative fiction is one of the greatest resources a society observer up in a privileged position vis-à-vis other members of
has for the extending of sympathies and building of solidarities the movement and thus makes solidarity difficult to achieve.2
around urgent issues of political emancipation. Second, the claim for “strategic essentialism” posits solidarity,
that is, collective identification around a particular standpoint,
1 Exclusionary Politics as a prerequisite for collective action to address perceived injus-
It is inexcusable to build analyses of historical experience around
tices. This is as against recognising that solidarities can also
exclusions, exclusions that stipulate, for instance, that only women emerge through the actions taken to correct particular injustices
can understand feminine experience, only Jews can understand and can include those who recognise the injustice as the reason
60 april 10, 2010 vol xlv no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

for action while not directly being disadvantaged themselves. experiences that differ from those expressed by the majority, but
Third, the assertion of “strategic essentialism” generally occurs the community itself may be weakened in its resistance to other
in the context of claiming justice through an appeal to the wider forms of oppression by the distraction of its internal policing
community but with no explanation as to why the wider commu- against difference.
nity ought to honour this claim for justice, especially when it is We suggest that alternative models of identity and community
often not deemed possible for them to constitute a part of the are required from those put forward by essentialist theories, and
movement itself. There is a requirement of inclusivity then – in that these are offered by the work of two theorists, Satya
terms of demanding acceptance of the validity of the claims Mohanty and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Mohanty’s ([1993] 2000)
made – at the same time, as an assertion of its impossibility post-positivist, realist theorisation of identity suggests a way
across what are posited as irreducible, essential traits (for a fuller through the impasses of essentialism, while avoiding the excesses
discussion see Holmwood 1995). of the postmodernism that Bramen, among others, derides as a
The arguments of this paper start out from a broad agreement proposed alternative to identity politics. For Mohanty ([1993]
that developing a politics from the basis of occupying a particular 2000), identities must be understood as theoretical constructions
social position or having a specific (singular) identity is problem- that enable subjects to read the world in particular ways; as such,
atic for the reasons identified above, as well as for covertly legiti- substantial claims about identity are, in fact, implicit explana-
mating – “absolving and forgiving”, in Said’s (1993: 35) words – tions of the social world and its constitutive relations of power.
the ignorance of those whose understanding and actions are nec- Experience – that from which identity is usually thought to derive
essary for countering social injustices. It has to be recognised – is not something that simply occurs, or announces its meaning
that issues exist between people and are not in people: that is, and significance in a self-evident fashion: rather, experience is
problems of social injustice occur in the relationships through always a work of interpretation that is collectively produced
which subjectivities are produced and thus, all those implicated (Scott 1991).
in those relationships are involved in their address. For example, Mohanty’s work resonates with that of Nelson (1993), who
sexism is not a problem for women to deal with alone, but is a similarly insists upon the communal nature of meaning or
problem situated in the contemporary relationships of social and k nowledge-making. Rejecting both foundationalist views of
material inequalities and requires mutual engagement for its knowledge and the postmodern alternative which announces the
address. This is an address which we consider is best served by the “death of the subject” and the impossibility of epistemology,
solidarities generated as a consequence of the activities around Nelson argues instead that, it is not individuals who are the
perceived injustices (that is, solidarities generated through the agents of epistemology, but communities. Since it is not possible
political movements of people working towards equality, justice) for an individual to know something that another individual
as opposed to those activities having to rely on assumed pre- could not also (possibly) know, it must be that the ability to make
existing solidarities (that is, being female, gay, black, dalit, etc). sense of the world proceeds from shared conceptual frameworks
This is not an argument for movements against specific injustices and practices. Thus, it is the community that is the generator and
or inequalities to be subsumed within a wider (say, socialist) repository of knowledge. Bringing Mohanty’s work on identity as
movement but, rather, an argument for movements to be theoretical construction together with Nelson’s work on episte-
conceived inclusively as movements where membership is not mological communities therefore suggests that, “identity” is one of
restricted to those presumed to suffer the injustice or inequality. the knowledges that is produced and enabled for and by individu-
As such, a question arises as to what would happen if the als in the context of the communities within which they exist.
