Art.

13: Mitigating Circumstances

Incomplete Justifying or Exempting Circumstances

People v. CA and Tangan (G.R. No. 103613)

Facts:

On December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on

Roxas Boulevard heading south and Generoso Miranda was driving his car in the same
direction with his uncle, Manuel Miranda. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan.
Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's way, causing him to swerve to the
right and cut Tangan's path. Tangan blew his horn several times. Generoso, slowed
down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he got
in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four or five times to overtake on the
right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane. When Tangan slowed down to make a U-
turn, Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan
also stopped his car and got out. Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives.
Then Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat.

According to the prosecution witnesses, Mary Ann Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz and
Manuel Miranda, the accused pointed his gun at Generoso Miranda and when Manuel
Miranda tried to intervene, the accused pointed his gun at Manuel Miranda, and after
that the accused pointed again the gun to Generoso Miranda, the accused shot
Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter. The shot hit the stomach of
Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall. Manuel Miranda grappled for the
possession of the gun and during their grappling, Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold
of the gun and after Rosalia Cruz has taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt
took the gun from her. The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda who was able
to get the gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.
 On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his witness by the
name of Nelson Pante claimed that after the gun was taken by the accused from inside
his car, the Mirandas started to grapple for possession of the gun and during the
grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying to wrest away the gun from the
accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused. The accused lost the
possession of the gun after falling at the back of his car and as soon as they hit the
ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting Generoso Miranda.

Tangan ran away while Generoso lay on the ground bloodied. Manuel looked for the
gun and ran after Tangan. Tangan found a policeman who allowed him to enter his
patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his nephew.
Manuel went back to where Generoso lay and there found two ladies, Mary Ann
Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel suggested that
Generoso be brought to the hospital in his car. He was rushed to the Philippine General
Hospital but he expired on the way.

Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
However, the information was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed
firearm, and he was separately charged with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm.
Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide case, but moved to quash the
information for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on various grounds. The motion
to quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. On
November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed and the joint trial of the two cases was
ordered.

After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but
convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part
of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his
favor; Tangan was released from detention after the promulgation of judgment and was
allowed bail in the homicide case.
Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court
but increased the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. His subsequent motion for
reconsideration and a motion to cite the Solicitor General in contempt were denied by
the Court of Appeals.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave abuse of discretion,
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, naming as respondents the Court of Appeals
and Tangan, where it prayed that the appellate court's judgment be modified by
convicting accused-appellant of homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating
circumstance. 

Issue:

Whether or not Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense?

Decision:

Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a

mitigating circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the
information is not shifted to the accused. In order that it may be successfully
appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense
be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other two
requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the unlawful aggression,
there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete, because if there is nothing to
prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no basis.

The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the
person defending himself but from the victim.
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. The exchange of
insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no
matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression,
except when coupled with physical assault. There being no lawful aggression on
the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls.
No Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong

People v. Callet (G.R. No. 135701)

Facts:

Elbert S. Callet was charged and found guilty of the crime of Murder in the death
of Alfredo Senador. Callet used a 9-inch hunting knife in stabbing the latter on the left
shoulder near the base of the neck causing Senador’s death shortly thereafter. Callet
appealed his conviction claiming that the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Dumaguete City (Branch 30) gravely erred in failing to consider the mitigating
circumstance of the fact that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong
thereforehis liability should be mitigated.

Issue:

Whether or not the criminal liability of Callet be mitigated in that he had no

intention to commit so grave a wrong?

Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The lack of “intent” to commit a wrong
so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the
body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused
used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an
opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did,
and he must be held responsible therefore, without the benefit of this mitigating
circumstance.
Romera vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner Arturo Romera, Roy Mangaya-ay, and five
other men were all headed to play volleyball. Caught in the rain, they all while away time at
the house of Ciriaca Capil, then one of their companions, Franklin Generol, pulled a prank on
Bebing Zulueta to which all of them laughed except Roy Mangaya-ay, the victim. Zulueta got
mad at Generol and said a remark to which Romero replied that they all should watch out in
Balaguan. Romero and Generol then left.

There are two sides of the story in this case. According to the victim, herein petitioner, with
a bolo in his hand, was already waiting for him and his companions when they arrived at the
house of Antonio Mangaya-ay. Romero stabbed Roy Mangaya-ay in the stomach, fell
unconscious, underwent surgery and was confined for more than three weeks. Petitioner’s
side of the story is that, a drunken Roy was the aggressor who went to their house carrying a
bolo who later on hacked their walls and Romero, although unsuccessfully. His stabbing of Roy
using the latter’s bolo was an act of self-defense.

The trial court found herein petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide.
Romero appealed the case the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
Thus, this review for certiorari.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation
present in this case?

RULINGS:
Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his
house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and
obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger.
Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while petitioner was still
in a fit of rage. In our view, there was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of passion
or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense.

But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate
mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based
on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the
facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of
facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating
circumstances.
Vindication of a Grave Offense

People v. Torpio (G.R. No. 138984)

Facts:

In the evening of October 11, 1997, Anthony went to the house of Dennis and
invited the latter for a drinking spree. Afterwards both left the house of Dennis and went
to a nearby store and started drinking with a companion named Porboy Perez. The
three proceeded to Shoreline. In a cottage, Anthony tried to let Dennis drink gin and as
the latter refused, Anthony bathed Dennis with gin and mauled him several times.
Dennis crawled beneath the table and Anthony tried to stab him with a 22 fan knife but
did not hit him. Dennis got up and ran towards their home.

Upon reaching home, he got a knife. Alarmed by the action of Dennis, his mother
shouted. Manuel, his father, tried to scold his son and confiscate from him the knife but
failed to do so, resulting to Manuel’s incurring a wound in his hand. He went back to the
cottage. Upon seeing Dennis, Anthony ran towards the creek but Dennis blocked him
and stabbed him. When he was hit, Anthony ran but got entangled with fishing net and
fell on his back. Dennis then mounted on him and continued stabbing him resulting to
the latter’s death. After stabbing, Dennis left and went to Camp Downes and slept there.
The next morning, Dennis voluntarily surrendered himself to Boy Estrera, a well-known
police officer.

The trial court rendered a judgment convicting Dennis for the crime of Murder
qualified by treachery or evident premeditation and appreciating three mitigating
circumstances. His father Manuel was acquitted. Not satisfied with the judgment,
Dennis appealed his case.

Issue:
 Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense is appreciated?

Decision:

The Supreme held that the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense was properly appreciated. Dennis was
humiliated, mauled and almost stabbed by the Anthony. Although the unlawful
aggression had ceased when Dennis stabbed Anthony, it was nonetheless a grave
offense for which the Dennis may be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance.

However, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be

considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two
circumstances arose from one and the same incident, i.e., the attack on the
appellant by Anthony, so that they should be considered as only one mitigating
circumstance.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORO MALEJANA

Expert opinion evidence is to be considered or weighed by the court like any other testimony, in the
light of their own general knowledge and experience upon the subject of inquiry. The probative force of
the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of the theory or opinion of the expert, but
rather in the aid that he can render to the courts in showing the facts which serve as a basis for his
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded. Malejana was charged with
murder for the death of one Janus Roces. During trial, the three eyewitnesses to the crime testified that
on the night of the incident, Malejana fired his armalite rifle at the victim at least five times. The
prosecution also presented the property custodian of PNP Pilar, Sorsogon, who testified that he issued
to Malejana an M-16 armalite rifle with 260 rounds of live ammunition and when the same was
returned to him two days after the incident, only 230 rounds of live ammunition were returned. The
rural health physician of Pilar, Sorsogon also testified and concluded that the immediate causes of death
of the victim were shock and hemorrhage while the antecedent cause was the multiple gunshot wounds
on the latter’s chest. The defense, for its part, presented as its sole witness ballistics expert Vicente de
Vera, chief of the Ballistics Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service. He testified against the
likelihood ofan armalite being used to kill the victim and posited that the gunshot wounds were more
consistent with those inflicted by bullets from a .45 caliber pistol. The trial court found Malejana guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution has established the guilt of Malejana beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: The trial court’s decision is AFFIRMED. De Vera’s testimony is not enough to overturn the trial
court’s decision and acquit Malejana. The proffered opinion of the said expert witness does not
conclusively rule out the possibility that an armalite rifle had been used. Expert opinion evidence is to be
considered or weighed by the court like any other testimony, in the light of their own general knowledge
and experience upon the subject of inquiry. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not
lie in a mere statement of the theory or opinion of the expert, but rather in the aid that he can render to
the courts in showing the facts which serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the
logic of his conclusion is founded. In addition, the inclusion or exclusion by the expert of factors or
elements that should or should not be considered in the determination of his opinion is to be considered
in determining the weight to be attached to his testimony. In this case, the factor that de Vera used as
the basis of his initial statement that a .45 caliber gun was used in the shooting, namely the nature and
character of the wounds sustained by the victim, did not take into account the distance and relative
position of Malejana. It must be remembered that the character of a gunshot wound depends upon the
kind of shot, the distance from the body and the gun, and the velocity with which the shot strikes the
body. The trial court, therefore, acted well within its discretion in not lending full-faith and credence to
the testimony of de Vera which, on its face, is inconclusive as to the point being made, i.e., that an
armalite rifle could not have possibly been used in the killing of Roces. Based on the evidence on record,
the prosecution was able to establish that Malejana was issued a firearm and shot the victim thrice in
the body. The wounds sustained by Roces were the direct and proximate result of his death.
“BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME”AS A VIABLE PLEA WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF SELF-
DEFENSE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel,
province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and
wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the
accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his death.
The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe
beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her
self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her
husband was equivalent to self-defense.

Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept of
self-defense is applicable in this case.

Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the
cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between
the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to
save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable—not
necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy
the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of
these elements were duly established.
People v. Bates (G.R. No. 139907)

Facts:

Around 2:00 in the afternoon of November 28, 1995, Edgar Fuentes, Simon
Fuentes and Jose Boholst left Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to deliver copra to a
certain Fely Rodado at Barangay Green Valley, Ormoc City. After delivering copra
around 5:00 in the afternoon, the three men headed back to Barangay Esperanza.
While they were along a trail leading to the house of Carlito Bates, the latter suddenly
emerged from the thick banana plantation surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at
Jose Boholst who was then walking ahead of his companions. Jose grabbed Carlito’s
right hand and elbow and tried to wrest possession of the firearm. While the two were
grappling for possession, the gun fired, hitting Carlito who immediately fell to the
ground. At that instant, Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo Bates, Jr., brother and
nephew of Carlito, respectively, emerged from the banana plantation each brandishing
a bolo. They immediately attacked Jose hacking him several times. Jose fell to the
ground and rolled but Marcelo and his son kept on hacking him. Marcelo, then, turned
to Simon and Edgar and shouted “huwes de kutsilyo”. Upon hearing the same, Simon
and Edgar ran.

Upholding the prosecution evidence, the trial court rendered its Judgment, finding
Marcelo Bates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

Issue:

Whether or not Marcelo could validly invoke the mitigating circumstance of

passion and obfuscation?

Decision:
 Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in favor of appellant.
To be considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or obfuscation must arise from
lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from anger and
resentment. In the present case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing is brother,
Carlito, shot by Jose. However, a distinction must be made between the first time that
Marcelo hacked Jose and the second time that the former hacked the latter. When
Marcelo hacked Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant
refrained from doing anything else after that, he could have validly invoked the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon seeing his brother
Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already prostrate on the
ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again was a clear case of someone acting out
of anger in the spirit of revenge.
 People v. Lab-eo (G.R. No. 133438)

Facts:

Segundina Cayno was engaged in the business of selling rummage goods. Early
in the morning of October 21, 1996 her son, Jerry Cayno went to the “dap-ayan” or
barangay hall, in front of the Tadian Public Market to display the goods for sale. After
displaying the goods, Segundina arrived and took over. Before noontime, while Nancy
and Julie were plucking the white hair strands of Segundina, appellant Wilson Lab-eo
arrived and approached his aunt, Segundina. Upon seeing him, Nancy went to a
distance of about two meters while Julie was still near Segundina. Appellant sat down
in front of his aunt and uttered something to her in a very soft voice. Nancy did not hear
what he said because of her distance from them while Julie could not make out the
conversation because of the sound coming from a running motor engine. What they
only heard was Segundina’s answer which was uttered in a loud angry voice “koma-an
ka tay baka mahigh bloodac” (“you get out because I might suffer high blood”). They
saw appellant leave. When appellant returned about 3 to 5 minutes after, Segundina
was sitting on a low rattan stool. In front of her were Nancy and Julie, they did not
notice appellant’s return, especially Segundina who had her back to appellant. When
Julie saw appellant approach Segundina from the back, Julie thought that he would just
box his aunt because she did not see the knife, which was wrapped in his blue jacket.
Then appellant suddenly made a thrusting motion and he stabbed Segundina on the left
portion of her back. He then ran away leaving the knife at the victim’s back with the
jacket he had covered it with, hanging by the knife’s handle. Appellant surrendered to
the police authorities. The appellant was indicted for murder. The appellant does not
deny stabbing Cayno. However, he maintains that neither treachery nor evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime. The Trial Court found the
appellant guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
Issue:

Whether or not the actuation of the accused can be properly appreciated as

passion or obfuscation in his favour?

Decision:

For a person to be motivated by passion and obfuscation, there must first exist
an unlawful act that would naturally produce an impulse sufficient to overcome reason
and self-control. There is passional obfuscation when the crime is committed due to an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. In asking the appellant to leave,
the victim did not do anything unlawful. There is an absolute lack of proof that the
appellant was utterly humiliated by the victim’s utterance. Nor was it shown that the
victim made that remark in an insulting and repugnant manner. The victim’s utterance
was not the stimulus required by jurisprudence to be so overwhelming as to overcome
reason and self-restraint.
People of the Philippines vs. Gonzales, Jr.
FACTS:
On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and herein accused-
appellant were both on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. At the intersection
point, the cars they were driving almost collided. Later on, when Andres found an
opportunity, he cut Gonzalez off, disembarked from his car and went over to Gonzales’.
Altercation then ensued. Meanwhile, Dino Gonzalez, son of Inocencio, entered the scene in
defense of his father. Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzalez took out the gun which
was already in his car compartment. Upon seeing his father, Gonzalez’s daughter, Trisha,
hugged her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to
free his hand and with Trisha’s substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost
his balance and the gun accidentally fired. Feliber Andres, Noel’s wife, was shot to death
while their son, Kenneth and nephew Kevin were wounded. 
The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of
frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. Accused were also ordered to pay
for civil liabilities to the heirs of Mrs. Andres, and the parents of Kevin Valdez.
Hence, an automatic review or this case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it found treachery was
present in the commission of the crime.

2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate
voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong be considered as mitigating circumstances.

RULINGS:
1. It has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes
committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are
generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately
employ a treacherous mode of attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to
his infuriation by reason of the victim’s provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden
attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or acts taunting the
accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim were held to be
without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. For the rules on
treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused,
unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter. We affirm the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and
accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.

2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete

defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense,
were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The
testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the appellant’s pretense of voluntary surrender. 

The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. Provocation
must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the
provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation
varies according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres
towards the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient
provocation to shoot at the complainant’s vehicle.

The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a
relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant
and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. 

Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining
when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a
wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed
and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant’s use of a gun, although not deliberately
sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of
the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting
crimes committed.
 People v. Enguito (326 SCRA 508)

Facts:

On or about September 22, 1991, Felipe Requerme was driving a motorela,

together with his wife Rosita and another passenger, Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre, who is
the deceased in this case. The deceased was picked up by them on their way home
and requested them to bring him to his house. While on their way, a white vehicle,
which was later on identified as a Ceres Kia automobile bearing Plate No. 722,
intentionally hit and pushed the motorela that they were riding and violently kept
pushing it causing it to turn around facing the direction from where it came from and fell
on its right side. Rosita testified that while she was struggling out of the motorela she
noticed that the white vehicle went up the elevated catwalk or pathway pursuing
Achumbre who was hit when he was already at the railing (barandilla). Then she
observed that the white vehicle drove away without even caring to see what happened
to them. The spouses/victims were brought to the police station while the Achumbre
was brought to the hospital who was declared dead on arrival. It was later on found out
upon investigation that said incident was predicated on the earlier fight which transpired
between Achumbre and the driver of the motor vehicle, Thadeos Enguito, the accused
in this case. As a result of the death of Achumbre, his wife filed a criminal complaint
against the accused. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty with the crime of
Homicide with Less Serious Physical Injuries, taking into consideration the aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle which was alleged in the information. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the latter modified the crime to Murder due to the aggravating
circumstance. The accused went to the Supreme Court imputing error on the decision of
the Court of Appeals with respect to the declaration of the crime of Murder against him
on the ground that he did not intentionally choose the motor vehicle he was driving as a
means of committing the offense, and that at most, the vehicle was the only available
means to stop the deceased from escaping. He argued that it was his intention to
apprehend and surrender the deceased to the police for his previous act of mauling him
but in the process, he killed the deceased.
Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle should be

considered in this case?

Decision:

The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use of motor

vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was
perpetrated by means thereof. Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle,
Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. By his own
admission, he testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the crossing. Accused-
appellant could have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of taking the law
into his own hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already noticed the deceased trying to
jump out of the motorela but he still continued his pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle
after hitting the deceased[16] who was hit when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the
Marcos bridge. Accused-appellant further used the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He
was already more than one (1) kilometer away from the place of the incident that he
stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him.

