EN BANC

[G.R. No. 202242. July 17, 2012.]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ , petitioner, vs . JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,

SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR. ,
respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA , J : p

The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected departure of Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General
Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as his potential successor, triggered the ling of this case.
The issue has constantly been nagging legal minds, yet remained dormant for lack of
constitutional challenge.
As the matter is of extreme urgency considering the constitutional deadline in the process
of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of the Chief Justice, the Court cannot delay
the resolution of the issue a day longer. Relegating it in the meantime to the back burner is
not an option.
Does the rst paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than
one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2)
representatives from each house of Congress with one (1) vote each sanctioned by the
Constitution? These are the pivotal questions to be resolved in this original action for
prohibition and injunction.
Long before the naissance of the present Constitution, the annals of history bear witness
to the fact that the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the
exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like
their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos Constitution 1 and the 1935
Constitution 2 had vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the
President, subject to con rmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during
these times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants
seeking con rmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with
the members of the legislative body. 3 AEIDTc

Then, with the fusion of executive and legislative power under the 1973 Constitution, 4 the
appointment of judges and justices was no longer subject to the scrutiny of another body.
It was absolute, except that the appointees must have all the quali cations and none of the
disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from political
pressure and partisan activities, 5 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the
need to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to
the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the
judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Its
composition, term and functions are provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the
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 Constitution, viz.:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex o cio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
o cio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President
for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of
the Members rst appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve
for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two
years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex o cio of the
Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as
may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its
annual budget the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending

appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as
the Supreme Court may assign to it.

In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC,
designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex o cio members. 6
Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the
House of Representatives and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC.
In other words, Congress had only one (1) representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC — one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. 7 Then,
curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. 8
At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition, 9 setting forth the
following:
GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION

I
Article VIII, Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear, de nite and needs no interpretation in
that the JBC shall have only one representative from Congress.

II

The framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned, contemplated and decided on

a JBC composed of only seven (7) members. HTacDS

III

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 Had the framers of the Constitution intended that the JBC composed of the one
member from the Senate and one member from the House of Representatives,
they could have easily said so as they did in the other provisions of the
Constitution.

IV

The composition of the JBC providing for three ex-o cio members is purposely
designed for a balanced representation of each of the three branches of the
government.

One of the two (2) members of the JBC from Congress has no right (not even 1/2
right) to sit in the said constitutional body and perform the duties and functions
of a member thereof.

VI

The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and
unconstitutional. 1 0

On July 9, 2012, the JBC led its Comment. 1 1 It, however, abstained from recommending
on how this constitutional issue should be disposed in gracious deference to the wisdom
of the Court. Nonetheless, the JBC was more than generous enough to offer the insights of
various personalities previously connected with it. 1 2
Through the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondents defended their position as
members of the JBC in their Comment 1 3 led on July 12, 2012. According to them, the
crux of the controversy is the phrase "a representative of Congress." 1 4 Reverting to the
basics, they cite Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution 1 5 to determine the meaning of the
term "Congress." It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of "Congress," such that the
absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. In simplistic terms, the House of Representatives, without the Senate and
vice-versa, is not Congress. 1 6 Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers,
requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its
mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of "a representative from Congress," it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. 1 7 cICHTD

Tracing the subject provision's history, the respondents claim that when the JBC was
established, the Framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby
allocating "a representative of the National Assembly" to the JBC. The phrase, however,
was not modi ed to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism, the legislative system
nally adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. According to
respondents, if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a
bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the
corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC. 1 8
The ambiguity having resulted from a plain case of inadvertence, the respondents urge the
Court to look beyond the letter of the disputed provision because the literal adherence to
its language would produce absurdity and incongruity to the bicameral nature of Congress.
1 9 In other words, placing either of the respondents in the JBC will effectively deprive a
house of Congress of its representation. In the same vein, the electorate represented by
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 Members of Congress will lose their only opportunity to participate in the nomination
process for the members of the Judiciary, effectively diminishing the republican nature of
the government. 2 0
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress
to be members of the JBC does not render the latter's purpose nugatory. While they admit
that the purpose in creating the JBC was to insulate appointments to the Judiciary from
political in uence, they likewise cautioned the Court that this constitutional vision did not
intend to entirely preclude political factor in said appointments. Therefore, no evil should
be perceived in the current set-up of the JBC because two (2) members coming from
Congress, whose membership to certain political parties is irrelevant, does not necessarily
amplify political partisanship in the JBC. In fact, the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are
undeniably presidential appointees. 2 1
The Issues
In resolving the procedural and substantive issues arising from the petition, as well as the
myriad of counter-arguments proffered by the respondents, the Court synthesized them
into two:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power
of judicial review have been met in this case; and

