CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Recent work in informal logic and argumentation has come to rely more and more on the
idea that certain common forms of argumentation--like argument from precedent,
argument from authority, argument from analogy, and so forth1 --are, in some instances,
"valid" or correct modes of reasoning. If so, they must have structures or "forms." But
what are these forms of argument, or so-called argumentation schemes? That is the
question addressed in this book.

Following the usual methods of logic, we would expect to find logical calculi, systems of
propositional calculus, or the probability calculus, that would model these types of
reasoning as valid or invalid. However, we will argue that this approach, at least by itself, is
not the answer2. Instead, we hope to show, these argumentation schemes can best be
revealed as normatively binding kinds of reasoning when seen as moves, or speech acts in
the setting of dialogue. In this pragmatic framework, two participants are reasoning
together in a goal-directed, interactive, conventionalized framework called a dialogue. An
argument is evaluated as good (correct, reasonable) to the extent that it contributes to the
goal of the dialogue. An argument is evaluated as bad (incorrect, fallacious) to the extent
that it blocks the goals of the dialogue.

According to this type of analysis, each of the types of argumentation modelled will have a
distinctive argumentation scheme (structure, form) that allows it to function as a way of
making a point or shifting a burden of proof in a dialogue.

NEED FOR A SYSTEMATIC STUDY

The reliance on argumentation schemes as a central component in the normative structure

of argument evaluation and analysis by theorists like van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984;
1992) has acutely raised the need for a more systematic study of these schemes. In
particular, what is vital is to see whether or how these schemes can function--like the forms
of argument in deductive logic--to test or verify that instances of them in natural language
argumentation are in some sense correct or reasonable. Although the term valid does not
seem to be quite the right word to use with many of these argumentation schemes, still,
when they are rightly or appropriately used, it appears that they are meeting some kind of
standard of correctness of use. What is important to come to know is what this standard is,
for the most common and widely recognized schemes especially, and how each of the
schemes can be tested against this standard.

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1
See chapter 3 for an account of the types of argumentation studied.
2
See van Eemeren and Grootendorst ( 1989).
Blair (1991) put his finger on the central problem when he cited van Eemeren and Kruiger
(1987) as identifying several different types of arguments like argument from analogy,
causal arguments of various kinds, arguments from rules and principles, argument from
consequences, and argument from precedent. But, Blair pointedly asked, what does it mean
to say of such an argument that its premises are sufficient for its conclusion? According to
the pragma-dialectical theory of van Eemeren and Grootendorst, Blair noted, "sufficiency
is a function of appropriately meeting the critics' challenges to premises and inferences" (p.
332). Blair also noted that this means that an argument can rightly be said to be sufficient
for its conclusion in this sense when it meets its burden of proof3 relying on "what may be
presumed without or accepted without further question" (p. 333). This answer seems
exactly right, and points us in a promising direction. For many of the most common and
basic types of argumentation schemes that require a new kind of analysis are inherently
presumptive and dialectical in just the way Blair describes.

But as Blair noted, van Eemeren and Kruiger ( 1987) only give a few examples of these
argumentation schemes, and clearly work is needed to more sharply define these types of
argumentation before we can see better how they can be used as an aid to determine when
an argument (of one of these types) is sufficient for its conclusion.

When we look to the literature on argumentation schemes, there is very little to be found.
Quite a few argumentation schemes can be found in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
(1969), but they are woven in with the general themes of the book. The single, outstanding
best source is the doctoral dissertation of Hastings (1963), which presents nine "modes of
reasoning" along with other "patterns of reasoning." Each mode of reasoning represents
what we call an argumentation scheme. Hastings presents an illustrative example of each
from everyday argumentation, and supplies a set of critical questions to match each
scheme. Thus, Hastings (1963) is a uniquely valuable source that in effect founded the
systematic study of argumentation schemes as a subject for further development.

Aside from this unique resource, however, there is very little to go on. Kienpointner (1987)
gave a useful historical and analytical overview of the subject. The ancient and medieval
classifications of the different "topics" identify many of the same types of argumentation
that we associate with argumentation schemes. However, their way of presenting these
schemes, by mixing them with logical doctrines like essentialism, that are now outdated and
unfamiliar to modern readers, detracts from the usefulness these accounts might have.

Other than the occasional paper on the subject, for example by van Eemeren and Kruiger
(1987), and scattered remarks by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984; 1992), there is
really nothing else to turn to in attempting to get a grasp of what argumentation schemes
are, or how they can be applied.

Just recently however, a new book has appeared which gives a comprehensive typology of
argumentation schemes, and identifies sixty of these schemes.

The typology of Kienpointner ( 1992) is made on the basis of the kind of warrant
(Schlussregel) used in an argument to provide the transition or inference from the premise(s)
to the conclusion. The typology ( Kienpointner, 1992) has

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3
Walton ( 1988).
three main categories of argumentation schemes: (I) those where the warrant is one of use
(Schlussregelbenützende Argumentation schemata), (II) inductive argumentation schemes, and (III)
a third category comprising argument from example, analogy argument, and argument
from authority. The first category is quite large, and comprises four subcategories: 1.
classifying schemes--including definition, genus-species and part-whole arguments. 2.
identity (Gleichheit)--including arguments based on similarity and difference. 3. against the
proposition (Gegensatz) schemes--these are arguments used negatively for refutation (what
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, called schemes of dissociation). 4. causal schemes.