Appellant contends that he should have been convicted of the crime of homicide
with two (2) mitigating circumstances of acting in passion and voluntary surrender; and
had the charge been homicide he could have pleaded guilty. We find that these
mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated in his favor. Accused-appellant was
allegedly "still very angry" while he was following, bumping and pushing the motorela
which was in front of him. He was previously mauled by the deceased and he was
allegedly rendered unconscious by the blows inflicted on him. When he regained
consciousness, he claims that he wanted to look for a policeman to report that he was
mauled. Clearly, accused-appellant's state of mind after he was mauled and before he
crushed Achumbre to death was such that he was still able to act reasonably. In fact, he
admitted having seen a police mobile patrol nearby but instead, he chose to resort to
the dastardly act which resulted in the death of Achumbre and in the injuries of the
spouses Requerme. For passion to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, facts
must be proved to show causes sufficient to produce loss of self-control and to
overcome reason. The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or
fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person
injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control.

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated.

Evidence shows that accused-appellant was further pursued by the police. Appellant
himself testified that he stopped his vehicle just after the police mobile stopped but
admitted having "stopped farther than the police mobile". SPO3 Catiil further testified
that appellant did not surrender but only stopped his vehicle when its right tire was
already flat. His testimony was corroborated by PO3 Makiling who was patrolling the
portion of Marcos Bridge. He testified that he saw the vehicle being driven by accused-
appellant already destroyed and the right portion of the vehicle a little bit lower as it was
running flat. Clearly, accused-appellant could have eluded arrest but his situation
became futile when his vehicle suffered a flat tire.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence or non-existence of a mitigating

circumstance in the case at bar will not affect the penalty to be imposed pursuant to
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime committed by accused-appellant is the
complex crime of murder with less serious physical injuries. Under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime shall be the maximum period of
the penalty for the most serious crime. The crime was committed in 1992 where the
penalty for the crime of murder, which is the most serious crime, was reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The death
penalty being the maximum period of the penalty for murder should be imposed for the
complex crime of murder with less serious physical injuries considering that under
Article 63, an indivisible penalty cannot be affected by the presence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance. And, consonant with the ruling in People vs. Muñoz that
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution did not change the period of the
penalty for murder except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
and reduces it to reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE vs GUEVARRA

Facts (as found by the prosecution):

April 8, 1980, evening; San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija:  Armed men entered the house of

spouses Luisito and Priscilla Cruz and robbed them of P3,000 & jewelry.  Subsequently, they

also took the spouses’ car and forcibly boarded Priscilla along with them.  They headed towards

Manila, and along the way Priscilla recognized the one of the kidnappers, who then was driving

the car.   They told her that they were holding her for ransom of P50,000, but later on left her at

Paxton Hotel in Valenzuela, the kidnappers having convinced themselves that the kidnapping

did not materialize.

On same date, Luisito Cruz reported the incident, which led the police authorities to the

detention and investigation of accused Vergel Bustamante at the WPD in Manila.  He was later

identified by Priscilla as the driver of the car when they kidnapped her.

Procedure:

 Information

 Amended Information, per trial court’s order.  The amended info charged Jaime

Guevarra, Poncing Abergas, Dan Tolentino, Baldo De Jesus, Roming Longhair, Boy Tae,

Boy Pogi, Vergel Bustamante alias “Dan Saksak”, and Chotse Doe alias Bernabe

Sulaybar, with kidnapping

 Separate trial for Abergas and Bustamante only, as Tolentino could not be served with

subpoenas and other accused were reported to have died already

 Conviction:  Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; sentence: Death Penalty

 Automatic review by Supreme Court.  But with the adoption of the 1987 Consti., which

does not allow imposition of death penalty, the sentence was reduced to reclusion

perpetua.  Thus Bustamante elected to continue the case on appeal.

  Bustamante’s claim on appeal:  trial court erred in ordering amendment of the info. To

include Vergel Bustamante alias “Dan Saksak” as one and the same person

HELD:

1)  Questioned order of the trial court to amend the info. and include the correct name of “Dan

Saksak” as Vergel Bustamante is not without basis.  Records of the criminal case forwarded by

the MTC of NE to the RTC of NE led the judge of the latter to believe that Bustamante & Dan

Saksak was one & the same person (di sinabi sa case kung bakit kasali yung MTC dito. 

Apparently, it conducted a preliminary examination):

a)    A subpoena issued by the MTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija in Crim  Case Nos. 186-80 & 192-

80 was directed to one Vergel Bustamante alias “Dan Saksak.”

b)    In a return of service of one subpoena, the warden of the City Jail of Manila informed the

Clerk of Court of the MTC of Gapan, NE that Vergel Bustmante @ Dan Saksak said to be one of

the accused is not included in the list of present Inmates of  said Jail

c)    The order issued by the MTC of Gapan, NE finding a prima facie case against the accused

therein also stated that one of the accused is Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak

d)    The letter of transmittal of the records of the cases to the RTC of NE stated that one of the

accused therein, Vergel Bustamante @ Dan Saksak is detained at the Mla. City Jail

2)  In any event, THE ISSUE CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL .  THE

ISSUE IS ONE AFFECTING JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON AND SHOULD HAVE

BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE RTC IN A MOTION TO QUAH THE INFORMATION.  SINCE

THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED TO DO SO, HE IS DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED HIS

OBJECTION TO THE INFORMATION.

 Andrada v. People (GR No. 135222)

Facts:

In an Information dated January 7, 1987, the Office of the City Prosecutor of

Baguio City charged petitioner with Frustrated Murder committed as follows: That on or
about the 24th day of September 1986, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and hack one Arsenio Ugerio on the head twice with a bolo
thereby inflicting the latter: hacking wound, head, resulting in (1) skull and scalp
avulsion vertex; (2) depressed comminuted skull fracture, right parieto occipital with
significant brain laceration; operation done; craciectomy; vertex debridement;
craniectomy; right parieto occipital; dural repair; debridement, thus performing all the
acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence thereof,
but nevertheless, the felony was not committed by reason of causes independent of the
will of the accused, that is, by the timely medical attendance extended to Arsenio Ugerio
which prevented his death. When arraigned on February 9, 1987, petitioner, with the
assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded “Not Guilty” to the crime charged. Thereafter,
trial ensued.

