JOSELANO GUEVARRA, A.C. No.

7136
Complainant,  
  PUNO, C.J.,
  QUISUMBING,
  YNARES-SANTIAGO,
  SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
  CARPIO,
versus AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
  CORONA,
  CARPIO MORALES,
  AZCUNA,
  TINGA,
  CHICO-NAZARIO,
  GARCIA,
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL VELASCO, JR., and
EALA, NACHURA, JJ.
Respondent. Promulgated:
  August 1, 2007
 

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO vs. ATTY.
NESTOR A. BAMBA Adm. Case No. 6708,
August 25, 2005
FACTS:

Quiambao was the president and managing director of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family-owned corporation engaged in providing securit
y and investigation services. She employed the legal services of Atty. Bamba  not only for the corporate affairs of AIB but also for her personal case. In f
act, Atty. Bamba acted as her counsel of record in an ejectment case. Atty. Bamba convinced the complainant to form a new security agency, QRMSI, wi
th the former as a silent partner. She then resigned. However, about six months thereafter, Atty. Bamba filed on behalf of AIB a complaint for replevin a
nd damages against her for the purpose of recovering from her the car of AIB assigned to her as a service vehicle. At this point the ejectment case was st
ill pending and he did not withdraw as counsel.

It was also averred that Atty. Bamba also convinced complainant’s brother to organize another security agency, SESSI, where the former served as its in
corporator, director, and president.
 

RULING:

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that Atty. Bamba;s theory is incorrect that since the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases 
with different issues, parties, and subject matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though unrelate
d, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the respondent may assert that the complainant ex
pressly consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his client
s and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsi
bility.

It must be noted that Republic Act No. 5487, otherwise known as the Private Security Agency Law, prohibits a person from organizing or having an inte
rest in more than one security agency. Thus, in organizing SESSI, the Atty. Bamba violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibilit
y, which mandates lawyers to promote respect for the law and refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law. Atty. Bamba is 
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR

DECISION
 
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyers oath.
 
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-
fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had
three children.
 
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that
from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone
calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you
at Megamall.
 
 Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night
or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from
work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her
parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
 
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together
on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which
Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
 
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and
friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled
off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.
 
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card
bearing the words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
handwritten letter datedOctober 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
 
My everdearest Irene,
 
By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the
aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what
youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting
happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love
but then lose it again? Or is it because theres a bigger plan for the two of
us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done
everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your
vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
 
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes
on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your
single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is
gone and until we are together again.
 
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us
to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my
mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
 
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
 
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE
YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
 
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG
AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]
 
Eternally yours,
 
NOLI
 
 
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at
No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April
2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends
saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert,
she was pregnant.
 
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card
on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
 
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR
ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the
couple attended the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of
French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B
at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page
21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report
is attached as Annex C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship
supplied),
 
 
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4.            Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of
their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general
public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
 
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
 
15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his
gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership
in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling
it a piece of paper. Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter
to complainants bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to
continue his love for her until we are together again, as now they are.
[6]
 (Underscoring supplied),
 
 
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
 
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15
of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents relationship
with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as
his relationship with his own family:
 
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful
relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware
ofRespondents special friendship with Irene.
 
x x x x
 
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to
the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a
mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
 handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and
Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of
the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
 
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
 
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an
inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article
XV, Sec. 2).[9]
 
 
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
 
19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and
the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing
obsessively his illicit love for the complainants wife, hemocked the
institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the
complainants marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades
the legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
 
 
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
 
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph
19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the
acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as
would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
 
To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,[12] alleging that
Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live
Birth as the girls father.Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy
of a Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent as
the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February
14, 2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.
 
 Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO
DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having
personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants
Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a
civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending
before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
 
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants Complaint-
Affidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct
examination.[16]Respondents counsel did not cross-examine complainant.[17]
 
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26,
2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading:
 
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
 
 
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
 
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring
supplied)
 
 
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed
the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
 
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
 
 RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)
 
 
Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed
pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
 
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for
lack of merit, gave no reasontherefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution
shows.
 
Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of
complainant, that there is no evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the
IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
 
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7,
2000 (Exh. C) and the news item published in the Manila
Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which
support the accusation of complainant against respondent.
 
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,
respondent through counsel made the following statements to wit:
Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint,
the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile
and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . .
 
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an
admission that there is indeed a special relationship between him
 and complainants wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex
H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth
of the child Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
it should be noted that complainants wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the
fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with
Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make
any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It
should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied
that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
 
 
Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an
adulterous relationship with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the
Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married woman who shall have
sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void.[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such
relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families.
 
In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,
 
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an
admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it
in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial
facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
[27]
 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
 
A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge
of Irenes daughter Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said
certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father. And
the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired information on DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage Certificate[29] shows that they were
affixed by one and the same person.Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
 
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in
his January 29, 2003 Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared
that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father
is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a lawyer.[31]
 
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has
been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence
adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other
party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other[32] which is the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
 
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.
 
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is
required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
 
 
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
 practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
 
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the
acts hereinabove enumerated.
 
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
 
 
under scandalous circumstances.[34]
 
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or
suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous
circumstances. Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
 
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a
mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse,
under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or
shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
 
x x x x,
 
 
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual
intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
 
 
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on
the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether
the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of
this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
  
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he
had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet,
and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to
merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
 
xxxx
 
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not
all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]
 
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not
the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that
the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors,
i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit
and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)
 
 
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission
to practice law which goes:
 
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of
law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I willsupport its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
 doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
 
 
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the
Constitution reading:
 
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.
 
 
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[40]
 
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.
 
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of
the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on March 22, 2005
informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition for nullity of his (complainants)
marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against
respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case,
which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
 
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainants Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
 
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same
 pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal,
the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally
resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though
no appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
 
 
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared
void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the
marriage was declared null and void.[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be aware
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed,
unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[44] In
carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that
her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself
being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And
he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
 
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ,
respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December
23, 2003 Motion toWithdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In
reversing the City Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ Secretary
Simeon Datumanong held:
 
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant
would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all
the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant
that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did
when complainant confronted her about Ealasfrequent phone calls and
text messages to her. Complainant also personally
witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knewMoje to
be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to
another woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her
about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both
respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Mojes subsequent
relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which
 was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital
vows with complainant.
 
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently
cohabited. Especially since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always
seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address
that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had
formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address
appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all
throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both
respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out
there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the
nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of
birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the
father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning
nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainants
supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly
beside the point for bothrespondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
 
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants
motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were
to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in
court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
 
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:
 
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge
is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from
that which courts assume in trying criminal case [47] (Italics in the
original),
 
  
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
 
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.
 
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06
passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines isANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
 
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of
the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
the Philippines.And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
 
This Decision takes effect immediately.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
Guevarra vs. Eala

Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C. No. 7136. August 1, 2007

FACTS:
Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committe on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a Noli Eala for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Mr. Guevarra alleged that his wife Irene Moje have been maintaining an illicit affair with Atty. Eala during their marriage, and presented certain facts proving
such allegation. These includes a social card, the preparation of which was admitted by the respondent and their (Atty. Eala and Ms. Moje) living together in a house which was
a few blocks aways from the church where Ms. Moje had exchange marital vows with the complainant. Also alleged and proven was the fact that the respondent was the father
of the complainant's daughter. The complainant further went on saying that Atty. Eala and his wife have been openly flaunting their adulterous relationship.

For Mr. Guevarra, respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit
love for the complainant's wife, Atty. Eala was charged to have mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits
adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Committee on Bar Discipline found the charge against sufficiently proven and recommended that Atty. Eala be disbarred for violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit. The complainant then went to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Where or not Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath"?

RULING:
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared
null and void. As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void,
and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,  Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Posted 27th July 2013 by Arthur Layese

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672

Complainant,
Present:
 
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009
 
x-----------------------------------------x
 
RESOLUTION
 
CORONA, J.:
 
 
This is a complaint for disbarment [1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe
Marie Labiano, convinced his clients [2] to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial
[3] [4]
assistance  and expeditious collection on their claims.  To induce
them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them
text messages.
 
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn
affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail
upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and
utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan
of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card: [6]
 
Front
 
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
 
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
 
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719
 
 
 
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and
authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card. [7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its
report and recommendation, [9] found that respondent had
encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating
Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the Rules of Court.
Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded
with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier
penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of
Rule 8.02 of the CPR.And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to,
including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made
known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
 
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL
SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT
OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law
is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise
their talents as merchants advertise their wares. [13] To allow a
lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation
and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of
service to which every member of the bar is called. [14]
 
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
 
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE
DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL
BUSINESS.
 
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. [16]
 
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the
CPR which provides:
 
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT
MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
 
 
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost
any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent in order to gain employment) [17] as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence [19] (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and
referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
 
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his
answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
 
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation
on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a
more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment
violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR,
settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers
client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services. [20] Again the
Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in
his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals.
Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.
[21]
 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02
of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients
as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
 
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his
client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for
surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
 
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of
mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected.[22]It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he
is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the
clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. [23] Either of
these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement
which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of
the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients
cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes
malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining employment.[26]Thus, in this jurisdiction, we
adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of
the legal profession.
 
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including
violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the
sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy
slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate
to its findings.
 
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by
petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character
and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use
of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
 
 (a)         lawyers name;
(b)        name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c)         address;
(d)        telephone number and
(e)         special branch of law practiced.[28]
 
 
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial
assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure
clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of
their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule
that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
 
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating
Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this
resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
 
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
 
SO ORDERED.

In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie
Labiano, “pirated” a client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangan’s allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s calling card which appears as follows:
FRONT

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
 LAW OFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

BACK

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied authorizing the printing of such calling cards.
ISSUES: 
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano.
HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain
him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangan’s clients, Atty. Tolentino  committed an unethical,
predatory overstep into another’s legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano,
he admitted he actually knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his law office.  Through Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s
law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that Atty. Tolentino could produce a more
favorable result.
Labiano’s calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will finance legal actions for the clients. The rule is,  a lawyer shall not lend money to
a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection
with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances
may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the
prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states “w/ financial assistance“, was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with
a promise of loans to finance their legal actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a personal and direct hand in the printing of said calling cards, he cannot be
punished with severity. At any rate, for all the infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was suspended by the Supreme Court for one year.
 

Valencia vs dionisio
DECISION
 
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
 
This is an appeal for reinstatement to the Bar of respondent Dionisio C.
Antiniw.
 
The record shows that respondent was disbarred and his name stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys on April 26, 1991 in a consolidated Decision[4] of this Court,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
  
 
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1.
Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name
is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer
Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months from
finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against
Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and
Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.
 
In the aforesaid consolidated Decision, respondent was found guilty of
malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the
same as evidence for his client in court.
 
Respondents motion for reconsideration of the consolidated decision
disbarring him was denied by the Resolution of August 26, 1993.[5] In the same
Resolution, the Court also held with respect to respondents plea for mercy and
compassion that:
 
x x x the same is merely NOTED until such time as he would
have been able to satisfactorily show contrition and proof of his being
again worthy of membership in the legal profession.
 
Subsequently, in a Manifestation dated September 17, 1993,[6] respondent
proffered his apologies to the Court for his shortcomings as a legal practitioner
asserting that if there was an offense or oversight committed against the legal
profession, it was due to his sincere belief that he was doing it honestly to protect
the interest of his client. He pleaded that, pending his submission of proof showing
that he is again worthy of membership in the Bar, he be permitted to continue with
his notarial work. In a Resolution dated October 19, 1993,[7] the Court denied
respondents plea in the aforesaid Manifestation.
On January 4, 1994, respondent filed a Petition dated December 8,
[8]
1993  praying for leave to submit proof of his being again worthy to be re-
admitted to the legal profession.Attached to the Petition were testimonials,
affidavits and sworn certifications of known and outstanding members of his
community at Urdaneta, Pangasinan, as well as manifestos and resolutions of
groups and associations representing various sectors thereat, all attesting to his
honesty, worthiness, respectability and competency as a lawyer and as an elected
Board Member in Pangasinan. In a Resolution dated January 27, 1994,[9] the Court
denied said petition. A Letter dated February 1, 1995[10] which was sent to the
Court by Bishop Jesus C. Galang, D.D. of the Diocese of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
pleading for respondents reinstatement, was noted in the Courts Resolution
dated March 14, 1995.[11]
 
Respondent filed an Appeal for Reinstatement dated March 8, 1996,
[12]
 declaring that since his disbarment, he had embarked on and actively
participated in civic and humanitarian activities in the Fifth District of Pangasinan
where he was again elected for the third time as a Provincial Board Member and
for which activities he received Plaques of Appreciation and Recognition,
Resolution/Letters, Awards and Commendations from local government officials
of Pangasinan and different groups and associations in the province, all showing
that he is worthy to once again practice the legal profession. His appeal, however,
was denied by the Resolution dated April 23, 1996.[13]
 
On December 17, 1996, respondent filed a Plea for Re-Admission
dated December 8, 1996,[14] reiterating his earlier plea for the lifting of his
disbarment. The plea was also denied on January 28, 1997.[15]
 
On September 1, 1997, respondent again filed a Plea for Judicial Clemency
and Reinstatement to the Bar dated August 30, 1997,[16] submitting in support
thereof the favorable indorsements, letters and resolutions from the Pangasinan
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); the Executive Judges of the
Regional Trial Courts at Lingayen and Urdaneta, Pangasinan; the Provincial
Prosecutors Association of Pangasinan; Eastern Pangasinan Lawyers League; the
Provincial Board of Pangasinan; Rotary Club of Urdaneta; and the past National
President of the IBP, Atty. Numeriano G. Tanopo Jr. The foregoing plea was
merely noted by the Court on October 14, 1997.[17]
 
The following year, respondent filed an Appeal dated July 8, 1998,
[18]
 reiterating therein his apologies to the Court and promising that should he be
given back his license to practice law, he will live up to the exacting standards of
the legal profession and abide by the Code of Professional Ethics and the Lawyers
Oath. Among the written proofs appended to his appeal was the Letter dated June
18, 1998[19] from Bishop Galang, of the Diocese of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, wherein
he reiterated his earlier plea for respondents reinstatement.
 
In a Letter dated July 13, 1998[20] received by this Court on July 23, 1998,
Bishop Galang withdrew his letter dated July 10, 1998 recommending respondents
reinstatement for being misled into signing the same.
 
 Thereafter, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion dated December 22,
[21]
1998,  wherein he pointed out that more than seven (7) years had elapsed from
the time of his disbarment and that others who were likewise disbarred but for a
shorter duration, namely Attys. Benjamin Grecia and Benjamin Dacanay,[22] had
already been reinstated to the law profession. Among the attachments to
respondents Manifestation was Resolution No. 98-7c dated 6 July 1998 issued by
the IBP, Pangasinan Chapter, strongly indorsing respondents plea for judicial
clemency and reinstatement, and the letter dated June 18, 1998 from Bishop
Galang supporting his reinstatement to the Bar.
 
In a Resolution dated February 9, 1999,[23] the Court noted (a) the letters
dated June 18, 1998 and July 13, 1998 of Bishop Galang; (b) Appeal dated July 8,
1998 and Manifestation and Motion dated December 22, 1998 both filed by
respondent. Respondent was also required to comment on Bishop Galangs letter
dated July 13, 1998 within ten days from notice.
 
In his Comments with Motion dated March 23, 1999,[24] on Bishop Galangs
letter dated July 13, 1998, respondent denied the existence of a letter dated July 10,
1998 of Bishop Galang but acknowledged the existence of the letter dated June 18,
1998. Respondent averred that if the Bishop was indeed referring to the June 18,
1998 letter, he never misled or had any intention to mislead the bishop into signing
the same. By its Resolution dated June 22, 1999,[25] the Court noted the aforesaid
Comments with Motion of respondent
An Appeal Reiterating Earlier Petition, Appeal, Pleas and Motion for
Reinstatement to the Bar dated August 28, 1999[26] was filed by the respondent
on September 21, 1999.In a Resolution dated November 16, 1999,[27] the Court
noted said appeal and denied for lack of merit respondents prayer that his Plea for
Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement dated September 1, 1997 and Manifestation
and Motion for Reinstatement dated December 22, 1998 be approved and given
due course.
 
Thereafter, respondents wife, Manuela A. Antiniw, sent to the Court a Letter
of Appeal dated February 7, 2000,[28] asking for clemency in behalf of her husband
and affirming therein that her husband had for eight (8) years continuously pleaded
for his reinstatement and that he had submitted proof by way of testimonials of (a)
his character and standing prior to his disbarment, (b) his conduct subsequent to his
disbarment, and (c) his efficient government service. Attached to the letter of
respondents wife was a sworn testimonial of one of the complainants in the
consolidated administrative cases, Lydia Bernal, attesting to the respondents
character reformation. The aforesaid letter was noted by the Court in a Resolution
dated 28 February 2000.[29]
 
Respondent filed a Plea for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement
dated March 19, 2001,[30] therein asserting that the long period of his disbarment
gave him sufficient time to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct,
redeem himself, and prove once more that he would be able to practice law and at
the same time uphold the dignity of the legal profession. The Court, in its
Resolution of June 26, 2001,[31] denied the aforesaid plea.
 
By its Indorsement dated September 10, 2001,[32] the Office of the Chief
Justice referred to the Bar Confidant the letter dated August 24, 2001[33] of
Assistant Commissioner Jesse J. Caberoy of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
requesting comment on the contention of respondent that the disbarment of a
lawyer only prevents him from practicing his profession and does not operate to
divest him of his earned eligibility by passing the Bar examination. In a Letter
dated September 20, 2001,[34] respondent cited pertinent provisions of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent Civil
Service Laws in support of his aforementioned stand. The aforesaid Letters
datedAugust 24, 2001 and September 20, 2001, of CSC Assistant Commissioner
and respondent, respectively, were noted by the Courts Resolution
dated November 20, 2001.[35]Likewise in said Resolution, the letters were referred
to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
 
In its Report and Recommendation dated January 25, 2002,[36] the OBC
opined that the eligibility vested in a successful bar candidate would not be
prejudiced or forfeited by his disbarment and the matter of enjoying first- grade
eligibility by passing the Bar, in relation to the position of City Administrator,
should be determined by the CSC. Nevertheless, the OBC was of the view that the
controversy between the CSC and respondent could not be considered as already
ripe for judicial determination. Thus, the OBC recommended that the CSC,
through Assistant Commissioner Caberoy, and respondent be advised to institute
the corresponding legal remedy before the proper court.
 
In a Resolution dated February 12, 2002,[37] the Court held that it could only
resolve actual controversies brought before it and would thus, refrain from
rendering advisory opinions. Accordingly, the Letter dated August 24, 2001 of
Assistant Commissioner Caberoy and Letter dated September 20, 2001 of
respondent were merely noted.
 
Respondent then filed a Plea for Reinstatement to the Bar dated February 28,
[38]
2002,  stating therein that for the past ten (10) years since he was disbarred, he
had deeply regretted having violated his obligations as a lawyer; that he realized
the gravity of his mistakes; and that because of such disbarment, he even lost his
chance to be permanently appointed as City Administrator of Urdaneta City and/or
as City Legal Officer, after his stint as a Provincial Board Member in Pangasinan
for three (3) consecutive terms. In the event his disbarment is lifted, respondent
then promised never to cause dishonor again to the legal profession and to abide by
the ideals and canons thereof. Attached to his Plea for Reinstatement to the Bar
were certifications from various civic and religious groups attesting to his good
moral character and to his worthiness to be a member of the legal profession.In a
Resolution dated April 23, 2002,[39] the Court noted the aforesaid
Plea. Subsequently, the Court required the IBP to Comment on the aforesaid
respondents Plea through its Resolution dated July 23, 2002.[40]
 
In its Comment of September 9, 2002,[41] the IBP, through its Commission
on Bar Discipline, recommended the following:
 
Considering that the respondent has shown that he has been
repentant of what he had done which was a gross violation of his lawyers
oath and of the Canon of Professional Ethics and that he has been
completely reformed and is therefore worthy to be reinstated in the Roll
of Attorneys as evidenced by Certifications of different religious and
civic groups, it is recommended that he be allowed to again practice the
legal profession.
 
It is, however recommended that he be placed on probation,
meaning that the reinstatement should only be temporary and that he be
placed under observation for one year.
 
If during the period of one year, he proves that he has completely
lived up to the high standards of the legal profession, by then it will be
recommended that his reinstatement as a member of the Bar be made
permanent.[42]
 
The aforesaid comment was noted and referred to the IBP Board of
Governors for comment and recommendation by the Resolution dated December 3,
2002.[43]
 
 The IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution No. XVI-2005-99,
dated March 12, 2005 [44] resolving as follows:
 
xxx to approve respondents Plea for Reinstatement and
recommend the reinstatement of Atty. Dionisio C. Antiniw as member of
the bar immediately.
 
On June 6, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution [45] referring the case to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for study and recommendation.
 
On March 23, 2007, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation,
[46]
 to wit:
 
Indeed the high standards of the Bar require an impeccable record
but our findings show that respondent has been sufficiently punished for
the last fifteen (15) years of his disbarment and he has sufficiently
reformed to be a worthy member of the Bar. In all candor, he promises
the Court that should he be reinstated to practice the legal profession, he
will faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the legal
profession and by his oath as a lawyer.
 
xxx
 
In the light of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the
disbarment of respondent DIONISIO C. ANTINIW from the practice of
law be LIFTED and he be allowed to resume the practice of law. [47]
We agree with the foregoing recommendations of the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline as affirmed by the IBP Board of
Governors.
 
Respondent was disbarred from the practice of law pursuant to the Decision
promulgated on April 26, 1991[48] which pertinently reads, as follows:
 
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed
falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices
his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the court.
 
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client. (Santos vs.
Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622) but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry
Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to
his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA
459) To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to
 and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer
must advocate his clients cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill
he can marshall, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his clients
interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor.
(Pangan vs Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
 
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the
most important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In
re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer
whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR,
136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving
him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent,
honorable and reliable in order that courts and the public may rightly repose
confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to
live up to the high standards of the law profession.[49]
 
 
However, the record shows that the long period of respondents disbarment
gave him the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and
repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again
to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and
officer of the court. During respondents disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years
to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his
efforts to show that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and
humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as
attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government
institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary.
 
In Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[50] the disbarment of a lawyer was
lifted for the reasons quoted hereunder:
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3)
years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to
soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and
prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of
upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and
repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready
once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands
from its practitioners.[51]
 
 Moreover, it is well-settled that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so
much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by
sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of
officers of the court. Restorative justice, not retribution, is our goal in disciplinary
proceedings.[52]
 
Guided by this doctrine and considering the evidence submitted by
respondent satisfactorily showing his contrition and his being again worthy of
membership in the legal profession, the Court finds that it is now time to lift
herein respondents disbarment and reinstate him to the august halls of the legal
profession, but with the following reminder:
 
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance
with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal
profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority
to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty as well x
x x. That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its
members.[53]
 
 
Likewise, respondent is enjoined to keep in mind that:
Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws, as he is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world,
to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the
very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic.[54]
 
 
WHEREFORE, the disbarment of DIONISIO C. ANTINIW from the
practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of
law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective
immediately.
 
 
SO ORDERED.
 
9. VALENCIA vs. ATTY.ANTINIW  
FACTS:
This is an appeal for reinstatement to the bar of respondent who was disbarred on April 26,
1991 for falsifying a deed of sale and introducing the same as evidence for his client.
Respondent motion for reconsideration of the consolidated decision disbarring him was denied
by the Resolution of August 26, 1993. September 17, 1993 - Respondent proffered his
apologies in a Manifestation to the Court for his shortcomings as a legal practitioner. He
pleaded that, pending his submission of proof showing that he is again worthy of membership in
the Bar, he be permitted to continue with his notarial work. - DENIED in a Resolution. January 4,
1994 - Respondent filed a Petition praying for leave to submit proof of his being again worthy to
be re-admitted to the legal profession. Attached to the Petition were testimonials, affidavits and
sworn certifications of known and outstanding members of his community, attesting to his
honesty, worthiness, respectability and competency as a lawyer and as an elected Board
Member in Pangasinan. - DENIED in a resolution by the Court.  March 8, 1996 €“ Respondent
filed an Appeal for Reinstatement declaring that since his disbarment, he had embarked on
and actively participated in civic and humanitarian activities in the Fifth District of Pangasinan.
– DENIED in a Resolution.  December 17, 1996 - Respondent filed a Plea for Re-Admission
reiterating his earlier plea for the lifting of his disbarment.“ DENIED September 1, 1997 -
Respondent again filed a Plea for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement to the Bar,submitting in
support thereof the favorable indorsements, letters and resolutions from the Pangasinan
Chapter of the IBP; the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts at Lingayen and
Urdaneta, Pangasinan; the Provincial Prosecutor Association of Pangasinan; Eastern
Pangasinan Lawyer League; the Provincial Board of Pangasinan; Rotary Club of Urdaneta; and
the past National President of the IBP, Atty. Numeriano G. Tanopo Jr. The foregoing plea was
merely noted by the Court on October 14, 1997.  July 8, 1998 - Respondent filed an
Appeal, reiterating therein his apologies to the Court and promising that should he be given
back his license to practice law, he will live up to the exacting standards of the legal
profession. Among the written proofs appended to his appeal was the Letter dated June 18,
1998 from Bishop Galang, of the Diocese of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, wherein he reiterated his
earlier plea for respondent reinstatement. July 13, 1998 €“ In a Letter  received by this Court on
July 23, 1998, Bishop Galang withdrew his letter dated July 10, 1998 recommending respondent
reinstatement for being misled into signing the same. December 22, 1998 - Respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion wherein he pointed out that more than seven (7) years had elapsed
from the time of his disbarment and that others who were likewise disbarred but for a shorter
duration, had already been reinstated to the law profession. Among the attachments to
respondent Manifestation was Resolution No. 98-7c dated 6 July 1998 issued by the IBP,
Pangasinan Chapter, strongly indorsing respondent plea for judicial clemency and
reinstatement, and the letter dated June 18, 1998 from Bishop Galang supporting his
reinstatement to the Bar.  February 9, 1999€“ In a Resolution, the Court noted: (a) the letters
dated June 18, 1998 and July 13, 1998 of Bishop Galang; (b) Appeal dated July 8, 1998 and
Manifestation and Motion dated December 22, 1998 both filed by respondent.Respondent was
also required to comment on Bishop Galang€letter datedJuly 13, 1998  within ten days from
notice.  March 23,1999 - In his Comments with Motion on Bishop Galang letter, respondent
denied the existence of a letter dated July 10, 1998 of Bishop Galang but acknowledged the
existence of the letter dated June 18, 1998. Respondent averred that if the Bishop was indeed
referring to the June 18, 1998 letter, he never misled or had any intention to mislead the bishop
into signing the same.By its Resolution dated June 22, 1999,the Court noted the aforesaid
Comments with Motion of respondent. August 28, 1999 - An Appeal Reiterating Earlier Petition,
Appeal, Pleas and Motion for Reinstatement to the Bar  was filed by the respondent on
September 21, 1999. - DENIED for lack of merit respondent prayer that his Plea for Judicial
Clemency and Reinstatement dated September 1, 1997 and Manifestation and Motion for
Reinstatement dated December 22, 1998 be approved and given due course. February 7, 2000
- Respondent wife, Manuela A. Antiniw, sent to the Court a Letter of Appeal asking for clemency
in behalf of her husband and affirming therein that her husband had for eight (8) years
continuously pleaded for his reinstatement and that he had submitted proof by way of
testimonials of : (a) his character and standing prior to his disbarment, (b) his conduct
subsequent to his disbarment, and (c) his efficient government service. Attached to the letter of
respondent wife was a sworn testimonial of one of the complainants in the consolidated
administrative cases, Lydia Bernal, attesting to the respondent character reformation. The
aforesaid letter was noted by the Court in a Resolution. March 19, 2001 - Respondent filed a
Plea for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement asserting that the long period of his disbarment
gave him sufficient time to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself,
and prove once more that he would be able to practice law and at the same time uphold the
dignity of the legal profession.- DENIED again by the Court in its resolution. In its Report and
Recommendation,the OBC opined that the eligibility vested in a successful bar candidate would
not be prejudiced or forfeited by his disbarment and the matter of enjoying first- grade eligibility
by passing the Bar, in relation to the position of City Administrator, should be determined by the
CSC.Nevertheless, the OBC was of the view that the controversy between the CSC and
respondent could not be considered as already ripe for judicial determination. Thus, the OBC
recommended that the CSC, through Assistant Commissioner Caberoy, and respondent be
advised to institute the corresponding legal remedy before the proper court. In a Resolution the
Court held that it could only resolve actual controversies brought before it and would thus,
refrain from rendering advisory opinions.Accordingly, the Letter dated August 24, 2001 of
Assistant Commissioner Caberoy and Letter dated September 20, 2001 of respondent were
merely noted. Feb 22, 2002 -Respondent then filed a Plea for Reinstatement to the Bar, stating
therein that for the past ten (10) years since he was disbarred, he had deeply regretted having
violated his obligations. Attached to his Plea for Reinstatement to the Bar were certifications
from various civic and religious groups attesting to his good moral character and to his
worthiness to be a member of the legal profession.April 23, 2002 “ In a Resolution, Court noted
the aforesaid Plea. Subsequently, the Court required the IBP to Comment on the aforesaid
respondent Plea through its Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be readmitted to the practice of law
HELD:
Yes. Records show that the long period of respondent disbarment gave him the chance to purge
himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his
willingness and capacity to live up once again of conduct demanded of every member of the
bar. It is well-settled that the objective of disciplinary proceedings is restorative justice, not
retribution. Guided by this doctrine and considering the evidence submitted by respondent
satisfactorily showing his contrition and his being again worthy of membership in the legal
profession, the court finds that it is now time to lift respondent disbarment.

Dolores v atty.alan s macasa

RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
 
 
This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C.
Belleza against respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and unethical
conduct in connection with the handling of a criminal case involving complainants
son.
 
On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their
mutual friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services
in connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by
policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act
(RA) 9165.[1] Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.
 
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent
thru their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an
additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both
payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not
issue any receipt.
 
On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the
purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants)
son. Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the
court the next day, she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the
court.
 
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several
occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the
case of complainants son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the
Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint[2] for disbarment against
respondent in the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Attached to the verified complaint was the affidavit[3] of Chua
which read:
 
I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill,
Brgy. Bata, Bacolod City, after having been sworn to in accordance
with law, hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza
[to] Atty. Alan Macasa when she looked for a lawyer to help her son in
the case that the latter is facing sometime [i]n [the] first week of
November 2004;
 
 2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of them, I am
the one who facilitated the payment of Mrs. DOLORES C. BELLEZA
to Atty. Alan Macasa;
 
3. That as far as I know, I received the following amount from
Mrs. Dolores Belleza as payment for Atty. Alan Macasa:
 
Date Amount
 
November 11, 2004 P15,000.00
A week after 10,000.00
November 18, 2004 5,000.00
 
4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I supposed as
Attorneys Fees were immediately forwarded by me to Atty. [Macasa];
 
5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to attest to the truth
of all the foregoing statements.
 
x x x x x x x x x[4]
 
In a letter dated May 23, 2005,[5] the IBP Negros Occidental chapter
transmitted the complaint to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).[6]
In an order dated July 13, 2005,[7] the CBD required respondent to submit his
answer within 15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for
extension of time to file an answer dated August 10, 2005,[8] simply brushed aside
the complaint for being baseless, groundless and malicious without, however,
offering any explanation. He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005
to submit his answer.
 
Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions[9] for second and third extensions of
time praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never
did.
 
When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19, 2006,
they were ordered to submit their respective position papers.[10]
 
In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007,[11] the CBD ruled that
respondent failed to rebut the charges against him. He never answered the
complaint despite several chances to do so.
 
The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
 
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct.
 
It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
 
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
 
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate
and apart from his own and those others kept by him.
 
 
The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he was
unfit and unworthy of the privileges conferred by law on him as a member of the
bar. The CBD recommended a suspension of six months with a stern warning that
repetition of similar acts would merit a more severe sanction. It also recommended
that respondent be ordered to return to complainant the P18,000 intended for the
provisional liberty of the complainants son and the P30,000 attorneys fees.
 
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the CBD with the modification that respondent be ordered to
return to complainant only the amount of P30,000 which he received as attorneys
fees.[12]
 
We affirm the CBDs finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors
but we modify the IBPs recommendation as to the liability of respondent.
 
RESPONDENT DISRESPECTED
LEGAL PROCESSES
 
 
Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the charges
against him. Yet, he showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to
answer and refute the accusations of professional misconduct against him. In doing
so, he failed to observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
  
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
 
Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position
paper. His propensity to flout the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern
and disrespect for the proceedings of the CBD. He disregarded the oath he took
when he was accepted to the legal profession to obey the laws and the legal orders
of the duly constituted legal authorities. He displayed insolence not only to the
CBD but also to this Court which is the source of the CBDs authority.
 
Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not
only irresponsible but also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and his
fellow lawyers.[13]His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to
obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying
with court directives as an officer of the court.[14] Respondent should have known
that the orders of the CBD (as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative
cases against lawyers) were not mere requests but directives which should have
been complied with promptly and completely.[15]
 
 
RESPONDENT GROSSLY NEGLECTED
THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
 
Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son.
Such undertaking imposed upon him the following duties:
 
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
 
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
 
x x x x x x x x x
 
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
 
x x x x x x x x x
  
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH
ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
 
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself
(particularly his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be
worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion of
his utmost learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied.[16]
 
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to
serve his client with competence and diligence.[17] He must conscientiously
perform his duty arising from such relationship. He must bear in mind that by
accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following representations: that he
possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly
situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense
of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable care and
diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his
clients cause; and that he will take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his
clients interest.[18]
A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the
relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice
and prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the
perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out
his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical.[19]
 
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively
represent his client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and
assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a
lawyer who represents an accused in a criminal case.
 
The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution.
[20]
 However, this right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample
legal assistance by his lawyer:
 
... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic
 rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or
performed perfunctorily.
 
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a
lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions
and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself
to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an
active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the
trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence.[21]
∞ ○ ∞
 
[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental
right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little
consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other
rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel.[22]
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client.[23] Tersely put, it means an
effective, efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory
representation.[24]
 
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and
receiving his attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as
effective and efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent
abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued
inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys
Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son
was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him
of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount
entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client,
respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.
 
 
 
RESPONDENT FAILED TO RETURN
HIS CLIENTS MONEY
 
 The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes
on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for
or from the client.[25]
 
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular
purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office
expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If
he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it
to the client.[26] His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if
the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant
disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[27]
 
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as
they fall due or upon demand.[28] His failure to return the clients money upon
demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own
use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.
[29]
 It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
[30]
 Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it may constitute aprima facie case of
swindling or estafa.
 
Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the
purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never
used the money for its intended purpose yet also never returned it to the client.
Worse, he unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to complainant despite the
latters repeated demands.
 
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to
the P30,000 attorneys fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable
compensation for his services is subject to two requisites: (1) the existence of an
attorney-client relationship and (2) the rendition by the lawyer of services to the
client.[31] Thus, a lawyer who does not render legal services is not entitled to
attorneys fees. Otherwise, not only would he be unjustly enriched at the expense of
the client, he would also be rewarded for his negligence and irresponsibility.
 
 
 
 
RESPONDENT FAILED TO UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
 
For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent failed to obey Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
 
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
 
Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it stands
for. In so doing, he disregards the ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal
profession.
 
Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public
confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.[32] Thus, every lawyer should act and comport
himself in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession.[33]
 
Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the
money for the bond of the complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings with his client.[34] He failed to live up to
his fiduciary duties. By keeping the money for himself despite his undertaking that
he would facilitate the release of complainants son, respondent showed lack of
moral principles. His transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person
and a shame to the legal profession.
 
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not
only of dishonesty but also of professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis John
Bellezas right to counsel and to bail under Sections 13 and 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution, and for violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and 19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01,
16.02, 16.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately.
 
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C. Belleza the
amounts of P30,000 and P18,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of
promulgation of this decision until full payment. Respondent is
further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount within
ten days from payment. Failure to do so will subject him to criminal prosecution.
 
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
entered into the records of respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the Office of the
Court Administrator to be furnished to the courts of the land for their information
and guidance.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
VALENCIA vs. ATTY. ANTINIW
FACTS: this is an appeal for reinstatement to the bar of
respondent who was disbarred
on april 26, 1991 for falsifying a deed of sale and
introducing the same as evidence for
his client. In a span of 15 years since his disbarment,
respondent had been undeterred
in filing motions for reconsideration, appeals, petitions,
and pleas for judicial clemency
and readmission to the bar, submitting in support thereof
favorable indorsements,
letters, and recommendations from various civic and
religious organizations. The IBP
recommended his readmission to the bar and the office
of the bar confidant likewise
affirmed the same.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent should be readmitted
to the practice of law
HELD: yes. Records show that the long period of
respondent’s disbarment gave him the
chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his
remorse and repentance, and to
demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once
again of conduct demanded of

every member of the bar. It is well-settled that the

objective of disciplinary proceedings
is restorative justice, not retribution. Guided by this
doctrine and considering the
evidence submitted by respondent satisfactorily showing
his contrition and his being
again worthy of membership in the legal profession, the
court finds that it is now time to
lift respondent’s disbarment.
MARIA EARL BEVERLY C. A.C. No. 6166

CENIZA,

Complainant, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,

Velasco, Jr.,

Nachura, and
 Peralta, JJ.

ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA,

Respondent. Promulgated:

October 2, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
 

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
 

In a verified complaint[1] dated July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with grave
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents.
 
The facts of the case are as follows:
 
On May 3, 2002, complainant sought the legal services of the respondent in
regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos
Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for attorneys fees since her mother-in-law
would arrive from the United States only in June 2002, respondent made her sign
a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo
Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished
them a copy of the complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession
representing legitime but with no docket number on it. They kept on following up
the progress of the complaint. However, three months lapsed before
respondent informed them that it was already filed in court . It was then that they
received a copy of the complaint with Civil Case No. 4198 and a rubber stamped
RECEIVED thereon. However, when complainant verified the status of the case
with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was
informed that no case with said title and docket number was filed.[2]
 
Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be
recovered were located in Koronadal, South Cotabato and
Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of the rule on venue that real actions
shall be filed in the place where the property is situated.Complainant also alleged
that respondent forged the signature of her husband,  Carlito C. Ceniza, in the
Affidavit of Loss attached to a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate
certificate of title filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 20,
in Misc. Case No. 114-2202.[3]
 
In her comment, respondent assailed the personality of the complainant to
institute the administrative complaint for disbarment as she was not a party to
the action for partition and recovery of ownership/possession. As such, her
allegations in the administrative complaint were all hearsay, self-serving and
unsubstantiated. Further, the charge of forgery of the Affidavit of Loss was belied
by the March 3, 2003 decision of the trial court, wherein Carlito C. Ceniza affirmed
his statements in the said affidavit when he was called to testify.[4]
 
On February 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
 
On April 29, 2004, respondent filed a Supplemental Comment explaining the
rubber stamped RECEIVED on the complaint. According to her, when her staff Jan
Kirt Lester Soledad was at the RTC Office of the Clerk of Court, she called him
through cellular phone and directed him to stop the filing of the complaint as the
same lacked certain attachments.However, one copy thereof was already
stamped RECEIVED by the receiving court personnel, who also assigned a docket
number. She kept the copies of the complaint, including the one with the stamp,
to be filed later when the attachments are complete.
 
Meanwhile, on November 7, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation with Urgent
Motion praying that the administrative complaint be likewise dismissed in view of
the dismissal of the criminal case due to complainants apparent lack of interest to
prosecute.
 
On January 19, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be found guilty of falsification of public document and be meted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three years. The
report reads in part, as follows:
 
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil
action, where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer
is a defendant. It involved no private interest. The complainant or
person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys
misconduct is in no sense a party and has generally no interest in its
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. It affords no redress for private grievance.
(Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154)

Prescinding from the aforequoted ruling, it is therefore irrelevant and

immaterial if herein complainant is not a party to the subject civil
complaint prepared by the respondent. A case of suspension or
disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether on the basis of the facts borne
out by the record, the charge has been proven.

 
On the payment of the acceptance fee in the amount of P32,000.00,
respondents contention that she acted as guarantor of Carlos Ceniza,
complainants husband, when he borrowed money from a money
lender, Domingo Natavio, the amount representing the acceptance,
does not inspire belief. The promissory note dated May 3, 2002,
appended as Annex A of the complaint-affidavit eloquently shows that
consistent with the complainants allegation, she was made to borrow
said amount to be paid as respondents acceptance fee.  It bears stress
that the date of the promissory note is the same date when
respondents services were engaged leading to the preparation of the
subject civil complaint. Complainants allegation is further enhanced by
the fact that such promissory note was even notarized by the
respondent.

On the alleged filing of the subject civil complaint, it is undisputed that

the same was not filed before the Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC Davao Del Sur, as evidenced by a Certification from the said
office appended as Annex A of complainants Manifestation dated
October 14, 2005. Thus, the claim of complainant that respondent
falsified or caused it to falsify the stamp marked received dated May 10,
2002 including the case number 4198, finds factual and legal bases.

It bears stress that a copy of the subject civil complaint was obtained by
complainant from the respondent herself who tried to impress upon
the former that contrary to her suspicion, the subject civil complaint
was already filed in court. However, inquiry made by the complainant
shows otherwise.

Respondents contention that after one copy of the complaint was

already stamped by court personnel in preparation for receiving the
same and entering in the courts docket, she caused it to be withdrawn
after realizing that the same lacked certain attachments, is bereft of
merit.

In the first place, respondent miserably failed to mention these lacking

attachments that allegedly caused the withdrawal of the
complaint. Secondly, and assuming arguendo that the withdrawal was
due to lacking attachments, how come the same was not filed in the
next office day complete with attachments. And lastly, the Certification
of the Clerk of Court clearly states that Civil Case No. 4188 is not the
case of Mercedes Callejo vda. De Ceniza, et al. vs. Charlotte Ceniza, et
al.

xxxx

The fact that the City Prosecutors Office of Digos, upon motion
for reconsideration of the respondent, dismissed a similar complaint
filed by herein complainant will not in anyway affect the above
captioned administrative complaint.

The pendency of a criminal action against the respondent, from

the facts of which the disciplinary proceeding is predicated, does not
pose prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the
disbarment case. (Calo vs. Degano, 20 SCRA 447) His conviction is not
necessary to hold the lawyer administratively liable because the two
proceedings and their objectives are different and it is not sound public
policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before the court
act on a complaint against a lawyer as it may emasculate the
disciplinary power of the court. (In re Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1) Nor is his
acquittal, by this fact alone, a bar to an administrative complaint against
him. (Piatt vs. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350).
  

The other allegations in the complaint about ignorance of the law

are found to be without basis.

RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that herein

respondent Atty. Vivian C. Rubia, be found guilty of the charge of
falsification of public document and be meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.

On May 31, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution
adopting the Investigating Commissioners recommendation with modification, as
follows:
 
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237

Adm. Case No. 6166

Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.

Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex A; and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents falsification of public document,
Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is hereby DISBARRED.

 
However, in its December 11, 2008 Resolution, the Board of Governors
reconsidered its May 31, 2007 Resolution by reducing the recommended penalty
of disbarment to five years suspension from the practice of law, thus:
 
RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-715

Adm. Case No. 6166

Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.

Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

 
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Recommendation of the Board of Governors First
Division of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with modification, that Resolution
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237 of the Board of Governors dated 31
May 2007 recommending the Disbarment of Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is
reduced to Five (5) years Suspension from the practice of law.

On April 20, 2009, the IBP forwarded the instant case to this Court as provided
under Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court.
 
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent from the practice of law for
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law and for falsification of public document. In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for
the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must
be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court
has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.[5]
 
The sole issue in this case is whether or not there is preponderant evidence to
warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against the respondent.
In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged
that respondent misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in
court, when in fact, upon verification with the RTC Clerk of Court, it was not. Such
misrepresentation is shown by the copy of the complaint with a stamped
RECEIVED and docket number thereon. Apart from said allegations, complainant
has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent deliberately
falsified a public document.
 
A perusal of the records shows that complainants evidence consists solely
of her Affidavit-Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not
appear in all the mandatory conferences set by the investigating commissioner in
order to give respondent the chance to test the veracity of her assertions. It is one
thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or falsification of public
document and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting
the same.
 
Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances
behind the filing of the complaint by respondents staff because she was not
present when the same was filed with the trial court. Complainant failed to
disprove by preponderant evidence respondents claim that the case was not filed
but was in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with RECEIVED and assigned with
a docket number. We find this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering
that the stamp did not bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which
is normally done when pleadings are received by the court.
 
Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was not
filed and that CIVIL CASE NO. 4198 pertained to another case, did not diminish the
truthfulness of respondents claim, but even tended to bolster it. Necessarily, as
the complaint was not filed, docket number 4198 indicated in the copy of the
complaint was assigned to another case thereafter filed in court.
 
Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioners ruling
that respondent was guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors, has no factual basis to stand on.
 
However, we find that respondent committed some acts for which she should be
disciplined or administratively sanctioned.
 
We find nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondents act of charging an
acceptance fee of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable under the
circumstances. The impropriety lies in the fact that she suggested that
complainant borrow money from Domingo Natavio for the payment thereof. This
act impresses upon the Court that respondent would do nothing to the cause of
complainants mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is made. Her
duty to render legal services to her client with competence and diligence should
not depend on the payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to
be paid upon the arrival of complainants mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a
month after respondent accepted the case.
 
Respondents transgression is compounded further when she severed the
lawyer-client relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new
employer Nakayama Group of Companies, which constrained her to return the
money received as well as the records of the case, thereby leaving her client with
no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the
withdrawal of her services.
 
Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication
with her client regarding the status of their complaint.
 
Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyers Oath which imposes upon every
member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of Canon 18, and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thus:
  
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients
request for information.

CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR

GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.

 
When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et
amore, he undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it,
regardless of its significance.Thus, his client, whether rich or poor, has the right to
expect that he will discharge his duties diligently and exert his best efforts,
learning and ability to prosecute or defend his (clients) cause with reasonable
dispatch. Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave administrative
liability as a member of the Bar. For the overriding need to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the legal profession demands that an erring lawyer
should be sanctioned.[6]
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is
found GUILTY of violation of Rule 18.03 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months effective immediately, with a warning that similar infractions in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
 
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified
of this Decision, and be it duly recorded in the personal file of respondent Atty.
Vivian G. Rubia.
 
SO ORDERED.
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ,
JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P.
LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S.
ROCO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996]

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system,
upon which the workings of the contentious and adversarial system in the
Philippine legal process are based - the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-
lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what
makes the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which
distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse
but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the
confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his
client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the
Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled
"Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."[1]

Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro
Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A.
Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and
herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law
firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter
referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal
services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative
and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply,
as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the
members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate
the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank
representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of
trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with
their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the
assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances.  As
members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul
Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.[2]

On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good

Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which
excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case
No. 33 as party-defendant.  Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private
[3]

respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the

identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. [4]

Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength

of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion,
Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja
G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law
offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed. conspired and confederated with each
other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and
its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-
owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total
outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA
Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of
UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand,
corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.[5]

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,

petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers participation in the acts with which their co-

defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendants-
ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and
Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed
under their respective names in Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint as
incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any
proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.

4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976

of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business
purposes not related to the allegations of the expanded Amended
Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any material interest therein and
therefore denies that the shares appearing in his name in Annex A of the expanded
Amended Complaint are his assets. [6]
 Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed
a separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in
the alleged ill-gotten wealth.
[7]

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR

OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent
PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-
defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.  The Counter-Motion for
[8]

dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October
18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions
precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the
identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-
client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings. [9]

Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to

substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the conditions
precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case
No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent
Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by
the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed
by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and
(c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21,
1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco originally
requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the
PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. [10]

It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did

not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of
the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the
identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. [11]

On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the

Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG
Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by
respondent PCGG. It held:
x x x.
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client
for whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until
they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the
privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until
they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the
existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the
PCGG as defendants herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that
Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of
cause against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both
under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).

The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed
of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7,
PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred
not to make the disclosures required by the PCGG.

The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as
party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the
same treatment accorded to Roco.

Neither can this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA
lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the
PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit. [12]

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but

the same was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA
lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking
the following grounds:
I

The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners

ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-
stockholders, to the strict application of the law of agency.
 II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering

petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore,
deserving of equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to
reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction
as would make the classification reasonable under the equal protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of
Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection clause.
III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding

that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other
information requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the identity
of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring

that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and
just grounds and with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners
ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for

reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which was denied by
respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's
resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No.
105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-
defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorable treatment, on the
pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client, giving
him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the
ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an
undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are
prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn
mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality
of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention,
alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client is not within the ambit of
the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required
(deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee
status.[13]

In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG

acted correctly in excluding him as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has
not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No.
0033 as to Roco `without an order of court by filing a notice of
dismissal,'"  and he has undertaken to identify his principal.
[14] [15]

Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

I

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-

defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly,
respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the bigger fish as they say in
street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGGs willingness to cut a
deal with petitioners -- the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion
from the complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned
resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client
for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until
they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by
the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers
cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the
client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the
PCGG as defendants herein. (Underscoring ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third
Division, entitled Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on
Good Government respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko,
manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to
establish through the ACCRA that their so called client is Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco; that it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies
to those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex A of the
Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust
and deeds of assignment, some in the name of particular persons, some in
blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA
lawyers that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of
these corporations who are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers
executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now,
these blank deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being
held by the nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds
of assignment and some of these assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is
important to our claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Cojuangco and some are for
Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of these corporations are really just paper
corporations. Why do we say that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no
fixed sets of directors at the time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the
crucial year. And not only that, they have no permits from the municipal authorities in
Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of Villareal Law Office. They
really have no address on records. These are some of the principal things that we
would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called themselves. [16]

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as
defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the
basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as
lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners inclusion as co-defendants in the
complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their
clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being
the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against
petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II

The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law

concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where
one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the
object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services
may be compensated by honorarium or for hire,  and mandato (contract of
[17]

agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract

in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who
requested him.  But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the
[18]

principal-agent and lessor-lessee.

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is
more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of
trust and confidence reposed on him by his client.  A lawyer is also as [19]

independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different
from and superior to those of an ordinary agent.  Moreover, an attorney also
[20]

occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact

an officer of the Court  and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of
[21]

action to be taken favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical
conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to
his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith,  that is required by [22]

reason of necessity and public interest  based on the hypothesis that

[23]

abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal
to the administration of justice. [24]

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that

distinguishes him from any other professional in society. This conception is
entrenched and embodies centuries of established and stable tradition.
 In Stockton v. Ford,  the U.S. Supreme Court held:
[25] [26]

There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence
than that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and
faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the
sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer
them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that
confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of
the party bestowing it. [27]

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil
Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section
383 of the Code specifically forbids counsel, without authority of his client to
reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment.  Passed on into various
[28]

provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently

worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any

communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course
of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorneys secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity.[29]

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:

(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his clients
business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's

fidelity to client:

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of
law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain
him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is
steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed
within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit,
much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of
fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.
 Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are
many and serve several constitutional and policy concerns. In the
constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct
rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to
choose between legal representation without effective communication and
disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he might
be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial
system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if
it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed
thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents
against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent
is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services
opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be
circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An
effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of
confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a
situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of
information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective
representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option
but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in
refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under
the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be
in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in
mystery.  Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in
[30]

the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of his client.[31]

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client
relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not
attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship.
 Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should,
as a general rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to
know who his opponent is.  He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against
[32]

unknown forces. [33]

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however

qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers
advice.

In Ex-Parte Enzor,  a state supreme court reversed a lower court order

[34]

requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her client on the ground that the
subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the issue of the
clients identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the
unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that
he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted a
bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised
her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not
remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited
for contempt for her refusal to reveal his clients identity before a grand
jury. Reversing the lower courts contempt orders, the state supreme court
held that under the circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions
described above, even the name of the client was privileged.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig,  involved the same exception, i.e. that client
[35]

identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that

the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very
criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the
activities of the Sandino Gang, a gang involved in the illegal importation of
drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners, represented key
witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued
summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and
information regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf of any other
person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under
the facts and circumstances of the case, held:
A clients identity and the nature of that clients fee arrangements may be
privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong
probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client
in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner,
279 F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of
California law, the rule also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that
the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind
the attorney-client privilege. In order to promote freedom of consultation of
legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the
legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure
except on the clients consent. 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In
furtherance of this policy, the clients identity and the nature of his fee
arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential
communications. [36]

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For
instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab
Corporation,[37]  prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow
a lawyers claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client because
this would expose the latter to civil litigation.

In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab
she was riding, owned by respondent corporation, collided with a second
taxicab, whose owner was unknown.Plaintiff brought action both against
defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the
information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of
defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was
somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the
second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the
institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a
car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was the
owner of the second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were
clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance
company had hired him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The
attorney in such cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder when the
policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating that it would
be used in an action or claim against him. [38]

x x x xxx xxx.
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of
professional advice or assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit
pending or contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such advice or aid;
x x x And whenever the communication made, relates to a matter so
connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford
presumption that it was the ground of the address by the client, then it is
privileged from disclosure. xxx.
It appears... that the name and address of the owner of the second cab
came to the attorney in this case as a confidential communication. His client is
not seeking to use the courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on that
theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service of the
summons on him has not been effected. The objections on which the court
reserved decision are sustained. [39]

In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,  the lawyer involved

[40]

was required by a lower court to disclose whether he represented certain

clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the courts request was to
determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were
connected with the purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer
refused and brought the question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the
lawyers refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed
from, that he represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of these
mines, it has made progress in establishing by such evidence their version of
the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the witness would
compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for certain people, but
that, as the result of communications made to him in the course of such
employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain
transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever gone
to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to
disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it
related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his
client.
[41]

3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys

client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the
only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.
In Baird vs Korner,  a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the
[42]

lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place

the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges
were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
 It appeared that the taxpayers returns of previous years were probably
incorrect and the taxes understated. The clients themselves were unsure
about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought advice from Baird on
the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then being
undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the
taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of $12,706.85, which had been
previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money
representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for
$12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the
payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird
identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on
the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to name the
attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged
communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS
summons. For Bairds repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty
of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could
not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of
money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income
taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into that
clients income tax liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that a
clients name is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the
legal services rendered that the disclosure of the clients identity exposes him
to possible investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court
held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general
rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby
admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more
years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for but one
purpose - to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may
check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the
payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are
due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment
of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link
that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal
crime.Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here
involved was employed - to advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should
be done.[43]

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which
could qualify as exceptions to the general rule.
 For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies
within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on
which the client seeks legal assistance.  Moreover, where the nature of the
[44]

attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is

the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has
been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in
disclosure of the entire transaction. [45]

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a

client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the clients name itself has
an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences. [46]

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at

bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated
earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there
would be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal
service sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the
PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the
PCGG which constitutes petitioners ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their

clients covering their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that
the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers,
regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the
corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in
the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering
their clients shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents
was part and parcel of petitioners legal service to their clients. More important,
it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore,
have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the
very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's
name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build
its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, that
would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client)
of a... crime."
[47]

An important distinction must be made between a case where a client

takes on the services of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about
how to go around the law for the purpose of committing illegal activities and a
case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something
illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall
within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes
illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not the
act for which the advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or
disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the
prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot
be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while
the prosecution may not have a case against the client in the second example
and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the
latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional
character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime.  The [48]

reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are
founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in
general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated
that "under such conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of
compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only
his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such
information could be made the basis of a suit against his client.
"Communications made to an attorney in the course of any personal
[49]

employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed

to be drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to
each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as
privileged communications."  Where the communicated information, which
[50]

clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but
there would be not much in the information known to the prosecution which
would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the client would
open up other privileged information which would substantiate the
prosecutions suspicions, then the clients identity is so inextricably linked to the
subject matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception,
applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the
privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of
legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys
must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In re
Grand Jury Proceedings and Tillotson v. Boughner.  What these cases
[51] [52]

unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may
amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the
prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a
convenient and readily available source of information in the building of a case
against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances
such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning
fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will
not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be revealed by
disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the
privilege.  It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their
[53]

client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in
turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their
expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's
case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their
own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the
name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the
nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus
between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it
would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the
name is as much "communication" as information revealed directly about the
transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly
privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing
himself to charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire
attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore
imposes a strict liability for negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing
to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as well as
the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to make
decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and
McCloy v. Boon,  the US Second District Court rejected the plea of the
[54]

petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the
latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client
hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its
client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any
context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent
requirements of causation and damages, and found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and
Shipley P.A. v. Scheller  requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-
[55]

vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly before the
end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of work
done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he
sought to pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while
settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client found a new
lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than
what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of
lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon  famously attributed to Justice
[56]

Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court found tha
WILLIAM S. UY vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES

A.C. No. 5280 : March 30, 2004

FACTS:

Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the
issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances
surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and
submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court.

When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office demanding a
certain amount other than what was previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after
reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later
that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a
letter-complaint against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public
Documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer
certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to
have filed.
Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is
withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the
petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant; that
there was no longer any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the
letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in
the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the Office
of the Register of Deeds.

The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.

ISSUE:  Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?

HELD:

No. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Documents filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his
personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance
of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant.  Clearly, there was no
attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the
proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.

Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in
his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased
son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant,
which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in
any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint
against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to
protect his personal or proprietary interests.

PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.

WILLIAM S. UY, complainant, vs. ATTY. FERMIN L.

GONZALES, respondent.
 RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty.

Fermin L. Gonzales for violation of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client
relationship. The complainant alleges:
Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to
prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After
confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and
discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted
to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tayug,
Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to his
(complainants) office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain amount
from him other than what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent left
his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed,
he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition for the
issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint dated
July 26, 1999 against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Tayug, Pangasinan for Falsification of Public Documents.[1] The letter-
complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer
certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent
was supposed to have filed. Portions of said letter-complaint read:

The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino,

married and a resident of 132-A Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, Michael Angelo T. UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors and residents of the
aforesaid address, Luviminda G. Tomagos, of legal age, married, Filipino and a
resident of Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F. Madayag, with office address at
A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, for
ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed as
follows:

That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land

consisting of 4.001 ha. for the amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated
at Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN C. GONZALES, as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter in favor of the former; that in the
said date, William S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33122,
covering the said land;

That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-33122, in the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his
name, William S. Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer of the aforesaid
land in favor of his children, namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy,
wherein William S. Uy made it appear that his said children are of legal age, and
residents of Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth, they are
minors and residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them as farmers/beneficiaries, thus
placing the said property within the coverage of the Land Reform Program;

That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured
the falsified documents which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure
from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165
(Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-named
children. Some of these Falsified documents are purported Affidavit of
Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of Non-Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996, without
the signature of affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said date, Fermin C.
Gonzales was already dead ;

That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud
undersigned, still accepted the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L.
Gonzales, P300,000.00, in PNB Check No. 0000606, and P40,000.00, in cash, as full
payment of the redemption of TCT No. 33122knowing fully well that at that time the
said TCT cannot be redeemed anymore because the same was already transferred in
the name of his children;

That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check, as
evidenced by the said check which was encashed by him;

That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and
continue to refuse to deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return
and repay the said P340,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned.[2]

With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a

lawyer and grossly disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his
client. Respondent unceremoniously turned against him just because he
refused to grant respondents request for additional
compensation. Respondents act tarnished his reputation and social standing.
[3]

In compliance with this Courts Resolution dated July 31, 2000,

[4]
 respondent filed his Comment narrating his version, as follows:
On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9
hectare-property situated in Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered
by TCT No. T-33122 which the latter acquired by purchase from his
(respondents) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales, Jr.. On the same date, he
paid complainant P340,000.00 and demanded the delivery of TCT No. T-
33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon request, he
gave complainant additional time to locate said title or until after Christmas to
deliver the same and execute the Deed of Redemption. After the said period,
he went to complainants office and demanded the delivery of the title and the
execution of the Deed of Redemption. Instead, complainant gave him
photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and TCT No. T-5165. Complainant
explained that he had already transferred the title of the property, covered by
TCT No.T-5165 to his children Michael and Cristina Uy and that TCT No. T-
5165 was misplaced and cannot be located despite efforts to locate
it. Wanting to protect his interest over the property coupled with his desire to
get hold of TCT No. T-5165 the earliest possible time, he offered his
assistance pro bono to prepare a petition for lost title provided that all
necessary expenses incident thereto including expenses for transportation
and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will be shouldered by complainant. To
these, complainant agreed.
On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the
lost title ready for signing and notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to
complainants office informing him that the petition is ready for filing and needs
funds for expenses. Complainant who was with a client asked him to wait at
the anteroom where he waited for almost two hours until he found out that
complainant had already left without leaving any instructions nor funds for the
filing of the petition. Complainants conduct infuriated him which prompted him
to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the
petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the
petition.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant was terminated when he gave the handwritten letter to
complainant; that there was no longer any professional relationship between
the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public
document; that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for
falsification were culled from public documents procured from the Office of the
Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.[5]
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[6]
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear
on April 2, 2003 before the IBP.[7] On said date, complainant did not appear
despite due notice. There was no showing that respondent received the notice
for that days hearing and so the hearing was reset to May 28, 2003.[8]
On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from
one Atty. Augusto M. Macam dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client,
William S. Uy, had lost interest in pursuing the complaint he filed against Atty.
Gonzales and requesting that the case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.[9]
On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report
and recommendation, portions of which read as follows:

The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the
filing of the Verified Petition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had
confided to respondent the fact of the loss and the circumstances attendant
thereto. When respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which expressly provides that A lawyer shall preserve the confidences
and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated. Respondent cannot argue that there was no lawyer-client relationship
between them when he filed the Letter-Complaint on 26 July 1999 considering that as
early as 14 April 1999, or three (3) months after, respondent had already terminated
complainants perceived lawyer-client relationship between them. The duty to maintain
inviolate the clients confidences and secrets is not temporary but permanent. It is in
effect perpetual for it outlasts the lawyers employment (Canon 37, Code of
Professional Responsibility) which means even after the relationship has been
terminated, the duty to preserve the clients confidences and secrets remains
effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility
provides that A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage
or that of a third person, unless the client with the full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.

On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty.
Augusto M. Macam, who claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging
that complainant is no longer interested in pursuing this case and requested that the
same be dismissed. The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings
of this nature cannot be interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court). Moreover, in Boliver vs. Simbol, 16
SCRA 623, the Court ruled that any person may bring to this Courts attention the
misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of the interest
or lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to
have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended
that he be SUSPENDED for a period ofSIX (6) MONTHS from receipt hereof, from
the practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the Bar.[10]

On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines issued Resolution No. XV-2003-365, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable
laws and rules, and considering that respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.[11]

Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the

manifestation of complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the
administrative complaint he filed against respondent, has no persuasive
bearing in the present case.
Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,

settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.

This is because:

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants,
the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant
or his withdrawal of the charges.[12]

Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.

Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls
for legal knowledge, training and experience.[13] While it is true that a lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court,[14] complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances
enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein
respondent.
Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of
the records reveals that the relationship between complainant and respondent
stemmed from a personal transaction or dealings between them rather than
the practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only
because he redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased
from his (complainants) son. It is not refuted that respondent paid
complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce its title and
execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him,
complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of the alleged loss
of the title which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely
transferred to his children, thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance
so as to secure the issuance of a new title to the property, in lieu of the lost
one, with complainant assuming the expenses therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in
respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of
obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client
should have employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that any
retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which
the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the
attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.[15]
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply
to the present case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa
Through Falsification of Public Documents filed by respondent against
complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with
complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of
the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from
complainant. Respondents immediate objective was to secure the title of the
property that complainant had earlier bought from his son.Clearly, there was
no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The
preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their
personal transaction.
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

Canon 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS

OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS
TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:

a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;

b) When required by law;

c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates
or by judicial action.

The alleged secrets of complainant were not specified by him in his

affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant
were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a
redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and
therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein
complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute
estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way
we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant
to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a
case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
administrative case filed against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, docketed as A.C.
No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Baculi vs. Battung

Judge Rene B. Baculi, Complainant, vs. Atty. Melchor A. Battung, Respondent

Supreme Court Second Division

 

A.C. No. 8920, September 28, 2011

Facts:

Judge Baculi, Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,

Tuguegarao City, filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Battung. He claimed that
on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No.
2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him
to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When
warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, “Then cite
me!”Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The
respondent then left.

While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom
and shouted, “Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!”
Judge Baculi ocited him for direct contempt of court for the second time.

After his hearings, respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, “Judge, I will
file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!” He kept on shouting, “I am not
afraid of you!” and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of
the building.
 Judge Baculi later found out that after the respondent left the courtroom, Atty.
Battung continued shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Issue:

Did Atty. Battung violate Cannons 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility?

Ruling:

IBP Commissioner found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to observe and
maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent also violated
Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The respondent’s
argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given due
consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding judge;
by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated.
De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.

The Supreme Court held that litigants and counsels, particularly the latter
because of their position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly
ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents.
 A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the
latter’s role, stature and position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly
berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross
ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner
tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and in his ability to
decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with
sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or
complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring
the justice system into disrepute.

Atty. Battung was ordered suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year
with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 3066. December 3, 2001]

J.K. MERCADO AND SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., and

SPOUSES JESUS and ROSARIO K. MERCADO, complainants,
vs. ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA and JOSE RONGKALES
BANDALAN, respondents.

RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:

A complaint for disbarment against Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera was filed by J.K. Mercado and
Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc., and the spouses Jesus Mercado and Rosario Mercado. The
complaint was an offshoot of an action, entitled "Rosario P. Mercado (`R. Mercado') vs. Jesus R.
Mercado (`J. Mercado'), Mercado and Sons and Standard Fruits Corporation (`Stanfilco'),"
docketed Civil Case No. 17215, for dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership,
accounting, support with support pendente lite, annulment of contract, reconveyance or recovery
of possession of conjugal share, partition, damages and attorney's fees.  The case was assigned to
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City presided over by Judge Jose
Bandalan. Rosario Mercado was represented by respondent Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera.
On 15 December 1986, the case was decided in favor of Rosario Mercado who was awarded
the sum of a little over P9 million. A writ of execution was issued and notices of garnishment
were served on Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation ("RCBC") at Claveria, Davao City;
RCBC at Tagum, Davao del Norte; and Traders Royal Bank at R. Magsaysay Avenue, Davao
City, where the total amount of P1,270,734.66 was garnished.
On 26 February 1987, Rosario Mercado terminated the services of respondent and tendered
the amount of P350,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. She demanded an accounting and the turn-
over of the money still in the custody of respondent but the latter refused, claiming that he was
entitled to P2,254,217.00 attorney's fees. Failing to recover the amount, Rosario Mercado filed a
complaint for disbarment against respondent.
The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The IBP Board of Governors, on 23 March 1993, adopted Resolution No. X-93-41,
recommending the suspension for one (1) year of Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera from the practice of
law.
The Court, in its resolution of 26 October 1999, affirmed the IBP recommendation with
modification that respondent Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for
only six (6) months.Respondent was likewise ordered to return to Rosario Mercado the amount
in excess of P350,000.00 still in his possession, without prejudice to whatever judicial action he
might wish to take to recover his unsatisfied attorney's fees, if any, the resolution directing at the
same time that his suspension would stand until he would have satisfactorily shown to the Court
his compliance therewith.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied with finality in the
resolution of the Court, dated 02 February 2000, a copy of which was received by respondent on
22 February 2000.
The following pleadings were thereafter filed before the Court:
a) An urgent motion, dated 13 March 2000, filed by respondent praying that the remaining
period of his suspension be lifted;
b) A motion for leave to file and admit a manifestation and motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution, dated 15 March 2000, filed by Rosario Mercado;
c) A manifestation and motion, dated 15 March 2000, filed by Rosario Mercado, praying
that a writ of execution be issued compelling respondent to pay or return to her the sum of
P396,692.20;
d) A motion for leave to file and admit a manifestation, dated 27 March 2000, filed by
Rosario Mercado, praying for the imposition of appropriate sanction against respondent;
e) A letter, dated 11 February 2000, of Mr. Jose Elises, and another letter of 08 March 2000
of Capt. Edward Ranada from Davao City, inquiring whether or not respondent could practice
law pending the resolution of his motion for reconsideration; and
f) A comment and opposition, dated 31 March 2000, filed by respondent relative to the
manifestation and motion for the issuance of a writ of execution filed by Rosario Mercado.
 On 24 May 2000, respondent informed the Court that in compliance with its resolution of 26
October 1999, he had voluntarily returned to Rosario Mercado the amount of P114,042.28 or the
excess of P350,000.00 still in his possession.
On 12 July 2000, the Court issued a resolution to the effect that the effectivity of suspension
of respondent should be reckoned from his receipt on 22 February 2000 of the resolution, dated 2
February 2000, of the Court (denying with finality the motion for reconsideration). The Court
took note of the court appearances of, and pleadings signed by, respondent during his period of
suspension from the practice of law.Respondent was required to explain his
infractions. Meanwhile, the Court resolved to remand to the IBP the issue regarding the
determination of the exact amount given by complainant to respondent and the amount to be
returned by respondent.
On 25 October 2000, the Court issued another resolution referring to the IBP, for
investigation, report and recommendation, the matter of respondent's alleged unauthorized
practice of law.
The IBP, in its report of 08 October 2001, made the following findings:
As to the issue of how much money is still in respondent's possession -

"To summarize, respondent was able to disburse and/or account to complainant the

following, to wit:

Amount deposited to complainant's TRB

and Metrobank account P300,000.00
Additional amount received by
complainant, as admitted 10,000.00
Amount received by complainant from
CBC garnished funds 5,000.00
Amount received by complainant by way
of BPI drafts & plane fare 52,000.00
Respondent's expenses in connection
with Civil Case No. 17,215 and three
CA cases 57,832.67
P424,832.67

"Deducting said amount from the amount received by respondent by way of garnished
funds from several banks in Davao City would leave a balance of P845,901.89
(P1,270,734.56 minus P424,832.67).

"Since respondent was allowed to retain for himself the amount of P350,000.00 by
way of attorney's fees and respondent voluntarily paid and/or returned to complainant
the amount P114,042.28 per BPI Manager's Check 497289 in compliance with the
Supreme Court directive, such amounts should be deducted or applied against
respondent's accountability of P845,901.89. Therefore, respondent still has in his
possession the amount of P381,859.61, after deducting the attorney's fees and the
voluntary payment by respondent. Thus,

Amount received by respondent by P1,270,734.56

way of garnished funds
Less: Disbursements/Deductions as 424,832.67
discussed above
Amount to be accounted for by P845,901.89
respondent
Less: (1) Respondent's attorney's fees P350,000.00
(2) Amount voluntarily
returned by respondent 114,042.28 464,042.28
Amount still in respondent's P381,859.61
possession

"Respondent is obliged to deliver to complainant the amount of P381,859.61 pursuant

to Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand."

Anent the alleged unauthorized practice of law by respondent during the period of his
suspension -
a) Re: His appearance before Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation ("HIGC") and
the filing of the Manifestation on Amicable Settlement. -

"There is no doubt that respondent's appearance before the HIGC and his subsequent
filing of the Manifestation on Amicable Settlement constitute practice of law in
violation of his suspension order. A cursory reading of the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during the proceedings before the HIGC on 24 February 2000 (Exhibit `D'
to `D-14,' Complainant's Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence) reveal that
respondent's purpose in appearing before the HIGC is to attend the scheduled
preliminary conference. During the preliminary conference, the parties - Atty. De
Vera, the Hearing Officer, and the opposing counsel - discussed the facts and
circumstances of the case. They also discussed the possibility of an amicable
settlement. These are acts which require legal expertise, training and experience.

"Respondent explained in his affidavit that he was at HIGC precisely to inform the
hearing officer of his suspension. Considering the delicate nature of his situation,
respondent should have, at the start of the preliminary conference, explicitly
manifested in open court regarding his suspension. Assuming that respondent did not
really intend to appear as counsel in said preliminary conference, his appearance as
counsel was clearly evident when he subsequently filed the Manifestation on Offer of
Amicable Settlement. Practice of law includes signing and filing of pleadings."
 b) Re: His appearance in People vs. Jailen Paul. -

"Respondent's ex-parte direct examination of Mrs. Eva Antipuesto was

a flagrant and blatant violation of his suspension order. Having been suspended
effective 22 February 2000, respondent should have refrained from performing acts
constituting practice of law - which include conducting a direct examination of a
witness. Respondent's explanation that he was constrained to conduct a direct
examination because of constant pleas by complainant, Ms. Eva Antipuesto, to speed
up the case cannot justify respondent's violation of his suspension order. Besides,
considering that he was under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor,
respondent should have allowed the public prosecutor Danilo Bello, who was present
on 29 February 2000 hearing, to conduct the direct examination. No amount of
explanation can change the fact [that] respondent conducted the direct examination
knowing fully well that he was suspended by Supreme Court from the practice of
law. As to the Motion to Reset filed by respondent in the said case, the same
constitutes practice of law."

c) Re: His appearance in "People vs. Nilda Cuison Go and People vs. Neolito Egot" on 07
March 2001. -

"As regards to the alleged appearance by respondent in the `Nilda Cuison Go' case,
complainant Mercado was not able to show convincing proof that respondent actively
practiced law by appearing as private prosecutor in said case. The Certification issued
by the Clerk of Court III cannot be considered a proof that respondent actively
practiced law. Respondent was able to explain fully that his appearance was only to
verify the case status of the case. However, respondent's appearance in the `Neolito
Egot' [case] is considered practice of law because he appeared before the court and
represented himself as private prosecutor.Respondent's subsequent desistance is of no
moment because there was intent on his part to appear as private prosecutor."

d) Re: His appearance in "People of the Phils. vs. Edgardo Estareja." -

"After a careful study of the parties' claims and defenses, respondent's appearance on
1 June 2000 for the promulgation of Decision and the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration constitute practice of law indefiance of the Supreme Court
Resolution. It appears that respondent did not `merely attend' the promulgation of the
judgment, respondent acted and appeared as counsel for the accused and actively
participated in the proceedings. As a matter of fact, after the promulgation of the
decision, respondent manifested in open court their intention to appeal and respondent
even gave his comments on the Decision of the trial court.These are acts that can be
performed only by a lawyer who is authorized to practice law. Needless to say, he was
also acting as counsel for the accused when he filed the Motion for Reconsideration."
 e) Re: His appearance as legal counsel of the LAKAS-NUCD before the Board of Canvasser
on 17 May 2000. -

"Respondent admitted having appeared at the canvassing in question but claims that
his participation therein was `merely like that of a non-lawyer acting as representative
of Governor Del Rosario and Representative Floreindo.' When LAKAS-NUCD hired
the services of respondent, he was hired not as a mere representative of its
candidates. Respondent was hired to protect the interest of its candidates in
accordance with the election laws. Reading from the transcript of stenographic notes
taken during the canvassing, there was an active and actual exercise of his legal
knowledge and expertise. Thus, his appearance constitutes practice of law."

f) Re: Complaint of Atty. Honesto Cabarroguis. -

"After a careful study of complainant's allegation, complainant Atty. Cabarroguis

failed to provide this Office convincing evidence that respondent actually passed on
'notes' to his son to guide the latter in his direct examination. The act of passing a
`piece of paper' inside the courtroom during the trial does not involve legal expertise
or the application of legal knowledge and therefore does not constitute practice of
law."

g) Re: Complaint of Mr. Jailen Paul. -

"Exhibit `EE' is a Manifestation dated 21 May 2001 signed by respondent requesting

for a resetting of the case. Exhibit `FF' is the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the hearing on 10 October 2000 of the case `People of the Philippines vs. Jailen
Paul' before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. Exhibit `GG' is an Urgent
Motion to Reset dated 3 October 2000 signed by Francis Arnold De Vera (for
Eduardo De Vera).

"The pleadings filed clearly show that respondent De Vera practiced law during his
suspension. The practice of law includes filing of pleadings before the courts.

h) Re: Pleadings filed by respondent during his suspension.-

"In the following cases, respondent violated his suspension order and practiced law
when he signed the following pleadings which were filed before the regular courts.

"Urgent Manifestation with motion to defer Issuance of Writ of Execution (Exhibit

`T,' Complainant's Formal Offer of Exhibit) dated 07 June 2000 in the case `Socorro
Tiongko et al., vs. Loreto Rosca,' Civil Case No. 3241-B-96;
"Urgent Ex-Parte Request Reiterating Urgent Prayer for 20-Day TRO (Exhibit `U')
dated 7 June 2000 in the case `Republic of the Philippines vs. Estate of Vicenta
Tongko,' Civil Case No. 27-544-99;

"Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief (Exhibit `V') dated 30 May 2000 in the case `Alcrej
Corporation vs. Raquel Camisura and Cesar Camisura,' Civil Case No. 2815-F-96;

"Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief (Exhibit `W') dated 30 May 2000 in the case `Ricardo
Gahol et al., versus Eliseo Gatapia' Civil Case No. 2817-F-96;

"Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief (Exhibit `X') dated 30 May 2000 in the case `Ricardo
Gahol, et al. vs. Eliseo Gatapia' Civil Case No. 2818-F-96; and

"Ex-Parte Urgent Request to Set Continuation of Hearing Contempt Incident (Exhibit

`Z') dated 23 June 2000 in the case `Panabo Public Market Vendors Estension
Association, Inc. vs. Municipality of Panabo,' Civil Case No. 89-23."

The IBP concluded that, in numerous occasions during the period of his suspension,
respondent engaged in the practice of law despite the absence of an order from the Supreme
Court lifting his suspension and that, on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties,
respondent still had in his possession the excess amount of P381,859.61 due and owing in favor
of Rosario Mercado.
Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience.[1] One is entitled to practice law if he has been duly admitted to the bar and there
maintains a good standing.
The findings of the IBP would disclose that respondent indeed actively engaged in the
practice of law during the period of his suspension. Respondent was suspended from the practice
of law by this Court for six months, which took effect on 22 February 2000 (date of receipt by
respondent of the Court's resolution of 2 February 2000). A review of the records would indicate
that respondent was last reported to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law on 1 June
2000 (when he appeared in the promulgation of decision in the case of People of the Philippines
vs. Eduardo Estareja). Thereforth, it would appear that he started to refrain from the practice of
law. The Investigating Commissioner reported that the exact sum still due from respondent to the
complainant would amount to P381,859.61, a finding amply supported by the records.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera is hereby DIRECTED to return to
Rosario Mercado the amount of P381,859.61, and his suspension from the practice of law shall
be lifted once he would have shown to the satisfaction of the Court his compliance therewith.