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CASES REPORTED

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

____________________
 

G.R. No. 231658. July 4, 2017.*

 
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO
S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A.
BILLONES, and TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR.,
petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
Executive Secretary; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA,
Secretary of the Department of National Defense and
Martial Law Administrator; and GEN. EDUARDO AÑO,

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Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and

Martial Law Implementor, respondents.

_______________

*  EN BANC.

 
 
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G.R. No. 231771. July 4, 2017.*

 
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T.
LINCUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A.
COBRADO, CARL ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM
BALANGHIG, RENATO REYES, JR., CRISTINA E.
PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT
TEACHERS’ REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO,
GABRIELA WOMEN’S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE
ARLENE D. BROSAS, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, MAE
PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA
ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D. LIM, VENCER
MARI CRISOSTOMO, and JOVITA MONTES, petitioners,
vs. PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL
EDUARDO AÑO, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA,
respondents.
 
G.R. No. 231774. July 4, 2017.*
 
NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S.
MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI, and ZAHRIA P. MUTI-
MAPANDI, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY (OFFICER-
IN-CHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF GEN.
EDUARDO M. AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M. DELA

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ROSA, and NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., respondents.

Judicial Review; Locus Standi; One of the requisites for

judicial review is locus standi, i.e., “the constitutional question is
brought before (the Supreme Court [SC]) by a party having the
requisite ‘standing’ to challenge it.”—One of the requisites for
judicial review is locus standi, i.e., “the constitutional question is
brought before [the Court] by a party having the requisite
‘standing’ to challenge it.” As a general rule, the challenger must
have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.” Over the years, there has been a trend towards

 
 
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relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example of

which is found in Section 18 of Article VII which provides that
any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. “[T]he
only requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the
suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He need not even be
a taxpayer.”
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is settled that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or by the law.—It is settled that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law.
Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the
Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has
the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for
resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear
legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from the
language of the Constitution or a statute. It must appear clearly
from the law or it will not be held to exist. A plain reading of the
aforequoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically
grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The standard of
review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions.—It
could not have been the intention of the framers of the

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Constitution that the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding”

would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or
Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for
certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper
tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that under
Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of
emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the
standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same
would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article
VII.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Lansang Doctrine;
Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; By inserting Section 18 in
Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect
constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.—To
recall, the Court held in the 1952 case of Montenegro v.
Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882, that the authority to decide whether
there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the President
and his decision thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts.
This ruling was reversed in the 1971

 
 
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case of Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, where it was held

that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a
political question and is within the ambit of judicial review.
However, in 1983, or after the declaration of martial law by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in Garcia-
Padilla v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472, abandoned the ruling in
Lansang and reverted to Montenegro. According to the Supreme
Court, the constitutional power of the President to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to judicial
inquiry. Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows
judicial review of the declaration of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987
Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the
Lansang doctrine.

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Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Section 18,

Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against
possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his power to
declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.—Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional
safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise
of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos
martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to
insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII. This is
clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its
members were deliberating on whether the President could
proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress.
Same; Judicial Review; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus;
The framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the
President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial
review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen
to question before the Supreme Court (SC) the sufficiency of the
factual basis of such proclamation or suspension.—To give more
teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987
Constitution not only placed the President’s proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule
on standing by allowing any citizen to question before this Court
the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or
suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a demandable right to
challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation
or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing
tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency
of the factual basis and to render its decision thereon within a
limited period of 30 days from date of filing.
Same; Presidency; The most important objective of Section 18,
Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief.—The

 
 
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most important objective of Section 18, Article VII is the

curtailment of the extent of the powers of the Commander-
in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not
placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained
under Article VII or the Executive Department.

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Same; Same; Judicial Review; The phrase “in an appropriate

proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose
of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of
the Chief Executive’s emergency powers.—A proceeding “[i]n its
general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be
brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of
conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing
judgments, and of executing.” In fine, the phrase “in an
appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen
for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as in
these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or
a matter to be resolved by the Court.
Same; Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Veto
Powers; The President’s extraordinary powers of suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law
are subject to the veto powers of the Supreme Court (SC) and
Congress.—The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated
the scope of the extraordinary powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential
action. In particular, the President’s extraordinary powers of
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court
and Congress.
Same; Same; Calling Out Power; The President may resort to
this extraordinary power (calling out power) whenever it becomes
necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion; the actual use to which the President puts the armed
forces is not subject to judicial review.—Among the three
extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign
and involves ordinary police action. The President may resort to
this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. “[T]he
power to call is fully discretionary to the President”; the only
limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional
boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of
discretion. In fact, “the actual use to which the President puts the
armed forces is x x x not subject to judicial review.”
Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; The
extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only
when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety
requires it.—The extraordinary powers of suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law
may be exercised only when

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there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety

requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in
the exercise of these powers: “(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2)
review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and
possible nullification by the Supreme Court.” The framers of the
1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase
“imminent danger thereof” as grounds for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial
law. They perceived the phrase “imminent danger” to be “fraught
with possibilities of abuse”; besides, the calling out power of the
President “is sufficient for handling imminent danger.”
Same; Same; The declaration of martial law serves as a
warning to citizens that the Executive Department has called upon
the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and
while the emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of
arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it
more difficult to restore order and enforce the law.—The powers to
declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights
and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law
serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department
has called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law
and order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must,
under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that
will render it more difficult to restore order and enforce the law.
As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the
Congress, and review by the Court.
Same; Same; A state of martial law is peculiar because the
President, at such a time, exercises police power, which is normally
a function of the Legislature.—A state of martial law is peculiar
because the President, at such a time, exercises police power,
which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the
President exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to
ensure public safety and in place of government agencies which
for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a
locality, which remains under the control of the State. In David v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), the Court,
quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s (Justice Mendoza’s)
Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13,
2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the
President as Commander-in-Chief may order the “(a) arrests and
seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies;

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(c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship;

and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x  x  x.” Worthy to note,
however, that the above cited acts that the President may perform
do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of
civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does it
supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies.
Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place
during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is also

 
 
7

suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially

charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most
severe threat to civil liberties, the Constitution has safeguards
against the President’s prerogative to declare a state of martial
law.
Same; Same; Even the recommendation of, or consultation
with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking
military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare
martial law.—Even the recommendation of, or consultation with,
the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking military
officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial
law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
shows that the President’s power to declare martial law is not
subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual
invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it
would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the
President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere
alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that
the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.
Statutes; Void for Vagueness Doctrine; The void-for-vagueness
doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if “men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application.”—The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a
law is facially invalid if “men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”
“[A] statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In
such instance, the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
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especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to

avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.”
Same; Same; The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool
developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases
or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases.—
The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing
“on their faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called
in American law, First Amendment cases. A facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is
overbroad because of possible “‘chilling effect’ on protected speech
that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does
not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an
overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from
speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The
overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.” It is best to
stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only
to free speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes.

 
 
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Same; Presidency; Calling Out Power; The President may

exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a
prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this
case.—The President may exercise the power to call out the
Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law,
although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future
exercise of the latter powers, as in this case. Even so, the Court’s
review of the President’s declaration of martial law and his calling
out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings
instituted for that particular purpose. As explained in Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000), the
President’s exercise of his power to call out the Armed Forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion may
only be examined by the Court as to whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Political Law; Operative Fact Doctrine; Under the “operative
fact doctrine,” the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an
“operative fact” before it is declared unconstitutional.—Neither
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would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the

nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant thereto.
Under the “operative fact doctrine,” the unconstitutional statute
is recognized as an “operative fact” before it is declared
unconstitutional.
Same; Doctrine of Contemporaneous Construction; Under the
doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987
Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at
the time they were drafting the Constitution.—Under the doctrine
of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987
Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence
at the time they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase
“sufficiency of factual basis” in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial
review of the President’s power to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to
satisfy itself that the President’s decision is correct, rather it only
needs to determine whether the President’s decision had
sufficient factual bases.
Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; As Commander-
in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial
law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of the Supreme
Court (SC).—As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole
discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress
and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is
a judgment call of the President,

 
 

the determination of this Court as to whether there is

sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only
on facts or information known by or available to the President at
the time he made the declaration or suspension, which facts or
information are found in the proclamation as well as the written
Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the
situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past
events. As to how far the past events should be from the present
depends on the President. Past events may be considered as
justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as
these are connected or related to the current situation existing at
the time of the declaration.

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Same; Same; Same; In determining the sufficiency of the

factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the
Supreme Court (SC) should look into the full complement or
totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually.—In
determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration
and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full
complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness
of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report
as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and
veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the
situation. To require precision in the President’s appreciation of
facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process
of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically
necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the
correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that
only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a
scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but
would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency
powers upon him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice Antonio
T. Carpio in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 668 SCRA 504 (2012),
to “immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency.”
Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the
correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late in
the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated
to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.
Same; Same; Same; Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of
the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not
enough reasons for the Supreme Court (SC) to invalidate the
declaration and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in
the proclamation and the written Report that support the
conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that
public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.—The
Court’s review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the
information at hand during the declaration or suspension;
subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court’s
review is concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover such a
situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60 days;
Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the
proclamation is made; and, this Court may investigate the factual

 
 
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background of the declaration. Hence, the maxim falsus in

uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. Falsities
of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the
proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for
the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long
as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written
Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual
invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the
declaration and/or suspension.
Same; Same; Same; Section 18, Article VII itself sets the
parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for
the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, “namely (1) actual invasion
or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such
power.”—Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for
determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration
of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, “namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2)
public safety requires the exercise of such power.” Without the
concurrence of the two conditions, the President’s declaration of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must be struck down.
Same; Same; Same; Rebellion; Since the Constitution did not
define the term “rebellion,” it must be understood to have the same
meaning as the crime of “rebellion” in the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).—As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a
technical or legal meaning, is construed to have the same
technical or legal meaning. Since the Constitution did not define
the term “rebellion,” it must be understood to have the same
meaning as the crime of “rebellion” in the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). x  x  x Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution
could only refer to rebellion as defined under Article 134 of the
RPC. To give it a different definition would not only create
confusion but would also give the President wide latitude of
discretion, which may be abused — a situation that the
Constitution seeks to prevent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements of.—For rebellion to
exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: “(1) there is
a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government;
and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to
remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the
territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of
land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief
Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The parameters for determining
the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual rebellion or
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invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two (2) requirements
must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.—In

 
 
11

determining the existence of rebellion, the President only

needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence
showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is
being committed. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of
proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Along
this line, Justice Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo, 668 SCRA 504 (2012), concluded that the
President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of
proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion
for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is
the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard
by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or
nonexistence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial
law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other
standards of proof, which, in order to be met, would require much
from the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of
emergency powers, the requirement of probable cause is much
simpler. It merely necessitates an “average man [to weigh] the
facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the
rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He
[merely] relies on common sense [and] x x x needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed x x x by the accused.” To summarize, the parameters
for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1)
actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first
two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for
the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
Same; Same; Same; The purpose of judicial review is not the
determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the
President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the
sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that
there is probable cause that rebellion exists.—It bears to
emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the
determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the
President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the
sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that
there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be
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reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and much

leeway and flexibility should be accorded the President. As such,
he is not expected to completely validate all the information he
received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
Same; Same; Same; The President’s conclusion, that there was
an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the
removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a
portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President from
performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a
tactical consideration of the facts.—A review of the aforesaid facts
similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in
issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending
to show that actual rebellion exists. The

 
 
12

President’s conclusion, that there was an armed public

uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the
allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory
and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers
and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the
facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of
proof.
Same; Judicial Review; The Supreme Court (SC) is not
concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the
facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the President
in responding to an urgent situation.—The allegation in the
Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216
and the Report are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic,
does not persuade. As mentioned, the Court is not concerned
about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts
because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the President in
responding to an urgent situation. x  x  x However, the so-called
counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news
articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources
shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. It was not even
shown that efforts were made to secure such affirmation albeit
the circumstances proved futile. As the Court has consistently
ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are
thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose
other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. This
pronouncement applies with equal force to the Cullamat Petition
which likewise submitted online news articles as basis for their
claim of insufficiency of factual basis.
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Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Doctrine of

Independent Relevant Statement; The Supreme Court (SC) in
Bedol v. Commission on Elections, 606 SCRA 554 (2009), made it
clear that the doctrine of independent relevant statement, which is
an exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases “where only the
fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or
falsity thereof is immaterial.”—Petitioners, however, insist that in
Bedol v. Commission on Elections, 606 SCRA 554 (2009), news
reports may be admitted on grounds of relevance,
trustworthiness, and necessity. Petitioners’ reliance on this case
is misplaced. The Court in Bedol made it clear that the doctrine of
independent relevant statement, which is an exception to the
hearsay rule, applies in cases “where only the fact that such
statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof
is immaterial.” Here, the question is not whether such statements
were made by Saber, et al., but rather whether what they said are
true. Thus, contrary to the view of petitioners, the exception in
Bedol finds no application here.
Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; For a declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion
or invasion and the public safety requirement.—

 
 

13

Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling

out power but definitely not the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of
actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In
his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence
perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not
only against government forces or establishments but likewise
against civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation
to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued; road blockades
and checkpoints were set up; schools and churches were burned;
civilian hostages were taken and killed; non-Muslims or
Christians were targeted; young male Muslims were forced to join
their group; medical services and delivery of basic services were
hampered; reinforcements of government troops and civilian
movement were hindered; and the security of the entire Mindanao
Island was compromised.

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Same; Same; Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual

basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and
that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.—These
particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities
had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus
impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. In the last paragraph of his Report, the
President declared: While the government is presently conducting
legitimate operations to address the ongoing rebellion, if not the
seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued
implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such
time that the rebellion is completely quelled. Based on the
foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation
No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to
believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the
martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Same; Same; Martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus are necessary for the protection of the
security of the nation; suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is “precautionary, and although it might [curtail]
certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the purpose of defending
and protecting the security of the state or the entire country and
our sovereign people.”—Considering the nation’s and its people’s
traumatic experience of martial law under the Marcos regime, one
would expect the framers of the 1987 Constitution to stop at
nothing from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would appear that
the constitutional writers entertained no doubt about the
necessity and practicality of such specie of extraordinary power
and thus, once again, bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief the
power to declare martial law albeit in its diluted form. Indeed,
martial law and the suspension of the privilege

 
 
14

of the writ of habeas corpus are necessary for the protection of

the security of the nation; suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is “precautionary, and although it might [curtail]
certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the purpose of defending
and protecting the security of the state or the entire country and
our sovereign people.” Commissioner Ople referred to the
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suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as a “form

of immobilization” or “as a means of immobilizing potential
internal enemies” “especially in areas like Mindanao.” Aside from
protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees
and promotes public safety. It is worthy of mention that rebellion
alone does not justify the declaration of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the public safety
requirement must likewise be present.
Same; Same; The determination by the Supreme Court (SC) of
the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts
and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.—The
Court does not have the same resources available to the
President. However, this should not be considered as a
constitutional lapse. On the contrary, this is in line with the
function of the Court, particularly in this instance, to determine
the sufficiency of factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. As
thoroughly discussed in Part VIII, the determination by the Court
of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts
and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. In
fact, the Court, in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 489
SCRA 160 (2006), cautioned not to “undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.” In this regard, “the Court
will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the [E]xecutive
[D]epartment”; in turn, the Executive Department will have to
open its findings to the Court, which it did during the closed door
session last June 15, 2017.
Same; Same; Presidency; The Constitution grants to the
President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.—Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states
that “[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law.” Clearly, the Constitution grants to the
President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part
thereof under martial law.
Same; Same; Not only where the grounds limited to actual
invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at sixty
(60) days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the
same time, it is subject to the veto powers of the Supreme Court
(SC) and Congress.—Considering the country’s history, it is
understandable that the resurgence of martial law would
engender apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the Court as
an institution cannot project a

 
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15

stance of nonchalance. However, the importance of martial

law in the context of our society should outweigh one’s prejudices
and apprehensions against it. The significance of martial law
should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past
experience. After all, martial law is critical and crucial to the
promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation’s
sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our country. It is vital
for the protection of the country not only against internal enemies
but also against those enemies lurking from beyond our shores.
As such, martial law should not be cast aside, or its scope and
potency limited and diluted, based on bias and unsubstantiated
assumptions. Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the
Constitution placed several safeguards which effectively watered
down the power to declare martial law. The 1987 Constitution
“[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of
[the] experience with the previous regime.” Not only were the
grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration
was likewise fixed at 60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or
extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto powers of the
Court and Congress.
Same; Same; Public Safety; Public safety, which is another
component element for the declaration of martial law, “involves the
prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the
safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm,
or damage, such as crimes or disasters.”—Public safety, which is
another component element for the declaration of martial law,
“involves the prevention of and protection from events that could
endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger,
injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters.” Public
safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical form.
Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically
measured by metes and bounds.
Same; Same; Another reason why the territorial scope of
martial law should not necessarily be limited to the particular
vicinity where the armed public uprising actually transpired, is
because of the unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime.—
Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law
should not necessarily be limited to the particular vicinity where
the armed public uprising actually transpired, is because of the
unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime. “The crime of
rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and
a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in
furtherance of rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] are

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deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion.” Rebellion

absorbs “other acts committed in its pursuance.” Direct assault,
murder, homicide, arson, robbery, and kidnapping, just to name a
few, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in
furtherance of rebellion; “[i]t cannot be made a basis of a separate
charge.” Jurisprudence also teaches that not only common crimes
may be absorbed in rebellion but also “offenses under special laws
[such as Presidential Decree No. 1829] which are perpetrated in
furtherance of the political offense.” “All crimes,

 
 
16

whether punishable under a special law or general law, which

are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance
thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be
isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.”
Same; Same; Presidency; The President’s duty to maintain
peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there
is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present
hostilities are in danger of spilling over.—The President’s duty to
maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place
where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where
the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not
intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from
Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut
their supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus,
limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where
there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of
declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective
and useless.
Same; Same; Same; As a crime without predetermined
bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe that the
declaration of martial law, as well as the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is
most necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.—
There were also intelligence reports from the military about
offensives committed by the ASG and other local rebel groups. All
these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi has already spilled
over to other parts of Mindanao. Moreover, considering the
widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established
among rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged
in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The
Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that
happened during the Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano
massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the countless bombings
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in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others.

The Court cannot simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation.
As a crime without predetermined bounds, the President has
reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law, as
well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called
for by the circumstances.
Same; Same; Terrorism; Human Security Act of 2007; As long
as the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18,
Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from
exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial law or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.—In any
case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also
be characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner
affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No.
9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007
expressly provides that “[n]othing in this Act shall be

 
 
17

interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of

constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the
government.” Thus, as long as the President complies with all the
requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism
cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of
proclaiming martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. After all, the extraordinary powers of the
President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act of
Congress can, therefore, curtail or diminish such powers. Besides,
there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states
that rebellion and terrorism are mutuality exclusive of each other
or that they cannot coexist together. RA 9372 does not expressly
or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one
of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other
as they have different elements.

Sereno, CJ., Dissenting Opinion:

Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that the President

was unable to lay down sufficient factual basis to declare martial
law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
entire islands group of Mindanao in Proclamation No. 216.—The
President was unable to lay down sufficient factual basis to
declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire islands group of Mindanao in

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Proclamation No. 216. Neither was he able to accomplish that in

his Report to Congress dated 25 May 2017. At most, he was able
to establish the existence of actual rebellion, and the danger to
public safety, in Marawi City. Thus, the position taken by Justice
Antonio T. Carpio that martial law is valid only in Marawi City is
correct, considering that respondents, who bear the burden of
proving the existence of sufficient facts to justify the declaration
of martial law, were unable to do so. However, I took one unique
aspect of this case into consideration, and as a result, concluded
that it is valid not only in the city of Marawi, but in the entire
province of Lanao del Sur of which Marawi is a part, and in the
provinces of Maguindanao and Sulu as well.
Same; Same; View that contrary to the sentiment of the
ponencia, it is not fear and bias that animates magistrates of the
Supreme Court (SC) when they seek to faithfully apply the words
of the Constitution in the review of Proclamation No. 216; rather,
it is the need to zealously protect the institutions of law and
governance that have been very carefully designed by the
Constitution.—The danger of misusing martial law is related to
the need to protect the military from returning to its misshapen
role during Marcos’ Martial Law. Contrary to the sentiment of the
ponencia, it is not fear and bias that animates magistrates of this
Court when they seek to faithfully apply the words of the
Constitution in the review of Proclamation No. 216; rather, it is
the need to zealously protect the institutions of law and
governance that have been very carefully designed by the

 
 
18

Constitution. Of course, the Court is unanimous that all

safeguards of constitutional rights must be kept in place as well.
Same; Same; View that ordinary military blockades and other
modes of interdiction are sufficient to address spillover and supply
corridor situations as impressed upon us during the closed door
session.—I have stretched the limits of the allowable coverage of
Proclamation No. 216 to areas which are the nesting grounds of
human, financial, and logistical support to the Maute fighters
that launched the actual rebellion in Marawi, and where actual
acts of rebellion, even if not mentioned by Proclamation No. 216
and the President’s Report, are described with sufficient
specificity by the AFP Chief of Staff in his sworn statement. The
same does not hold true with respect to supply corridors, or
spillover arenas for as long as they remain only as potential, and
not actual, areas of combat amounting to rebellion. Ordinary
military blockades and other modes of interdiction are sufficient
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to address spillover and supply corridor situations as impressed

upon us during the closed door session.
Same; Same; View that the intensity of the rebellion, the areas
over which it is being waged are matters that the Supreme Court
(SC) must carefully examine.—While Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA
448 (1971), recognized that actual rebellion can be limited in
geographical area, it nevertheless upheld the nationwide
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus because
the evidence that the Court detailed in the Decision spoke of a
nationwide spread of acts of rebellion and anarchy. The only
conclusion from the Court’s pronouncements in Lansang is that
this Court is required not only to determine the existence of
actual rebellion, but also, the time for and the place over
which martial law can be declared. The intensity of the
rebellion, the areas over which it is being waged are matters that
the Court must carefully examine.
Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) cannot render
inutile the second sentence of Article VII, Section 18 by refusing to
review the presidential decision on the coverage of martial law vis-
à-vis the place where actual rebellion is taking place, and the
necessity to public safety of declaring martial law in such places.—
The phraseology of the Constitution is purposive and directed.
Martial law can only be declared: a) when there is actual invasion
or rebellion; b) when public safety requires it; and c) over the
entire Philippines or any part thereof. This Court cannot render
inutile the second sentence of Article VII, Section 18 by refusing
to review the presidential decision on the coverage of martial law
vis-à-vis the place where actual rebellion is taking place, and the
necessity to public safety of declaring martial law in such places.
The use of the phrase “when public safety requires it” can only
mean that the Court must ask whether the powers being invoked
is proportional to the state of the rebellion, and corresponds with
its place of occurrence.

 
 
19

Same; Same; Terrorism; Human Security Act of 2007; View

that while terrorism does not always amount to a rebellion, acts of
terrorism may be committed in furtherance of a rebellion.—
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9372 (Human Security Act) defines
terrorism as any punishable act that sows or creates a condition
of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand. Among the punishable acts enumerated in the
definition of terrorism are those that may also fall under
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rebellion. It would thus appear that the crime of terrorism covers

an even larger universe of crimes. Apparently, while terrorism
does not always amount to a rebellion, acts of terrorism may be
committed in furtherance of a rebellion. Significantly, the Court
in Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971), had the luxury of
information on the ideology and methodologies utilized by the
rebels in pursuance of their beliefs. Thus, bombing incidents,
assassinations, attacks on the civilian population, violent
demonstrations, the paralyzation of basic utilities, and even the
establishment of front organizations were conclusively
acknowledged as acts done in furtherance of rebellion.
Same; Same; View that the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus appear to
have sufficient factual basis in the following three (3) provinces:
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and Sulu.—The declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus appear to have sufficient factual basis in the
following three provinces: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and Sulu.
Other than these provinces, the respondents have not alleged any
other incident reasonably related to the Maute attack in Marawi
City.
Same; Same; View that the validity of the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the three (3) provinces specified above does not
vest the President and his officials with unhampered discretion to
wield his powers in any way and whichever direction he desires.—
The validity of the declaration of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the three provinces
specified above does not vest the President and his officials with
unhampered discretion to wield his powers in any way and
whichever direction he desires. Their actions must meet legal
standards even in a martial law setting. These standards ensure
that Marcosian martial law does not happen again and the
foundations of a just and humane society envisioned by the
Constitution remain intact. At the very core, the bedrock of these
standards is the fourth paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution: A state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment
of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.

 
 
20

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Same; Same; View that it has been opined that the martial
law administrator has the authority to issue orders that have the
effect of law, but strictly only within the theater of war — an area
that is not necessarily the same as the entire territorial scope of the
martial law declaration.—The Constitution specifically provides
that a state of martial law does not supplant the functioning of
the legislative assemblies. Therefore, as reflected in the
deliberations of the framers, the President is not automatically
vested with plenary legislative powers. Ordinary legislation
continues to belong to the national and local legislative bodies
even during martial law. This necessarily connotes the continued
operation of all statutes, even during a state of martial rule. It
has been opined that the martial law administrator has the
authority to issue orders that have the effect of law, but strictly
only within the theater of war — an area that is not necessarily
the same as the entire territorial scope of the martial law
declaration. Should it happen that this opinion is upheld by this
Court, it must however be noted that this does not give the
administrator plenary legislative powers, since the orders issued
must still be in accordance with the Constitution, especially the
Bill of Rights. But outside the so-called theater of war, the
operative law is ordinary law.
Same; Same; Arrests; View that as in the conduct of searches,
the continued operation of the Constitution during martial law
necessarily connotes that the constitutional guarantee against
arbitrary arrests under the Bill of Rights remains in full effect.—
As in the conduct of searches, the continued operation of the
Constitution during martial law necessarily connotes that the
constitutional guarantee against arbitrary arrests under the Bill
of Rights remains in full effect. As a general rule, a warrant of
arrest is necessary before an arrest can be validly affected as
provided in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. However,
because rebellion, conspiracy, or proposal to commit rebellion and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof constitute
direct assaults against the State, they are in the nature of
continuing crimes. As such, arrests without warrant of persons
involved in rebellion are justified because they are essentially
committing an offense when arrested.
Same; Same; View that since the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended under Proclamation No. 216, Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution mandates that all persons
arrested or detained for rebellion or offenses directly connected
with invasion shall be judicially charged within three (3) days;
otherwise they shall be released.—The arrest of persons involved
in rebellion is thus synonymous with a valid warrantless arrest of
a person committing a crime in the presence of the arresting
officer. Since the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is

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suspended under Proclamation No. 216, Section 18, Article VII of

the Constitution mandates that all persons arrested or detained
for rebellion or offenses directly connected with invasion shall be
judicially charged within three days; otherwise they shall be
released.