Petitioner interposed self-defense and invoked the mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender.

The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Peter Andrada guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
 Whether or not the accused Peter Andrada is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender?

Decision:

Evidence for the prosecution shows that petitioner, after attacking the victim, ran away.
He was apprehended by responding police officers in the waiting shed at the corner of
Cambas Road and Magsaysay Avenue. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the
surrender must be spontaneous, made in such a manner that it shows the interest of the
accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and expenses that would be
necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Here, the surrender was not
spontaneous.
People v. Quimzon (G.R. No. 133541)

Facts:

In an Information dated July 28, 1992, appellant, Ricky Quimzon and three oher
persons, namely Salvacion Lascarom, Canoto Cabero and Edgardo Detona were charged with
the crime of murder allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 7 th day of March 1992,
in the Municipality of Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philipines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another
with treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniuosly attack, assault, strike, stab and wound one Marlo Casiong with short
bolos locally known as “pisao” which accused provided themselves for the purpose, thereby
hitting and inflicting upon the said Marlo Casiong with fatal wounds on the different parts of his
body which caused his death shortly thereafter.

Appellant surrendered to the police authorities on August 18, 1994 while his other co-
accused remain at-large. When arraigned on September 28, 1994, appellant, with the
assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial
ensued.

The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Ricky Quimzon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s
Decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant Ricky Quimzon is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender?

Decision:

It appears in the Commitment Order, dated August 14, 1994, issued by the Municipal
Trial Judge of the MTC of Burauen, Leyte, that appellant “voluntarily surrendered to SPO1
Josefino Agustin of PNP Burauen, Leyte on August 18, 1994.” An examination of the records
reveals that it can not be considered as a mitigating circumstance. For the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surreder to be appreciated, the accused must satisfactorily comply
with three requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a
person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. There must be a
showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either
because the accused acknowledges his guilt or wishes to spare them the trouble and expense
concominant to his capture.

The surrender of appellant was far from being spontaneous and unconditional. The
warrant of arrest is date June 17, 1992 and all the accused, including appellant, remained at-
large, which prompted the Executive Judge of the RTC of Palo, Leyte to achieve the case. It
took appellant two years before he finally surrendered to the police. In between said period,
appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Fix Bail Bond without surrendering his person to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Records do not reveal that the motion had been acted upon by the
trial court. This act of appellant may be considered as a condition set by him before he
surrenders to proper authorities, thus preventing his subsequent act of surrendering from being
considered as a mitigating circumstance.
G.R. No. 135551. October 27, 2000
People vs. Taraya

FACTS:

Accused-appelants Ampie Taraya, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, all are relatives, were charged for the
crime of murder qualified by treachery for the death of Salvador Reyes.

Salvador Reyes was killed on the night of September 24, 1995. Prosecution witnesses  Mariano Adillo,
David Angeles and Gregorio Reyes testified against the accused appellants. Their statements were
countered by  Armando Bilara, Domingo Decena, SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez and the accused appellants
themselves.

Prosecution witness Mariano testified that he saw the three accused approach Salvador the night
Salvador was killed. Prosecution witness David Angles swore to have seen the actual killing and
positively identified the three accused. Gregorio Reyes, the victim’s father, said that his son had an
altercation with Arly.

The defense countered their claims. Barangay Tanod Armando Bilara stated that David Angeles’ brother
had a fistfight with Jonar, implying that there might be a different reason as to David Angeles’ insistence
on Jonar’s involvement in the killing. Domingo Decena also testified that on the night of the killing he
saw Salvador hit Ampie with a pipe which Ampie luckily avoided. Domingo added that Ampie, to defend
himself hacked Salvador and ran away. Domingo stated that he also ran back home out of fear and only
found out of Salvador’s death the next morning. SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez testified that Ampie did
surrender himself at the police station on Octiber 9, 1997. Ampie admitted on killing Salvador but
contended that he did so out of self-defense and said that his cousins had nothing to do with it. Jonar
and Arly both had alibis.

Trial Court ruled against accused appellants for murder and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.

Accused appellants appealed, arguing that  Ampie should not be charged with murder since he have
done so only out of self-defense plus Salvador was also armed with a pipe that night, which disqualifies
treachery in the case. They further asserted that Arly and Jonar were not co-conspirators in the killing of
Salvador Reyes. They were implicated by David Angeles, Jr claims which were not supported by clear
evidence. Furthermore, they insisted that Ampie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since he
surrendered himself at the police station at his own will.

ISSUE:
1.     Whether or not Jonar and Arly were co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador.
2.     Whether or not Ampie’s contention of self-defense be given consideration.
3.     Whether or not Ampie’s voluntary surrender made him eligible for a a mitigated sentence.

HELD:
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
crime and decide to commit it. It does not require that such agreement occurred for an appreciable
period prior to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient that at the time of the execution thereof, all
accused had the same purpose and were united therein.

The Court ruled that David Angeles’ testimony was not persuasive as to the participation of Arly and
jonar in the crime. There had been no certainty as to their action to show a deliberate and concerted
cooperation on their part as to likewise render them liable for the killing of Salvador. Prosecution
evidence failed to convince the court as to its sufficiency with moral certainty that there indeed had
been conspiracy among accused-appellants. Thus, The Court acquitted Jonar and Arly.

The Court also ruled that, there being no positive and direct evidence to show that the attack was
sudden and unexpected, treachery as a circumstance to qualify the killing to murder cannot be
appreciated against AMPIE. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires that the offender deliberately employs means of
execution which deprives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate. Ampie
thereforecould only be charged with homicide.

As to the issue of Ampie’s voluntary surrender, the court emphasized that for one to avail of mitigating
circumstance for  voluntary surrender, the following requisites must be present: (1) the offender had
not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the
latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or
information filed.