(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions
with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter
to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its Comment, the JBC submits that petitioner is clothed with locus standi to le the
petition, as a citizen and taxpayer, who has been nominated to the position of Chief
Justice. 2 2 CIDTcH

For the respondents, however, petitioner has no "real interest" in questioning the
constitutionality of the JBC's current composition. 2 3 As outlined in jurisprudence, it is
well-settled that for locus standi to lie, petitioner must exhibit that he has been denied, or
is about to be denied, of a personal right or privilege to which he is entitled. Here, petitioner
failed to manifest his acceptance of his recommendation to the position of Chief Justice,
thereby divesting him of a substantial interest in the controversy. Without his name in the
official list of applicants for the post, the respondents claim that there is no personal stake
on the part of petitioner that would justify his outcry of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the
mere allegation that this case is of transcendental importance does not excuse the waiver
of the rule on locus standi, because, in the rst place, the case lacks the requisites
therefor. The respondents also question petitioner's belated ling of the petition. 2 4 Being
aware that the current composition of the JBC has been in practice since 1994, petitioner's
silence for eighteen (18) years show that the constitutional issue being raised before the
Court does not comply with the "earliest possible opportunity" requirement.
Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to rst
ascertain the nature of the petition. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations therein and the character of the relief sought, the Court
views the petition as essentially an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 5
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 The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which
would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only
relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the document sought to be
construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised
in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original
jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. 2 6
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but
also to the sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take
cognizance of it. After all, the petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin
Congress from sending two (2) representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC. SDHETI

The Courts' power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 2 7 Generally, a
party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present,
especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in
issue.
Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does the party possess a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that there is real, concrete and legal
con ict of rights and duties from the issues presented before the Court? In David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 2 8 the Court summarized the rules on locus standi as culled from
jurisprudence. There, it was held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators
may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1)
cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters,
there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must
be a claim that the o cial action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in
assailing an allegedly illegal o cial action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected
no differently from any other person, and can be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or
"taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being de ected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure
of public funds is the mortal wound in icted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement
of an invalid statute. 2 9
In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a
nominee to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As a taxpayer, petitioner
invokes his right to demand that the taxes he and the rest of the citizenry have been paying
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 to the government are spent for lawful purposes. According to petitioner, "since the JBC
derives nancial support for its functions, operation and proceedings from taxes paid,
petitioner possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that the JBC's
proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that its composition and actions do not
violate the Constitution." 3 0 cSaADC

Notably, petitioner takes pains in enumerating past actions that he had brought before the
Court where his legal standing was sustained. Although this inventory is unnecessary to
establish locus standi because obviously, not every case before the Court exhibits similar
issues and facts, the Court recognizes the petitioner's right to sue in this case. Clearly,
petitioner has the legal standing to bring the present action because he has a personal
stake in the outcome of this controversy.
The Court disagrees with the respondents' contention that petitioner lost his standing to
sue because he is not an o cial nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that
a "personal stake" on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only
o cial nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC's duty is not at
all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of
aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court's ruling. More
importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary
is the nucleus of the controversy. The Court considers this a constitutional issue that must
be passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and
worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this question to the Court, clothed
with legal standing and at the same time, armed with issues of transcendental importance
to society. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an
object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not di cult to perceive
from the opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in
jurisprudence are attendant in this case: (1) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and speci c interest in
the questions being raised. 3 1 The allegations of constitutional violations in this case are
not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the government. The
allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court.
The Court need not elaborate on the legal and societal rami cations of the issues raised. It
cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of the
magistrates in our judicial system.
The Composition of the JBC
Central to the resolution of the foregoing petition is an understanding of the composition
of the JBC as stated in the rst paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. It
reads:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex o cio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
o cio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
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 retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
HTScEI

