Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited

Author(s): Sasson Sofer

Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Jul., 1988), pp. 195-211
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097144
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 Review of International Studies (1988), 14, 195-211 Printed in Great Britain

Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited

Sasson Sofer

Expressions such as 'Old Diplomacy' and 'New Diplomacy' bear no

relation to reality.

Jules Cambon

There are two popular claims about diplomacy in the modern history of international
relations. According to the first, World War One constituted a decisive turning point
in the modern era, marking the emergence of a new diplomacy, distinct in both
essence and style from that which had existed previously. The second maintains that
diplomacy is in a state of continuous decline. This study proposes that the distinction
between old and new diplomacy is simplistic and inaccurate, and that the argument
regarding the decline of diplomacy is not a valid one. Raymond Aron's observation
that 'diplomacy, in the traditional sense of the term, functions up to a certain degree
between allies, but hardly any longer among enemies, or even between the blocs and
the neutral nations,'1 is only partially correct, and reflects its time of writing at the
height of the cold war.
The analysis will emphasize continuity and evolution, rather than revolution, in
the development of diplomacy. While routines, procedures, and settings have been
modified, the basic principles of diplomacy as the basis for negotiations between
nation states have an enduring validity. Moreover, the resilience of the diplomatic
system has been remarkable in the twentieth century which has seen such change in
technology and in the structure of world order.
The very term 'new diplomacy' is problematic. Diplomacy is a modern phe
nomenon. The establishment of a resident embassy and a separate bureaucracy for
foreign policy constitutes one of the most important innovations of European
civilization. Resident embassies were first introduced in the mid-fourteenth century.
Foreign ministries evolved at a later stage; the initial codification of diplomatic
protocol was consolidated in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna.2 Itmay be seen, there
fore, that the 'old diplomacy' is a relatively new development, despite the tendency to
dismiss it as part of a defunct culture associated with a privileged minority.
The article will first identify the sources of the concept of new diplomacy, examin
ing whether it possesses foundations distinct from those of traditional diplomacy. A
detailed analysis of the elements referred to in the literature as characteristic of the
new diplomacy will follow, particularly cultural and ideological influences, the
expansion of international society and the challenge of a multitude of new states, the
significance of open diplomacy, and the changes which have occurred in inter
national relations since the onset of multilateral diplomacy and summit conferences.
The final section will discuss the argument about the decline of diplomacy.
Definitions of diplomacy abound; that of Hedley Bull is precise and complete,

0260-2105/88/03/0195-17/S03.00 ? 1988 Review of International Studies

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 196 Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited

relying upon Satow, Nicolson, and the Oxford English Dictionary. According to
Bull, diplomacy is 'the conduct of relations between states and other entities with
standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.'3 In addition to
this it is useful to make two distinctions: between diplomacy and the use of force, and
diplomacy and foreign policy. The first of these marks an integral part of diplomacy
as being the attempt to produce compromise without the use of force. The second is
more complex, and is the source of much misunderstanding. Foreign policy
incorporates the formulation of policy regarding political, constitutional, and
bureaucratic processes and the definition of the fundamental principles and national
interests of each state. Thus, it assumes a continuous interaction between domestic
considerations and the external arena. Diplomacy constitutes only one element of
foreign policy, though one of essential importance. It implements foreign policy
through negotiation, making policy understood and if possible accepted by other
nations. Interests, aims and concepts of foreign policy may change, while in
diplomacy what usually changes are only the methods of implementation and the
repertoire of persuasion. However, the dividing lines between diplomacy and foreign
policy are not always easily drawn. By providing necessary information, presenting a
choice of alternatives and as a result of its quality and style, diplomacy can influence
policy making.4
The discussion of diplomacy is somewhat marginal in international relations
theory.5 Diplomacy 'exists' within international theory, but is rarely analysed or
extensively explored. In addition, the conceptual wealth of the literature on
diplomacy is quite limited and, to a great degree, divorced from the development of
political theory. Diplomatic history itself tends to be descriptive rather than
analytical.6
There are two conceivable reasons for the paucity of debate on diplomacy. The
first is the scientism which views diplomatic literature as redundant and anecdotal.
The second is a direct result of that reading of the era of the cold war, which has the
threat of force as the essential foundation of viable foreign policy. According to the
strategic approach and theories of bargaining, relations among nations constitute a
system of mutual deterrence, tacit agreements, and coercive diplomacy, in which
messages and signals are transmitted between heads of state. The diplomat is
rendered a message-carrier who plays no part in the making of national policy. In
foreign-policy analysis and organizational models, where the diplomat is a viable
actor, he is usually portrayed as the victim of his timidity or bureaucratic routine,
succumbing to the policy of other branches of government.
Political realism which perceives force as a permanent means of maintaining world
order, still contends that, at any given time, the state must employ the most suitable
means of achieving the national interest. Diplomacy is the sovereign's art of
conciliating between contradictory interests and a manifestation of prudence in inter
national politics, while the diplomat himself is assigned a secondary role in the world
of power politics.
Diplomacy comes in for sharper criticism from scholars who view the nation-state
system as the major cause of inequality in world order. Modelski argues that, 'reduc
tion in the role of diplomacy may be a necessary condition for world order'. Galtung
adopts a completely Utopian outlook, stating that the 'true world' of tomorrow will
consist of a web of 'associations and organizations', a world where bilateralism will
become insignificant and free from the 'structural violence' built into the system.7
Diplomacy, then, is described as technologically redundant and politically harmful
for the international society.

