April 25, 2018

G.R. No. 230751

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner 
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 230751

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner 
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal  assailing the Decision  dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution  dated March 20,
1 2 3

2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.

The facts are as follows:

On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of
Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias
(Wilfredo).  The allegations of the petition read:
4

1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a residnet of 106 Molave
street, Zone B. San Miguel Tarlac City;

2. [Wifredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Araya,
Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]

3. The[p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda,
Pangasinan x x x;

4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at 106
Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel, Tarlac City;

5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their
conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;

6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never
made contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;

7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission,
[Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;

8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her]
beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts,
[neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place
frequented by the New People's Army;

9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope, and
after more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been
tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for
her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;

10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least
declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;

11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under
P.D. No. 1638 as amended.

The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac City
RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)_.
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of the
Philippines (Republic).5

On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision  in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition. The
6

dispositive portion of the Decision reads:7

WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS
absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for purpose
of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiotrari.8

On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the Republic
and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850
is ANNULED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.

The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:

1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the
Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was
invoking the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not
that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.

2. Be that it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been dismissed by
the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to
have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code.
As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of
evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead-which presumption may be
invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an independent action or
proceeding.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence,this appeal.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal

The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is
not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must,
therefore, be set aside.

RTC Erred I Declaring the

Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under
Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's
Petition for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death is Not Based on
Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil
Code

A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.

It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner's
petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, RTC
gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was
likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.  This is wrong.
9

The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would
have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law. Thus:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death
Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death,
petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim
for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended. 10

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390
or Article 391 of the Civil Code  as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
11

Code express the general rule regarding presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives,
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has
not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.

Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of
Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper.The petition for the declaration of presumptive
death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.

Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of

Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been
Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is
To Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under
the CivilCode, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our
Jurisdiction

The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The decision itself is
objectionable.

Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is
because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any
authority to take cognizance of the same.

The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of
Death of Nicolai Szatraw.  In the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of death  is
12 13

merely one of the evidence that-while may be invoked in any action or proceeding-cannot be the
lone subject of an independent action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which permits the court to presume that
a person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise
and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or
heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or
special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the
subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right ti be enforced nor is
there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a
prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of particular fact, for
the petition does not pray for the declaration that the petitioner 's husband us dead, but merely asks
for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If
there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband os dead, such a
pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration, even if
judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is
already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would be a prima faciepresumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason
that it cannot be the subject of judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is tha only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter
must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a
party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may
arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of
the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular
fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially
provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject
to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)

The above ruling in Szatraw has since been ussed by the subsequent cases of Lukban v.
Republic  and Gue v. Republic  in disallowing petitions for declaration of presumptive death based
14 15

on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, implicity, also those based on the Civil based on Article 391 of
the Civil Code).

Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the

considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was
disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz: 16

1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a court or
a tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.

2. Since Articles 390 an d 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action
brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles
actually presents

no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual rights to
be enforces, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established.

3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article 391
of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really become "final" as the
same only confirms tha existence of a prima facie or disputable presumption. The function of a court
to render decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between litigants is thereby
compromised.

4. Moreove, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already established
by law.

Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition
that-like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law.  Hence, by acting
17

upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of presumptive death, the
RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA,
therefore, was only correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.

II

Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is
minded to make.
It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the misconception that
a court declaration is required in order to establish a person is presumptively dead for purposes of
claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman under pertinent laws.  This misconception is
18

what moved petitioner to file her misguided petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise
simple claim for death benefits either before the Philippine Veterans' Affair Office (PVAO) of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

What the Court finds deeply disconnecting, however, is the possibility that such misconception may
have been peddles by no less than the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such agencies, as a
matter of practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the petitioner, to first secure a court
declaration of presumptive death before processing the death before processing the death benefits
of missing serviceman.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following
guidelines-culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public, PVAO and
the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:

1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without
requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such
soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, on the basis of
the evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of death under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.

It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises
by operation of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the
said articles are established.  Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court declaration in
19

order to establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes
established jurisprudence on the matter. 20

2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or
the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence"  which shows that the
21

concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and or under the circumstances
prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to
here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.

3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the
claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified under
Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or
the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient, they should not
hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim.

4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to
invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof,
the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with the
CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court.  And finally, shold such recourse still fail, the claimant
1avvphi1

may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.

While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by the
foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be replicated in
the future.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and
Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467
are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.

SO ORDERED.

88

February 15, 2017

G.R. No. 222541

RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner 
vs.
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari  assailing the Decision  dated May 29, 2015
1 2

and the Resolution  dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
3

102745, which reversed the Decision  dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
4

Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891 declaring the marriage of Jose O. Del Rosario (Jose)
and Rachel A. Del Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to
Article 36  of the Family Code, as amended.
5 6

The Facts

Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen (17) years old, sometime in December
1983 at a party in Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.  Very soon, they became romantically
7

involved.8

Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper. During this period,
Rachel allegedly provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and Jose
eventually decided to get married on December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose
City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son, named Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On February
19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony held in the Philippine Independent Church,
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya. 9

In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic helper/caregiver and has been working
there ever since, only returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation. Through her efforts, she
was able to acquire a house and lot in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija. 10

In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition  for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
11

docketed as Civil Case No. 11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
essential marital obligations. In support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during their marriage,
Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband and father. According to
Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent; he punched her in the shoulder a few days before their
church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused to pay for the transportation expenses of his
parents; he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to
leave Jose's parents' house where they were then staying; and he even locked her out of their house
in the middle of the night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her relatives from the bus
terminal, which he refused to perform. Rachel added that Jose would represent himself as single,
would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a
text message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly), stating: "love, kung ayaw mo na akong
magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na lang dito."  Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa
12

mo, ayaw mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa 'yo." On one occasion, she, together with Wesley
and Beverly, caught Jose and the other woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally,
she claimed that Jose would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly
drifted apart. 13

Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during its early years, and it was only
later in their marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions. 14

Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley  and her sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn
15

Cabusora,  which corroborated her allegations, as well as the testimony  of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr.
16 17

Tayag), who prepared the Psychological Report  (Report) on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr.
18

Tayag's Report, which was primarily based on her interview with Rachel and Wesley, stated that
Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) characterized by: (a) his lack of empathy
and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to
his own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of depth when it comes to his
marital commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his shortcomings. 19

For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. Jose maintained that: (a) he had dutifully
performed all of his marital and parental duties and obligations to his family; (b) he had provided for
his family's financial and emotional needs; and (c) he contributed to the building and maintenance of
their conjugal home. He claimed that although they occasionally had misunderstandings, they
nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out that their first major argument was when Rachel
decided to go to Hongkong to work; that they continued to communicate through mail during her stay
overseas; and that he remained supportive of Rachel and would advise her to give her family the
financial aid that they need so long as she would not sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the
alleged extra-marital affair and having laid hand on Rachel and their son.  Jose presented as well
20

the testimony of Faustino Rigos to support his allegations. 21

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision  dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the marriage between Jose and Rachel void
22

on the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag,
declaring that Jose's APD interferes with his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties, as
he in fact even refused to take responsibility for his actions, notwithstanding the overwhelming
evidence against him. 23

Jose appealed  to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to seek employment, squandering of their
24

money on vices, violent nature, and infidelity are not the serious, grave, and permanent
psychological condition that incapacitates him to perform his marital obligations required by Article
36 of the Family Code, as amended. At most, they are personality defects, i.e., immaturity,
irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness, which may be considered as grounds for legal separation under
Article 55  of the same code.
25 26

The CA Ruling

In a Decision  dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC,  holding that the totality
27 28

of the evidence Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.  Particularly, the CA declared that
29

Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek employment, his act of squandering their money on his
vices, and his temper and alleged propensity for violence were not so grave and permanent as to
deprive him of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond sufficient to
nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code; at best, they showed that Jose was
irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature which nonetheless do not amount to the
downright incapacity that the law requires. Additionally, the CA pointed out that the root cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature, and the incapacity itself were not
sufficiently explained as Dr. Tayag's Report failed to show the relation between Jose's "deprived
childhood" and "poor home condition," on one hand, and grave and permanent psychological
malady, on the other. Finally, it observed that while Dr. Tayag's testimony was detailed, it only
offered a general evaluation on the supposed root cause of Jose's personality disorder. 30

Rachel moved for reconsideration,  which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution  dated
31 32

December 1, 2015; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's
finding of psychological incapacity.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution,  and marriage as the foundation of the family.  Because of this, the Constitution decrees
33 34

marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this
regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36  of the Family 35

Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.  It 36

should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under Article 68  of the Family Code, among
37

others,  include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and
38

render help and support.  In other words, it must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to
39

deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. 40

In Santos v. CA,  the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
41

Code must be characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.  The Court laid 42

down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36

in Republic v. Molina  (Molina) whose salient points are footnoted below,  that incorporated the
43 44

basic requirements the Court established in Santos.

Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is not absolutely

necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality
of the evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established.  The evidence need not necessarily come from the allegedly
45

incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons intimately related to the spouses, i.e., relatives
and close friends, who could clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or
about the time of the marriage.  In other words, the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its
46

application calls for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity.  To be clear, however, the totality of the evidence
47

must still establish the characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity, incurability, and juridical
antecedence.

Thus, in Dedel v. CA,  the Court declared that therein respondent's emotional immaturity and
48

irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual
promiscuity.  In Taring v. Taring,  the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable differences, sexual
49 50

infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as [these] may only be due to a person's difficulty,
refusal, or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological
illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses."  The Court equally did not consider as
51

tantamount to psychological incapacity the emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity,

and other behavioral disorders invoked by the petitioning spouses in Pesca v. Pesca,  Republic v.
52

Encelan,  Republic v. De Gracia,  and Republic v. Romero,  to name a few, and thus dismissed
53 54 55

their petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.

The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, denies the petition. Based on the totality of
the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's
immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.

Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that Jose: (1) would often
indulge in drinking sprees; (2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging
his duties as a father to Wesley and as a husband to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3)
flirts openly and represented himself as single; and (4) engaged in an extra-marital affair with a bar
girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on several occasions. Significantly, Rachel admitted that
their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr. Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply
summarized Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with APD and proceeded to
conclude that Jose's "personality flaw is deemed to be severe, grave, and have become deeply
embedded within his adaptive systems since early childhood years, thereby rendering such to be a
permanent component of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair despite any form
of intervention." 56

It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be
characterized as grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential
parameters for establishing psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the
concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure,
or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and to what extent his alleged
actions and behavior correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear to conclude that Jose's condition has
no definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's conception. Neither did the Report specify
the reasons why and to what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and how it incapacitated him
to understand and comply with his marital obligations.  Lastly, the Report hastily concluded that Jose
1awp++i1

had a "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition" that automatically resulted in his APD
equivalent to psychological incapacity without, however, specifically identifying the history of Jose's
condition antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years that
could explain his behavior during the marriage.

Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine, at the very least, his
background that could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding that his APD is rooted in
his childhood or was already existing at the inception of the marriage. To be sure, established
parameters do not require that the expert witness personally examine the party alleged to be
suffering from psychological incapacity provided corroborating evidence are presented sufficiently
establishing the required legal parameters.  Considering that her Report was based solely on
57

Rachel's side whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony deserved the application
of a more rigid and stringent standards which the RTC failed to apply.

In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to
show that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity
that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize, psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the
marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility
and duty of a married person.  There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
58

person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage -
which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity. 59

A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves;  a marriage, no
60

matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient evidence
establishing psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36, the Court is compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated
December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

0000

February 6, 2017

G.R. No. 214064

MIRASOL CASTILLO, Petitioner 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE IMPAS, Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Mirasol

Castillo (Mirasol) challenging the Decision and Resolution,  dated March 10, 2014 and August 28,
1 2

2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled against the dissolution and nullity of
her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The facts of the case follow:

As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then,
eventually, became sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his
affair with his former girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation. With
the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got married in Bani, Pangasinan on April 22,
1984 and were blessed with two (2) children born in 1992 and in 2001. 3

On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint  for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional
4

Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90.

Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious prompting her to believe that the
same was made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe resumed
philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him with different women. One time, she has just
arrived from a trip and returned home to surprise her family. But to her consternation, she caught
him in a compromising act with another woman. He did not bother to explain or apologize. Tired of
her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with
him. Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with her, and
5

not supporting their children for a period of not less than ten (10) years without any reason,
constitute a severe psychological disorder. 6

In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie

Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in her Psychological Evaluation Report,  concluded that Felipe is
7

psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations. A portion of the report reads:

x x xx
The personality disorder speaks of antecedence as it has an early onset, with an enduring pattern
and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. His poor
parental and family molding (particularly lack of parental parenting) caused him to have a defective
superego and he proved to be selfish, immature and negligent person and followed a pattern of
gross irresponsibility and gross disregard of the feelings of his partner/wife disregarding the marriage
contract and the commitment he agreed on during the wedding. In other words, the root cause of
respondent's flawed personality pattern can be in childhood milieu. Respondent's familial
constellation, unreliable parenting style from significant figures around him, and unfavorable
childhood experiences have greatly affected his perceptions of himself and his environment in
general. The respondent did not grow up mature enough to cope with his obligations and
responsibilities as married man and father.

It also speaks of gravity as he was not able to carry out the normative and ordinary duties of
marriage and family, shouldered by any married man, existing in ordinary circumstances. He just
cannot perform his duties and obligations as a husband, as he entered into marriage for his own
self-satisfaction and gratification, manipulate and denigrate the petitioner for his own pleasures and
satisfaction. In the process, respondent was unable to assume his marital duties and responsibilities
to his wife. He failed to render mutual help and support (Article 68, FC).

Additionally, it also speaks of incurability, as respondent has no psychological insight that he has a
character problem. He would not acknowledge the pain he caused to people around him. People
suffering from this personality disorder are unmotivated to treatment and impervious to recovery.
There are no medications and laboratory examinations to be taken for maladaptive behavior such as
the NPD (Narcissistic Personality Disorder).

Otherwise stated, his personality disorder is chronic and pervasive affecting many aspects of his life,
such as social functioning and close relationships.  Apparently, he has failed to develop appropriate
1âwphi1

adjustment methods. He lacks the intrapersonal and interpersonal integration that caused him the
failure to understand the very nature of that sharing of life that is directed toward the solidarity and
formation of family.

xxxx 8

In a Decision  dated January 20, 2012, the RTC in Civil Case No. 4853-11 declared the marriage
9

between Mirasol and Felipe null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Court hereby declares the marriage contract by the petitioner
MIRASOL CASTILLO to the respondent FELIPE IMPAS on April 22, 1984 in Bani, Pangasinan to be
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Clerk of Court is directed
to enter this judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue the
corresponding Entry of Judgment. Thereupon, the Office of the Civil Registrars in Bani, Pangasinan
and Imus, Cavite, are also mandated to cause the registration of the said ENTRY OF JUDGMENT in
their respective Book of Marriages.

Likewise, furnish the petitioner and the counsel of the petitioner, the respondent, the Solicitor
General, 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos and the Civil Registrar General with
copies hereof.

Upon compliance, the Court shall forthwith issue the DECREE OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

SO ORDERED. 10

On February 22, 2012, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order  dated April 3, 2012.
11

On appeal, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 99686 reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, ruling
that Mirasol failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering from
psychological incapacity, thus, incapable of performing marital obligations due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.  A pertinent portion of
12

the decision reads:

x x xx

Based on the records, it appears more likely that Felipe became unfaithful as a result of unknown
factors that happened during the marriage and not because of his family background. His tendency
to womanize was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that are grave,
permanent and incurable. In fact, it was only after thirteen (13) years of marriage that he started to
engage in extra-marital affairs. In the complaint filed by Mirasol, she said that after they got married,
their relationship as husband and wife went smoothly and that she was of the belief that she had a
marriage made in heaven.

In short, Felipe's marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological
disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. Sexual infidelity, by
itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be
shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. Since that situation does not
obtain in the case, Mirasol's claim of psychological incapacity must fail. Psychological incapacity
must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Felipe, We
cannot but rule in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 20, 2012 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED. 13

Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Mirasol elevated the case before this Court raising
the issue, thus:

[Petitioner] was able to establish that respondent is suffering from grave psychological condition that
rendered him incognitive of his marital covenants under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Basically, the issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the totality of evidence presented
warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on
the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

This Court rules in the negative.

Mirasol alleges that she has sufficiently established that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of the witnesses are entitled to great respect because of its opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses. Since the court a quo accepted the veracity of the petitioner's premises,
there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of Felipe's psychological incapacity drawn from the
expert witness. She claims that Montefalcon was correct in interviewing her for it was submitted that
it was only her who knew best whether her husband was complying with his marital obligations.
Moreover, the OSG admits that personal examination of the respondent by the clinical psychologist
is not an indispensable requisite for a finding of psychological incapacity.

On the other hand, the OSG argues that Mirasol failed to establish from the totality of evidence the
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of Felipe's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
The conclusions of the clinical psychologist that he was psychologically incapacitated and that such
incapacity was present at the inception of the marriage were not supported by evidence. At most, the
psychologist merely proved his refusal to perform his marital obligations.  Moreover, she has no
14

personal knowledge of the facts from which she based her findings and was working on pure
assumptions and secondhand information related to her by one side. 15

Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.  Psychological incapacity must be
16

characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 17

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,  this Court laid down the more definitive
18

guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases, viz.:

x x xx
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. x
xx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. x x x In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. x x x

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. x x x

xxx 19

The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of each
case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. 20

As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting: 21

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable
to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity
and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable,
are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining
the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before
it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties
but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. 22

The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological
incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have automatically ensured the granting of
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the
other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented
by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. 23

Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal of the records, this Court rules that the
totality of the evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's psychological incapacity.

Clinical psychologist Montefalcon opined that respondent is encumbered with a personality disorder
classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder deeply ingrained in his personality structure that
rendered him incapacitated to perform his marital duties and obligations. In her direct testimony, she
stated:

ATTY. BAYAUA:

Question: Were you able to interview and conduct examination on the respondent?

Answer: No, sir.

Question: [W]here did you base your conclusion that supported your findings that the husband of
Mirasol is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage?

Answer: From the interviews I had with the petitioner and also from my interview of the couple's
common friend who validated all information given to me by the petitioner.

Question: You mean to say you were not able to interview the respondent?

Answer: No sir. But I sent him an invitation to undergo the same psychological evaluation I
administered with the petitioner but he did not respond to my invitation.

Question: [W]hat relevant information were you able to gather from your interview of the friend of the
couple?

Answer: She validated every piece of information relayed to me by the petitioner during the
interview.

x x xx

Question: Madam witness, were you able to determine at what point in time in the life of the
respondent did he acquire this disorder that you mentioned?

Answer: The disorder of the respondent already existed even at the time of celebration of their
marriage, although the incapacity became manifest only after their marriage. His disorder seemed
to have started during the early years of his life.

Question: In your expert opinion, what would be the likely source of the disorder of the respondent?

Answer: The disorder of the respondent seemed to have developed during the early years of
his life due to his poor parental and family [molding] particularly lack of parental
guidance. [His] parents separated when he was still young and when [his] mother had another affair
and lived with her common-law husband. Respondent's familial constellation and [unfavorable]
childhood experiences have greatly affected his perceptions of himself and his environment.
Respondent did not grow up mature enough to cope with his obligations and responsibilities as a
married man and father.

xxx 24

The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the psychological evaluation by Montefalcon. A
perusal of the RTC's decision would reveal that there was no assessment of the veracity of such
allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the pieces of evidence presented. Also,
there were no factual findings which can serve as bases for its conclusion of Felipe's psychological
incapacity.

The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.  The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a
25

mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the
courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which
the logic of her conclusion is founded. 26

Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of Felipe's personality disorder, it was, however, admitted that she evaluated
respondent's psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and her
witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which brought about his personality disorder as painted
in the evaluation was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner. There was no
independent witness knowledgeable of respondent's upbringing interviewed by the psychologist or
presented before the trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple's common friend, agreed with
petitioner's claims in the interview with the psychologist, confirmed the information given by
petitioner, and alleged that she knew Felipe as "chick boy" or ''playboy."  She did not testify before
27

the court a quo.

As such, there are no other convincing evidence asserted to establish Felipe's psychological
condition and its associations in his early life. Montefalcon's testimony and psychological evaluation
report do not provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Mirasol's one-sided
assertion. The said report falls short of the required proof for the Court to rely on the same as basis
to declare petitioner's marriage to respondent as void.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him psychologically
incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must still be "medically or clinically identified,"
and adequately established by evidence.  We cannot take the conclusion that Felipe harbors a
28

personality disorder existing prior to his marriage which purportedly incapacitated him with the
essential marital obligations as credible proof of juridical antecedence. The manner by which such
conclusion was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence
required in determining psychological incapacity. The lack of corroborative witness and evidence
regarding Felipe's upbringing and family history renders Montefalcon's opinion on the root cause of
his psychological incapacity conjectural or speculative.

Even if the testimonies of Mirasol and Montefalcon at issue are considered since the judge had
found them to be credible enough, this Court cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to
information on Felipe's pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case
because we only have petitioner's words to rely on. To make conclusions and generalizations on a
spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, as in the case at
bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness
of the content of such evidence. 29

Anent Felipe's sexual infidelity, Mirasol alleged in her judicial affidavit, to wit:

x x xx

Question: You said Madam Witness that after several months you and respondent became
sweethearts, what happened next Madam Witness?

Answer: Sir, while we were already sweethearts, I got dismayed when respondent was also
maintaining another woman who was his former girlfriend.

Question: What was the reaction of the respondent when you told him about his relation with his
former girlfriend?

Answer: Respondent was shocked and became moody Sir. This turned our relationship sour and it
led to being stormy.

Question: You said Madam Witness that you and respondent's relationship became sour and
stormy, what happened next, if any?

Answer: Sir, my relationship with respondent should have been ended had it not been with the timely
intervention of our parents. Respondent and I reconciled.

x x xx

Question: Madam Witness as you said you finally got married with the respondent as evidenced in
fact by a Marriage Certificate. What happened next after the marriage?

Answer: After our wedding, our relationship as husband and wife went on smoothly. I was of the
belief that my marriage was made in heaven and that respondent had already reformed his ways
and had completely deviated from his relationship with his ex-girlfriend;

xxx 30

Question: After giving birth to your first child did respondent change or become responsible
considering that he is already a father?

Answer: No, Sir. I thought that having our first child would already change the ways of respondent.
The birth of our first child did not actually help improve respondent's ways because respondent is
really a man who is not contented with one woman even before we got married;

xxx 31

Question: After you gave birth to you[r] second child what happened next Madam Witness?

Answer: Sir, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, respondent is back to his old habit where he has
been seen having relationship with a different woman. This was also seen by our relatives and
friends of respondent.

x xx 32
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.  In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's
33

unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality,

completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse.  It is indispensable
34

that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. 35

As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview
with the subject himself. Apart from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's allegations, no other
reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged
personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable. We are not persuaded that the
natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or clinically established.

Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.  Based on the records, this Court finds that there
36

exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Felipe's sexual infidelity and irresponsibility
can be equated with psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. We reiterate that there was
no other evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not present other witnesses
to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that
their relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and
had no serious evidentiary value.

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA against the dissolution and
nullity of the parties' marriage due to insufficiency of the evidence presented. The policy of the State
is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of
the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage. 37

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari filed by herein petitioner Mirasol

Castillo. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the assailed Decision and Resolution, dated March 10, 2014 and
August 28, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals.

9999999999

July 27, 2016

G.R. No. 215723

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner 

vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, and
THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision  dated July 31, 2014 and the
1 2

Resolution  dated November 28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106
3

(RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Facts

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike
(Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.  Their 4

union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who
was born on April 4, 2007. 5

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce  before the
6

Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in
the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register ofMichiyuki
7

Koike.8
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage  on file with the 9

Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition  for judicial 10

recognition of ioreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code  before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692.
11

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.  On the other hand, Doreen presented
12

several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of

Divorce"  and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"  both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and
13 14

duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also
presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul
for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign
Affairs, as well as a Certification  issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of
15

said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil
Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The
Civil Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009"  were likewise submitted as proof 17

of the existence of Japan's law on divorce. 18

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision  dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an action for
19

recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be
proven in accordance with Sections 24  and 25  of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The
20 21

RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be
public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her
husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil
Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by
the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that
the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the
matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified expert witness nor
was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those
on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as learned treatises
pursuant to Section 46,  Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the
22

subject matter was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreignjudgments and law. 23

Doreen's motion for reconsideration  was denied in a Resolution  dated November 28, 2014; hence,
24 25

this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce. 1âwphi1

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages
or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 26

In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas, the Court had the occasion to rule that:
27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.  Justice Herrera explained that, as a
1âwphi1
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show
the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation
28

omitted)

Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,  it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
29

spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal
law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.  Since our courts do not take
30

judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact. 31

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the
existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation
of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a
question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in
fact binding subject to certain exceptions.  In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from
32

judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 33

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court
may refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues
of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination
of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.

This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal likewise "may"
be dismissed when there is error irr the choice or mode of appeal. 34

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or refer
the case to the CA, the question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice
warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that
procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed
to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the
existence of the courts. 35

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is
hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of
evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

---------------

April 18, 2016

G.R. No. 189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, 
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision   in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution  that affirmed the
1 2

same. The CA reversed the Decision  dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court
3

(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.

The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on the
ground that respondent had a previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA
believes on the other hand, that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if
the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to await a final decree of
nullity of the first marriage.

The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding thus and
consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista).
On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage,  praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to
4

Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its
Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC. The
reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was
null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged. 5

On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22
January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its
Decision  declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab
6

initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated 22
January 2003 had become final and executory.  7

On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence  claiming that the proof adduced by
8

petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it
was bigamous. In his Opposition,   petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of
9

respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her
previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in its
Order   dated 8 March 2005.
10
In a Decision   dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
11

respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of
the Family Code.   The dispositive portion reads:
12

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage
between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979,
at the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID
AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the Family Code.  13

The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato
on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The
lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could
presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial
declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said that even if respondent
eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial
decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with
Renato.  14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were
concerned.   His motion, however, was denied by the RTC in its Order  dated 6 September 2007.
15 16

Thereafter, both petitioner  and Respondent  filed their respective Notices of Appeal.
17 18

In a Decision  dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order
19

and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's
marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the
marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.  Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code
20

does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 21

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the questioned
CA Resolution dated 16 September 2009.
22

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Respondent filed her Comment  praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner valid
23

be affirmed in toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared
conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment,  petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.
24

OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in
effect at the time of its celebration.  In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both
25

marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in
effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions
under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81,  82,  and 83 (first
26 27 28

paragraph);  and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph),  85 and 86.
29 30 31 32

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a
void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable
marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be
ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void
marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4)
in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal
fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the
decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to
establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree. 33

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza,   People v. Aragon,   and Odayat v. Amante,   that the Civil Code contains
34 35 36

no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.  37

In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second
marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage
was contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was
deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous.
Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its performance, hence,
nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.

This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual
antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial
decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous
marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage.   A second marriage contracted
38

prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and
void.   In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this
39

requirement:

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is

the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the
Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life." So
crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of
policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot
be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their
union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to
render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as
human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official
state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of
society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively
confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone. (Emphases supplied)
40
1âwphi1

However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero  and Ty v. Court of Appeals,   the requirement

41 42

of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity
of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in
force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:

x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for
entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was
merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first
marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took
place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity
of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore,
we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent x x x. (Citations omitted)

As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court
thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her
first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision
of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen
the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

------------

January 13, 2016

G.R. No. 207406

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are
guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari  assailing the Court of Appeals Decision  dated July
1 2

18, 2012 and Resolution  dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
3

Decision  of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella
4

Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.  Norberto
5

was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. 6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto
with bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
7

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the legal requisites for its validity
with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to and at the time
of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law. 8

Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at
the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children. 10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another
woman[.]"  She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M.
11

Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National
Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto. 12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in
1987.  "After much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in
13

1994." 14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake
marriage"  with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.  Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s
15 16

revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were
married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children. 17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an
affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone
conversation with her paramour. 18
Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair.
The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing
her paramour. 19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint
for bigamy against Norberto. 20

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage
with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The
dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED. 21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the
penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the
penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED. 22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution
23

dated June 3, 2013. 24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment  to which Norberto filed a Reply.
25 26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.  He presents as evidence a
27

Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no
28

record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that
with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the
prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. 29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the
crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that
punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.  Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved
30

in favor of the accused[,]"  Norberto prays for his acquittal.

31 32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage with
Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise proved
that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage
was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the second marriage
would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be
convicted of bigamy. 33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it
has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife
Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is
suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license.
Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more
than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious
first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision
from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

I
Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following
elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil
registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license allegedly
issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still
legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the
crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on
July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August
3,1988.  Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines  govern the validity of his first
35 36

marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
renders the marriage void from the beginning: 37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides.  The marriage license represents the state’s
38

"involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested." 39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties." 40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and
License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of this
office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA
M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987. 41

This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist. 42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract
between him and his first wife, Gina.  The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a
43

positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first marriage. This "should be given
44
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the
marriage[.]" 45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro  was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a
46

marriage.  As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the marriage
47

license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil registrar’s]
records." 48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license."49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’
sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the
contracting parties." 50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification
in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for
bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To
our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for
him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its
presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification
in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine
that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement
that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite
should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is
not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned.
Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do
this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.  In Cariño, the marriage contract
51

between Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number.  In 52

addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage license issued to
Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.  This court declared Santiago Cariño’s first marriage void for
53

having been solemnized without a marriage license. 54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely
and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing
officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into
on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days,
petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the
bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In
other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own
actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage,
petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage
contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to
the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license
cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was
issued.

The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.  There is no
55

evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been
issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after the
document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates
to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown whether there
was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the
proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.
This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official
functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that
there is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the
context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage
license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor
does it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly
executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage
contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion that the
marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a

deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the case—that a
well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases
can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion of a government
employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but which
he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an
accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the
demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as much as to make our own judgment
based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using both, we have no
reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II

Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially
declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code.  The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.
56

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.  that

57

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. 58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of
the Family Code: 59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. 1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of
bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming
that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first."  Further, "[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of
60

the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent

marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void." 61

For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En
Banc as petitioner insists. 62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently
married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994.  As for the last element of bigamy, that the
63

subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy
was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to Gina
having been judicially declared void. 64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime
charged. 1âwphi1

III
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on
petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court
then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to
the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered. 65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.  The penalty next lower to that is prision
66

correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years;  hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.
67

As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period,
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges
from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously computed.
The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness[,]’"  we lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6)
68

months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision

dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

888888888888

G.R. No. 200233               JULY 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.  The CA affirmed
1

the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232   convicting her
2

of bigamy.

THE FACTS

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,   Leonila G. Santiago and
3

Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information   for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her
4

putative husband escaped the criminal suit.  5

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2
June 1974,   asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married
6

Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she
wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility."  7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime
of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got
married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her
should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void
due to the lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution.  She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
1âwphi1

occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation
and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already
married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of
his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.  8

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an
admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage."  Thus, the
9

trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 

10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one
(1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio
for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an
exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case,
petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years
prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:  11

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court
to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment
of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these
proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known
of the previous marriage of Santos.

Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.  12

THE ISSUES

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because
she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara,   she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence
13

of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages
exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married
Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year
requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment   filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
14

argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her
husband's subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the
courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

In Montanez v. Cipriano,   this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:

15

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d)
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in
the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr.   instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v.
16

Archilla   likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing
17

prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other
while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno:  18

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage
of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
the following circumstances:   (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of
19

her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person
like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of
the R TC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.  20

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly
charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty
on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of
prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.

Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla   holds that the second spouse, if
21

indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.
Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as
an accomplice in the crime of bigamy."   Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
22

accomplice to the crime.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree,   prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day
23

to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and
two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,   petitioner shall be entitled
24

to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.

The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.   If the accused wants to
25

raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of
evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.   In this case, petitioner has
26

consistently  questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
27

celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.  28

Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not
pass judgment on the validity of the marriage.  The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack
1âwphi1

her union with Santos was in vain.

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts,   and given
29

that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review,   this Court now resolves to
30

correct the error of the courts a quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. 31

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996   and 32

that after six months of courtship,  she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
33

prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija,
prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of
her in-laws,  and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.  On cross examination,
34 35

respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an
agent who sold her piglets. 36

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only
less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five
years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented
that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately,
subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,   in which the solemnizing
37

officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions
of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.  In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,  we had the occasion to emphasize that the
38 39

State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment."

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and,
in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery
of the sanctity of marriage. 
40

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded."   If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
41

transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts.   As a result, litigants
42

shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.  43

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages,  petitioner married Santos while knowing full well
44

that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use
her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground
that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that
when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil
Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was
celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract
a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage,
and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore,
unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as
innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State."   It must be safeguarded from the
45

whims and caprices of the contracting parties.   in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy,
46

this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

88888888888

April 25, 2018

G.R. No. 230751

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner 
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
 DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal  assailing the Decision  dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution  dated March 20,
1 2 3

2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.

The facts are as follows:

On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of
Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias
(Wilfredo).  The allegations of the petition read:
4

1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a residnet of 106 Molave
street, Zone B. San Miguel Tarlac City;

2. [Wifredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Araya,
Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]

3. The[p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda,
Pangasinan x x x;

4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at 106
Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel, Tarlac City;

5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their
conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;

6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never
made contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;

7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission,
[Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;

8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her]
beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts,
[neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place
frequented by the New People's Army;

9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope, and
after more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been
tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for
her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;

10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least
declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;

11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under
P.D. No. 1638 as amended.

The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac City
RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)_.

Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of the
Philippines (Republic). 5

On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision  in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition. The
6

dispositive portion of the Decision reads: 7

WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS
absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for purpose
of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiotrari.8

On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the Republic
and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850
is ANNULED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.

The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:

1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the
Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was
invoking the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not
that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.

2. Be that it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been dismissed by
the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to
have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code.
As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of
evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead-which presumption may be
invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an independent action or
proceeding.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence,this appeal.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal

The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is
not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must,
therefore, be set aside.

RTC Erred I Declaring the

Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under
Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's
Petition for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death is Not Based on
Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil
Code

A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.

It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner's
petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, RTC
gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was
likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.  This is wrong.
9

The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would
have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law. Thus:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death
Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death,
petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim
for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended. 10

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390
or Article 391 of the Civil Code  as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
11

Code express the general rule regarding presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives,
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has
not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.

Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of
Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper.The petition for the declaration of presumptive
death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.

Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of

Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been
Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is
To Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under
the CivilCode, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our
Jurisdiction

The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The decision itself is
objectionable.

Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is
because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any
authority to take cognizance of the same.

The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of
Death of Nicolai Szatraw.  In the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of death  is
12 13

merely one of the evidence that-while may be invoked in any action or proceeding-cannot be the
lone subject of an independent action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:

The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which permits the court to presume that
a person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise
and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or
heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or
special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the
subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right ti be enforced nor is
there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a
prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of particular fact, for
the petition does not pray for the declaration that the petitioner 's husband us dead, but merely asks
for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If
there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband os dead, such a
pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration, even if
judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is
already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would be a prima faciepresumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason
that it cannot be the subject of judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is tha only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter
must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a
party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may
arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of
the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular
fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially
provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject
to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)

The above ruling in Szatraw has since been ussed by the subsequent cases of Lukban v.
Republic  and Gue v. Republic  in disallowing petitions for declaration of presumptive death based
14 15

on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, implicity, also those based on the Civil based on Article 391 of
the Civil Code).

Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the

considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was
disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:16

1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a court or
a tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.

2. Since Articles 390 an d 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action
brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles
actually presents

no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual rights to
be enforces, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established.

3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article 391
of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really become "final" as the
same only confirms tha existence of a prima facie or disputable presumption. The function of a court
to render decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between litigants is thereby
compromised.

4. Moreove, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already established
by law.

Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition
that-like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law.  Hence, by acting
17

upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of presumptive death, the
RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA,
therefore, was only correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.

II

Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is
minded to make.

It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the misconception that
a court declaration is required in order to establish a person is presumptively dead for purposes of
claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman under pertinent laws.  This misconception is
18

what moved petitioner to file her misguided petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise
simple claim for death benefits either before the Philippine Veterans' Affair Office (PVAO) of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

What the Court finds deeply disconnecting, however, is the possibility that such misconception may
have been peddles by no less than the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such agencies, as a
matter of practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the petitioner, to first secure a court
declaration of presumptive death before processing the death before processing the death benefits
of missing serviceman.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following
guidelines-culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public, PVAO and
the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without
requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such
soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, on the basis of
the evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of death under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.

It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises
by operation of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the
said articles are established.  Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court declaration in
19

order to establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes
established jurisprudence on the matter. 20

2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or
the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence"  which shows that the
21

concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and or under the circumstances
prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to
here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.

3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the
claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified under
Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or
the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient, they should not
hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim.

4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to
invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof,
the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with the
CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court.  And finally, shold such recourse still fail, the claimant
1avvphi1

may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.

While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by the
foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be replicated in
the future.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and
Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467
are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.

SO ORDERED.

888888888888

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 210929               July 29, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

vs.
EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, assails the October 18, 2013
Decision  and the January 8, 2014 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
1 2

03768-MIN, which affirmed the October 8, 2009 Judgment  of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,
3

Malaybalay City, Bukidnon (RTC), in SP Proc. Case No. 3316-09, granting the petition of respondent
Edna Orcelino-Villanueva (Edna) and declaring her husband, Romeo L. Villanueva (Romeo), as
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code. 4

The Antecedents
Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City.

In 1992, Edna worked as domestichelper in Singapore while her husband worked as a mechanic in
Valencia City, Bukidnon.In 1993, Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo had left their
conjugal home without reason or information as to his whereabouts.

Thereafter, Edna took a leave from work and returned to the country to look for Romeo. She inquired
from her parents-in-law and common friends in Iligan City. Still, she found no leads as to his
whereabouts or existence. She also went to his birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental, and
inquired from his relatives.

On August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition  to declare Romeo presumptively dead
5

under Article 41 of the Family Code.

During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness. In its October 8, 2009 Order,  the RTC
6

granted the petition on the basis of her well-founded belief of Romeo’s death. Hence:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Romeo L. Villanueva to
be presumptively dead for all legal intents and purposes in accordance with Article 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to his reappearance.

SO ORDERED. 7

On August 13, 2010, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in finding that Edna had a well-
founded belief that Romeo, her absent spouse, was dead. It argued that the conclusions reached by
the RTC were in direct opposition to established jurisprudence, as ruled by the Court in Republic v.
Nolasco  (Nolasco) and U.S. v. Biasbas.
8 9

On October 18, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition, holding that the RTC acted within its jurisdiction
in issuing the assailed decision having been expressly clothed with the power to determine the
case.  It also cited Article 247 of the Family Code  which provided for the final and immediate
10 11

executory character of the decision of the RTC, acting as a family court, thus, rendering the issue of
whether or not Edna had sufficiently established a well-founded belief to warrant the decree of
presumptive death of her absent spouse, as moot and academic. On November 20, 2013, the OSG
filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it on January 8, 2014.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE CONCLUSION REACHED BY THE RTC IS CONTRARY TO PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE GROUNDS RAISED BY THE
PETITIONER TO ASSAIL THE RTC DECISION ARE MERE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT. 12

The OSG argues that the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
when the latter affirmed the existence of Edna’s well-founded belief as to the death of her absent
spouse. It claims that the evidence presented by Edna, which merely consisted of bare and
uncorroborated assertions, never amounted to a diligent and serious search required under
prevailing jurisprudence.

Respondent Edna, through her counsel, invokes the finality, inalterability and immutability of the
RTC decision, which was affirmed by the CA. 13

Ruling of the Court

The Court grants the petition.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive death may be
granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead.  In this case, Edna failed. The RTC and the CA overlooked Edna’s patent noncompliance with
14

the said requirement.

The well-founded belief in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the
spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still
alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would
not suffice.  The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
15

burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not
only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead. 16

This strict standard approach ensures that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws in light of the
State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Courts should never allow
procedural shortcuts but instead should see to it that the stricter standard required by the Family
Code is met. 17

Accordingly, in a string of cases, this Court has denied petitions for the declaration of presumptive
death on the said basis.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,  the Court ruled that the present spouse failed to
18

prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his
petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the following:

(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;

(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;

(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among her
friends;

(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during his
free time;

(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and

(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.

Despite these claimed "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court
explained that he failed to present the persons from whom he made inquiries and only reported his
wife’s absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC. Similarly in Republic
v. Granada,  the Court ruled that the present spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief" that her
19

absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. She simply did not exert diligent
efforts to locate her husband either in the country or in Taiwan, where he was known to have
worked. Moreover, she did not explain her omissions. In said case, the Court wrote:

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of the
death of the absent spouse depends upon inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of an absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by the present spouse.

In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who
had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:

(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;

(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and

(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless.

The Court held that the present spouse’s methods of investigation were too sketchy to form a basis
that his wife was already dead. It stated that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had
chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Recently, in Republic v. Cantor  (Cantor), the Court considered the present spouse’s efforts to have
20

fallen short of the "stringent standard" and lacked the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence
as she did not actively look for her missing husband; that she did not report his absence to the police
or seek the aid of the authorities to look for him; that she did not present as witnesses her missing
husband’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who could corroborate her efforts to locate him;
that these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named; and that there
was no other corroborative evidence to support her claim that she conducted a diligent search. In the
Court’s view, the wife merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated
inquiries from her in laws, neighbors and friends. She, thus, failed to conduct a diligent search. Her
claimed efforts were insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead.

In this case, Edna claimed to have done the following to determine the whereabouts and the status
of her husband:

1. She took a vacation/leave of absence from her work and returned to the Philippines to
look for her husband.

2. She inquired from her parents-in-law in Iligan City and from their common friends in the
same city and in Valencia City.

3. She went as far as the birthplace of her husband in Escalante, Negros Oriental, so she
could inquire from her husband’s relatives.

Despite her efforts, she averred that she received negative responses from them because none of
them had knowledge of the existence of her husband who had been missing for 15 years. Applying
the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases, particularly Cantor, Edna’s efforts
failed to satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent husband’s death. Her claim of making
diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare assertions without
any corroborative evidence on record. She also failed to present any person from whom she inquired
about the whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her children from whom she
learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she was the lone witness. Following the basic
rule that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof,  the Court cannot give
21

credence to her claims that she indeed exerted diligent efforts to locate her husband.