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The rst paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and
places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where
the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor
of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the
second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special
members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice and "a representative of Congress."
As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of
Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of
what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than
one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in
no uncertain terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. 3 2 It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of
the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. 3 3 Verba legis non est recedendum — from the words of a statute
there should be no departure. 3 4
The raison d'être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained; 3 5 and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail. 3 6 EHASaD

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made clear and speci c by considering the company of words in which it is
founded or with which it is associated. 3 7 This is because a word or phrase in a statute is
always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be
modi ed or restricted by the latter. 3 8 The particular words, clauses and phrases should
not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the
statute must be considered in xing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give
effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 3 9 In short, every meaning to be given to
each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since
a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases
and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
"Congress" used in Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense.
No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
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 Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative
may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as
pointed out by an esteemed former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his
memorandum, 4 0 "from the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent that
each category of members pertained to a single individual only." 4 1
Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers. 4 2 Not any of these instances, however, is present in the case at bench.
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the
Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of
the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was
intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus:
MR. RODRIGO:
Let me go to another point then.

On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about the appointments of

members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts. At present
it is the President who appoints them. If there is a Commission on
Appointments, then it is the President with the con rmation of the
Commission on Appointment. In this proposal, we would like to establish a
new o ce, a sort of a board composed of seven members called the
Judicial and Bar Council. And while the President will still appoint the
member of the judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees of this
Council. TAcDHS

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO.
O f the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the President
appoints four of them who are regular members.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. CONCEPCION.
The only purpose of the Committee is to eliminate partisan politics. 4 3

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO.
If my amendment is approved, then the provision will be exactly the same as the
provision in the 1935 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5.
xxx xxx xxx
If we do not remove the proposed amendment on the creation of the Judicial and
Bar Council, this will be a diminution of the appointing power of the
highest magistrate of the land, of the President of the Philippines elected
by all the Filipino people. The appointing power will be limited by a group
of seven people who are not elected by the people but only appointed. TEcADS

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 Mr. Presiding O cer, if this Council is created, there will be no uniformity in our
constitutional provisions on appointments. The members of the Judiciary
will be segregated from the rest of the government. Even a municipal judge
cannot be appointed by the President except upon recommendation or
nomination of the three names by this Committee of seven people,
commissioners of the Commission on Elections, the COA and the
Commission on Civil Service . . . even ambassadors, generals of the Army
will not come under this restriction. Why are we going to segregate the
Judiciary from the rest of our government in the appointment of high-
ranking officials?

Another reason is that this Council will be ineffective. It will just besmirch the
honor of our President without being effective at all because this Council
will be under the in uence of the President. Four out of seven are
appointees of the President and they can be reappointed when their term
ends. Therefore, they would be kowtow the President. A fth member is the
Minister of Justice, an alter ego of the President. Another member
represents the Legislature. In all probability, the controlling part in the
legislature belongs to the President and, therefore, this representative form
the National Assembly is also under the in uence of the President. And
may I say, Mr. Presiding O cer, that event the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is an appointee of the President. So it is futile he will be
influence anyway by the President. 4 4 [Emphases supplied]

At this juncture, it is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves
a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into
half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members
of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and
eventually muddle the JBC's voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The
aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism
which the Constitution itself created. While it would be unreasonable to expect that the
Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that
an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock. aDSTIC