“identity” in “identity politics” were rethought along the lines of The post-positivist reformulation of “experience” is necessary
the solidarities that are generated around the address of injus- here as it privileges understandings that emerge through the
tices rather than the solidarity that is presumed to ensue from processing of experience in the context of negotiated premises
being the victim of an injustice. Defending “identity” against a about the world, over experience itself producing self-evident
variety of critiques from the academic left, Bramen (2002) asserts knowledge (self-evident, however, only to the one who has “had”
that identity can also be productive in its construction of moral the experience). This distinction is crucial for, if it is not the expe-
and other communities. Our question, however, would be why rience of, for example, sexual discrimination that “makes” one a
such communities – sites of resistance and the discovery of politi- feminist, but rather, the paradigm through which one attempts to
cal agency – need to be constructed around essentialising rheto- understand acts of sexual discrimination, then it is not necessary
ric and restricted (this is the implication) to those who suffer the to have actually had the experience oneself in order to make the
injustice. Indeed, Bramen herself recognises that “identity poli- identification “feminist”. If being a “feminist” is not a given fact
tics certainly has its limitations, primarily in terms of prescribing of a particular social (and/or biological) location – that is, being
modes of behaviour that pressure individuals to conform to cer- designated “female” – but is, in Mohanty’s terms, an “achieve-
tain standards of authenticity” (2002: 7-8). And this surely is a ment” – that is, something worked towards through a process of
real problem; that essentialist rhetoric establishes belonging to a analysis and interpretation – then two implications follow. First,
community, and thus identity, on the basis of presumed shared that not all women are feminists. Second, that feminism is some-
attributes or experiences that are imagined to be irreducible. As thing that is “achievable” by men.3
such, not only may the community itself become oppressive to While it is accepted that experiences are not merely theoretical
those who do not share those attributes, or who wish to articulate or conceptual constructs which can be transferred from one
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 10, 2010 vol xlv no 15 61
SPECIAL ARTICLE

person to another with transparency, we think that there is some- the physical attribute of being a woman or upon sharing the same
thing politically self-defeating about insisting that one can only experiences. Since at least the 1970s, a key aspect of black and/or
understand an experience (or then comment upon it) if one has postcolonial feminism has been to identify the problems associated
actually had the experience oneself. As Rege (1998) argues, to with such assumptions (see, for discussion, Rege 1998, 2000).
privilege knowledge claims on the basis of direct experience, or We believe that it is the identification of injustice which calls
then on claims of authenticity, can lead to a narrow identity poli- forth action and thus allows for the construction of healthy soli-
tics that limits the emancipatory potential of the movements or darities.6 While it is accepted that there may be important differ-
organisations making such claims. Further, if it is not possible to ences between those who recognise the injustice of disadvantage
understand an experience one has not had, then what point is while being, in some respects, its beneficiary (for example, men,
there in listening to each other? Following Said, such a view white people, brahmins), and those who recognise the injustice
seems to authorise privileged groups to ignore the discourses of from the position of being at its effect (women, ethnic minorities,
disadvantaged ones, or, we would add, to place exclusive respon- dalits), we would privilege the importance of a shared political
sibility for addressing injustice with the oppressed themselves. commitment to equality as the basis for negotiating such differ-
Indeed, as Rege suggests, reluctance to speak about the experi- ences. Our argument here is that thinking through identity
ence of others has led to an assumption on the part of some white claims from the basis of understanding them as epistemological
feminists that “confronting racism is the sole responsibility of communities militates against exclusionary politics (and its asso-
black feminists”, just as today “issues of caste become the sole ciated problems) since the emphasis comes to be on participation
responsibility of the dalit women’s organisations” (Rege 1998). in a shared epistemological and political project as opposed to
Her argument for a dalit feminist standpoint, then, is not made in notions of fixed characteristics – the focus is on the activities indi-
terms solely of the experiences of dalit women, but rather a call viduals participate in rather than the characteristics they are
for others to “educate themselves about the histories, the pre- deemed to possess. Identity is thus defined further as a function
ferred social relations and utopias and the struggles of the of activity located in particular social locations (understood as
marginalised” (Rege 1998). This, she argues, allows “their cause” the complex of objective forces that influence the conditions in
to become “our cause”, not as a form of appropriation of “their” which one lives) rather than of nature or origin (Mohanty 1995:
struggle, but through the transformation of subjectivities that 109-10). As such, the communities that enable identity should not
enables a recognition that “their” struggle is also “our” struggle. be conceived of as “imagined” since they are produced by very
Following Rege, we suggest that social processes can facilitate real actions, practices and projects.
