Republic of the Philippines It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are

SUPREME COURT restrictions imposed on him. These are:

Manila
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner
EN BANC gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.

G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986 2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of
respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his
place of residence.
EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, 3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should
FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO, respondents. not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass
media representatives nor give any press release or information that is
inimical to the interest of national security."
Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno and Joker Arroyo for petitioner,

4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their

representatives.

The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
an improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by
the respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his
As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 freedom.
Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled:
The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the
A prime specification of al application for a writ of instant petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is conditions imposed by the respondents."
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
We agree with the petitioner.
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient. ... The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the
temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of
Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the
This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in law,
petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the
remained undiminished up to the present. The respondents' contention
writ of habeas corpus.
that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily be
denied. Efren C. Moncupa may have been released from his detention
cell. The restraints attached to his temporary release, however, In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized
preclude freedom of action and under the Villavicencio v. Lukban rule and transported against their will to Davao were no longer under any
warrant this Court's inquiry into the nature of his involuntary restraint official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change
and our relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal. their domicile without asking for official permission. Indeed, some of
them managed to return to Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the
involuntary restraints caused by the official action, fined the Mayor of
Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on
Manila and expressed the hope that its "decision may serve to bulwark
April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Street and
the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to
individual liberty from Megal encroachment."
MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On
April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic
Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus
was issued against him and eight (8) other persons. has not become moot and academic. Other precedents for such a
conclusion are not wanting.
After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant
Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:
Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado
Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that the petitioner was not
An employment agency, regardless of the amount
a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators
it may advance to a prospective employee or
recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal
maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her
possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents
freedom of movement. The fact that no physical
under Presidential Decree No. 33.
force has been exerted to keep her in the house of
the respondent does not make less real the
Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement,
petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of freedom to transfer from one place to another,
First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the from to choose one's residence. Freedom may be
City Court of Quezon City. Against the other accused, however, the lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded
cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended. Significantly, the or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti- existence of the will. If the actual effect of such
Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant psychological spell is to place a person at the
that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower protection of courts of justice as much as the
court. individual who is illigally deprived of liberty by
deprived or physical coercion.
Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court ruled:
The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of
petitioner's detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had Although the release in the custody of the Deputy
been suspended as to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, Minister did not signify that petitioners could once
the respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, again enjoy their full freedom, the application
the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders of the could have been dismissed, as it could be
Minister temporary of National Defense with the approval of the withdrawn by the parties themselves. That is a
President. The respondents stated. "Since the petitioner is free and no purely voluntary act. When the hearing was held
longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for on September 7, 1978, it turned out that counsel
habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar for petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz could have
cases. academic in a hasty manner when he set forth the
above allegations in his manifestation of August
30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition has
appeared for petitioners, while conceding that
become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary
there was such a release from confinement, also
release.
alleged that it was conditioned on their restricting
 their activities as labor union leaders to the
premises of the Trade Unions of the Philippines
and ABSOLUTE Services, presumably in
Macaraig as well as the Ministry of labor. As the
voting was to take place in the business firm in
Bataan, the acts set would nullify whatever efforts
they could have exerted. To that extent, and with
the prohibition against their going to Bataan, the
restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so, the moot
and academic character of the petition was far
from clear.

More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or not a

temporary release from detention renders the petition for writ of
habeas corpus moot and academic. As in this case of Moncupa, the
petitioners in Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al, G.R. No. 69270,
October 15, 1985, were temporarily released from detention. The
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on
the ground that the petitioners had been temporarily released and their
case had, therefore, become moot and academic. The petitioners
insisted, however, that their case may be considered moot and
academic only "if their release would be permanent." In ruling for the
petitioners, we said:

Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes

moot and academic when the restraint on the
liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily
or permanently. We have so held in a number of
cases. But the instant case presents a different
situation. The question to be resolved is whether
the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a
person for an offense after a court of competent
jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An
affirmative answer is the one suggested by the
respondents because the release of the petitioners
being merely 'temporary' it follows that they can be
re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a
court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such
a reservation is repugnant to the government of
laws and not of men principle. Under this principle
the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal
charge he can no longer be detained or re-
arrested for the same offense. This concept is so
basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration.

In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free
from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully
denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is
present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of
freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments,
become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf
may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and
why the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not
be lifted.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached

to the temporary release of the petitioner are declared null and void.
The temporary release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No
costs,

SO ORDERED.