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
"Congress" in Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both
the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because
at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral
form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a
bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII,
Section 8 of the Constitution. 4 5 On this score, the Court cites the insightful analysis of
another member of the Court and JBC consultant, retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago. 4 6 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the
composition of the JBC re ects the Commission's desire "to have in the Council a
representation for the major elements of the community." . . . The ex-o cio
members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main branches
of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders
in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was
to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government . . . . Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members
with the three ex-o cio members having equal say in the choice of judicial
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 nominees.
xxx xxx xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in
the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution.
Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch of in the matter of its
representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative and
constituent powers requires the Senate and House of Representatives to
coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress' role under our
constitutional scheme. While the latter justi es and, in fact, necessitates
the separateness of the two houses of Congress as they relate inter se,
no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the
other two co-equal branches of government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental
branches to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary.
The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act
as such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative
influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly
bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the
three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of constitutional
construction, the Court nds the above thesis as the paramount justi cation of the Court's
conclusion that "Congress," in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as
one body. It is evident that the de nition of "Congress" as a bicameral body refers to its
primary function in government — to legislate. 4 7 In the passage of laws, the Constitution is
explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress' non-legislative powers such as, inter alia, the power of appropriation, 4 8 the
declaration of an existence of a state of war, 4 9 canvassing of electoral returns for the
President and Vice-President, 5 0 and impeachment. 5 1 In the exercise of these powers, the
Constitution employs precise language in laying down the roles which a particular house
plays, regardless of whether the two houses consummate an o cial act by voting jointly
or separately. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these
powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. Verily, each
house is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with
keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with
the principle of checks and balances, to the other branches of government. HSTAcI

This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of
judicial o cers. Hence, the term "Congress" must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic
scheme which the Constitution laid with rmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a
single representative of Congress, as one of the co-equal branches of government.
Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative
solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment
of members of the Judiciary. 5 2 To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a holistic
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 approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of
the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative in uence in the JBC by having
more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would,
as one former congressman and member of the JBC put it, "negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution." 5 3 EAISDH

To quote one former Secretary of Justice:

The present imbalance in voting power between the Legislative and the other
sectors represented in the JBC must be corrected especially when considered vis-
à-vis the avowed purpose for its creation, i.e., to insulate the appointments in the
Judiciary against political in uence. By allowing both houses of Congress
to have a representative in the JBC and by giving each representative
one (1) vote in the Council, Congress, as compared to the other
members of the JBC, is accorded greater and unwarranted in uence in
the appointment of judges. 5 4 [Emphasis supplied]

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or
half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution,
providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending
appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate
should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to
which all persons, including the highest o cials of the land, must defer. Constitutional
doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be
simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself
to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it. 5 5 Hence, any act
of the government or of a public o cial or employee which is contrary to the Constitution
is illegal, null and void.
As to the effect of the Court's nding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional, it bears mentioning that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no o ce;
it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. 5 6 This rule, however, is not absolute. In
the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nulli ed. In Planters
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, 5 7 the Court explained: CEDHTa

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as
a matter of equity and fair play. It nulli es the effects of an unconstitutional law
by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose

an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied
to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality
in reliance upon a law creating it.
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 Considering the circumstances, the Court nds the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its nding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
At this point, the Court takes the initiative to clarify that it is not in a position to determine
as to who should remain as the sole representative of Congress in the JBC. This is a
matter beyond the province of the Court and is best left to the determination of Congress.
Finally, while the Court nds wisdom in respondents' contention that both the Senate and
the House of Representatives should be equally represented in the JBC, the Court is not in
a position to stamp its imprimatur on such a construction at the risk of expanding the
meaning of the Constitution as currently worded. Needless to state, the remedy lies in the
amendment of this constitutional provision. The courts merely give effect to the lawgiver's
intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not
include the power to correct, by reading into the law what is not written therein.
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL . The Judicial and Bar Council
is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as
a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution. HIcTDE

This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED .
Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Carpio, * J., took no part. I am a nominee to the CJ position.
Velasco, Jr., * J., took no part. I am being considered for nomination by the JBC.
Leonardo-de Castro, * J., took no part. I am one of the incumbent Justices being
considered by the JBC for nomination to CJ position.
Brion, ** J., took no part.
Del Castillo, J., I join the dissent of J. Abad.
Abad, J., see my dissenting opinion.
Sereno, L* J., took no part — a nominee for CJ.