When Ampie surrendered, a pending warrant of arrest had already been issued. His arrest by that time
was already imminent.
Confession of Guilt
People v. Montinola (G.R. Nos. 131856-57)

Facts:

On 18 November 1996, William Montinola, armed with an unlicensed Cal .380 Pistol
Llama deliberately, willfully and criminally with violence against or intimidation of persons, with
intent of gain, take and carry away cash amount of P67,500.00 belonging to Jose Eduardo
Reteracion. Montinola shot the victim on the neck, killing Reteracion. Two criminal cases were
filed against Montinola and he was later on sentenced to reclusion perpetua for robbery with
homicide and death for illegal possession of firearm.

Issue:

Whether the use of an unlicensed firearm on the killing perpetrated by reason or on

occasion of the robbery may be treated as a separate offense or as an aggravating
circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide?

Decision:

Sec. 1 of P.D.1866 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. Said Presidential Decree was
however, amended by R.A. 8294, while Montinola’s case was still pending. R.A. 8294 provides
that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The Court held “In
recent cases, we ruled that there could be no separate conviction for illegal possession of
firearm if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm; instead, such
use shall be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder
committed. Hence, insofar as the new law will be advantageous to WILLIAM as it will spare him
from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm, it shall be given retroactive effect.”
Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294,
use of an unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder
committed. “At any rate, even assuming that the aggravating circumstances present in the
commission of homicide or murder may be counted in the determination of the penalty for
robbery with homicide, we cannot appreciate in this case the special aggravating circumstance
of use of an unlicensed firearm mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866,
as amended by R.A. No. 8294. Such law was not yet enacted when the crime was committed by
WILLIAM; it cannot, therefore, be given retroactive effect for being unfavorable to him.” The
Court further held “Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible
penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the
commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance. If we would apply
retroactively the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm under Section 1
of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, the imposable penalty would be death.
Conformably with our ruling in People v. Valdez, insofar as the new law would aggravate the
crime of robbery with homicide and increase the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death, it
would not be given retroactive application, lest it would acquire the character of an ex post facto
law. Hence, we shall not appreciate that special aggravating circumstance. There being no
modifying circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
accused-appellant WILLIAM.”
People v. Dawaton (G.R. No. 146247)

Facts:
Edgar Dawaton was found guilty by the trial court of murder qualified by treachery and
was sentenced to death. On 20 September 1998, Leonidas Lavares and several companions,
including Dawaton were drinking in the house of the accused’s uncle. Already drunk, Leonidas
Lavares decided to sleep while the accused and his companions continued drinking. Dawaton
awakened Lavares by stabbing him at the base of the neck. Dawaton continued stabbing
Lavares until the victim died. Dawaton then ran away to the house of his other relative, where
he was later on arrested by the police.

Issue:
Whether or not the penalty of death imposed by the trial court upon the accused was
correct?

Decision:
No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not considering the alternative
circumstance of intoxication in favor of the accused. “Under Art. 15 of The Revised Penal Code,
intoxication of the offender shall be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offender
commits a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan
to commit said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.The allegation that the accused was drunk when he committed the
crime was corroborated by the prosecution witnesses. The accused and his drinking
companions had consumed four (4) bottles of gin at the house of Esmeraldo Cortez, each one
drinking at least a bottle. It was also attested that while the four (4) shared another bottle of gin
at the house of Amado Dawaton, it was the accused who drank most of its contents.” The Court
further stated that “Under Art. 63, par. 3, of The Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the
law prescribes a penalty composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, such as in this case, when
the commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no aggravating circumstance attended
the killing but there existed the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, the accused should be
sentenced only to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.”
Similar and Analogous Circumstances
Canta v. People (G.R. No. 140937)

Facts:

Narciso Gabriel owns a cow that was passed on from one person to another and each
person was responsible for the care and custody of the said cow. At the time the cow got lost, it
was under the care and custody of Gardenio Agapay. Agapay took the cow in the mountain of
Pilipogan, 40 meters away from his hut, at around 5:00 in the afternoon. When he came back to
get the cow at past 9 in the evening, the cow was gone. However, Aagapay saw footprints that
led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. Vallejos told Agapay that Exuperancio Canta took the
cow.

Agapay and Maria were instructed by Narciso to get the cow and on their way to
Florenitno Canta’s house, they saw Exuperancio. The latter told them that if it was really
Narciso who was the owner of the cow, he should get it himself. Exuperancia accompanied the
two to his father’s house and both recognized the cow but Florentino was not home.
Exuperancio told Maria and Agapay that he would call them the next day to talk about the
matter with his father. Exuperancio never called. The matter was reported to the police and
Narciso and Exuperancio were called for investigation. Exuperancio admitted taking the cow
but claims that he was the real owner of the cow and that it was lost on December 3, 1985.
However, Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the
municipal treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and female. Then, the
petitioner also presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated February 27, 1985
and a statement executed by Franklin Telen, who was the janitor at the treasurer's office of the
municipality, that he executed the certificate of ownership in favor of Exuperancio. The trial
court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged. Exuperancio filed a
Motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's
decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower courts were correct in sentencing Exuperancio to ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and
eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay the costs?

Decision:

No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of
violation of §2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
However, it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The trial court
apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special law and applied §1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, which provides that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same." However, as held in People v. Macatanda,P. D. No. 533 is not a
special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to
amend the Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, §10 of
the law provides:
 The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the

commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be fixed in its minimum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i. e.,prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor medium, and the maximum of which is prision mayor in its maximum period.
People v. Evina (405 SCRA 152)

Facts:
Gerardo Gavina was serve sentence of Reclusion Pertpetua for raping certain
Ms. Maritess Catcharo. Based on the given facts, Gerardo took advantage of the time
when the victim’s mother was not around. He would likely forced Maritess to have carnal
knowledged against her will and even poked a knife at her while doing the deed in the
victim’s dwelling and threthened the victim to kill her family should she tell her parents
what happened. On November 13, 1991 when the appellant arrived at the Catcharro
residence he proceeded inside the bedroom of Maritess, the latter ran out of the
bedroom and told her mother not to leave her because her Papa Gerry might raped her
again. Surprised by what he heard, the following day Maritess was brought to Tacloban
City Medical Center for a check-up and found to have lacerations to the victims genitalia.
Contrary to the facts above, appellant claimed that the night of the incident he was
working as porter until 10 PM, thus it cannot be said that he committed the crime
accused of him. Based on the information submitted, aggravating circumstances of use
of weapon and dwelling were not alleged.