the understanding of experiences, thus making those experi-
ences the possible object of analysis and action for all, while 2 The Reification of Identity
recognising that they are not equally available or powerful for We wish to turn now to a related problem within identity politics
all subjects.4 that can be best described as the problem of the reification of
Understandings of identity as given and essential, then, we politicised identities. Brown (1995) positions herself within the
suggest, need to give way to understandings which accept them debate about identity politics by seeking to elaborate on “the
as socially constructed and contingent on the work of particular, wounded character of politicised identity’s desire” (ibid: 55); that
overlapping, epistemological communities that agree that this or is, the problem of “wounded attachments” whereby a claim to
that is a viable and recognised identity. Such an understanding identity becomes over-invested in its own historical suffering and
avoids what Bramen identifies as the postmodern excesses of perpetuates its injury through its refusal to give up its identity
“post-racial” theory, where in this “world without borders (“rac- claim. Brown’s argument is that where politicised identity is
ism is real, but race is not”) one can be anything one wants to be: founded upon an experience of exclusion, for example, exclusion
a black kid in Harlem can be Croatian-American, if that is what itself becomes perversely valorised in the continuance of that
he chooses, and a white kid from Iowa can be Korean-American” identity. In such cases, group activity operates to maintain and
(2002: 6). Unconstrained choice is not possible to the extent that, reproduce the identity created by injury (exclusion) rather than
as Nelson (1993) argues, the concept of the epistemological com- – and indeed, often in opposition to – resolving the injurious
munity requires any individual knowledge claim to sustain itself social relations that generated claims around that identity in the
in relation to standards of evaluation that already exist and that first place. If things have to have a history in order to have a
are social. Any claim to identity, then, would have to be recog- future, then the problem becomes that of how history is con-
nised by particular communities as valid in order to be success- structed in order to make the future. To the extent that, for Brown,
ful. This further shifts the discussion beyond the limitations of identity is associated primarily with (historical) injury, the future
essentialist accounts of identity by recognising that the commu- for that identity is then already determined by the injury “as both
nities that confer identity are constituted through their shared bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the
epistemological frameworks and not necessarily by shared char- present which embodies that history” (ibid 1995: 73). Brown’s sug-
acteristics of their members conceived of as irreducible.5 Hence, gestion that as it is not possible to undo the past, the focus back-
the epistemological community that enables us to identify our- wards entraps the identity in reactionary practices, is, we believe,
selves as feminists is one that is built up out of a broadly agreed too stark and we will pursue this later in the article.
upon paradigm for interpreting the world and the relations Politicised identity, Brown maintains, “emerges and obtains its
between the sexes: it is not one that is premised upon possessing unifying coherence through the politicisation of exclusion from
62 april 10, 2010 vol xlv no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

an ostensible universal, as a protest against exclusion” (ibid: 65). Indeed, Brown herself recognises the problems involved here,
Its continuing existence requires both a belief in the legitimacy of stating that
the universal ideal (for example, ideals of opportunity, and re- [since] erased histories and historical invisibility are themselves such
ward in proportion to effort) and enduring exclusion from those integral elements of the pain inscribed in most subjugated identities
ideals. Brown draws upon Nietzsche in arguing that such identi- [then] the counsel of forgetting, at least in its unreconstructed
Nietzschean form, seems inappropriate if not cruel (1995: 74).
ties, produced in reaction to conditions of disempowerment and
inequality, then become invested in their own impotence through She implies, in fact, that the demand exerted by those in pain
practices of, for example, reproach, complaint, and revenge. may be no more than the demand to exorcise that pain through
These are “reactions” in the Nietzschean sense since they are recognition: “all that such pain may long for – more than revenge
substitutes for actions or can be seen as negative forms of action. – is the chance to be heard into a certain release, recognised into
Rather than acting to remove the cause(s) of suffering, that suf- self-overcoming, incited into possibilities for triumphing over,
fering is instead ameliorated (to some extent) through “the estab- and hence, losing itself” (1995: 74-75). Brown wishes to establish
lishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue” (ibid 1995: the political importance of remembering “painful” historical
70), and is compensated for by the vengeful pleasures of recrimi- events but with a crucial caveat: that the purpose of remembering
nation. Such practices, she argues, stand in sharp distinction to – pain is to enable its release. The challenge then, according to her,
in fact, provide obstacles to – practices that would seek to dispel is to create a political culture in which this project does not
the conditions of exclusion. mutate into one of remembering pain for its own sake.