Kienpointner's typology turns out to be quite useful to help us gain a perspective on the
variety of argumentation schemes studied in this book. We have also adopted the policy of
identifying and classifying the argumentation schemes on the basis of the warrant or rule
(we think of it as expressing a type of generalization) that links the premise(s) of an
argument to the conclusion. However, the scope of our inquiry is more narrow than that of
Kienpointner. We analyze only what we call presumptive argumentation schemes, (i.e.,
ones where the generalization is presumptive in nature, and meant to admit of exceptions).
Therefore, we do not include, for example, inductive arguments, part-whole arguments, or
genus-species arguments, presuming that (by and large, at any rate) these types of
argumentation are not presumptive in nature.

A number of the argumentation schemes we study in the subsequent chapters do, however,
fit nicely into Kienpointner's typology. A number of them (especially the ad hominem
variants in chapter 3) fit into the Gegensatz category. Several others are clearly causal in
nature. Arguments based on example, authority, and analogy also fit into Kienpointner's
typology. However, we classify arguments from authority, or at least the subspecies we call
the argument from expert opinion, as a species of argument from position to know (see
chapter 3).

Thus there are some points of difference between Kienpointner's way of classifying
argumentation schemes and our own. But the main difference is that we are concentrating
on what we call presumptive reasoning, and that makes the scope of our inquiry, and also,
to some extent the basis on which it is made, different from Kienpointner's. Certainly the
problem remains of understanding how many of the most common of these argumentation
schemes in everyday conversation are inherently different from the usual models of
deductive and inductive reasoning--these are the presumptive argumentation schemes.

Perhaps part of the problem is that this kind of project never appealed to logicians very
much because it seemed to have more to do with rhetoric and the discovery of persuasive
arguments, for example, in making a speech. If so, it seemed questionable whether it was
appropriate to try to see presumptive arguments as, in some sense, logically valid. More
often, they have been portrayed as fallacious. This apparent ambiguity has dogged the
subject from its beginnings.

ARISTOTLE'S TOPICS

The history of the systematic study of argumentation schemes begins with Aristotle's
(1939) Topics. The purpose of this treatise was to apprehend what Aristotle

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called dialectical reasoning, in which two parties reason together on the basis of premises that
are endoxa, usually translated as "generally accepted opinions" ( Topica 100b18). Dialectical
reasoning contrasts with demonstration, a kind of reasoning which "proceeds from premises
which are true and primary," for example, the first principles of science (100a28).

Aristotle also recognized a third kind of reasoning he called contentious (or eristic), which is
"based on opinions which appear to be generally accepted but are not really so" ( Topica
100b26).

In the Topics, Aristotle was taking a point of view on argumentation that subsequently came
to be pushed to one side and forgotten. He saw reasoning as being used in different ways
in different types of dialogue. And he set out to study and evaluate the uses of different
types of argumentation as used within the norms or conventions of these different types of
dialogue.

Such an approach has long seemed unfamiliar and even alien, and especially so in the 20th
century, where logic, and reasoning generally, is seen exclusively from a semantic and
formalistic point of view. Modern symbolic logic, a development of Aristotle's syllogistic
(deductive) logic, came to abstract reasoning from its uses in a context of dialogue entirely.
According to the formalistic viewpoint that became very dominant in the positivistic era of
the first half of the 20th century, an "argument" came to be seen as a set of propositions
with "truth-values" attached to them. The idea of the use of an argument in different types
of conventionalized dialogues, or structures of interactive reasoning, dropped out of the
picture. The idea was reverted to in Wittgenstein's "language-games" in his later
philosophy, but has not begun to be investigated in any systematic way until the recent
advent of argumentation as a field.

For these reasons, it is difficult for a 20th-century reader, especially one familiar with
formal logic in some form, to have much of a grasp of what Aristotle was up to when he
wrote about dialectical argumentation. The ideas in the Prior Analytics are familiar, because
Aristotle was presenting a theory of objective validity, concerned with universal and
absolute propositions, for example, of the form "All F are G," where the individuals that
have property F all have property G (without considering exceptions). However in the
Topics, Aristotle was presenting a theory of dialectical argumentation, in which an argument
is evaluated relative to another person ( Topics 155b10).

However, although dialectical argumentation, by its nature, involves two people reasoning
together, Aristotle was not attempting to consider any particular pair of individuals, or the
varying reactions of all individuals. Instead, according to Evans ( 1977), he is "contrasting
the art which pays attention to the views of each individual, however eccentric these views
be, with that which organizes and selects certain views as typical and specially relevant to
the subject under consideration" (p. 76 ). Thus Aristotle's position is not an extreme
relativism, but a qualified relativism that judges the worth of an argument in relation to an
endoxon, which could perhaps be called a plausible or typical point of view on an issue
where opinions differ. An argument is judged good or not, in relation to a point of view.

As Evans ( 1977) pointed out, the translation of the word endoxon presents difficulties.
Evans did not think that it represents probability of any sort, and can instead be taken, in a
basic sense, as meaning "representative of someone's view"

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(p. 78 ). Aristotle also makes a distinction between a qualified and an unqualified endoxon (
Topica 159a39-159b1). Something endoxon "may be so either without qualification or in a
way which is qualified by reference to some person ( Evans, 1977, p. 80). Evans came to
the view that the unqualified endoxon could be translated as "absolute plausibility,
unqualified by reference to this person" (p. 83 ), whereas the qualified endoxon refers to
something that is plausible to a particular person, or participant in dialectical
argumentation. The plausible, in other words, can take an absolute or relative form.

Those schooled in traditional (formal) logic might have difficulty in seeing how this notion
of plausibility represents or relates to some logical, as opposed to rhetorical method of
evaluating reasoning. But evidently, Aristotle thought that it does. According to De Pater (
1968, p. 188), the Aristotelian topic or topos has two functions. In its selective function, a topic
is a device to find arguments within a possible set of types of arguments. Using this
function, an orator can run over the list of topics, representing different kinds of
argumentation, and pick out the best or most appropriate one to make his case on a given
issue. This is more of a rhetorical or inventive function of a topic. Van Eemeren,
Grootendorst and Kruiger ( 1987) called this function a "tactical aid" or "search formula,"
in setting up an argument (p. 65 ).

In its guarantee function, the topic is a kind of inference link that grants "the plausibility of the
step from arguments to controversial claim" ( Kienpointner, 1987, p. 280). The guarantee
function uses the argumentation scheme as a bridging structure of inference or Toulmin
warrant that connects a set of premises to a conclusion. Used as a guarantee function, an
argumentation scheme works in much the same way a deductive form of inference like
modus ponens does, in sanctioning a form of argumentation as valid or invalid, correct or
incorrect, in accord with a given standard of correct reasoning.

Whereas the selective function is rhetorical, a device to aid in the invention of useful
argumentation, the guarantee function is logical, in the sense that it gives a standard to
evaluate reasoning as correct or incorrect, in a normative sense.

INFORMAL FALLACIES

Recent work of the author on informal fallacies has shown, time and time again, with the
major, traditional fallacies, that each of them is a species of argumentation that is not
inherently incorrect or fallacious in itself, in every instance of its use4. What has been
shown, instead, is that each of these types of argumentation is tentative and inconclusive--
open to critical questioning--while still being strong enough, in many cases, to have some
degree of bindingness or logical correctness in transferring acceptance from the premises
to the conclusion. However, the bindingness is not of an unconditional or absolute kind--
like deductive validity. Instead, it is a kind of tentative or provisional acceptance that is
involved, (i.e., "Now I have accepted these premises, I am bound to tentatively accept the
conclusion, for the sake of argument or discussion, unless some definite evidence comes

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4
Walton ( 1987; Prag. Theory, 1995).
in that is sufficient to indicate rejecting it"). The "validity" such an argument has (if that is
the right word) is presumptive and provisional in nature5. It is frail, and subject to default.

Even so, such presumptively based arguments can be very useful and important in cases
where action must be taken, but firm evidence is not presently available. Examples would
be in planning, where the future holds many uncertainties, or in practical deliberation,
where prudent action often requires acting on provisional hunches and guesswork, always
subject to revision, as better information comes in.

This new approach to fallacies raises two problems. One is the problem that if these types
of argumentation are not always fallacious, how do you tell the difference between the
fallacious and the nonfallacious cases? The beginning of the answer to this question is to
see that each individual case has to be examined on its merits, by bringing forward and
analyzing the textual evidence of the case.

The other problem is even more fundamental. If these types of argumentation can be
correct, in some sense, and nonfallacious in some instances of their use, what form or
structure do they have as correct arguments? By what standard can we measure or test their
correctness (or incorrectness) in a given case? In a nutshell, this is the problem of
argumentation schemes.

This problem has been expressed perspicuously by Marks ( 1988), who used the following
example.

Case 1.1: The prisoner confessed to the crime. Therefore, the prisoner is guilty.

The truth of the premise of this argument does not conclusively prove the truth of the
conclusion, because there might be many reasons why a prisoner might confess to a crime
of which he is not guilty. Marks called the argument "informally fallacious," (p. 307) and
admittedly it is a kind of argument that would tend to be labeled as fallacious in the
standard treatment of the logic textbooks (see Hamblin, 1970, chapter 1). Even so, the
argument does seem to have a measure of worth, subject to what is, or comes to be known
about the circumstances of its use.

