Bravo v.

Merdegia
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1430, October 22, 1999
Editha L. Roxas
Facts:
Judge Narciso G. Bravo, Presiding Judge of Branch 46 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate filed a
complaint charging respondent Judge Ricardo M. Merdegia, Presiding Judge of Branch 45 of said court,
with (11) falsification of the Certificate of Service and (2) rendition of an unjust judgment through
negligence or gross ignorance of the law. These acts were allegedly committed in connection with Civil
Case No. 4241, entitled Narciso J. Bravo vs. Masbate Colleges, Inc., and Manuel J. Bunan, which was
assigned to respondent's sala. Complainant further averred that in the said decision he was ordered to
pay moral damages of P10,000; attorney's fees of P10,000; and litigation expenses of P3,000. Such
awards had no legal basis, as they did not fall under the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2208 of the Civil
Code. Respondent then, as alleged by the complainant, committed a felonious act of rendering an unjust
judgment through negligence or gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant thereafter submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator a certified true copy of
respondent's decision in Civil Case No. 4241 and a copy of his letter written in the official stationery of
his office, addressed to the respondent wherein he pointed out and discussed the alleged palpable
errors in the decision.

Issue: Whether Judge Merdegia guilty of rendering an unjust judgment through negligence.

Ruling: NO. The SC upheld the findings of the Deputy Court Administrator, which provides that:

Anent the charges of ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust judgment, a cursory reading
of the complaint and its annexes shows that these charges arose from respondent's appreciation of the
evidence of the parties in the civil case in which complainant as plaintiff lost. It is respondent's decision
which is actually being questioned.

Since obviously complainant disagrees with respondent Judge's ruling in the case, his remedy was
to appeal the decision, as he in fact did, and not to file an administrative complaint against the
judge. He must await the final outcome of his appeal so that it can then be properly determined
whether an administrative complaint lies against the judge. Even then and even if the appellate
court upholds complainant's appeal, respondent judge cannot be held administratively liable in
the absence of showing of malice or wrongful conduct on his part in rendering his decision.
(Pagayanan vs. dela Victoria, A.M. OCA IPI 97-282-RTJ, March 4, 1998).

Moreover, any action that may be taken with respect to these charges may be premature at this
stage and may pre-empt the action that the Court of Appeals may take on the appeal. (Paulina S.
Alvernaz vs. Judge Manuel Padolina, A.M. No. RTJ 90-612).
 JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
Editha L. Roxas
Facts: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile,
(Napoles and the PDAF scam) before the Sandiganbayan (SB). Enrile motion to dismiss for lack of
evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail; and a supplemental
opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information.

The SB heard both motions and denied Enrile’s motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest
on the plunder case against the accused. Before the date of arraignment, Enrile filed a motion for bill of
particulars before the SB but the latter denied Enrile’s motion essentially on the following grounds:

(1) the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information;
and
(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.

Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him and alleges that he was left to speculate on what his
specific participation in the crime of plunder had been.

ISSUE: W/N the denial of the motion for bill of particulars because it is just “substantial reiterations”
was proper.

RULING: No. The denial was not proper. That every element constituting the offense had been alleged
in the Information does not preclude the accused from requesting for more specific details of the
various acts or omissions he is alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the
function of a bill of particulars.

Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This right requires that the offense charged be
stated with clarity and with certainty in the information charging him to inform the accused of the crime
he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense. An Information only needs to state
the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts supporting
the ultimate facts) can be provided during the trial.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, reads:

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public officer who, by himself or in

connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered
by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof
forfeited in favor of the State. [Emphasis supplied.]

Based on this definition, the elements of plunder are:

(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of government-owned or
-controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
(f) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence
to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. [Emphasis supplied.]

Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and the
Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one another and
with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as
an essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by two or by all of the accused.  In the crime of plunder, the
amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the
total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million.

However, Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the following questions –
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “combination”? What are the particular overt
acts which constitute the “series”? Who committed those acts? [Emphasis ours.]

The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or series of overt or criminal acts.”
Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act.

The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and made
the necessary determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly
after Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of documents
marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence
of these desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous
documents what the desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by
the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent defense.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFON
G.R. No. 12602, March 14, 2003
Editha L. Roxas
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 18, 1993 at Barangay Oring, Municipality of Caramoan, Province of
Camarines Sur the accused Expedito Alfon, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation
while armed with a fan knife (balisong biente nueve) without any warning whatsoever did, assaulted
and stabbed the victim Tomas S. Alferez hitting the latter twice on his chest and other parts of the body
thereby inflicting stab wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death.

RTC finds accused Expedito Alfon guilty and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua. The trial court concluded that the eyewitnesses’ testimonies convincingly
established that appellant had killed the victim with treachery. It, however, ruled out the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation for lack of proof. It rejected the denial and version of the
appellant due to the lack of supporting evidence.

Alfonso avers that the killing could not have been attended by treachery considering that the wounds
were inflicted on the front of the victim. As discussed earlier, he seeks to cast doubt on the
prosecution’s averment that the attack came from behind, arguing that the attack could be more likely
frontal. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Alfon there is treachery.

Ruling: YES.
The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim which renders the latter
unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. This
criterion applies, whether the attack is frontal or from behind. Even a frontal attack could be
treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the
attack or avoid it. The fact that the location of the fatal stab wound is in front does not in itself negate
treachery.

In the case at bar, it was established that appellant came from behind, went towards the right of the
victim, and suddenly stabbed the victim’s chest while holding the latter’s left shoulder. Evidence shows
that, first, at the time of attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, as he was unarmed
and totally unsuspecting when appellant suddenly held and stabbed him; and second, appellant
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means of attack, as he was seen surreptitiously
following the victim with a balisong tucked under his waist. Clearly therefore, treachery attended the
crime.
 Norberto Cruz y Bartolome v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014
Editha L. Roxas
Facts: The petitioner Norberto Cruz was charged with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness
involving different victims. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Cruz guilty of both
crimes charged, hence, this appeal.

Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their plastic wares and glass wares
in La Union. Upon reaching the place, they set up their tents to have a place to sleep. Petitioner’s wife
and their driver went back to Manila to get more goods. While sleeping, AAA felt that somebody was on
top of her mashing her breast and touching her private part. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she
will be killed. AAA fought back and Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. AA left the tent to
seek for help. When she returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB.
This prompted Norberto to leave the tent.

Norberto denies the commission of the crime alleging that he could not possibly do the acts imputed out
in the open as there were many people preparing for the “simbang gabi”. He further assails the
credibility AAA for the crime of rape, alleging that the complaints were filed only for the purpose of
extorting money from him.

Issue: Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape against AAA?

Ruling: NO, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. The basic element of rape is carnal knowledge of
a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as “the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with
a woman,” in other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
touches the external genitalia of the female. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the
penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.

Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage.
In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of
execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates
rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the
felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal
relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim and was already touching her genitalia with his hands
and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on
her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be
highly unwarranted. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or “susceptible of double interpretation,”
such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular
injury.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act of touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts
of lasciviousness is committed. Petitioner’s embracing and touching the victim’s vagina and breasts did
not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in
the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie
with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her. The intent to commit rape should not
easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed
overt acts leading to rape.

Hence, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape.