Habeas Corpus

— Boratong vs. Delima September 8, 2020

Facts: This case is a petition for Writ of Amparo and Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus/Data (With Prayers for Production and Inspection of Place) and a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo[2] assailing the sudden transfer of national inmates
from the National Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa City to the National Bureau of
Corrections in Manila City for the purpose of conducting an inspection on their living
quarters.
In a December 12, 2014 Memorandum, captioned "SECRET," then Secretary Leila M.
De Lima (Secretary De Lima) directed then Bureau of Corrections Director Franklin
Jesus B. Bucayu and then National Bureau of Investigation Director Virgilio L. Mendez
(Director Mendez):

1.) The transfer of the following inmates from Bilibid Prison to a temporary NBP
extension

2.) To conduct search on the abovementioned inmates' quarters, which are suspected
to contain illegal drug precursors and paraphernalia, illegal drugs (methamphetamine
hydrochloride), rearms and other weapons, cash, mobile phones, laptops, other
communication gadgets, and other miscellaneous contrabands, and to forthwith seize
and con scate any illegal and/or prohibited items.

3.) To undertake intensive investigation and case build-up towards the end of ling
appropriate cases, as may be warranted by the results of the foregoing operations,
against inmates and BuCor o cials or employees who may be found involved or liable.

As a result of this operation and surprise raid, several illegal paraphernalia and
contraband was seized from the inmates.

The 19 inmates were subsequently transferred to the New Bilibid Prison Extension
Facility in the National Bureau of Investigation compound in Taft Avenue, Manila while
their living quarters were dismantled.

Several petitions for the writs of amparo and habeas corpus and data were led by the
inmates concerned. Petitioner Boratong alleged that when the Petition was led, Amin
Imam Boratong was denied access to his counsel and visitation from his relatives. She
also insists that there was no reason to transfer her husband from the National Bilibid
Prison to the National Bureau of Investigation since his conviction was still pending
appeal. His summary transfer to "a place where armed authorities are ubiquitous" and
incommunicado status, she argues, were equivalent to an enforced disappearance,
which should have justi ed the issuance of a writ of amparo.

The O ce of the Solicitor General, meanwhile, argues that the Petitions should be
dismissed for being moot. It points out that the inmates had already been returned to
the National Bilibid Prison facility in Building 14. It also notes that the reliefs sought by
petitioners, that is, the grant of visitation rights and the return of the inmates to the
National Bilibid Prison, have already been granted by subsequent events. Nonetheless,
the O ce of the Solicitor General argues that the writ of amparo is only available to
threats of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, none of which petitioners
su er from. It asserts that the Rule on Amparo requires respondents to state the steps
or actions taken to determine the fate and whereabouts of the aggrieved party in the
return, which respondent in this case cannot comply with since the location of the
inmates is known to all individuals, including their counsels. It likewise points out that
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 visitation rights is not a relief available in a writ of amparo.45 It argues that no threat to
the right to security was present since the transfers were made to address the alleged
illegal activities inside the Maximum Security Compound, and none of the inmates
were maltreated during their J detention in the National Bureau of Investigation.

The O ce of the Solicitor General likewise contends that the writ of habeas corpus
was an improper remedy since it was shown that the restraint of liberty is by virtue of a
valid legal process.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the petitions led are rendered moot for being led out of time.

2. Should the writ of habeas corpus be granted

Ruling:

1. Court may still pass upon actions for habeas corpus even when the alleged illegal
detention has ceased if the action is one that is capable of repetition yet evading
review.

Here, the national inmates had been returned to their actual detention facilities. There
is, however, a lingering question of whether the Department of Justice is authorized to
transfer them to another facility without a court order, which could happen at any time.
Its capability of being repeated had already been demonstrated when on June 10,
2019, President Duterte, through Secretary of Justice Menardo Guevarra, ordered the
transfer of 10 "high pro le" inmates from the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa City to
the Marines Barracks Rudiardo Brown in Taguig City.62 While this transfer has not been
questioned before this Court, there is still no de nitive ruling on whether the
Department of Justice has the authority to transfer national inmates. Thus, this Court
takes the opportunity in this case despite the mootness of the reliefs sought.

Note:

At rst glance, the Petitions appear to have already been rendered moot. Petitioners'
relatives had already been returned to the National Bilibid Prison facility in Building 14
and the grant of visitation rights had also been restored.54 In David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo:

“A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use
or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.”

But the court is not precluded from deciding cases otherwise moot if " rst, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest are involved; third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review."

The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and e ectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only su cient defense of
personal freedom."65 Its primary purpose "is to determine the legality of the restraint
under which a person is held."66 The writ may be applied to any manner of restraint as
"[a]ny restraint which will preclude freedom of action is su cient.
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 Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that "the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal con nement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto." Thus, the general rule is that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus can
only be led by a person illegally deprived of liberty.

Here, Amin Imam Boratong has already been deprived of his liberty through a valid
legal process by a court of competent jurisdiction, that is, his conviction by the Pasig
City Regional Trial Court in 2006. When he was transferred to the New Bilibid Prisons
Extension Facility, however, Boratong's counsels alleged that he was kept
incommunicado by respondents and that they had no information as to his present
condition or his exact whereabouts during his transfer.

Detention incommunicado, regardless of whether the detention was by virtue of a valid

legal process, is speci cally prohibited by Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states:

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an o ense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot a ord the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.

there was an urgent need to remove the national inmates from their place of
con nement and to transfer them to another detention facility. Considering that the
Secretary of Justice has the authority to determine the movement of national inmates
between penal facilities, there is no compelling reason for this Court to grant these
Petitions.

2. No.
The National Bureau of Investigation Memorandum87 dated January 14,
2015 shows that the inmates' counsels and immediate family were allowed
access to the inmates within reasonable guidelines. In a con dential
memorandum88 dated January 3, 2015 by Special Investigator Ramon Alba
addressed to Director Mendez, it was reported that a follow-up inspection
was conducted on the temporary detention cell of Boratong and Colanggo
on December 29, 2014. The follow-up inspection yielded two (2) mobile
phones as well as Canadian $475.00 and P659,550.00 in cash.89 The raid
was conducted during the period alleged by petitioners that Boratong and
Colanggo were incommunicado. Re: Abellana v. Paredes90 cautions that
"[m]ere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional right is not enough.
The violation of constitutional right must be su cient to void the entire
proceedings."91 Hence, there is no compelling reason for this Court to
grant the writ of habeas corpus.
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 — Sumbong vs. CA 255 SCRA 663

Facts:
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in
Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months
old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for
treatment. Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance
of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged as a result.
Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The
spouses Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her.
Petitioner led a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance
of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was
being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied
due course and summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan.
Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who
claimed to be their guardian.
The O ce of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner’s
complaint, led an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal
Detention of a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed
that the child may be found in quezon city. When Sombong reached the residence, a
small girl named Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed the child to be
hers even if she wasn’t entirely sure that it was Arabella.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner led a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong’s favor and ordered
the respondents to deliver the child.
The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent: (1)
The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the
identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of
the child in question, what the e ect would proof of abandonment be under the
circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question of the child’s welfare be the
paramount consideration in this case which involves child custody.
The TC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Is habeas corpus the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?

Held: Yes but requisites not met. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held. A prime speci cation of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and e ective, and not merely nominal or moral,
illegal restraint of liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and e ectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only su cient defense of personal freedom. A prime speci cation of an application
for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is su cient.
To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the
nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic
requisite under the rst part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides that “except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
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corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal con nement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty.”
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to
in cases where “the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.” Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the
restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again that the said writ is the proper
legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the
latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will.
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the
writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody over a child.
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all
depend on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the
right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being
withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of
the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.
1. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that
Arabella is the same person as Cristina. It will be remembered that, in habeas corpus
proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual
presumptions including those as to identity of person.
The ponente noticed that there was no show of emotion on the mother when she met
her lost daughter.
Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to
be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. The process is
both logical and analytical.
In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual
and separate existence of petitioner’s child, Arabella, from that of private respondents’
foster child, Cristina. According to one witness, there were several babies left in the
clinic and it wasn’t certain if Arabella was given to the petitioner.
2. Petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the
minor Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private
respondents are unlawfully withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over
Cristina. Moreover, the way the respondents obtained custody isn’t material to the
habeas corpus issue.
3. Private respondents are nancially, physically and spiritually in a better position to
take care of the child, Cristina. They have the best interest of Cristina at heart. On the
other hand, it is not to the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the
custody of petitioner due top her lack of a stable job and her separation from a married
man.

— Bagtas vs. Santos Nov. 27, 2009

Facts: Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo (Spouses Gallardo) are the parents of Maricel S.
Gallardo (Maricel). Two weeks after graduating from high school in April 2000, Maricel
ran away to live with her boyfriend. She became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy
S. Gallardo (Maryl Joy). Maricel’s boyfriend left her.
In February 2002, Maricel returned to her parents but, on the same day, ran away and
lived with Noel Bagtas and Lydia Sioson in Antipolo City. She went to Negros
Occidental and left her daughter in the custody of Bagtas and Lydia. She wrote a letter
dated February 5, 2001 relinquishing her rights over Maryl Joy.
(Letter: Ako po si Maricel S. Gallardo 18 taong gulang ay kusang ipinagkaloob ang
aking anak sa pagkadalaga sa mag-asawang Noel B. Bagtas at Neneth A. Bagtas sa
kadahilanan pong itinakwil ako ng sarili kong mga magulang at hindi ko po kayang
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 buhayin at dahil po sa tinakbuhan ako ng aking boyfriend kaya wala na pong ibang
paraan para ako makabangon o makapagsimula ng panibagong buhay kaya para
mabigyan ng magandang buhay ang aking anak inisip ko po na ito na ang pinaka
madaling paraan para po sa pagbabago ng aking buhay.
Kaya mula sa araw na ito ay wala na akong karapatan sa aking anak. Sila ang tatayo
bilang magulang ng aking anak.)
In April 2002, Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of Maryl Joy but Bagtas
and Sioson refused. Thus, they led a petition for habeas corpus with the RTC which
ordered Bagtas and Sioson to explain why they were withholding the custody of Maryl
Joy. Eventually, both parties entered into agreement on the following:
1.the child should be placed in custody of the petitioners on Friday, Saturday
and Sunday;
2.that the child should be returned to the respondents by the petitioners on
Sunday at 8:00 o’clock in the evening subject to visitorial rights of the petitioners
anytime of the day; and
3.that the child can be brought by the respondents to Valenzuela but should be
returned to the petitioners on Friday morning.
Notwithstanding the agreement, Rosita brought Maryl Joy to Samar. Thus, Bagtas and
Sioson led a motion against the spouses to produce the body of Maryl Joy and they
be cited in contempt for failing to comply with the agreement. They also pray for the
dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus led by Spouses Gallardo invoking Section
3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which states that “If, for no justi able cause, the
plainti fails x x x to comply with x x x any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion."
RTC cited the spouses in contempt and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus of
Spouses for being moot and academic as the subject of the petition has already been
produced to the court and turned over to the them.
Not satis ed with how the RTC ruled the case, Bagtas and Sioson led a motion for
reconsideration contending that the RTC should have dismissed the case based on
Rules of Court, not on mootness, with prayer that Maryl Joy be returned to them. They
averred that RTC issued a con icting order because it cited the Spouses for contempt
for violating the agreement and yet they dismissed the habeas corpus for being moot
and academic. This, according to them, in e ect give premium to the act of Gallrdo’s
not turning over the child to Bagtas and Sioson,
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the sole purpose that the petition for
habeas corpus was the production of Maryl Joy and that the Spouses Gallardo
exercised substitute parental authority. They contended that the action led by Bagtas
and Sioson does not constitute grounds for habeas corpus but of determining who has
the custody over the child. However, it is clear that Spouses Gallardo are, under the
law (Art. 214, Family Code), authorized to exercise substitute parental authority over
the child in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, the entitlement to the
legal custody of the child being necessarily included therein to make possible and/or
enable the petitioners to discharge their duties as substitute parents.
Bagtas led with the CA a petition for certiorari but it was dismissed. According to the
court, Spouses Gallardo obtained initial custody of the minor in violation of a valid
court order however, they can exercise substitute parental authority over her as they
are the grandparents. Furthermore, they contended that:
In custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal or involuntary
restraint is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ of
habeas corpus as a remedy; rather, the writ is prosecuted for the purpose of
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 determining the right of custody of a child. By dismissing the petition, the trial
court in e ect upheld Gallardos’ right of custody over the minor involved as
against that of Bagtas.
Hence, this petition.
Issue/s: Whether or not the court erred in upholding the right of the Spouses over the
custody of the minor vis-a vis the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus?
Ruling: No. The CA erred in a rming the Orders of the RTC. Section 1, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases where
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the persons entitled thereto. In
cases involving minors, the purpose of thus petition is not limited to the production of
the child before the court. However, it is to determine who has the rightful custody over
the child.
In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that habeas corpus is the proper legal
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be
in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody
cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is
not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.
The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl
Joy was produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine
who had the rightful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in
e ect, granted the petition for habeas corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to
the Spouses Gallardo without su cient basis.
Mindful of the nature of the case, the court a quo should have conducted a
trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the case for
resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus,
petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering
that said psychiatric report, which was the court’s primary basis in awarding
custody to respondent, is insu cient to justify the decision. The fundamental
policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be
disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family
and the youth. (Laxamana vs Laxamana)

Though, it is true that Article 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. Article 216 also states that in default of parents or a
judicially appointed guardian, the surviving grandparent shall exercise substitute
parental authority over the child. However, in determining who has the rightful
custody over a child, the child’s welfare is the most important consideration. The
court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child.

The controversy does not involve the question of personal freedom, because an
infant is presumed to be in the custody of someone until he attains majority age.
In passing on the writ in a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of an
equitable nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian,
the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due weight as a
claim founded on human nature and considered generally equitable and
just. Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of the
petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the
case of adults, but on the court’s view of the best interests of those whose
welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or another. Hence,
the court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of
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 any person, but should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody
as its welfare at the time appears to require. (Sombong vs CA)

The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions
regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration. In the same vein, the Family Code authorizes the courts
to, if the welfare of the child so demands, deprive the parents concerned of
parental authority over the child or adopt such measures as may be proper under
the circumstances.

In Sombong, the Court laid down three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus
involving minors:

(1) the petitioner has a right of custody over the minor,

(2) the respondent is withholding the rightful custody over the minor, and

(3) the best interest of the minor demands that he or she be in the custody of
the petitioner.

These requisites are not clearly established in the present case because the RTC
hastily dismissed the action and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the
Spouses Gallardo without conducting any trial.

DISPOSITION: Case remanded for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the
tness of the Gallardo’s to have custody of Maryl Joy.

— Lucina vs. Ilago September 15, 2020

Facts: AJ Lucena, daughter of the petitioners, left the family home and joined
Anakbayan, a youth organization advocating ideals of national democracy. In a press
conference, AJ appeared and explained that she was never abducted but joined
Anakbayan voluntarily.

As a result, petitioners led a petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and
habeas corpus and impleaded in the petition are respondents Sarah Elago,
representative of Kabataan party list and Alex Danday, spokesperson of Anakbayan.

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of temporary protection order prohibiting the party
lists from recruiting and threatening the life, liberty and security of AJ, an order to place
AJ under the custody of the petitioners and to produce AJ in Court

Issue: Whether or not the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo and habeas
corpus will prosper?

Ruling: No. Petitioners’ plea for the issuance of a writ of amparo is not proper. The
remedy of amparo, in its present formulation, is con ned merely to instances of
“extralegal killings” or “enforced disappearances” and to threats thereof.

Here, there is not much issue that AJ’s situation does not qualify either as an actual or
threatened enforced disappearance or extralegal killing. AJ is not missing. Her
whereabouts are determinable. By all accounts, she is staying with the Anakbayan and
its o cers which, at least insofar as AJ’s case is concerned, are not agents or
organizations acting on behalf of the State. Indeed, against these facts, petitioners’
invocation of the remedy of amparo cannot pass.
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 Agcaoli vs. Farinas July 3, 2018

DOCTRINES:

Doctrine:
Administrative supervision which shall govern the administrative relationship between a
department or its equivalent and regulatory agencies or other agencies as may be
provided by law, shall be limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to
generally oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are managed
e ectively, e ciently and economically but without interference with day-to- day
activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management
audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary
for the proper performance of o cial functions, including recti cation of violations,
abuses and other forms of maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget
proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them. Thus, administrative
supervision merely involves overseeing the operations of agencies to ensure that they
are managed e ectively, e ciently and economically, but without interference with day-
to-day activities

Thus, to e ectively exercise its power of administrative supervision over all courts as
prescribed by the Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 828, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 842, created the O ce of the Court Administrator. Nowhere in
the functions of the several o ces in the O ce of the Court Administrator is it provided
that the Court can assume jurisdiction over a case already pending with another court.

The House Rules railroaded to initiate the inquiry

• Referral of House Resolution No. 882 from the Committee on Rules to the Committee
on Good Government and the scheduling for hearing on 02 May 2017 all took place on
16 March 2017, without the conduct of preliminary determination before the Committee
on Rules (for determination of whether it is the proper subject of legislative inquiry) and
before the respondent Committee on Good Government (for determination of
jurisdiction over the subject matter)
• The subpoena ad testi candum for petitioners Ilocos 6 to appear at the hearing
scheduled on 16 May 2017 were only served on them on 15 May 2017 - one (1) day
prior to the scheduled hearing, instead of at least three (3) days as required under
Section 8 of the House Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
• Despite lack of su cient notice, the Committee of Good Government and Public
Accountability cited petitioners Ilocos 6 in contempt for failure to appear at the 16 May
2017 hearing.

• The conditions of con nement are degrading and inhuman - e ectively a continuing
psychological torture in icted on the Ilocos 6. The Ilocos 6 were not provided food and
mattresses and beddings. The detention was a stock room with very poor ventilation
and turned hastily into a detention room.
• These conditions evince the coercive nature of the interrogation as evidenced by
statements of Respondent Fariñas during the inquiry on May 29, 2017 that petitioners
will be detained until the House of Representatives resumes its session in July 24,
2017.
• A Petition for Habeas Corpus was led by the Petitioners Ilocos 6 before the Courts
of Appeals where a “Writ of Habeas Corpus” was issued. Subsequently, an "Order of
Release" was issued to the Ilocos 6 after posting bond but said order was not served
because the process server was denied entry to the House of Representatives.
• Worse, the leadership of the House of Representatives, speci cally House Speaker
Pantaleon Alvarez, openly outed the authority of the Court of Appeals, stating publicly
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 that the House of Representatives would not recognize the orders of the Court of
Appeals and even threatened to abolish the Court of Appeals through a legislation
originating from the House of Representatives.

• In the end, with the Committee, speci cally Respondent Fariñas unsatis ed with their
answers to the questions raised by the Committee, the Ilocos 6 were ordered back into
detention, until they were ready to answer the queries of the Committee in a manner
that it deemed satisfactory.

While the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before the CA, petitioners and co-
petitioner Marcos led the instant Omnibus Petition.

In opposition, respondents maintain that the writ of Amparo and writ of Habeas
Corpus are two separate remedies which are incompatible and therefore cannot co-
exist in a single petition. Further, respondents argue that the issuance of a writ
of Amparo is limited only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
which are not extant in the instant case.

Issue: 1. WON the petition for writ of amparo while petition for habeas corpus is
pending is proper?

2. Whether or not Court assumes jurisdictions over the pending Habeas Corpus by
invoking the power of administrative supervision of the Court provided under Sec. 6,
Article VIII of the Constitution.

Ruling:
1. No. While there is no procedural and legal obstacle to the joining of a petition for
habeas corpus and a petition for Amparo,117 the peculiarity of the then pendency of
the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA renders the direct resort to this Court for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo inappropriate.

The privilege of the writ of Amparo is con ned to instances of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof

Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily admit that the instant Omnibus
Petition does not cover extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats
thereof. Thus, on this ground alone, their petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo is
dismissible.

2. No. Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall
have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This
Constitutional provision refers to the administrative supervision that the Department of
Justice previously exercised over the courts and their personnel. Administrative
Supervision in Section 38, paragraph 2, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Administrative Code
is de ned as follows: (a) Administrative supervision which shall govern the
administrative relationship between a department or its equivalent and regulatory
agencies or other agencies as may be provided by law, shall be limited to the authority
of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such
agencies and to insure that they are managed e ectively, e ciently and economically
but without interference with day-to-day activities; or require the submission of reports
and cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection
to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; to
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 take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of o cial functions,
including recti cation of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; and
to review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or
add to them. Thus, administrative supervision merely involves overseeing the
operations of agencies to ensure that they are managed e ectively, e ciently and
economically, but without interference with day-to-day activities.
Thus, to e ectively exercise its power of administrative supervision over all courts as
prescribed by the Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 828, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 842, created the O ce of the Court Administrator. Nowhere in
the functions of the several o ces in the O ce of the Court Administrator is it provided
that the Court can assume jurisdiction over a case already pending with another court.
Moreover, Rule 4, Section 3(c) of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC provides: The administrative
functions of the Court en banc consist of, but are not limited to, the following: (c) the
transfer of cases, from one court, administrative area or judicial region, to another, or
the transfer of venue of the trial of cases to avoid miscarriage of justice.
Clearly, the administrative function of the Court to transfer cases is a matter of venue,
rather than jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by respondents, the import of the
Court's pronouncement in Gutierrez is the recognition of the incidental and inherent
power of the Court to transfer the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank
in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of
preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. Such incidental and inherent power
cannot be interpreted to mean an authority on the part of the Court to determine which
court should hear speci c cases without running afoul with the doctrine of separation
of powers between the Judiciary and the Legislative.

— Ampatuan vs. Macaraeg June 29, 2010

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held. A prime speci cation of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and e ective, and not merely nominal or moral,
illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy
and e ectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only su cient defense of personal freedom. A prime speci cation of an application for
a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is su cient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must rst inquire into
whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint
exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should
be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the
writ will be refused.

Facts:
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at
the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation
conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the
male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded
to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were
conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s O ce.
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 On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge
Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, nding probable cause to charge PO1
Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1
Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that

the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be
released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.

Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution
O ce, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, led a Petition for the Issuance of
a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.

On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus

commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing
said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of
PO1 Ampatuan.

Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the ling of the
administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this
Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police o cer. The petitioner
countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative
case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the resignation has not
been acted by the appropriate police o cials of the PNP, and that the administrative
case was led while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC
reversed and dismissed the petition.

Issue:
Whether the respondent court gravely abused its discretion when it failed to
consider that the arrest and detention of PO1 Ampatuan was made without any
warrant and therefore, illegal.

Ruling:
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the con nement or detention is
valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the ling of the application for the
writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of
Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the ling of the application

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody.
Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the
Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides
that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary
machinery of the PNP.

Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a
restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police o cers
under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of
liberty.

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of
habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor e ective restraint that would call for the grant of
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 the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP
authorities that the police o cers concerned are always accounted for.

In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is

entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan.
The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty
guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.

— Abella vs. Paredes July 10, 2019

FACTS
A search warrant was issued gainst the accused Michael Badajos. The search warrant
was for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
When the team led by P/Supt. Labra arrived, the accused was present. They identi ed
themselves as police o cers and informed the accused of the existence of the search
warrant. PO2 Maglinte was designated as searcher while PO2 dela Victoria was
designated recorder. The search was done in the presence of the accused and
barangay tanods of Bgy. Suba.
The sala of the 2-storey house was searched rst. Then they found the hanged pants
of the accused in the window. There was no other male person in the house. They
found in the said front pocket of the accused a big transparent plastic pack of white
crystalline substance believed to be shahu. They also found shabu paraphernalia. (not
necessary)
An information was led against petitioner. He pleaded not guilty. He led a Motion to
Quash which was denied.
RTC issued an Order submitting the case for decision for failure of petitioner and his
counsel to appear during the scheduled hearing.
Petitioner led an Urgent Motion to Defer Promulgation of Judgment as there was no
proper guidance of his previous counsel; that the present counsel was never furnished
copies of notice from the Court.
RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. Upon Motion for New Trial, the
accused claimed that he had been deprived of his right to due process because he had
not been properly noti ed ever since Atty. Albura became his new counsel and that
Atty. Albura received only two notices involving the case.
RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest and denied the accused’s Motion for New Trial. RTC
ruled that petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process. The RTC stated that
there was no proper substitution of counsel.
Lastly, the RTC ruled that contrary to petitioner's claims, he was not deprived of his
day in court. He was represented when all prosecution witnesses testi ed and the latter
were cross-examined by his previous counsel.
Petitioner was arrested at his residence. Atty. Albura led a Manifestation of his
withdrawal as counsel for petitioner, which was granted.
Petitioner's third counsel, Atty. Acosta, led a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the
ground that petitioner was "deprived of his constitutional right to be heard and to
present evidence in his behalf in view of the excusable negligence of Atty. Albura in not
appearing in the hearing and for failure of his bondsman or Atty. Albura to inform him of
the scheduled hearing.
RTC denied the petition and ruled that the accused is bound by the negligence of his
counsel. CA a rmed.
Petitioner led a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus before the SC.
ISSUE
Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be granted RULING - NO
The Writ of Habeas Corpus
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 It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and
determined by a court of justice and to have it ascertained whether he is held
under lawful authority.
The Writ extends to all cases of illegal con nement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled. Thus,
be
.
If a person's liberty is restrained by some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing. The writ cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a
competent court which was not ousted of this jurisdiction through some irregularity in
the course of the proceedings.
However, the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of as a post-conviction
remedy when any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: 1) there has
been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the
court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3) the imposed penalty has been
excessive, thus voiding the sentence as such excess. Here, petitioner is invoking the
rst circumstance.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that when the detention complained of nds its origin in
what has been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding
is considerably narrowed. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes from the
exceptional circumstances, the threshold remains high. Mere allegation of a violation of
one's constitutional right is not enough. Thus, The violation of constitutional right must
be su cient to void the entire proceedings.

— Go vs. Dimagiba June 21, 2005

FACTS
Dimagiba issued Go thirteen checks that were subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for the reason “Account Closed”.
Go lodged a complaint against Dimagiba for violating B.P. 22 in the MTCC of
Baguio City (Branch 4) which convicted the respondent on July 16, 1999 for 13
counts of violation of the law a quo. Dimagiba was also ordered to serve 2-
month imprisonment for each count and a ne of 1,295,000 pesos.
Dimagiba appealed in Baguio City RTC Branch 4 on May 23, 2000, but the latter
denied the appeal. Having no further appeal in CA, Branch 4 issued a Certi cate
of Finality of the Decision on February 1, 2001.
The MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his
sentence and a Writ of Execution for the enforcement of his civil liability.
Dimagiba led a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2001, praying to
recall the Order of Arrest and a Modi cation of the Final Decision, arguing that
only the penalty of ne shall be imposed on him. The MTCC denied the motion.
Dimagiba was arrested on September 28, 2001.
Dimagiba led a Petition of Habeas Corpus in Baguio City RTC Branch 5. The
court ordered the immediate release of the respondent and ordered Dimagiba to
pay 100,000 pesos in lieu of his imprisonment. The court justi ed this
modi cation by invoking the SC ruling on Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000, which allegedly required the
imposition of only a ne instead of imprisonment for BP 22 violations, provided
that the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent.
The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba.
It further noted that (1) he was a rst-time o ender; and (2) the civil liability had
already been satis ed through the levy of his properties.
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 Petitioner Susan Go elevated the case to the Supreme Court assailing the order
a quo.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not habeas corpus is a proper remedy since the case has
conclusively been decided.