Marks (1988) considered that we could understand the argument as having a suppressed
premise, "If a person confesses to a crime, then that person is guilty of that crime." This
move makes the argument deductively valid--it now has the form of modus ponens--but does
not save the argument. For any criticism of the nonexplicitized form (as expressed in the
version in Case 1.1), would apply equally well to the suppressed premise.

Marks saw a problem here, for the argument in question (once explicitized) is unsound,
containing a false premise, but what has become of the sense of "fallaciousness" that was
invoked by the initial presentation of it in Case 1.1?

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5
See chapter 2.
The solution to Marks' problem advanced in this book will take the following form of
argumentation. Because the prisoner was presumably in a position to know whether he
committed the crime or not, then his confessing does give a "push," or a weight of
evidence towards the hypothesis that he did commit the crime. However, such a
conclusion could easily turn out to be mistaken. The prisoner may have been coerced into a
confession, or have had some reason for making a confession (e.g., to protect someone
else), even though, in fact, he did not commit the crime. Perhaps the confession was even
an outcome of a session of plea-bargaining. Hence the argument in Case 1.1 is best
described (as things stand) as a fragile or slender, provisional kind of basis for inferring the
conclusion from the premise, but not such a bad argument that it deserves to be called
fallacious.

This is not to say that the argument in Case 1.1 could never be fallacious, depending on
how the case is filled out. If the prosecuting attorney ignored genuine evidence that the
confession was coerced by the police, and kept pushing the argument in Case 1.1 forward
dogmatically, it could become appropriate to speak of a fallacy having been committed.

But by itself, the argument in Case 1.1 is not fallacious, even with the suppressed premise
added.

If we were to view this suppressed premise as a universal generalization of the form, "For
all x, if x confessed to a crime, then x is guilty of that crime," then we would have to
concede that, in fact, this premise is false. One counterinstance is all that is needed to
refute an (unqualified) universal generalization of this form. Interpreted in this way, the
argument in Case 1.1 could be alleged to be a fallacy.

But would this be an appropriate or justifiable way of interpreting the argument in Case
1.1? In general, it would not be. In fact, it could quite legitimately be described as an
instance of the straw man fallacy of interpreting the point of view of an arguer. In this
instance, the fallacy is that of exaggerating the claim or viewpoint expressed to make it
appear much stronger, or more extreme, than the case would justify.

How then should we interpret the implicit premise that links the explicit premise to the
conclusion in the argument in Case 1.1? It is argued in this book that this conditional ought
to be cast in a form that expresses the idea that normally if x confesses to a crime, then it is
reasonable to move forward in subsequent investigation, discussion, or actions, on the
assumption that x committed the crime. However, such an assumption follows neither by
logical necessity nor by probability or inductive reasoning (at least of any straightforward
kind). Instead, the conditional licenses only a permissible conclusion to be drawn from the
premise as antecedent, on the assumption that the case of x is typical, in the sense that no
known circumstance of the case defeats the application of the conditional to that case.

According to this interpretation, the argument in Case 1.1, when supplemented with a
nonexplicit conditional premise or warrant, linking the explicit premise to the conclusion,
has a function in dialogue of shifting an obligation, or weight of questioning, from one
participant to another. Once put forward by a proponent in a dialogue (for example, in a
legal trial), the argument creates a presumption that shifts a weight or burden onto anyone
who would doubt it to ask

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appropriate critical questions, or to give evidence to indicate that this case is somehow not
typical in a relevant respect.

Thus this argument is not a strong argument, and it is far from being conclusive. But on
our interpretation, it should not be called a fallacious argument.

Obviously, however, such an argument could easily become fallacious, or be used

fallaciously, where it has been pushed forward too strongly in a dialogue, in a way that
ignores, or suppresses the proper kind of qualifications that always need to be attached to
such presumptive generalizations. In fact, there is actually a traditional name for this
generic type of fallacy. It is called secundum quid, or neglect of qualifications.

Arguments like the one in Case 1.1 lie on a razor's edge: They are somewhat weak and
unreliable, and apt to fail occasionally, but they are not so bad or inherently erroneous that
they should be called "fallacious" in all instances. On the other hand, they can turn out to
be fallacious, in some cases. And, in particular, they run the risk of committing the secundum
quid fallacy as quite a general sort of failure they are prone to. If this is right, a new
approach to fallacies is called for-an approach that takes more care in assessing the
particulars of a given case.

In arguments like the one in Case 1.1, the premise, if true in a given case, does give a
reason for accepting the conclusion. But it is not a conclusive reason, and it is subject to
default relative to what is known (or becomes known) of the further circumstances of the
case. The problem then is to find the underlying structure of inference in such a case that
enables one to identify and test the correctness (or incorrectness) of the argument as an
instance of an argumentation scheme.

HOW ARE SCHEMES NORMATIVELY BINDING?

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) introduced the concept of an argumentation

scheme by looking at ways people typically argue when a speaker has a standpoint or
conclusion in mind, and tries to convince a listener to come to accept that conclusion.