Separate Opinions
ABAD , J., dissenting :

Some of my colleagues who have been nominated to the position of Chief Justice like me
have inhibited themselves from this case at the outset. I respect their judgments. I, on the
other hand, chose not to inhibit myself from the case since I have found no compelling
reason for doing so. CTaIHE

I take no issue with the majority of the Court on the threshold question of whether or not
the requisite conditions for the exercise of its power of judicial review have been met in
this case. I am satisfied that those conditions are present.
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 It is the main question that concerns me: whether or not each of the Senate and the House
of Representatives is entitled to one representative in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC),
both with the right to vote independently like its other members.
The problem has arisen because currently one representative each from the Senate and
the House of Representatives take part as members of the JBC with each casting one vote
in its deliberations. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez challenges this arrangement, however,
citing Section 8 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which literally gives Congress
just one representative in the JBC. Thus:
"Article VIII, Section 8.(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex o cio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as
ex o cio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector." 1
(Emphasis ours)

The majority heavily relies on the wordings of Section 8 (1) above. According to them, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution used plain, unambiguous, and certain terms in crafting
that section and, therefore, it calls for no further interpretation. The provision uses the
inde nite article "a" signifying "one" before the word "representative" which in itself is in
singular form. Consequently, says the majority, Congress should have but just one
representative in the JBC. Section 8 (1) uses the term "Congress" in its generic sense,
without any special and speci c mention of the two houses that compose it, namely the
Senate and the House of Representatives. DcHSEa

The majority also invokes the doctrine of noscitur a sociis which states that a proper
interpretation may be had by considering the words that accompany the term or phrase in
question. 2 By looking at the enumeration in Section 8 (1) of who the JBC members are,
one can readily discern that every category of membership in that body refers just to a
single individual.
There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction: first, verba legis, that
is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed; second, where there is ambiguity,
ratio legis est anima, meaning that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers; and third, ut magis valeat quam pereat, meaning
that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. 3
There is no question that when the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) deliberated on
the provisions regarding the composition of the JBC, the members of the commission
thought, as the original draft of those provisions indicates, that the country would have a
unicameral legislative body, like a parliament. For this reason, they allocated the three "ex
o cio" membership in the council to the Chief Justice, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative from the National Assembly, evidently to give representation in the JBC to
the three great branches of government.
Subsequently, however, the ConCom decided, after a very close vote of 23 against 22, to
adopt a bicameral legislative body, with a Senate and a House of Representatives.
Unfortunately, as Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the ConCom, admits, the committee
charged with making adjustments in the previously passed provisions covering the JBC,
failed to consider the impact of the changed character of the legislature on the inclusion of
"a representative of the Congress" in the membership of the JBC. 4
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 Still, it is a basic principle in statutory construction that the law must be given a reasonable
interpretation at all times. 5 The Court may, in some instances, consider the spirit and
reason of a statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, or
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers. 6 Applying a verba legis or
strictly literal interpretation of the constitution may render its provisions meaningless and
lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation, or an injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort
should be made to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter. 7
IHaSED

To insist that only one member of Congress from either the Senate or the House of
Representatives should sit at any time in the JBC, is to ignore the fact that while these two
houses of Congress are involved in the common task of making laws, they are separate
and distinct. 8 Senators are elected by the people at large, while the Members of the House
of Representatives, by their respective districts or sectors. They have detached
administrative organizations and deliberate on laws separately, indeed, often coming up
with dissimilar drafts of those laws. Clearly, neither the Senate nor the House of
Representatives can by itself claim to represent the Congress. Those who drafted Section
8 (1) did not intend to limit the term "Congress" to just either of the two Houses.
Notably, the doctrine that a proper interpretation may be had by considering the words
that accompany the term or phrase in question should apply to this case. While it is true
that Section 8 (1) provides for just "a representative of the Congress," it also provides that
such representation is "ex o cio." "Ex o cio" is a Latin term, meaning "by virtue of one's
o ce, or position." 9 This is not too different from the idea that a man, by virtue of being a
husband to his wife, is also a father to their children. So in Section 8 (1), whoever occupies
the designated o ce or position becomes an "ex o cio" JBC member. For instance, if the
President appoints Mr. X as Chief Justice, Mr. X automatically becomes the chairman of
the JBC, an attached function, by virtue of his being the Chief Justice. He replaces the
former Chief Justice without need for another appointment or the taking of a separate
oath of o ce. In the same way, if the President appoints Mr. Y as Secretary of Justice, Mr.
Y also automatically becomes a member of the JBC, also an attached function, by virtue of
his being the Secretary of Justice.
Now, under the rules of the Senate, the Chairman of its Justice Committee is automatically
the Senate representative to the JBC. In the same way, under the rules of the House of
Representatives, the Chairman of its Justice Committee is the House representative to the
JBC. Thus, there are two persons in Congress, not just one, who hold separate o ces or
positions with the attached function of sitting in the JBC. Section 8 (1) cannot be literally
applied simply because there is no o ce, serving both the Senate and the House of
Representatives, with the attached function of sitting as member in the JBC.
Inevitably, if the Court were to stick to the literal reading of Section 8 (1), which restricts
JBC representation to just one person holding o ce in Congress and working under both
houses, no one will qualify as "ex o cio" member of JBC. No such individual exists.
Congress would consequently be denied the representation that those who drafted the
Constitution intended it to have.
Allowing a Senator and a Congressman to sit alternately at any one time cannot be a
solution since each of them would actually be representing only his half of Congress when
he takes part in JBC deliberations. Allowing both, on the other hand, to sit in those
deliberations at the same time with half a vote each is absurd since that would diminish
their standing and make them second class members of JBC, something that the
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 Constitution clearly does not contemplate. It is presumed when drafting laws that the
legislature does not intend to produce undesirable consequences. Thus, when a literal
translation would result to such consequences, the same is to be utterly rejected. 1 0
Indeed, the JBC abandoned the half-a-vote practice on January 12, 2000 and recognized
the right of the Senator and the Congressman attending their deliberations to cast one
vote each. Only by recognizing this right can the true spirit and intent of Section 8 (1) be
attained. aDHCEA