RULING
No, the writ of habeas corpus may not be availed of when the person in custody
is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. The writ of habeas
corpus applies to all cases of illegal con nement or detention in which
individuals are deprived of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and e ectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more speci cally, to
obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally con ned or
imprisoned without su cient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful
custody.

However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a

consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional
circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus
voiding the sentence as to such excess. The remedy should have been an
appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed
that the execution of the judgment be stayed.

— IBP vs. DOJ July 25, 2017

FACTS: This is a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus with a
petition for declaratory relief led by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Pangasinan Chapter Legal Aid, pursuant to its purpose, as stated in "In the
Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines," issued by the Supreme
Court on January 9, 1973, and the provisions under Guidelines Governing the
Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid O ces in All Chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Guidelines on Legal Aid).

The petition claims that as a result of jail visitations participated in by the IBP
Legal Aid Program, as well as a series of consultations with the Philippine
National Police (PNP) on the extant condition of detention prisoners, it was
discovered that several detention prisoners had been languishing in jail for years
without a case being led in court by the prosecutor's o ce and without de nite
ndings as to the existence or nonexistence of probable cause.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS

PROPER EVEN IF THE CASE IS
ALREADY MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
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 RULING:

The rule is that a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be

delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in
Article 125 of the RPC, otherwise, the public o cial or employee
could be held liable for the failure to deliver except if grounded on
reasonable and allowable delays.

Article 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from
con ning a person without informing him of his o ense and without allowing
him to post bail. It punishes public o cials or employees who shall detain any
person for some legal ground but fail to deliver such person to the proper
judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. In case the detention is
without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting o cer with
arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the RPC. This is without prejudice to the
possible ling of an action for damages under Article 32 of the New Civil Code
of the Philippines.

Article 125 of the RPC, however, can be waived if the detainee who was validly
arrested without a warrant opts for the conduct of preliminary investigation.
The question to be addressed here, therefore, is whether such waiver gives
the State the right to detain a person inde nitely. The Court answers in the
negative.

The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP,
and PNP the unbridled right to inde nitely incarcerate an arrested person and
subject him to the whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ.
The waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the prescribed period for
preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right to
liberty.

Stated di erently, the waiver of the e ects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a
license to detain a person ad in nitum. Waiver of a detainee's right to be
delivered to proper judicial authorities as prescribed by Article125 of the RPC
does not trump his constitutional right in cases where probable cause was
initially found wanting by reason of the dismissal of the complaint led
before the prosecutor's o ce even if such dismissal is on appeal,
reconsideration, reinvestigation or on automatic review. Every person's basic
right to liberty is not to be construed as waived by mere operation of Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The fundamental law provides limits and this
must be all the more followed especially so that detention is proscribed absent
probable cause.

Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be
promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite
a waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in
cases of violation of R.A. No. 91659 ) for the conduct of the preliminary
investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases where the investigating
prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was
appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration,
reinvestigation or automatic review. The reason is that such dismissal
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 automatically results in a prima facie nding of lack of probable cause to le an
information in court and to detain a person.

The Court is aware that this decision may raise discomfort to some,
especially at this time when the present administration aggressively wages
its "indisputably popular war on illegal drugs." As Justice Diosdado Peralta
puts it, that the security of the public and the interest of the State would be
jeopardized is not a justi cation to trample upon the constitutional rights of
the detainees against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and to a speedy disposition of
the case.

— Ilosorio vs. Bender May 12, 2000

(Special Proceedings – Husband cannot be forced to live with his wife by Habeas
Corpus)
Facts: Erlinda led with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of her
husband Potenciano alleging that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see
and visit her husband.
The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but denied
the petition for habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject
of the petition. Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for
habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband and enforce consortium as the
wife.
Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation
rights.
Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in their conjugal dwelling.
Held: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be
enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal con nement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is
available where a person continuous unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy and e ectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restrainment, as the best and only su cient defense of personal
freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal.
A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be the subject
of visitation rights against free choice. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded
visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for
such right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
the sheri s or by any other mesne process.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal con nement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To
justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
e ective not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and e ective detention or deprivation of
Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was
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 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental
capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right
of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheri s or by any
other process.

— Jackson vs. Macalinog 415 SCRA 390

The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau
of Immigration.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or
discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of,
at the earliest, the ling of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the
detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such
as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of
the ling of the application. Any such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial
process preventing the discharge of the detained person.

CASE SUMMARY: Petitioner, an American citizen, was found in possession of

US passports issued under his name and a certain Steve Bator. After receiving
a certi cation from the US Embassy that the said passports have been
cancelled because the same were tampered with, the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) ordered his arrest for being an undesirable
alien. Petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID. Petitioner led a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus which was dismissed by the RTC. On
whether the CID can issue a warrant of arrest, the SC held that the term
"court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau
of Immigration.

DOCTRINES:

• The writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal con nement
or detention

• The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation

Board of the Bureau of Immigration

FACTS:

• In 1997, Raymond M. Jackson, an American citizen was charged for

violation of Article 176, RPC1. He was found to be in possession of US
passports under the names of Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven
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 Bernard Bator after a search conducted in his residence in Angeles City.

• The Board of Commissioners (BOC) of the CID ordered the summary

deportation of Jackson.

• Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration with the CID regarding the
BOC deportation order but this was
denied. However, petitioner could not be deported because he led a
petition to lift the summary order of
deportation with the CID, which had not yet been resolved.

• In 1999, the US Embassy in Manila issued a certi cation that the US

Passports had been cancelled because
the same were tampered with.

o CID ordered his arrest for being an undesirable alien based on the hold
departure order of the Makati

RTC and the certi cation of the US Embassy. Petitioner was arrested and
detained at the CID.

• Jackson then led a petition for habeas corpus against the

Commissioner of the CID, et al.

• RTC dismissed his petition

ISSUES: Won the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants of arrest
(YES)

o On the assumption that he can, WON such warrants can only be issued to
enforce a nal order of

deportation (YES)

RULING: The petition is dismissed.

• Court held that under Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, except as
otherwise provided by law, the writ

of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal con nement or

detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it.

o The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from
unlawful restraint.

o It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which
he is detained
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 • Under Sec. 4, Rule 102, the term "court" includes quasi-judicial
bodies like the Deportation Board of the
Bureau of Immigration.

• Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his
release or discharge from custody.

o What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the

earliest, the ling of the

application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of
the ling of the application.

o Any such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process

preventing the discharge of the detained person.

• As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint rests on the petitioner
who attaches such restraints. If it appears that the detained person is in
custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall
be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint (Sec. 13, Rule
102). In this case, the return

f the writ by the respondents shows that the respondent was arrested
and detained at the CID

detention center based on the BOC order which had become nal and
executory.

• The Court also held that the certi cation of a foreign embassy is su cient
ground for the arrest and deportation of aliens from the Philippines.

PETITION DISMISSED.
DECISION OF THE RTC in Special Proceedings AFFIRMED

NOTES:

RULE 102. HABEAS CORPUS

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an o cer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed;
or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an o ense in the Philippines, or of a
person su ering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
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 On burden of proof:

Sec. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. — If it appears that
the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law,
the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint;
but if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return
shall be considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party
claiming the custody must prove such facts.

— Alejano vs. Cabuay August 25, 2005

ACTS:

Some 321 armed soldiers led by junior o cers Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt.
Nicanor Faeldon (PN-Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN),
Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (PA), and Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV entered and took control
of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments in Makati City in the early morning of July
27, 2003. The soldiers disarmed the security personnel of Oakwood and planted
explosives in its immediate surroundings. In its public announcement, the junior
o cers renounced their support to the administration and called for the resignation of
then President Gloria Arroyo and several other cabinet members. After a series of
negotiations with government emissaries, they voluntarily surrendered, defused the
explosives, and returned to their barracks.

On July 31, 2003, Chief of Sta of AFP Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all the Major
Service Commanders to turn over custody of 10 junior o cers to the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center. The transfer
took place while investigation was ongoing. By August 1, 2003, government
prosecutors led an Information with the RTC of Makati City charging the soldiers of
the crime of coup d’etat penalized under Art. 134-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Thereafter, the RTC issued a commitment order giving the custody of Trillanes and
Gambala to the commanding o cers of ISAFP. Gen. Abaya issued another directive
related to the Oakwood incident ordering all Major Service Commanders to take into
custody the military personnel under their command. On August 11, 2003, herein
petitioners, Atty. Homobono Adaza and Atty. Roberto Rafael Pulido, counsels of
detainees Alejano, Faeldon, Gambala, Maestrecampo and Trillanes, led a petition for
habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. It was granted and SC directed the
respondents to make a return of the writ and produce the persons of the detainees
before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled hearing. On the same day, the detainees
and other co-accused led before the RTC a Motion for Preliminary Investigation which
was granted. After the return of writ was made and the detainees were produced
before the CA, the petition was submitted for a decision based on the memoranda led
by both parties. Subsequently, the CA ruled to dismiss the petition on the grounds that
habeas corpus cannot be availed by the detainees as they were already charged of the
crime of coup d’etat before the RTC. This circumstance entailed a valid indictment and
that the writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy only if the legality

of the indictment or the violation of fundamental Constitutional rights were in question.

Further, the CA held that the right to confer of the detainee to their counsels was not
violated as such was properly regulated and reasonable under the circumstances. Also,
the right to privacy which was allegedly violated through opening and reading of
Trillanes’ and Maestrecampo’s letters by the detention o cers was not a subject for a
habeas corpus for it does not amount to illegal restraint. The CA ordered Gen. Pedro
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 Cabuay, the Chief of ISAFP, to uphold the visiting hours and 2 hours exercise per day
of the detainees.

ISSUES:

• 1) Whether or not the right to privacy of the detainees was violated by reading
the
letters addressed to them

• 2) Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus was the proper remedy
for
the alleged violation of right to privacy and right to confer with their counsel

RULING:

1)

No.

The alleged violation of the right to privacy of communication sanctioned by Sec. 3,

Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, including the right against cruel and unusual
punishment and right to counsel were not appreciated in this case. It is in consideration
of the government’s objective of securing the safety of all detainees and preventing the
escape of the detainees that the regulation of detention centers must be made and
implemented. To this end, RA 7438 or the act which provides the rights of an arrested
and detained person was enacted. Under Sec. 4 (b) of RA 7438 grants the detention
o cer the authority to “undertake such reasonable measures” or regulations. Particular
consideration in this predicament was the fact that high ranking o cers of the New
People’s Army (NPA) and Abu Sayyaf were also detained in the same facility.

As for the alleged violation of the right to privacy, this pertained to the instance which
the ISAFP o cials opened the letters handed by Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of
the counsels for mailing. Letters were not in a sealed envelope as such was not
available in the ISAFP Detention Center. Deriving from US jurisprudence, prison o cial
are generally permitted to open and read all incoming and outgoing mail of convicted
prisoners to prevent smuggling of contraband and avert coordinated escapes. In the
case at bar, the subject letters were not con dential letters between detainees and their
counsels and therefore, can be read by the ISAFP o cials. Should the letters be
marked as con dential under privileged communication between the counsel and the
client, those can only be opened for inspection but cannot be read.

With regard to the allegation of cruel and unusual punishment, the petitioners referred
to the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the iron
grills in their cells with plywood. However, the Supreme Court upheld the principle set
in the case of Bell v. Wol sh in the US that the inevitable consequence of detention is
interference of a detainee’s desire to live comfortably. Restrictions of all the rights, even
fundamental ones, are inherent in being detained. Such restrictions can only be
considered as punishments if (1) the action causes the inmate to su er some harm or
"disability" greater than, or independent of, the inherent discomforts of con nement
and (2) the purpose of the action is to solely to punish the inmate. The boarding of iron
bars, in this case, prevents direct physical contact, but still allow the detainees to have
visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their visitors. It also intends
to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband
and weapons from one cell to another. All above-mentioned explanations were
considered as reasonable and non-punitive response to valid security concerns.
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Also, the visit of the counsels was neither prohibited nor limited but only regulated as it
could be done on a daily basis from 8am to 5pm with noon break. This schedule does
no undermine the right to counsel as it gives su cient time to the counsels to confer
with the detainees.

2) No.

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks for the issuance of an order to present
an individual before the court to explain the cause of his detention. Should the cause of
the detention be held unlawful, the writ will be issued and the detainees be released.
The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention
of a person in order to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his
liberty. Case law has already expanded the writ’s application to circumstances where
there is deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights. However, the courts extend the
scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the
court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is
imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.

In the case at bar, the petitioners admit that there was no question as to the legality of
the detention. Clearly, what they question was the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay
which prevented the petitioners, as counsels, from seeing their clients, the detainees,
any time of the day or night as a violation to the right to counsel under Republic Act
No. 7438. Such subject matter does not warrant a writ of habeas corpus as remedy.

The decision of CA was a rmed.

Writ of Amparo

De Lima et.al vs. Gatdula Case Digest

G.R. No. 204528

Feb. 19, 2013
En Banc

FACTS:
Respondent Gatdula led a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of
Manila, directed against petitioners.

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo or not, the judge issued
summons and ordered the petitioners to le an answer. He also set the case for
hearing.

The counsel for petitioners manifested that a Return and not an Answer is appropriate
for Amparo cases but the Judge opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure
applied since an Amparo case is summary in nature, thus, required an Answer.

The hearing was conducted and the judge ordered the parties to le their respective
memoranda.

RTC then rendered a decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and interim
reliefs prayed for namely: Temporary protection, production and inspection orders.
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The decision was assailed by the petitioners through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
via Rule 45 as enunciated in Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the ling of an Answer was appropriate?
2. Whether or not the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure apply in a Petition for Writ
of Amparo?
3. Whether or not the holding of the hearing on the main case was proper?
4. Whether or not the ling of the memorandum was proper?
5. Whether or not the decision granting the privilege of the Writ and the interim reliefs
was correct?
6. Whether or not the mode of appeal under Rule 45 availed by the Petitioners was
correct?

RULING:
1. No. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the
issuance of Writs of Amparo.

2. The Revised Rules of Summary Procedures apply only to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is

mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from
that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and
criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.34 It is not a civil nor a
criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is
seriously misplaced.

3. No. The holding of the hearing without the Return was not proper. There will be a
summary hearing only after the Return is led to determine the merits of the petition
and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not led, the hearing will be
done ex parte.

4. No. A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

5. No. The decision was not correct. This gives the impression that the decision was
the judgment since the phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo:

"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs
as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis
supplied).

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called
the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The judgment should detail the required acts from the
respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to
the petitioner's life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.

6. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order. A
Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present
petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the
salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.
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 HELD:
(1) NULLIFY all orders issued by the Judge in relation to this Petition for the Issuance of
a Writ of Amparo case;

(2) DIRECT the Judge to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this
Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the
petition and its attached a davits.

REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ

lawandtreasuresinajarofclay Political Law Cases May 2, 2020 6 Minutes
97. G.R. No. 182161.December 3, 2009.
Facts:
“Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on
November 30, 2007.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure
Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the
Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of
petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national
security and public safety.
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion
against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause.
On January 3, 2008, petitioner led the instant petition claiming that despite the
dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on
December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID o cials at the NAIA as his name is
included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of
petitioner’s counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled ight to
Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to y back to the
Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the
NAIA for his ights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID o cers
because of the continued inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the
Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45.
Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the
availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioner’s right to travel is
illegal.
the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying the privilege
of the writ of amparo.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation
by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ
of amparo.

Ruling:
The petition must fail.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
“Section 1. Petition.—The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public o cial or employee, or of a private individual
or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.”
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,11 made a categorical
pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is con ned to these two
instances of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” or to threats thereof.
He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The
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 Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of
the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to
security.
First, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,15 the Court explained the
concept of right to life in this wise:
“While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be
alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned – the right to
security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life. In a broad sense, the
right to security of person “emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment
of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to
exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a
deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life
according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.
Second, the right to liberty, was de ned in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio,
Jr.,17 in this manner:
“Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was de ned by Justice Malcolm to include
“the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he
has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for
the common welfare.” x x x
Third, Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.18 thoroughly expounded on
the import of the right to security, thus:
First, the right to security of person is “freedom from fear”… “freedom from
threat.” Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee
of protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo,
this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from
threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2.
On the other hand, the right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to
another.20As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,21 “xxx a person’s right to
travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding
the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave
the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion.”22
Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of
the criminal case led against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to
establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there
exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
We nd the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of
Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:
“Section 22. E ect of Filing of a Criminal Action.—When a criminal action has been
commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be led. The reliefs under the writ
shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under
the writ of amparo.”
We quote with approval the CA’s ruling on this matter:
“The said provision [Section 22] is an a rmation by the Supreme Court of its
pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul25 that once a complaint or information is led in
court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on
the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondent’s MR of the
dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over Criminal
Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the
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 court a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the
exclusion of even this Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO
was and is available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, supra).”
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to
separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v.
Del Rosario,27 thus:
“Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point
in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any
clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security—the personal concern
that the writ is intended to protect—is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the
issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or
on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a
separately led criminal case.”
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his
apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner’s
apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat
to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of
an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon
the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and
Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18,
Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and
Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).

Caram vs Segui
G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014
Facts: Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship
with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with
the latter’s child without the bene t of marriage. During this time, she intended to have
the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in
Parañaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for
having a second illegitimate son. On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian
at Amang Rodriguez Memorial MedicalCenter, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered
all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily
surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.
Issue: Whether or not writ of Amparo is the proper remedy available to the Petitioner.
Held: No. Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from
her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the
necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is
not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings led that what is
involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child,
who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the
Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless
of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public o cial or
employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the
right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the
quality of life.
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 G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017
LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO vs. COMMISSIONER JAIME H. MORENTE, et. al.
FACTS: Danielle Tan Parker is a holder of Philippine Passport issued by the DA on 5
March 2010 and valid until 4 March
2015. On 15 January 2013, Parker was charged for deportation for being an
undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien. It was alleged that Danielle was a
fugltive from justice in the United States of America with an outstanding arrest warrant
issued against her. Subsequently, a Summary Deportation Order was issued against
Danielle upon veri cation that she arrived In the Philippines on 23 March 2011 under
the Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of a perlod of one year. Parker was
not in the list of approved applications of the DA for dual citizenship and her American
Passport had been revoked by the United States Department of State. Thus, she was
considered an undocumented, undesirable, and overstaying alien, in violation of the
Philippine
Immigration
Act of
1940.
Pursuant to the SDO issued by the Bureau of Immigration, Parker was arrested in
Tagaytay City. She was then taken to the Immigration Detention Facility in Bicutan. She
is still currently detained in the Immigration Detention Facility as the deportation was
not carried out due to the fact that Parker is charged with falsi cation and use of
falsi ed documents before MTC In Davao City. Parker, as petitioner, led a Petition for
Habeas Corpus. The Bureau of Immigration was able to produce the body of Parker
before the RTC. The Bureau of Immigration then alleged that as the SDO had become
nal and executory, it served as the legal authority to detain Parker. The Bureau of
Immigration also argued that Parker cannot be released or deported without the nal
disposition of her pending criminal case in Davao City. The RT dismissed the petition,
nding that the detention of Parker was legal. The CA a rmed the RTC and found that
Parker failed to prove that she was a Filipino citizen to warrant judicial intervention
through habeas corpus. Callo led this petition for a writ of amparo with prayer to issue
Interim Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention. Callo
argues that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus, there Is no reason for her
to be detained by the Bureau of Immigration and that the life of Parker is endangered in
the detention center.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to life, liberty, and security of Parker is threatened by
the respondents to warrant the Issuance of the writ of amparo and subsequently the
award of the interim reliefs

SC RULING: No. The right to life, liberty, and security of Parker was not threatened by
the respondents to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo and subsequently the
award of the interim reliefs.
The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to
violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more
speci cally, to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof. Enforced disappearance is de ned under Republic Act (RA) No.
9851, Section 3(g). The Supreme Court has enumerated the elements constituting
enforced disappearance as de ned under RA No. 9851 are as follows: (a) that there be
an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fute or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition;
and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
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 The elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case. There is also
no threat of such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a detention carried out
by the State through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and fourth elements are not
present. There is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or refusal to
give information on the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo admits, Parker is
detain d in the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of Immigration. In fact, the
Bureau of Immigration had produced the body of Parker before the RTC in the
proceedings for the writ of habeas corpus previously initiated by Parker herself.
Similarly, there is no intention to remove Parker from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. Parker has a pending criminal case against her in Davao City,
which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting her from the country. Further,
for the issuance of the writ, it is not su cient that a person's life is endangered. It is
even not su cient to allege and prove that a person has disappeared. It must be
shown by the required quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the government or a political
organization, and that there is a refusal to acknowledge the same or to give information
on the fate or whereabouts of the missing persons. In this case, Parker has not
disappeared. Her detention has been su ciently justi ed by the Bureau of Immigration,
given that there is an SDO and a pending criminal case against her. Lastly, while "any
person" may le a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a petition for the writ of
amparo, the order of priority on who can le the petition as enumerated in Section 2 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amaro should be strictly followed. In this case, there was no
allegation nor proof that Parker had no immediate family members or any ascendant,
descendant, or collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
a nity. In fact, no allegation was made on any of the familial relationship of Parker as
only her whereabouts from 2011 were alleged and discussed. Therefore, based on the
order of priority, Callo had no legal standing to le this petition.

Santiago vs. Tulfo G.R. No. 205039. October 21, 2015

Extrajudicial killings,” according to case law, are generally characterized as “killings

committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings,” while “enforced disappearances,” according to Section 3(g) of
Republic Act No. 9851, otherwise known as the “Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity,”
“means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.”
Facts:
Petitioners arrived at the NAIA Terminal 3 from a vacation. They waited for the arrival of
their baggage but were eventually informed that it was o oaded and transferred to a
di erent ight. As they were complaining at the Cebu Paci c complaint desk, they
noticed a man taking photos of Claudine with his cellular phone. RayMart approached
the man and asked what he was doing. Suddenly, the man, later identi ed as Ramon
“Mon” Tulfo, allegedly punched and kicked Raymart, forcing the latter to ght back.
Claudine joined the commotion, and was allegedly kicked and pushed by Mon. Several
airport security personnel came to stop the altercation and brought them to the Airport
Police Department for investigation.
Days after the incident, respondents Ra y, Ben, and Erwin Tulfo, brothers of Mon, aired
on their TV program comments and expletives against petitioners, and threatened that
they will retaliate. Terri ed by the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners led a petition
for the issuance of a writ of amparo against respondents.
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Then Presiding Judge Vargas issued a Resolution granting a TPO in favor of petitioners
and directed respondents to le their return/answer.
In his return, Ben Tulfo claimed that the statements he uttered did not involve any
actual threat and that he merely expressed his strong sentiments to defend his brother.

Ultimately, the RTC dismissed the petition and ordered the dissolution of the TPO. It
held that the petition is not a proper subject of a writ of amparo since the rules were
intended to apply solely to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Petitioners’ MR were denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of petitioners’ amparo petition was correct.
Ruling:
Yes.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the Court
has already explained that the writ of amparo, under the “The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo,” was intended to address and, thus, is presently con ned to cases
involving extralegal killings and/or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal
killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is con ned
to these two instances or to threats thereof, x x x.
Indeed, while amparo (which literally means “protection” in Spanish) has been regarded
as a special remedy provided for the enforcement of constitutional rights, the
parameters of protection are not the same in every jurisdiction.
In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has
limited the remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
or threats thereof.
“Extrajudicial killings,” according to case law, are generally characterized as “killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings,” while “enforced disappearances,” according to Section 3 (g) of R. A.
9851, “means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed
by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the
fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
While the foregoing rule, does state that the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life,
liberty, and security of the person desiring to avail of it, the same section’s second
paragraph quali es that the protection of such rights speci cally pertain to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which are more concrete
cases that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and security.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners’ amparo petition before the RTC does not
allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats
thereof, in the senses above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad
invocation of respondents’ purported violation of their right to life and security, carried
out by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect government
participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the purview of
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail.
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 Razon vs Tagitis GR No. 182498 December 3,2009
FACTS: The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and
the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an
IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007
from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension
House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following
day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer
around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the
afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and
even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of
Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait. On
November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of
Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a
sworn a davit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’
disappearance. On December 28, 2007, Mary Jean Tagitis led a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The
petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, PNP; Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief,
CIDG; Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael,
Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet. Mary Jean said in her statement that she
approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos
City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military
who could help them nd/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of her e orts did
not produce any positive results except the information from persons in the military
who do not want to be identi ed that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men.
According to reliable information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, speci cally with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being
held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr.
Tagitis with the di erent terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah.

ISSUE: Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr.
Morced Tagitis.

RULING: The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classi ed as an enforced

disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies. Under the UN
Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other
form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law." Under this de nition, the elements that constitute enforced
disappearance are essentially fourfold: (a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty; (b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State; (c)
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person; (d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of
the law. There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared.
The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension
House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard
of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned – the petitioner,
Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under
mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The framers of the Amparo Rule
never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or
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actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must
of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in
light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of
uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim
exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or
where the victim is detained, because these information may

purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this

type of situation, to require the level of speci city, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token
gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and
security. The unique evidentiary di culties presented by enforced disappearance
cases; these di culties form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo
Rule shall encounter. These di culties largely arise because the State itself – the party
whose involvement is alleged – investigates enforced disappearances. Past
experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary di culties are generally
threefold.

First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators.
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are
usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for
their own lives. Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the
disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced
disappearance Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities
deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred. "Deniability" is
central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven
disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring
the victim’s human rights. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes
of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal
guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.

Navia, et al. v. Pardico

EDGARDO NAVIA,RUBEN DIO,and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners, v. VIRGINIA
PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 184467 : June 19, 2012
FACTS:
A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of
Lolita M. Lapore. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore
(Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When
Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the
vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could nd her son Bong.
Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should
go with them to the security o ce of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged
against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter,
Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the o ce of the security department of Asian Land also
located in Grand Royale Subdivision.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia led a Petition
for Writ of Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly
issued and served on the petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision
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 granting the petition. Petitioners led a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the trial court.
Petitioners essentially assail the su ciency of the amparo petition. They contend that
the writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the
violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security
are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to
establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with
some degree of speci city the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners
constituting a violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And
second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing;
or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the
entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof
that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus
posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for
Bens disappearance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper?

HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: writ of amparo
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the
rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is
to provide an expeditious and e ective relief “to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public o cial or employee, or of a private individual or entity.”
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every
human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the
right to liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to
liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in
accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and
security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.
The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this
Court de ned enforced disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally
accepted principles of international law and adopted the International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances de nition of enforced
disappearances, as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.”
From the statutory de nition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the
following elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue,
allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It
must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of
removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply
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 put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence
the indispensable element of government participation.
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not
enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out
with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government.
This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The
petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens
disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, o cials, or employees were impleaded or
implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its
agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence in investigating his case, the Court will de nitely not hold the government or
its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie
against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still,
government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.
Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam,
Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for
the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to
some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall
within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance
must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State
participation di erentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a
missing person.
DISMISSED

SANCHEZ VS DARROCA (G.R. NO. 242257 OCTOBER 15, 2019)

In The Matter of Petition For Writ of Amparo of Vivian A. Sanchez
Vivian Sanchez vs PSupt. Marc Anthony Darroca
G.R. No. 242257 October 15, 2019
J. Leonen
Facts: On August 16, 2018, Sanchez learned that her estranged husband, Eldie
Labinghisa (Labinghisa), was among the seven (7) alleged members of the New
People’s Army who were gunned down by the Philippine National Police in Barangay
Atabay, San Jose, Antique. Upon discovering that the corpses were sent to St. Peter’s
Funeral Home, Sanchez went there to verify the news of her husband’s death. At the
funeral home, however, the police o cers stationed there took photos of her without
her permission. Fearing what the o cers had done, she left without being able to see
or identify her husband’s body.
A few hours after Sanchez had returned from the funeral home, Police O cer 2 Nerissa
A. De la Cruz (PO2 Dela Cruz), a close friend of hers, informed her that her photo was
being circulated at the police station. The o cer urged her to tell the investigating
o cers her husband’s name, otherwise, they would go after her. PO2 De la Cruz also
warned her to voluntarily cooperate with the investigating o cers, or they might
suspect her and put her under surveillance.
The following day, Sanchez went back to the funeral home, where she was confronted
by three (3) police o cers who threatened to apprehend and charge her with
obstruction of justice if she refused to answer their questions. Again fearing for her
safety, Sanchez hurried home without con rming the identity of her husband’s body.
Later that day, two (2) police o cers went to Sanchez’s house and showed her a photo
of a cadaver. She con rmed the dead body as Labinghisa.
In the following days, Sanchez noticed the frequent drive-bys of a police car in front of
her house and a vehicle that tailed her and her family when they went to Iloilo to attend
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 her husband’s wake. She also noticed someone shadowing her when she was outside
her house, causing her to fear for her and her children’s safety.
With this, Sanchez was forced to le for a petition for a Writ of Amparo. In an August
28, 2018 Order, the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of amparo and a temporary
protection order. It also directed members of the Philippine National Police to le a
veri ed written return.

Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to the privilege of a writ of amparo.

Held: Yes. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued by this Court as an exercise of
its power to “promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights[.]” Section 1 de nes a petition for a writ of amparo as “a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty[,] and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public o cial or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.” The writ of amparo is, thus, an equitable
and extraordinary remedy primarily meant to address concerns such as, but not limited
to, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo speci es substantial evidence as the
degree of proof required of both parties to a petition. Section 18 further reinforces the
requirement of substantial evidence for the petitioner to establish his or her allegations
to warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo.
Wives and children are not ordinary witnesses, as evidenced by the privileges they
enjoy against State incursion into their relationships. Hence, respondents’ surveillance
of petitioner and her children as witting or unwitting witnesses against her husband or
his activities is correctible by a writ of amparo.
The Philippine National Police’s Ethical Doctrine Manual enjoins its police o cers to
respect human dignity and human rights, and to judiciously use their authority in the
performance of duty.

MAYOR MAMBA v. BUENO

Mayor William Mamba, et. al vs Leomar Bueno

G.R. No. 191416
February 7, 2017

FACTS:

On June 13, 2009, the canteen owned by Emelita Mamba, (Emelita) in Tuao, Cagayan
was robbed. Emelita is the mother of Mayor William Mamba (Mayor Mamba), then
mayor of the Municipality of Tuao, Cagayan, and Atty. Mamba, then a Malacanang
o cial. The Task Force Lingkod Bayan (Task Force), an agency created by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tuao to help the local police with the peace and order of the
municipality, undertook an investigation on the robbery. On June 14, 2009, several
members of the Task Force, Malana, Anggana and Sagalon, together with Barangay
O cials, Cinabre and Encollado, went to the house of the respondent, then still a
minor, to invite him for questioning on his supposed involvement in the robbery. The
respondent and his mother, Maritess Bueno (Maritess), acceded to the invitation.
Thereupon, the respondent was brought to the Tuao police station.

The parties gave di erent accounts of what happened after the respondent was
brought to the police station:

When they reached the police station, there were no police investigators or any
representative from the SWD o ce and so the investigation could not proceed. A
certain Raymund Rodriguez was, at that time, also at the police station. He claimed
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 that he and his brother Robin were approached by the respondent to rob the canteen.
Robin, however, declined the o er. Later that night, Raymund saw the respondent and
Lorenzo Haber robbing the canteen. Robin reported the incident to the Task force.
The petitioners further claim that at the time of the robbery, Mayor Mamba and Atty.
Mamba were out of town for an o cial leave and a report to work in Malacanang,
respectively. The respondent’s custody was then referred to the Task Force. Haber’s
custody was also referred to the Task Force as there was also no police investigators
available when he was invited to the police station.

Atty. Mamba arrived on June 17, 2009.

On June 18, 2009, while on their way to the police station, they were met by Police
Supt. Joselito Buenaobra, of the PNP in Cagayan. The respondent’s custody was
thereafter transferred to the PNP.
On the other hand, the respondent alleges that:

On June 14, 2009, Tumaliuan and dayag, both members of the Task Force, upon order
of Baligod, then Municipal Administrator of Tuao, fetched the respondent from the
police station and brought him to Mayor Mamba’s house. In the evening, the
respondent was made to board a white van driven by Anggangan, where he was
beaten with a gun by Malana, who later threatened him that he would be killed.
Thereafter, he was brought back to Mayor Mamba’s house. Heber, a minor, was
likewise brought to Mayor Mamba’s house. The respondent an Haber were then
tortured. They were made to roll on the grass while being kicked and beaten with a cue
stick by Malana; hot was poured over their bodies, to force them to admit to their
involvement of the robbery, but they denied any involvement therein.

Maritess went to the police station to look for her son; she was told that the
respondent was brought to Mayor Mamba’s house. Maritess was not permitted to see
her son and she was able to talk to Mayor Mamba. Maritess then sought the
assistance of P/Supt Buenaobra regarding the respondent’s disappearance. The PNP
Cagayan regional O ce was then preparing a case for Habeas Corpus when the
respondent was released on June 18, 2009 to the local SWD o ce.

Maritess then sought the assistance of the Regional O ce of the CHR in Cagayan as
regards the case of the respondent. On August 25, 2009, the respondent, assisted by
the CHR, le a Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with the CA. A summary
hearing was thereafter conducted. The respondent presented in evidence his own
testimony and the testimonies of Dr. Tiangco, of the Cagayan Valley Medical Center,
provincial welfare o cer, Elvira Layus, and Maritess. The petitioners, on the other hand,
presented the testimonies of Cinabre, Incollado, Baligod and Robin.

The CA further issued subpoena duces tecum and testi candum to and heard the
testimony of P/Supt Buenaobra. On January 18, 2010, the CA rendered the decision
granting petition for writ of amparo against respondents.

The CA opined that the respondent’s rights to liberty and security were undeniably
undermined when he was invited by the members of the Task force for investigation
and was brought to Mayor Mamba’s house.

The CA further claimed that the invitation extended to the respondent by the Task
Force members was in the nature of an arrest. The same amounted to an invalid
warrantless arrest since the circumstances of the case do not fall within the purview of
Section 2 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
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 The CA ruled that, the refusal of the members of the Task Force and especially Mayor
Mamba, to admit and address the irregularities committed by its members is
tantamount to continuing violation of the respondent’s right to security. The petitioners
sought for reconsideration but was denied. Hence the petition.

ISSUES

Whether or not the CA erred in issuing the writ of amparo in favour of the respondent.

HELD

The petition is devoid of merit.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court a rms the factual ndings
of the CA, which is largely based on respondent’s evidence. The totality of the evidence
presented by the respondent meets the requisite evidenciary threshold. His allegation
were corroborated by the testimony of Haber who further testi ed to their torture. He
added that he and the respondent were brought to the guardhouse where they were
su ocated by placing plastic bags on their heads, and that a wire was inserted to their
penises.

The respondent’s claim was further corroborated by Dr. Tiangco who that she
examined the respondent and found that he su ered several injuries and multiple
second degree burns. It also attested that respondent had scars on his head, arms and
back. What is clear is that the respondent was able to prove by substantial evidence
that he was apprehended by the members of the Task Force, illegally detained, and
tortured.

The fact that the respondent, after four days of detention, had been released, however,
does not negate the propriety of the grant of writ of amparo.

Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still be issued in the respondents favour

notwithstanding his release. Verily, the petitioners failed to point to any speci c
measures undertaken by them to e ectively investigate the irregularities alleged by the
respondent and to prosecute those who are responsible therefor. Worse, the illegal
detention and torture su ered by the respondent were perpetrated by the members of
the Task Force themselves.

Clearly, there is substantial evidence in this case that would warrant the conclusion that
the respondent’s right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, was
violated.