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 Sasson Sofer 197

The origins of the new diplomacy

In 1815, 1918, and the early 1960s, diplomatic protocol was formulated and
modified by the international community. In 1815 and 1918 these changes followed
wars which altered the balance of power and the nature of European society. While
1815 established the foundations of nineteenth century statesmanship, building on
diplomacy's past achievements, 1918 constituted an endeavour to fashion a new
diplomacy on the basis of a Utopian and revolutionary vision. The United Nations
Conference on Diplomatic Relations in 1962 closed the historical circle: the
diplomatic code was not challenged, despite profound differences among nations.
The concept of new diplomacy was not a product of the deficiencies of the
diplomatic method; rather, it was precipitated by the crisis in the system of the
European balance of power that elevated the United States and the Soviet Union to
prominence. The new diplomacy was ushered in by a country with a legacy of isola
tionism and a regime which had declared war upon the social, political, and ideo
logical order of European society.
Ironically, the champions of the new diplomacy imparted great importance to
traditional diplomacy by rendering it a central cause of the outbreak of World War
One. The proponents of the new diplomacy contended that foreign policy must be
based upon popular control and that national policy could not rely upon a balance of
power an arms race, trade wars, and colonial rivalries. War was no acci
encouraging
dental failure; the entire system was culpable inasmuch as it was undemocratic and
served the strong. The new diplomacy would bring about disarmament, free trade,
and self-determination.8 No persuasive explanation was forwarded for the long
period of peace in Europe secured by the balance of power system and 'secret'
diplomacy. The offensive against the old diplomacy failed to focus on the real causes
of the First World War; at most, it was an assault on one of its byproducts.
The concept of new diplomacy gained historical importance when US President
Woodrow Wilson introduced it towards the end of the first world war as the doctrine
that would govern the norms of international behaviour and the nature of the peace
conventions. In terms of intellectual history, Wilson's ideas originated in the eight
eenth century.9 The attitude of the founding fathers toward the Old World was
ambivalent; yet, the only diplomatic tradition available and familiar to them was that
of Europe. Their natural inclination was towards the English rather than the conven
tional tradition, particularly not that of the ancien r?gime. According to Felix
Gilbert, the philosophes' criticism of the ancien r?gime and its diplomatic practice
had a crucial impact upon the development of American diplomacy. The philosophes
denied that the maintenance of peace could be a direct result of the balance of power
and refused to accept that it was a function of the whims and moods of the absolute
monarch. Eighteenth century diplomacy was viewed as a conspiracy which must be
replaced by open diplomacy resting on moral principles. Hence, the diplomacy of the
new republic was formulated out of the internal tension between the principles of the
Enlightenment and the Staatsr?son of European politics at its height.
The liberal tradition, particularly the influence of John Locke and Thomas Paine,
shaped the fundamental principles upon which the attitudes of American society
toward international politics were based. Diplomacy was regarded as an immoral
institution and identified with war and intrigue.10 A Utopian perception of inter
national society emerged, analogous to the ideal civil society. If all societies were
democratic, a family of nations would evolve, along with a new world order which
would guarantee peace, thus rendering diplomacy superfluous.11
In the light of this interpretation, Wilson's views towards the end of the first world

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 198 Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited

war were a globalization of the American school of liberal thought. His speeches
reflected the liberal criticism of European diplomacy and the balance of power
system. The solution was thought to be contingent upon the creation of 'a
community of free nations' headed by a permanent, sovereign institution that would
manage it according to desirable moral standards. Wilson's plans suffered from two
salient drawbacks. Though the liberal criticism of European diplomacy was
consistent with the isolationist credo,12 the implementation of the new approach
required massive US intervention in world politics, contrary to the desire of the
American public. Secondly, the statesmen of the allied countries, who would become
Wilson's partners to the peace accords, still supported the concept of the balance of
power and the methods of the old diplomacy.
Diplomatic history presents an entirely different picture from intellectual history.
Wilson's appeal for open diplomacy derived not only from an abstract, idealistic
vision, but from 'realistic diplomatic origins'.13 The Fourteen Points contained
nothing which contradicted the political interests of the United States. They were
directed towards the United States' Western European allies as well as against the
Soviet Union, constituting, inter alia, a counterweight to Bolshevik diplomacy and
compelling Britain and France to reconsider their traditional style of diplomacy. This
inevitably led to a reassessment of their national interests as great powers.
The brief period subsequent to the Bolshevik revolution, particularly that between
November 1917 and March 1918, during which Leon Trotsky served as the People's
Commissar of Foreign Affairs, is important in order to understand Wilson's
reactions and timing. The Russians had formulated their own definition of open
diplomacy which they were about to present at the Brest-Litovsk talks. They made
public the secret treaties of the Allied Powers and adopted several principles of
liberalism, such as the right to self-determination, seeking to direct the new
diplomacy against the Allies. At the same time, in countries like Germany, Austro
Hungary, France, and Great Britain, support grew for the principles of the new
diplomacy. Wilson had to announce the platform of the new diplomacy immediately
and to direct it against the Central powers, so that the Germans would not benefit
from the accord with the Russians. At the same time, he had to pressure France and
Britain to approximate his views regarding the war's termination, thus precluding a
Bolshevik ideological monopoly in the establishment of European order.14
Wilson's speech of 8 January 1918 was his most important peace address, clearly
showing the impact of the challenge of the Bolshevik revolution and of Brest-Litovsk
upon his thought. Its early timing indicates that the speech was not intended to
constitute a basis for the negotiations; itwas, rather, a means of propaganda directed
more towards Europe than towards the American people.15
At the outset of 1918, Wilson failed to assess correctly the significance of the
Bolshevik revolution, and even tended to believe that Lenin and Trotsky sought to
implement the principles of the new diplomacy. Only US Secretary of State Robert
Lansing cautioned Wilson against responding to the Russian challenge. He disagreed
with the overall Wilsonian policy, maintaining that British Prime Minister David
Lloyd George, French President Georges Clemenceau, and Italian Prime Minister
Vittorio Orlando had outmanoeuvred the President at the peace conference.16
Examination of Wilson's behaviour reveals that he chose somewhat undistin
guished participants for the United States delegation to the conference, not including
a single senator. During the course of the conference he demonstrated incompetence
in leading the delegation, concentrating obsessively on the idea of the League of
Nations.17 The president anticipated the extensive support of the American and
European publics; yet, these responded positively to general, abstract principles,

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 Sasson Sofer 199

showing little interest in the details of the negotiations. There was a substantial
divergence between the goals which he set out to achieve and the tactics of actually
attaining them. It ultimately emerged that Wilson neglected the consolidation of the
political and constitutional support which might have secured the success of the new
diplomacy. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson described the miserable reper
cussions upon US diplomacy during Wilson's administration: he 'left the State
Department a shambles'.18 Harold Nicolson, who served as Lloyd George's secretary
at Versailles, criticized Wilson both as a statesman and a Utopian. He perceived the
refusal of the United States to join the League of Nations and to ratify the Treaty of
Versailles as one of the great failures of the new era. Nicolson's shock at Wilson's
surrender to popular opinion, waiving the products of patient diplomatic negotia
tions, was considered a manifestation of what would henceforth become a permanent
phenomenon in international relations.19

Challenges to the old diplomacy

Apart from this liberal criticism, the diplomacy of the twentieth century has been
confronted by three major ideological challenges: (1) Bolshevik revolutionism;
(2) the totalitarianism of the radical right; and (3) the accession of new, non-Western
states to international society. The common denominator was the tendency towards
revisionism and the opposition to the existing world order. Towards the end of the
century, it can be determined that the principles of European diplomacy persisted,
despite the fact that international society had become universal and was charac
terized by a diversity of cultures.
Reservations must be raised regarding the assumption that the stability of tradi
tional diplomacy was contingent upon the cultural homogeneity of the European
ruling class. Raymond Aron, among many others, writes that 'the homogeneity of
the system favours the limitation of violence'.20 This premise is exceedingly general,
and does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the conflicts which nevertheless
took place. Values and ideology were not the main determinants of Europe's system
of alliances; indeed, it is highly unlikely that cultural affinity played an important
role in the formulation of the grand coalitions of the European wars.
Ideology has been regarded as both incompatible with diplomacy and one of the
elements of change in the structure and style of the post-1919 European diplomacy.21
The inter-war period is portrayed as a series of master plans directed by totalitarian
powers, eventually rendering Europe an ideological battlefield. In fact, ideology
played a secondary role in amending the style and practice of professional diplomacy.
The content and style of inter-war diplomacy underwent a metamorphosis, but its
organization and proceedings withheld the change.
The totalitarian regimes succeeded in temporarily neutralizing professional
diplomacy and, in the case of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, even established
alternate organizations that dealt with foreign policy. The diplomatic bureaucracy
remained relatively stable, as the foreign offices did not appear sufficiently strong to
threaten the new regimes. Most professional diplomats were able to continue to serve
their country, be it Spain, Italy, Germany, or the Soviet Union.22

The right-wing dictators

The right wing dictators perceived foreign policy as the heart of their leadership; to a
large extent, they were their own diplomats, at a high price to their nations. The
Bolshevik ?lite exercised greater caution and, after a revolutionary period, ultimately
mastered the diplomatic craft.23

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 200 Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited

A curious consistency exists in the attitude towards the European dictator

between the two World Wars. He is simultaneously viewed as the executor of an
innovative diplomatic style and as the modern and efficient archetype of traditional
diplomacy. For the historian, Italy ismore readily judged than Germany. Until the
ouster of Foreign Minister Dino Grandi in July 1932, Italian diplomats were granted
greater room to manoeuvre. The transition to tono fascista, manifested by militant
rhetoric, limitations upon diplomats, and policies of concealment and obfuscation,
was no invention of diplomatic tradition. Rather, it was an opening for future
foreign policy failures headed by Benito Mussolini and Count Galeazzo Ciano, who
led Italy into the May 1939 pact of steel, subordinating Italy to German policy in the
absence of any real guarantees. Departure from the line of combitioni which had
characterized Italian diplomacy restricted the previous room for manoeuvre.24
Despite the fact that Hitler controlled his bureaucracy more tightly than did
Mussolini, his attitude towards Wilhelmstrasse was different; the Neurath period
featured a large degree of continuity. Hitler utilized old methods in order to conceal
his revolutionary concept of foreign policy, employing public rhetoric in order to
conduct diplomacy of surprise.25 However, the initial success of Hitler's foreign
policy in the 1930s, often contrary to the advice of his diplomats was prejudicial to
the prestige of Germany's foreign service at a crucial period in European diplomacy.

The Soviet Union and the new diplomacy

The Soviet Union seemed likely to be the first of the European powers to apply the
rules of the new diplomacy. Bolshevik decrees of November 1917 announced that,
henceforth, negotiations would be conducted 'absolutely openly before the entire
people'. Diplomatic titles were abolished by Trotsky, and the Brest-Litovsk talks
were portrayed as the antithesis of secret diplomacy, a manifestation of the capitalist
superstructure. The Soviet leadership claimed that Bolshevik diplomacy was unique
in its openness, fairness, humanitarianism, and peaceful orientation.26
The Soviets were soon disillusioned, reverting to traditional methods of
diplomacy. The failure of the revolution abroad, particularly in Germany, coupled
with the need to defend it at home, had a sobering effect.27 In fact, the writings of
Marx and Lenin could hardly constitute a useful guide for the conduct of Soviet
diplomacy. Marx's approach toward international relations was fragmentary and
lacked prominence in his writings.28
George Chicherin, a Menshevik of aristocratic descent who joined the Bolshevik
party only after the Revolution, succeeded Trotsky as the head of the Narkomindel in
March 1918 and served as Commissar for Foreign Affairs for a longer period than
any other foreign minister of his time. The Commissariat returned to the practices of
professional diplomacy, producing first-rate diplomats. Soviet diplomats became
'sticklers for diplomatic etiquette'. Chicherin applied the Czarist diplomatic
tradition to the new regime, thus assuring a degree of continuity in Russian foreign
policy. He even proposed that diplomats study Czarist diplomacy in order to compre
hend the problems of the Soviet Union.29
Russian diplomacy successfully coped with the demands of traditional diplomacy
and the representation of a revolutionary regime by clearly separating the Foreign
Ministry from the Comintern. As early as the negotiations with the Germans towards
the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, the Soviets demonstrated their
ability in conducting secret diplomacy. The Soviet leadership could always draw
upon Byzantine diplomacy, a manifestation of the continuity of the Czarist heritage
that relied upon centralism, dogmatism, orthodox faith, and bureaucracy.30

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 Sasson Sofer 201

The path was short from the defence of the Soviet Union as the centre of the
Communist revolution to the security of Russia as a nation-state and renewed
identification with its historic interests. This stage, defined as tactical, pending the
achievement of the goals of the revolution, returned the Bolsheviks to traditional
diplomacy and a balance of power strategy. Soviet diplomacy came full circle with
Andrei Gromyko and Anatoly Dobrynin, cited by a former US ambassador to
Moscow as exemplars of the professional diplomat.31 Itmay be seen, therefore, that
while ideology is essential to the understanding of a regime's structure and general
conception of foreign policy, this does not necessarily hold true regarding diplomatic
practice.

Diplomacy and the new states

The twentieth century is characterized by the unprecedented expansion of inter

national society. This took place as a result of the ever weakening European
dominance and of the dispersion of the universal values of European culture and
thought. Prime among these was sovereignty, expressed by the right to self
determination and the principle of equality between nations. The increase in the
number of states rendered the international system far more complex, precluding the
consolidation of extensive consensus on international issues. None the less, although
the accession of new states to the world order led to different formations of thought
and behavioural norms, diplomatic rules contributed more to cooperation than to
conflict. The variance between the West and the East and between the North and the
South was greater in terms of the nature of society, regime, and domestic structure
than in the external domain.32
The objection of the Third World to diplomatic rules is often attributed to a
manifestation of the revolt against the West; the rules were perceived as representa
tive of the European legacy and tutelage from which they had broken free.33
However, this factor is rendered marginal by the real problems with which the Asian
and African countries had to cope, deriving from the great tension between their
formal equality in international relations and the low levels of socio-economic
development which fostered their inferiority in world order. From the onset of the
1970s, their struggle focused upon the policy of the New International Economic
Order, despite the considerable differences among the countries of the Third World
in terms of interests and other political demands. This policy served as a source of
unity, after the fundamental objectives of anti-colonialism and independence had
been achieved.34 The chosen means of struggle included regional organization, the
establishment of a parliamentary bloc in international organizations, and an attempt
to amend the international agenda and order of priorities in order to attract greater
attention to the resolution of Third World problems. The results of the struggle had
little impact on diplomatic procedures and failed to precipitate significant change in
the plight of the Third World countries.
Although diplomacy is a product of European culture and tradition, new states,
even those professing a revolutionary ideology, tend to accept its rules and,
ironically, to espouse its formal, ceremonial, and traditional roles. The diplomatic
protocol which was ratified by the 'reactionary powers' of the Holy Alliance is
perceived as the gateway to legitimization and participation in international society.
New nations have not proposed substantial changes in diplomatic practice. The
Communist bloc, like the former colonial states, claimed equality of privilege,
considering the rules of diplomacy as a formal expression of sovereignty.35 In fact,
rather than repeal, the new states sought reform of the rules within the framework of