Brown casts the dilemma discussed above in terms of a choice Indeed, if Brown feels that this may be “a pass where we ought
between past and future, and adapting Nietzsche, exhorts the to part with Nietzsche” (1995: 74), then Freud may be a more suit-
adoption of a (collective) will that would become the “redeemer able companion. Since his early work with Breuer, Freud’s writ-
of history” (ibid: 72) through its focus on the possibilities of creat- ings have suggested the (only apparent) paradox that remember-
ing different futures. As Brown reads Nietzsche, the one thing ing is often a condition of forgetting. The hysterical patient, who
that the will cannot exert its power over is the past, the “it was”. is doomed to repeat in symptoms and compulsive actions a past
Confronted with its impotence with respect to the events of the she cannot adequately recall, is helped to remember that trau-
past, the will is threatened with becoming simply an “angry spec- matic past in order then to move beyond it: she must remember in
tator” mired in bitter recognition of its own helplessness. The one order to forget and to forget in order to be able to live in the
hope for the will is that it may, instead, achieve a kind of mastery present.7 This model seems to us to be particularly helpful for the
over that past such that, although “what has happened” cannot dilemma articulated by both Brown (1995) and Kilby (2002),
be altered, the past can be denied the power of continuing to de- insisting as it does that “forgetting” (at least, loosening the hold
termine the present and future. It is only this focus on the future, of the past, in order to enable the future) cannot be achieved
Brown continues, and the capacity to make a future in the face of without first remembering the traumatic past. Indeed, this would
human frailties and injustices that spares us from a rancorous seem to be similar to the message of Beloved, whose central motif
decline into despair. Identity politics structured by ressentiment of haunting (is the adult woman, “Beloved”, Sethe’s murdered
– that is, by suffering caused by past events – can only break out child returned in spectral form?) dramatises the tendency of the
of the cycle of “slave morality” by remaking the present against unanalysed traumatic past to keep on returning, constraining, as
the terms of the past, a remaking that requires a “forgetting” of it does so, the present to be like the past, and thereby, disallow-
that past. An act of liberation, of self-affirmation, this “forgetting ing the possibility of a future different from that past.
of the past” requires an “overcoming” of the past that offers iden- As Sarah Ahmed argues in her response to Brown, “in order to
tity in relationship to suffering, in favour of a future in which break the seal of the past, in order to move away from attach-
identity is to be defined differently. ments that are hurtful, we must first bring them into the realm of
In arguing thus, Brown’s work becomes aligned with a posi- political action” (2004: 33). We would add that the task of analys-
tion that sees the way forward for emancipatory politics as re- ing the traumatic past, and thus opening up the possibility of
siding in a movement away from a “politics of memory” (Kilby political action, is unlikely to be achievable by individuals on
2002: 203) that is committed to articulating past injustices and their own, but that this, instead, requires a “community” of par-
suffering. While we agree that investment in identities prem- ticipants dedicated to the serious epistemic work of remembering
ised upon suffering can function as an obstacle to alleviating and interpreting the objective social conditions that made up that
the causes of that suffering, we believe that Brown’s argument past and continue in the present. The “pain” of historical injury is
as outlined is problematic. First, following Kilby (2002), we not simply an individual psychological issue, but stems from
share a concern about any turn to the future that is figured as a objective social conditions which perpetuate, for the most part,
complete abandonment of the past. This is because for those forms of injustice and inequality into the present.