 
 

21

Same; Same; Arrests; Terrorism; View that arrests of persons

charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism may be made without judicial
warrant only upon authority in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council (ATC).—Arrests of persons charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism may be made without judicial warrant only upon
authority in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council. Immediately
after taking custody, the arresting officers shall notify in writing
the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest.
The officer is allowed to detain the person for a period not
exceeding three days from the moment the latter has been taken
into custody. Within three days, the arresting officers shall
present the person suspected of the crime of terrorism before any
judge of the place where the arrest took place at any time of the
day or night. Judges shall ascertain the identity of the arresting
officers and the persons presented and inquire as to the reasons
for the arrest. They shall also determine by questioning and
personal observation whether or not the suspect has been
subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture. They
shall submit a written report within three calendar days to the
proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus
arrested.
Same; Same; Same; View that because the civil courts remain
open and fully functional during martial rule, warrants of arrest
can be issued only by a judge on the basis of probable cause.—
Because the civil courts remain open and fully functional during
martial rule, warrants of arrest can be issued only by a judge on
the basis of probable cause. The regular operation of the courts
necessarily maintains the applicability of the Rules of Court; thus,
the procedure under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court on the
issuance of an arrest order must be followed.
Same; Same; Same; View that once a valid arrest has been
affected, the procedure laid down in Section 3, Rule 113, shall be
followed — the person arrested shall be delivered to the nearest
police station or jail without unnecessary delay.—Once a valid
arrest has been affected, the procedure laid down in Section 3,
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Rule 113, shall be followed — the person arrested shall be

delivered to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary
delay. If it is a case of warrantless arrest under exception nos. 1
and 2 above, the arrested person shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 6 (formerly Section 7) of Rule 112, or
through inquest proceedings. If there is a warrant of arrest, it
must be executed within 10 days from its receipt, after which the
officer executing it shall make a report to the judge issuing the
warrant within 10 days after its expiration. In view of the regular
operation of the courts, the rules on arraignment and plea under
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court would have to be followed after the
arrested person has been judicially charged.
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; View that the
allowable periods of detention in cases of valid warrantless arrests
are based on the laws prescribing

 
 
22

the period of time within which the arrested person must be

judicially charged.—The allowable periods of detention in cases of
valid warrantless arrests are based on the laws prescribing the
period of time within which the arrested person must be judicially
charged. These laws apply even during martial law, in view of the
provision mandating the continued operation of the civil courts
and applicability of the Rules of Court. Detained persons ought to
be charged for acts and omissions punished by the Revised Penal
Code and other special penal laws. It must be remembered that
the theory that a person may be detained indefinitely without any
charges and that the courts cannot inquire into the legality of the
restraint not only goes against the spirit and letter of the
Constitution, but also does violence to the basic precepts of
human rights and a democratic society.
Same; Same; Same; View that since the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus has been suspended, Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution mandates that the arrested persons shall be judicially
charged within three (3) days from the arrest.—Since the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended, Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution mandates that that the arrested
persons shall be judicially charged within three days from the
arrest. Otherwise they shall be released.
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; View that in case the
warrantless arrest was made during an actual or imminent
terrorist attack, the arrested suspect may be detained for more
than three (3) days provided that arresting officer is able to secure

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the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial, or regional

official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the
Court of Appeals (CA) nearest the place of the arrest.—In case of a
valid warrantless detention under the Human Security Act, the
officer is allowed to detain the person arrested for terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism for a period not exceeding three
days from the moment the latter has been taken into custody by
the law enforcement personnel. In case the warrantless arrest
was made during an actual or imminent terrorist attack, the
arrested suspect may be detained for more than three days,
provided, that arresting officer is able to secure the written
approval of a municipal, city, provincial, or regional official of a
Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, Regional
Trial Court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of
Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest was made
during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or after office hours, the
arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the
arrested suspect to the residence of any of the officials mentioned
above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. It
is necessary, however, that the approval in writing of any of the
said officials be secured by the police or law enforcement
personnel concerned within five days after the date of the
detention of the persons concerned. The arrested individuals
whose connection with the terror attack or

 
 
23

threat is not established, shall be released immediately and

within three days after the detention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in case of a warrantless
arrest for a legal ground involving other crimes, the period of
detention allowed under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) shall
apply.—In case of a warrantless arrest for a legal ground
involving other crimes, the period of detention allowed under the
Revised Penal Code shall apply. The detained person must be
judicially charged within a. 12 hours for crimes or offenses
punishable with light penalties, or their equivalent; b. 18 hours
for crimes or offenses punishable with correctional penalties, or
their equivalent; c. 36 hours for crimes or offenses punishable
with afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent. Failure to
judicially charge within the prescribed period renders the public
officer effecting the arrest liable for the crime of delay in the
delivery of detained persons under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. Further, if the warrantless arrest was without any
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legal ground, the arresting officers become liable for arbitrary

detention under Article 124. However, if the arresting officers are
not among those whose official duty gives them the authority to
arrest, they become liable for illegal detention under Article 267
or 268. If the arrest is for the purpose of delivering the person
arrested to the proper authorities, but it is done without any
reasonable ground or any of the circumstances for a valid
warrantless arrest, the arresting persons become liable for
unlawful arrest under Article 269.
Same; Same; Same; Human Security Act of 2007; View that
the rights of a person arrested or detained must be respected at all
costs, even during martial law.—The rights of a person arrested
or detained must be respected at all costs, even during martial
law. The main source of these rights is Section 12, paragraphs 1
and 2, Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited. Section 19(2), Article III of the
Constitution further provides: The employment of physical,
psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. These
rights are further spelled out in R.A. 7438: 1. The right to be
assisted by counsel at all times; 2. The right to remain silent; 3.
The right to be informed of the above rights; 4. The right to be
visited by the immediate members of their family, by their
counsel, or by any nongovernmental organization, whether
national or international.

 
 
24

Same; Same; Same; View that the law provides that any
waiver by persons arrested or detained under the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by these persons in
the presence of their counsel.—The law provides that any waiver
by persons arrested or detained under the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation,
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shall be in writing and signed by these persons in the presence of

their counsel. Otherwise, the waiver shall be null and void and of
no effect.
Same; Same; Same; Human Security Act of 2007; View that
the rights of persons detained for the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism are addressed and specifically
provided for in the Human Security Act.—The rights of persons
detained for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism are addressed and specifically provided for in the
Human Security Act. These rights are the following: 1. The right
to be informed of the nature and cause of their arrest; 2. The right
to remain silent; 3. The right to have competent and independent
counsel; 4. The right to be informed of the cause or causes of their
detention in the presence of their legal counsel; 5. The right to
communicate freely with their legal counsel and to confer with
them at any time without restriction; 6. The right to communicate
freely and privately without restrictions with the members of
their family or with their nearest relatives and to be visited by
them; 7. The right to freely avail themselves of the service of a
physician or physicians of choice; and 8. The right to be informed
of the above rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; View that while the
Anti-Torture Act allows evidence obtained as a result of torture to
be used against the person or persons accused of committing
torture, the Human Security Act absolutely prohibits the
admissibility of that evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or
hearing.—The Human Security Act also protects those detained,
who are under investigation for the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, from any form of torture.
However, while the Anti-Torture Act allows evidence obtained as
a result of torture to be used against the person or persons
accused of committing torture, the Human Security Act absolutely
prohibits the admissibility of that evidence in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry,
proceeding, or hearing.
Searches and Seizures; View that the rule is that the
Constitution bars State intrusions upon a person’s body, personal
effects or residence, except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court; Nevertheless, the
interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute, as there are exceptions known as valid warrantless
searches.—The rule is that the Constitution bars State intrusions
upon a person’s body, personal ef-

 
 
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25

fects or residence, except if conducted by virtue of a valid

search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined
in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court.
Specifically, “no search warrant x x x shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched.” Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, in turn, lays down
the procedure for the issuance of a valid search warrant. It must
be emphasized that the requirement of probable cause before a
search warrant can be issued is mandatory and must be complied
with; a search warrant not based on probable cause is a nullity or
is void; and the issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation,
arbitrary. Further, any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Nevertheless, the
interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute, as there are exceptions known as valid warrantless
searches.
Constitutional Law; Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel; View
that the liberty of abode and of changing it may be impaired only
“upon lawful order of the court” as guided by the “limits prescribed
by law”; The impairment of the right to travel under the second
paragraph can be done even without court order.—The ability to
set up military blockades around the affected areas is related to
the people’s constitutionally protected freedom of movement,
specifically the liberty of abode and right to travel. The
limitations on this ability are found in Section 6, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides as follows: The liberty of abode and
of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall
the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law. Under the first paragraph, the liberty of abode and of
changing it may be impaired only “upon lawful order of the court”
as guided by the “limits prescribed by law.” The clear intent is to
proscribe “hamletting” or the herding of people into a militarily-
quarantined sanctuary within rebel areas as was done during the
Marcos regime. Therefore, the restrictive type of military blockade
is not countenanced by law.
Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel; Military Blockade; View
that an allowable and “less restrictive” version of a military
blockades is the setting up of police or military checkpoints, which
has been ruled by the Supreme Court (SC) as not illegal per se.—
Under the Human Security Act, the liberty of abode and right to
travel of a person charged with terrorism may be restricted as
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follows: Section 26. Restriction on Travel.—In cases where

evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged with the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to
bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the
prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within
the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is
pending, in the interest of national security and public safety,
consistent with Article III, Section 6 of

 
 
26

the Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality or city,

without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation
of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be
forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court. He/she may also be
placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual
place of residence. While under house arrest, he or she may not
use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the internet or
other means of communications with people outside the residence
until otherwise ordered by the court. The restrictions above
mentioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused
or of the dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the
discretion of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of the
accused. An allowable and “less restrictive” version of a military
blockades is the setting up of police or military checkpoints, which
has been ruled by this Court as not illegal per se. Checkpoints are
allowed for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of
public order and are conducted in a manner least intrusive to
motorists.
Searches and Seizures; View that subjecting a vehicle to an
extensive search, as opposed to a mere routine inspection, has been
held to be valid only for as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that they will find the instrumentality, or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.—Subjecting a
vehicle to an extensive search, as opposed to a mere routine
inspection, has been held to be valid only for as long as the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality, or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle
to be searched.
Criminal Law; Wiretapping; Anti-Wire Tapping Law; View
that under Republic Act (RA) No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law),
the tapping of any wire or cable; or the use of any other device or
arrangement to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
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communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known

as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder — or however described otherwise — shall be
allowed only upon a written order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for cases involving crimes enumerated therein.—Under R.A.
4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law), the tapping of any wire or cable;
or the use of any other device or arrangement to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder — or however
described otherwise — shall be allowed only upon a written order
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for cases involving the following
crimes: 1. Treason, 2. Espionage, 3. Provoking war and disloyalty
in case of war, 4. Piracy, 5. Mutiny in the high seas, 6. Rebellion,
7. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, 8. Inciting to
rebellion, 9. Sedition, 10. Conspiracy to commit sedition, 11.
Inciting to sedition, 12. Kidnapping as defined by the Revised
Penal Code, and 13. Violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,
which punishes espionage and other offenses against national
security.

 
 
27

Same; Same; Same; View that the recordings made under

court authorization shall be deposited with the court in a sealed
envelope or sealed package within forty-eight (48) hours after the
expiration of the period fixed in the order; the envelope or package
so deposited shall not be opened; or the recordings replayed or used
in evidence; or their contents revealed, except upon order of the
court.—The recordings made under court authorization shall be
deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package
within 48 hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the
order. The envelope must be accompanied by an affidavit of the
peace officer who was granted that authority, stating the number
of recordings made; the dates and times covered by each
recording; the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the
deposit and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or
any part thereof have been made or, if made, that all those
duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package
deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited
shall not be opened; or the recordings replayed or used in
evidence; or their contents revealed, except upon order of the
court. The court order shall not be made except upon motion, with
due notice and opportunity to be heard afforded to the person or

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persons whose conversations or communications have been

recorded.
Same; Same; Human Security Act of 2007; View that under
that law, the interception and recording of communications of
terrorists are allowed upon a written order of the Court of Appeals
(CA).—If the subjects of the surveillance are members of a
judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons, or is any person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism, the provisions of the Human Security Act shall apply.
Under that law, the interception and recording of communications
of terrorists are allowed upon a written order of the Court of
Appeals. Any organization, association, or group of persons may
be declared a terrorist and outlawed organization, association, or
group of persons by the RTC upon application of the Department
of Justice.
Same; Human Security Act of 2007; Bank Records; View that
under the Human Security Act (Republic Act [RA] No. 9372), only
upon a written order of the Court of Appeals (CA) may there be an
examination and gathering of any relevant information on the
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in a bank
or financial institution of a person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; or of a
judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons; or of a member of such judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of
persons.—Under the Human Security Act, only upon a written
order of the Court of Appeals may there be an examination and
gathering of any relevant information on the deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in a bank or
financial institution of a person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; or of a
judicially de-

 
 
28

clared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or

group of persons; or of a member of such judicially declared and
outlawed organization, association, or group of persons. The bank
or financial institution concerned cannot refuse to allow the
examination or to provide the desired information, when so
ordered by and served with the written order of the Court of
Appeals.

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Same; Terrorism; Freeze Orders; Terrorism Financing

Prevention and Suppression Act; View that Republic Act (RA) No.
10168 authorizes the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC),
either upon its own initiative or at the request of the Anti-
Terrorism Council (ATC), to issue an ex parte order to freeze,
without delay, (a) property or funds that are in any way related to
the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism; or (b) property or
funds of any person, group of persons, terrorist organization, or
association, in relation to which there is probable cause to believe
that it is committing or attempting or conspiring to commit, or is
participating in or facilitating the commission of the financing of
terrorism or acts of terrorism.—The financing of terrorism was
more specifically dealt with under R.A. 10168 (Terrorism
Financing Prevention and Suppression Act). Under this law, the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), either upon its own
initiative or at the request of the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), is
authorized to investigate (a) any property or funds that are in any
way related to financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism; (b)
property or funds of any person or persons in relation to whom
there is probable cause to believe that such person or persons are
committing or attempting or conspiring to commit, or
participating in or facilitating the financing of terrorism or acts of
terrorism as defined in the law. For purposes of the foregoing
investigation, the AMLC is authorized to inquire into or examine
deposits and investments in any banking institution or nonbank
financial institution without a court order. R.A. 10168 further
authorizes the AMLC, either upon its own initiative or at the
request of the ATC, to issue an ex parte order to freeze, without
delay, (a) property or funds that are in any way related to the
financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism; or (b) property or funds
of any person, group of persons, terrorist organization, or
association, in relation to which there is probable cause to believe
that it is committing or attempting or conspiring to commit, or is
participating in or facilitating the commission of the financing of
terrorism or acts of terrorism.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the freeze order shall be
effective for a period not exceeding twenty (20) days, which may be
extended up to a period not exceeding six (6) months upon a
petition filed by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) with
the Court of Appeals (CA) before the expiration of the period;
during the effectivity of the freeze order, an aggrieved party may
file with the Court of Appeals a petition to determine the basis of
the freeze order within 20 days from its issuance.—The freeze
order shall be effective for a period not exceeding 20 days, which
may be extended up to a period not exceeding six months upon a
petition filed by the AMLC with the Court of Appeals before the
expiration of the

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29

period. However, if it is necessary to comply with binding

terrorism-related resolutions, including Resolution No. 1373 of
the UN Security Council pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter of
the UN, the AMLC shall be authorized to issue a freeze order
with respect to the property or funds of a designated organization,
association, group, or any individual. The freeze order shall be
effective until the basis for its issuance shall have been lifted.
During the effectivity of the freeze order, an aggrieved party may
file with the Court of Appeals a petition to determine the basis of
the freeze order within 20 days from its issuance. If the property
or funds, subject of the freeze order, are found to be in any way
related to the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism
committed within the jurisdiction of the Philippines, the property
or funds shall be the subject of civil forfeiture proceedings as
provided in R.A. 10168.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; View that as the
Supreme Court (SC) ruled in Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans,
Jr., 137 SCRA 628 (1985), the government has a right to be
protected against broadcasts that incite the listeners to violently
overthrow it.—Ultimately, the test for limitations on freedom of
expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule —
that words used in those circumstances are of such nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they would bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent. As
this Court ruled in Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, Jr., 137
SCRA 628 (1985), the government has a right to be protected
against broadcasts that incite the listeners to violently overthrow
it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or
to signal the start of widespread uprising. During a state of
martial law, media restrictions may be countenanced, provided,
there is a danger to national security as justified by the clear and
present danger rule.
Martial Law; Armed Conflicts; View that if the declaration of
martial law was precipitated by an armed conflict, whether
international   or non-international,   the parties thereto are
obligated to protect persons who are not, or are no longer,
participating in hostilities. Otherwise, the commission of any of the
prohibited acts under the law Republic Act (RA) No. 9851 will
render the responsible person liable.—The obligations under the
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) continue to be effective
even during a state of martial law. R.A. 9851 (The Philippine Act
on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide,

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and Other Crimes Against Humanity) continues to impose

obligations on those who implement martial law. If the
declaration of martial law was precipitated by an armed conflict,
whether international or non-international, the parties thereto
are obligated to protect persons who are not, or are no longer,
participating in hostilities. Otherwise, the commission of any of
the prohibited acts under the law as enumerated below will
render the responsible person liable.

 
 
30

Same; Same; View that as a state party to the 1949 Geneva

Conventions and their Additional Protocols, the Philippines is
bound to observe the laws and customs of war, in the course of its
involvement in an international or non-international armed
conflict.—As a state party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
their Additional Protocols, the Philippines is bound to observe the
laws and customs of war, in the course of its involvement in an
international or non-international armed conflict. The existence of
an armed conflict, and the exact nature thereof, determines the
status, protections, rights, and obligations of both our armed
forces and the opposing groups. In the case of an international
armed conflict, i.e., the existence of war or armed hostilities
between two or more states, we are obligated to comply with the
provisions of the four Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I,
and relevant customary law. On the other hand, a non-
international armed conflict, i.e., the occurrence of “protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organised
armed groups or between such groups within a State,” would
bring into effect the provisions of Additional Protocol II and
norms of customary law applicable to such internal conflicts.
Same; View that the manner as to how martial law is
implemented is not subject to the plenary discretion of the
President. There are clear legal standards dictating what he can
and cannot do.—The manner as to how martial law is
implemented is not subject to the plenary discretion of the
President. There are clear legal standards dictating what he can
and cannot do. The Court, as the vanguard of the rule of law,
must see to it that the rule of law is upheld. By engaging in the
foregoing tasks, the Supreme Court realizes the fullness of its
existence as envisioned in our Constitution.

Carpio, J., Dissenting Opinion:

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Martial Law; Locus Standi; View that as discussed in the

deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the “citizen” who
can challenge the declaration of martial law need not be a
taxpayer, or a resident of the locality where martial law is
declared, or even directly or personally prejudiced by the
declaration.—Any citizen can be a petitioner. As discussed in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the “citizen” who
can challenge the declaration of martial law need not be a
taxpayer, or a resident of the locality where martial law is
declared, or even directly or personally prejudiced by the
declaration. This was deliberately designed to arrest, without
further delay, the grave effects of an illegal declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ wherever it may be
imposed, and to provide immediate relief to the entire nation.
Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) is vested by the 1987
Constitution with the power to determine the “sufficiency of the
factual basis” of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ.—The Court is vested by the 1987
Constitution with the power to determine the “sufficiency of

 
 
31

the factual basis” of the declaration of martial law or

suspension of the privilege of the writ. Indeed, the Court is
expressly authorized and tasked under paragraph 3, Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to be a trier of facts in the
review petition. Moreover, the standard of “sufficiency of factual
basis” is a unique standard applicable only to a review of the
constitutionality of the declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ.
Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that the “sufficiency of the
factual basis” standard, which applies exclusively to the review of
the imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ, is separate and distinct from the “grave abuse of discretion”
standard.—Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution uses the phrase “sufficiency of the factual basis,”
which means that the declaration must not only have factual
basis, but the factual basis must also be sufficient. This rules out
the “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction” standard as the latter requires absence of factual
basis. Under the “sufficiency of the factual basis” standard, there
may be factual basis, but the same may not be sufficient to justify
the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ. Under the “grave abuse of discretion” standard, there

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must be no factual basis whatsoever, which is clearly not the

letter and intent of paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution prescribing the review of the declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Thus, the
“sufficiency of the factual basis” standard, which applies
exclusively to the review of the imposition of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ, is separate and distinct
from the “grave abuse of discretion” standard.
Same; Same; View that being a sui generis petition intended
as a checking mechanism against the abusive imposition of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, the
proceeding under paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution places the burden of proof on the Government.—Being
a sui generis petition intended as a checking mechanism against
the abusive imposition of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ, the proceeding under paragraph 3, Section
18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution places the burden of proof
on the Government. It is the Government that must justify the
resort to extraordinary powers that are subject to the
extraordinary review mechanisms under the Constitution. This is
only logical because it is the Government that is in possession of
facts and intelligence reports justifying the declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Ordinary citizens
are not expected to be in possession of such facts and reports.
Hence, to place the burden of proof on petitioners
pursuant to the doctrine of “he who alleges must prove” is
to make this Constitutional checking mechanism a futile
and empty exercise. The Court cannot interpret or apply a
provision of the Constitution as to make the provision
inutile

 
 
32

or meaningless. This is especially true to a constitutional

provision designed to check the abusive use of emergency powers
that could lead to the curtailment of the cherished Bill of Rights of
the people.
Same; Same; View that to “review” the “sufficiency of the
factual basis” for the declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ means: (1) to make a finding of fact that
there is or there is no actual rebellion or invasion, and if there is,
(2) to determine whether public safety requires the declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ to suppress
the rebellion or invasion.—The Court cannot simply trust blindly
the President when he declares martial law or suspends the
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privilege of the writ. While the 1987 Constitution vests the

totality of executive power in one person only, the same
Constitution also specifically empowers the Court to “review” the
“sufficiency of the factual basis” of the President’s declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ if it is
subsequently questioned by any citizen. To “review” the
“sufficiency of the factual basis” for the declaration of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ means: (1) to make a
finding of fact that there is or there is no actual rebellion or
invasion, and if there is, (2) to determine whether public safety
requires the declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ to suppress the rebellion or invasion.
Same; Same; Presidency; Calling Out Power; View that if the
President decides only to call out the armed forces, the review
power of the Supreme Court (SC) under the “sufficiency of the
factual basis” standard does not apply because this standard, as
paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution itself
states, applies only in case martial law is imposed or the privilege
of the writ is suspended.—The Court’s review power is to
determine whether there are sufficient facts establishing rebellion
and requiring, for the protection of public safety, the imposition of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ. The
Court is tasked by the 1987 Constitution to review an executive
act of the President, an act that involves discretion because the
President has the prerogative to decide how to deal with the
rebellion — whether only to call out the armed forces to suppress
the rebellion, or to declare martial law — with or without the
suspension of the privilege of the writ. If the President decides
only to call out the armed forces, the review power of the Court
under the “sufficiency of the factual basis” standard does not
apply because this standard, as paragraph 3, Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution itself states, applies only in case
martial law is imposed or the privilege of the writ is suspended.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; View that probable cause of the
existence of either rebellion or invasion suffices and satisfies the
standard of proof for a valid declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ.—Probable cause of the
existence of either rebellion or invasion suffices and satisfies the
standard of proof for a valid declaration of martial law or
suspension of the

 
 
33

privilege of the writ. Probable cause is the same amount of

proof required for the filing of a criminal information by the
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prosecutor and for the issuance of an arrest warrant by a judge.

Probable cause has been defined as a “set of facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any
offense included therein has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested.”
Same; Same; Same; View that it is only upon the existence of
probable cause that a person can be “judicially charged” under the
last two (2) paragraphs of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.—The requirement of probable cause is consistent
with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It is only
upon the existence of probable cause that a person can be
“judicially charged” under the last two paragraphs of Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: Sec. 18. x x x. x x x x
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. During the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Same; Same; Same; View that lacking probable cause of the
existence of rebellion, a declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ is without any basis and thus,
unconstitutional.—Probable cause, basically premised on common
sense, is the most reasonable, most practical, and most expedient
standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence
or nonexistence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Lacking probable
cause of the existence of rebellion, a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ is without any basis and
thus, unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Commander-in-Chief Powers; View that in
exercising his Commander-in-Chief power to declare martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ, the 1987 Constitution requires
that the President establish the following: (1) the existence of
actual rebellion or invasion; and (2) public safety requires the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
to suppress the rebellion or invasion.—In exercising his
Commander-in-Chief power to declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ, the 1987 Constitution requires that the
President establish the following: (1) the existence of actual
rebellion or invasion; and (2) public safety requires the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ to suppress the rebellion or invasion. Needless to
say, the absence of either element will not authorize the
President, who is sworn to defend the Constitution, from

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exercising his Commander-in-Chief power to declare martial law

or suspend the privilege of the writ.

 
 
34

Same; Same; Same; View that the President cannot proclaim

martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ absent an actual
rebellion or actual invasion.—Imminent danger or threat of
rebellion or invasion is not sufficient. The 1987 Constitution
requires the existence of actual rebellion or actual invasion.
“Imminent danger” as a ground to declare martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ, which was present in both the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, was intentionally removed in the 1987
Constitution. By the intentional deletion of the words “imminent
danger” in the 1987 Constitution, the President can no longer use
imminent danger of rebellion or invasion as a ground to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ. Thus, the
President cannot proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ absent an actual rebellion or actual invasion. This is
the clear, indisputable letter and intent of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; View that the twin requirements of actual
rebellion or actual invasion, and public safety, must both be
complied with before the President, acting as Commander-in-
Chief, is authorized by the 1987 Constitution to impose martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ in any part, or in the
entirety, of the Philippines.—The existence of actual rebellion or
invasion alone would not justify the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ. Another requisite must be
satisfied, that is, public safety requires the declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ to
suppress rebellion or invasion. The 1987 Constitution
mandates that the President must establish that the gravity of
the rebellion or invasion is such that public safety requires the
imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
to suppress the rebellion or invasion. If a single armed fighter
takes up arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing a part of the Philippines from allegiance to the
Government, public safety would not justify the President’s
imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ. Although a single armed fighter can commit rebellion, public
safety is certainly not endangered to require the imposition of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ in
suppressing such rebellion. In sum, the twin requirements of
actual rebellion or actual invasion, and public safety, must both
be complied with before the President, acting as Commander-in-
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Chief, is authorized by the 1987 Constitution to impose martial

law or suspend the privilege of the writ in any part, or in the
entirety, of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; View that the armed and public uprising
in Marawi City by four hundred (400) to five hundred (500)
Maute-Hapilon armed fighters, with the announced intention to
impose Shariah Law in Marawi City and make it an Islamic
State, is concrete and indisputable evidence of actual rebellion.—
The armed and public uprising in Marawi City by 400 to 500
Maute-Hapilon armed fighters, with the announced intention to
impose Shariah Law in Marawi

 
 
35

City and make it an Islamic State, is concrete and

indisputable evidence of actual rebellion. The OSG cites People v.
Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 (1956), People v. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389
(1995) and Ladlad v. Velasco, 523 SCRA 318 (2007), in support of
its position that rebellion is a crime of masses and multitudes.
However, the Maute-Hapilon armed fighters in Marawi City,
numbering no more than 500, do not constitute masses or
multitudes. Neither do they command masses or multitudes of
followers in Marawi City. Nevertheless, rebellion may be
committed even by a single armed fighter who publicly takes up
arms against the government to remove a certain territory from
allegiance to the Government. Rebellion is not necessarily a crime
of masses or multitudes.
Same; Same; View that without question, the widespread
killing of both government forces and innocent civilians, coupled
with the destruction of government and private facilities, thereby
depriving the whole population in Marawi City of basic necessities
and services, endangered the public safety in the whole of Marawi
City; However, the same does not apply to the rest of Mindanao.—
Without question, the widespread killing of both government
forces and innocent civilians, coupled with the destruction of
government and private facilities, thereby depriving the whole
population in Marawi City of basic necessities and services,
endangered the public safety in the whole of Marawi City. Hence,
with the concurrence of an actual rebellion and requirement of
public safety, the President lawfully exercised his Commander-in-
Chief powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of
the writ in Marawi City. However, the same does not apply to the
rest of Mindanao. Proclamation No. 216 and the President’s
Report to Congress do not contain any evidence whatsoever
of actual rebellion outside of Marawi City. In fact, the
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Proclamation itself states that the Maute-Hapilon armed fighters

in Marawi City intended to remove “this part of Mindanao,”
referring to Marawi City, from Philippine sovereignty. The
Proclamation itself admits that only “this part of Mindanao” is
the subject of separation from Philippine sovereignty by the
rebels. The President’s Report did not mention any other
city, province or territory in Mindanao, other than Marawi
City, that had a similar public uprising by a rebel group,
an element of actual rebellion. Thus, the President’s Report
concludes that “based on various verified intelligence
reports from the AFP and the PNP, there exists a strategic
mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City.”
Same; Same; View that allowing a state of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ in the rest of Mindanao
where there is no actual rebellion is a gross violation of the clear
letter and intent of the 1987 Constitution.—Capability to rebel,
absent an actual rebellion or invasion, is not a ground to
declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ under the
1987 Constitution. Respondents cannot rely on the Maute-
Hapilon group’s intention to establish

 
 
36

an Islamic State in the whole of Mindanao or even on its

capability to deprive duly constituted authorities of their powers
as a justification to the imposition of martial law or suspension of
the writ in the other areas of Mindanao where there is in fact no
actual rebellion. The fear that the rebellion in Marawi City will
spread to other areas in Mindanao is a mere danger or threat
and may not even amount to an imminent danger or threat. In
any event, to allow martial law outside Marawi City on the basis
of an imminent danger or threat would unlawfully reinstate the
ground of “imminent danger” of rebellion or invasion, a ground
that was intentionally removed from the 1987 Constitution.
Allowing a state of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ in the rest of Mindanao where there is no actual rebellion
is a gross violation of the clear letter and intent of the 1987
Constitution.
Same; Same; View that the reference to nonconfinement to
“predetermined bounds” does not refer to geographical boundaries,
but to the scope of the attending crimes and circumstances.—When
the Court ruled in People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 (1956) and
People v. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389 (1995), that rebellion “cannot
be confined a priori within predetermined bounds,” the Court was
referring to the crimes that may or may not be absorbed in
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rebellion depending on the absence or presence of political motive

for the commission of the crimes attending the commission of
rebellion. In other words, the reference to nonconfinement
to “predetermined bounds” does not refer to geographical
boundaries, but to the scope of the attending crimes and
circumstances.
Same; Same; View that the rebels who escape Marawi City
may be issued a warrant of arrest anywhere within the Philippines
without the need to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ outside of Marawi City.—The rebels who escape Marawi
City may be issued a warrant of arrest anywhere within the
Philippines without the need to declare martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ outside of Marawi City. The rebels may
even be arrested by a civilian pursuant to the provision on
warrantless arrests under the Rules of Court. To allow martial
law in the whole of Mindanao on the sole basis of securing the
arrest of rebels who escape Marawi City would not only violate
the 1987 Constitution, but also render useless the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Court. The act of the
rebels in fleeing or escaping to other territories outside of the
place of rebellion will certainly not constitute armed public
uprising for the purpose of removing from allegiance to the
Philippines the territory where the rebels flee or escape to.
Same; Same; View that Proclamation No. 216, having been
issued by the President in the absence of an actual rebellion
outside of Marawi City, was issued without sufficient factual
basis, contrary to the express requirement under Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, with respect to areas outside of
Marawi City.—Proclamation No. 216, having been issued by the
President in the

 
 
37

absence of an actual rebellion outside of Marawi City, was

issued without sufficient factual basis, contrary to the express
requirement under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, with respect to areas outside of Marawi City.
Same; Same; Continuing Crimes; View that once there is a
rebellion, any rebel is deemed to be continuously committing the
crime of rebellion wherever he or she may be in the Philippines,
even if the rebel has hidden his or her firearm to avoid arrest.—
Considering that rebellion is a continuing crime in our
jurisdiction, any suspected rebel can be the subject of a
warrantless arrest within Philippine territory wherever he or she

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goes. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, any person who has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer can be arrested
without warrant; or if it be an offense which had just been
committed, that the police officer making the arrest has personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it. Once there is a rebellion, any rebel is deemed to
be continuously committing the crime of rebellion
wherever he or she may be in the Philippines, even if the
rebel has hidden his or her firearm to avoid arrest. In short,
with or without a state of martial law, a suspected rebel of a
known rebellion such as the present communist CCP-NPA
rebellion, can be arrested anywhere in the Philippines, with or
without a warrant. Trial courts can take judicial notice of the
ongoing communist rebellion in the country.
Same; Continuing Crimes; Continuing Rebellion Doctrine;
View that without a declaration of martial law, the prosecution
will have to prove the fact of rebellion to justify the arrest on the
ground of continuing rebellion; trial courts cannot take judicial
notice of the new rebellion for the purpose of automatically
applying the continuing rebellion doctrine.—The difference lies,
however, when there is actual rebellion by a new rebel group in a
specific locality. The rebels can still be arrested anywhere.
However, in a state of martial law, trial courts can take judicial
notice of the rebellion for the purpose of applying the continuing
crime doctrine under Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990). In
contrast, without a declaration of martial law, the prosecution
will have to prove the fact of rebellion to justify the arrest on the
ground of continuing rebellion; trial courts cannot take judicial
notice of the new rebellion for the purpose of automatically
applying the continuing rebellion doctrine.
Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that in a state of martial
law where the privilege of the writ is suspended, those arrested of
rebellion must be judicially charged within three (3) days from
arrest.—In a state of martial law where the privilege of the writ is
suspended, those arrested of rebellion must be judicially charged
within three days from arrest. In other words, they can be
lawfully detained for three days without need to file an
Information before the court. In contrast, absent a declaration of
martial law, the rebel arrested must be charged judicially within
36 hours as prescribed under Article 125 of the Revised Penal

 
 
38

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Code. Without martial law, the suspected rebel, absent any

criminal charge, can only be lawfully detained for 36 hours.
Same; Same; Right to Privacy of Communication; Right to
Travel; View that with the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ, the right to privacy of
communication and the freedom to travel can be legitimately
restricted on the ground of public safety, provided there is a law
enacted by Congress specifically authorizing such restriction.—
With the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ, the right to privacy of communication and the freedom
to travel can be legitimately restricted on the ground of public
safety, provided there is a law enacted by Congress
specifically authorizing such restriction. Under Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, “[a] state of martial law does
not suspend the operation of the Constitution,” including Article
III on the Bill of Rights. However, these rights are not absolute
and their continued enjoyment is subject to certain limitations, as
may be prescribed by law. Among these are the right to
privacy of communication and the freedom to travel, both of which
can be restricted through a law when public safety requires it.
Same; Emergency Powers; View that with the declaration of
martial law, Congress may by law delegate to the President
emergency powers such as the takeover of privately owned public
utilities or businesses affected with public interest.—With the
declaration of martial law, Congress may by law delegate to the
President emergency powers such as the takeover of privately
owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest.
Section 23, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution authorizes
Congress to delegate by law powers to the President in times of
“national emergency”: Sec. 23. (1) x  x  x. (2) In times of war or
other national emergency, the Congress may, bylaw, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Same; Same; View that in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489
SCRA 160 (2006), the Supreme Court (SC) expressly held that the
takeover of privately owned public utilities or businesses affected
with public interest is one of the emergency powers that Congress
can validly delegate by law to the President.—In David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), the Court expressly
held that the takeover of privately owned public utilities or
businesses affected with public interest is one of the emergency
powers that Congress can validly delegate by law to the
President.

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Same; View that under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article VII of

the Constitution, a state of martial law may “authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on

 
 
39

military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts

are not able to function.” However, this also needs a law to be
enacted by Congress since a state of martial law does not suspend
the operation of the 1987 Constitution and it is Congress that is
empowered by law “to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts.”—Under paragraph 2, Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a state of martial law may
“authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are not able to function.”
However, this also needs a law to be enacted by Congress since a
state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the 1987
Constitution and it is Congress that is empowered by law “to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.”
To date, no statute confers jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are unable to function.
On the contrary, Republic Act No. 7055 even strengthened civilian
supremacy over the military by returning to the civil courts the
jurisdiction over certain offenses involving members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, other persons subject to military law,
and the members of the Philippine National Police, repealing for
the purpose certain presidential decrees promulgated during the
Marcos dictatorship. In short, the 1987 Constitution does not
automatically vest significant additional powers to the
President under a state of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ. However, a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ has a built-in trigger
mechanism for the applicability of other constitutional provisions
that may lawfully restrict the enjoyment of constitutional rights,
provided there are existing laws specifically authorizing
such restrictions.
Same; View that the 1987 Constitution further mandates that
a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution. It is apparent that President Duterte does not
understand, or refuses to understand, this fundamental principle
that forms part of the bedrock of our democracy under the 1987
Constitution, despite his having taken a solemn oath of office to
“preserve and defend the (1987) Constitution.”—The review power
of the Court, as well as of the Legislature, on the President’s
exercise of his Commander-in-Chief powers was precisely written
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in the 1987 Constitution as a checking mechanism to prevent a

recurrence of the martial law of Marcos. The 1987 Constitution
further mandates that a state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution. It is apparent that President
Duterte does not understand, or refuses to understand, this
fundamental principle that forms part of the bedrock of our
democracy under the 1987 Constitution, despite his having taken
a solemn oath of office to “preserve and defend the (1987)
Constitution.”

Velasco, Jr., J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Martial Law; View that the power to declare Martial Law

under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is similar to
the citizen’s right to self-defense

 
 
40

under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as

unquestionably a State may use its military power to put down a
rebellion too strong to be controlled by the civil authorities to
preserve its “sovereignty. . . and the integrity of [its] national
territory.”—Martial Law is the law of necessity in the actual
presence of an armed conflict. The power to declare it is
exercised precisely upon the principle of self-preservation
in times of extreme emergency. To an extent, the power to
declare Martial Law under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is similar to the citizen’s right to self-defense under
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as unquestionably a
State may use its military power to put down a rebellion too
strong to be controlled by the civil authorities to preserve its
“sovereignty . . . and the integrity of [its] national territory.” As it
is a necessity — the confluence of the existence of an actual
rebellion or invasion and the requirements of public safety — that
gives the power to the President to proclaim Martial Law, such
necessity must be shown to exist before such proclamation.
However, as discussed in the ponencia, in deciding upon the
existence of this necessity, the facts as they were presented to
the President at the moment he made the proclamation
must govern; his decision must be scrutinized based on the
information that he possessed at the time he made the
proclamation and not the information he acquired later.
Thus, if the facts that were presented to him would excite a
reasonable and prudent mind to believe that actual invasion or
rebellion existed and the public safety required the imposition of

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Martial Law, the President is justified in acting on such belief. A

subsequent discovery of the falsity of such facts will not render
his act invalid at its inception.
Same; Probable Cause; View that probable cause is the
evidentiary measure for the discretion given to the President’s
decision to proclaim a Martial Law.—The President is not
expected to act on proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the
existence of actual invasion or rebellion and requirements of
public safety. He must be able to act with urgency to best respond
to the exigencies of the circumstances contemplated in Section 18,
Article VII — actual invasion or rebellion. It should, therefore, be
sufficient that he acts with the reasonableness and prudence of an
average man to suitably respond to such events. Thus, probable
cause is the evidentiary measure for the discretion given to the
President’s decision to proclaim a Martial Law.
Same; Same; View that the Constitution, as couched, does not
require precision in establishing the fact of rebellion.—Certainly,
the urgency of the circumstances envisioned under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution requires the President to act with
promptness and deliberate speed. He cannot be expected to check
the accuracy of each and every detail of information relayed to
him before he exercises any of the emergency powers granted to
him by the Constitution. The window of opportunity to quell an
actual rebellion or thwart an invasion is

 
 

41

too small to admit delay. An expectation of infallibility on the

part of the commander-in-chief may be at the price of our
freedom. As I have pointed out in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
668 SCRA 504 (2012), “the President cannot be expected to risk
being too late before declaring Martial Law or suspending the
writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution, as couched, does not
require precision in establishing the fact of rebellion. The
President is called to act as public safety requires.” A degree of
trust must, therefore, be accorded to the discretion exercised by
the officer upon whom the exercise of emergency powers has been
confided by the Constitution.
Same; View that Martial Law is not the end in itself, it is a
temporary means to achieve the paramount object of restoring
peace under civilian authority.—Martial Law is not the end in
itself, it is a temporary means to achieve the paramount
object of restoring peace under civilian authority. With the
breakdown of civilian government in Marawi at the hands of the

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Maute Group, which has a reported culpable intention and

capability to do the same to the rest of Mindanao, I find it proper
that the President exercised his Martial Law powers to suppress
the rebellion and temporarily replace the incapacitated civilian
authorities with military men in the hopes of ending as soon
possible this tragic humanitarian disaster.
Same; Calling Out Power; View that compared to the calling
out power of the President, the power to declare Martial Law is
less benign and “poses the most severe threat to civil liberties.”—
Indeed, compared to the calling out power of the President, the
power to declare Martial Law is less benign and “poses the most
severe threat to civil liberties.” This Court’s ruling in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), outlines the marked
differences between the two emergency powers, thus: Under the
calling out power, the President may summon the armed forces
to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.
  This involves ordinary police action x  x  x. x  x  x  x The
declaration of Martial Law is a “warn[ing] to citizens that
the military power has been called upon by the executive
to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that,
while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest
and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any
way render more difficult the restoration of order and the
enforcement of law.”
Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that the Supreme Court
(SC) in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), would
later cite Justice Vicente V. Mendoza when he stated that,
specifically, the following powers can be exercised by the President
as Commander-in-Chief where there is a valid declaration of
Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus: “(a)
arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; [and] (c) takeover of

 
 
42

news media and agencies and press censorship.”—This Court

in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), would later
cite Justice Vicente V. Mendoza when he stated that, specifically,
the following powers can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief where there is a valid declaration of Martial
Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus: “(a) arrests and
seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies;
[and] (c) takeover of news media and agencies and press
censorship.” Truly, in the occasion of a rebellion or invasion, the
paramount object of the State is the safety and interest of
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the public and the swift cessation of all hostilities; it is

neither the adjustment to nor the accommodation of the unbridled
exercise of private liberties. As Martial Law is borne out of
necessity, interference of private rights may be justified. This
concept is not foreign and is recognized by our laws. The prime
example is the inherent police power of the state, which can
prevail over specific constitutional guarantees. As this Court
elucidated, “the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the
laws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right of
association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are
always subject to the pervasive and dominant police power of the
State and may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and
important public interests.”
Same; Same; View that intrusions into the civil rights must be
proportional to the requirements of necessity.—Intrusions into
the civil rights must be proportional to the requirements
of necessity. Only such power as is necessary to achieve the
object of quashing the rebellion or thwarting the invasion and
restoring peace can be used. “It is an unbending rule of law that
the exercise of military power when the rights of the citizen are
concerned shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency
requires.” Anything in excess of what is considered “military
necessity” or is markedly removed from what is “needed in order
to head the [rebellion or invasion] off” will render liable the officer
who committed such ultra vires act. Surely, an act against
chastity and the desecration of women is unjustified even in times
of war. Such and similar acts remain violative of the laws, which
continue to be effective even after Martial Law is proclaimed.
Same; Same; View that while Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution provides that in times of public emergency, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended, there is
no express authority allowing the suspension of the other
guarantees and civil liberties.—The continuous operation of the
1987 Constitution, a safeguard embedded in the very provision
bestowing upon the President the power to proclaim Martial Law,
primarily ensures that no right will unnecessarily be obstructed
or impaired during Martial Law and that “civilian authority is, at
all times, superior over the military.” Notably, while Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of
public emergency, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may
be suspended, there is no express authority allowing the
suspension of the other guarantees and

 
 
43

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civil liberties. Understandably, the question as to what can

or cannot be done during Martial Law has long been discussed
and debated over.
Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; View that the suspicion of
rebellion upon which a warrantless arrest is made must be based
on a probable cause, i.e., the ground of suspicion is supported by
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person
sought to be arrested has “committed or is actually committing”
the crime of rebellion.—As the basis for the declaration of Martial
Law — rebellion — is a continuing crime, the authorities may
resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion
under the foregoing provision of the Rules of Court. It must,
however, be emphasized that the suspicion of rebellion upon
which a warrantless arrest is made must be based on a probable
cause, i.e., the ground of suspicion is supported by personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person
sought to be arrested has “committed or is actually committing”
the crime of rebellion. Thus, parenthetically, the general arrest
orders must be issued by the Armed Forces on the basis of
probable cause. Alternatively, it must be shown that the person to
be arrested was caught in flagrante delicto or has committed or
is actually committing an overt act of rebellion or any other
offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
Warrantless Searches and Seizures; View that searches and
seizures without judicial warrants can only be had in the following
cases: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3)
customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and
frisk situations (Terry search); (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (7) exigent and emergency circumstance; and (8) search of
vessels and aircraft.—Searches and seizures without judicial
warrants can only be had in the following cases: (1) search of
moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search); (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest; (7) exigent
and emergency circumstance; and (8) search of vessels and
aircraft, where, again, probable cause exists that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Freedom of Speech and of the Press; Clear and Present Danger
Test; View that in the restriction of the freedom of speech and of
the press, the military must still be guided by the clear and present
danger test — that words are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that the military has the
right to prevent.—In the restriction of the freedom of speech and

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of the press, the military must still be guided by the clear and
present danger test — that words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that the military

 
 
44

has a right to prevent. Thus, the military can prohibit the

dissemination of vital information that can be used by the enemy,
e.g., they can ban posts on social media if there is a clear and
present danger that such posts will disclose their location. The
same test, the presence of clear and present danger, governs the
power of the military to disperse peaceable assemblies during
Martial Law. As this Court held, tolerance is the rule and
limitation is the exception. Otherwise stated, in the absence of
clear and present danger, the military is bound by the rules of
maximum tolerance under Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 880,
otherwise known as the “The Public Assembly Act of 1985.”
Police Power; View that the Supreme Court (SC) has held that
it is the legislature, not the executive, which is the constitutional
repository of police power, the existence of a national emergency,
such as a rebellion or invasion, notwithstanding.—This Court,
however, has held that it is the legislature, not the executive,
which is the constitutional repository of police power, the
existence of a national emergency, such as a rebellion or invasion,
notwithstanding. Accordingly, the power to temporarily
takeover or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest can
only be done whenever there is a law passed by Congress
authorizing the same.
Martial Law; View that without a doubt, state agents — the
members of the armed forces — who abuse their power and
discretion under the proclaimed Martial Law and thereby violate
their duty as the “protector of the people and the State” are
criminally and civilly liable.—Without a doubt, state agents —
the members of the armed forces — who abuse their power and
discretion under the proclaimed Martial Law and thereby violate
their duty as the “protector of the people and the State” are
criminally and civilly liable. And here lies the ultimate safeguard
against the possible abuses of this emergency power — the
ultimate responsibility of the officers for acts done in the
implementation of Martial Law. To whom much is given, much
will be required.

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Leonardo-De Castro, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that the 1987

Constitution categorically institutionalized (a) the power of this
Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the said
privilege; and (b) the power of Congress to revoke or, upon the
initiative of the President, to extend the said proclamation and
suspension.—The 1987 Constitution categorically
institutionalized (a) the power of this Court to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
and the suspension of the said privilege; and (b) the power of
Congress to revoke or, upon the initiative of the President, to
extend the said proclamation and suspension. The 1987
Constitution expressly laid out as well the consequences
or

 
 
45

effects of a state of martial law, specifically that: the

operation of the Constitution is not suspended; civil courts
and legislative bodies shall continue to function; no
jurisdiction is conferred on military courts or agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function; the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not automatically
suspended by the declaration of martial law; and any
citizen has legal standing to initiate before the Supreme
Court an appropriate proceeding as the avenue for the
exercise of the power of judicial review of the aforesaid
Presidential actions.
Same; Same; View that the lack of any specific rules governing
such a petition does not prevent the Supreme Court (SC) from
exercising its constitutionally mandated power to review the
validity or propriety of a declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the
Court may adopt in its discretion any rule or procedure most apt,
just and expedient for this purpose.—In the resolution of this
particular issue, I am of the opinion that Sections 1 and 5 of
Article VIII do not restrict the jurisdiction of the Court to the
actions mentioned therein. Furthermore, petitioners may file with
this Court an action denominated as a petition under Section 18,
Article VII for it is the Constitution itself that (a) grants a judicial
remedy to any citizen who wishes to assail the sufficiency of the
basis of a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) confers jurisdiction
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upon this Court to take cognizance of the same. The lack of any
specific rules governing such a petition does not prevent the Court
from exercising its constitutionally mandated power to review the
validity or propriety of a declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the
Court may adopt in its discretion any rule or procedure most apt,
just and expedient for this purpose.
Same; Same; View that I must register my vigorous objection
to the implication that a petition under Section 18, Article VII is
the only appropriate proceeding wherein the issue of sufficiency of
the factual basis of a declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
raised.—I must register my vigorous objection to the implication
that a petition under Section 18, Article VII is the only
appropriate proceeding wherein the issue of sufficiency of the
factual basis of a declaration of martial law and/or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be raised. It is
my considered view that this issue may be raised in any action or
proceeding where the resolution of such issue is germane to the
causes of action of a party or the reliefs prayed for in the
complaint or petition. The meaning and the import of the term
“appropriate proceeding” are best understood in the context of the
scope, extent, conditions and limitations of the exercise of
governmental powers during martial law under Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

 
 
46

Same; Same; Judicial Review; View that the intent of the

framers of our Constitution in expressly providing for judicial
review under Section 18, Article VII is to provide an additional
safeguard against possible abuse of the executive power to declare
martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.—I am in wholehearted agreement with the ponencia that
the intent of the framers of our Constitution in expressly
providing for judicial review under Section 18, Article VII is to
provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse of the
executive power to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. However, I do not believe that the
same framers, who are so zealously opposed to the rise of
dictatorship, would limit our citizens’ judicial remedies against an
unconstitutional or oppressive martial law regime to a single type
of “sui generis” action or proceeding that at the time of their
deliberations was yet unnamed and unseen, and for which no
specific rules of procedure had even been promulgated.
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Same; Same; Same; View that there is no constitutional or

procedural bar for the issue of sufficiency of factual basis of a
martial law proclamation to be raised in a petition for certiorari or
prohibition should a party choose to avail of these remedies.—A
party may find cause to seek the nullification or prohibition of
acts committed by government officials in the implementation of
martial law on the ground of grave abuse of discretion in which
case a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition may be his/her
best judicial recourse. There is no constitutional or procedural bar
for the issue of sufficiency of factual basis of a martial law
proclamation to be raised in a petition for certiorari or prohibition
should a party choose to avail of these remedies. It is
jurisprudentially accepted that: With respect to the Court,
however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari
or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also
to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1 [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution].
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Same; Same; Same; View that to my mind, the Supreme Court
(SC) may even review the sufficiency of the factual basis for a
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ in a habeas corpus proceeding.—To my mind, the Court may
even review the sufficiency of the factual basis for a declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ in a
habeas corpus proceeding. This has judicial precedent in such
cases as Lansang v. Garcia, 42

 
 
47

SCRA 448 (1971), wherein the Court inquired into the

“constitutional sufficiency” of the factual bases for the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and Aquino v. Ponce
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974), wherein the Court took cognizance of
the issue of constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the
proclamation of martial law. In both instances, the issue of factual
sufficiency was elevated to the Court through petitions for habeas
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corpus as petitioners therein uniformly asserted that they were

illegally arrested and detained.
Same; Same; Same; View that it would be unjust,
unreasonable and contrary to the orderly administration of justice
to require a person who might have been illegally detained under
martial law to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus separately
from a petition under Section 18, Article VII if he/she wishes to
secure his/her liberty and at the same time question the
constitutional validity of a proclamation of martial law or a
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.—It would
be unjust, unreasonable and contrary to the orderly
administration of justice to require a person who might have been
illegally detained under martial law to file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus separately from a petition under Section 18, Article
VII if he/she wishes to secure his/her liberty and at the same time
question the constitutional validity of a proclamation of martial
law or a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
That would be an inimical consequence of a ruling by this Court
that the “appropriate proceeding” envisaged by the framers of our
Constitution under Section 18, Article VII refers solely to a
petition filed specifically for the purpose of questioning the
sufficiency of the factual basis of a martial law proclamation or a
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Same; Same; Same; View that it is Section 18, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution which authorizes the Supreme Court (SC) to
review factual issues in order to determine the sufficiency of the
factual basis of a martial law declaration or a suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and, as discussed above, the
Court may employ the most suitable procedure in order to carry
out its jurisdiction over the issue as mandated by the Constitution.
—In the hierarchy of legal authorities binding on this Court,
constitutional provisions must take precedence over rules of
procedure. It is Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which authorizes the Court to review factual issues in order to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of a martial law
declaration or a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and, as discussed above, the Court may employ the most
suitable procedure in order to carry out its jurisdiction over the
issue as mandated by the Constitution. Time and again, the Court
has stressed that it has the inherent power to suspend its own
rules when the interest of justice so requires.
Same; Same; Rebellion; Terrorism; View that while rebellion
is considered as an act of terrorism under the law, the latter can be
used to achieve a political

 
 

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48

end, such as removing from allegiance to the State any part of

the national territory or overthrowing the duly constituted
authorities.—While rebellion is considered as an act of terrorism
under the law, the latter can be used to achieve a political end,
such as removing from allegiance to the State any part of the
national territory or overthrowing the duly constituted
authorities. Even so, such lawless elements engaged in terrorism
will never acquire any status recognized under International
Humanitarian Law. Yet, acts of terrorism may be taken into
account in the context of determining the necessity for a
declaration of martial law within our constitutional framework.
Plainly then, rebellion can be committed through an offense or a
violation of any special law so long as it is done as a necessary
means to attain, or in furtherance of, the purpose of rebellion. In
Ponce Enrile v. Amin, 189 SCRA 573 (1990), the Court held that
the offense of harboring or concealing a fugitive, or a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829, if committed in furtherance of the
purpose of rebellion, should be deemed to form part of the crime of
rebellion instead of being punished separately.
Same; View that to construe the existence of rebellion in the
strict sense employed in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) to limit
martial law to places where there are actual armed uprising will
hamper the President from exercising his constitutional authority
with foreseeable dire consequences to national security and at
great peril to public safety.—To construe the existence of rebellion
in the strict sense employed in the Revised Penal Code to limit
martial law to places where there are actual armed uprising will
hamper the President from exercising his constitutional authority
with foreseeable dire consequences to national security and at
great peril to public safety.
Same; View that the Constitution does not prescribe the
quantum of proof to determine the “sufficiency” or “adequacy” of
the factual basis for such a proclamation.—The Constitution vests
upon the Supreme Court the duty to determine the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the Presidential proclamation of martial law.
The Constitution does not prescribe the quantum of proof to
determine the “sufficiency” or “adequacy” of the factual basis for
such a proclamation. We can only rely on settled jurisprudence
but bearing in mind the nature of the respective responsibilities
lodged upon the President, the Legislature and the Judiciary
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, where the
system of checks and balances, as a concomitant feature of the
principle of the separation of powers, is made distinctly manifest.
Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Probable Cause; View that
while I do not subscribe to the meaning of rebellion advanced by
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Justice Carpio, his view on the quantum of proof to sustain the

proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the writ, which
is “probable cause,” is consistent, I believe, with my view that the
test to be applied to determine sufficiency of factual basis for the
exercise of said Presidential power is reasonableness or the absence
of arbitrariness.—While

 
 
49

I do not subscribe to the meaning of rebellion advanced by

Justice Carpio, his view on the quantum of proof to sustain the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the writ, which
is “probable cause,” is consistent, I believe, with my view that the
test to be applied to determine sufficiency of factual basis for the
exercise of said Presidential power is reasonableness or the
absence of arbitrariness. “Probable cause” and
“reasonableness” are two sides with almost the same meaning or
with little difference in degree of proof necessary. “Probable
cause” and “reasonableness” are the same standards to sustain
the assailed Presidential proclamation.
Same; Same; Same; View that there is probable cause or
reasonable ground to believe that the series of violent acts and
atrocities committed by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups
are directed against the political order in Mindanao with no other
apparent purpose but to remove from the allegiance of the Republic
of the Philippines the island of Mindanao and deprive the Chief
Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the
land and to maintain public order and safety therein.—These
factual antecedents show that there is probable cause or
reasonable ground to believe that the series of violent acts and
atrocities committed by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist
groups are directed against the political order in Mindanao with
no other apparent purpose but to remove from the allegiance of
the Republic of the Philippines the island of Mindanao and
deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to
enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and
safety therein. On the other hand, petitioners maintain that the
facts relied upon by the President in support of his declaration of
martial law are invariably false, simulated, and/or hyperbolic.
However, the evidence presented by petitioners to bolster these
claims consisted mainly of unverified news articles culled from
news websites on cyberspace with nary an author or credible
source presented in court or, who at the very least, executed an
affidavit to corroborate what has been alleged.

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Same; Same; Judicial Review; View that given the

inadmissibility and lack of probative value of petitioners’ proffered
evidence, the ponencia was correct in upholding the factual bases
relied upon by the President — facts which are sourced from the
entire intelligence-gathering machinery of the government itself
and presented in utmost detail personally to the Members of the
Supreme Court (SC) in closed session.—Jurisprudence has
established that newspaper articles amount to “hearsay evidence,
twice removed” and are, therefore, not only inadmissible but
without any probative value at all, whether objected to or not,
unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the
matter asserted. Therefore, given the inadmissibility and lack of
probative value of petitioners’ proffered evidence, the ponencia
was correct in upholding the factual bases relied upon by the
President — facts which are sourced from the entire intelligence-
gathering machinery of the government itself and presented in
utmost detail personally to the Members of this Court in closed
session.

 
 
50

Same; Same; The 1987 Constitution concedes to the President,

through Section 18, Article VII or the Commander-in-Chief clause,
the discretion to determine the territorial coverage or application of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.—With regard to the contention that since Marawi City is
the epicenter of hostilities, it is therefore error on the part of the
President to subject the entire Mindanao region under martial
rule. Petitioners submit that the proper course of action should
have been to declare martial law only in Marawi City and its
immediate environs. This contention is misplaced. The 1987
Constitution concedes to the President, through Section 18,
Article VII or the Commander-in-Chief clause, the discretion to
determine the territorial coverage or application of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and I
quote: [I]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, [the President] may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. x  x  x
(Emphasis supplied) What is clear from this provision is a tacit
acknowledgment that since the President possesses the means
and wherewithal to access vital and classified information from
the government’s entire intelligence apparatus, he is given wide
latitude to define the metes and bounds within which martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
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should take effect. In the consolidated cases at bar, the

intelligence report that was presented to the Members of this
Court in closed session indicated that several local armed groups
other than those presently engaged in the fighting in Marawi City
have established alliances with the Maute Group to form an ISIS-
linked organization with the aim of establishing a wilayah in
Mindanao and eventually dismembering the entire Mindanao
region from Philippine territory. Prior and contemporaneous
events likewise suggest that the same groups were committed to
this concerted act of rebellion all over Mindanao.

Peralta, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Appropriate

Proceedings; View that the “appropriate proceeding” under
paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution refers to
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC) where the
inquiry is on whether the President acted arbitrarily.—It
necessarily follows that the “appropriate proceeding” under
paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution refers to
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court where the inquiry is on
whether the President acted arbitrarily. The proper role of the
Supreme Court, in relation to what it has been given as a duty to
perform whenever the Commander-in-Chief proclaims martial
law or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is
merely to determine whether he acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is not for
Us to rule on whether he decided rightly or otherwise, but
whether he acted without factual basis, hence, acted whimsically
or capriciously. If he had factual basis, there was no arbitrariness.
We cannot second guess what he should have done

 
 
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under the prevailing circumstances. If the President was

wrong in his assessment and in exercising his judgment call, he
shall be answerable to the people and history and not to this
Court.
Same; Same; View that to limit the declaration of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Marawi City alone where there is actual rebellion verges on the
absurd.—To limit the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Marawi
City alone where there is actual rebellion verges on the absurd. If
we are to follow a “piece-meal” proclamation of martial law, the

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President would have to declare it repeatedly. Where there is

already a declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, considering that rebellion is
a continuing crime, there is no need for actual rebellion to occur in
every single town or city of Mindanao in order to validate the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the entire island. Indeed, there is no need
for a separate declaration because the declaration itself already
covers the whole of Mindanao. The validity of the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao is further bolstered by
the fact that rebellion has no “predetermined bounds.”
Same; Same; View that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS)-linked rebel groups have a common goal of taking control of
Mindanao from the government for the purpose of establishing the
region as a wilayah. This political purpose, coupled with the rising
of arms publicly against the government, constitutes the crime of
rebellion and encompasses territories even outside Marawi City,
endangering the safety of the public not only in said City but the
entire Mindanao.—Consistent with the nature of rebellion as a
continuing crime and a crime without borders, the rebellion being
perpetrated by the ISIS-linked rebel groups is not limited to the
acts committed in Marawi City. The criminal acts done in
furtherance of the purpose of rebellion, which are absorbed in the
offense, even in places outside the City are necessarily part of the
crime itself. More importantly, the ISIS-linked rebel groups
have a common goal of taking control of Mindanao from
the government for the purpose of establishing the region
as a wilayah. This political purpose, coupled with the
rising of arms publicly against the government, constitutes
the crime of rebellion and encompasses territories even
outside Marawi City, endangering the safety of the public
not only in said City but the entire Mindanao.

Bersamin, J., Separate Opinion:

Martial Law; View that the 1987 Constitution is often

described as an anti-martial law fundamental law.—The 1987
Constitution is often described as an

 
 
52

anti-martial law fundamental law. This may most probably

be because the Filipino people have thereby firmly
institutionalized solid safeguards to ensure against the abuse of

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martial law as a response to any internal or external threats to

the stability of the Republic. I think, however, that the description
may not be entirely apt. Martial law had theretofore no generally
accepted definition, much less precise meaning. The lack of an
accepted or constant definition and precision has been recognized
in this jurisdiction for some time now. The need for the Court to
enlighten our people through a higher understanding of the
concept of martial law thus exists even today. But the problem is
not only about the meaning; it is also about the scope of martial
law. Such understanding is essential to the determination of the
serious issues that have been presented in these consolidated
cases.
Same; View that in its strict and absolute sense, martial law
supersedes all civil authority during the period in which it is in
operation.—There is much about martial law that is mysterious
probably because of its extraordinary and uncommon effects on
civilians used to a rule by civil authority. The traditional concept
of martial law is its not being law in the usual sense but the will
of the military commander, to be exercised by him or her only on
his or her responsibility to his or her government or superior
officer; when once established, it applies alike to citizen and
soldier. In its comprehensive sense, the term martial law is that
which is promulgated and administered by and through military
authorities and agencies for the maintenance of public order and
the protection of persons and property in territory wherein the
agencies of the civil law usually employed for such purposes have
been paralyzed, overthrown, or overpowered, and are unable, for
the time being, fully to operate and function. In its strict and
absolute sense, however, martial law supersedes all civil authority
during the period in which it is in operation.
Same; View that during martial law, the President is granted
the powers of a commanding general in a theater of war, and, as
such, becomes authorized to issue orders that have the effect and
force of law strictly in the theater of war.—The majority opinion,
ably written for the Court by Justice Del Castillo, adverts to the
discussion among the members of the Constitutional Commission
on the added powers of the President during martial law. As can
be gathered from the discussion, martial law does not
automatically vest legislative power in the President; and does
not supplant the functioning of civil courts. During martial law,
the President is granted the powers of a commanding general in a
theater of war, and, as such, becomes authorized to issue orders
that have the effect and force of law strictly in the theater of war.
Same; View that the necessity that can justify the wielding of
the power looks to the President as the commander-in-chief of all
the Armed Forces of the State to respond swiftly and capably to
any internal or external threats.—The

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right to proclaim, apply and exercise martial law is one of the

rights of sovereignty, and is as essential to the existence of a
nation as the right to declare and carry on war. In Republican
Philippines, the power to proclaim martial law has always been
lodged in the Presidency. This is by no means either odd or
unwelcome. The necessity that can justify the wielding of the
power looks to the President as the commander-in-chief of all the
Armed Forces of the State to respond swiftly and capably to any
internal or external threats. Giving to the bicameral Congress the
right to exercise the power may be cumbersome, inconvenient and
unwieldy, and is anathema to the notion of responding to the
critical emergency that directly and immediately threatens to
diminish, if not destroy, the sovereignty of the State itself over the
territory and population of the country. Indeed, of the three great
branches of the Government, it is the President, as the Chief
Executive and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, who has
the ability and competence and the means to make the timely and
decisive response.
Same; View that the President has the leeway to choose his or
her responses to any threat to the sovereignty of the State.—The
President has the leeway to choose his or her responses to any
threat to the sovereignty of the State. He or she may call out the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion; or, in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he or she may suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law for a period not exceeding 60 days.
Same; Appropriate Proceedings; View that to equate the
appropriate proceeding to the certiorari action authorized under
Section 5(1), in relation to the second paragraph of Section 1, is
erroneous.—The third paragraph of Section 18 suffices to confer
on the Court the exclusive and original jurisdiction to determine
the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial
law. To equate the appropriate proceeding to the certiorari action
authorized under Section 5(1), in relation to the second paragraph
of Section 1, is erroneous. As earlier pointed out, the third
paragraph of Section 18 defines the legal duty to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law
upon the filing of the petition for the purpose by any citizen. The
Court has then to discharge the duty. The silence of Section 5(1)
on what the appropriate proceeding is should be of no consequence

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because Section 5 is not the sole repository of the cases or

situations coming under the Court’s jurisdiction.
Same; Check-and-Balance; View that the check-and-balance
constitutional design set down in Section 18 of Article VII of the
1987 Constitution establishes a structure of collaboration among
the three (3) great branches of the Government in the matter of the
proclamation of martial law.—The check-and-balance
constitutional design set down in Section 18 of Article VII of the
1987 Constitution establishes a structure of collaboration among
the three great branches of the

 
 
54

Government in the matter of the proclamation of martial law.

Although the power of proclaiming martial law over the country
or any part of it is exclusively lodged in the President, he or she is
nonetheless required to report to Congress on the proclamation,
and Congress shall then decide whether to revoke or extend the
state of martial law. The Court, being a passive institution, may
be called upon to review and determine the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation, and whether the public safety
requires it, only upon the petition for the purpose by any citizen.
The invocation of the third paragraph of Section 18 by the
petitioning citizen suffices to initiate this Court’s power to review
the sufficiency of the factual bases of the declaration of martial
law. This initiation, which triggers the inquiry or review by the
Court, albeit unique, conforms to the constitutional design.
Same; Appropriate Proceedings; View that the appropriate
proceeding, once commenced, should not focus on whether the
President gravely abused his or her discretion or not in
determining the necessity for proclaiming martial law.—The
appropriate proceeding, once commenced, should not focus on
whether the President gravely abused his or her discretion or not
in determining the necessity for proclaiming martial law. Instead,
the 1987 Constitution mandates the Court to examine and sift
through the factual basis relied upon by the President to justify
his proclamation of martial law and to determine whether the
factual basis is sufficient or not. To rule that a finding of grave
abuse of discretion is essential is to confine the discharge of the
duty by the Court within limits not considered at the time of the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Doing so may also produce
impractical results. Consider this hypothetical scenario.
Supposing that the President cites 10 factual bases for his
proclamation of martial law, and the Court, upon its assiduous
review of the factual bases, considers nine of the 10 as
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manufactured or fabricated or inadequate, leaving but one as true

or authentic. Under the thesis of the OSG, the Court would
necessarily nullify the proclamation simply because the President
was found to have gravely abused his or her discretion. The Court
would thereby act indifferently towards the one true or authentic
justification on the ground that the grave abuse of discretion as to
the nine tainted the proclamation.
Same; Same; View that the determination of sufficiency or
insufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial
law is usually a matter of validating the good judgment of the
President of the facts or information known to or made available to
him or her.—The determination of sufficiency or insufficiency of
the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law is usually a
matter of validating the good judgment of the President of the
facts or information known to or made available to him or her.
This goes without saying that such facts must have occurred prior
to or about the time the determination by the President is made.
Whether or not such facts are later shown by subsequent events
to be fabricated or false or inadequate is not a decisive factor
unless the President

 
 
55

is credibly shown to have known of the fabrication or falsity

or inadequacy of the factual bases at the time he or she issued the
proclamation of martial law. In that situation, the main
consideration is definitely not whether or not grave abuse of
discretion intervened.
Same; Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that the third
paragraph of Section 18 tells me that the term appropriate
proceeding is different from the proceedings or actions that the
Supreme Court (SC) may take cognizance of under Section 5(1) or
Section 1.—My reading of the third paragraph of Section 18 tells
me that the term appropriate proceeding is different from the
proceedings or actions that the Court may take cognizance of
under Section 5(1) or Section 1. My foremost reason for so holding
is that the third paragraph of Section 18 textually mandates the
Court to be a trier of facts, an office and function that the Court is
not generally called upon to discharge under either Section 5(1) or
Section 1. It is true that the Court is not always precluded from
reviewing facts. There are occasions when it assumes the role of a
trier of facts, like, to name some, in criminal appeals; in appeals
from rulings of the Court of Appeals in proceedings for the writ of
amparo; or when it sits as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. In
fine, I deem it to be plainly erroneous to subsume the appropriate
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proceeding allowed in the third paragraph of Section 18 to the

certiorari jurisdiction vested by Section 5(1) in relation to the
expanded jurisdiction defined in second paragraph of Section 1.
Same; Same; Same; View that in discharging its
constitutional duty of reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis
for the proclamation of martial law, the Supreme Court (SC)
should be least curtailed by form and formality; Until adequate
rules for the regulation of the appropriate proceeding under the
third paragraph of Section 18 are crafted and promulgated, the
Court should be content with the petitions as they have been filed
in these consolidated cases.—In discharging its constitutional duty
of reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
proclamation of martial law, the Court should be least curtailed
by form and formality. It should dutifully undertake the review
regardless of form and formality. It should also eschew the usual
judicial tools of avoidance, like locus standi and justiciability,
because the task at hand is constitutionally inevitable for the
Court. Until adequate rules for the regulation of the appropriate
proceeding under the third paragraph of Section 18 are crafted
and promulgated, the Court should be content with the petitions
as they have been filed in these consolidated cases.
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; View that the burden of proof to
show that the factual basis of the President in proclaiming martial
law was insufficient has to fall on the shoulders of the citizen
initiating the proceeding.—My view is that the burden of proof to
show that the factual basis of the President in proclaiming
martial law was insufficient has to fall on the shoulders of the
citizen initiating the proceeding. Such laying of the burden of
proof is constitutional, natural

 
 
56

and practical — constitutional, because the President is

entitled to the strong presumption of the constitutionality of his
or her acts as the Chief Executive and head of one of the great
branches of Government; natural, because the dutiful
performance of an official duty by the President is always
presumed; and practical, because the alleging party is expected to
have the proof to substantiate the allegation.
Same; Same; View that where the petitioning citizen has
incorporated or stated in the petition those of the factual bases that
he or she admits, and those that he or she denies because he holds
them to be false or fabricated, or inadequate to justify the
proclamation, specifying the reasons for the denial or for holding

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such factual bases as false, fabricated or inadequate, then the

burden of evidence — as distinguished from the burden of proof —
may be shifted to the Government.—I also suggest future
consideration that where the petitioning citizen has incorporated
or stated in the petition those of the factual bases that he or she
admits, and those that he or she denies because he holds them to
be false or fabricated, or inadequate to justify the proclamation,
specifying the reasons for the denial or for holding such factual
bases as false, fabricated or inadequate, then the burden of
evidence — as distinguished from the burden of proof — may be
shifted to the Government. This process, known in civil procedure
as the specific denial, may be very useful in allocating the duty to
come forward with the evidence.
Same; Same; View that after accepting the factual premises
based on the existence of an actual rebellion fueled by the
movement for secession, and knowing that the rebellion has been
happening in various areas of Mindanao for a long time already, I
agree with the majority that the proclamation of martial law over
the entire Mindanao was warranted.—After accepting the factual
premises based on the existence of an actual rebellion fueled by
the movement for secession, and knowing that the rebellion has
been happening in various areas of Mindanao for a long time
already, I agree with the majority that the proclamation of
martial law over the entire Mindanao was warranted. Indeed, the
local armed groups had formed linkages aimed at committing
rebellion throughout Mindanao, not only in Marawi City, which
was but the starting point for them. Verily, the rest of Mindanao,
even those not under armed conflict at the moment of the
proclamation, were exposed to the same positive danger of the
rebellion that gave rise to the necessity for the proclamation.

Mendoza, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Martial Law; View that martial law is not merely an implied

or necessary power, but a power expressly and categorically
entrusted by the people to the president.—Martial law is a
polarizing concept. On the one hand, it is an extraordinary
constitutional power conferred on the president, which he may

 
 
57

exercise when there is invasion or rebellion and when public

safety requires it. Martial law is not merely an implied or
necessary power, but a power expressly and categorically
entrusted by the people to the president. Yet, an invocation of the

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said power generates a dissonant reaction from various sectors of

the citizenry — some are downright antagonistic. They still
vividly recall how, during the Marcos regime, martial law was
utilized, not as a shield to protect the sovereignty from both
foreign and local threats, but as a mechanism to stifle dissent, to
oppress the opposition, and to plunder the economy. The same
power intended to protect the citizenry from danger was instead
used to violate their constitutional and human rights.
Same; View that in case of invasion or rebellion and when the
public safety requires it, the Supreme Court (SC) cannot just
enjoin the implementation of martial law. It can only do so if the
sufficiency of the factual bases for such declaration cannot be
proven in an appropriate proceeding.—Considering the trauma
sustained by the people during the Marcos regime, the Court
understands the skepticism of some sectors of society. In case of
invasion or rebellion and when the public safety requires it,
however, the Court cannot just enjoin the implementation of
martial law. It can only do so if the sufficiency of the factual bases
for such declaration cannot be proven in an appropriate
proceeding.
Same; View that compared to the past constitutions, the
president’s discretion has been greatly diminished. In the exercise
of his martial law powers, he must at all times observe the
constitutional safeguards.—It is to be noted that the
Constitution does not define what martial law is and what
powers are exactly granted to the president to meet the
exigencies of the moment. Fr. Bernas merely described it as one
similar to the martial law of the American legal system. Thus,
martial law is a fluid and flexible concept, which authorizes the
president to issue orders as the situation may require. For said
reason, it can be said that the president possesses broad powers,
which he may exercise to the best of his discretion. To confine
martial law to a particular definition would limit what the
president could do in order to arrest the problem at hand. This is
not to say, however, that the president has unrestricted powers
whenever he declares martial law. Compared to the past
constitutions, the president’s discretion has been greatly
diminished. In the exercise of his martial law powers, he must at
all times observe the constitutional safeguards. In crafting
the provisions, the Framers sought to establish equilibrium
between the protection of the public from possible abuses and the
president’s prerogative to wield the martial law power.
Same; View that in not giving a positive definition on what
martial law is and merely providing specific restrictions, the
Framers were striking a balance between the right of the State to
protect itself from local and foreign threats and the concern of the
public over the abuse in the exercise of such potent power.—

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Clearly, the Framers were cognizant of the past abuses

prevalent during the Marcos regime when they laid down the
powers of the president under the Commander-in-Chief Clause.
At the same time, they recognized the necessity to provide the
president sufficient elbow room to address critical situations.
Thus, the present Constitution is more stringent and more precise
in contrast to past provisions because it imposed limitations on
the exercise of the martial law power. As can be gleaned from the
Constitution, it did not define what martial law is in order to
make it flexible enough to be an effective tool to address
extraordinary needs during extraordinary times. To my mind, in
not giving a positive definition on what martial law is and merely
providing specific restrictions, the Framers were striking a
balance between the right of the State to protect itself from local
and foreign threats and the concern of the public over the abuse
in the exercise of such potent power. The Framers deemed it wise
to impose safeguards to curtail possible abuses of the martial law
powers without categorically defining martial law as not to
unduly restrict the president.
Same; View that it is the people, through the Constitution,
who entrusted to the president their safety and security.—It must
be borne in mind that it is the people, through the
Constitution, who entrusted to the president their safety
and security. They gave him enough latitude and discernment
on how to execute such emergency powers. If the Framers did
not so cramp him, it is not for the Court to impose
restrictions. To do so is dangerous for it would tie up the
hands of future presidents facing the same, if not more
serious, critical situations. At any rate, the Framers have put
in place several safeguards to prevent violations of the
constitutional and other human rights.
Same; View that one of the important reforms in the present
charter is the removal of the phrase “imminent danger.”—One of
the important reforms in the present charter is the removal of the
phrase “imminent danger.” Thus, at present, martial law may be
declared only when following circumstances concur: (1) there is
actual rebellion or invasion; (2) and the public safety requires it.
Same; Rebellion; View that rebellion, as understood in the
Constitution, is similar to the rebellion contemplated under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).—Rebellion, as understood in the
Constitution, is similar to the rebellion contemplated under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in order for the president to
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declare martial law, he must be satisfied that the following

requisites concur: (1) there must be a public uprising; (2) there
must be taking up arms against the government; (3) with the
objective of removing from the allegiance to the government or its
laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of
any body of land, naval or other armed forces; (4) the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, is deprived of
any of their powers or prerogatives; and (5) the public safety
requires it. In turn, the initial determination of

 
 
59

the president must be scrutinized by the Court if any citizen

challenges said declaration.
Same; Commander-in-Chief Powers; View that the
Commander-in-Chief Clause granted the president a sequence of
graduated powers, from the least to the most benign, namely: (1)
the calling out power; (2) the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and (3) the power to declare martial law.—
The Commander-in-Chief Clause granted the president a
sequence of graduated powers, from the least to the most benign,
namely: (1) the calling out power; (2) the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (3) the power to declare
martial law. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338
SCRA 81 (2000), the Court explained the supplementary role of
the military in the exercise of the president’s calling out power.
Same; Same; View that although the Commander-in-Chief
Clause grants him graduated powers, it merely pertains to the
intensity of the different powers from the least benign (calling out
powers) to the most stringent (the power to declare martial law),
and the concomitant safeguards attached thereto. The Constitution
does not require that the different powers under the Commander-
in-Chief Clause be exercised sequentially.—Under the calling out
power, the president merely summons the armed forces to aid him
in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. The
military merely supplements the police forces, with the latter
having supervision over the former. It is not, however, required
that the president must first resort to his calling out power before
he can declare martial law. Although the Commander-in-Chief
Clause grants him graduated powers, it merely pertains to the
intensity of the different powers from the least benign (calling out
powers) to the most stringent (the power to declare martial law),
and the concomitant safeguards attached thereto. The
Constitution does not require that the different powers under the
Commander-in-Chief Clause be exercised sequentially.
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Same; Same; View that so long as the requirements under the

Constitution are met, the president may choose which power to
exercise in order to address the issues arising from the emergency.
—So long as the requirements under the Constitution are
met, the president may choose which power to exercise in
order to address the issues arising from the emergency. In
other words, when there is sufficient factual basis for the
declaration of martial law, the president can resort to the most
awesome power granted under the Commander-in-Chief Clause.
He cannot be faulted for not resorting to his calling out power if
he finds that the situation requires a stronger action. When the
president declares martial law, he, in effect, declares that the
military shall take a more active role in the suppression of
invasion or rebellion in the affected areas. The armed forces can
conduct operations on their own without any command or
guidance from the police.

 
 
60

Same; Same; View that as can be gleaned from the

deliberations, the power of the Supreme Court (SC) to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law
was precisely included to remove from the president the unbridled
prerogative to determine the necessity thereof.—As can be gleaned
from the deliberations, the power of the Court to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law
was precisely included to remove from the president the unbridled
prerogative to determine the necessity thereof. It is a
precautionary measure to prevent a repeat of possible abuses in
cases where the awesome power to declare martial law rests only
on one individual. Consequently, the Executive Department
cannot hide behind the cloak of the political question doctrine
because the Constitution itself mandated the review, thus,
unquestionably justiciable.
Same; View that in times of emergencies, our Constitution
demands that the Supreme Court (SC) repose a certain amount of
faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive, but
at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully
prescribed procedural limitations.—The question as to the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law
and the manner by which the president executes it pursuant to
such declaration are entirely different. The Court, upon finding
that the factual basis is sufficient, cannot substitute the
president’s judgment for its own. “In times of emergencies, our
Constitution demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in
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the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive, but at the
same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed
procedural limitations.”
Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) can act on any
petition questioning such sufficiency independently of the
congressional power to revoke.—There is nothing in the
constitutional provisions or the deliberations which provide that it
is only after Congress fails or refuses to act can the Court exercise
its power to review. I am of the position that the Court can act on
any petition questioning such sufficiency independently of the
congressional power to revoke.
Same; View that when the parties are not in an equal position
with respect to the evidence to prove a negative fact, then, the party
denying the negative fact is bound to establish its existence.—
Indeed, “he who alleges, not he who denies, must prove.” This
rule, however, exists in recognition of the fact that in most court
proceedings, he who puts forth an allegation is, in all probability,
in possession of documents or other pieces of evidence to
substantiate his claim. It is not, however, without an exception. If
a party’s case depends upon the establishment of a negative fact,
and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of
each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring
the negative fact. To put it in another way, when the parties are
not in an equal position with respect to the evidence to prove a
negative fact, then, the party denying the negative fact is bound
to establish its existence.

 
 
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Same; Probable Cause; View that in the ponencia, it has been

written that probable cause is the allowable standard of proof as
the President needs only to convince himself that there is evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a rebellion has been committed
or being committed.—In the ponencia, it has been written that
probable cause is the allowable standard of proof as the President
needs only to convince himself that there is evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a rebellion has been committed or
being committed. Others are of the view that as the Court
exercises its certiorari jurisdiction, the point to determine should
be arbitrariness, as enunciated in Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA
448 (1971).
Same; Same; View that the president establishes the existence
of rebellion or invasion, not as a crime for purposes of prosecution
against the accused, but merely as a factual occurrence to justify

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his declaration of martial law.—“For purposes of filing a criminal

information, probable cause has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. It is
such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in
the Information, or any offense included therein, has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by
the suspect.” Accordingly, in a criminal case, it is necessary that a
crime has been committed. In contrast, the president establishes
the existence of rebellion or invasion, not as a crime for purposes
of prosecution against the accused, but merely as a factual
occurrence to justify his declaration of martial law. If the
president has sufficient and strong basis that a rebellion has been
planned and the rebels had started to commit acts in furtherance
thereof, he can already command the military to take action
against the rebels.
Same; Same; View that unlike in the executive or judicial
determination of probable cause, the president may rely on
information or intelligence even without personally examining the
source.—This is to say that the president is afforded much leeway
in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law. Unlike in the executive or judicial
determination of probable cause, the president may rely on
information or intelligence even without personally examining the
source. He may depend on the information supplied by his
subordinates, and, on the basis thereof, determine whether the
circumstances warrant the declaration of martial law. While the
president is still required to faithfully comply with the twin
requirements of actual rebellion and the necessity of public safety,
he is not bound by the technical rules observed in the
determination of probable cause.
Same; Same; View that I fully concur with the ponencia that
the proclamation of martial law by the President has sufficient
factual basis. First, it has been

 
 
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unquestionably established that the Islamic State of Iraq and

Syria (ISIS)-linked local groups had planned to, and did, invade
Marawi City. Second, they were heavily armed and posed a
dangerous threat against government forces. Third, the occupation
by the ISIS-linked groups paralyzed the normal functions of
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Marawi and caused the death and displacement of several Marawi

residents. Fourth, they sought to sever Marawi from the allegiance
of the government with the goal of establishing a wilayah in the
region.—Guided by the above mentioned standard, I fully concur
with the ponencia that the proclamation of martial law by the
President has sufficient factual basis. First, it has been
unquestionably established that the ISIS-linked local groups had
planned to, and did, invade Marawi City. Second, they were
heavily armed and posed a dangerous threat against government
forces. Third, the occupation by the ISIS-linked groups paralyzed
the normal functions of Marawi and caused the death and
displacement of several Marawi residents. Fourth, they sought to
sever Marawi from the allegiance of the government with the goal
of establishing a wilayah in the region. The intention of the rebels
to isolate and sever Marawi from the government is evident from
the video retrieved by the military from their initial operations in
Marawi. In the said video, it can be seen that Hapilon, together
with other unidentified members, were listening in closely as
Abdullah Maute was giving directions or suggestions on how to
commence and execute their planned offensive. In particular, they
sought to isolate Marawi so that it could be used as their center of
operation to access all points in Mindanao.
Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) cannot order the
authorities to lift martial law in this appropriate proceeding
because the judicial review, provided in the Constitution as a
mechanism to check abuses, is limited only to the ascertainment of
the sufficiency of the factual basis. When there is no longer any
basis to continue the imposition of martial law, the remedy is to
file a certiorari petition to question the arbitrariness of the
assessment to prolong the period.—The nation is fortunate that
the country has a decisive president who took immediate action to
prevent the expansion of the rebellion to other areas. At a great
price, its spread to other areas was checked. If it has indeed been
contained, the Court, however, cannot order the authorities
to lift martial law in this appropriate proceeding because
the judicial review, provided in the Constitution as a
mechanism to check abuses, is limited only to the
ascertainment of the sufficiency of the factual basis. When
there is no longer any basis to continue the imposition of
martial law, the remedy is to file a  certiorari  petition to
question the arbitrariness of the assessment to prolong the
period.
Same; View that under the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the
president may declare martial law in the Philippines or in any part
thereof; There is no constitutional provision suggesting that martial law
may only be declared in areas

 
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where actual hostilities are taking place.—Under the

Commander-in-Chief Clause, the president may declare martial
law in the Philippines or in any part thereof. Thus, it is
understood that the president has the discretion to determine the
territorial scope of the coverage as long as the constitutional
requirements are met. In other words, there must be concurrence
of an actual rebellion or invasion and the necessity for public
safety. There is no constitutional provision suggesting that
martial law may only be declared in areas where actual hostilities
are taking place. The president must be given much leeway in
deciding what is reasonably necessary to successfully quash such
rebellion or invasion. As Commander-in-Chief, he has under his
command the various intelligence networks operating in the
country and knows what is needed and where it is needed.
Same; View that restricting the operation of the armed forces
within the confines of Marawi City would be ineffective in quelling
the uprising. The insurgents would simply cross city borders and
be beyond the reach of the martial law authorities, who would not
be able to exercise martial law powers.—Restricting the operation
of the armed forces within the confines of Marawi City would be
ineffective in quelling the uprising. The insurgents would simply
cross city borders and be beyond the reach of the martial law
authorities, who would not be able to exercise martial law powers.
They will not be able to arrest any of them, unless they have
personal knowledge of what the rebels have just committed, are
committing or about to commit. Certainly, this is not what the
Framers intended in including the martial law provisions in our
Constitution. First and foremost in their minds were the security,
safety, and territorial integrity of the country.

Reyes, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Martial Law; View that the government, particularly the

President, should be accorded extensive authority and discretion
when what is at stake is the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the State.—“The right of a government to maintain its existence is
the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty. To protect the nation’s
continued existence, from external as well as internal threats, the
government ‘is invested with all those inherent and implied
powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were
generally considered to belong to every government as such, and
as being essential to the exercise of its functions.’” The
government, particularly the President, should be accorded
extensive authority and discretion when what is at stake is the
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sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State. The measures

undertaken by the President in such cases should enjoy the
widest latitude of constitutional interpretation, tempered only by
reason, lest the government be stymied and rendered inutile.
Constitutional Law; Commander-in-Chief Powers; View that
at the center of the controversy in this case is a proper
interpretation of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution,
which outlines the President’s Commander-in-Chief

 
 
64

powers, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces;
second, the power to declare martial law; and third, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.—At the center
of the controversy in this case is a proper interpretation of Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, which outlines the
President’s Commander-in-Chief powers, i.e., first, the power to
call out the armed forces; second, the power to declare martial
law; and third, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The power to call out the armed forces may only be
exercised if it is necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. On the other hand, the power to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
entails a more stringent requisite — it necessitates the existence
of actual invasion or rebellion and may only be invoked when
public safety necessitates it.
Same; Same; Rebellion; View that in rebellion, it is not enough
that there be a public uprising and taking arms against the
Government, it must be shown that the purpose of the uprising or
movement is either: first, to remove from the allegiance to the
Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part
thereof or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
second, to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.—In rebellion, it
is not enough that there be a public uprising and taking arms
against the Government, it must be shown that the purpose of the
uprising or movement is either: first, to remove from the
allegiance to the Government or its laws the territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof or any body of land, naval, or
other armed forces; or second, to deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives.
Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that it is in
the President alone that the Constitution vests the powers to

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declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus subject to the aforementioned requisites.—It is in the
President alone that the Constitution vests the powers to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
subject to the aforementioned requisites. Accordingly, contrary to
the petitioners’ suppositions, the recommendation of the
Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) or of any
other high-ranking officials of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) is not a condition precedent to the declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Further, when the President declares martial law or suspends the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he is inevitably exercising a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. The President, as
Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive on whom is committed
the responsibility of preserving the very survival of the State, is
empowered, indeed obliged, to preserve the State against
domestic violence and foreign attack. In the discharge of that
duty, he necessarily is accorded a very broad authority and
discretion in ascertaining the nature and extent of the danger
that confronts the nation and in selecting the means or

 
 
65

measures necessary for the preservation of the safety of the

Republic. Indeed, whether actual invasion or rebellion exists is a
question better addressed to the President, who under the
Constitution is the authority vested with the power of
ascertaining the existence of such exigencies and charged with the
responsibility of suppressing them. His actions in the face of such
emergency must be viewed in the context of the situation as it
then confronted him.
Same; Same; Same; View that in declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
only needs to be convinced that there is probable cause of the
existence of an invasion or rebellion.—In declaring martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President only needs to be convinced that there is probable cause
of the existence of an invasion or rebellion. To require a higher
standard of evidence would amount to an unnecessary restriction
on the President’s use of exclusive prerogatives under Section 18
of Article VII of the Constitution. Probable cause is a reasonable
ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded
on such a state of facts as would lead a person of ordinary caution
and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean actual or
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positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely

based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is enough that it is
believed, given the state of facts, that an actual invasion or
rebellion indeed exists.
Same; Same; Same; View that it would be unreasonable and
utterly baseless to require the President to first exercise his calling
out power and treat the same as a condition precedent to the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.—The President, in case of the
extraordinary circumstances mentioned in Section 18 of Article
VII of the Constitution, has broad discretionary powers to
determine what course of action he should take to defend and
preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State or
any part thereof. Thus, it would be unreasonable and utterly
baseless to require the President to first exercise his calling out
power and treat the same as a condition precedent to the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
Same; Same; View that martial law entails a substitution of
the military in the performance of executive functions, including
the maintenance of peace and order and the enforcement of laws
relative to the protection of lives and properties, which is normally
a function of the Philippine National Police (PNP).—The
imposition of martial law, however, “does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment
of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function x x x.” It does involve the
substitution of the military in the civilian functions of
government, except, by express terms of the Constitution, the by
express terms of the Constitution, the performance of legislative
and judicial performance of legislative and judicial functions. In
other words, martial law entails a substitution of the military in
the performance of executive

 
 
66

functions, including the maintenance of peace and order and

the enforcement of laws relative to the protection of lives and
properties, which is normally a function of the Philippine
National Police (PNP). Otherwise stated, during a state of martial
law, the military personnel take over the functions, inter alia, of
the PNP.

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Martial Law; Appropriate Proceeding; View that contrary to

the respondents’ assertion, the term “appropriate proceeding”
under Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution could not have
referred to a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.—I agree with the majority opinion that the term
“appropriate proceeding,” refers to a sui generis proceeding, which
is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction of the Court laid
down under Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, contrary to
the respondents’ assertion, the term “appropriate proceeding”
under Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution could not have
referred to a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The “appropriate proceeding” under Section 18, unlike a
certiorari suit, must be resolved by the Court within 30 days from
the institution of the action. More importantly, as articulated by
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, certiorari is an extraordinary
remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. What
is at issue in the “appropriate proceeding” referred to under
Section 18 is only the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Same; Burden of Proof; View that the petitioners have burden
of proof to show that the President’s declaration of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus lacks
sufficient factual basis.—As already stated, the petitioners have
burden of proof to show that the President’s declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
lacks sufficient factual basis. First, as a general rule, official acts
enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the presumption may be
overthrown only by evidence to the contrary. When an act is
official, a presumption of regularity exists because of the
assumption that the law tells the official what his duties are and
that he discharged these duties accordingly. The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence
of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption
is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Second, it is elementary that
he who alleges a fact must prove it, and a mere allegation is not
evidence, and since the petitioners allege that there is no factual
basis to support the said declaration and suspension, they are
bound to prove their allegations.
Same; Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Hearsay Evidence Rule;
View that the petitioners failed to prove that the President had
insufficient basis in declaring

 
 

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67

martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus in the whole of Mindanao; A perusal of the petitioners’
allegations shows that the same are merely based on various
newspaper reports on the ongoing armed fighting in Marawi City
between the government forces and elements of the Maute Group.—
The petitioners failed to prove that the President had insufficient
basis in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. It is incumbent
upon the petitioners to present credible evidence to prove that the
President’s declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had insufficient basis.
However, a perusal of the petitioners’ allegations shows that the
same are merely based on various newspaper reports on the on-
going armed fighting in Marawi City between the government
forces and elements of the Maute Group. However, newspaper
articles amount to “hearsay evidence, twice removed” and are
therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value
at all.
Hearsay Evidence Rule; Newspaper Articles; View that a
newspaper article is admissible only as evidence that such
publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated, but
not as to the truth of the matters stated therein.—A newspaper
article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does
exist with the tenor of the news therein stated, but not as to the
truth of the matters stated therein. Hearsay evidence is that kind
of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit
to be attached to the witness himself, but rests also in part on the
veracity and competency of some other person from whom the
witness received his information. By itself, and as repeatedly
conveyed by jurisprudential policy, hearsay evidence is devoid of
merit, irrespective of any objection from the adverse party.
Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus are official acts of the President, exercised
pursuant to the Commander-in-Chief powers accorded to him by
no less than the Constitution.—The declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are official
acts of the President, exercised pursuant to the Commander-in-
Chief powers accorded to him by no less than the Constitution. As
such, the same enjoys the presumption of regularity, which is
conclusive unless clear and convincing evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty is adduced. There is none in this case,
however, except for hearsay evidence consisting of the unverified
newspaper articles; the petitioners’ allegations vis-à-vis the
supposed irregularity in the declaration and suspension cannot be
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justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any

evidentiary or probative value in this jurisdiction.
Same; Same; View that the President, in declaring martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the whole of Mindanao, had probable cause to believe that the
armed insurgents in Marawi City and the rest

 
 
68

of Mindanao are mounting a rebellion against the State and

are not merely engaged in armed hostilities.—The President, in
declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, had probable cause to
believe that the armed insurgents in Marawi City and the rest of
Mindanao are mounting a rebellion against the State and are not
merely engaged in armed hostilities. It should be noted that the
President had previously issued Proclamation No. 55 on
September 4, 2016, which declared a state of national emergency
on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. Part of the reasons
for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent
acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on
military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing
and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi
City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other
detainees.
Same; Same; Commander-in-Chief Powers; View that it would
be unreasonable to wait for a territory of the Philippines to be
actually removed from the allegiance to the Government before the
President may be authorized to exercise his Commander-in-Chief
powers.—It cannot be gainsaid that the President had reasonable
belief that the hostilities in Marawi City is not merely an armed
public uprising, but is already a realization of the rebel groups’
plan to mount a full scale rebellion in Mindanao. Surely, the
President may not be faulted for using everything in his arsenal
of powers to deal with the exigencies of the situation; more so
considering that what is at stake is the very sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which the President is duty-
bound to preserve and protect. It would be unreasonable to wait
for a territory of the Philippines to be actually removed from the
allegiance to the Government before the President may be
authorized to exercise his Commander-in-Chief powers.
Same; Same; Same; View that it would be the height of
absurdity to expect the President to dawdle around and wait for
the armed attacks by the rebel groups to reach the neighboring

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cities of Marawi and the rest of the provinces of Mindanao before

he exercise his power to declare martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.—The contention that the
coverage of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should have been limited
only to Marawi City is utterly baseless. To stress, the conduct of
the rebel groups at the time of the siege of Marawi City, and even
prior thereto, coupled with the aforementioned military
intelligence reports in the possession of the President, are
sufficient bases to engender a reasonable belief that the Marawi
City is but a staging ground for the widespread armed attacks in
the whole of Mindanao, with the ultimate objective being the
establishment of an ISIS caliphate therein and, thus, removing
Mindanao from the allegiance to the Government. Given the
foregoing considerations, it would be the height of absurdity to
expect the President to dawdle around and wait for the armed
attacks by the rebel groups to reach the

 
 
69

neighboring cities of Marawi and the rest of the provinces of

Mindanao before he exercise his power to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas caround and wait for
the armed attacks by the rebel groups to reach theorpus.
Same; Same; View that the ghosts of the past should not
impede the resolution of our current predicament. The country is
facing an actual rebellion in Mindanao; no amount of denial
would make the rebellious insurgency in Mindanao wither away.
—It cannot be emphasized enough that sovereignty and territorial
integrity, which are in danger of being undermined in cases of
invasion or rebellion, are indispensable to the very existence of
the State. It is therefore the primordial duty of the President,
within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, to exercise all
means necessary and proper to protect and preserve the State’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The President should thus be
allowed wide latitude of discretion dealing with extraordinary
predicament such as invasion or rebellion. The petitioners’
apprehensions regarding the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is quite
understandable given the abuses that were committed when the
same measures were implemented in the Philippines a few
decades back supposedly to address the threat of communist
insurgency. Nevertheless, the ghosts of the past should not
impede the resolution of our current predicament. The country is

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facing an actual rebellion in Mindanao; no amount of denial would

make the rebellious insurgency in Mindanao wither away.
Same; Same; View that the President’s powers to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
are retained in the 1987 Constitution by the framers thereof for a
reason — they are effective measures to quell invasion or rebellion
and are thus necessary for the protection and preservation of the
State’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.—The President’s
powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus are retained in the 1987 Constitution by the
framers thereof for a reason — they are effective measures to
quell invasion or rebellion and are thus necessary for the
protection and preservation of the State’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity. In any case, whatever the misgivings the
petitioners may have as regards the present declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, suffice it to say that the 1987 Constitution, unlike the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has placed enough safeguards to
ensure that the ghosts of the past would no longer return to haunt
us.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J., Separate Opinion:

Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Appropriate

Proceedings; View that the term “appropriate proceeding” can only
be classified as a sui generis proceeding that is exclusively peculiar
to this Court’s special jurisdiction to review the factual basis of a
martial law declaration.—It is my view that the term “appro-

 
 
70

priate proceeding” can only be classified as a sui generis

proceeding that is exclusively peculiar to this Court’s special
jurisdiction to review the factual basis of a martial law
declaration. Being a class of its own, it cannot therefore be
equated or even approximated to any of our usual modes of
review, such as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court (which is an appeal) or a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 (which is a special civil action). Clearly, a petition
based on Section 18, Article VII is not an appeal to review errors
committed by a lower court; neither is it a special civil action for it
is in fact, attributed as a type of “proceeding.”
Same; Same; Same; View that a petition anchored on Section
18, Article VII is a case originally filed before the Supreme Court
(SC), or that it would eventually result in the nullification of a
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governmental act does not — as it should not — mean that it can

be classified as an action for certiorari.—That a petition anchored
on Section 18, Article VII is a case originally filed before this
Court, or that it would eventually result in the nullification of a
governmental act does not — as it should not — mean that it can
be classified as an action for certiorari. The similarities between
the two begin and end there. As earlier stated, a Section 18,
Article VII petition carries no cause of action and is instead, a
proceeding meant to establish a particular factual basis. This
fundamental difference alone already precludes the above
supposition. Besides, other cases, such as for prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, are equally
impressed with the feature of being originally filed before the
Court, yet their nature and parameters remain conceptually
distinct from one another. Meanwhile, the resulting nullification
of a martial law proclamation (if so found by this Court to rest on
insufficient factual basis) is not a conclusion exclusive to an action
for certiorari; rather, the proclamation would be nullified on the
ground that it violates the requirements of the Constitution. In
fine, the cosmetic similarities between a Section 18, Article VII
proceeding and a certiorari action are not valid reasons to
confound the nature of the former with the latter.
Same; Same; Same; View that since Section 18, Article VII
petition is a sui generis proceeding, the usual standards of review,
such as to determine errors of judgment in a Rule 45 petition, or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in a Rule 65 petition, should therefore find no
application.—Since Section 18, Article VII petition is a sui generis
proceeding, the usual standards of review, such as to determine
errors of judgment in a Rule 45 petition, or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in a Rule 65
petition, should therefore find no application. The standards used
in Rule 45 and Rule 65 petitions trace their jurisdictional bases
from Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) is not
called on to exercise its expanded power of judicial review to
determine “whether or not there

 
 
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has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government”; rather, the Supreme Court is called to exercise
its special jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the
President’s factual basis in declaring martial law.—The Court is
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not called on to exercise its expanded power of judicial review to

determine “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”; rather, the
Court is called to exercise its special jurisdiction to determine the
sufficiency of the President’s factual basis in declaring martial
law. This parameter of review is not only explicit in Section 18,
Article VII; it is, in fact, self-evident. Thus, all the more should
this Court debunk the notion that the “appropriate proceeding”
under Section 18, Article VII is a certiorari action with the
parameter of grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; View that probable cause, being
merely “premised on common sense, is the most reasonable, most
practical, and most expedient standard by which the President can
fully ascertain the existence or nonexistence of rebellion, necessary
for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ,” my view
that the purpose of and vantage point assumed by a prosecutor or
judge in a determination of probable cause are fundamentally
different from the purpose of and vantage point assumed by the
President when he proclaims martial law.—The same holds true
for the evidentiary threshold of probable cause, which is but “the
amount of proof required for the filing of a criminal information
by the prosecutor and for the issuance of an arrest warrant by a
judge.” Probable cause is ascertained from the vantage point of a
“reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense
charged in the Information or any offense included therein has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.” “In
determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the
rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He
[merely] relies on common sense.” While it had been previously
opined that probable cause, being merely “premised on common
sense, is the most reasonable, most practical, and most expedient
standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence
or nonexistence of rebellion, necessary for a declaration of martial
law or suspension of the writ,” it is my view that the purpose of
and vantage point assumed by a prosecutor or judge in a
determination of probable cause are fundamentally different from
the purpose of and vantage point assumed by the President when
he proclaims martial law. Verily, the standard of probable cause
cannot be applied to the decision-making process of the highest-
ranking public official in the country, who, through credible
information gathered by means of the executive machinery, is not
only tasked to determine the existence of an actual rebellion but
must also calibrate if the demands of public safety require a
martial law proclamation.

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Same; Same; Sufficient Factual Basis; View that the

deliberations, and more significantly, the actual text of Section 18,
Article VII do not reflect the insinuation that the term “sufficient
factual basis” is equivalent to the gauge of arbitrariness, as
espoused in Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971) and Aquino,
Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974).—These past constitutional
provisions on martial law do not reflect the Court’s power to
“review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof” under the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, the variance in the
constitutional context under which Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA
448 (1971) and Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974), were
decided negates the notion that the Framers of the 1987
Constitution applied the pronouncements made in those cases
when they were crafting a novel constitutional provision which
had no existing equivalent at that time. Thus, it is my impression
that there could have been no contemporary construction of the
term “sufficient factual basis” in reference to the Lansang and
Aquino, Jr. pronouncements. At any rate, the deliberations, and
more significantly, the actual text of Section 18, Article VII do not
reflect the insinuation that the term “sufficient factual basis” is
equivalent to the gauge of arbitrariness, as espoused in Lansang
and Aquino, Jr. If such was their intention, then the Framers
should have so indicated. Instead, the Framers created a new
safeguard under Section 18, Article VII to effectively prevent the
aberration of a Marcosian martial law from again happening in
our country.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) should
construe the term “sufficient factual basis” in its generic sense.—I
submit that this Court should therefore construe the term
“sufficient factual basis” in its generic sense. “[T]he general rule
in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that, in the
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given
their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning; the words
should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary,
commonly accepted usage, and without resorting to forced or
subtle construction. Words are presumed to have been employed
by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and
acceptation.” Moreover, “a word of general signification employed
in a statute should be construed, in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, to comprehend not only peculiar conditions
obtaining at the time of its enactment but those that may
normally arise after its approval as well. This rule of construction,
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known as progressive interpretation, extends by construction the

application of a statute to all subjects or conditions within its
general purpose or scope that come into existence subsequent to
its passage, and thus keeps legislation from becoming ephemeral
and transitory.”
Same; Same; Rebellion; View that the deliberations of the
Framers of the 1987 Constitution make it sufficiently clear that
there must be an actual rebellion and not merely an imminent
danger thereof, which was formerly, a ground to impose martial
law under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions but demonstrably

 
 
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deleted in the present Constitution.—The deliberations of the

Framers of the 1987 Constitution make it sufficiently clear that
there must be an actual rebellion and not merely an imminent
danger thereof, which was formerly, a ground to impose martial
law under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions but demonstrably
deleted in the present Constitution. Fr. Bernas explained that the
phrase “imminent danger thereof” “could cover a multitude of sins
and could be a source of a tremendous amount of irresistible
temptation. And so, to better protect the liberties of the people, we
preferred to eliminate that.”
Same; Same; Same; Continuing Crimes; View that rebellion
has been also classified as a “continuing crime.” A continuing
crime or delito continuado is “a single crime consisting of a series
of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not
susceptible of division.”—The nature of rebellion as a
movement is the reason why, as jurisprudence states, this
crime “cannot be confined a priori within predetermined
bounds.” A “movement” has been defined as “a series of
organized activities working toward an objective; also: an
organized effort to promote or attain an end.” Complementary to
this attribution, rebellion has been also classified as a “continuing
crime.” A continuing crime or delito continuado is “a single crime
consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal
resolution or intent not susceptible of division.”
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Absorption; View that being a
movement involving a plurality of acts, which, however, is
animated by a single criminal resolution or intent, common crimes
committed in furtherance of the rebellion are deemed absorbed.—
Anent its temporality, a “continuing offense” has been
characterized as “a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set
on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent

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force, however long a time it may occupy.” It is “[o]ne

consisting of a continuous series of acts which endures after the
period of consummation x x x.” Being a movement involving a
plurality of acts, which, however, is animated by a single criminal
resolution or intent, common crimes committed in furtherance of
the rebellion are deemed absorbed. In the landmark case of People
v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956), this Court classified rebellion
as a political crime and explained the doctrine of absorption:
[P]olitical crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to
achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or
motive. If a crime usually regarded as common like homicide, is
perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance “to
the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
thereof,” then said offense becomes stripped of its “common”
complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of
rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
Same; Same; View that the President would then have ample
discretion to determine the territorial extent of martial law,
provided, that the requirement of

 
 
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public safety justifies this extent.—The President would
then have ample discretion to determine the territorial
extent of martial law, provided, that the requirement of
public safety justifies this extent. Since as above
discussed rebellion, by nature, defies spatial
limitability, the territorial scope of martial law
becomes pertinent to Section 18, Article VII’s second
(when public safety requires) and not its first
requirement (actual rebellion). By these premises, it is
also erroneous to think that the territorial extent of martial
law should be only confined to the area/s where the actual
exchange of fire between the rebels and government forces
is happening. To reiterate, rebellion is, by nature, a
movement; it is much more than the actual taking up of
arms. While the armed public uprising consummates the
crime for purposes of prosecuting the accused under the
RPC, its legal existence is not confined by it. It is a complex
net of intrigues and plots, a movement that ceases only
until the rebellion is quelled. Commissioner Regalado had,
in fact, observed that it is not necessary for an armed

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public uprising to happen “all over the country” so as to

consider the situation “within the ambit of rebellion.”
Same; Same; View that the territorial extent of martial
law is therefore malleable in nature, as it should always be
relative to the exigencies of the situation.—It is this second
requirement of public safety which determines the
territorial coverage of martial law. The phrase “when the
public safety requires it” under Section 18, Article VII is
similarly uncharted in our jurisprudence. Since it has not
been technically defined, the term “public safety” may be
likewise construed under its common acceptation — that is,
“[t]he welfare and protection of the general public, usually
expressed as a governmental responsibility.” For its part,
“public welfare” has been defined as “[a] society’s well-
being in matters of health, safety, order, morality,
economics and politics.” Under Section 18, Article VII, the
obvious danger against public safety and the society’s well-
being is the existence of an actual invasion or rebellion.
Adopting the generic definition of the term “public safety,”
it may then be concluded that the phrase “when the public
safety requires it” under Section 18, Article VII would refer
to the government’s responsibility to declare martial law in
a particular territory as may be reasonably necessary to
successfully quell the invasion or rebellion. In this sense,
the territorial extent of martial law is therefore malleable
in nature, as it should always be relative to the exigencies
of the situation.
Same; View that no one except the President is given the
authority to impose martial law. By necessary implication,
only he has the power to delimit its territorial bounds.—
Under our prevailing constitutional order, no one except
the President is given the authority to impose martial law.
By necessary implication, only he has the power to delimit
its territorial bounds. In the case of Spouses Constantino,
Jr. v. Cuisia, 472 SCRA 505 (2005), the Court had occasion
to discuss the extraordinary nature of the President’s
power to declare martial
 
 

75

law, stating that the exercise thereof, among others, call for
the supersedence of executive prerogatives.
Same; Calling Out Power; View that in the exercise of the
power to call [(as well as the power to declare martial law)], on-
the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction
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of property.—While the Court’s power under Section 18, Article

VII is designed as an important check to the President’s martial
law power, the reality is that this Court carries no technical
competence to assess the merits of a particular military strategy.
Meanwhile, “the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the
state. In the exercise of the power to call [(as well as the power to
declare martial law)], on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human
lives and mass destruction of property.”
Same; View that based on military intelligence, Hapilon
performed a symbolic hijra or pilgrimage to unite with the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-linked groups in mainland
Mindanao.—Based on military intelligence, Hapilon performed a
symbolic hijra or pilgrimage to unite with the ISIS-linked groups
in mainland Mindanao. This was geared towards realizing the
five step process of establishing a wilayah, which are: first, the
pledging of allegiance to the Islamic State; second, the unification
of all terrorist groups who have given bay’ah or their pledge of
allegiance; third, the holding of consultations to nominate a
wali or a governor of a province; fourth, the achievement
of consolidation for the caliphate through the conduct of
widespread atrocities and uprisings all across Mindanao;
and finally, the presentation of all these to the ISIS leadership for
approval or recognition. In this light, the OSG asserted that the
ISIS had already appointed Hapilon as the emir in the
Philippines, which is the third step in the establishment of
wilayah in Mindanao. This fact was validated through an
announcement in the ISIS weekly newsletter, Al Naba, and
confirmed in a June 21, 2016 video by ISIS entitled “The Solid
Structure.” Notably, the foregoing evidence belie petitioners’
supposition, based once more on an uncorroborated news article,
that “the Maute Group is more of the clan’s private militia
latching into the IS brand to inflate perceived capability.”
Same; Rebellion; View that the government has established
that an actual rebellion (and not merely an imminent danger
thereof) already exists at the time President Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216. The May 23, 2017 Marawi siege is evidently
an armed public uprising, which motive is to further the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS’s) global agenda of establishing a
wilayah in Mindanao, and in so doing, remove from the allegiance
of the Philippine Government or its laws, the aforesaid territory.—
The government has established that an actual rebellion (and not
merely an imminent danger thereof) already

 
 
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exists at the time President Duterte issued Proclamation No.

216. The May 23, 2017 Marawi siege is evidently an armed public
uprising, which motive is to further the ISIS’s global agenda of
establishing a wilayah in Mindanao, and in so doing, remove from
the allegiance of the Philippine Government or its laws, the
aforesaid territory. Furthermore, it was amply demonstrated that
the incidents in furtherance thereof would deprive the Chief
Executive wholly or partially, of his powers or prerogatives. As
the President correctly explained, the events of May 23, 2017
“constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to
establish the groups’ seat of power in Marawi City for their
planned establishment of a DAESH [wilayah] or province
covering the entire Mindanao.” “The cutting of vital lines for
transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to
further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed
consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the
decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the
brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced,
and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually
the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government.”
Accordingly, “[t]here exists no doubt that lawless armed groups
are attempting to deprive the President of his power, authority
and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading
their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to
undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and
offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are
faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local
governments.”
Same; Same; View that President Duterte’s imposition of
martial law over the whole of Mindanao is rationally
proportionate to meet the exigencies of the situation at the time he
made such declaration.—The second requirement of public safety
was met. It is my opinion that President Duterte’s imposition of
martial law over the whole of Mindanao is rationally
proportionate to meet the exigencies of the situation at the time
he made such declaration. Without a doubt, the potency of the
ISIS threat to complete its mission in establishing a wilayah here
is a public safety concern, which affects not only Marawi City but
the entire Mindanao. Again, as uncovered through unrefuted
intelligence reports, the ISIS is already on the third step of this
establishment process. The next step would be the consolidation
for the caliphate through the conduct of widespread atrocities and
uprisings all across Mindanao. Surely, the President could not sit
idly by and wait for the ISIS’s plan to reach its full fruition before
declaring martial law in order to respond to this exigent situation.

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More so, the historical actuations of the Maute Group and ISIS-
related Groups, as well as that of the ISIS itself, showcase that
the danger to Mindanao is not only apparent but real. In other
words, a widespread outbreak of violence, if left unpacified, looms
in the horizon.
Same; Same; View that considering the network and alliance-
building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals, and
lawless armed men, the siege

 
 
77

of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing

goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao.—It is
important to note that the source of the Maute Group’s support
does not merely remain local. The main ISIS caliphate abroad,
which is one of the world’s richest organizations according to the
UN, including its other cell groups all over the world, can be
variably tapped as funding or arms sources. In this regard,
President Duterte aptly stated that “[t]he taking up of arms by
lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by
foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant
acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao,
have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in
Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the
entire Island of Mindanao.” “Considering the network and
alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local
criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a
vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control
over the entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift
and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the
Filipino people and preserve our national integrity.”

Leonen, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Martial Law; Terrorism; View that terrorism does not merit a

vague declaration of martial law and in a wide undefined
geographical area containing other localities where no act of
terrorism exists.—Terrorism merits calibrated legal and political
responses executed by the decisive and professional actions of our
coercive forces. The Constitution, properly read in the context of
all its provisions and in the light of our history, does not allow a
vague declaration of martial law which contains no indication as
to who it actually empowers and what fundamental rights will be
suspended or bargained. Terrorism does not merit a vague

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declaration of martial law and in a wide undefined geographical

area containing other localities where no act of terrorism exists.
Same; Same; View that the group committing atrocities in
Marawi are terrorists. They are not rebels.—The group committing
atrocities in Marawi are terrorists. They are not rebels. They are
committing acts of terrorism. They are not engaged in political
acts of rebellion. They do not have the numbers nor do they have
the sophistication to be able to hold ground. Their ideology of a
nihilist apocalyptic future inspired by the extremist views of
Salafi Jihadism will sway no community especially among
Muslims.
Same; Same; View that there is no rebellion that justifies
martial law. There is terrorism that requires more thoughtful
action.—There is no rebellion that justifies martial law. There is
terrorism that requires more thoughtful action. The Constitution
does not only require that government alleges facts, it must show
that the facts are sufficient. The facts are sufficient when (a) it is
based on credible intelligence and (b) taken collectively
establishes that there is

 
 

78

actual rebellion and that public safety requires the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus and the
exercise of defined powers within the rubric of martial law. We
cannot use the quantum of evidence that is used by a prosecutor
or a judge. We have to assume what a reasonable President would
do given the circumstances. The facts presented are not sufficient
to reasonably conclude that the armed hostilities and lawless
violence happening in Marawi City is “for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory
of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land,
naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or
the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.”
Same; View that the vagueness of Proclamation No. 216 hides
its real intent.—The vagueness of Proclamation No. 216 hides its
real intent. Thus, Operational Directive for the Implementation of
martial law issued by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines orders his forces to: “dismantle the NPA, other
terror-linked private armed groups, illegal drug
syndicates, peace spoilers and other lawless armed groups.”
Arresting illegal drug syndicates and “peace spoilers” under
martial law also unduly expands Proclamation No. 216. The

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factual bases for the declaration of Martial Law as

presented by the respondents do not cover these illegal acts
as rationale for its proclamation. They do not also fall
within the concept of “rebellion.” It is made possible by a
vague and overly broad Proclamation.
Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that as the Commander-
in-Chief provision, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
establishes the parameters of the proclamation of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It
prescribes limited instances when the President may resort to these
extraordinary remedies.—The present petitions are justiciable. I
concur that the petitions are the “appropriate proceedings” filed
by “any citizen” which appropriately invokes sui generis judicial
review contained in the Constitution. However, in addition to the
remedy available in Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution,
any proper party may also file a Petition invoking Article VIII,
Section 1. The remedies are not exclusive of each other. Neither
does one subsume the other. Furthermore, the context and history
of the provisions on judicial review point to a more heightened
scrutiny when the Commander-in-Chief provision is used. As the
Commander-in-Chief provision, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution establishes the parameters of the proclamation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. It prescribes limited instances when the President
may resort to these extraordinary remedies. Section 18 likewise
gives the two (2) other branches their respective roles to
counterbalance the President’s enormous power as Commander-
in-Chief.
Judicial Review; View that traditionally, Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), clarifies that judicial review is
not an assertion of the superi-

 
 

79

ority of the judiciary over other departments. Rather, it is the

judiciary’s promotion of the superiority of the Constitution.—The
power of judicial review is the Court’s authority to strike down
acts of the executive and legislative which are contrary to the
Constitution. This is inherent in all courts, being part of their
power of judicial review. Article VIII, Section 1 includes, but does
not limit, judicial power to the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies and determine whether or not any branch or
instrumentality of the Government has committed grave abuse of
discretion. Traditionally, Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil. 139 (1936), clarifies that judicial review is not an assertion
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of the superiority of the judiciary over other departments. Rather,

it is the judiciary’s promotion of the superiority of the
Constitution: The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed “judicial supremacy” which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution.
Same; Appropriate Proceedings; View that the “appropriate
proceeding” referred to under Article VII, Section 18 cannot simply
be classified under the established types of judicial power, since it
does not possess any of the usual characteristics associated with
either traditional or expanded powers of judicial review.—The
Constitution further provides for a stricter type of judicial review
in Article VII, Section 18. It mandates the Supreme Court to
review “in an appropriate proceeding the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof.” The “appropriate
proceeding” referred to under Article VII, Section 18 cannot
simply be classified under the established types of judicial power,
since it does not possess any of the usual characteristics
associated with either traditional or expanded powers of judicial
review. “Appropriate proceeding” under the martial law provision
is a sui generis proceeding or in a class by itself, as seen by how it
is treated by the 1987 Constitution and the special mandate
handed down to the Supreme Court in response to the President’s
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Same; Same; View that traditionally, the Supreme Court (SC)
is not a trier of facts. However, under Article VII, Section 18, the
Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
President’s proclamation of martial law within thirty (30) days
from the time the petition is filed.—An indicator that the

 
 
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Court’s authority under the martial law provision is distinct

from its more recognized power of judicial review is that it can be
found in Article VII (Executive) and not Article VIII (Judiciary) of
the 1987 Constitution. It emphasizes the additional role of the
Supreme Court which should assume a vigilant stance when it
comes to reviewing the factual basis of the President’s declaration
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. A similar though not identical role is vested on Congress
in the same Commander-in-Chief provision. The Constitution
expects both Houses to check on the wisdom of the President’s
proclamation since they have been given a blanket authority to
revoke the proclamation or suspension. Traditionally, the Court is
not a trier of facts. However, under Article VII, Section 18, the
Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for
the President’s proclamation of martial law within thirty (30)
days from the time the petition is filed.
Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that the rule on standing
is also significantly relaxed when the provision allows “any
citizen” to question the proclamation of martial law. This is in
stark contrast with the requirement under the Rules of Court that
“every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.”—The rule on standing is also significantly
relaxed when the provision allows “any citizen” to question the
proclamation of martial law. This is in stark contrast with the
requirement under the Rules of Court that “every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.”
Justice Antonio Carpio asserted in his dissent in Fortun v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 668 SCRA 504 (2012), that the deliberate
relaxation of locus standi was designed to provide immediate
relief from the possible evils and danger of an illegal declaration
of martial law or suspension of the writ: It is clear that the
Constitution explicitly clothes “any citizen” with the legal
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the declaration of
martial law or suspension of the writ. The Constitution does not
make any distinction as to who can bring such an action. As
discussed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
the “citizen” who can challenge the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the writ need not even be a taxpayer. This was
deliberately designed to arrest, without further delay, the grave
effects of an illegal declaration of martial law or suspension of the
writ, and to provide immediate relief to those aggrieved by the
same. Accordingly, petitioners, being Filipino citizens, possess
legal standing to file the present petitions assailing the
sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 1959.
Same; Same; Appropriate Proceedings; View that
notwithstanding the sui generis proceeding, a resort to a petition
for certiorari pursuant to the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) jurisdiction

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under Article VIII, Section 1 or Rule 65 is also proper to question

the propriety of any declaration or implementation of the
suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus or martial law.—The
jurisprudential principle respecting the hierarchy of courts does
not apply. The provision allows any

 
 

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petitioner to seek refuge directly with this Court.

Nonetheless, the hierarchy of courts doctrine is not an iron-clad
rule. It is true that Article VIII, Section 5 provided for instances
when the Court exercises original jurisdiction: Section 5. The
Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1) Exercise
original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
However, the enumeration in Article VIII, Section 5 is far from
exclusive as the Court was also endowed with original jurisdiction
under Section 1 of the same article and over the sui generis
proceeding under Article VII, Section 18. Notwithstanding the sui
generis proceeding, a resort to a petition for certiorari pursuant to
the Court’s jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 1 or Rule 65 is
also proper to question the properiety of any declaration or
implementation of the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus or
martial law.
Same; Same; Congress; View that while the Supreme Court
(SC) is limited to reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis
behind the President’s proclamation or suspension, Congress does
not operate under such constraints and can strike down the
President’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief powers as it
pleases without running afoul of the Constitution.—Unlike the
Court which is empowered to strike out a proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus only
on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis, the Congress is
given a much wider latitude in its power to revoke the
proclamation or suspension, with the President powerless to set
aside or contest the said revocation. The framers also intended for
the Congress to have a considerably broader review power than
the Judiciary and to play an active role following the President’s
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. Unlike the Court which can only act upon
an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, Congress may, by
voting jointly and upon a majority vote, revoke such proclamation
or suspension. The decision to revoke is not premised on how
factually correct the President’s invocation of his Commander-in-
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Chief powers are, rather, Congress is permitted a wider latitude

in how it chooses to respond to the President’s proclamation or
suspension. While the Court is limited to reviewing the sufficiency
of the factual basis behind the President’s proclamation or
suspension, Congress does not operate under such constraints and
can strike down the President’s exercise of his Commander-in-
Chief powers as it pleases without running afoul of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Presidency; Commander-in-Chief Powers; View
that the powers provided under Article VII, Section 18, are
extraordinary powers, to be exercised in extraordinary times, when
the ordinary powers as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive
will not suffice to maintain peace and order. Article VII, Section 18
constitutionalized the actions the President can take to respond to
cases of invasion, rebellion, and lawless violence, but these are
exceptions to the ordinary rule of law.—The President exercises
the powers inherent to the posi-

 
 
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tions of Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief at all

times. As a general principle, his execution of these powers is not
subject to review. However, the powers provided under Article
VII, Section 18, are extraordinary powers, to be exercised in
extraordinary times, when the ordinary powers as Commander--
in-Chief and Chief Executive will not suffice to maintain peace
and order. Article VII, Section 18 constitutionalized the actions
the President can take to respond to cases of invasion, rebellion,
and lawless violence, but these are exceptions to the ordinary rule
of law. These powers have been characterized as having a
graduated sequence, from the most benign, to the harshest. The
most benign of these extraordinary powers is the calling out
power, whereby the President recedes as Chief Executive and law
enforcement functions take a back seat to the urgent matter of
addressing the matter of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion.
As the most benign of the powers, it is the power that the
President may exercise with the greatest leeway; he may exercise
it at his sole discretion.
Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is simply a suspension of a
remedy. The suspension of the privilege does not make lawful
otherwise unlawful arrests, such that all detentions, regardless of
circumstance, are legal.—The writ of habeas corpus was devised
as a remedy to ensure the constitutional protection against
deprivation of liberty without due process. It is issued to
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command the production of the body of the person allegedly

restrained of his or her liberty. The suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is simply a suspension of a remedy. The
suspension of the privilege does not make lawful otherwise
unlawful arrests, such that all detentions, regardless of
circumstance, are legal. Rather, the suspension only deprives a
detainee of the remedy to question the legality of his detention.
Martial Law; View that President Marcos’ implementation of
martial law was a total abuse and bastardization of the concept of
martial law.—President Marcos’ implementation of martial law
was a total abuse and bastardization of the concept of martial
law. A reading of the powers President Marcos intended to
exercise makes it abundantly clear that there was no public
necessity that demanded the President be given those powers.
Thus, the 1987 Constitution imposed safeguards in response to
President Marcos’ implementation of martial law, precisely to
prevent similar abuses in the future and to ensure the focus on
public safety requiring extraordinary powers be exercised under a
state of martial law.
Same; View that the authority to place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law is not a definition of a power, but a
declaration of a status — that there exists a situation wherein
there is no capability for civilian government to continue.—Martial
law under President Marcos was an aberration. We must return
to the original concept of martial law, arising from necessity,
declared because civil governance is no longer possible in any
way. The authority to place

 
 

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the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law is not a

definition of a power, but a declaration of a status — that there
exists a situation wherein there is no capability for civilian
government to continue. It is a declaration of a condition on the
ground, that there is a vacuum of government authority, and by
virtue of such vacuum, military rule becomes necessary. Further,
it is a temporary state, for military rule to be exercised until civil
government may be restored. This Court cannot dictate the
parameters of what powers the President may exercise under a
state of martial law to address a rebellion or invasion. For this
Court to tell the President exactly how to govern under a state of
martial law would be undue interference with the President’s
powers. There may be many different permutations of governance
under a martial law regime. It takes different forms, as may be
necessary.
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Same; View that while the Supreme Court (SC) cannot state
the parameters for the President’s martial law, this Court’s
constitutional role implicitly requires that the President provide
the parameters himself, upon declaring martial law.—While this
Court cannot state the parameters for the President’s
martial law, this Court’s constitutional role implicitly
requires that the President provide the parameters himself,
upon declaring martial law. The proclamation must
contain the powers he intends to wield. This Court has the
power to determine the sufficiency of factual basis for determining
that public safety requires the proclamation of martial law. The
President evades review when he does not specify how martial
law would be used. It may be assumed that any rebellion or
invasion will involve arms and hostility and, consequently, will
pose some danger to civilians. It may also be assumed that, in any
state of rebellion or invasion, the executive branch of government
will have to take some action, exercise some power, to address the
disturbance, via police or military force. For so long as the
President does not declare martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus to address a disturbance to the peace,
this Court does not have the power to look at whether public
safety needs that action.
Same; Void for Vagueness Doctrine; View that the vagueness
of a declaration of martial law is, in my view, unconstitutional as
it will evade review of the sufficiency of facts required by the
constitutional provision.—I disagree with the proposed ponencia’s
view that the vagueness of a Presidential Proclamation on martial
law can only be done on grounds of alleged violation of freedom of
expression. Rather, the vagueness of a declaration of martial law
is, in my view, unconstitutional as it will evade review of the
sufficiency of facts required by the constitutional provision. We
need to distinguish between our doctrines relating to acts being
void for vagueness and those which are void due to overbreadth.
The doctrine of void for vagueness is a ground for invalidating a
statute or a governmental regulation for being vague. The
doctrine requires that a statute be

 
 

84

sufficiently explicit as to inform those who are subject to it

what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.
Same; Void for Overbreadth Doctrine; View that the void for
overbreadth doctrine applies when the statute or the act “offends
the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control

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or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations

may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”—The void for
overbreadth doctrine applies when the statute or the act “offends
the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.” In Adiong v. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 712
(1992), the Court applied the doctrine in relation to the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution. Thus, in Adiong, the
Commission on Elections issued a Resolution prohibiting the
posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8
1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any
place, including mobile places whether public or private except in
areas designated by the COMELEC. The Court characterized the
regulation as void for being “so broad.”
Same; Void for Vagueness Doctrine; View that Proclamation
No. 216 fails to accord persons a fair notice of which conduct to
avoid and leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out their functions.—From these pronouncements, it is clear that
what is relevant in the application of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is not whether it is a freedom of speech case, but rather
whether it violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution for
failure to accord persons a fair notice of which conduct to avoid;
and whether it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out their functions. Proclamation No. 216 fails to accord
persons a fair notice of which conduct to avoid and leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out their functions.
Proclamation No. 216 only declared two (2) things, namely, the
existence of a state of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Same; Same; View that the dismantling of illegal drug
syndicates has no discernible relation to rebellion, but
Proclamation No. 216 and General Order No. 1 had no guidelines
or standards to follow for their implementation, leaving law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out their functions.—
The proclamation that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
has been suspended is a clear act that needs no further
explication. A declaration of a state of martial law is not so clear.
It is comparable to congress passing a law that says, “Congress
has passed a law,” without providing the substance of the law
itself. The nation is left at a loss as to how to respond to the
proclamation and what conduct is expected from its citizens, and
those implementing martial law are left unbridled discretion as to
what to address, without any standards to follow.

 
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85

Indeed, it was so vague that the Operations Directive of the

Armed Forces, for the implementation of martial law in
Mindanao, includes as a key task the dismantling not only of
rebel groups, but also illegal drug syndicates, among others. The
dismantling of illegal drug syndicates has no discernible relation
to rebellion, but Proclamation No. 216 and General Order No. 1
had no guidelines or standards to follow for their implementation,
leaving law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out their
functions.
Same; Same; View that a broad declaration of martial law
therefore will not be sufficient to inform. It will thus immediately
violate due process of law.—While clear about what martial law
does not include, it does not define what the President will want
to actually do as a result of the proclamation. A broad declaration
of martial law therefore will not be sufficient to inform. It will
thus immediately violate due process of law. Furthermore, it
would be difficult if not impossible to determine the sufficiency of
the facts to determine when “public safety requires” martial law if
the powers of martial law are not clear. The confusion about what
the Court was reviewing was obvious during the oral arguments
heard in this case. The Solicitor General was unable to clearly
delineate the powers that the President wanted to exercise.
Neither was this amply covered in his Memorandum. In truth, the
scope of martial law is larger than what was presented in the
pleadings.
Same; Same; View that Proclamation No. 216, General Order
No. 1 as well as the Operational Directive should be declared
unconstitutional for being vague and for evading review of its
factual basis.—The government’s concept of martial law, from the
broad provisions of Proclamation No. 216 therefore partakes of
different senses. Rightly so, the public is not specifically guided
and their rights are put at risk. This is the ghost of martial law
from the Marcos era resurrected. Even Proclamation No. 1081 of
September 21, 1972 was more specific than Proclamation No. 216.
Yet, through subsequent executive issuances, the scope of martial
law became clearer: it attempted to substitute civilian
government even where there was no conflagration. It was
nothing but an attempt to replace democratically elected
government and civilian law enforcement with an iron hand. For
this alone, Proclamation No. 216, General Order No. 1 as well as
the Operational Directive should be declared unconstitutional for
being vague and for evading review of its factual basis.

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Same; Probable Cause; View that I cannot agree with the

ponencia that the standard of evidence is probable cause similar to
either the prima facie evidence required of a prosecutor or the
finding that will validate a judge’s issuance of a warrant of arrest
or search warrant.—It bears stressing that what is required of
this Court is to look into the sufficiency of the factual basis
surrounding Proclamation No. 216, hence, determining the
quantum of evidence to be used, like substantial evidence,
preponderance of evidence, or proof beyond reasonable

 
 
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doubt, becomes immaterial. I cannot agree with the ponencia

therefore that the standard of evidence is probable cause similar
to either the prima facie evidence required of a prosecutor or the
finding that will validate a judge’s issuance of a warrant of arrest
or search warrant.
Same; View that despite the clear wording of the Constitution
as regards what is expected of the Supreme Court (SC) and the
minimal trigger put in place to initiate the Court’s involvement,
the government intends to create an absurd situation by asserting
that petitioners cannot refer to news reports to support their claim
of factual insufficiency.—Despite the clear wording of the
Constitution as regards what is expected of the Court and the
minimal trigger put in place to initiate the Court’s involvement,
the government intends to create an absurd situation by asserting
that petitioners cannot refer to news reports to support their
claim of factual insufficiency. The government claims that news
reports are unreliable for being hearsay in character and that
they might even be manipulated by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines as part of its tactic of psychological warfare or
propaganda.
Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Sufficient Factual Basis; View
that good intelligence requires that information gathered by
intelligence agencies is collected and subsequently analyzed.—The
President, in exercising the powers of a Commander-in-Chief
under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, cannot be
expected to personally gather intelligence information. The
President will have to rely heavily on reports given by those
under his or her command to arrive at sound policy decisions
affecting the entire country. It is imperative, therefore, that the
reports submitted to the President be sufficient and worthy of
belief. The recommendation or non-recommendation of the
President’s alter egos regarding the imposition of martial law or

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the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus would

be indicative of the sufficiency of the factual basis. Reports
containing intelligence information should be shown to have
undergone a rigorous process to ensure their veracity and
credibility. Good intelligence requires that information gathered
by intelligence agencies is collected and subsequently analyzed.
Cogent inferences are then drawn from the analyzed facts after
which judgments are made.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Zamboanga siege and the
Mamasapano clash, cited by the President in his Report to
Congress dated May 25, 2017, are incidents that neither concern
nor relate to the alleged  Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-
inspired groups. Moreover, there is no direct or indirect correlation
between these incidents to the alleged rebellion in Marawi City.—
The Zamboanga siege and the Mamasapano clash, cited by the
President in his Report to Congress dated May 25, 2017, are
incidents that neither concern nor relate to the alleged ISIS-
inspired groups. Moreover, there is no direct or indirect
correlation between these incidents to the alleged rebellion in
Marawi City.

 
 
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Same; Same; Same; View that the factual bases cited by

respondents in their pleadings seem to be mere allegations. The
sources of these information and the analyses to vet them were not
presented.—The factual bases cited by respondents in their
pleadings seem to be mere allegations. The sources of these
information and the analyses to vet them were not presented. In
their Consolidated Comment and Memorandum, respondents
assert that the Abu Sayyaf Group from Basilan (ASG Basilan),
the Ansarul Khilafah Philippines (AKP) or the Maguid Group, the
Maute Group (Maute Group) from Lanao del Sur, and the
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) are ISIS-inspired
or ISIS-linked. They also assert that these groups “formed an
alliance . . . to establish a wilayah, or Islamic province, in
Mindanao.” Respondents failed to show their sources to support
the inference that the ASG Basilan, AKP, Maute Group, and
BIFF are indeed linked to the ISIS and that these groups formed
alliances. Respondents’ only basis is Isnilon Hapilon’s “symbolic
hijra.” Respondents also rely heavily on the ISIS newsletter, Al
Naba, which allegedly announced the appointment of Isnilon
Hapilon as an emir. These allegations neither explain nor
conclusively establish the nature of the links of the four (4) groups
to the ISIS. The ISIS newsletter, Al Naba, cannot be considered
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as a credible source of information. It is a propaganda material,

which provides skewed information designed to influence opinion.
Same; Same; Same; View that aside from the failure to
present their sources to support the factual bases cited in
Proclamation No. 216 dated May 23, 2017 and the Report of
President Duterte dated May 25, 2017, there is also absolutely no
factual basis for the dismantling and arrest of illegal drug
syndicates and peace spoilers.—Aside from the failure to present
their sources to support the factual bases cited in Proclamation
No. 216 dated May 23, 2017 and the Report of President Duterte
dated May 25, 2017, there is also absolutely no factual basis for
the dismantling and arrest of illegal drug syndicates and peace
spoilers. The inclusion of illegal drug syndicates and peace
spoilers unjustifiably broadens the scope of martial law. There
has been no evidence presented in this case that would explain
their inclusion in the Operational Directive for the
Implementation of Martial Law.
Same; Same; Same; Terrorism; View that taking the facts in
their proper context, there may be acts of terrorism but not
necessarily rebellion. The facts also establish that the Maute
Group are no more than terrorists who committed acts of violence
in order to evade or resist arrest of their leaders.—Taking the facts
in their proper context, there may be acts of terrorism but not
necessarily rebellion. The facts also establish that the Maute
Group are no more than terrorists who committed acts of violence
in order to evade or resist arrest of their leaders. Terrorism is a
premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine
agents. It is motivated by political, religious, or ideological beliefs
and is intended to instill fear

 
 

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and to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the

pursuit of goals that are usually political or ideological. Terrorists
plan their attack to draw attention to their cause, thus, the mode
and venue of attacks are deliberately chosen to generate the most
publicity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the United Nations (UN)
member states still have not come to an agreement on a single
definition of terrorism.—The United Nations defines terrorism as:
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in
the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for
political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever

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the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,

ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to
justify them. However, the United Nations member states still
have not come to an agreement on a single definition of terrorism.
The majority of definitions of terrorism have been written by
government agencies, making them inherently biased as the
government is deliberately excluded from the definition of
terrorism.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rebellion; View that the concept of
terrorism requires an objective element which is the use of serious
violence against persons as a means of terrorist action; On the
other hand, rebellion is an act of armed resistance to an
established government or leader.—The concept of terrorism
requires an objective element which is the use of serious violence
against persons as a means of terrorist action. The subjective
element includes the motives and intention of the perpetrators.
The subjective element is traced back to the roots of terrorism in
the French Revolution to create a climate of terror and fear within
the population or parts of the population. But with respect to the
modern definition of terrorism, the element of fear and insecurity
is only a sufficient subjective element but not a necessary
requirement, implying that if the intention of intimidating the
population is present, the intention of coercing the government is
not a necessary additional requirement. On the other hand,
rebellion is an act of armed resistance to an established
government or leader. Conflicts between liberation movements
and an established government present a unique form of conflict
which would involve both guerrilla and regular armed warfare.
International law distinguishes between 3 categories or stages of
challenges to established state authority, on an ascending scale,
(1) rebellion, (2) insurgency, and (3) belligerency.
Same; Same; Insurgency; View that insurgency is of a more
serious nature than rebellion in that some scholars are of the
opinion that the conferring of the status as “insurgents” brings
them out of the scope of municipal law and onto the international
law forum.—Insurgency is of a more serious nature than rebellion
in that some scholars are of the opinion that the conferring of the
status as “insurgents” brings them out of the scope of municipal
law and onto the international law forum. Insurgency would
constitute a civil disturbance which is usu-

 
 
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ally confined to a limited area of the territory of the state and

is supported by a minimum degree of organization. Under the
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material field of application test, a dissident armed group can

claim the status of insurgent only when it is under responsible
command and exercises such control over a part of its territory as
to enable it to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations.
Same; Same; Belligerency; Words and Phrases; View that
belligerency is the final category of a challenge to an established
government recognized by international law.—Belligerency is the
final category of a challenge to an established government
recognized by international law. The Institut de Droit
International, in the Resolution on Insurrection adopted in 1900
laid down the necessary criteria for a state of belligerency to be
recognized: (1) insurgents had occupied a certain part of the State
territory, (2) established a government which exercised the rights
inherent in sovereignty on that part of territory, and (3) if they
conducted the hostilities by organized troops kept under military
discipline and complying with the laws and customs of war.
Same; Same; “Terrorists” and “Rebels,” Distinguished.—The
crime of terrorism has 3 elements, (1) the predicate crime
committed, (2) the effect of the perpetration of the crime (to sow
and create widespread and extraordinary fear), and (3) the
purpose of which is to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand. The difference between terrorists and rebels
boils down to their intention. Terrorists use fear and violence to
advance their agenda or ideology, which may or may not be
political in nature. While rebels use violence as a form of strategy
to obtain their goal of destabilizing or overthrowing the
government in order to gain control over a part of or the entire
national territory. If rebels succeed in overthrowing the
government, then they install themselves as the ruling party and
their status is legitimized.
Same; Same; Rebellion; Terrorism; View that the acts of
terrorism committed by the Maute Group and their allies, after the
attempted service of warrants of arrest against their leaders and
the disruption of their plans while trying to escape, is not rebellion
in the context of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—In
its broader sense, rebellion falls under terrorism because of its
resort to violence, which in turn creates widespread fear and
panic, to attain its goals of overthrowing the government.
However, not all acts of terrorism can qualify as rebellion.
Certainly, the acts of terrorism committed by the Maute Group
and their allies, after the attempted service of warrants of arrest
against their leaders and the disruption of their plans while
trying to escape, is not rebellion in the context of Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code. It is certainly not the kind of rebellion
that warrants martial law.

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Same; Same; Same; View that rebellion is a political crime

with the ultimate objective of overthrowing or replacing the current
government.—Rebellion is

 
 
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a political crime with the ultimate objective of overthrowing

or replacing the current government. The acts comprising
rebellion, no matter how violent or depraved they might be, are
not considered separately from the crime of rebellion: In short,
political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to
achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or
motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is
perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the
Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
thereof, then it becomes stripped of its “common” complexion,
inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the
former acquires the political character of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; View that the situation in Mindanao is
not one waged by a national liberation movement that would call
into application the rules during an international armed conflict.
—The situation in Mindanao is not one waged by a national
liberation movement that would call into application the rules
during an international armed conflict. At present, the
Philippines is not occupied by a foreign invader or colonist;
neither is it being run by a regime that seeks to persecute an
entire race. The combatant status applies only during an
international armed conflict. Because there is no international
armed conflict here, those who take up arms against the
government are not considered combatants. As a consequence,
they are not immune for acts of war and do not have prisoner-of-
war status. The armed hostilities in Marawi, if at all, may be
considered a non-international armed conflict if the Maute Group
falls under the category of “organized armed group” and if the
fighting may be considered “protracted” under Additional Protocol
II. Assuming there is a non-international armed conflict, those
who directly participate in hostilities in Mindanao are considered
unlawful fighters, not combatants. As unlawful fighters, they are
not immune from prosecution for their acts of war. They also do
not enjoy prisoner-of-war status; they are merely war detainees.
Same; Same; Same; View that the terrorists responsible for the
armed hostilities in Marawi cannot be considered rebels.—If there
is no protracted armed violence by an organized armed group,

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then the rebellion is an entirely law enforcement situation. Article

1(2) of Additional Protocol II states that situations of riots,
internal disturbances and “isolated and sporadic acts” of violence
are outside the concerns of International Humanitarian Laws.
When there is no armed conflict, there is only a law enforcement
situation. The use of force is limited and the participants in the
violence are liable for common crimes. The terrorists responsible
for the armed hostilities in Marawi cannot be considered rebels. It
is true that they may have discussed the possibility of a caliphate.
Yet, from all the evidence presented, they are incapable of
actually holding territory long enough to govern. Their current
intentions do not appear to be to establish a government in
Marawi. In all the presentations of the respondents, it was

 
 

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clear that government was able to disrupt the terrorists and

the hostilities that resulted were part of the defensive posture of
those involved in the terror plot. The armed hostilities in Marawi
are not the spark that would supposedly lead to conflagration and
the burning down of the entirety of Mindanao due to rebellion.
The Maute Group are terrorists, pure and simple. They are not
rebels within the constitutional meaning of the term, neither is
there armed conflict as understood under International
Humanitarian Law.
Presidency; Calling Out Power; View that unlike the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus which must concur with the twin
requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and necessity of public
safety, no such conditions are attached to the President’s calling
out power.—Declaring Proclamation No. 216 and related
issuances as unconstitutional will not have an effect on
Proclamation No. 55. Although embodied in the same section, the
calling out power of the President is in a different category from
the power to proclaim martial law and suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000), classified the calling out power of
the President as “no more than the maintenance of peace and
order and promotion of the general welfare.” The calling out
power of the President can be activated to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. Among the three
Commander-in-Chief powers mentioned in Article VII, Section 18,
the calling out power is the most benign compared to the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
proclamation of martial law. Additionally, unlike the
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proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus which must concur with the twin
requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and necessity of
public safety, no such conditions are attached to the President’s
calling out power. The only requirement imposed by the
Constitution is that “whenever it becomes necessary [the
President] may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion.”
Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that never again
should this court allow itself to step aside when the powerful
invoke vague powers that feed on fear but could potentially
undermine our most cherished rights.—History teaches us that to
rely on the iron fist of an authoritarian backed up by the police
and the military to solve our deep-seated social problems that
spawn terrorism is fallacy. The ghost of Marcos’ Martial Law lives
within the words of our Constitution and rightly so. That ghost
must be exorcised with passion by this Court whenever its
resemblance reappears. Never again should this court allow itself
to step aside when the powerful invoke vague powers that feed on
fear but could potentially undermine our most cherished rights.
Never again should we fall victim to a false narrative that a vague
declaration of martial law is good for us no matter the
circumstances. We should have the courage to never again clothe
authoritarianism in any disguise with the mantle of
constitutionality.

 
 
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Jardeleza, J., Separate Opinion:

Martial Law; View that when the President declares martial

law, such declaration is complete by itself — it does not require the
affirmation or ratification by Congress, much less the Judiciary.—
The powers given to the President, Congress, and the Court are
independent of each other, and each is supreme within its own
sphere. When the President declares martial law, such
declaration is complete by itself — it does not require the
affirmation or ratification by Congress, much less the Judiciary.
This is in keeping with the objective of martial law, that is, “the
preservation of the public safety and good order,” and which
necessitates swift action by the President if it is to be effective.
Should Congress, however, exercise its veto power, the “revocation
shall not be set aside by the President.” Neither is such revocation
subject to judicial review.

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Same; View that a proceeding under Article VII, Section 18

significantly differs from any other action falling within the
Supreme Court’s (SC’s) jurisdiction as specified under Article VIII,
Section 5.—A proceeding under Article VII, Section 18
significantly differs from any other action falling within the
Court’s jurisdiction as specified under Article VIII, Section 5.
First, as opposed to other public suits which require petitioners
challenging a governmental act to show locus standi or legal
standing, Article VII, Section 18 explicitly waives such
requirement by granting standing to “any citizen.” Legal standing
refers to a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such
that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just
a generalized grievance. The term “interest” means a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest. Thus, a party will generally be allowed
to litigate only when he can demonstrate that: (1) he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. The
requirement of legal standing is “rooted in the very nature of
judicial power.” It is a hurdle that a party must overcome to meet
the “case and controversy” requirement of Article VIII, Sections 1
and 5 that “lies at the very heart of the judicial function.” A carte
blanche grant of legal standing to any citizen presents a
significant departure from the Court’s exercise of judicial power.
Same; Supreme Court; View that Article VII, Section 18
textually calls for the Supreme Court (SC) to review facts. Again,
this creates an exception to the long-standing legal principle that
the Court is not a trier of facts.—Article VII, Section 18 textually
calls for the Court to review facts. Again, this creates an exception
to the long-standing legal principle that the Court is not a trier of
facts. This applies whether the Court exercises its power of review
on certiorari or its so-called “expanded certiorari jurisdiction.” In
reviews on certiorari, it is

 
 
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not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh

such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the
lower court. More so, in the consideration of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari, where neither questions of fact nor even of law
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are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction

or grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; View that Article VII, Section 18 prescribes a
vastly different timetable within which the Supreme Court (SC)
must decide the case. It unequivocally mandates the Court to
“promulgate its decision thereon within thirty (30) days from its
filing.” In contrast, all other cases filed with the Court “must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four (24) months from date of
submission.”—Article VII, Section 18 prescribes a vastly different
timetable within which the Court must decide the case. It
unequivocally mandates the Court to “promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.” In contrast, all other
cases filed with the Court “must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission.”
Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Appropriate Proceedings; View
that Article VII, Section 18’s reference to an “appropriate
proceeding” simply means that there must be a petition, sufficient
in form and substance, filed by a Filipino citizen before the
Supreme Court (SC) challenging the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.—Article VII, Section 18’s
reference to an “appropriate proceeding” simply means that there
must be a petition, sufficient in form and substance, filed by a
Filipino citizen before the Court challenging the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the President’s proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is
precisely what petitioners have done. Shoehorning Article VII,
Section 18 into Article VIII, Sections 1 and 5 is a superfluous
exercise because the former is complete in itself. As a provision
that confers jurisdiction, Article VII, Section 18 defines a
demandable public right, the purpose of which is the vindication
of the Constitution, and specifies which court has jurisdiction and
the circumstances under which such jurisdiction may be invoked.
The nature of an action is determined by the material allegations
of the complaint, the applicable law, and the character of the
relief prayed for. The substantive allegations for an action under
Article VII, Section 18 would normally consist of (1) a presidential
act declaring martial law and/or suspending the privilege of the
writ and (2) the absence or falsity of the factual basis, and the
relief to be sought is the revocation of the presidential act. An
Article VII, Section 18 petition is therefore in the nature of a
factual review unlike any other proceeding cognizable by the
Court. Alternatively, the reference to an “appropriate proceeding”
could mean that the framers of the Constitution has left it to the
Court, pursuant to its power to “[p]romulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional

 
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rights,” to provide the procedural means for enforcing the

right of action under Article VII, Section 18 — akin to what the
Court had done when it promulgated the rules on Writ of Amparo,
Writ of Habeas Data, and Writ of Kalikasan. The absence of such
rule, however, does not derogate from the substantive public right
granted to all citizens by Article VII, Section 18.
Same; Same; Sufficient Factual Basis; Sufficiency-of-Factual-
Basis Test; View that by textually adopting the sufficiency-of-
factual-basis test, the Constitution raised the bar that the executive
branch must hurdle in order to sustain the proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.—By
textually adopting the sufficiency-of-factual-basis test, the
Constitution raised the bar that the executive branch must hurdle
in order to sustain the proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ. Whereas Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87
(1905), (as reinstated by Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472
[1983]) barred judicial review of the presidential act under the
political question doctrine and Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
(1971), favored the abuse of discretion/arbitrariness test which is
“hard to prove in the face of the formidable obstacle built up by
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty,”
the 1987 text empowered the Court to make an independent
determination of whether the two conditions for the exercise of
the extraordinary executive powers have been satisfied, i.e.,
whether there is in fact actual invasion and rebellion and whether
public safety requires the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ. The shift in focus of
judicial review to determinable facts, as opposed to the manner or
wisdom of the exercise of the power, created an objective test to
determine whether the President has complied with the
constitutionally prescribed conditions. This is consistent with the
thrust of the 1987 Constitution “to forestall a recurrence of the
long and horrible nightmare of the past regime when one single
clause, the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitution then
in force that authorized the President to declare martial law was
held to have nullified the entire Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.”
Same; Same; Judicial Review; View that just as the
Constitution set the limited conditions under which the President
may exercise the power to declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ, so did it set in no uncertain terms the
parameters of the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) review.—The strength of
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971), as the controlling

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precedent is also not clear-cut, as it was overruled by Garcia-

Padilla v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 (1983), prior to the 1987
Constitution. As already mentioned, the framers did not include
“arbitrariness” in the final text of Article VII, Section 18. While
Lansang has its merits, it would be error to assume that, in the
face of the plain language of Article VII, Section 18, it was
readopted in full. The phrase “sufficiency of the factual basis”
should be understood in the sense that it has in common use and
given its ordinary meaning. One does not always have to look for
some addi-

 
 

95

tional meaning to an otherwise plain and clearly worded

provision. Just as the Constitution set the limited conditions
under which the President may exercise the power to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ, so did it set in no
uncertain terms the parameters of the Court’s review. We cannot
expand these parameters by constitutional interpretation.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; View that the standard of
probable cause is one evolved by jurisprudence as part of the
criminal process, particularly in searches, seizures, and arrests,
and not for the purpose of evaluating the demands of public safety.
—The ponencia, relying on a dissent in Fortun v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, 668 SCRA 504 (2012), applied the standard of probable
cause, which is defined as “such set of facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any offense
included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.” I have no serious misgivings to the underlying principle
behind the adoption of such standard, other than, for obvious
reasons, it is inapplicable in assessing the public safety
requirement. This is because the standard of probable cause is
one evolved by jurisprudence as part of the criminal process,
particularly in searches, seizures, and arrests, and not for the
purpose of evaluating the demands of public safety.
Same; Same; Rebellion; Reasonable Test; View that the
standard of review in determining whether actual rebellion exists
and whether public safety requires the extraordinary presidential
action should likewise be guided by reasonableness.—Accordingly,
the standard of review in determining whether actual rebellion
exists and whether public safety requires the extraordinary
presidential action should likewise be guided by reasonableness.
As well put in an American case, reasonableness is “what ‘from
the calm sea level’ of common sense, applied to the whole
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situation, is not illegitimate in view of the end attained.” Since

the objective of the Court’s inquiry under Article VII, Section 18 is
to verify the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s
action, the standard may be restated as such evidence that is
adequate to satisfy a reasonable mind seeking the truth (or falsity)
of its factual existence. This is a flexible test that balances the
President’s authority to respond to exigencies created by a state of
invasion or rebellion and the Court’s duty to ensure that the
executive act is within the bounds set by the Constitution. The
test does not require absolute truth of the facts alleged to have
been relied upon by the President, but simply that the totality of
facts and circumstances make the allegations more likely than not
to be true.
Same; Same; View that consistent with the sui generis nature
of the present petitions and in view of the fact that this is the first
time the Supreme Court (SC) will resolve a challenge to the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege, approach is to define a stan-

 
 
96

dard that is not hamstrung by the whole body of jurisprudence

that is applicable to different sets of cases.—What reasonableness,
probable cause, and substantial evidence all have in common is
that they use as a benchmark the hypothetical “reasonable mind”
or “reasonable person,” which signifies a sensible mind, fairly
judicious in his actions, and at least somewhat cautious in
reaching his conclusions. But consistent with the sui generis
nature of the present petitions and in view of the fact that this is
the first time the Court will resolve a challenge to the sufficiency
of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege, the more principled approach is to
define a standard that is not hamstrung by the whole body of
jurisprudence that is applicable to different sets of cases.
Resorting to existing standards that were neither designed nor
evolved to test the exercise of commander-in-chief powers,
specifically the determination of the sufficiency of the factual
basis of such exercise, would lead to a rule that is of questionable
provenance.
Same; Same; Rebellion; View that in order to avoid a repeat of
the excesses associated with the Marcos martial law, the 1987
Constitution narrowed the grounds for suspension of the privilege
and declaration of martial law to “invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it.” It removed lawless violence and
insurrection as grounds, as well as the phrase “imminent danger
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thereof,” which means that there must be actual rebellion.—In

order to avoid a repeat of the excesses associated with the Marcos
martial law, the 1987 Constitution narrowed the grounds for
suspension of the privilege and declaration of martial law to
“invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.” It
removed lawless violence and insurrection as grounds, as well as
the phrase “imminent danger thereof,” which means that there
must be actual rebellion. Notably, the grounds set by the 1987
Constitution are the exact same grounds that first appeared in
the suspension clause of the US Constitution. The similarity did
not escape the attention of Father Bernas who, while agreeing
that martial law under the 1987 Constitution falls under
Willoughby’s third formulation, observed that “[m]artial law in
the Philippines jurisdiction is imposed not by or through an
authorization from Congress but by the Executive as specifically
authorized and within the limits set by the Constitution.”
Same; Same; Same; View that Black’s Law Dictionary defines
rebellion as an “open, organized, and armed resistance to an
established government or ruler.” The common theme is that there
is a public, armed resistance to the government. In my view, this
definition is the most consistent with the purpose of the grant of
martial law/suspension powers: to meet the exigencies of internal
or external threats to the very existence of the Republic.—Of
course, the President cannot declare martial law or suspend the
writ on the basis of any disturbances. There must be some
baseline against which the President’s action may be evaluated
against. It has been suggested that what is essential is that
armed hostilities is in defiance of authorities. This is similar to
the first portion of the

 
 
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RPC definition: “rising publicly and taking arms against the

Government.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines rebellion as an
“open, organized, and armed resistance to an established
government or ruler.” The common theme is that there is a public,
armed resistance to the government. In my view, this definition is
the most consistent with the purpose of the grant of martial
law/suspension powers: to meet the exigencies of internal or
external threats to the very existence of the Republic.
Same; Same; Same; Public Safety; Reasonableness Test; View
that the only requirement that can be logically imposed is that the
threat to public safety must, applying the reasonableness test, more
likely than not be genuine based on publicly available facts or
military reports founded on verifiable facts.—The other condition
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for the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege

of the writ is the demands of public safety. Unlike rebellion,
public safety is not as easily verifiable. Whether the exercise of
the proclamation/suspension powers is required by public safety
necessarily involves the prudential estimation of the President of
the consequences of the armed uprising. Because it is phrased
expressly in discretionary terms, it is difficult to set parameters in
a vacuum, however broadly, as to what predicate facts should
exist. To me, the only requirement that can be logically imposed is
that the threat to public safety must, applying the reasonableness
test, more likely than not be genuine based on publicly available
facts or military reports founded on verifiable facts.
Same; Same; Same; Reasonableness Test; View that for the
third paragraph of Article VII, Section 18 to operate as a
meaningful check on the extraordinary powers of the executive, the
better rule would be for the Government, at the first instance, to
present to the Supreme Court (SC) and the public as much of the
facts (or conclusions based on facts) which were considered by the
President.—As a sui generis proceeding, where the Court performs
a function it normally leaves to trial courts, it is not bound by the
strictures of the Rules on Evidence. For one, the Court cannot
indulge the presumption of regularity of the President’s action, as
it might be accused of abdicating its constitutional duty to make
an independent appreciation of the facts. Neither can the general
rule “he who alleges must prove” strictly apply here. For the third
paragraph of Article VII, Section 18 to operate as a meaningful
check on the extraordinary powers of the executive, the better
rule would be for the Government, at the first instance, to present
to the Court and the public as much of the facts (or conclusions
based on facts) which were considered by the President: x  x  x
[S]ince the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities
of the executive department, the executive department, if the
President wants his suspension [and declaration] sustained, will
have to open whatever findings the department might have to the
scrutiny of the Supreme Court.

 
 
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Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Government, as early

as the filing of its Comment to the petition, should present its case
utilizing facts in the public domain or sensitive matter that it
decides, in the public interest, to declassify and/or redact.—I thus
propose the following general procedure in the future conduct of
similar proceedings: The Government, as early as the filing of its
Comment to the petition, should present its case utilizing facts in
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the public domain or sensitive matter that it decides, in the public

interest, to declassify and/or redact. Only upon the invocation by
the Government of “a specific and on-the-record evaluation that
‘closure is essential to preserve higher values [than the
public’s right to access] and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest’” can in camera presentation of evidence be
considered and allowed. For this reason, it is imperative that any
invocation of privilege be timely made (i.e., in its Comment) so
that both the Court and petitioners would have reasonable
opportunity to respond. Petitioners-citizens may thereafter be
given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence. Based on
our experience in this proceeding, I submit that proffer by the
Government of a fact (or conclusion based on facts) which it
asserts the Court to consider, but not make of public record on
grounds of national security, should come with a heavy
presumption against its nature as a privileged matter, imposing
on the Government a heavy burden on why a specific fact should
not be made public. More than mere general invocations of
reasons of national security, there must, for example, be some
showing that the matter, if publicly disclosed, may reveal critical
information relating to the capabilities of our intelligence sources,
and or imperil secret sources, among others. In the same manner,
the Government may invoke (and subsequently justify the grant
of) such a privilege in response to specific questions propounded
by the Court or the parties to its witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the facts pertinent to
rebellion, understood as a public, armed resistance to the
government, are publicly verifiable.—The facts pertinent to
rebellion, understood as a public, armed resistance to the
government, are publicly verifiable. These are mostly
circumscribed between 1300 of May 23, 2017, when the military
operation to arrest Hapilon and the Maute leaders began, and
2200 of the same date, when the President issued Proclamation
No. 216. To me, the following undisputed facts are decisive of the
issue of rebellion: (1) there was a sustained offensive against
government troops from 1300 through 2200 with the terrorists
showing no immediate sign of retreat; (2) the terrorists
establishment checkpoints on public roads; (3) they publicly
hoisted ISIS flags in various places; and (4) there were multiple
military and civilian casualties and injuries. The totality of these
more than adequately satisfies the constitutional requirement of
actual rebellion. Even when measured by the more rigid RPC
definition, the siege of Marawi clearly constitutes rebellion. There
is an armed public uprising against the government and,
considering the terrorist groups’ publicly avowed objective of
establishing an

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Islamic province, their purpose is clearly to remove a part of

the Philippine territory from the allegiance to the government.
Same; Sufficient Factual Basis; View that the siege of Marawi
City and the recent increase in terrorist activities in Mindanao
have, to my mind, reasonably established that there is sufficient
factual basis that public safety requires the declaration of martial
law for the entire Mindanao.—The siege of Marawi City and the
recent increase in terrorist activities in Mindanao have, to my
mind, reasonably established that there is sufficient factual basis
that public safety requires the declaration of martial law for the
entire Mindanao. The objective of ISIS to establish an Islamic
caliphate is well-known. Whether Hapilon is actually sponsored
by ISIS is less clear, but he has publicly proclaimed that he is the
emir of all ISIS forces in the Philippines and the announcement in
an ISIS newsletter that he has been appointed as such has not
been controverted. The five-step process to establish of wilayat is
not disputed, and the assessment that Hapilon and his followers
are somewhere between the third and fourth steps are confirmed
by the uncovered plot to assault Marawi. Add to this their
penchant for raising the ISIS flag during the siege of Marawi,
then it becomes clear that the ASG and the Mautes are, at the
very least, ISIS-inspired. Their public statements and terroristic
acts are being used as propaganda to recruit more members, and
if they are in fact not yet ISIS-linked, to get the attention and
support of ISIS. These groups are no less dangerous just because
there is some doubt as to their direct linkage with ISIS. As the
siege of Marawi and their past terror activities have shown, the
threat they pose is real.
Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Reasonableness Test; View that
the standard of reasonableness requires the Supreme Court (SC) to
exercise caution in evaluating the factual assertions of the
executive department, but it does not create a presumption against
matters coming from their side.—In the absence of countervailing
evidence or patent implausibility of the facts presented by the
executive department, it is difficult, if not irresponsible, to cast
aside the statements personally made before the Court by the
Secretary of Defense and the AFP Chief-of-Staff. The standard of
reasonableness requires the Court to exercise caution in
evaluating the factual assertions of the executive department, but
it does not create a presumption against matters coming from
their side. After the oral arguments and the submission of the
pleadings, I find nothing incredulous or farfetched with respect to
the claimed capabilities and objectives of the terror groups. The

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executive’s assessment of the nature and level of threat posed by

these ISIS-inspired terror groups in Mindanao is not incompatible
with local and foreign media reports and publicly available
research papers. Understandably, the information provided to the
Court is not perfect and, given the 30-day period imposed by the
Constitution, we do not have the time to vet it to the point of
conclusiveness. But that is the constraint inherent in the nature
of the process dealt us by Article VII, Section 18. The role of the
Court is to determine

 
 

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whether, on the basis of the matters presented to us, the

threat to public safety is genuine. I conclude that, more
likely than not, it is.

