GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L.

MEER Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not
perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever
Facts: form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere
privilege of judges — personal and therefore waivable — but a basic
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest
Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court (Evans vs. Gore).
during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this
action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment
was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of
taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

Issue:

Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a

diminution thereof?

Held:

Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that
salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the
Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be
indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the
Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial
officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing
official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been
transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional
Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the
judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on
judicial salaries really impairs them.

This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These
pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the
corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on
incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only
when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to
diminish their official stipend — that the taxation must be resisted as an
infringement of the fundamental charter.
 issue involves the right of other constitutional officers whose compensation
is equally protected by the Constitution, for instance, the President, the
Republic of the Philippines Auditor-General and the members of the Commission on Elections. Anyway
SUPREME COURT the subject has been thoroughly discussed in many American lawsuits and
Manila opinions, and we shall hardly do nothing more than to borrow therefrom
and to compare their conclusions to local conditions. There shall be little
EN BANC occasion to formulate new propositions, for the situation is not
unprecedented.
G.R. No. L-2348 February 27, 1950
Our Constitution provides in its Article VIII, section 9, that the members of
GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee, the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such
vs. compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during
BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant. their continuance in office." It also provides that "until Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Francisco annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos". When in 1945 Mr. Justice
Carreon for oppositor and appellant. Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not "provided otherwise", by fixing a
Gregorio Perfecto in his own behalf. different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided
by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.
BENGZON, J.:
Now, does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice to a diminution thereof?.
Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court
during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this A note found at page 534 of volume 11 of the American Law Reports
action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment answers the question in the affirmative. It says:
was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of
taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. Where the Constitution of a state provides that the salaries
of its judicial officers shall not be dismissed during their
The Manila judge upheld his contention, and required the refund of the continuance in office, it had been held that the state
amount collected. The defendant appealed. legislature cannot impose a tax upon the compensation
paid to the judges of its court. New Orleans v. Lea (1859) 14
The death of Mr. Justice Perfecto has freed us from the embarrassment of La. Ann. 194; Opinion of Attorney-General if N. C. (1856) 48
passing upon the claim of a colleague. Still, as the outcome indirectly affects N. C. (3 Jones, L.) Appx. 1; Re Taxation of Salaries of Judges
all the members of the Court, consideration of the matter is not without its (1902) 131 N. C. 692, 42 S. E. 970; Com. ex. rel. Hepburn v.
vexing feature. Yet adjudication may not be declined, because (a) we are Mann (1843) 5 Watts & S,. (Pa.) 403 [but see to the contrary
not legally disqualified; (b) jurisdiction may not be renounced, ad it is the the earlier and much criticized case of Northumberland
defendant who appeals to this Court, and there is no other tribunal to which county v. Chapman (1829) 2 Rawle (Pa.) 73] *
the controversy may be referred; (c) supreme courts in the United States
have decided similar disputes relating to themselves; (d) the question A different rule prevails in Wisconsin, according to the same annotation.
touches all the members of the judiciary from top to bottom; and (e) the Another state holding the contrary view is Missouri.
The Constitution of the United States, likes ours, forbids the diminution of indirect, that might by possibility in times of political
the compensation of Judges of the Supreme Court and of inferior courts. excitement warp their judgments.
The Federal Governments has an income tax law. Does it embrace the
salaries of federal judges? In answering this question, we should consider Upon these grounds I regard an act of Congress retaining in
four periods: the Treasury a portion of the Compensation of the judges,
as unconstitutional and void2.
First period. No attempts was made to tax the compensation of Federal
judges up to 1862 1. The protest was unheeded, although it apparently bore the approval of the
whole Supreme Court, that ordered it printed among its records. But in
Second period. 1862-1918. In July, 1862, a statute was passed subjecting the 1869 Attorney-General Hoar upon the request of the Secretary of the
salaries of "civil officers of the United States" to an income tax of three per Treasury rendered an opinion agreeing with the Chief Justice. The collection
cent. Revenue officers, construed it as including the compensation of all of the tax was consequently discontinued and the amounts theretofore
judges; but Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the judiciary, wrote to the received were all refunded. For half a century thereafter judges' salaries
Secretary of the Treasury a letter of protest saying, among other things: were not taxed as income.3