who have suffered oppression and exclusion, the injunction to In sum, Brown presents too stark a choice between past and
give up articulating a pain that is still felt may seem cruel future. In the example of Beloved with which we began this
and impossible to meet. We would argue instead that the “turn article, Paul D’s acceptance of Sethe’s experiences of slavery as
to the future” that theorists such as Brown and Grosz call distinct from his own, enable them both to arrive at new under-
for, to revitalise feminism and other emancipatory politics, standings of their experience. Such understanding is a way of
need not be conceived of as a brute rejection of the past. partially “undoing” the (effects of) the past and coming to terms
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 10, 2010 vol xlv no 15 63
SPECIAL ARTICLE

with the locatedness of one’s being in the world (Mohanty 1995). Conclusion: The Need for a Tomorrow
As this example shows, opening up a future, and attending to the Social constructionist understandings of identity are often taken
ongoing effects of a traumatic past, are only incorrectly under- to be antithetical to forms of essentialism. However, to the extent
stood as alternatives. that identities, even on the social constructionist account, are
A second set of problems with Brown’s critique of identity poli- understood to be self-referential, they are therefore, posited in
tics emerge from what we regard as her tendency to individualise terms of a supposed internal coherence, rather than being about
social problems as problems that are the possession and the engaging with others, learning, and potentially changing. In this
responsibility of the “wounded” group. Brown suggests that the case, we would argue, coherence can then be seen as a form of
problems associated with identity politics can be overcome essentialism. Brown’s understanding of identity as obtaining “a
through a “shift in the character of political expression and politi- unifying coherence” (1995: 65), for example, does not acknowl-
cal claims common to much politicised identity” (1995: 75). She edge that it is the very attempt to create coherence that can lead
defines this shift as one in which identity would be expressed in to the removal of opportunities for dialogue within and across
terms of desire rather than of ontology by supplanting the lan- communities. If something is coherent, in its own terms, there is
guage of “I am” with the language of “I want this for us” (1995: no overlap with others and no engagement with what is present
75). Such a reconfiguration, she argues, would create an opportu- or missing. Lack of integration, or dissension, can then appear to
nity to “rehabilitate the memory of desire within identificatory the identity group as an external “threat” to the identity in ques-
processes…prior to [their] wounding” (1995: 75). It would fur- tion, as opposed to being a measure of dialogue within and
ther refocus attention on the future possibilities present in the between communities making particular identity claims. This is,
identity as opposed to the identity being foreclosed through its we believe, an unacknowledged danger haunting Brown’s
attention to past-based grievances. account, since the “us” that she identifies in her examination of
What is problematic here is that Brown’s conception of the “us” politicised identities is the specific “us” which is directly suffer-
in “I want this for us” appears to leave open the possibility that ing. This focus on the specific “us” does not acknowledge the
the “us” both precedes and succeeds the want and its fulfilment wider “us” who might potentially be engaged with the relief of
in the manner of a more or less stable identity. The logic of that suffering; that is, Brown does not recognise here the over-
Brown’s argument itself, however, would suggest that the “us” lapping epistemological communities that make up any “us”. The
which has been produced by the want need not exist in the same absence of such recognition is logically contradictory, since any
way once this want has been fulfilled since the initial conditions claim to suffering is always implicitly an appeal to others to
of its emergence have altered. There is an ambiguity here in recognise their implication in its conditions.
Brown that requires clarification particularly in relation to the Political mobilisation around suffering engenders solidarities
following. Despite Brown’s insistence that the “I want” “distin- between those who are suffering and those who afford recogni-
guishes itself from a liberal expression of self-interest by virtue of tion of (and then action around) that suffering. Those who suffer
its figuring of a political or collective good as its desire” (1995: generally claim their common humanity with others in asking for
75), her references to Nietzschean notions of “self-overcoming” people to look beyond the specific circumstances of their suffer-
risk individualising, albeit in collective form, both the problem ing, and in doing so, the request is to address those specific
and the potential solutions. In other words, she appears to sug- circumstances on the basis of a humanity not bound to the
gest that injured identities are the “property” of stable, singular
collectivities and that the problems they face can be overcome in
isolation, without an engagement with others. This is especially
problematic to the extent that it could be appropriated as a way of
placing responsibility for the failure to advance socially at the REVIEW OF AGRICULTURE
hands of the group suffering, and not with the wider communi- December 26, 2009
ties who are complicit in maintaining the conditions of that suf- Economic Liberalisation and Indian Agriculture:
fering. Here we find ourselves in sympathy with Bramen, who A State-wise Analysis – G S Bhalla, Gurmail Singh
notes the Secret of Gujarat’s Agrarian Miracle after 2000 – Tushaar Shah, Ashok Gulati,
similarity of this left critique with the conservative behaviouralist’s Hemant P, Ganga Shreedhar, R C Jain
dismissal of black victimage. Pull yourself up by your own bootstraps.
Biotechnology and Pro-Poor – N Chandrasekhara Rao,
Don’t be a victim but an agent of change (2002: 4).
Agricultural Development S Mahendra Dev
As Bramen notes, such slogans, and Brown’s own emphasis Sustainable Development of Biofuels: – S S Raju, P Shinoj,
upon self-overcoming, “do not address the structural dynamics Prospects and Challenges P K Joshi
that continue to victimise and impoverish targeted communities” Pulses Production Technology: Status and Way Forward – A Amarender Reddy
(2002: 4). Indeed, we would argue there is a significant danger in
For copies write to:
Brown’s argument of appropriation by right wing positions, a Circulation Manager,
danger exacerbated by the absence of specific empirical analysis Economic and Political Weekly,
in her chapter. By not specifying which movements she is charac- 320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
terising as “ressentiment” ones, Brown allows this charge to be Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013.
email: circulation@epw.in
adopted and levelled at potentially any group.