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 202 Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited

existing diplomatic institutions. Their chances of being harmed from international

anarchy were greater than those of the established states; the reinforcement of
diplomatic norms, therefore, was in the interest of the Third World. As Cornelia
Navari notes, 'To weak, self-regarding states, fearful of intervention, whose govern
ments are continually attempting to legitimize their expanded prerogatives, all the
traditional instruments of external legitimacy have proven useful.'36
The international community has bestowed unprecedented status upon the small
states: new norms recognized their equality before international law and the
sovereign rights of states over their territory; international organizations, particu
larly the United Nations, became an institutional manifestation of the principle of
equality. The results were, nevertheless, somewhat equivocal. The ability of the new
states to take advantage of the rules of parliamentary diplomacy enabled them to
initiate comprehensive 'legislation' regarding matters important to them. However,
rhetoric, abuse, and bloc voting, led to a decrease in the importance of the inter
national institutions.37
The new states successfully influenced the debate on international issues such as
colonialism, apartheid, foreign aid, and the economic order, but failed to become a
significant third force capable of changing the rules of the international system.
Many of these states retained the marks of their imperial past and were often
economically and politically unable to break free of their mother countries. Some of
them encountered great difficulty in the establishment of extensive diplomatic repre
sentation and lacked stable, professional bureaucracies to deal with foreign policy
matters.38

Elements of the new diplomacy

Open diplomacy
From its inception, the new diplomacy was viewed as integrally linked with the
concept of democracy. This was an expansion of the changing nature of international
relations and a recognition that factors such as economics, the totality of war, and
qualitative components of national power?for example, leadership, governmental
structure, and the degree of social consensus and unity?are related directly to the
conduct of foreign policy. None the less, parliamentary supervision of foreign policy
and the impact of public opinion do not necessarily lead to a demand for changes of
diplomatic rules or facilitate control of foreign policy.
The first of Wilson's Fourteen Points is highly ambiguous regarding the
diplomatic practice which would follow from open diplomacy. Stipulating that
'diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view', the clause fails to
specify what the public's role is to be. Is the diplomat obliged merely to publicize the
results of negotiations, as Wilson suggested in a letter to Secretary of State Robert
Lansing, or must he reveal each stage of the talks in which he takes part? Nicolson's
contention that 'there was all the difference in the world between "open covenants"
and "openly arrived at covenants",' that is, between policy and negotiation, hardly
requires further elaboration.39
The notion of open diplomacy seemed to go along with the expectation of an
outcome that was both moral and effective; 'secret' was perceived as immoral and
prejudicial to the outcome of the talks. Diplomats have claimed, however, that
secrecy actually enhances the objectivity and rationality of the parties' positions,
concluding that the prospects of achieving an international accord are directly
proportionate to the level of confidentiality maintained.40

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 Sasson Sofer 203

The recording of thousands of international treaties by the League of Nations and

the United Nations has had little impact on the course of international diplomacy,
although these agreements were ostensibly exposed to public scrutiny. In democratic
societies it is the norm that the outcome of the diplomatic process must become
public knowledge. In terms of the general populace, the success or failure of the
negotiations is of the utmost significance.
Nicolson has criticized 'the irresponsibility of the sovereign people', the transfer of
domestic political methods to the international arena, and the irrationality of the
public in considering international issues.41 Walter Lippman writes that the 'unhappy
truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been wrong in the critical junctures'.42
Historical experience, however, does not always vindicate these concerns regarding
the negative role of public opinion.43 In fact, it is difficult to establish any direct
relationship between public opinion and the conduct of diplomacy. It is also a
mistake to assume that public opinion became an influential force only subsequent to
World War One. It had already gained prominence in the late nineteenth century;
and ?lites and interest groups had played a significant role in influencing foreign
policy even earlier.
Within the context of open diplomacy the analysis of public opinion is usually one
sided, taking into account only the impact of something called 'the populace' on the
statesman, the diplomat, or the military leader. Public opinion, however, is not an
autonomous force; it is frequently organized by voluntary organizations or a specific
political group. And in most instances, public opinion is divided. It is as subject to
manipulation as it is capable of influencing decision-makers. Thus, it is not
surprising that politicians sometimes prefer to negotiate with authoritarian rulers,
inasmuch as they presume a rigid control of public opinion.44
Determination of the desirable proportion between openness and secrecy in the
conduct of diplomacy is not a matter of quantity regarding the number of issues or
details to be hidden from the public, but a question of fundamental values. The
promise of national accord on policy is also tied to the relationship established with
the general populace and with specific interest groups. Extensive consensus increases
the chances that international agreements will withstand the trial of time.45 None the
less, in terms of the role and impact of both public opinion and the media on foreign
policy, the experience of the twentieth century has been most ambivalent. These two
forces have enjoyed unprecedented and comprehensive expression; nevertheless, this
has been a century of great strategic and diplomatic surprises, and one in which the
opportunity to manipulate public opinion has increased.

The practice of new diplomacy

Among the most salient aspects of the new diplomacy is the appearance of multi
lateral diplomacy and the institution of summitry; these ostensibly altered the
practice and nature of diplomacy. It has been claimed that today's rapid means of
communication and transportation have rendered certain elements of traditional
diplomacy obsolete. In fact, the ambassador's influence has not been mitigated.
Orders are transmitted promptly, and the diplomat can dispatch reports and recom
mendations to a wider range of targets.46
Frequent sojourns to foreign capitals by heads of state and foreign ministers do
not necessarily detract from the diplomat's importance. Politicians are no substitute
for the accumulative experience of professional diplomats abroad. Agreements
concluded between top-ranking statesmen must be maintained, nurtured, and
subjected to periodic reassessment.

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 204 Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited

In the past, the lack of direct communication between the embassy and the home
capital did not, in itself, augment the diplomat's importance or his autonomy to act
without authorization. While eulogizing the professional diplomat of the twentieth
century, Nicolson allows that:
most ambassadors during the period of slow communications were so
terrified of exceeding their instructions or of assuming an initiative that
might embarrass their home government, that they adopted a purely passive
attitude, missed opportunity after opportunity, and spent their time writing
brilliant reports on situations that had entirely altered by the time their
despatches arrived.47