With respect to the seven-man membership of the JBC, the majority assumes that by
providing for an odd-numbered composition those who drafted the Constitution sought to
prevent the possibility of a stalemate in voting and that, consequently, an eight-man
membership is out of the question. But a tie vote does not pose a problem. The JBC's
main function is to choose at least three nominees for each judicial position from which
the President will select the one he would want to appoint. Any tie in the voting is
immaterial since this is not a yes or no proposition. Very often, those in the shortlist
submitted to the President get even votes. On the other hand, when a yes or no proposition
is voted upon and there is a tie, it merely means that the proposition is lost for failure to
get the plurality of votes.
The majority points out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution created the JBC as a
response to a public clamor for removing partisan politics from the selection process for
judges and justices of the courts. It thus results that the private sector and the three
branches of government have been given active roles and equal voices in their selection.
The majority contends that, if it were to allow two representatives from the Congress in
the JBC, the balance of power within that body will tilt in favor of Congress.
But, it is not partisan politics per se that Section 8 (1) intends to remove from the
appointment process in the judiciary, but partisan domination of the same. Indeed,
politicians have distinct roles in that process. For instance, it is the President, a politician,
who appoints the six regular members of the JBC. And these appointees have to be
con rmed by the Commission on Appointment, composed of politicians. What is more,
although it is the JBC that screens candidates for positions in the judiciary, it is the
President who eventually appoints them.
Further, if the idea was to absolutely eliminate politics from the JBC selection process, the
framers of the Constitution could simply have barred all politicians from it. But the
Constitution as enacted allows the Secretary of Justice, an alter-ego of the President, as
well as representatives from the Congress to sit as members of JBC. Evidently, the
Constitution wants certain representatives of the people to have a hand in the selection of
the members of the judiciary.
The majority also holds the view that allowing two members of the Congress to sit in the
JBC would undermine the Constitution's intent to maintain the balance of power in that
body and give the legislature greater and unwarranted in uence in the appointment of
members of the Judiciary. But this fear is unwarranted. The lawmakers hold only two
positions in that eight-man body. This will not give them greater power than the other six
members have. Besides, historically, the representatives from the Senate and the lower
house have frequently disagreed in their votes. Their outlooks differ. TaDCEc

Actually, if the Court would go by numbers, it is the President who appoints six of the
members of the JBC (the Chief Justice, the Secretary of Justice, and the four regular
members), thus establishing an edge in favor of presidential appointees. Placing one
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 representative each from the Senate and the House of Representatives rather than just one
congressional representative somewhat blunts that edge. As the OSG correctly points out,
the current practice contributes two elective o cials in the JBC whose membership is
totally independent from the Office of the President.
Lastly, the presence of an elected Senator and an elected member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC is more consistent with the republican nature of our
government where all government authority emanates from the people and is exercised by
representatives chosen by them.
For the above reasons, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Footnotes

*No Part — Inhibited for being a JBC applicant.