64 april 10, 2010 vol xlv no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

circumstances. The mistake of some forms of identity politics, Focusing on the future, on how we would like things to be
then, is to associate identity with suffering. While a recognition tomorrow, based on an understanding of where we are today,
of historical (and contemporary) suffering is an important aspect would allow for partial reforms to be seen as gains and not threats.
of the political process of seeking redress for the conditions of It is only if one believes that political action can only occur in the
suffering, it does not constitute identity singularly. context of identification of past injustices as opposed to future jus-
“Wounded attachments”, we would argue, do not represent tice that one has a problem with (partial) reforms in the present.
the general condition of politicised identities, but rather, are prob- Political identity which exists only through an enunciation of its
lematic constructions of identities which fail to recognise (or injury and does not seek to dissolve itself as an identity can lead to
accept) the processes of change associated with movements. The the ossification of injured relations. The “wounded attachment” oc-
accumulation of different sorts of challenges around similar curs when the politicised identity can see no future without the in-
issues generally leads to the gradual amelioration of the condi- jury also constituting an aspect of that future. Developing on the
tions which generated the identity (and the associated move- work of Brown, we would argue that not only does a “reformed”
ment) in the first instance. If the emphasis in the movement is on identity politics need to be based upon desire for the future, but
identity then successful reform (even partial reform) reduces the that that desire should actually be a desire for the dissolution (in
injury and thus diminishes the power of the identity claim based the future) of the identity claim. The complete success of the femi-
upon that injury. This is because reform is necessarily uneven in nist movement, for instance, would mean that feminists no longer
terms of the impact it has. This then poses a problem for those existed, as the conditions that caused people to become feminist
within the movement who would wish the reforms to go further had been addressed. Similarly, with the dalit movement, its success
and who see in the reforms a weakening of the identity that they would be measured by the dissolution of the identity of “dalit” as a
believe is a necessary prerequisite for political action. As they can salient political category. There would be no loss here, only a gain.
no longer mobilise the injured identity – and the associated As we have argued, following Mohanty ([1993] 2000) and
suffering – as common to all (and thus requiring address because Nelson (1993), it is participation in the processing of one’s own
of its generalised effect), there is often, then, a perceived need to and other’s experiences into knowledge about the world, in the
privilege that suffering as particular and to institute a politics of context of communities that negotiate epistemological premises,
guilt with regard to addressing it – truly the politics of ressentiment. which confers a notion of politicised identity. Since it is an under-
The problems arise by insisting on the necessity of political standing of “tomorrow” (what that would be, and how it is to be
action being constituted through pre-existing identities and soli- achieved) that establishes one as, for example, a feminist, such
darities (for example, those of being a woman). If, instead, it was an identity claim does not exclude others from participation, and
recognised that equality for women is not separable from (or it does not solicit the reification of identity around the fact of his-
achievable separated from) wider issues of justice and equality torical or contemporary suffering. By removing these obstacles to
within society then reforms could be seen as steps towards equal- progress, the “tomorrow” that is the goal, is more readily achiev-
ity. A movement concerned with issues of social justice (of which able. Identity politics, then, “needs a tomorrow” in this sense:
gender justice is an integral aspect) would allow for provisional that the raison d’être of any politicised identity is the bringing
reforms to prevailing conditions of injustice without calling into about of a tomorrow in which the social injustices of the present
question the basis for the movement – for there would always be have been overcome. But identity politics also needs that tomor-
more to be achieved.8 Each achievement would itself necessitate row – today – in the sense that politicised identities need to
further revision of what equality would look like. And it would inscribe that tomorrow into their self-definition in the present, in
also necessitate revision of the particular aims that constitute the order to avoid consolidating activity around the maintenance of
“identity” afforded by participating in that movement. In this the identity rather than the overcoming of the conditions that gen-
way, identity becomes more appropriately understood as being, erated it. That the tomorrow to be inscribed – today – in the self-
in part at least, about participating in a series of dialogues about definition of one’s political identity, is one in which that identity
what is desired for the future in terms of understandings of will no longer be required, is not a situation to be regretted, since
social justice. it is rather the promise of success for any movement for justice.