The act in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the Third period. 1919-1938. The Federal Income Tax Act of February 24, 1919
compensation of every judge 3 per cent, and if it can be expressly provided that taxable income shall include "the compensation of
diminished to that extent by the name of a tax, it may, in the judges of the Supreme Court and inferior courts of the United States".
the same way, be reduced from time to time, at the Under such Act, Walter Evans, United States judge since 1899, paid income
pleasure of the legislature. tax on his salary; and maintaining that the impost reduced his
compensation, he sued to recover the money he had delivered under
The judiciary is one of the three great departments of the protest. He was upheld in 1920 by the Supreme Court in an epoch-making
government, created and established by the Constitution. decision.*, explaining the purpose, history and meaning of the Constitutional
Its duties and powers are specifically set forth, and are of a provision forbidding impairment of judicial salaries and the effect of an
character that requires it to be perfectly independent of the income tax upon the salary of a judge.
two other departments, and in order to place it beyond the
reach and above even the suspicion of any such influence, With what purpose does the Constitution provide that the
the power to reduce their compensation is expressly compensation of the judges "shall not be diminished during
withheld from Congress, and excepted from their powers of their continuance in office"? Is it primarily to benefit the
legislation. judges, or rather to promote the public weal by giving them
that independence which makes for an impartial and
Language could not be more plain than that used in the courageous discharge of the judicial function? Does the
Constitution. It is, moreover, one of its most important and provision merely forbid direct diminution, such as expressly
essential provisions. For the articles which limits the powers reducing the compensation from a greater to a less sum per
of the legislative and executive branches of the year, and thereby leave the way open for indirect, yet
government, and those which provide safeguards for the effective, diminution, such as withholding or calling back a
protection of the citizen in his person and property, would part as tax on the whole? Or does it mean that the judge
be of little value without a judiciary to uphold and maintain shall have a sure and continuing right to the compensation,
them, which was free from every influence, direct and whereon he confidently may rely for his support during his
continuance in office, so that he need have no nonpolitical forum in which those understandings can be
apprehension lest his situation in this regard may be impartially debated and determined. That forum our courts
changed to his disadvantage? supply. There the individual may assert his rights; there the
government must accept definition of its authority. There
The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory the individual may challenge the legality of governmental
that a larger measure of liberty and justice would be action and have it adjudged by the test of fundamental
assured by vesting the three powers — the legislative, the principles, and that test the government must abide; there
executive, and the judicial — in separate departments, each the government can check the too aggressive self-assertion
relatively independent of the others and it was recognized of the individual and establish its power upon lines which all
that without this independence — if it was not made both can comprehend and heed. The constitutional powers of
real and enduring — the separation would fail of its the courts constitute the ultimate safeguard alike of
purpose. all agreed that restraints and checks must be individual privilege and of governmental prerogative. It is in
imposed to secure the requisite measure of independence; this sense that our judiciary is the balance wheel of our
for otherwise the legislative department, inherently the entire system; it is meant to maintain that nice adjustment
strongest, might encroach on or even come to dominate the between individual rights and governmental powers which
others, and the judicial, naturally the weakest, might be constitutes political liberty. Constitutional government in
dwarf or swayed by the other two, especially by the the United States, pp. 17, 142.
legislative.
Conscious in the nature and scope of the power being
The particular need for making the judiciary independent vested in the national courts, recognizing that they would
was elaborately pointed our by Alexander Hamilton in the be charge with responsibilities more delicate and important
Federalist, No. 78, from which we excerpt the following: than any ever before confide to judicial tribunals, and
appreciating that they were to be, in the words of George
xxxxxxxxx Washington, "the keystone of our political fabric", the
convention with unusual accord incorporated in the
At a later period John Marshall, whose rich experience as Constitution the provision that the judges "shall hold their
lawyer, legislator, and chief justice enable him to speak as offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times
no one else could, tersely said (debates Va. Gonv. 1829- receive for their services a compensation which shall not be
1831, pp. 616, 619): . . . Our courts are the balance wheel of diminished during their continuance in office." Can there be
our whole constitutional system; and our is the only any doubt that the two things thus coupled in place — the
constitutional system so balanced and controlled. Other clause in respect of tenure during good behaviour and that
constitutional systems lacks complete poise and certainly of in respect of an undiminishable compensation-were equally
operation because they lack the support and interpretation coupled in purpose? And is it not plain that their purposes
of authoritative, undisputable courts of law. It is clear was to invest the judges with an independence in keeping
beyond all need of exposition that for the definite with the delicacy and importance of their task, and with the
maintenance of constitutional understandings it is imperative need for its impartial and fearless performance?
indispensable, alike for the preservation of the liberty of the Mr. Hamilton said in explanation and support of the
individual and for the preservation of the integrity of the provision (Federalist No. 79): "Next to permanency in office,
powers of the government, that there should be some nothing can contribute more to the independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for their support. . . . In the
general course of human nature, a power over a man's In September 1, 1919, Samuel J. Graham assumed office as judge of the
subsistence amounts to a power over his will. Unites States court of claims. His salary was taxed by virtue of the same
time income tax of February 24, 1919. At the time he qualified, a statute
xxxxxxxxx fixed his salary at P7,500. He filed action for reimbursement, submitting the
same theory on which Evans v. Gore had been decided. The Supreme Court
These considerations make it very plain, as we think, that of the United States in 1925 reaffirmed that decision. It overruled the
the primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution distinction offered by Solicitor-General Beck that Judge Graham took office
was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect after the income tax had been levied on judicial salaries, (Evans qualified
of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench, before), and that Congress had power "to impose taxes which should apply
and to promote that independence of action and judgment to the salaries of Federal judges appointed after the enactment of the taxing
which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, statute." (The law had made no distinction as to judges appointed before or
limitations, and pervading principles of the constitution, and after its passage)
to the admiration of justice without respect to persons, and
with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Fourth period. 1939 — Foiled in their previous attempts, the Revenue men
persisted, and succeeded in inserting in the United States Revenue Act of
xxxxxxxxx June, 1932 the modified proviso that "gross income" on which taxes were
payable included the compensation "of judges of courts of the United States
But it is urged that what plaintiff was made to pay back was taking office after June 6, 1932". Joseph W. Woodrough qualified as United
an income tax, and that a like tax was exacted of others States circuit judge on May 1, 1933. His salary as judge was taxed, and
engaged in private employment. before the Supreme Court of the United States the issue of decrease of
remuneration again came up. That court, however, ruled against him,
If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited, it declaring (in 1939) that Congress had the power to adopt the law. It said:
can find no justification in the taxation of other income as
to which there is no prohibition, for, of course, doing what The question immediately before us is whether Congress
the Constitution permits gives no license to do what it exceeded its constitutional power in providing that United
prohibits. States judges appointed after the Revenue Act of 1932 shall
not enjoy immunity from the incidence of taxation to which
The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and everyone else within the defined classes of income is
appears to be directed against all diminution, whether for subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has committed
one purpose or another; and the reason for its adoption, as itself to the position that a non-discriminatory tax laid
publicly assigned at the time and commonly accepted ever generally on net income is not, when applied to the income
since, make with impelling force for the conclusion that the of federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the
fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution prohibition of Article 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. To
by taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the suggest that it makes inroads upon the independence of
independence of the judges as of far greater importance judges who took office after the Congress has thus charged
than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. them with the common duties of citizenship, by making
(American law Reports, annotated, Vol. 11, pp. 522-25; them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the
Evans vs. Gore, supra.) Government, is to trivialize the great historic experience on
which the framers based the safeguards of Article 3, Sec. 1.
To subject them to a general tax is merely to recognize that
 judges also are citizens, and that their particular function in the position that the 16th Amendment empowered Congress "to collect
government does not generate an immunity from sharing taxes on incomes from whatever source derived" admitting of no exception.
with their fellow citizens the material burden of the Said the Harvard Law Journal:
government whose Constitution and laws they are charged
with administering. (O'Malley vs. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, In the recent case of Evans vs. Gore the Supreme Court of
A. L. R. 1379.) the United States decided that by taxing the salary of a
federal judge as a part of his income, Congress was in effect
Now, the case for the defendant-appellant Collector of Internal Revenue is reducing his salary and thus violating Art. III, sec. 1, of the
premised mainly on this decision (Note A). He claims it holds "that federal Constitution. Admitting for the present purpose that such a
judges are subject to the payment of income taxes without violating the tax really is a reduction of salary, even so it would seem that
constitutional prohibition against the reduction of their salaries during their the words of the amendment giving power to tax 'incomes,
continuance in office", and that it "is a complete repudiation of the ratio from whatever source derived', are sufficiently strong to
decidenci of Evans vs. Gore". To grasp the full import of the O'Malley overrule pro tanto the provisions of Art. III, sec. 1. But, two
precedent, we should bear in mind that: years ago, the court had already suggested that the
amendment in no way extended the subjects open to
1. It does not entirely overturn Miles vs. Graham. "To the extent that what federal taxation. The decision in Evans vs. Gore affirms that
the Court now says is inconsistent with what said in Miles vs. Graham, the view, and virtually strikes from the amendment the words
latter can not survive", Justice Frankfurter announced. "from whatever source derived". (Harvard law Review, vol.
34, p. 70)
2. It does not expressly touch nor amend the doctrine in Evans vs, Gore,
although it indicates that the Congressional Act in dispute avoided in part The Unites States Court's shift of position 5 might be attributed to the above