Furthermore, the contention that summit meetings and conference diplomacy

constitute a unique twentieth century phenomenon which has changed the nature of
modern diplomacy is not accurate.48 Indeed these institutions might indicate a return
to a more conservative convention, whereby the ruler resumed a decisive and active
role in the formulation of foreign policy. Summit meetings are most logical and
suitable for the absolute ruler, and are not necessarily the product of democracy or
public diplomacy. It is true, however, that summitry perhaps appears innovative in
the American tradition, when one considers that the November 1906 visit of US
President Theodore Roosevelt to Panama made him the first chief executive to depart
the United States during his incumbency.49
The significance of summit meetings is much debated. Strong opposition to the
practice of summitry is voiced by some American diplomats. Malcolm Toon, for
example, writes: 'I have never regarded meetings at the summit as a satisfactory way
of conducting diplomacy, and certainly those inwhich I have played a role did little to
improve mutual understanding.'50 Summit meetings may entail tremendous loss of
prestige in the event of failure, and often lead to inexactitude and misunderstanding,
owing to logistic difficulties of interpretation, as well as improvisations due to time
pressures. Moreover, the assertion that only heads of government have the requisite
authority to make 'on the spot' decisions might only exacerbate the apprehension of
the professional diplomat about errors made out of haste.
Prolonged negotiations between diplomats usually precede the conclusion of an
agreement's final details by heads of state. Rather than signalling a new era,
conference diplomacy may be viewed as the climax of traditional diplomatic activity.
Rapid transportation is not the sole reason for meetings of world leaders. Nor is there
any direct correlation between the importance of summitry and the decline of pro
fessional diplomacy. European conferences, from the Conference of Westphalia in
1648 to the Congress of Berlin in 1878, were certainly as significant in determining the
course of international relations as those of the twentieth century.
Summit meetings are suitable and desirable in times of crisis; however, they cannot
serve as a permanent substitute for traditional diplomacy. They are of symbolic and
constructive value in publicly noting turning points in international relations, but not
in continuous diplomatic activity. The great complexity of international issues
suggests caution about the prospects for a solution in meetings between heads of
state. International relations the professional diplomat might argue, should not be
based upon the capriciousness of friendship or hostility or upon changes of govern
ment. Intimate acquaintance does not necessarily foster understanding; on the
contrary, new information and awareness of intentions often augment controversy.
The reduction of the chances of diplomatic success to the level of the individual
sovereign is a risk to be taken only infrequently, when absolutely requisite. To a large
extent, summit meetings constitute an uncontrolled diplomatic process which allows

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 Sasson Sofer 205

sudden impressions of short-term validity to gain precedence over comprehensive

and careful assessments. Finally, politicians participating in the conduct of
diplomacy have great difficulty detaching themselves from considerations of
domestic political utility.51
The permanent existence of multilateral diplomacy and international organiza
tions is one of the major innovations of twentieth century diplomacy. But this change
is the product of tendencies visible long before the outbreak of the First World War.52
The institutionalization of these phenomena ismore a reflection of the expansion of
the international system than a qualitative change in the structure of international
society. Traditional diplomacy flourishes within these new frameworks, which have
neither increased understanding among nations nor mitigated the intensity of
bilateral diplomacy. Multilateral diplomacy complements traditional diplomacy; it
does not replace it. The two certainly are not mutually exclusive alternatives between
which states can choose.53
International organizations, particularly the United Nations, constitute the most
significant attempt to make the principle of the sovereign equality of states coexist
with the absence of parity witnessed in reality. The actual implementation of this
principle, however, would bring the great powers to an inconceivable procedural
inferiority. The conflict between the superpowers is an additional factor in the
diminished impact of the United Nations. The organization retains a certain symbolic
importance, but is devoid of any real strength in terms of a community of nations
acting together to maintain the principle of collective security. As Abba Eban writes:
'the devotees of international organizations have been more successful in criticizing
the balance of power cult than in developing a convincing alternative.'54 Apart from
the first years subsequent to World War Two, most of the achievements of inter
national diplomacy have been attained independently of the United Nations.
Conference diplomacy is a more frequent occurrence, but it too represents no real
change in international relations, and makes no great impact on the pattern of power
politics. Multilateral meetings for the resolution of conflict provoke the fear that
radical states will create difficulties in achieving an accord which could be more
readily facilitated in a limited framework. For small states, the image of the
conference is one of concession and coercive agreement. The absence of cooperation
at the bilateral level can hardly be expected to give way to collaboration in the multi
lateral framework.55

The decline of diplomacy?

The introduction of new diplomacy was the product of the belief that traditional
diplomacy was on the decline; in the words of Vansittart, the professional diplomat
was 'technologically obsolete, politically superseded, and placed in a position where
[his] own trained judgments mattered less and less'.56 Taking the narrowest
definition of diplomacy as the work of the diplomatist according to traditional
protocol, with its broadest characterization as the conduct of foreign policy in its
entirety, one does not witness decline, but rather a logical, requisite, historical
change. This is not a diplomatic revolution, but a continuous process of organic
development and adaptation that dates back to the Renaissance.
A central supposition of this argument is that the foreign ministry has lost its
prominence inasmuch as both the formulation of policy and the conduct of negotia
tions are handled by heads of state. Diplomacy has moved 'from the court to the
cabinet'; the politician has assumed the role of the diplomat, whose services are no
longer in demand. With the increase in appointments of non-professionals, the

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 206 Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited

foreign ministry has been reduced to the level of technical apparatus.57 Accordingly,
statesmen and politicians accuse diplomats of lacking a comprehensive conception of
foreign policy and espousing a parochial and unrealistic viewpoint. Military leaders
and commentators claim that diplomacy is secondary to strategic imperatives, and at
times prejudicial to the national interest. Careful perusal of these allegations will
reveal both inaccuracy and inconsistency.
The need for structural changes in foreign ministries became apparent even prior to
World War One and the call for a new diplomacy. From the end of the nineteenth
century until the mid-1920s, the foreign ministries of the major European countries
underwent organizational reform, serving as a model for other states. This trend
gradually faded out, ostensibly due to the economic crisis.58 It was not, however,
necessarily the by-product of a new conception of the nature of diplomacy. Even the
United States, the champion of the new diplomacy, enacted the Rogers Act in 1924,
establishing its diplomatic career service.59
Foreign ministries drew barrages of criticism after World War Two, mainly on the
grounds of inefficiency and waste of public funds. Other governmental bureaucracies
continued to assume functions entrusted previously to foreign ministries. In fact,
although censured as 'wasteful aristocratic reserves', foreign ministries were among
the most economical of governmental departments, relative to the constant increase
in national budgets and rising military expenditures.
Allegations regarding the diminishing role of the foreign ministry in the formula
tion of foreign policy and its preoccupation with tactics, rather than strategy, fail to
take into account that most organizational frameworks suffer from the same ills;
reform, in the final analysis, is subject to political decision. Initiative and innovation
are demanded from the bureaucrat/diplomat at the same time that he is required to
execute the orders of his political superiors.60
The foreign ministry constitutes a stable and permanent bureaucracy which
functions regardless of political attitudes. Foreign policy cannot be conducted
without the assistance of a professional diplomatic apparatus. The authority of rulers
over this bureaucracy, both at home and abroad, has been exaggerated greatly.
Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has confessed that, as national
security adviser, he frequently circumvented the State Department out of fear of its
'cumbersome machinery'. As secretary of state, however, he soon learned 'that one
could not in the long run bypass the Department of State'.61
Diplomacy was never the exclusive preserve of diplomats, with rulers confined to
the sidelines. Foreign policy decisions are not made solely by diplomats. Moreover,
diplomats are often discriminated against by an arbitrary system of political appoint
ments. The decline in the status of the ambassador as an independent professional
and the advantages granted to the ruler's favourites are essentially a return to the
court of the past. However capable, no individual or small group has the ability to
cope with the myriad of complexities involved in foreign policy decision-making.
Politicians, for their part, tend to focus upon limited issues of foreign policy and to
neglect their wider contexts.62
Contemporary international relations demands knowledge of an extensive range of
spheres?economics, science, political and military. Hence, the participation of
'non-professionals' in the diplomatic process is somewhat inevitable. The status of
every participant in the decision-making process has taken a plunge, not only that of
the diplomat. If 'diplomacy today is too important and too complicated to be left to
the professional diplomats',63 this is equally true of the economist, the scientist, and
the military leader. The diplomat is the liaison between the various perspectives,
ensuring the primacy of political considerations in relations among nations.