Notes dismissed as “trivial” or as a matter of being man to “understand” the experience in the sense
1 Here, we are thinking of instances where aca- “oversensitive”. Second, that the man shares with of coming to a recognition of the emotions pro-
demics and intellectuals lend support to move- the woman certain theoretical premises about the duced, the effects of such an incident, and its
ments whose aims, in another context, they society they are in, which may include most broader societal causes and implications. Indeed,
would (and have) disagree with. One notable obviously the premise that it is a society in which he may be able to assist with the process by which
example being Edward W Said’s support for Pales- citizens are treated unequally according to gen- the woman herself makes sense of this experi-
tinian nationalism existing in a paradoxical rela- der. Further premises may include that a domi- ence, and her feelings around it, by contributing
tionship with his commitment to cosmopolitan- nant cultural understanding of women is that to this processing of experience into knowledge
ism (on this, see Bhambra 2006). they are of value to the extent that they are his own experiences of being interpellated as
2 For further discussion of the issues associated with judged sexually desirable to men. A common way male in society.
standpoint epistemology, see Bhambra 2007: 27-33. in which this valuation of women is enforced is 4 One of the social processes that we consider
3 To give an example, imagine a scenario in which a through such acts, which far from being trivial or important is that of narrative fiction which invites
woman attempts to explain to a man the experi- even flattering, are ways of interpellating women identification with subject positions and experi-
ence of receiving unwanted sexual attention in into a subject-position that is implicitly inferior to ences that may be radically different from the
the street. What is required for this experience to men. Through agreeing to process and make reader’s own. Narrative is not only essential to the
be “understood” by the man could perhaps be as sense of the woman’s “experience” through a construction of identity, it also provides a vehicle
follows. First, that this experience is judged broadly-shared epistemological paradigm, in the for the communication of experiences across
worthy of attention and interpretation and is not manner suggested above, it is possible for the different identities.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 10, 2010 vol xlv no 15 65
SPECIAL ARTICLE
5 “Black”, for example, has been used as a political References and Power: Toward a Historical Materialism
category by mixed, coloured, African, Indian, (Boston: Northeastern University Press).
West Indian, Pakistani and other ethnic groups Ahmed, Sarah (2004): The Cultural Politics of Emotion
Holmwood, John (1995): “Feminism and Epistemo-
both in Britain in the 1970s and in South Africa (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
logy: What Kind of Successor Science?”, Socio-
during the anti-apartheid struggles. Bhambra, Gurminder K (2006): “Beginnings: Edward logy, 29(3), pp 411-28.
6 The philosopher of medicine Georges Canguil- W Said and Questions of Nationalism”, Interven-
Kilby, Jane (2002): “Redeeming Memories: The Poli-
hem ([1943] 1991) argues that the health of a bio- tions: International Journal of Postcolonialism,
tics of Trauma and History”, Feminist Theory, 3(2),
logical organism is given by the provisionality of 8(1): 1-8.
pp 201-10.
its norms and its openness to their future revi- – (2007): Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism
Margree, Victoria (2002): “Normal and Abnormal:
sion. Perhaps, solidarities and communities can and the Sociological Imagination (Basingstoke:
Georges Canguilhem and the Question of Mental
be said to be healthy to the extent to which their Palgrave).
Pathology” and “Canguilhem and Social Patho-
norms for understanding experiences and pro- Bickford, Susan (1997): “Anti-Anti Identity Politics: logy”, Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology, 9(4):
ducing knowledge are open to revision in the light Feminism, Democracy, and the Complexities of 299-312 and 317-19.
of new claims. Where communities are resistant Citizenship”, Hypatia, 12(4): 111-31.
to change – such that they refuse to countenance Mohanty, Satya P (1995): “Epilogue: Colonial
Bramen, Carrie Tirado (2002): “Turning Point: Why Legacies, Multicultural Futures: Relativism, Ob-
any revision of identity claims, for example, they the Academic Left Hates Identity Politics”, Textual jectivity, and the Challenge of Otherness”, PMLA,
could be termed pathological in Canguilhem’s Practice, 16(1): 1-11. 110(1): 108-18.
terms. For, if it is “coherence” that one requires, Brown, Wendy (1995): States of Injury: Power and
then dissension is interpreted as a threat, rather – ([1993] 2000): “The Epistemic Status of Cultural
Freedom in Late Modernity (New Jersey: Prince- Identity: On Beloved and the Postcolonial
than as the opportunity for reformulating norms, ton University Press).
principles, or ways of perceiving and making Condition” in Paula M L Moya and Michael
Canguilhem, Georges ([1943] 1991): The Normal and R Hames-Garcia (ed.), Reclaiming Identity:
sense of the world (for further discussion see
the Pathological translated by C R Fawcett (New Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmod-
Margree 2002).