In his endeavor to transfer the acceptability of the premises to the conclusion and to
achieve the interactional effect that the listener accept his standpoint, the speaker tries to
put forward his argument in such a fashion that it convinces the listener. He
communicates, as it were, that he knows the way that leads from what is already accepted
to the standpoint. In arguing in one of these ways, he relies on a ready-made argumentation
scheme: a more or less conventionalized way of representing the relation between what is
stated in the argument and what is stated in the standpoint. (p. 96)

This way of defining the concept of an argumentation scheme appears to make it a matter
of what people conventionally or typically accept as a pattern of argumentation linking
premises to a conclusion. Thus, it does not appear, by this description, that the
argumentation scheme binds the speaker or listener (or anyone else) to accept the
conclusion as following from the premises logically.

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Indeed, in a footnote, van Eemeren and Grootendorst seem to confirm that, as they see it,
an argumentation scheme does not imply that the given argument it applies to is logically
valid, in some sense.

On this point, logic has not much to offer. In spite of important differences in the way
logicians define the object, scope, and method of their work, they seem unanimous in
thinking that their concern with validity is about formal rather than substantive relations
between premises and conclusions, syntactico-semantic rather than pragmatic aspects,
reasoning in isolation rather than in context, implications rather than inferences and--most
important to us at this juncture--transmission of truth rather than acceptance. (p. 96 )

It seems at this point that argumentation schemes have more of a rhetorical or persuasive
function than a logical function. They represent ways of communicating an argument in a
dialogue, in relation to the conventions of what kinds of moves or speech acts are
conventionally accepted in that type of dialogue.

Kienpointner (1987) judged that argumentation schemes require a different kind of

approach from the way arguments are evaluated in a deductive, formal logic. With
argumentation schemes, it does not seem possible "to construct an algorithm to test the
validity of natural language argumentation by translating it into a formal language." Apart
from considering the context of use in a particular case, there seems to be no way to judge
between "sound" and "fallacious" instances of argumentation schemes. Consequently,
Kienpointner drew the conclusion that evaluating instances of argumentation schemes is
best done by taking into account the context of dialogue of the given case.

. . . the soundness of argumentation can't be judged independently of semantic and

pragmatic standards underlying the argumentation, i.e. the language game played by
subgroups of a speech community (in the sense of the late Wittgenstein). Consequently, the
use theory of meaning can be seen as an adequate theoretical frame to understand and
describe the diversity of soundnessconcepts and soundness-judgments in a community. (p.
279)

This means that an argumentation scheme could be used correctly in one type of dialogue
(language game) and fallaciously, or incorrectly, in relation to another type of dialogue.

For example, a thinly veiled threat could be inappropriate, and even rightly judged
fallacious, in the context of a critical discussion. If the same threat were to occur in a
negotiation dialogue however, it could be an acceptable, and not wholly inappropriate
move or tactic, in that context of dialogue.

It is well known that van Eemeren and Grootendorst have the goal of studying
argumentation normatively, and not just descriptively, as they have often stated ( van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984). And in fact, a few years later ( 1992), we found them
saying that argumentation schemes are the key means of evaluating many arguments in
everyday conversations, and that the argumentation scheme does "correspond to" certain
"assessment criteria."

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A person who puts forward an argumentation anticipates criticism, and by choosing a
particular type of argumentation, using the one argumentation scheme rather than the
other, he implies that he thinks he knows which route will lead to the justification of his
standpoint. At any rate, whether he really thinks this or not, if he is to be taken seriously by
the other party, he may be held to be committed to deal with the critical questions which
pertain to a justification via the argumentation scheme that is inherent in his
argumentation.

In relying on a certain argumentation scheme, the arguer invokes a particular testing

method in a dialectical procedure, in which certain critical reactions are relevant, and others
not. Each argumentation scheme calls, as it were, for its own set of critical reactions. In
conjunction with each other, these reactions constitute a well-rounded test for checking the
soundness of an argumentation of the type concerned. (p. 98 )

This way of describing argumentation schemes suggests that they are normatively binding,
in the following sense. If the hearer accepts the premises of the speaker's argument, and
the argument is an instance of a genuine and appropriate argumentation scheme (for the
type of dialogue they are engaged in), then the hearer must or should (in some binding way)
accept the conclusion. This does not appear to be "validity" in the same sense in which the
word is familiarly used in deductive (or perhaps even inductive) logic. But it does appear to
express a normative or broadly logical sense of validity, bindingness, conditional
acceptability, or whatever you want to call it.

The sense of "validity" expressed here expresses a commitment to deal with critical
questions appropriate for an argument. It appears, moreover, to be a dialogue-relative (or
dialectical) concept of validity or bindingness (obligation). It appears, judging from the
previous quotation, that argumentation schemes do definitely have a logical aspect,
expressing a kind of validity, though (as their footnote makes clear) not any kind of validity
recognized in the usual formal logic of propositions and quantifiers.

The problem then is to understand generally how argumentation schemes can be seen as
being a part of some framework of logical reasoning so that they can be seen as "binding,"
or as possessing or conveying some kind of validity, when used properly in argumentation.

In everyday conversation, the glue binding a set of premises to a conclusion is practical

reasoning.

Case 1.2: I want to get to the station to catch the train to Groningen. Therefore, I must
run.

In this kind of inference, the premise states a goal, and there is a nonexplicit premise
stating that running, in this case, is the means of achieving the goal. The conclusion
connects the two premises together, stating that the agent must (if he wants to attain the
goal) carry out the indicated action.

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Clearly this type of reasoning has an argumentation scheme. One premise defines or
describes a goal. The other premise describes a means of achieving the goal. The
conclusion directs the agent towards action to carry out the means.6 6

But this type of reasoning is so common and distinctive, having many variants and
subspecies of argumentation, that it is misleading to call it an argumentation scheme. Better
to call it a type of reasoning that can be used in argumentation in different types of
dialogue (as in Walton, What Reas., 1990).

PRACTICAL REASONING

The analysis of argumentation schemes is very much affected by the recognition of

practical reasoning as a distinctive type of reasoning, as distinguished from what might be
called theoretical or discursive reasoning. Practical reasoning (Walton, Pract. Reas., 1990) is a
kind of goal-directed, knowledge-based reasoning that is directed to choosing a prudent
course of action for an agent that is aware of its present circumstances. In a practical
inference, the conclusion is an imperative that directs the agent to a prudent course of
action. The premises describe the agent's goals and knowledge in a given situation,
especially practical knowledge of ways and means.

Discursive reasoning, by contrast, has a cognitive orientation, weighing reasons for and
against the truth or falsity of a proposition. Logic, in the past, has usually dealt with
discursive reasoning as the only important kind of reasoning to be evaluated, and ignored
practical reasoning. However, when one turns to study argumentation in everyday
conversation, it appears that practical reasoning is the medium of many of the most
commonly used argumentation schemes. This hypothesis is well confirmed in chapter
three, where many of the argumentation schemes are shown to be special forms of
practical reasoning.

Practical reasoning is a goal-directed sequence of linked practical inferences that seeks out a
prudent line of conduct for an agent in a set of particular circumstances known by the
agent Where a is an agent, A is an action, and G a goal, the two basic types of practical
inferences are respectively, the necessary condition scheme and the sufficient condition
scheme (Walton, Pract. Reas., 1990; see also Schellens, 1987).

G is a goal for a
Doing A is necessary for a to carry out G
Therefore, a ought to do A

G is a goal for a
Doing A is sufficient for a to carry out G
Therefore, a ought to do A

The second premise, in both types of inferences, is to be understood as relative to what a

knows or reasonably takes to be the case, as far as he grasps the particular circumstances in
the given case. These circumstances can change, and practical

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6
See Clarke ( 1985), Audi ( 1989), and Walton ( Pract. Reas., 1990).
reasoning is therefore to be understood as a dynamic kind of reasoning that needs to be
corrected or updated as new information comes in.

The concepts of necessary and sufficient conditions incorporated in the second premise
need to be understood as typically flexible rather than strict relationships. Both need to be
judged in relation to the given knowledge base of the agent, subject to exceptions and
overriding circumstances that can come to light in a particular case. These are very special
kinds of conditionals that have a special kind of logic in their own right, analyzed later.

The conclusion of a practical inference guides an agent to a prudent course of action,

subject to the conditions set in the premises. The conclusion is a practical imperative
directing the prudentially wise to do something, given the circumstances, as the agent sees
them, expressed in the premises. If the agent is committed to the premises, then the agent
ought (prudentially) to be committed to the course of action which is directed by the
conclusion. Otherwise, the set of commitments is pragmatically inconsistent (Walton, Arg.
Pos., 1985).

As argumentation, practical reasoning is used in a context of dialogue. Most commonly,

practical reasoning is used in deliberations, but it is also often used in advice-solicitation
dialogues, and in critical discussions. Four kinds of critical questions function alongside a
practical inference as a means of indicating a proper weight of commitment to be assigned
to the conclusion in a given context of dialogue.

Q1: Are there alternative ways (other than A) of realizing G? Q2: Is it possible for a to do
A? Q3: Does a have goals other than G that should be taken into account? Q4: Are there
other consequences of bringing about A that should be taken into account?

In weighing these critical questions against a practical inference in a given case, in a context
of dialogue, burden of proof plays an important role. If the premises of a practical
inference are well-supported as reasonable commitments for an agent, a weight of
presumption is thrown against a respondent who questions the practical validity of the
practical inference in the given situation. To shift the burden back onto the proponent, the
respondent must pose one or more of these appropriate critical questions. Thus practical
reasoning has a kind of validity that should be judged in relation to the requirements of
burden of proof in a given situation.

The kind of analysis of practical reasoning briefly outlined previously and further
developed and elaborated in Walton (Pract. Reas., 1990) makes room for the pragmatic view
of presumption of the sort advocated by Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca (1969), Ullman-
Margalit (1983), and Clarke (1989). Presumption can be justified in reasoning, on a practical
basis, on the grounds that it can enable the line of reasoning to go ahead, even in the
absence of absolute knowledge of what will happen in a particular situation where some
commitment to action or inaction needs to be made. Guidance toward a prudent course of
action typically necessitates operating on presumptions that could turn out to be wrong,
and drawing conclusions (tentatively) from these presumptions by practical inferences,
even if such reasoning is a kind of careful guesswork.

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Practical reasoning is typically based on rough and ready generalizations drawn from
practical skills, common experiences, or mastery of a craft. These generalizations are often
too rough to admit of quantification, and they also tend to be subject to exceptions and
irregularities.

PLAUSIBLE REASONING

The argumentation schemes identified in chapter three all have one thing in common. They
are presumptive and plausibilistic in nature, meaning that if the premises are true (or
acceptable), then the conclusion does not follow deductively or inductively, but only as a
reasonable presumption in given circumstances of a case, subject to retraction if those
circumstances should change. Moreover, such changes do not tend to be quantifiable as
probabilities (except perhaps very roughly), because hard or objective evidence to back
them up is not available. Instead, the basis of their support is subjective (i.e., based on a
source, signs or other not-very-reliable indicators that are inherently open to critical doubt).

Drawing conclusions from premises using these argumentation schemes is a kind of

presumptive guesswork, where one participant in a dialogue presumes that the other is
speaking in accord with the Gricean maxim of cooperativeness appropriate for the type of
dialogue they are engaged in. Understandably, logicians in the past have been suspicious of
this kind of inference as being a valid, genuine, or reliable kind of reasoning. And it surely
must be conceded, in favor of these reservations, that this type of presumptive
argumentation is often subject to failure and default, even to fallacies, and that as a species
of reasoning it is not highly reliable. It is best seen as a defeasible guide to prudent action in
a case where better evidence (that might enable deductive or inductive reasoning to be
used) is not available. You could call presumptive reasoning a kind of lack of knowledge
inference, or argumentation from ignorance, to be used when a decision is practically
necessary or useful, even if uncertainty prevails ( Walton, Arg. Ig., 1995).

In looking for a logic behind these argumentation schemes, conventional expectations

would suggest looking for a formal calculus (like propositional calculus, in deductive logic)
that would enable us to calculate some numerical degrees of confidence for the inferences
from premises to conclusions. In fact, Rescher ( 1976; 1977) already constructed a logic of
plausible reasoning of this kind.

However, here we take quite a different approach, by postulating that the validity or
correctness of an argumentation scheme, as used in a given case, depends on the context of
dialogue appropriate for that case. On our analysis, each argumentation scheme has a set of
critical questions attached to it. The use or function of the argumentation scheme is to shift
a burden or weight of presumption to the other side in a dialogue (Walton, Plaus. Arg.,
1992). The asking of an appropriate critical question, one that matches the argumentation
scheme, shifts the weight of presumption back to the other side, in turn. The basis for
evaluation of the argumentation then is to be sought in the burden of proof, the
obligations of each party to prove, disprove, or question some particular proposition, as set
in the opening stages of the dialogue. This initial confrontation, in conjunction with

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the argumentation schemes used at any particular stage of the argumentation in the
dialogue, determine the evaluation of the argument as strong, weak, open to doubt,
fallacious, and so forth. This way of evaluating an argument is dialectical in the sense that it
depends on the prior sequence of exchanges in a dialogue, on the type of dialogue, and on
the initial problem the participants have set out to solve or resolve.

In this framework, attaching some numerical values, truth-values, or whatever, to the

propositions is not, by itself, much help. The locus of evaluation is elsewhere. You need to
look at the argument in context, especially in relation to the discussion that has preceded it
in the dialogue. The argumentation schemes and the matching critical questions set out a
profile of dialogue--a question-reply sequence of exchanges--that defines what is correct or
appropriate at any given point, in relation to the exchanges that surround it.

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES AND THEMES

According to this new approach, any claim that a fallacy has been committed must be
evaluated in relation to the text of discourse available in a given case. The first task is to
locate the argument (i.e., generally a set of premises and a conclusion, that supposedly
contains the fallacy). Such an argument will always occur in a context of dialogue,
according to the new theory. Much of the work of analysis and evaluation of the allegedly
fallacious argument will involve placing that argument in a context of dialogue.

When dealing with fallacies, there are generally three parts or aspects of a given argument
to be concerned with. First, one needs to identify the argumentation scheme, or form of
the argument. For example, if it is a deductive argument the form could be that of modus
ponens. Or if it is an argument from consequences, the argumentation scheme is of the type
for argumentation from consequences (see chapter 3).

Evaluating the argument at this first level, it can be criticized on two grounds. First, it may
be an invalid argument, or otherwise fail to conform to the requirements appropriate for
that type of argumentation scheme. Second, one or more of the premises can be criticized
on the grounds that it has been inadequately supported.

The second aspect of an argument to be considered is that of relevance. Even if the

argument is a good one at this first level, it still could fail to be relevant. But what do we
mean here by 'relevant? It has been argued elsewhere (Walton, Prag. Theory, 1995), that
relevance, in this sense, is dialectical relevance, meaning that an argument is relevant if it
fulfills its proper function in the given context of dialogue.