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 Sasson Sofer 207

Despite the increased prospects of circumvention, there is no substitute for the

diplomat in the context of day-to-day international activity. The professional
diplomat accumulates and evaluates the accuracy of information requisite to the
formulation and execution of policy, expertly assessing the various options available
to his or her government. The ambassador is a symbolic representative of his or her
country's sovereignty, and controls the most important environment of its bilateral
relations. Permanent residence facilitates the rectification of errors and unexpected
misunderstandings. Even when heads of state are personally acquainted they cannot
be knowledgeable about the extensive periphery which influences foreign relations,
such as the parliament, political parties, the economy, and the media. Furthermore,
the ambassador enjoys several advantages in explaining his or her country's policy.
In the event of an error, the damage is less than that incurred by a declaration of a
head of state. His or her explanations are construed as the voice of a professional
authority uninhibited by considerations of domestic politics and popular rhetoric.64

The continuing value of diplomacy

International politics have undergone a marked change over the course of the
twentieth century. The erosion of international understanding, the emergence of a
bipolar system, and the addition of an unprecedented number of new nation-states
are all phenomena which cannot be easily dealt with. They necessitate not the
abandonment but the careful observance of several rules of traditional diplomacy.
The universal international system developed out of the common values of the
European res publica Christiana and on the basis of recognition of international law.
The diplomatic method was spread throughout the world, expressing the raison de
syst?me and constituting an integral part of the minimal conditions securing the
existence of international society.65 Diplomacy bloomed during periods of pluralism,
espousal of the principle of the equality of states, and consensus regarding the rules
and practices governing international relations. The absence of diplomacy would
represent a revolution in international society, inasmuch as it is the primary
apparatus of maintaining stability and significant relations among nations. The
contention that the decline of diplomacy is inevitable is dangerous, given its potential
as a self-fulfilling Such a trend would entail far-reaching
prophecy. changes in the
structure of international relations. Diplomacy's fate is bound up with the
acceptance of political norms and rules of behaviour which make international
society a meaningful reality.
Revisions of the diplomatic method have had less impact than the asymmetry
between the progress of military
technology and its accompanying destructive capa
bilities, on the one hand, and statecraft, on the other. The legacy of the inter-war
period is that, to be effective, diplomacy must be backed by palpable force. It would
be illusory to presume that the use of force repudiates the
importance of diplomacy.
Twentieth-century dictatorships, however, have associated diplomacy with
weakness, concession, and failure.
In an age of fundamental conflicts of interests and cultural cleavage between
states, and under the omnipresent threat of nuclear weapons, diplomatic norms
remain one of the few stable foundations of international If the
society. relationship
between ends and means appears irrational in the nuclear age, this serves to reinforce
diplomacy's importance as the only alternative to total destruction.
Throughout the ages, the main functions of diplomacy have remained the same.
The qualities demanded of the professional have not changed since their
diplomat
formulation by Francois de Callieres at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

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208 Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited

Monumental developments in international relations notwithstanding, the second

attempt at codification of diplomatic procedures was made as long as 150 years after
the Congress of Vienna. As Zara Steiner notes: 'despite differences, the older forms
proved to be surprisingly resistant to change'.66 So while the diplomat may have
declined in power and status, and been joined by other servants of the state for the
proper fulfilment of the diplomatic function, it is a function which continues, and
may have become more rather than less entrenched with the expansion of inter
national society. It would not be surprising if this era was to be characterized not as
the age of diplomacy's decline, but as the century of diplomacy.

References and notes

?. R. Aron, Peace and. War (London, 1966), p. 58. See also, J. W. Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy
and Rules (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 203-4.
2. G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston, 1955), pp. 71-82; A. G. Craig, A. L. George, Force
and Statecraft (Oxford, 1983), pp. 11-16.
3. H. Bull, The Anarchical Society (London, 1977), pp. 162-163; for other definitions see, A. James,
*
Diplomacy and International Society', International Relations, 6 (1980), p. 936; A. Watson,
Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States (New York, 1983), p. 11; H. Nicolson, (London,
Diplomacy
1969), pp. 7,12-16; G. K. Mookerjee, Diplomacy (New Delhi, 1973), p. 100; E. Plischke, Microstates
in World Affairs 1977), p. 41; J. D. B. Miller, The World
(Washington, of States (London, 1981),
p. 33; A. James, 'International Society', British Journal of International Studies, 4 (1978), p. 97;
Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Lord Gore-Booth, D. Pakenham
Practice, (eds.) (London, 1979), p. 3.
4. E. Satow, op. cit., p. 3. H. Nicolson, Diplomacy (London, 1969), pp. 12, 82; J. Cable, 'Diplomacy: A
Case for Resuscitation', International Relations, 7 (1983), p. 2261; F. S. Northedge, 'The Nature of
Foreign Policy', in F. S. Northedge (ed.), The Foreign Policies of the Powers (London, 1968),
pp. 1-3.
5. J. Der Derian, On Diplomacy (Oxford, 1987), pp. 1-3.
6. G. A. Craig, The Historian and the Study of International Relations', The American Historical
Review, 88 (1983); H. Butterfield, 'The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy', inH. Butterfield,
M. Wight, Diplomatic Investigations (London, 1966), p. 183.
7. G. Modelski, Principles of World Politics(London, 1972), pp. 180-206; J. Galtung, The True Worlds
(New York, 1980), pp. 382,421; See also, P. G. Lauren, 'Diplomacy: History, Theory, and Policy', in
P. G. Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy (New York, 1979), pp. 3-18.
8. A. J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven, 1959), pp. 14-22; H.
Butterfield, op. cit., pp. 181-2. Only after the nature of the inter-war period had been revealed did the
image of the past undergo a metamorphosis. Thus, despite the relentless criticism of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, these periods were subsequently portrayed as the Golden Age of European
diplomacy.
9. F. Gilbert, To the Farewell Address (New York, 1965), pp. 60-75; F. Gilbert, 'The "New Diplomacy"
of the Eighteenth Century', World Politics, 4 (1951), pp. 1-38; R. D. Masters, 'The Lockean
Tradition in American Foreign Policy', International Affairs, 21 (1967), pp. 253-77; E. D. Cronon
(ed.), The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson (Indianapolis, 1965), p. 447.
10. See, M. Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, 1978), p. 33, and pp. 25, 75, 93,
132; see also, H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1973), p. 639.
11. F. Gilbert, To the Farewell Address, p. 66; E. L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of
International Relations (London, 1976), pp. 50-8.
12. See, L. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition (New York, 1955), pp. 3-11, 284-309.
13. A. J. Mayer, op. cit., pp. 329-67; G. A. Craig, A. L. George, op. cit., pp. 52-4; T. A. Bailey,
Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (Chicago, 1963), pp. 82-4; also, C. Thome, Ideology and Power
(London, 1965), p. 175; E. Weisband, The Ideology of American Foreign Policy: A Paradigm of
Lockean Liberalism (Beverly Hills, 1973), p. 19.
14. T. A. Bailey, op. cit., pp. 22-7; A. J. Mayer, op. cit., pp. 275-7, 371-3.
15. For the text of the president's address see, E. D. Cronon, op. cit., pp. 438-45; see also A. J. Mayer,
op. p. 339 and A. L. George,
cit., J. L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (New York,
1956), pp. 199-201.
16. H. W. Brands, 'Unpremeditated Lansing: His "Scraps'", Diplomatic History, 9 (1985), pp. 30-2;
D. D. Lazo, 'A Question of Loyalty: Robert Lansing and the Treaty of Versailles', ibid., pp. 35-53.
17. A. L. George, J. L. George, op. cit., pp. 219-39.

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 Sasson Sofer 209

18. D. Acheson, 'The Eclipse of the State Department', Foreign Affairs, 49 (1971), pp. 597-9.
19. H. Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (London, 1969), pp. 185-211; H. Nicolson, The Evolution of
Diplomatic Method (London, 1953), pp. 87-9; see also, H. J. Morgenthau, 'The Main Springs of
American Foreign Policy', in R. A. Goldwin, Readings in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1959),
pp. 633-9.
20. R. Aron, op. cit., p. 100; see also, A. Eban, The New Diplomacy (New York, 1983), p. 341; H. Bull,
The Anarchical Society, p. 183; H. Nicolson, Diplomacy, p. 245; C. V. Crabb, Nations inMultipolar
World (New York, 1968), pp. 78-9; E. B. Haas, A. S. Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations
(New York, 1956), p. 153; G. A. Craig, 'On the Nature of Diplomatic History: The Relevance of Some
Old Books', in P. G. Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy, p. 33.
21. C. J. Friedrich, Z. K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York, 1956), p. 354;
K. J. Holsti, International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, 1972), pp. 203-5; A. Watson, op. cit., p. 71.
22. Z. Steiner,
The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London, 1982), pp. 21-2; Z. Steiner,
'Foreign Ministries Old and New', International Journal, 17 (1981-1982), p. 359; see also, G. A.
Craig, 'The Professional Diplomat and His Problems 1919-1939', World Politics, 4 (1952),
pp. 145-6.
23. On totalitarian diplomacy see also, M. I. Handel, The Diplomacy of Surprise: Hitler, Nixon, Sadat
(Cambridge, Mass., 1981), pp. 9-10; H. Nicolson, Diplomacy, pp. 144, 147.
24. H. S. Hughes, 'The Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism: 1922-1932', in G. A. Craig, F. Gilbert (eds.),
The Diplomats 1919-1939 (New York, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 512-36; G. A. Craig, War, Politics and
Diplomacy (New York, 1966), pp. 220-6.
25. Z. Steiner, The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries, p. 12; G. A. Craig, War, Politics and Diplomacy,
pp. 226-31; see also, E. Jackel, Hitler's World View (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), pp. 27-46; G. A.
Craig, 'The German Foreign Office from Neurath to Ribbentrop', in G. A. Craig, F. Gilbert, op. cit.,
vol. 2, pp. 406-36.
26. A. E. Senn, Readings in Russian Political and Diplomatic History (Honewood, 1956), vol. 2,
pp. 32-3; T. J. Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology (London, 1979), pp. 151-2.
27. See H. Nicolson, Diplomacy, pp. 58-9.
28. See, V. Kubalkova, A. A. Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism and the Theory of International
Relations (London, 1980), pp. 12-62, 298-325; T. J. Uldricks, op. cit., pp. 143-7.
29. T. H. von Laue, 'Soviet Diplomacy: G. V. Chicherin, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
1918-1930', in G. A. Craig, F. Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 234-81; M. Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled
(Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p. 282.
30. A. B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History (Princeton, 1960), pp. 324-44, 498; see
also, V. V. Aspaturian, 'Dialectics and Duplicity in Soviet Diplomacy', International Affairs, 17
(1963), p. 48. Marx and Engels did not have a complimentary view of Russian diplomatic tradition.
31. M. Toon, 'In Defense of the Foreign Service', New York Times Magazine (12 December 1982); on
Soviet diplomacy see also, J. G. Whealan, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiations Behavior (Boulder,
1983); A. Eban, op. cit., pp. 89-133; G. A. Craig, War, Politics and Diplomacy, pp. 231-47; R. H.
McNeal, International Relations Among Communists (Englewood Cliffs, 1967), pp. 1-40.
32. See also, A. Bozeman, 'The International Order in a Multicultural World'; and R. Dore, 'Unity and
Diversity in Contemporary World Culture', in H. Bull, A. Watson (eds.), The Expansion of Inter
national Society (Oxford, 1985), pp. 387-424; H. Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 243-8.
33. M. Keens-Soper, 'The Liberal Disposition of Diplomacy', International Relations, 5 (1975),
pp. 913-14; G. A. Craig, War, Politics and Diplomacy, p. 204; A. Gyorgy, G. A. Blackwood,
Ideologies in World Affairs (Waltham, 1967), p. 235.
34. See also, H. Bull, 'The Revolt Against theWest', in H. Bull, A. Watson, op. cit., pp. 217-28; the Sixth
Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly convened in May 1974 adopted the
declaration on NIEO.
35. See also, A. Watson, op. cit., pp. 169-70; H. Bull, 'The Emergence of a Universal International
Society', in H. Bull, A. Watson, op. cit., p. 124; G. Mcdermott, The New Diplomacy (London, 1973),
p. 16;W. Levi, Law and Politics in the International Society (Beverly Hills, 1976), p. 137.
36. C. Navari, 'Diplomatic Structure and Idiom', in J. Mayall (ed.), The Community of States (London,
1982), p. 29.
37. Ibid., pp. 29-30; G. K. Mookerjee, 109; A. Eban, op. cit., pp. 171-88; M. Handel,
op. cit., p. Weak
States in the International System (London, 1981), pp. 265-76; H. Nicolson, The Evolution of
Diplomatic Method, pp. 84-93; A. B. Baker, 'Small State Diplomacy', and Sir Pierson Dixon,
'Diplomacy at the United Nations', in D. S. Kertesz, A. M. Fitzsimons (eds.), Diplomacy in a
Changing World (Notre Dame, 1959), pp. 339-64, 373-85.
38. J. P. Boyce, Foreign Affairs for New States (New York, 1977), pp. 35-9; E. Plischke, Microstates in
World Affairs, pp. 41-60; A. Watson, op. cit., pp. 158-75; G. W. Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded
World (Boston, 1976), pp. 278-98.