**On leave. Also no part — Inhibited for being a JBC applicant.

1.Article 80 Title X of the Malolos Constitution provides: "The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court and the Solicitor-General shall be chosen by the National Assembly in concurrence
with the President of the Republic and the Secretaries of the Government, and shall be
absolutely independent of the Legislative and Executive Powers."

2.Section 5 Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution provides: "The Members of the Supreme Court
and all judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments."
3.1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, 437.

4.Section 4 Article X of the 1973 Constitution provides: "The Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President."
5.1 Records, Constitutional Commission, Proceedings and Debates, p. 487.

6.List of JBC Chairpersons, Ex-Officio and Regular Members, Ex Officio Secretaries and
Consultants, issued by the Office of the Executive Officer, Judicial and Bar Council, rollo,
pp. 62-63.
7.Id.

8.Comment of the JBC, p. 80, citing Minutes of the 1st En Banc Executive Meeting, January 12,
2000 and Minutes of the 12th En Banc Meeting, May 30, 2001.
9.Rollo, pp. 3-69.

10.Id. at 17-18.

11.Id. at 76-106.
12.Id. at 80.

13.Id. at 117-163.
14.Id. at 142.

15."The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
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 of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum."

16.Id.
17.Rollo, p. 143.

18.Id. at 148.
19.Id.

20.Id.

21.Id. at 150-153.
22.Id. at 78.

23.Id. at 131.

24.Id. at 131-133.
25.Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof,
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
xxx xxx xxx

26.1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts.

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the
judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
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 substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law.

27.Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 522 Phil. 1, 27 (2006).

28.522 Phil. 705 (2006).

29.LAMP v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012.
30.Rollo, p. 6.

31.Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 899 (2003), citing Kilosbayan v.
Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 155-157.
32.National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 250 (2005);
Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., 437 Phil. 289 (2002).
33.Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra note 31 at 885, citing J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
34.Id.

35.Id.

36.Id.
37.Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (CCBPI), Naga Plant v. Gomez, G.R. No. 154491, November 14,
2008, 571 SCRA 18, 37; People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA
115, 139; and Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 255 Phil. 71 (1989), citing Co Kim Chan v.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil. 371 (1945).
38.People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 115, 139; Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 255 Phil. 71 (1989), citing Co Kim Chan v. Valdez, 75 Phil. 371 (1945).
39.Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 154, 180 (2001).
40.Memorandum of Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, dated March 14, 2007; rollo,
pp. 95-103.

41.Id. at 103.

42.Ursua v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 157, 163 (1996).

43.1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, p. 445.

44.1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, pp. 486-487.
45.Comment of Respondents, rollo, pp. 142-146.

46.Comment of JBC; id. at 91-93.

47.1987 Constitution, Article 6 Section 27 (1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before
it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
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 House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House
shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any
bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

48.1987 Constitution, Article 6 Section 24 — All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.

49.1987 Constitution, Article 6 Section 23 (1) — The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to
declare the existence of a state of war.
50.1987 Constitution, Article 7 Section 4 — The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after
the day of the election, open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case
two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.

51.1987 Constitution, Article 11 Section 3 (1) — The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

xxx xxx xxx

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President
of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but
shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.

52.1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates Records of the
Constitutional Convention, p. 487.
53.Comment of the JBC, rollo, p. 104.

54.Memorandum of Justice Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera, Comment of the JBC, id. at 105-
106.
55.Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935,
December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 137-138, citing Cruz, Philippine Political law, 2002 ed.
p. 12.

56.Claudio S. Yap v. Thennamaris Ship's Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc.,
G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369, 380.

57.G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485, 516-517.

ABAD, J., dissenting:

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 1.The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

2.Government Service Insurance System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 162372, October 19,
2011.
3.Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.

4.http://opinion.inquirer.net/31813/jbc-odds-and-ends (last accessed 18 July 2012).

5.Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110524, July 29, 2002.
6.People v. Manantan, G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962, citing Crawford, Interpretation of Laws,
Sec. 78, p. 294.

7.Navarro v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010, dissenting opinion of J.
Perez.
8.Supra note 1, Article VI, Section 1.

9.Webster's New World College Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 477.

10.Supra note 5.

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