PARDON v.

AMNESTY
Amnesty and pardon are powers bestowed on the supreme authority of a nation to give forgiveness
to individuals or group of individuals who have been found guilty of some act. ... A pardon is only
given after a judgment has been pronounced whereas amnesty is given even before the final
judgment.Jul 28, 2011

42. Vera v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-181184, 31 January 1963
Facts:
In the Court of First Instance of Quezon, petitioners Gaudencio Vera, Restituto
Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, Paulino Bayran, and 92 others, as John
Does, were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo
Lozanes, alias Azarcon. Upon petitioners' motion, invoking the benefits of Amnesty
Proclamation of the President, series of 1946, the case was referred to the Eighth
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, which actually tried i t.

The kidnapping, torturing and killing of Lt. Amadeo Lozanes of the Hunters was
denied by the Vera’s Guirella Party. None of the petitioner- defendants admitted having
committed the crime charged to them, not even the only defendant, Gaudencio Vera,
who took the witness stand. The decedent was actually a lieutenant of the Hunter’s
ROTC Guerilla Associations who was engaged in the resistance movement, which may
not be claimed by the accused as to further the resistance movement at the time as
defense intimate but rather the killing of Lt. Lozanes would tend to weaken
commensurately the resistance movement against the Japanese invaders.

As stated by the petitioners of denying the accusation, there would be no room,

The petitioners were not satisfied by the decision of the commission thus,
appealing in the Court of Appeals was their next moved.

Issue:
Whether or not persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having
committed the crime of which they were accused.

Ruling:
Yes. For Administrative Order No. 144 of the Department of Justice, dated
October 11, 1950, amending Administrative Order No. 179 thereof, and issued on
November 17, 1949, explicitly directs that "where the offense charged against any
person is not one against chastity but is covered by the Revised Penal Code, and the
offense took place between December 8, 1941 and the date of the liberation of the
province or city where the offense is alleged to have been committed, "in order that the
 Amnesty Commission may take cognizance of the case, the accused or respondent
must allege or claim verbally or in writing that he committed the acts charged against
him in furtherance of the resistance movement or against persons who aided in the war
efforts of the enemy', for amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime".

We find no merit in petitioner's claim that the Court of Appeals erred in applying
or citing Department of Justice Administrative Order No. 144, series of 1950, 1

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to

43. People v. Casido, G.R. No. 116512, 7 March 1997

Facts:
In our Resolution of 30 July 1996, we ruled that the conditional pardons granted
in this case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void for
having been extended on 19 January 1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal,
and disposed of the incidents. On 18 September 1996, the Court required Hon. Nilo C.
Mariano and Hon. Nestor J. Ballacillo to submit to this Court a list of the members of the
Secretariat who participated in the deliberations on the accused-appellants application
for pardon and recommended the grant thereof, together with a certified true copy of the
agreement between the Secretariat and the counsel for the applicants for pardon
regarding the filing with the appropriate courts of motions for the withdrawal of appeals
pending therein.
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is
predicated on a wrong contention of the nature or character of an amnesty.
Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.

Issue:

Whether or not the release of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin

Ruling:

As to the pardon, the court find unsatisfactory the Explanation of the Secretariat
of the Committee. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolved that the
release of accused-appellants William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin was valid solely
on the ground of the amnesty granted them and this case is dismissed with costs de
oficio.

The Members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or
Pardon and of its Secretariat are admonished to exercise utmost care and diligence in
the performance of their duty to save the President from any embarrassment in the
exercise of his power to grant pardon or parole.

SO ORDERED.
MILITARY POWERS:

 The Commander-in-chief Clause

44. Gudani v. Senga,G.R. No. 170165, 15 August 2006.

Facts:

On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior
officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005. The hearing was
scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye,
particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt
purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano. On 23 September 2005, Gen. Senga replied through a letter to Sen. Gen.
Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga (Gen. Senga)
were among the several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend
the 28 September 2005 hearing but the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a
Memorandum signed by Gen. Senga, Gen., Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend
the Senate Committee on the said hearing.

A day before the hearing, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time
informing the senator that “no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to
appear” before the hearing scheduled on that day. With all their will, both Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004
elections. Gen. Senga to order them subjected to General Court Martial proceedings for willfully
violating an order of a superior officer. In the meantime, President Arroyo issued EO 464, which
was subject subsequently declared unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from testifying at a
legislative inquiry

Ruling:

The President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential
approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule
unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds
significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the
approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title
as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again,
the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s
ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect.
Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court
will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the
Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief
of the armed forces.