Accordingly, the CA correctly issued the writ of amparo in favour of the respondent.
The petition is denied and the decision and resolution of the CA are a rmed.
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Facts:

Cleofas and Marciana (respondents) alleged that one evening, their respective
sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their
home in, Tarlac; that at around past midnight the next day, Nicolas’ "wives"
Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and
saw armed men in soldiers’ uniforms passing by; that at around dawn of the
same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas, but to no avail.
Respondents alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria, niece of a neighbor, later
informed them that she had seen two men inside Camp Servillano Aquino of
the Northern Luzon Command (Nolcom) Tarlac City, whom Josephine later
identi ed as Nicolas and Heherson (the victims) after respondents had shown
her their photographs; and that Josephine informed them that she saw the
victims again on September 24, 2006 and November 1, 2006, this time at the
Camp of the Bravo Company of the Army’s 71st Infantry Batallion inside
Hacienda Luisita Upon the endorsement of the CHR to the Ombudsman,
respondents prayed for the issuance of writ of amparo. The appellate court,
after hearing, absolved herein petitioner among others, but granted herein
respondents with the reliefs of investigation of the camps and thorough
impartial investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether the grant of the reliefs by the appellate court after nding want of
substantial evidence are valid and proper.

Ruling:

No.

These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a
judicious determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in
the present case, still order the inspection of the military camps and order the
army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of Nicolas and
Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted
by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a nding that
petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the
victims.

DOCTRINE:
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 failure to establish that the public o cial observed extraordinary diligence in
the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege
of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or
her claim by substantial evidence.

LEE VS ILAGAN (G.R. NO. 203254 OCTOBER 8, 2014)

FACTS
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data, Ilagan, a policeman, alleged that
he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee were former common law partners
When Ilagan paid a visit to Lee at his condominium in July 2011, he found that his digital
camera was missing. Lee asked Ilagan at the latter’s of ce about a supposed sex video
featuring Ilagan and another woman that she found on the aforementioned camera.

Ilagan denied the video and requested that Lee return the camera, but he was
unsuccessful. Ilagan reportedly smashed Lee’s head against a wall inside his of ce and
walked away during the ght

Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in ling various complaints
against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of R.A. 9262; and (b) an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the NAPOLCOM

Ilagan argued that Lee’s actions of reproducing the subject video and attempting to
circulate it to the top ranks of the NAPOLCOM, as well as uploading it to the internet,
violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy, but also that of the other
woman, and thus a writ of habeas corpus in his favor is justi ed
The RTC granted Ilagan the privilege of the writ of habeas data, ordering the
implementing of cer to turn over copies of the subject video to him and prohibiting Lee
from further reproducing it

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas
data in favor of Ilagan

RULING
The court ruled in the negative
The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances

It was conceived as a judicial remedy for enforcing individuals’ right to privacy,

particularly their right to informational privacy (which is described as “the right to control
the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”

Thus, in order to suf ciently lay the foundation of a petition for the issuance of such writ,
it is required under Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule that the petition suf ciently
alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
The allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence demonstrating
a real or threatened breach of the victim’s right to privacy in his or her life, liberty, or
security and the writ of habeas data will not be issued to protect solely property or
commercial interests, nor will it be issued where the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions are ambiguous and questionable
 

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 In this case, Ilagan was unable to adequately allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty, or security had been or would be breached by the alleged reproduction and
threatened distribution of the sex video

According to the Supreme Court, the failure to allege the nexus (or logical relationship)
between one’s privacy right to his rights to life, liberty or security may render the petition
dismissible. As Ilagan failed in that regard, the SC dismissed his petition

Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

FACTS
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classi ed her as
someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the bene t of data
veri cation, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa led a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as o cials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to
privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or
security.

RULING
NO.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide
a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It
must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on
the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence
that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents
su ciently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the
criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public o cials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs
the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore,
the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

Points to ponder:

1) De nition of Writ of Habeas Data, Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Corpus

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public o cial or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
 

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 WRIT OF AMPARO
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public o cial or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal con nement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto.

2) What are the contents of the petition?

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Sec. 6. Petition. - A veri ed written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it a ects the right
to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the les, registers or databases, the government o ce, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, recti cation, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or les kept by the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

WRIT OF AMPARO
SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. – The petition shall be signed and veri ed and shall
allege the following:
1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the
threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent
may be described by an assumed appellation;
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such
threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting a davits;
4. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
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 5. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible
for the threat, act or omission; and
6. The relief prayed for.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Section 3. Requisites of application therefor. — Application for the writ shall be by
petition signed and veri ed either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by
some person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained
on his liberty;
(b) The o cer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if
both are unknown or uncertain, such o cer or person may be described by an
assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be deemed the
person intended;
(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be
procured without impairing the e ciency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or
restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear.

3) Who may le said petition?

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Sec. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may le a petition for the writ of habeas
data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition
may be led by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or a nity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph; or

Sec. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be led with the Regional Trial Court where
the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where
the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.

The petition may also be led with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data les of government o ces.

WRIT OF AMPARO
SEC. 2. Who May File. – The petition may be led by the aggrieved party or by any
quali ed person or entity in the following order:
1. Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents
of the aggrieved party;
2. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or a nity, in default of those mentioned
in the preceding paragraph; or
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 3.Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no
known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
The ling of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized
parties to le similar petitions. Likewise, the ling of the petition by an authorized party
on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order
established herein.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Section 3. Requisites of application therefor. — Application for the writ shall be by
petition signed and veri ed either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by
some person on his behalf

4) Where to le?

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Sec. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial
Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.

When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it
may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial
Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has
jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or
stored.

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before
such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan
or any of its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
information is gathered, collected or stored.

The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

WRIT OF AMPARO
SEC. 3. Where to File. – The petition may be led on any day and at any time with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or
any of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in
the Philippines.
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable
before such court or judge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it
may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial
Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its
elements occurred.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before
such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals
or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act
or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

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 Section 2. Who may grant the writ. — The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by
the Supreme Court, or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so
granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made
returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance,
or any judge thereof for the hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted
by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and
returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.

5) What are the grounds?

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
ection 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public o cial or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

Sec. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may le a petition for the writ of habeas
data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition
may be led by:

WRIT OF AMPARO
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public o cial or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided
by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal con nement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

6) Enforceability of the Writ?

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Sec. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial
Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.

When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it
may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial
Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has
jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or
stored.

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before
such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan
or any of its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
information is gathered, collected or stored.

The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

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WRIT OF AMPARO
The petition may be led on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial Court of
the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements
occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any
justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Section 2. Who may grant the writ. — The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by
the Supreme Court, or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so
granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made
returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance,
or any judge thereof for the hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted
by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and
returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.

7) How many days should the court resolve the petition?

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Sec. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the ling of the petition, the court, justice or judge
shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk
of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within
three (3) days from the issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge
may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any o cer or person
serve it.
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 The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall
not be later than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.

Sec. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion,
destruction, or recti cation of the erroneous data or information and grant other
relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be
denied.

Upon its nality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheri or any lawful o cers as
may be designated by the court, justice or judge within ve (5) working days.

WRIT OF AMPARO
SEC. 6. Issuance of the Writ. – Upon the ling of the petition, the court, justice or
judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue.
The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent
necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and
may deputize any o cer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall
not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.

SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs
as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Section 5. When the writ must be granted and issued. — A court or judge authorized
to grant the writ must, when a petition therefor is presented and it appears that the writ
ought to issue, grant the same forthwith, and immediately thereupon the clerk of the
court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of emergency, the judge
may issue the writ under his own hand, and may depute any o cer or person to serve
it.

Section 12. Hearing on return. Adjournments. — When the writ is returned before one
judge, at a time when the court is in session, he may forthwith adjourn the case into the
court, there to be heard and determined. The court or judge before whom the writ is
returned or adjourned must immediately proceed to hear and examine the return, and
such other matters as are properly submitted for consideration, unless for good cause
shown the hearing is adjourned, in which event the court or judge shall make such
order for the safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the
case requires. If the person imprisoned or restrained is not produced because of his
alleged sickness or in rmity, the court or judge must be satis ed that it is so grave that
such person cannot be produced without danger, before proceeding to hear and
dispose of the matter. On the hearing the court or judge shall disregard matters of form
and technicalities in respect to any warrant or order of commitment of a court or o cer
authorized to commit by law.
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 Section 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same. — A clerk of
a court who refuses to issue the writ after allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a
person to whom a writ is directed, who neglects or refuses to obey or make return of
the same according to the command thereof, or makes false return thereof, or who,
upon demand made by or on behalf of the prisoner, refuses to deliver to the person
demanding, within six (6) hours after the demand therefor, a true copy of the warrant or
order of commitment, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand
pesos, to be recorded in a proper action, and may also be punished by the court or
judge as for contempt.

8) Remedy of Petitioner if denied?

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the nal judgment or order to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.

The period of appeal shall be ve (5) working days from the date of notice of the
judgment or nal order.

The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.

NOTE:
The distinctions between Rule 45 and 65 are far and wide, the most notable of which is
that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65, while errors of judgment are correctible only by appeal in a petition for review
under Rule 45.

WRIT OF AMPARO
SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the nal judgment or order to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be ve (5) working days from the date of notice of the
adverse judgment.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Section 18 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, explicitly provides,

viz:
Sec. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. — An appeal in
habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by ling with the clerk of the court
or the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight (48) hours from
notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals
therefrom.
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9) Preliminary Citation?

10) Peremptory Writ?

NOTES:
HABEAS CORPUS VS AMPARO

Habeas corpus is designed to enforce the right to freedom of the person, whereas
amparo is designed to protect those other fundamental human rights enshrined in the
Constitution but not covered by the writ of habeas corpus.