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 210 Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited

39. H. Nicolson, p. 84; see also, H. Nicolson,

Diplomacy, The Evolution of Diplomatie Method, p. 78.
40. B. R. Mowat, Diplomacy and Peace (London, 1935), p. 68; H. Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic
Method, p. 76; A. Eban, op. cit., p. 347.
41. H. Nicolson, The Old Diplomacy and the New (London, 1961), p. 8; H. Nicolson, The Evolution of
Diplomatic Method, pp. 82, 90.
42. W. Lippman, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston, 1955), p. 20.
43. On public opinion and Diplomacy see, H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 532-40; E.
Plischke, Conduct of American Diplomacy (Princeton, 1961), pp. 31-8; A. M. Rendel, 'Policy
Makers and Opinion', International Journal, 30 (1974-1975), pp. 80-91; A. G. Craig, A. L. George,
op. cit., pp. 60-72; A. Eban, op. cit., pp. 345-58.
44. Such was the attitude toward Begin and Sadat in the Middle East peace negotiations. Eban's claim that
the media 'changed the whole spirit and nature of diplomacy', is exaggerated. A. Eban, op. cit.,
p. 345; Kissinger argues that the media can be beneficial in increasing the public's understanding of
policy. Considering Kissinger's experience, it is debatable whether the diplomat or the journalist
makes better use of the others'
services. Interview, American Heritage (August-September, 1983).
45. See also, L. Merchant,'New Techniques in Diplomacy', in E. A. J. Johnson, The Dimensions of
Diplomacy (Baltimore, 1964), 125-7; R. R. Fagen, 'Some Assessments and Uses of Public Opinion in
Diplomacy', The Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), pp. 451-7.
46. D. Busk, The Craft of Diplomacy (London, 1967), pp. 238-43; A. Watson, op. cit., pp. 139-47; D.
Acheson, op. cit., p. 605; H. Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, pp. 81-2; L.
Merchant, pp. 121-4.
47. H. Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, p. 82.
48. E. Plischke, Summit Diplomacy (College Park, 1958), pp. 3-4; A. Eban, op. cit., p. 344.
49. E. Plischke, Conduct of American Diplomacy, p. 49; J. D. B. Miller, op. cit., pp. 42-3; G. Ball, op.
cit., pp. 29-45.
50. M. Toon, op. cit.; see also, H. A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), p. 1220; H. A.
Kissinger, A World Restored (Boston, 1957), p. 2; G. W. Ball, op. cit., 30-1; C. V. Crabb, op. cit.,
pp. 86-92; G. A. Craig, A. L. George, op. cit., 66-7.
51. K. W. Thompson, American Diplomacy and Emergent Patterns (New York, 1962), pp. 243-56; H. J.
Morgenthau, The Restoration of American Politics (Chicago, 1962), pp. 285-92; A. Eban, op. cit.,
pp. 358-64; H. Nicolson, Diplomacy, pp. 157-8; K. J. Holsti, op. cit., pp. 177-8; J. Cable, op. cit.,
pp. 2270-7. The abortive treaty of Bjorko, agreed upon by the Kaiser and the Czar in July 1905, is the
most outstanding example of an understanding between heads of state cancelled by professional
diplomats.
52. J. W. Beyen, 'Diplomacy by Conference', in K. Braunias, G. Stourzh (eds.), Contemporary
Diplomacy (Vienna, 1959), pp. 59-67; H. Butterfield, op. cit., p. 188.
53. See also, Sir Pierson Dixon, op. cit.; E. Plischke, Conduct of American Diplomacy, pp. 27-31; H. J.
Morgenthau, The Restoration of American Politics, p. 201; H. Bull, The Anarchical Society,
pp. 165-6; A. Watson, op. cit., p. 20.
54. A. Eban, op. cit., p. 241; see also, H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 525-31; A.
Watson, op. cit., pp. 151-7; C. Navari, op. cit., p. 25; T. Hovet, 'United Nations Diplomacy', Inter
national Affairs, 17 (1963), pp. 29-41.
55. H. Nicolson, Diplomacy, p. 158; see also E. Satow, op. cit., pp. 229-35.
56. Quoted in G. P. Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats (Stanford, 1976), p. 231; see also, Lord
Vansittart, 'The Decline of Diplomacy', Foreign Affairs, 28 (1950), pp. 177-88.
57. G. F. Kennan, Memories (Boston, 1972), vol. 2, 319-20; D. Acheson, op. cit., pp. 593, 602; G. P.
Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, p. 226; A. Eban, op. cit., p. 369; A. Watson, op. cit., p. 121 ;H.
Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, pp. 74-5; H. Nicolson, The Old Diplomacy and the
New, p. 3; Z. Steiner, The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries, pp. 20, 25-6.
58. Z. Steiner, Foreign Ministries Old and New, pp. 365-6; Z. Steiner, The Time Survey of Foreign
Ministries, pp. 13-14,28-32; see also, M. Donelan, 'The Trade of Diplomacy', International Affairs,
45 (1969), pp. 605-16; G. P. Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats; the reforms were instituted mainly
during the years 1890-1925. A second period of change came after World War II.
59. H. M. Cardozo, Diplomats in International Cooperation: Stepchildren of the Foreign Service (Ithaca,
1962), pp. 6-7.
60. See also, J. Ayers, Diplomacy and Its Discontents (Toronto, 1971), pp. 123-34.
61. H. A. Kissinger, American Heritage, p. 50.
62. Eban presents a considered and balanced view of this issue: 'prime ministries and foreign ministries do
much hard negotiating, and ambassadors often have a strong influence on policy.' A. Eban, op. cit.,
p. 369; see also, J. Cable, op. cit., pp. 2262-3, 2268-9; G. A. Craig, War, Politics and Diplomacy,
pp. 281-5; H. Nicolson, Diplomacy, pp. 38, 74, 122.
63. G. Mcdermott, op. cit., p. 47.

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 Sasson Sofer 211

64. H. The Anarchical

Bull, Society, pp. 179-81; K. J. Holsti, op. cit., pp. 182-5; A. Watson, op. cit.,
pp. 120-31; H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 519-24; A. James, International
Society, 98-9.
65. M. Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', in H. Butterfield, M. Wight, op. cit.,
pp. 89-131; Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 167-79, 315-17; A. James, 'Diplomacy and Inter
national Society', pp. 940-1; A. Watson, op. cit., pp. 9-21; A. Watson, 'European International
Society and Its Expansion', H. Bull, 'The Emergence of Universal International Society', in H. Bull,
A. Watson, op. cit., pp. 13-32, 117-26.
66. Z. Steiner, Foreign Ministries Old and New, p. 362; G. A. Craig, 'On the Nature of Diplomatic
History: The Relevance of Some Old Books', in P. G. Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy, pp. 21-42.

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