Natural Resources and Environmental Law 7

Thus, this petition for review on certiorari. Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property,
which is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987, executed by their
parents, who earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz by virtue
of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay” dated March 10, 1979. In
their application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of and and they have
been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner
since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of possession, they,
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the same, in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more
than 50 years since the filing of the application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that
the subject property is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner
opposed the application for registration on several grounds, one of which is that neither the applicants
nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for a period of not less than thirty 30 years.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the respondents, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have
proven that they possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
HELD: ​No. Respondents’ earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of
their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession
since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed
the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that
their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule
that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land
when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared
for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest
does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

5. Republic vs. CA GR No. L-43938, April 15, 1988

FACTS: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and
Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by
plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his
children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
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In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land
by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the
Liberation.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September
1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of
adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side
cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and
Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January
2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators
on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels,
and its payment of annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized the
claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In
other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both
Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.
ISSUE: ​Whether respondent court’s decision, i.e. “the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while
at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim,” is
correct.
HELD: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested
rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the
private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by
them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property
was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair
the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. Such rights were not affected either by the
stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain
except those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. The perfection of the
Natural Resources and Environmental Law 9

mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from
the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent
over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the
same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is “no conflict
of interest” between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is
rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its
surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to
separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the
mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or
underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the
State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in
public and even private land devoted to “agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any
purpose other than mining.” Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals
without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be
used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once
minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use
may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private
party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

6. Cruz vs. NCIP G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount
Natural Resources and Environmental Law 10

to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.
ISSUE:​ Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution.
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the indigenous people or indigenous cultural communities ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the indigenous cultural
communities over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the indigenous cultural communities by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the indigenous cultural communities of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

7. Republic vs. Tri-Plus Corporation, GR No. 150000, September 26, 2006

FACTS: On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation filed with the MTC an Application for Registration of Title
over two parcels of land designated as Lots 1061 and 1062 of the cadastral survey of Consolacion, Cebu
and located at Barangay Tayud, Consolacion. Tri-Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the
subject parcels of land, including the improvements thereon, having acquired the same through purchase;
and that it is in actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject
properties in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, including that of its
predecessors-in-interest.
The Republic opposed the application stating that the tax declarations and receipts of tax payments, do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of its
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish
title or grant may no longer be availed of by the applicant because it failed to file an appropriate
application for registration in accordance with the provisions P.D. No. 892; and that the subject parcels of
land are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and are not subject to
private appropriation.
The MTC and CA ruled in favor of the respondents. Petitioner contends that a mere notation appearing in
the survey plans of the disputed properties showing that the subject lands had been classified as
alienable and disposable on June 25, 1963 is not sufficient to establish the nature and character of these
lands. Petitioner asserts that there should be a positive act on the part of the government, such as a
Natural Resources and Environmental Law 11

certification from the DENR, to prove that the said lands are indeed alienable and disposable. Petitioner
further contends that even if the subject properties were classified as alienable and disposable on June
25, 1963, the law, nonetheless,
requires that such classification should have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:​ Whether or not the lands in question are alienable or disposable.
HELD: ​No. Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the classification and
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of
the Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the
notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and
disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In
the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the
said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands
subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.

8. Secretary of DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707 and 173775, October 8, 2008
Full text: ​GR No. 167707

FACTS: This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief
filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist
zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed
a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
Natural Resources and Environmental Law 12

classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No.
705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
ISSUE: Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land,
therefore making these lands alienable.
HELD: ​No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and
a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

9. Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic, GR No. 179987, September 3, 2013

FACTS: Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he purchased
from Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted,
public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to
the judicial confirmation of his title.
The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the Republic appealed the judgment to the
CA, which reversed the RTC Judgment.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the said decision to
this Court through a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was denied. Petitioners and the
Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: ​(1) What are the classifications of public lands? (2) Whether or not petitioners were able to prove
that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
HELD:
(1.) Classifications of land according to ownership. Land, which is an immovable property, may be
classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it
either:
(a) is intended for public use; or