York: Zone Books). ernism (London: University of California Press),
7 Enumerating the ways in which a traumatic expe- 29-66.
Farred, Grant (2000): “Endgame Identity? Mapping
rience is forgotten, or loses its power, Freud and
the New Left Roots of Identity Politics”, New Morrison, Toni ([1987] 1997): Beloved (New York:
Breuer ([1893] 1991) mention two of particular
Literary History, 31: 627-48. Knops).
importance: there is “association”, whereby a
traumatic event (such as an accident) gets associ- Freud, Sigmund and Josef Breuer ([1893] 1991): “On Nelson, Lynn Hankinson (1993): “Epistemological
ated with more reassuring ideas (such as being the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Pheno- Communities” in Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth
mena: Preliminary Communication” in The Potter (ed.), Feminist Epistemologies (London:
rescued); and “abreaction”, whereby the psychic
Penguin Freud Library, Vol 3, Studies in Hysteria Routledge), 121-59.
energy generated in reaction to trauma achieves
release through expression by word or gesture. (Harmondsworth: Penguin), 53-69. Rege, Sharmila (1998): “Dalit Women Talk Different-
The crucial point is that these processes can only Fuss, Diana (1989): Essentially Speaking: Feminism, ly: A Critique of ‘Difference’ and Towards a Dalit
take place if the traumatic memory is present to Nature and Difference (London: Routledge). Feminist Standpoint Position”, Economic & Politi-
consciousness. If the memory is instead uncon- Grosz, Elizabeth (2000): “Deleuze’s Bergson: Dura- cal Weekly, 33(44): WS39-WS46.
scious, then the procedures of forgetting cannot tion, the Virtual and a Politics of the Future” in – (2000): “‘Real Feminism’ and Dalit Women:
take place and the patient is doomed to “remem- Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook (ed.), Deleuze Scripts of Denial and Accusation”, Economic &
ber” instead through the language of the hysteri- and Feminist Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Political Weekly, 35(6): 492-95.
cal body, and her “present” is reduced to being a University Press), pp 214-34. Said, Edward W (1993): Culture and Imperialism
repetition of the past. Guha, Ranajit (1983): “The Prose of Counter-Insur- (London: Chatto and Windus).
8 In arguing for the necessary dissolution of political gency” in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies II: Scott, Joan (1991): “Evidence of Experience”, Critical
identities we are not suggesting that political Writings on South Asian History and Society Inquiry, 17(summer): 773-97.
identities per se will disappear as we believe that (Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp 1-42. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (2003): Death of a Disci-
there are always likely to be new issues that arise as Hartsock, Nancy C M (1984): “The Feminist Stand- pline (New York: Columbia University Press).
present ones are resolved (nor are we claiming that point: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Young, Iris (1997): “The Complexities of Coalition”,
politicised identities are the only form of identity). Feminist Historical Materialism” in Money, Sex Dissent 44(winter): 64-69.

SAMEEKSHA TRUST BOOKS

Inclusive Growth
K N Raj on Economic Development
Essays from The Economic Weekly and Economic & Political Weekly

Edited by ASHOKA MODY

The essays in the book reflect Professor K N Raj’s abiding interest in economic growth as a fundamental mechanism for lifting the poor and
disadvantaged out of poverty. He has also been concerned that the political bargaining process may end up undermining growth and not
provide support to those who were excluded from access to economic opportunities. These essays, many of them classics and all published
in Economic Weekly and Economic & Political Weekly, are drawn together in this volume both for their commentary on the last half century of
economic development and for their contemporary relevance for understanding the political economy of development in India and elsewhere.

Pp viii + 338 ISBN 81-250-3045-X 2006 Rs 350

Available from
Orient Blackswan Pvt Ltd
Mumbai Chennai New Delhi Kolkata Bangalore Bhubaneshwar Ernakulam
Guwahati Jaipur Lucknow Patna Chandigarh Hyderabad
Contact: info@orientblackswan.com

66 april 10, 2010 vol xlv no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly