The senator, currently detained at the PNP custodial center, also argued that the allegations
against her do not actually constitute sale and trading of illegal drugs and liability of
government officials under Republic Act 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act), but
rather only direct briberyDe Lima likewise claimed political persecution supposedly for being
the number one critic of the Duterte administration’s war on drugs as reason for her
indictment.
She sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) stopping the proceedings in
the drug cases against her and status quo ante order on the arrest warrant issued by
Muntinlupa RTC Branch 204 that would allow her release from detention.
She said the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warra nt
despite the fact that she has a pending motion to quash. The senator maintained
that the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over her case because she
was charged on the basis that she used her position as Secretary of Justice in
relation to the alleged criminal acts, Last week, De Lima filed a last-minute motion
seeking the inhibition of Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr. due to alleged “conflict of
interest” But Velasco rejected the plea, saying he did not vote in favor of Agojo’s acquittal
when the case was decided by the SC.
The DOJ indicted the senator before the RTC, saying drug cases fall under exclusive
jurisdiction of the trial courts.
But De Lima argued that the executive agency has no jurisdiction over the cases that should
have been forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman.
De Lima in her petition asked the SC to nullify her arrest warrant and questioned
the jurisdiction of the Muntinlupa RTC.
Issue: w/n the DOJ and the RTC and the ombdsman has no jurisdiction over her case
Ruling : The SC ruled that the Muntinlupa RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the drug
charges against De Lima, even if her position with salary grade higher than 27 is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
In the drug cases, De Lima is accused of receiving around P10 million in drug payoffs from
high profile convicts engaged in the drug trade in the New Bilibid Prison.
In his 39-page dissenting opinion released by the High Court on October 10, Carpio described
the accusations against the lady senator as “blatantly a pure invention.”
The SC voted 9-6, denying De Lima’s petition to nullify her arrest on lack of
jurisdiction by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Muntinlupa Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The High Court instead voted via majority that contrary to
De Lima’s assertion, the anti-graft court Sandiganbayan does not have
authority to try her for drug charges.
The senator, currently detained at the PNP custodial center, also argued that the allegations
against her do not actually constitute sale and trading of illegal drugs and liability of
government officials under Republic Act 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act), but
rather only direct briberyDe Lima likewise claimed political persecution supposedly for being
the number one critic of the Duterte administration’s war on drugs as reason for her
indictment.
She sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) stopping the proceedings in
the drug cases against her and status quo ante order on the arrest warrant issued by
Muntinlupa RTC Branch 204 that would allow her release from detention.
She said the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warra nt
despite the fact that she has a pending motion to quash. The senator maintained
that the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over her case because she
was charged on the basis that she used her position as Secretary of Justice in
relation to the alleged criminal acts, Last week, De Lima filed a last-minute motion
seeking the inhibition of Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr. due to alleged “conflict of
interest” But Velasco rejected the plea, saying he did not vote in favor of Agojo’s acquittal
when the case was decided by the SC.
The DOJ indicted the senator before the RTC, saying drug cases fall under exclusive
jurisdiction of the trial courts.
But De Lima argued that the executive agency has no jurisdiction over the cases that should
have been forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman.
De Lima in her petition asked the SC to nullify her arrest warrant and questioned
the jurisdiction of the Muntinlupa RTC.
Issue: w/n the DOJ and the RTC and the ombdsman has no jurisdiction over her case
Ruling : The SC ruled that the Muntinlupa RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the drug
charges against De Lima, even if her position with salary grade higher than 27 is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
In the drug cases, De Lima is accused of receiving around P10 million in drug payoffs from
high profile convicts engaged in the drug trade in the New Bilibid Prison.
In his 39-page dissenting opinion released by the High Court on October 10, Carpio described
the accusations against the lady senator as “blatantly a pure invention.”
The SC voted 9-6, denying De Lima’s petition to nullify her arrest on lack of
jurisdiction by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Muntinlupa Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The High Court instead voted via majority that contrary to
De Lima’s assertion, the anti-graft court Sandiganbayan does not have
authority to try her for drug charges.
Petitioner Isabelo C. Dela Cruz (Isabelo) claimed that in 1975 he and his sister,
respondent Lucila C. Dela Cruz and (Lucila) and Cornelia C. Dela Cruz (Cornelia),
bought on installment a 240-square meter land in Las Piñas from Gatchalian Realty, Inc.
Isabelo and Cornelia paid the down payment and religiously paid the monthly
amortizations. On the following year, Isabelo constructed a residential house on the
1
subject lot.
2
Because of Lucia’s plea for the siblings to help their cousin, Corazon L. Victoriano
(Corazon), who was in financial distress, Isabelo agreed to have the lot they bought used
as collateral for the loan that Corazon planned to secure from the Philippine Veterans
Bank. To make this posible, Lucila paid the P8,000.00 that they still owed Gatchalian
Realty, Inc. On January 18, 1979 the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) S-80735 in Lucila’s name and this was mortgaged for Corazon’s benefit. But,
3
since Corazon failed to pay her loan, the bank foreclosed on the property on March 1,
1989 for P286,000.00. Lucila redeemed it on March 27, 1992. 4
On October 7, 2002 Lucila executed an affidavit of waiver relinquishing all her share,
5
interest, and participation to half of the lot to Isabelo and the other half to her niece,
Emelinda C. Dela Cruz (Emelinda). On even date, Isabelo and Emelinda executed a
Kasunduan acknowledging their respective rights in the property. Claiming ownership of
6
half of the subject property by virtue of Lucila’s affidavit of waiver, on August 22, 2005
Isabelo filed an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas
City in SCA 05-0008, seeking the segregation of his portion of the land and the issuance
of the corresponding title in his name. But Lucila countered that the property, including
the house built on it, belonged to her since she paid for the same out of her income as
pawnshop general manager and from selling jewelry. 7
She claimed that her affidavit of waiver did not cede ownership of half of the property to
Isabelo since the affidavit made clear that her waiver would take effect only if the
problems that beset their family were resolved. Since this condition had not been met,
she had every right to revoke that waiver as in fact she did so on September 24, 2004 in
the Kasulatan ng Pagpawalang Bisa ng "Affidavit Waiver." 8
On February 7, 2008 the RTC rendered a Decision denying Isabelo’s complaint for lack
9
of merit. It also ordered him to pay Lucila P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to bear the
costs of suit. 10
The RTC ruled that Lucila’s ownership was evidenced by the tax declaration, the real
property tax payment order, and the title to the land in her name. Isabelo’s testimony on
cross-examination conclusively also showed that Lucila owned the property. 11
Isabelo’s contention that it was he and Cornelia who paid for the monthly amortization of
the property cannot be believed since Cornelia herself testified that Lucila paid for all the
amortizations on the land. 12
Further, the RTC held that Lucila’s affidavit of waiver did not confer title over the property
on Isabelo considering that, absent an annotation on TCT S-80735, the waiver cannot
ripen into an adverse claim. More importantly, Lucila already cancelled the waiver
through the Kasulatan that she subsequently executed. 13
The RTC was also unconvinced that the house belonged to Isabelo. It noted that the
receipts for the construction materials and survey plan that he presented did not prove
ownership. Recovery of property, not partition was the proper remedy. Isabelo appealed
to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV 90797. On December 18, 2009 the latter
court rendered a Decision affirming the RTC ruling that Isabelo failed to established his
14
right to half of the subject property as would entitle him to have the same partitioned. But
the CA deleted the award of attorney’s fees and costs for failure of Lucila to justify her
claims and for the RTC’s failure to state in its decision the rationale for the awards.
Isabelo moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it. 15
Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that
Lucila’s cession of half of the property to Isabelo through waiver did not have the effect of
making him part owner of the property with a right to demand partition.
Ruling of the Court
In partition, the court must first determine the existence of co-ownership. The action will
not lie if the plaintiff has no proprietary interest in the subject property. Indeed, the
rules require him to set forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title to the
16
property. It would be premature to order partition until the question of ownership is first
definitely resolved.17
At bottom, the question is: did Lucila’s affidavit of waiver ceding to Isabelo half of the
subject property conveys to him a right of ownership over that half? The CA agreed with
the RTC that Lucila’s affidavit of waiver did not vest any property right to Isabelo since
the condition she set in that affidavit had not been fulfilled. This then gave Lucila the right
in the meantime to rescind the waiver, something that she eventually did. But, contrary to
the position that the CA and the RTC had taken, Lucila’s waiver was absolute and
contained no precondition. The pertinent portion of the affidavit of waiver reads:
That to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive all my share, interest and
participation in so far as it refer to the one half portion (120 SQ. M.) of the above-parcel
of land, with and in favor of my brother ISABELO C. DELA CRUZ, of legal age, married,
Filipino and residing at Las Pinas City, and the other half portion (120 SQ. M.) in favor of
my niece, EMELINDA C. DELA CRUZ, also of legal age, single, Filipino and residing at
Sto. Rosario Hagonoy, Bulacan; x x x x 18
Evidently, Lucila would not have used the terms "to put everything in proper order, I
hereby waive…" if her intent was to set a precondition to her waiver covering the
property, half to Isabelo and half to Emelinda. If that were her intention, she could have
stated, "subject to the condition that everything is put in proper order, I hereby waive..."
or something to that effect. When she instead said, "That to put everything in proper
order, I hereby waive my share, interest and participation" in the two halves of the subject
property in favor of Isabelo and Emelinda, Lucila merely disclosed what motivated her in
ceding the property to them. She wanted to put everything in proper order, thus she was
driven to make the waiver in their favor. Lucila did not say, "to put everything in proper
order, I promise to waive my right" to the property, which is a future undertaking, one that
is demandable only when everything is put in proper order. But she instead said, "to put
everything in proper order, I hereby waive" etc. The phrase "hereby waive" means that
Lucila was, by executing the affidavit, already waiving her right to the property,
irreversibly divesting herself of her existing right to the same. After he and his co-owner
Emelinda accepted the donation, Isabelo became the owner of half of the subject
property having the right to demand its partition.
WHEREFORE, THE Court:
1. GRANTS the petition;
2. SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 18, 2009 and resolution dates May 25,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 90797 as well as the Decision dated
February 7, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas in SCA 05-0008;
3. ORDERS the partition of the subject property between petitioner Isabelo C. Dela Cruz
and Emelinda C. Dela Cruz;
4. ORDERS the remand of the records of SCA 05-0008 to the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas; and
5. DIRECTS the latter court to proceed with the partition proceedings in the case in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