Issue:
Whether or not aggravating circumstances proved during trial but was not alleged
in the information may be considered?

Decision:
The supreme court held in the negative. Although the special aggravating
circumstance of the use of a weapon and the aggravating circumstance of dwelling were
proven, these aggravating circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty
because they were not alleged in the information as mandated by Rule 110, Sections 8
and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Although the crimes charged were
committed before the effectivity of the said rule, nevertheless, the same should be
applied retroactively being favorable to the appellant.
PEOPLE vs ANTONIO

Facts: In the early morning of June 16, 1996 Wilson Antonio alias “Instik”, the accused and
Sergio “Bobby” Mella were having a drinking session where the victim boxed the accused. Upon
arriving home together 2shots were fired although it was not certain who fired the shots Wilson
believed it was Bobby. Wilson then shouted out that he will kill Bobby. At 7:15 am of June 16,
1996 went to the house of the victim despite her sister’s plea Wilfe. Upon arriving Wilson shot
the victim while he was in bed sleeping together with his7 year old son. The victim
died thereafter. Wilson eluded arrest for more than one year. 

The accused raised insanity as a defense. Wilson, has from 1994 to 1996, underwent treatment
for his unusual behavior. He was prescribed medications but did not take them religiously.
Furthermore he habitually drank alcohol, which interfered with his medication. On Sept 14, 1998
Dr. Rowena Cosca examined the accused and diagnosed him with schizo-affective disorder. A
person suffering from psychosis does not know what he is doing and is deprived of his faculty to
distinguish right from wrong; he is deprived of reason and does not understand the
consequences of his actuations because of his behavioral symptoms. 

Issue: Whether or not the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime
entitling him to exempting circumstances of insanity. 

Held: No he is not. Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in

committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. When
insanity is alleged to free a person from criminal liability, it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence which must refer to the time immediately preceding the act or at the very
moment of its execution. A review of the evidence fails to show that the accused was legally
insane at the time he shot Bobby. Dr. Cosca’s testimony as well as that of Wilson’s mother
failed to show that he was insane at the moment of the killing since they were not there.
Wilson’s testimony during his cross examination admitting his awareness of the circumstances
of crime militates heavily against the defense. His condition however qualifies as a mitigating
circumstance of illness which diminishes the exercise of his will without depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts. 
People v. Palaganas (501 SCRA 533)

Facts:

On January 16, 1998 brothers Servillano and Michael Ferrer went to Tidbits
Videoke bar singing and drinking beer. On the same evening Jaime Palaganas and
Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista arrived. The two groups occupied separate
tables. After the Ferrer’s singing Jaime Palaganas started singing and was joined by
Tony Ferrer who sang loudly and in mocking manner. This insulted Jaime and soon a
fight ensued between Ferrer’s and Palaganas. Ferdinand ran towards his house and
sought help from his brother Fuijeric, the latter went outside however he was stoned by
the Ferrer brothers. As they were continuously stoned the appellant Ferdinand suddenly
pulled the trigger with the gun in his hands. The trial court rendered a decision finding
the petitioner guilty of the crime of Homicide and Frustrated homicide but not guilty of
violation of COMELEC RES. 2958.

Issue:

Whether or not violation of COMELEC RES. 2958 may be considered as Special

aggravating circumstances which will negate consideration of mitigating circumstances
of voluntary surrender?

Decision:

With the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating
circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance. 68 Republic Act No. 8294
applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21
April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant
case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance
and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.
People v. Mendoza (327 SCRA 695)

Facts:

Efren Mendoza was charged with the crime of murder for killing Anchito Nano. In
this case Efren alleged that Anchito Nano arrived at their house and upon arrival it
started to destroy the house and that the her wife was shouting for help. Efren
immediately look for something to protect his family but found a bolo. He approached
Anchito but the latter tried to hacked him but he was able to hacked him first on the right
side of his neck resulting to the death of the victim. Thereafter Mendoza went to
Municipal Hall of Vinzon and voluntarily surrendered to the police. He claimed that it
was self defense. The autopsy revealed that location of the wounds found on the body
of the victim came from the back of the victim’s body. The court ruled rejecting
appellant’s self defense. This court finds that the accused was not in imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm, an attempt to defend himself by means which appeared
unreasonable by using a long bolo is unjustifiable. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating circumstances

of treachery?

Decision:

The Supreme Court held in the negative. A qualifying circumstance changes the
nature of the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance, on the other hand, does not
affect the designation of the crime; it merely provides for the imposition of the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus, while a generic aggravating
circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance, a qualifying circumstance
may not. 32
Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating circumstance.
Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the same time be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the
maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary surrender.
People v. Villamor (G.R. Nos. 140407-08)

Facts:

On November 25, 1995, brothers Jerry Velez and Jelord Velez were on their way
home on board a motorcycle. A motorcycle was speeding behind them and as they
were about to cross the bridge, they heard gun shots firing behind them. As they turned
around, Jerry identified PO3 Renato Villamor and Jessie Maghilom riding the
motorcycle behind them. Shots were fired at them and Jerry sustained wounds on the
abdomen and elbow while Jelord died on the spot. The trial proceeded against PO3
Villamor while Maghilom was still at large. During trial, the Trial Court found the PO3
Renato Villamor guilty of having commited Murder aggravated by the circumstance of
taking advantage of his public position.

Issue:

Whether or not the Trial Court properly applied the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of public position?

Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled that the aggravating circumstance of “taking advantage
of public position” under paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was
improperly applied.