Caguioa, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Political Questions;

View that indeed, it is now hornbook — that the constitutionality
of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ is no longer a political question within the operation of the
1987 Constitution.—At the outset, it cannot be gainsaid — indeed,
it is now hornbook — that the constitutionality of the declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ is no
longer a political question within the operation of the 1987
Constitution. No attempt should be countenanced to return to
that time when such a grave constitutional question affecting the
workings of government and the enjoyment by the people of their
civil liberties is placed beyond the ambit of judicial scrutiny as
long as the Court remains faithful to the Constitution.
Same; Same; Justiciable Questions; View that the declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ are
justiciable questions by express authorization of the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.—The
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ are justiciable questions by express authorization of the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The
language of the provision and the intent of the framers clearly
foreclose any argument of nonjusticiability. Moreover, the
question before the Court does not squarely fall within any of the
formulations of a political question. Concretely, even as the first
paragraph of Section 18 commits to the Executive the issue of the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ, the third paragraph commits the review to the Court and

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provides the standards to use therein — unmistakably carving

out the question from those that are political in nature. Clearly,
no full discretionary authority on the part of the Executive was
granted by the Constitution in the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ. As well, insofar as Section
18 lays down the mechanics of government in times of emergency,
it is precisely the province of the Court to say what the law is.
Same; Same; View that Section 18 is a neutral and
straightforward fact-checking mechanism, shorn of any political
color whatsoever, by which any citizen can invoke the aid of the
Supreme Court (SC) — an independent and apolitical branch of
government — to determine the necessity of the Executive’s
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
based on the facts obtaining.—I agree with the ponencia that
Section 18 contemplates a sui generis proceeding set into motion
by a petition of any citizen. Plainly, Section 18 is a neutral and
straightforward fact-checking mechanism, shorn of any political
color whatsoever, by which any citizen can invoke the aid of the
Court — an

 
 
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independent and apolitical branch of government — to

determine the necessity of the Executive’s declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ based on the facts
obtaining. Given its sui generis nature, the scope of a Section 18
petition and the workings of the Court’s review cannot be limited
by comparison to other cases over which the Court exercises
jurisdiction — primarily, petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court and Article VIII, Section 1.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; View that the only reasonable
interpretation within the context and object of the Constitution is
that the review is mandatory.—It has been proposed that the
review is discretionary upon the Court, given the use of the word
“may,” and further supported by arguments that an
interpretation that the review is mandatory will lead to absurdity,
to clogging of the Court’s dockets, and that the 30-day period to
decide Section 18 petitions are taxing for the Court and executive
officials. The argument is untenable — it reduces the provision to
mere lip service if the Court can shirk its duty by exercising its
discretion in the manner so suggested. While the word “may” is
usually construed as directory, it does not invariably mean that it
cannot be construed as mandatory when it is in this sense that
the statute (in this case, the Constitution), construed as a whole,
can accomplish its intended effect. I submit that the only
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reasonable interpretation within the context and object of the

Constitution is that the review is mandatory. Keeping in mind
that “under our constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court is the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, particularly of the
allocation of powers, the guarantee of individual liberties and the
assurance of the people’s sovereignty,” the Court’s review rises to
the level of a public duty owed by the Court to the sovereign
people — to determine, independent of the political branches of
government, the sufficiency of the factual basis, and to provide
the Executive the venue to inform the public.
Same; Same; Same; View that the constitutional mandate to
review, as worded and intended, necessarily requires the Supreme
Court (SC) to delve into both factual and legal issues
indispensable to the final determination of the “sufficiency of the
factual basis” of the declaration of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ.—The constitutional mandate to review,
as worded and intended, necessarily requires the Court to delve
into both factual and legal issues indispensable to the final
determination of the “sufficiency of the factual basis” of the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ. This cannot be resisted by the mere expediency of relying on
the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts; indeed, even when it
sits as an appellate court, the Court has recognized exceptions
when examination of evidence and determination of questions of
fact are proper. Section 18, as a neutral and straightforward fact-
checking mechanism, serves the functions of (1) preventing the
concentration in one person — the Executive — of the power to
put in place

 
 
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a rule that significantly implicates civil liberties, (2)

providing the sovereign people a forum to be informed of the
factual basis of the Executive’s decision, or, at the very least, (3)
assuring the people that a separate department independent of
the Executive may be called upon to determine for itself the
propriety of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; View that I concur with the
ponencia’s holding that the threshold of evidence for the
requirement of rebellion or invasion is probable cause, consistent
with Justice Carpio’s dissenting opinion in Fortun v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, 668 SCRA 504 (2012).—I concur with the ponencia’s
holding that the threshold of evidence for the requirement of
rebellion or invasion is probable cause, consistent with Justice
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Carpio’s dissenting opinion in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 668

SCRA 504 (2012). It is sufficient for the Executive to show that at
the time of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the   writ, there “[existed] such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense [rebellion] has been committed.”
This standard of proof upon the Executive confirms my position
that the burden of proof is originally and continually borne by the
Executive throughout the entire fact-checking proceeding, for
clearly, the petitioning citizen cannot be expected to prove or
disprove the factual basis that is within the exclusive knowledge
only of the Executive. For truly, the Executive does not receive
evidence in determining the existence of actual rebellion — only
such facts and circumstances that would lead to the belief that
there is actual rebellion. However, to satisfy the Court of the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ (i.e., that indeed,
probable cause to believe that actual rebellion existed at the time
of the proclamation, and that public safety required it), the
Executive must be able to present substantial evidence tending to
show both requirements.
Same; Same; View that the Executive needs to reveal so much
of its factual basis for the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ so that it produces in the
mind of the Supreme Court (SC) the conclusion that the
declaration and suspension meets the requirements of the
Constitution.—To me, the requirement of “sufficiency” in a
Section 18 proceeding is analogous to the “substantial evidence”
standard in administrative fact-finding. The Executive needs to
reveal so much of its factual basis for the declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ so that it produces
in the mind of the Court the conclusion that the declaration and
suspension meets the requirements of the Constitution.
Otherwise, the Court’s finding of sufficiency becomes anchored
upon bare allegations, or silence. In any proceeding, mere
allegation or claim is not evidence; neither is it equivalent to
proof. For the same reason, I submit that presumption of
regularity or constitutionality cannot be relied upon, neither by
the Executive nor the Court, to declare that there is sufficient
factual basis for the declaration of martial law or the suspension
of the

 
 
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writ. The presumption disposes of the need to present

evidence — which is totally opposite to the fact-checking exercise
of Section 18; to be sure, reliance on the presumption in the face
of an express constitutional requirement amounts to a failure by
the Executive to show sufficient factual basis, and judicial
rubberstamping on the part of the Court.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; View that the 1987
Constitution now positively mandates the Supreme Court (SC) to
review the “sufficiency of the factual basis” of the President’s
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ; the deliberations show an unmistakable and widely-held
intent to remove the question of the sufficiency of the factual basis
for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ from the category of political questions that are beyond
judicial scrutiny.—The standard of review in Lansang v. Garcia,
42 SCRA 448 (1971), was sound, as situated in the context of
Article VII, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1935 Constitution. At
the time, the power to declare martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ was textually-committed to the Executive
without a corresponding commitment to the Court of a
review. Even then, on the basis of the principle of checks and
balances, the Court determined the constitutionality of the
suspension by satisfying itself of some existence of factual basis —
or the absence of arbitrariness — without explicit authority from
the Constitution then in force. Lansang’s holding that the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ is not a political question stands as stated in the third
paragraph of Section 18. However, given the changing contours of
and safeguards imposed upon the Executive’s power to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ, Lansang is no
longer the standard of review under the 1987 Constitution.
Obviously, the mechanics under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions
belong to different factual and legal milieu. The 1987 Constitution
now positively mandates the Court to review the “sufficiency of
the factual basis” of the President’s declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ; the deliberations show an
unmistakable and widely-held intent to remove the question of
the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ from the category
of political questions that are beyond judicial scrutiny.
Same; Same; Same; View that the use of the word
“sufficiency,” signals that the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) role in the
neutral straightforward fact-checking mechanism of Section 18 is
precisely to check post facto, and with the full benefit of hindsight,
the validity of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ, based upon the presentation by the Executive
of the sufficient factual basis therefor (i.e., evidence tending to

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show the requirements of the declaration of martial law or

suspension of the privilege of the writ: actual rebellion or invasion,
and requirements of public safety).—Lansang’s, test of
arbitrariness as equated to the “existence” of factual basis is
clearly a lower standard than the

 
 

104

“sufficiency” required in Section 18. The use of the word

“sufficiency,” signals that the Court’s role in the neutral
straightforward fact-checking mechanism of Section 18 is
precisely to check post facto, and with the full benefit of hindsight,
the validity of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ, based upon the presentation by the
Executive of the sufficient factual basis therefor (i.e., evidence
tending to show the requirements of the declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ: actual rebellion or
invasion, and requirements of public safety). This means that the
Court is also called upon to investigate the accuracy of the facts
forming the basis of the proclamation — whether there is actual
rebellion and whether the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ are necessary to ensure
public safety.
Same; Same; Same; View that the fact that Section 18 checks
for sufficiency and not mere arbitrariness does not, as it was not
intended to, denigrate the power of the Executive to act swiftly and
decisively to ensure public safety in the face of emergency.—Since
Section 18 is a neutral straightforward fact-checking mechanism,
any nullification necessarily does not ascribe any grave abuse or
attribute any culpable violation of the Constitution to the
Executive. Meaning, the fact that Section 18 checks for sufficiency
and not mere arbitrariness does not, as it was not intended to,
denigrate the power of the Executive to act swiftly and decisively
to ensure public safety in the face of emergency. Thus, the
Executive will not be exposed to any kind of liability should the
Court, in fulfilling its mandate under Section 18, make a finding
that there were no sufficient facts for the declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
Same; Same; Same; View that I disagree with the ponencia’s
statement that in the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis,
the Supreme Court (SC) can only consider the information and
data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration and that it is not allowed to undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.—I disagree with the
ponencia’s statement that in the review of the sufficiency of the
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factual basis, the Court can only consider the information and
data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration and that it is not allowed to undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The reliance on
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), and IBP v.
Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000), is misplaced because these cases
deal with the exercise of calling out powers over which the
Executive has the widest discretion, and which is not subject to
judicial review, unlike the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ. To recall, even then, the
check on exercise of powers by the Executive was not merely
arbitrariness, but “an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.”

 
 

105

Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; View that while I concur

with the holding that probable cause is the standard of proof to
show the existence of actual rebellion at the time of the
proclamation, I submit that the second requirement of public
safety (i.e., necessity) is a continuing requirement that must still
exist during the review, and that the Supreme Court (SC) is not
temporally bound to the time of the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ in determining the
requirements of public safety.—While I concur with the holding
that probable cause is the standard of proof to show the existence
of actual rebellion at the time of the proclamation, I submit that
the second requirement of public safety (i.e., necessity) is a
continuing requirement that must still exist during the review,
and that the Court is not temporally bound to the time of the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ in determining the requirements of public safety.
Same; Same; Rebellion; View that the powers to declare
martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ are further
limited through the deletion of insurrection and the phrase “or
imminent danger thereof” from the enumeration of grounds upon
which these powers may be exercised, thereby confining such
grounds to actual rebellion or actual invasion, when public safety
so requires.—I concur with the ponencia that the rebellion
mentioned in the Constitution refers to rebellion as defined in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime
of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government.
By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or
multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a
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priori within predetermined bounds. The crime of rebellion

requires the concurrence of intent and overt act; it is integrated
by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes
expressed in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt
acts of violence described in the first paragraph of Article 135.
Both purpose and overt acts are essential elements of the crime
and without their concurrence the crime of rebellion cannot
legally exist. Returning to Section 18, the powers to declare
martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ are further
limited through the deletion of insurrection and the phrase “or
imminent danger thereof” from the enumeration of grounds upon
which these powers may be exercised, thereby confining such
grounds to actual rebellion or actual invasion, when public safety
so requires. This is seen from the deliberations which show that
the calling out powers of the President are already sufficient to
prevent or suppress “imminent danger” of invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.
Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; View that the finding of
probable cause to believe that rebellion exists in this case is solely
for the purpose of reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis for
the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ; it does not serve to determine the existence of the separate
criteria for an objective characterization of a non-international
armed conflict.—I adopt Chief Justice Sereno’s findings of fact
and find, based

 
 
106

on the totality of the evidence presented, that it has been

sufficiently shown that at the time of the declaration of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ, the
information known to the Executive constituted probable cause to
believe that there was actual rebellion in Marawi City. Needless
to state, the finding of probable cause to believe that rebellion
exists in this case is solely for the purpose of reviewing the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ; it does not serve to
determine the existence of the separate criteria for an objective
characterization of a non-international armed conflict. The
application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a
measure of prudence and humanity, and does not, in any way,
legitimize these terrorist groups, to use the appropriate
appellation.
Same; Same; Public Safety; View that the second
indispensable requirement that must be shown by the Executive is
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that public safety calls for the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ.—The second indispensable
requirement that must be shown by the Executive is that public
safety calls for the declaration of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ. Here, there can be no serious
disagreement that the existence of actual rebellion does not, on its
own, justify the declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ if there is no showing that it is necessary to
ensure public safety. According to Fr. Bernas: Martial law
depends on two factual bases: (1) the existence of invasion or
rebellion, and (2) the requirements of public safety. Necessity
creates the conditions for martial law and at the same time limits
the scope of martial law. Certainly, the necessities created by a
state of invasion would be different from those created by
rebellion. Necessarily, therefore, the degree and kind of vigorous
executive action needed to meet the varying kinds and degrees of
emergency could not be identical under all conditions. They can
only be analogous.
Same; Rebellion; View that the initial scope of martial law is
the place where there is actual rebellion, meaning, concurrence of
the normative act of armed public uprising and the intent.—
Indeed, the requirement of actual rebellion serves to localize the
scope of martial law to cover only the areas of armed public
uprising. Necessarily, the initial scope of martial law is the place
where there is actual rebellion, meaning, concurrence of the
normative act of armed public uprising and the intent.
Elsewhere, however, there must be a clear showing of the
requirement of public safety necessitating the inclusion.
Same; Same; Continuing Crimes; View that it should be noted
that even if principal offenders, conspirators, accomplices, or
accessories to the rebellion flee to or are found in places where
there is no armed public rising, this fact alone does not justify the
extension of the effect of martial law to those areas. They can be
pursued by the State under the concept of rebellion being a
continuing crime,

 
 
107

even without martial law.—It should be noted that even if

principal offenders, conspirators, accomplices, or accessories to
the rebellion flee to or are found in places where there is no armed
public rising, this fact alone does not justify the extension of the
effect of martial law to those areas. They can be pursued by the
State under the concept of rebellion being a continuing crime,
even without martial law. In the landmark case of Umil v. Ramos,
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187 SCRA 311 (1990), rebellion was designated as a “continuing

crime” by the Court, wherein it sustained the validity of the arrest
of a member of the NPA while the latter was being treated for a
gunshot wound in the hospital. The accused therein, who was
charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, was arrested for
being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization,
despite not performing any overt act at the time of his arrest.
Same; Public Safety; View that martial law grants no
additional powers to the Executive and the military, unless the
magnitude of the emergency has led to the collapse of civil
government, or by the very fact of civil government performing its
functions endangers public safety.—I submit that martial law
grants no additional powers to the Executive and the military,
unless the magnitude of the emergency has led to the collapse of
civil government, or by the very fact of civil government
performing its functions endangers public safety. This is the
import of the fourth paragraph of Section 18. Perforce, the Bill of
Rights remains in effect, and guarantees of individual freedoms
(e.g. from arrests, searches, without determination of probable
cause) should be honored subject to the well-defined exceptions
that obtain in times of normalcy. This is not to say, however, that
the capability of the military to pursue the criminals outside of
the area of armed public uprising should be curtailed. The
Executive, prior to the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ, had already exercised his
calling out power through Proclamation No. 55 covering the entire
island of Mindanao. The military remains fully empowered “to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,” as
Proclamation No. 55 remains valid and is not part of the scope of
this Section 18 review.
Same; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Rebellion; View that while the
Supreme Court (SC) is not so unreasonable not to accept
arguments that other areas outside of the place of actual rebellion
are so intimately or inextricably linked to the rebellion such that it
is required to declare martial law to ensure public safety in those
areas, or of operational or tactical necessity, there has been no
showing, save for conclusionary statements, of specific reasons for
the necessity that would justify the imposition of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ over the entire island.—
The ponencia authorizes the operation of martial law over the
entire Mindanao based on linkages established among rebel
groups. While the Court is not so unreasonable not to accept
arguments that other areas outside of the place of actual rebellion
are so intimately or inextricably linked to the rebellion such that
it is required to declare martial law to ensure public safety

 
 
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in those areas, or of operational or tactical necessity, there

has been no showing, save for conclusionary statements, of
specific reasons for the necessity that would justify the imposition
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ over
the entire island. Thus, I cannot agree with the ponencia that
there is sufficient factual basis to declare martial law over the
whole of Mindanao.
Same; Same; Same; View that extending martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ even to contiguous or
adjacent areas cannot be done without a showing of actual
rebellion in those areas or a demonstration that they are so
inextricably connected to the actual rebellion that martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ are necessary to ensure
public safety in such places.—Verily, the existence of actual
rebellion without the public safety requirement cannot be used as
justification to extend the territorial scope of martial law to
beyond the locale of actual rebellion. Extending martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ even to contiguous or
adjacent areas cannot be done without a showing of actual
rebellion in those areas or a demonstration that they are so
inextricably connected to the actual rebellion that martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ are necessary to ensure
public safety in such places.

Martires, J., Separate Opinion:

Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that while Section

18, Article VII of the Constitution allows any Filipino citizen to
assail through an appropriate proceeding the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
thereof, it is only the Supreme Court (SC) which was conferred
with the sole authority to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.—Notably, while Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution allows any Filipino citizen to assail
through an appropriate proceeding the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, it is
only the Court which was conferred with the sole authority to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. In both instances, the citizen and the Court are expressly
clothed by the Constitution with authority: the former to bring to
the fore the validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law

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and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,

and the latter to make a determination as to the validity thereof.
It is through the exercise of this authority, after the proclamation
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, that both the citizen and the Court pierce through
the exclusive realm of the President in the exercise of his
Commander-in-Chief powers. But it should be stressed that the
exercise of this authority must be anchored on an “appro-

 
 

109

priate proceeding” that would bind the citizen and the Court
as they march towards the sole domain of the Commander-in-
Chief. Clearly, therefore, the absence of an “appropriate
proceeding” nullifies the exercise by the citizen of his authority
and, unless the Court in the exercise of its judicial discretion rules
otherwise, divests it likewise of its authority to grant the plea of
the suitor before it.
Same; Same; Appropriate Proceedings; View that Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution does not categorically identify what
the “appropriate proceeding” is.—Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution does not categorically identify what the “appropriate
proceeding” is. For sure, the “appropriate proceeding”
contemplated therein cannot be Section 18, Article VII itself for
otherwise this could have been expressly spelled out in the
provision. Moreover, there is nothing in Section 18, Article VII
from which it can be reasonably inferred that it is by itself a
proceeding. By using the phrase “appropriate proceeding,” the
Constitutional Commission obviously acknowledged that there
already exists an available course of action which a citizen can
invoke in supplicating the Court to exercise its awesome review
power found under Article VIII of the Constitution. The words
“appropriate proceeding” should be read in their natural, ordinary
and obvious signification, devoid of forced or subtle construction.
“For words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker
in their ordinary and common use and acceptation. And courts as
a rule, should not presume that the lawmaking body does not
know the meaning of the words and the rules of grammar.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the argument that the
“appropriate proceeding” contemplated in Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution is sui generis is tantamount to regarding the
phrase “appropriate proceeding” as a surplusage and a superfluity,
barren of any meaning.—The argument that the “appropriate
proceeding” contemplated in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution is sui generis is tantamount to regarding the phrase
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“appropriate proceeding” as a surplusage and a superfluity,

barren of any meaning. To follow this interpretation would mean
that while Section 18, Article VII requires that there be an
“appropriate proceeding” to set the foundation for judicial review,
that proceeding, however, is none other than Section 18, Article
VII itself. This could not have been the intent of the framers of
the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Review; View that when the
Constitutional Commission used the phrase “appropriate
proceeding” in Section 18, Article VII, it actually acknowledged
that there already exists an available route by which a citizen may
attack the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof.—When the Constitutional
Commission used the phrase “appropriate proceeding” in Section
18, Article VII, it actually acknowledged that there already exists
an available route by which a citizen may attack the suffi-

 
 
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ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law

or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
the extension thereof. And by defining the extent of judicial power
of the Court in Section 1, Article VIII, the Constitutional
Commission clearly identified that the “appropriate proceeding”
referred to in Section 18, Article VII is one within the expanded
jurisdiction of the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the petitions for
certiorari and prohibition are not limited to correcting errors of
jurisdiction of a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but extends to any
branch or instrumentality of the government; thus, confirming that
there are indeed available “appropriate proceedings” to invoke the
Supreme Court’s (SC’s) judicial review pursuant to Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution.—A petition for certiorari is proper
when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. A petition for prohibition may be filed
when the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Clearly, these are the two modes, i.e.,
“appropriate proceedings,” by which the Court exercises its
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judicial review to determine grave abuse of discretion. But it must

be stressed that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are not
limited to correcting errors of jurisdiction of a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but extends to any branch or
instrumentality of the government; thus, confirming that there
are indeed available “appropriate proceedings” to invoke the
Court’s judicial review pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; View that the President may use his
Commander-in-Chief powers but with defined limitations: (a) to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion he may
call out the armed forces; and (b) in case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty (60) days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law.—When petitioners claimed that their petitions were
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, they, in
effect, failed to avail of the proper remedy, thus depriving the
Court of its authority to grant the relief they pleaded. The Court
must take note that the Constitutional Commission had put in
place very tight safeguards to avoid the recurrence of another
dictator rising in our midst. Thus, the President may use his
Commander-in-Chief powers but with defined limitations: (a) to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion he may
call out the armed forces; and (b) in case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it,

 
 
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he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law.
Same; Same; View that in the same manner that there are
limitations for the exercise by the President of his powers pursuant
to Section 18, Article VII, the Constitution likewise provides for the
specific manner by which such exercise can be attacked before the
Supreme Court (SC): only by a citizen of the Philippines and
through an appropriate proceeding.—In the same manner that
there are limitations for the exercise by the President of his
powers pursuant to Section 18, Article VII, the Constitution
likewise provides for the specific manner by which such exercise
can be attacked before the Court: only by a citizen of the
Philippines and through an appropriate proceeding. The absence
of one of these requisites should have warranted the outright
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dismissal of the petition. But if only for the transcendental

importance of the issues herein, I defer to the majority in taking
cognizance of these petitions. After all, “[t]his Court has in the
past seen fit to step in and resolve petitions despite their being the
subject of an improper remedy, in view of the public importance of
the issues raised therein.”
Same; Same; View that in the resolution of these petitions, it
should be noted that Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides for a specific parameter by which the Supreme Court
(SC), in relation to Section 18, Article VII, should undertake its
judicial review — it must be proven that grave abuse of discretion
attended the President’s act in declaring martial law and in
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.
—In the resolution of these petitions, it should be noted that
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for a specific
parameter by which the Court, in relation to Section 18, Article
VII, should undertake its judicial review — it must be proven that
grave abuse of discretion attended the President’s act in declaring
martial law and in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Mindanao. Nothing short of grave abuse of discretion
should be accepted by the Court. Grave abuse of discretion has a
definite meaning. There is grave abuse of discretion when an act
is done in a “‘capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.’ The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an ‘evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.’” That same definition finds importance to this Court in
assessing whether the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216,
acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; View that
the evidence presented by petitioners are mere online news articles.
The ponencia correctly observed that said news articles are
hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any
probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving

 
 

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the truth of the matter asserted.—The general rule is that no

evidence is needed for a negative allegation. However, “[i]n
determining whether an assertion is affirmative or negative, we
should consider the substance and not the form of the assertion. A
legal affirmative is not necessarily a grammatical affirmative, nor
a legal negative a grammatical negative; on the contrary, a legal
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affirmative frequently assumes the shape of a grammatical

negative, and a legal negative that of a grammatical affirmative.”
Petitioners’ allegations, though couched in a grammatical
negative, is actually a legal affirmative — they are claiming that
five statements in Proclamation No. 216 and the President’s
Report are false. Being a positive assertion, petitioners are
required to present evidence on their claim. Notably, however, the
evidence presented by petitioners are mere online news articles.
The ponencia correctly observed that said news articles are
hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any
probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving
the truth of the matter asserted. Moreover, the five statements
assailed by petitioners merely constitute a few of the numerous
facts presented by the President in his report. Even assuming
that those five statements are inaccurate, such inaccuracy will
not cast arbitrariness on the President’s decision since petitioners
did not controvert the rest of the factual statements in
Proclamation No. 216 and the President’s Report.
Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; View that the increasing
number of casualties of civilians and government troops, the
escalating damage caused to property owners in the places
attacked by the rebel groups, and the incessant assaults in other
parts in Mindanao leave no doubt that such dangers to public
safety justified the declaration of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege.—As to the requirement of public safety, there are
no fixed standards in determining what constitutes such
interference to justify a declaration of martial law. However, in
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971), the Supreme Court
declared that “the magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the
second condition essential to the validity of the suspension of the
privilege.” With this as the yardstick, logic mandates that the
extent of the rebellion shown by the above mentioned
circumstances, supported as they are by verified intelligence
reports, was sufficient to reasonably conclude that public safety
had been compromised in such manner as to require the issuance
of Proclamation No. 216. The increasing number of casualties of
civilians and government troops, the escalating damage caused to
property owners in the places attacked by the rebel groups, and
the incessant assaults in other parts in Mindanao leave no doubt
that such dangers to public safety justified the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege.
Same; Same; Rebellion; View that for purposes of declaring
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, it is absurd to require that there be public uprising in every
city and every province in Mindanao before rebellion can be
deemed to exist in the whole island if there is already reason to

 
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believe that the rebel group’s culpable intent is for the whole of
Mindanao and that public uprising has already started in an area
therein.—The peculiarity of the crime of rebellion must also be
noted. “The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts
committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves
are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion.” For
purposes of declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, it is absurd to require that there be
public uprising in every city and every province in Mindanao
before rebellion can be deemed to exist in the whole island if there
is already reason to believe that the rebel group’s culpable intent
is for the whole of Mindanao and that public uprising has already
started in an area therein.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; View that the judicial power of
the Supreme Court (SC), vested by Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, is separate and distinct from the review that may be
undertaken by Congress.—Nothing in Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution directs Congress to exercise its review powers
prior to the judicial review of the Court. The judicial power of the
Court, vested by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, is
separate and distinct from the review that may be undertaken by
Congress. The judicial review by the Court is set in motion by the
filing of an appropriate proceeding by a citizen. Indeed, the
Constitution even requires that the Court promulgate its decision
within thirty days from the filing of the appropriate proceeding.
With this explicit directive in the Constitution, it is beyond doubt
that the process of judicial review cannot be conditioned upon the
exercise by Congress of its own review power.

Tijam, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Locus Standi; View that

as a rule, a party must be able to establish a direct and personal
interest in the controversy to clothe him with the requisite locus
standi; The Constitution, however, has relaxed this rule with
respect to petitions assailing the sufficiency of the factual basis of a
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, requiring only that the petitioner be any
Filipino citizen.—As a rule, a party must be able to establish a
direct and personal interest in the controversy to clothe him with
the requisite locus standi. He must be able to show, not only that
the government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
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enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some

indefinite way. The Constitution, however, has relaxed this rule
with respect to petitions assailing the sufficiency of the factual
basis of a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, requiring only that the
petitioner be any Filipino citizen. The exception was so provided
to facilitate the institution of any judicial challenge to such
proclamation or suspension. This is just one of the

 
 
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several safeguards placed in Section 18, Article VII of the

Constitution to avert, check or correct any abuse of the
extraordinary powers, lodged in the President, of imposing
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Nevertheless, this should not result in the Court taking
cognizance of every petition assailing such proclamation or
suspension, if it appears to be prima facie unfounded. That the
Court has the authority to outright deny patently unmeritorious
petitions is clear from the above quoted provision, which uses the
permissive term “may” in referring to the Court’s exercise of its
power of judicial review. The term “may” is indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option. When used in law, it is
directory and operates to confer discretion.
Same; Same; Sufficiency of Factual Basis; View that the
requirement of a prima facie showing of insufficiency of the factual
basis in the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus becomes even more important
if, as the ponencia declares, this Court’s review is to be confined
only to the Proclamation, the President’s Report to Congress, and
the pleadings.—Indeed, given that any citizen can file the action,
it must be required that the petition should allege sufficient
grounds for the Court to take further action. For instance, a
petition that simply invokes the court’s judicial power to review
the proclamation without alleging specific grounds, or is based on
a general, unsubstantiated and conclusory allegation that the
President was without or had false factual basis for issuing the
proclamation or suspension, could be dismissed outright.
Otherwise, in the absence of a personal stake or direct injury
which will ordin

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