the consequences of that case. detraction which, without appearing on the surface, led to Frankfurter's
sweeping expression about judges being also citizens liable to income tax.
Carefully analyzing the three cases (Evans, Miles and O'Malley) and piecing But it must be remembered that undisclosed factor — the 16th Amendment
them together, the logical conclusion may be reached that although — has no counterpart in the Philippine legal system. Our Constitution does
Congress may validly declare by law that salaries of judges appointed not repeat it. Wherefore, as the underlying influence and the unuttered
thereafter shall be taxed as income (O'Malley vs. Woodrough) it may not tax reason has no validity in this jurisdiction, the broad generality loses much of
the salaries of those judges already in office at the time of such declaration its force.
because such taxation would diminish their salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles
vs. Graham). In this manner the rationalizing principle that will harmonize Anyhow the O'Malley case declares no more than that Congress may validly
the allegedly discordant decision may be condensed. enact a law taxing the salaries of judges appointed after its passage. Here in
the Philippines no such law has been approved.
By the way, Justice Frankfurter, writing the O'Malley decision, says the
Evans precedent met with disfavor from legal scholarship opinion. Besides, it is markworthy that, as Judge Woodrough had qualified after the
Examining the issues of Harvard Law review at the time of Evans vs. Gore express legislative declaration taxing salaries, he could not very well
(Frankfurter is a Harvard graduate and professor), we found that such complain. The United States Supreme Court probably had in mind what in
school publication criticized it. Believing this to be the "inarticulate other cases was maintained, namely, that the tax levied on the salary in
consideration that may have influenced the grounds on which the case went effect decreased the emoluments of the office and therefore the judge
off"4, we looked into the criticism, and discovered that it was predicated on qualified with such reduced emoluments.6
The O'Malley ruling does not cover the situation in which judges already in General Circular No. 449 of the Department of Finance dated March 4,
office are made to pay tax by executive interpretation, without express 1940, which says in part:
legislative declaration. That state of affairs is controlled by the
administrative and judicial standards herein-before described in the "second xxxxxxxxx
period" of the Federal Government, namely, the views of Chief Justice
Taney and of Attorney-General Hoar and the constant practice from 1869 to The question of whether or not the salaries of judges should
1938, i.e., when the Income Tax Law merely taxes "income" in general, it be taken into account in computing additional residence
does not include salaries of judges protected from diminution. taxes is closely linked with the liability of judges to income
tax on their salaries, in fact, whatever resolution is adopted
In this connection the respondent would make capital of the circumstance with respect to either of said taxes be followed with respect
that the Act of 1932, upheld in the O'Malley case, has subsequently been to the other. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the
amended by making it applicable even to judges who took office before United States in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 59 S.
1932. This shows, the appellant argues, that Congress interprets the Ct. 838, to which the attention of this department has been
O'Malley ruling to permit legislative taxation of the salary of judges whether drawn, appears to have enunciated a new doctrine
appointed before the tax or after. The answer to this is that the Federal regarding the liability of judges to income tax upon their
Supreme Court expressly withheld opinion on that amendment in the salaries. In view of the fact that the question is of great
O'Malley case. Which is significant. Anyway, and again, there is here no significance, the matter was taken up in the Council of
congressional directive taxing judges' salaries. State, and the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice was
requested to give an opinion on whether or not, having in
Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an amendment to the mind the said decision of the Supreme Court of the United
Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter States in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, there is
appointed", the O'Malley case is not relevant. As in the United States during justification in reversing our present ruling to the effect that
the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in judges are not liable to tax on their salaries. After going over
the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount the opinion of the court in the said case, the Honorable, the
circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Secretary of Justice, stated that although the ruling of the
Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not Supreme Court of the United States is not binding in the
include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from Philippines, the doctrine therein enunciated has resolved
diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which the issue of the taxability of judges' salaries into a question
must be deemed to have been transplanted here; 7 and second, when the of policy. Forthwith, His Excellency the President decided
Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition that the best policy to adopt would be to collect income and
against diminution off the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was additional residence taxes from the President of the
known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. Evans vs. Philippines, the members of the Judiciary, and the Auditor
Gore and Miles vs. Graham were then outstanding doctrines; and the General, and the undersigned was authorized to act
inference is not illogical that in restraining the impairment of judicial accordingly.
compensation the Fathers of the Constitution intended to preclude taxation
of the same.8 In view of the foregoing, income and additional residence
taxes should be levied on the salaries received by the
It seems that prior to the O'Malley decision the Philippine Government did President of the Philippines, members of the Judiciary, and
not collect income tax on salaries of judges. This may be gleaned from the Auditor General during the calendar year 1939 and
thereafter. . . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Of course, the Secretary of Justice correctly opined that the O'Malley clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the
decision "resolved the issue of taxability of judges' salaries into a question discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is
of policy." But that policy must be enunciated by Congressional enactment, irrefutable that they guaranty against a reduction of salary
as was done in the O'Malley case, not by Executive Fiat or interpretation. by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation
in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a
pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or other commodities, they pay the valid consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since
corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on the valid and full consideration or the public purpose
incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only promoted is received in the place of the tax. Theory and
when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to Practice of Taxation (1900), D. A. Wells, p. 541. (Gordy vs.
diminish their official stipend — that the taxation must be resisted as an Dennis (Md.) 1939, 5 Atl. Rep. 2d Series, p. 80)
infringement of the fundamental charter.
It is hard to see, appellants asserts, how the imposition of the income tax
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not may imperil the independence of the judicial department. The danger may
perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever be demonstrated. Suppose there is power to tax the salary of judges, and
form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere the judiciary incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and the Executive. In
privilege of judges — personal and therefore waivable — but a basic retaliation the income tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent on all
limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest. salaries of government officials on the level of judges. This naturally reduces
(Evans vs. Gore) the salary of the judges by 30 per cent, but they may not grumble because
the tax is general on all receiving the same amount of earning, and affects
Indeed the exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not the Executive and the Legislative branches in equal measure. However,
really a gratuity or privilege. Let the highest court of Maryland speak: means are provided thereafter in other laws, for the increase of salaries of
the Executive and the Legislative branches, or their perquisites such as
The exemption of the judicial compensation from reduction allowances, per diems, quarters, etc. that actually compensate for the 30
is not in any true sense a gratuity, privilege or exemption. It per cent reduction on their salaries. Result: Judges compensation is thereby
is essentially and primarily compensation based upon diminished during their incumbency thanks to the income tax law.
valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the Consequence: Judges must "toe the line" or else. Second consequence:
government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as Some few judges might falter; the great majority will not. But knowing the
part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The frailty of human nature, and this chink in the judicial armor, will the parties
undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in losing their cases against the Executive or the Congress believe that the
securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in judicature has not yielded to their pressure?
the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent
foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently Respondent asserts in argumentation that by executive order the President
accepted by those who are qualified by talent, knowledge, has subjected his salary to the income tax law. In our opinion this shows
integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a obviously that, without such voluntary act of the President, his salary would
private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of not be taxable, because of constitutional protection against diminution. To
personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the argue from this executive gesture that the judiciary could, and should act in
judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its like manner is to assume that, in the matter of compensation and power
professional emoluments, sever their connection with their and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such
assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs.
The judgment will be affirmed. So ordered. professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, sales,
or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal
concur. property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or
the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit,
or gains, profits, and income derived from any source
whatever.
Separate Opinions
That income tax law has been amended several times, specially as to the
OZAETA., J., dissenting: rates of the tax, but the above-quoted provisions (except as to the rate)
have been preserved intact in the subsequent Acts. The present income tax
It is indeed embarrassing that this case was initiated by a member of this law is Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No.
Court upon which devolves the duty to decide it finally. The question of 466, sections 21, 28 and 29 of which incorporate the texts of the above-
whether the salaries of the judges, the members of the Commission on quoted provisions of the original Act in exactly the same language. There
Elections, the Auditor General, and the President of the Philippines are can be no dispute whatsoever that judges (who are individuals) and their
immune from taxation, might have been raised by any interested party salaries (which are income) are as clearly comprehended within the above-
other than a justice of the Supreme Court with less embarrassment to the quoted provisions of the law as if they were specifically mentioned therein;
latter. and in fact all judges had been and were paying income tax on their salaries
when the Constitution of the Philippines was discussed and approved by the
The question is simple and not difficult of solution. We shall state our Constitutional Convention and when it was submitted to the people for
opinion as concisely as possible. confirmation in the plebiscite of May 14, 1935.

The first income tax law of the Philippines was Act No. 2833, which was Now, the Constitution provides that the members of the Supreme Court and
approved on March 7, 1919, to take effect on January 1, 1920. Section 1 (a) all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as may be
of said Act provided: fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office." (Section 9, Article VIII, emphasis ours.)a
There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually
upon the entire net income received in the preceding The simple question is: In approving the provisions against the diminution of
calendar year from all sources by every individual, a citizen the compensation of judges and other specified officers during their
or resident of the Philippine Islands, a tax of two per continuance in office, did the framers of the Constitution intend to nullify
centum upon such income. . . . (Emphasis ours.) the then existing income tax law insofar as it imposed a tax on the salaries
of said officers ? If they did not, then the income tax law, which has been
Section 2 (a) of said Act provided: incorporated in the present National Internal Revenue Code, remains in
force in its entirety and said officers cannot claim exemption therefrom on
Subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are their salaries.
hereinafter allowed, the taxable net income of a person
shall include gains, profits, and income derived from Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution provides that all laws of the
salaries, wages or compensation for personal service of Philippine Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this
whatever kind and is whatever form paid, or from
Constitution, until amended, altered, modified. or repealed by the Congress The salaries provided in the Constitution for the Chief Justice and each
of the Philippines. associate Justice, respectively, of the Supreme Court were the same
salaries ]which they were receiving at the time the Constitution was framed
In resolving the question at bar, we must take into consideration the and adopted and on which they were paying income tax under the existing
following well-settled rules: income tax law. It seems clear to us that for them to receive the same
salaries, subject to the same tax, after the adoption of the Constitution as
"A constitution shall be held to be prepared and adopted in before does not involve any diminution at all. The fact that the plaintiff was
reference to existing statutory laws, upon the provisions of not a member of the Court when the Constitution took effect, makes no
which in detail it must depend to be set in practical difference. The salaries of justices and judges were subject to income tax
operation" (People vs. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; People vs. when he was appointed in the early part of 1945. In fact he must have
Draper, 15 N. Y. 537; Cass vs. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; People declared and paid income tax on his salary for 19454 — he claimed
vs. N. Y., 25 Wend. (N. Y. 22). (Barry vs. Traux, 3 A. & E. Ann. exemption only beginning 1946. It seems likewise clear that when the
Cas 191, 193.). framers of the Constitution fixed those salaries, they must have taken into
consideration that the recipients were paying income tax thereon. There
Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a was no necessity to provide expressly that said salaries shall be subject to
constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws income tax because they knew that already so provided. On the other hand,
upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon if exemption from any tax on said salaries had been intended, it would have
which they express their judgment and opinion in its been specifically to so provide, instead of merely saying that the
adoption (Baltimore vs. State, 15 Md. 376, 480; 74 Am. Dec. compensation as fixed "shall not be diminished during their continuance in
572; State vs. Mace, 5 Md. 337; Bandel vs. Isaac, 13 Md. office."
202; Manly vs. State, 7 Md. 135; Hamilton vs. St. Louis
County Ct., 15 Mo. 5; People vs. Gies, 25 Mich. 83; Servis vs. In the light of the antecedents, the prohibition against diminution cannot be
Beatty, 32 Miss. 52; Pope vs. Phifer, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 686; interpreted to include or refer to general taxation but to a law by which said
People vs. Harding, 53 Mich. 48, 51 Am. Rep. 95; Creve salaries may be fixed. The sentence in question reads: "They shall receive
Coeur Lake Ice Co. vs. Tamm, 138 Mo. 385, 39 S. W. Rep. such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished
791). (Idem.) during their continuance in office." The next sentence reads: "Until the
Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been shall receive an annual compensation of P16,000, and each associate
framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior Justice, P15,000." It is plain that the Constitution authorizes the Congress to
and existing laws and with reference to them. Constitutions, pass a law fixing another rate of compensation, but that such rate must be
like statutes, are properly to be expounded in the light of higher than that which the justices receive at he time of its enactment or, if
conditions existing at the time of their adoption, the general lower, it must not affect those justice already in office. In other words,
spirit of the times, and the prevailing sentiments among the Congress may approve a law increasing the salaries of the justices at any
people. Reference may be made to the historical facts time, but it cannot approve a law decreasing their salaries unless such law is
relating to the original or political institutions of the made effective only as to justices appointed after its approval.
community or to prior well-known practices and usages. (11
Am. Ju., Constitutional Law, 676-678.) It would be a strained and unreasonable construction of the prohibition
against diminution to read into it an exemption from taxation. There is no
justification for the belief or assumption that the framers of the Constitution
intended to exempt the salaries of said officers from taxes. They knew that
it was and is the unavoidable duty of every citizen to bear his aliquot share show did not obtain in the United States at the time the federal and state
of the cost of maintaining the Government; that taxes are the very blood Constitutions were adopted. We shall further show that in any event what
that sustains the life of the Government. To make all citizens share the they now borrow is not usable because it has long been withdrawn from
burden of taxation equitably, the Constitution expressly provides that "the circulation.
rule of taxation shall be uniform." (Section 22 [1], Article VI.) We think it
would be a contravention of this provision to read into the prohibition When the American Constitution was framed and adopted, there was no
against diminution of the salaries of the judges and other specified officers income tax law in the United States. To this circumstance may be attributed
an exemption from taxes on their salaries. How could the rule of income the claim made by some federal judges headed by Chief Justice Taney, when
taxation be uniform if it should not be applied to a group of citizens in the under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1862, their salaries were subjected to an
same situation as other income earners ? It is to us inconceivable that the income tax, that such tax was a diminution of their salaries and therefore
framers ever intended to relieve certain officers of the Government from prohibited by the Constitution. Chief Justice Taney's claim and his protest
sharing with their fellows citizens the material burden of the Government — against the tax were not heeded, but no federal judge deemed it proper to
to exempt their salaries from taxes. Moreover, the Constitution itself sue the Collector of Internal Revenue to recover the taxes they continued to
specifies what properties are exempt from taxes, namely: "Cemeteries, pay under protest for several years. In 1869, the Secretary of the Treasury
churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, referred the question to Atty. General Hoar, and that officer rendered an
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or opinion in substantial accord with Chief Justice Taney's protest, and also
educational purposes." (Sec. 22 [3], Article VI.) The omission of the salaries advised that the tax on the President's compensation was likewise invalid.
in question from this enumeration is in itself an eloquent manifestation of No judicial pronouncement, however, was made of such invalidity until June
intention to continue the imposition of taxes thereon as provided in the 1, 1920, when the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U.S. 245, 64 L. ed. 887) was
existing law. Inclusio est exclusio alterius. decided upon the constitutionality of section 213 of the Act of February 24,
1919, which required the computation of incomes for the purpose of
We have thus far read and construed the pertinent portions of our own taxation to embrace all gains, profits, income and the like, "including in the
Constitution and income tax law in the light of the antecedent case of the President of the United States, the judges of the Supreme and
circumstances and of the operative factors which prevailed at the time our inferior courts of the United States, [and others] . . . the compensation
Constitution was framed, independently of the construction now prevailing received as such." The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
in the United States of similar provisions of the federal Constitution in through Mr. Justice Van Devanter, sustained the suit with the dissent of
relation to the present federal income tax law, under which the justices of Justice Holmes and Brandeis. The doctrine of Evans vs. Gore holding in
the Supreme Court, and the federal judges are now, and since the case of effect that an income tax on a judge's salary is a diminution thereof
O'Malley vs. Woodrough was decided on May 22, 1939, have been, paying prohibited by the Constitution, was reaffirmed in 1925 in Miles vs. Graham,
income tax on their salaries. Were this a majority opinion, we could end 69 L. ed 1067.
here with the consequent reversal of the judgment appealed from. But ours
is a voice in the wilderness, and we may permit ourselves to utter it with In 1939, however, the case of O'Malley vs. Woodrough (59 S. Ct. 838, 122 A.
more vehemence and emphasis so that future players on this stage L. R. 1379) was brought up to the test the validity of section 22 of the
perchance may hear and heed it. Who knows? The Gospel itself was a voice Revenue Act of June 6, 1932, which included in the "gross income," on the
in the wilderness at the time it was uttered. basis of which taxes were to be paid, the compensation of "judges of courts
of the United States taking office after June 6, 1932." And in that case the
We have to comment on Anglo-American precedents since the majority Supreme Court of the United States, with only one dissent (that of Justice
decision from which we dissent is based on some of them. Indeed, the Butler), abandoned the doctrine of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham by
majority say they "hardly do nothing more than to borrow therefrom and to holding:
compare their conclusions to local conditions." which we shall presently
 To subject them [the judges] to a general tax is merely to Our colleagues import and transplant here the dead limbs of Evans vs. Gore
recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their and Miles vs. Graham and attempt to revive and nurture them with
particular function in government does not generate an painstaking analyses and diagnoses that they had not suffered a fatal blow
immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the from O'Malley vs. Woodrough. We refuse to join this heroic attempt
material burden of the government whose Constitution and because we believe it is futile.
laws they are charged with administering.
They disregard the actual damage and minimize it by trying to discover the
The decision also says: process by which it was inflicted and he motivations that led to the
infliction. They say that the chief axe-wielder, Justice Frankfurter, was a
To suggest that it [the law in question] makes inroads upon Harvard graduate and professor and that the Harvard Law Journal had
the independence of judges who took office after Congress criticized Evans vs. Gore; that the dissenters in said case (Holmes and
had thus charged them with the common duties of Brandeis) were Harvard men like Frankfurter; and that they believe this to
citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot share of the be the "inarticulate consideration that may have influenced the grounds on
cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great which the case [O'Malley vs. Woodrough] went off." This argument is not
historic experience on which the framers based the valid, in our humble belief. It was not only the Harvard Law Journal that had
safeguard of Article 3, section 1. criticized Evans vs. Gore. Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues said that the
decision in that case "met with wide and steadily growing disfavor from
Commenting on the above-quoted portions of the latest decision of the legal scholarship and professional opinion," and they cited the following:
Supreme Court of the United States on the subject, Prof. William Bennett, Clark, Furthermore Limitations Upon Federal Income Taxation, 30 Yale L. J.
Munro, in his book, The Government of the United States, which is used as a 75; Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1919-1920, 15 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 635, 641-
text in various universities, says: ". . . 644; Fellman, Diminution of Judicial Salaries, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 89; Lowndes,
Taxing Income of Federal Judiciary, 19 Va. L. Rev. 153; Powell, Constitutional
All of which seems to be common sense, for surely the Law in 1919-1920, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 117, 118; Powell, The Sixteenth
framers of the Constitution from ever cutting a judge's Amendment and Income from State Securities, National Income Tax
salary, did not intend to relieve all federal judges from the Magazine (July, 1923), 5, 6; 20 Columbia L. Rev. 794; 43 Harvard L. Rev. 318;
general obligations of citizenship. As for the President, he 20 Ill. L. Rev. 376; 45 Law Quarterly Rev. 291; 7 Va. L. Rev. 69; 3 University of
has never raised the issue; every occupant of the White Chicago L. Rev. 141. Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues also said that
House since 1913 has paid his income tax without protest. "Evans vs. Gore itself was rejected by most of the courts before whom the
(Pages 371-372.) matter came after that decision." Is not the intention to throw Evans vs.
Gore into the graveyard of abandoned cases manifest from all this and from
We emphasize that the doctrine of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham is the holding that judges are also citizens, liable to income tax on their
no longer operative, and that all United States judges, including those who salaries?
took office before June 6, 1932, are subject to and pay income tax on their
salaries; for after the submission of O'Malley vs. Woodrough for decision The majority say that "unless and until our legislature approves an
the Congress of the United States, by section 3 of the Public Salary Act of amendment to the income tax law expressly taxing 'the salaries of judges
1939, amended section 22 (a) of the Revenue Act of June 6, 1932, so as to thereafter appointed,' the O'Malley case is not relevant." We have shown
make it applicable to "judges of courts of the United States who took office that our income tax law taxes the salaries of judges as clearly as if they are
on or before June 6, 1932." And the validity of that Act, in force for more specifically mentioned therein, and that said law took effect long before the
than a decade, has not been challenged. adoption of the Constitution and long before the plaintiff was appointed.
We agree that the purpose of the constitutional provision against
diminution of the salaries of judges during their continuance in office is to
safeguard the independence of the Judicial Department. But we disagree
that to subject the salaries of judges to a general income tax law applicable
to all income earners would in any way affect their independence. Our own
experience since the income tax law went effect in 1920 is the best
refutation of such assumption.

The majority give an example by which the independence of judges may be

imperiled thru the imposition of a tax on their salaries. They say: Suppose
there is power to tax the salaries of judges and the judiciary incurs the
displeasure of the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the income
tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent tax on all salaries of
government officials on the level of judges, and by means of another law
the salaries of the executive and the legislative branches are increased to
compensate for the 30 per cent reduction of their salaries. To this we reply
that if such a vindictive measure is ever resorted to (which we cannot
imagine), we shall be the first ones to vote to strike it down as a palpable
violation of the Constitution. There is no parity between such hypothetical
law and the general income tax law invoked by the defendant in this case.
We believe that an income tax law applicable only against the salaries of
judges and not against those or all other income earners may be
successfully assailed as being in contravention not only of the provision
against diminution of the salaries of judges but also of the uniformity of the
rule of taxation as well as of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
So the danger apprehended by the majority is not real but surely imaginary.

We vote for the reversal of the judgment appealed from the dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint.

Paras J., concurs.

 reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the
independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the
other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial
officials. The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than
any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

Endencia v David
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs.
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a
of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We
Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that “SEC. 13. No salary wherever further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and
received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitution or by law.” According to the brief of the Solicitor General on Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task
behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers
the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which
became Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590,
Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of
compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of
the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule
is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act,
or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any
binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a
statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the
legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. ** The
 Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same
question of law, they were jointly submitted for determination in the lower
court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well
considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by
this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of
income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a
diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.

We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the

Republic of the Philippines proposition and the arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto
SUPREME COURT vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented here. In that
Manila case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United States
Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S.,
EN BANC 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a
diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953 confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees, justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial
vs. officers.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
for appellant. supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after
Manuel O. Chan for appellees. its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his
point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent
MONTEMAYOR, J.: discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became
Republic Act No. 590.
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our
ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to Constitution:.
re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing
the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until
representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to they reach the age of seventy years, or become
October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They
October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law,
Court, without special pronouncement as to costs. which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief
 Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws.
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos. Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws
extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law
As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning
provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in
the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if
by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid
their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the and unconstitutional.
Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor General, because
Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and
Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power
in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs.
income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)
Republic Act No. 590:
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of
the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they
exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office.
declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the
the Constitution or by law. fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing;
and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so
Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any
are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the other course would lead to the destruction of the
collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality
by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline
Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action
the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the
exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)
income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature
validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income Under the American system of constitutional government,
tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a among the most important functions in trusted to the
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a
otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to the closely connected power, the determination of whether
fundamental principles regarding separation of powers. laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to
the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department Am. Jur., 905.).
is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical
Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of side thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an
compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old system where the in-
the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the
continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the previously received his full salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well- obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary.
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes
from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that his
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the
pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law present system of withholding the income tax at the source, where the full
was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in
with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the number of
a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; pay-days during the year and actually deducted from his salary
otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not receive his
function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday,
supplied) that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday,
constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an — fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by
attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year.
so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further
(11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied) dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the income
tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the
assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually
interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be
basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by
specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have P1,744.45?
in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a
decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No.
processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the
determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among
Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any
different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country,
department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly they should pay income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this
violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the
government, particularly those governing the separation of powers. Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the
Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption also extends
to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans
Auditor General, the members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of
members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater
Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is
relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for
enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is
107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental
the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and
interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to
preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal the members of the Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of
but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal,
judicial officials. eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and training
required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but quite late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being
was grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does not die or become
United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245): incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit
of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the
The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and
was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect because of the meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the
of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid
and to promote that independence of action and judgment would be real, substantial and onerous.
which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties,
limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or
to the administration of justice without respect to person abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public interest.
and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the
being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of
grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace
other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its spirit are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of the
and the principle on which it proceeds. Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech,
remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor,
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the
enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk thereof are justices memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making such
of the peace, many of them receiving as low as P200 a month, and statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption.
considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law,
such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this
amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes on their
of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively for
large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22
less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes
on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments or
income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court in
the United States administered by the United States Veterans the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, G. R. No. L-2314, in view of the part I had in
Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds that case as former Solicitor General, I wish however to state that I concur
received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in in the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13, Republic Act No.
the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such 590, in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall
services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are be considered "not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the
exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages Constitution or by law", constitutes an invasion of the province and
and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, I am of the opinion that said
Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. section is null and void, it being a transgression of the fundamental principle
35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen underlying the separation of powers.
may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his
ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public
policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the framers of
the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their
compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary. I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, in which I concurred. But I
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. disagree with the majority in ruling that no legislation may provide that it be
Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a held valid although against a provision of the Constitution.
judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We
further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and
of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task
of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought
and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is

hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
 that the salaries of Justices and Judges are property subject to general
income tax applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such
income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitution
protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in
office.

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the

constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the
Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
FACTS: framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect.
1. Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr.,
were duly appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people,
Judicial Region. through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the
spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of
2. Petitioners seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR maintaining the government and should share the burden of general
and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court) from making any deduction income taxation equitably.
of withholding taxes from their salaries.
The ruling that “the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a
3. Petitioners submit that “any tax withheld from their emoluments or diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decreased or diminution of affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be deemed discarded.
their salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.”

ISSUE:

Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminution of the salaries of

Judges/Justices?

HELD:

The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in
PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil 552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696),
that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of
their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates
 their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter
administratively in response to representations that the Court direct its
Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of
members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had
reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive as follows:

RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. — The

Republic of the Philippines Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and standing
SUPREME COURT directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of
Manila this Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding
taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court
EN BANC as well as from the salaries of all other members of the
judiciary.
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised
JR., petitioners, through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear
vs. intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the
SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of
Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the
RESOLUTION deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to
Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would
be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches
52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final
Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra,
perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to
the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any
withholding taxes from their salaries. public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment
of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the
Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6,
ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that
salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "non-
tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of
Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section
applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by 10, Article VIII, negate such contention.
Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:

A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate
1935 Constitution provided: Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges of the lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of office, their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to
inferior courts) shall receive such compensation as may be income tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide
fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of
continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied). _____________ and each Associate Justice
______________ pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices Commissioners presented their objections to the provision on tax
of the Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts shall exemption, thus:
be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their
continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours). MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax
of the salary of justices, does this not violate the principle of
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal
1973 Constitution specifically stipulated: protection of the law? After all, tax is levied not on the
salary but on the combined income, such that when the
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or judge receives a salary and it is comingled with the other
employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt income, we tax the income, not the salary. Why do we have
from payment of income tax. 3 to give special privileges to the salary of justices?

The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads: MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary.
We prohibit the increase or decrease of their salary during
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary
of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be and affecting the independence of the judges.
fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased. 4 (Emphasis supplied). MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a
clause to respect tenure, but the special privilege on
 taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to
uniformity in taxation and the equal protection clause. 6 the amendment saying that it is not enough to drop the
phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax," because if
xxxxxxxxx that is all that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall
back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs.
MR. OPLE. x x x David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil.
696[ which excludes them from income tax, but rather I
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the would propose that the statement will read: "During their
sponsor, Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for whom we continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished
have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN
and the judicial system as a whole with the whole armor of support of this position, I would say that the argument
defense against the executive and legislative invasion of seems to be that the justice and judges should not be
their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens subjected to income tax because they already gave up the
outside, especially the humble government employees, income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet
might say that in trying to erect a bastion of justice, we members and all other employees. And I know right now,
might end up with the fortress of privileges, an island of for instance, there are many people who have accepted
extra territoriality under the Republic of the Philippines, employment in the government involving a reduction of
because a good number of powers and rights accorded to income and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are
the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest not the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting
degree by other employees of the government. service in government.

An example is the exception from income tax, which is a Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the
kind of economic immunity, which is, of course, denied to amendment. Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a
the entire executive department and the legislative. 7 suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas
announced:
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986,
Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be During the suspension, we came to an understanding with
changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income tax" the original proponent, Commissioner Rigos, that his
be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches in amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their
the government. continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of
Judiciary, defended the original draft and referred to the ruling of this Court Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of far greater which says:
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries."
Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote. No salary or any form of emolument of any public
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in support of an amendment to officer or employee, including constitutional
the amendment with the request for a modification of the amendment," as officers, shall be exempt from payment of income
follows: tax.
 So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the people in the adoption of the Constitution. 11 it may also be safely assumed
understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax. that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.121avvphi1
When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-
exemption from tax of salaries of public officers, Commissioner Bernas Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which,
replied: for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder:

FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices
found in the General Provisions. But at any rate, when we of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be
put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the underst fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).

it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing

anding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be
David will not apply anymore. higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if
lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption
finally approved without objection. from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that
therefore, is that there will be a provision under the Article "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition
on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed
kindly take note that the salaries of officials of the in Endencia vs. David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the
government including constitutional officers shall not be fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and
exempt from income tax? The amendment proposed herein unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of
and accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
"During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax" Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people,
is deleted.9 through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the
spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the maintaining the government and should share the burden of general
constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the income taxation equitably.
Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the dismissed.Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
 proper license or permit therefore from competent
authority.

In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and of the
firearm and ammunitions in question, invokes as his legal excuse or
authority therefor, the appointment issued him by Governor Dimakuta as
secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as follows:1awphi1.net

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Republic of the Philippines For having shown good faith by previously surrending to
SUPREME COURT this Office a firearm, Datu Sumaguina Macarandang of
Manila Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET
AGENT of peace and order campaigns and detention of
EN BANC crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby authorized to hold and
carry in his possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12
G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959 GA. Serial No. 942131 with twenty(20) rounds of
ammunitions for the successful execution of his hazardous
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, mission.
vs.
MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant. Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me
from time to time all activities and whereabouts of lawless
Valeriano V. Rovira for appellant. and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor Marantoa, as well as all matters affecting tranquility therein
General Florencio Villamor for appellee. existing.lawphi1.net

PARAS, C. J.: It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority
to issue any firearm license or permit; but section 879 of the Revise
Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused an, after trial, convicted of the Administrative Code provides, as shown at lease by the subject matter
crime of illegal possesion of fire-arms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating
under the following information: to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of the
accused as secret agent to the assist in the maintenance of peace and order
That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of campaigns and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category
Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic of the Philippines of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the expressly covered by section 879.
above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously keep and have his custody and Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and accused acquitted,
control one Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-924131 and with costs de officio. So ordered.
(8) rounds of ammunitions, without first having obtained in
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo. Labrador and Gutierrez amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by
David, JJ., concur. Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of
August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his
custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial
number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities.
Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower
court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel
Republic of the Philippines stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in
SUPREME COURT this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and
Manila that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent
of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine
EN BANC Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he
would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967 that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly
specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, to get a license for his firearm."
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant. Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document
so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant. question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his
R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee. possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having
secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding
FERNANDO, J.: authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes,
Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a admits."
secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense
to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for
ammunition. We hold that it does not. decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits
consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste,"
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another document likewise
information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to
accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2 the
connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as oath of office of the accused as such secret agent, 3 a certificate dated March
11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4
Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal
not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not
governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of
The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts
respective memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with
authority.
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two
years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
him are forfeited in favor of the Government." Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The Footnotes
decision must be affirmed.
1
Exhibit 1.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of 2
Exhibit 2.
firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or 3
Exhibit 3.
ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the 4
Exhibit 4.
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial 5
Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, Administrative Code.
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not
covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public 6
Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.
servants for use in the performance of their official duties." 6
7
Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24 Phil. 504, 513.
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As
such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental 8
L-12088, December 23, 1959.
duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It
cannot be set aside. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of
the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
Martinez for plaintiff-appellee. possess and carry the firearm in question.

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant. Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials
as claimed by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated
ANTONIO, J.:p December 10, 1962, reads:

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic
capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him agent in the detection of crimes and in the
to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) preservation of peace and order in the province of
day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression
which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal
application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1 cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the
detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby
The complaint filed against the accused reads: appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the
appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of as you have qualified for the position. As such
September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally of
Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and a peace officer and particularly to help in the
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the preservation of peace and order in this province
above-named accused, a person not authorized by and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and month. It should be clearly understood that any
feloniously keep in his possession, custody and abuse of authority on your part shall be considered
direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of
with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty your appointment and immediate separation from
shells without first securing the necessary permit or the service. In accordance with the decision of the
license to possess the same. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December
23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm,
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of particularly described below, for use in connection
not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held. with the performance of your duties.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon
the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the the performance of your duties by taking your oath
requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to of office and filing the original thereof with us.
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an
appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and Very trul
an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,
 (Sgd.) the trialFELICIANO
court's judgment ofLEVISTE
conviction against the accused because it was
Provincial
shown
Governor
that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and
ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY: Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true
that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit,
Make: — German nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
"peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the
SN: — 64 issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as
Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection
Cal:— .22 of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements
Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held
information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use
subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful
condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader.
temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by
his personal protection while in the performance of his duties. implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the
following ground:
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-
mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with The law is explicit that except as thereafter
authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of
vs. Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument
on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been or implement used or intended to be used in the
appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic
to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next
held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable section provides that "firearms and ammunition
for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in
mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal
and Confidential Agent. police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such
firearms are in possession of such officials and
 public servants for use in the performance of their It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his
official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to
Code.) possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit
for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ... . therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the punishable.
Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial
Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and
down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only
in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero Fernando, J., took no part.
doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he
accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment. Footnotes

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless

evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8
of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation
upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the
date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is
a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of
the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was
found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the
trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in
1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal
laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably
foreseen for the guidance of society.