A public officer must use the influence that is vested in his office as a means to
realize the purpose of the crime to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. The
question “Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime” must be asked in order
to appreciate this circumstance as an aggravating circumstance.

No proof was shown that Villamor took advantage of his position of being a
policeman when he shot Jelord Velez. Neither was his influence, prestige or
ascendancy used in killing Velez. Even without occupying a public position, the
accused could have committed the crime.
People v. Magayac (G.R. No. 126043)

Facts:

On February 11, 1994, Jimmy Lumague, Tino Magayac and Manuel Magayac,
were preparing for fishing along with other persons. Tino Magayac, pushed Jimmy for
no reason. When Jimmy asked why, Tino proceeded to hit Jimmy at the back. Hours
later, Tino hit Jimmy at the stomach and Manuel proceeded to hit Tino as well. The
fight, however, was intervened. The next day, Jimmy and Manuel exchanged blows.
They were, again, separated from each other. On February 12, Manuel, while carrying a
long rifle, approached Jimmy. As the Jimmy was trying to leave, he was shot by Manuel
right on his stomach. Jimmy fell on the ground and was shot at the back several times.
Afterwhich, Manuel surrendered to the PC Mobile Force. An information for Murder
with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of public position as a member of the CAFGU. The Trial Court found him
guilty of Murder aggravated by cruelty and taking advantage of public position,
appreciated by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Issue:

Whether or not the circumstance of taking advantage of public position should be

appreciated as an aggravating circumstance considering the facts of the case?

Decision:

The Supreme Court held that in the commission of the offense, there was no
aggravating circumstance, specifically “abuse of public position”.
Considering the facts of the case, Manuel was a member of the CAFGU and the
weapon used to shoot Jimmy was a government issued M-14 rifle. These, however, do
not necessarily prove that Manuel took advantage of his public position as a member of
the CAFGU when the crime of murder was committed.

Fortuna v. People (G.R. No. 135784)

Facts:

On July 21, 1992, siblings Diosdada Montecillo and Mario Montecillo were
standing at the corner of Mabini and Harrison Streets. A mobile patrol car stopped in
front of them and a policeman alighted. The policeman frisked Mario and took Mario’s
belt. He motioned Mario to enter the car. Mario obeyed and was followed by Diosdada.
While inside the car, the policemen told Mario that he would be brought to the Bicutan
police station where he would be interrogated, mauled and heckled for carrying a deadly
weapon. They told the Montecillos that the bailbond for carrying a deadly weapon was
P12,000. The Montecillos were asked how much they had and then Diosdada was
asked to alight from the car. The driver followed her, took P1,500 from her wallet and
instructed her to tell the others that she only had P3,500. Inside the car, they were told
to put all her money on the box. The Montecillos were told to get off at Harrison Plaza.
From there, they went home. The 3 policemen, Fortuna, Garcia, and Pablo, were
charged with robbery and were found guilty of having conspired in committing the crime
with intimidation of persons.

Issue:

Whether or not abuse of public position should be taken as an aggravating

circumstance by the mere fact that the accused were police officers?

Decision:

The Supreme Courted held that the lower courts failed to appreciate the
aggravating circumstance of “abuse of public position.”
Being police officers, it placed them in a position terrify the Montecillos to surrender their
money as bail. It was on the account of their authority that convinced the Montecillos
that they had committed a crime and that they would be taken to the police station. Had
they not been police officers, they would have not convinced the Montecillos into giving
them their money.
People v. Tac-an (G.R. No. 76338-39)

Facts:

Renato Tac-anand Francis Escanowere close friends being classmates in high

school and members of the local Bronx gang. Francis withdrew from the gang on the
advice of his mother who saw that Renato carried a handgun on his visits to their home.
Things started turning sour between the two, and came to a head on Dec 14, 1984.
After an earlier altercation on that day, Renato went home and got his gun. He entered
the Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas in Rm15 and shouted for Francis.
After locating the victim he fired at him but missed. He was later able to hit him in the
head as he was running to the door with his classmates to escape. After this, Renato
paced outside in the hallway. A teacher unknowing that Renato was the culprit, asked
him for help unwittingly informing him that Francis was still alive. Renato immediately re-
entered the room and saying "So, he is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over
Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of
Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder,
and exited on his front chest just above the right nipple.

Tac-an was charged with illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866. An
amended information for murder was subsequently filed aggravated by the use of illegal
possession of firearms.

Issues:

Whether or not illegal possession of a firearm is a special aggravating

circumstance in crimes of homicide and murder?

Decision:

No.Under an information charging homicide or murder, the use of an unlicensed

firearm is not an aggravating circumstance nor can it be used to increase the penalty for
the second offense of homicide or murder to death or reclusion perpetua. The character
of the instrument used in taking or destroying human existence is not one of those
included in the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code.

On the other hand, under an information for unlawful possession of a firearm or

ammunition, P.D. 1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable penalty for unlawful
possession if the unlicensed firearm was used to destroy human existence. Though it is
not one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code, it may still be considered to increase the penalty imposed because of the explicit
provision of the said special law.
 People v. De Mesa (G.R. No. 137036)

Facts:

Barangay Chairman Patricio Motas of Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City was
pronounced dead on arrival on October 15, 1996 at San Pablo City District Hospital.
The autopsy report showed that the cause of death was shock and hemorrhage due to
gunshot wounds at the back of the victim.

Hernando De Mesa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
murder by the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. He was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, pay the costs and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.
Treachery, nighttime, in contempt of or with assault to public authorities, were
appreciated by the trial court as aggravating circumstances attending the case thereby
qualifying the crime committed to murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in determining the nature of the crime
committed and the corresponding penalty to be imposed?

Decision:

Yes. The prosecution failed to positively prove the presence of anyqualifying

aggravating circumstance whereby the crime committed is only homicide for which the
imposable penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code is Reclusion Temporal.

Being the case, Indeterminate Sentence Law may now be applied and absent
any aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty that may be imposed is
prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium
period as maximum.