1. Cequena v.

Bolante
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEÑA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent.

G.R. No. 137944 (330 SCRA 216)

April 6, 2000

Panganiban, J.

FACTS:
Prior to 1954, the land having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 26-0027 situated in Binangonan, Rizal was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, the father of respondent. Sinforoso died in
1930. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza
of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito
Mendoza, the father of the petitioners and brother of Sinforoso.

During the cadastral survey, respondent Honorata is the present occupant of the land
together with Miguel Mendoza, another brother of the petitioners. The trial court
rendered the petitioners as the lawful owner and possessors of the land. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision because the genuineness and the due
execution of the affidavit. It was said to be insufficient to overcome the denial of
respondent and her mother. Moreover, the probative value of petitioners’ tax receipts
and declarations paled in comparison with respondent’s proof of ownership of the
disputed parcel. The actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by
respondent since 1985 gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code. The
petitioners contended otherwise that she came into possession through force and
violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.

ISSUES:
1.) Did the respondent have the actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession
of the land?
2.) Are tax declarations and receipts a conclusive evidence of ownership or
possession?

HELD:
1.) Yes. Possession by the petitioner before 1985 was not exclusive, as the
respondent also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners’ father
and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse
possession of the land.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor
because, benefitting from her father’s tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she
has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners’
father acquired joint possession only in 1952.

2.) No. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At
most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property
for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. The
petitioners’ claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.

2. Dizon v. Beltran
EDDIE E. DIZON and BRYAN R. DIZON, petitioners, vs.
YOLANDA VIDA P. BELTRAN, respondent.

FACTS:
Spouses Dizon (Eddie and Verona) entered into a compromise agreement that their
conjugal home shall be put into sale after Verona has issued a Temporary Protection
Order against Eddie and James. whereby they contemplated selling the disputed
property in the amount of not less than P4,000,000.00, which price shall be increased
by P100,000.00 for every succeeding year until the same is finally sold.
Verona died on December 8, 2009 due to cardio-respiratory arrest, upon
knowledge of such death, Eddie Dizon immediately requested to be offshored from work
as a seafarer. However, he was not able to make it to Verona’s burial upon his arrival
on December 21, 2009.
A copy was furnished to Eddie by Vida Beltran a deed of absolute sale which
was conveyed to her for P1,500,000.00.
Eddie alleged that such sale was forged and the amount of 1,500,000.00 was not
in accord with the Spouses Dizon’s agreement to sell the disputed property for not less
than P4,000,000.00.
On May 18, 2010, Vida sent a formal letter requiring the petitioners to vacate the
disputed property, but to no avail.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Vida has a cause of action for unlawful detainer against the petitioners
considering that the Deed was falsified.

HELD:
No. When the Deed was executed on December 1, 2009, Eddie claimed that he was
abroad while Verona was already unconscious. Vida did not directly refute these
allegations and instead pointed out that the Deed was pre-signed in April of 2008. The
foregoing circumstances reduced the Deed into the category of a private instrument.

With respect to deeds of sale or conveyance, what spells the difference between a
public document and a private document is the acknowledgment in the former that the
parties acknowledging the document appear before the notary public and specifically
manifest under oath that they are the persons who executed it, and acknowledge that
the same are their free act and deed.

In the instant petition, Vida impliedly admits the irregularity of the Deed’s notarization as
both of the vendors were not personally present. Consequently, clue execution can no
longer be presumed. Besides, the extant circumstances surrounding the controversy
constitute preponderant evidence suggesting that forgery was committed. Eddie
promptly filed a criminal case for falsification of documents and a civil case to nullify the
Deed. Later, the Office of the Davao City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict
Vida for falsification. Consequently, the issue of ownership cannot be disregarded in the
unlawful detainer case. It bears stressing though that while the RTC aptly resolved the
issue of ownership, it is at best preliminary and shall not be determinative of the
outcome of the two other cases filed by Eddie against Vida.

3. Lamsis v. Dong-e

DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD MONDIGUING, JOSE

VALDEZ, JR. and Heirs of AGUSTIN KITMA, represented
by EUGENE KITMA, petitioners, vs. MARGARITA
SEMON DONG-E, respondent

FACTS:

Margarita Semon Dong-E’s (Margarita) family’s ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1
can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap. Upon Ap-aps death,
the property was inherited by his children, who obtained a survey plan in 1964 which
included Lot No. 1. On the same year, they declared the property for taxation purposes
in the name of The Heirs of Ap-ap. The heirs of Ap-ap then executed a Deed of
Quitclaim on February 26, 1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margaritas
father).
Sometime between 1976 and 1978, Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary Lamsis,
allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot
No. 1 together with their respective families. They were allowed to erect their houses,
introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo Lamsis and Nancy
Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners Delfin Lamsis
(Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions of Lot No.
1. Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied 5,000
square meters thereof. Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the acts of
their first cousins.

When Gilbert Semon died in 1983, his children extrajudicially partitioned the property
among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita. Since then,
Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1 and occupied and improved the
property together with her husband; while at the same time, tolerating her first cousins
occupation of portions of the same lot.

This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began
expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof. Delfin
allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard Mondiguing
(Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose).

With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of ownership,

possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of Lot No. 1 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The complaint prayed for the annulment
of the sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to vacate the portions of the
property which exceed the areas allowed to them by Margarita. Margarita claimed that,
as they are her first cousins, she is willing to donate to Delfin and Agustin a portion of
Lot No. 1, provided that she retains the power to choose such portion.

Petitioners contend that Margarita do not own such parcel of land they are
possessing, and such property is owned by the heirs of Joaquin Smith. To bolster
her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as evidence an
unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands
(CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting
favorably on her and her siblings’ ancestral land claim over a portion of the 186,090-
square meter property stating the denial of Thomas Smith’s application of Ancestral
Land and recognizing Ap-ap as the rightful heir thereof.

ISSUE:
1. Whether petitioners, through long-term possession, have acquired the property by
prescription.

2. Whether the registration proceeding on certification of Ancestral Lands filed by

respondent Margarita would constitute as a litis pendencia over the reivindicatory case.

HELD:

1. No. Petitioners admitted that they had occupied the property by tolerance of the
owner thereof. Having made this admission, they cannot claim that they have acquired
the property by prescription unless they can prove acts of repudiation.
It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the concept of
an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in the concept of owner,
such as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive
prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such
repudiation has been communicated to the other party.
Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner
are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession by tolerance is not
adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed, do not start the
running of the period of prescription.

In the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act of
repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At most, we can
find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the property to
petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the same was done only in 1998, shortly before
respondent filed a case against them. Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the
operation of acquisitve prescription had yet to be attained.

2. No. Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands)
is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a
reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership.

“For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites
must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other case.”

The third element is missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not
constitute res judicata or be conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the
reivindicatory case. Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the
reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed in favor of the certification case.