At the first level of criticism, one is mainly concerned with the premises and conclusion of
the argument--what might be called its inferential structure and content. This could be
called a local level of analysis, because the concern is with the premises and conclusion of a
single argument, as opposed to considering the broader use of the inference in a context of
dialogue.

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With some kinds of fallacies, of the kind called errors of reasoning (Walton, Prag. Theory,
1995), there is no need to go beyond this first level of analysis. However, with the
sophistical tactics type of fallacies, two more levels are necessary to evaluate. The third level
is global.

The third level of criticism requires studying the use of an argument in a broad context of
dialogue. At this level, we need to ask what type of dialogue the argument is supposed to
be taking place within, and what stage of the dialogue it is in. This is called the dialectical
level of analysis, because it pertains to how the argumentation was used in a context of
dialogue to contribute to the goal of that type of dialogue. For most of the major informal
fallacies, this third level of analysis is crucial. With respect to the three major informal
fallacies chiefly studied in this book, it is shown that this dialectical level of analysis is
absolutely crucial.

Typically, at the second level, in order to evaluate an argument as correct or fallacious, in

addition to seeing whether it meets the requirements of its appropriate argumentation
scheme, we also need to see how it is used over a larger segment of the dialogue, in the
sequence of question-reply argumentation. To do this, we need to reconstruct a profile of
dialogue in which the argumentation should properly be used, and contrast this with the
actual sequence that took place. This task involves the application of a normative model of
dialogue to a text of discourse given in the actual case to be analyzed (as far as it can be
reconstructed). Good examples are the profiles of dialogue used to analyze the fallacy of
many questions in Walton ( Quest. Reply, 1989) and the profiles of dialogue used to analyze
the fallacy of begging the question in Walton ( Begg. Quest., 1991).

As contrasted with an argumentation scheme, which is a local inference used at one point
or stage of a dialogue an argumentation theme is a sequence of argumentation modelled in a
profile of dialogue which reveals how the argument was used in a protracted manner over
an extended stretch of dialogue.

For each argumentation scheme, there is a matching set of critical questions appropriate for
that scheme. To ask an appropriate critical question in a dialogue shifts the burden of proof
back onto the side of the proponent of the original argument to reply to this question
successfully. For each use of an argumentation scheme by a proponent of an argument in a
dialogue, typically there arises a whole sequence of questions and replies from the response
of the respondent, and the subsequent replies of the proponent. This sequence of
connected arguments, questions and replies, is called the argumentation theme.

By studying the argumentation theme in a given case, much can be revealed about the
critical attitudes of the proponent and the respondent For example, we can ask whether the
proponent is putting forward the argumentation in a way that shows that he or she is
observing the Gricean maxims of honesty, cooperativeness, relevance, and so forth, or
whether he or she is not really open to paying due accord to the evidence put forward by
the other side, but merely engaging in eristic dialogue or quarrelling. Such a judgment is
generally best made not at too localized a level, on the basis of a single inference or putting
forward of an argumentation scheme, but rather on the basis of performance over a longer,
protracted sequence of dialogue exchanges.

Where a major informal fallacy has occurred in a given case, in some instances the error
can be revealed, analyzed, and evaluated at the local level as an error of
-15-
reasoning. We might look at the argumentation scheme, for example, and point out that
one of the premises has not been adequately supported. The problem here may simply be
an error or oversight, but if it is a serious enough one, we may rightly say that a fallacy was
committed.

However, in other cases, things may not be this simple, because the fallacy can only be
documented and proved by bringing forward textual evidence to show that the arguer's use
of the argumentation theme over a protracted sequence of dialogue reveals an
uncooperative, tricky or deceptive use of argumentation. Such a use of sophistical tactics
can be evaluated as fallacious to the extent that it blocks the legitimate goals of the dialogue
that the participants in argumentation are supposed to be engaged in (Walton, Prag. Theory,
1995).

In this type of case, you have to take a broader, pragmatic view of the concept of fallacy
that takes the dialectical context of an argument into account. Instead of just looking at the
argument at the local or micro level, you need to evaluate the larger context of dialogue in
which the argument was used (Walton, Prag. Theory, 1995).

Clearly then, identifying the various argumentation schemes will not, by itself, solve all the
problems of analyzing the various informal fallacies. But identifying the argumentation
schemes, and showing how they can be used, in some cases, as reasonable arguments, is a
first and essential step in studying the fallacies. Once we see how argumentation schemes
can be used rightly to yield correct (if presumptive) arguments in some cases, we can work
from there to study the different ways they are abused, in different contexts of dialogue, to
generate fallacies.

The purpose of this book, however, is not to analyze the fallacies. The purpose is to
analyze argumentation schemes. But we pick several major informal fallacies that are
especially vital in relation to the study of argumentation schemes, and show the connection
between the fallacy and the argumentation scheme in these cases.

-16-
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