Moreover, no document was submitted to corroborate the allegation that her husband had been
missing for at least fifteen (15) years already. As the OSG observed, there was not even any attempt
to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her husband disappeared. In Cantor, the present spouse
claimed to have sought the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, reported his absence to the
police.  Yet, the Court denied her pleas.
22

Verily, it makes sense to conclude that her efforts were not diligent and serious enough to give
meaning to her well-founded belief that Romeo was already dead. Suffice it to state that her petition
should have been denied at the first instance. The RTC, however, granted it, reasoning

xxx that it was in 1993 when the petitioner while abroad heard the news from her children that her
husband left their conjugal home xxx without informing the children nor communicating with the
herein petitioner as to the reasons why he left their family abode nor giving them any information as
to his whereabouts; that herein petitioner took vacation/leave of absence from her work and return to
the Philippines, in order to look for her husband and made some inquiries with her parents-in-law in
Iligan City, from their common friends in Iligan City and in Valencia City, and even went as far as the
birthplace of her husband, particularly at Escalante, Negros Oriental, inquiring from her husband's
relatives, but she only got negative response from them since none of them have any knowledge as
to the present existence of her husband that since the year 1993 up to the present, a period of about
fifteen [15] years have elapsed, the person and the body of petitioner's husband could not be found,
located nor traced as there is no any information as to his existence or whereabouts. 23

Worse, the CA affirmed the RTC decision when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the
OSG. The CA should have realized the glaring and patent disregard by the RTC of the rulings in
similar situations where petitions for declaration of presumptive death have been denied by this
Court. By declaring Romeo presumptively dead, the CA clearly ignored this Court's categorical
pronouncements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the October 18, 2013 Decision and the
January 8, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband declared presumptively dead
is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 January 13, 2016

G.R. No. 207406

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are
guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari  assailing the Court of Appeals Decision  dated July
1 2

18, 2012 and Resolution  dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
3

Decision  of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella
4

Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.  Norberto
5

was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. 6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto
with bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
7

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the legal requisites for its validity
with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to and at the time
of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law. 8

Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at
the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children. 10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another
woman[.]"  She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M.
11

Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National
Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto. 12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in
1987.  "After much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in
13

1994." 14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake
marriage"  with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.  Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s
15 16

revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were
married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children. 17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an
affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone
conversation with her paramour. 18

Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair.
The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing
her paramour. 19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint
for bigamy against Norberto. 20

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage
with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The
dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED. 21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the
penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the
penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED. 22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution
23

dated June 3, 2013. 24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment  to which Norberto filed a Reply.
25 26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.  He presents as evidence a
27

Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no
28

record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that
with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the
prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. 29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the
crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that
punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.  Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved
30

in favor of the accused[,]"  Norberto prays for his acquittal.

31 32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage with
Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise proved
that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage
was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the second marriage
would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be
convicted of bigamy. 33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it
has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife
Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is
suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license.
Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more
than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious
first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision
from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following
elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil
registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license allegedly
issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still
legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the
crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on
July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August
3,1988.  Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines  govern the validity of his first
35 36

marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
renders the marriage void from the beginning: 37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides.  The marriage license represents the state’s
38

"involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested." 39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties." 40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and
License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of this
office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA
M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987. 41

This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist. 42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract
between him and his first wife, Gina.  The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a
43

positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first marriage. This "should be given
44

greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the
marriage[.]" 45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro  was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a
46

marriage.  As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the marriage
47

license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil registrar’s]
records." 48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license."49
This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’
sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the
contracting parties."50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification
in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for
bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To
our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for
him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its
presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification
in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine
that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement
that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite
should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is
not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned.
Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do
this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.  In Cariño, the marriage contract
51

between Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number.  In 52

addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage license issued to
Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.  This court declared Santiago Cariño’s first marriage void for
53

having been solemnized without a marriage license. 54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely
and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing
officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into
on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days,
petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the
bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In
other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own
actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage,
petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage
contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to
the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license
cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was
issued.

The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.  There is no
55

evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been
issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after the
document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates
to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown whether there
was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the
proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official
functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that
there is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the
context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage
license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor
does it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly
executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage
contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion that the
marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a

deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the case—that a
well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases
can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion of a government
employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but which
he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an
accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the
demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as much as to make our own judgment
based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using both, we have no
reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II

Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially
declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code.  The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.
56

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.  that

57

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. 58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of
the Family Code: 59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. 1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of
bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming
that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first."  Further, "[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of
60

the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent

marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void." 61

For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En
Banc as petitioner insists. 62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently
married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994.  As for the last element of bigamy, that the
63

subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy
was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to Gina
having been judicially declared void. 64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime
charged. 1âwphi1

III

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on
petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court
then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to
the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered. 65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.  The penalty next lower to that is prision
66

correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years;  hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.
67
As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period,
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges
from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously computed.
The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness[,]’"  we lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6)
68

months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision

dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

8888888

August 30, 2016

A.C. No. 9920

[Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant 

vs.
FORMER JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Respondent

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

A judge should know, or ought to know, his or her role as a solemnizing officer.

This disbarment complaint is an offshoot of our Decision in Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Necessario, et al.  Respondent Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis (Tormis), together with
1

other judges and employees of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, was dismissed for
turning the solemnization of marriages into a business. Tormis was dismissed from the service for
2

the second time, and this Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate disbarment
proceedings against her.

On July 3, 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, led the judicial audit.team created
by the Office of the Court Administrator to investigate Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Cebu City for alleged misdeeds in the solemnization of marriages. 3

Two (2) undercover agents from the judicial audit team, posing as a couple, went to the Palace of
Justice to ask about the marriage application process.  They were told by the guard on duty to go to
4

Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy." 5

Fearing that the male undercover would be recognized by the court employees in Branch 4, the two
agreed that only the female undercover would go inside the court. 6 She was then assisted by a
woman named Helen.  Helen assured the female undercover that their marriage process could be
1âwphi1

hurried. 7 She also claimed that it was possible for the marriage to be solemnized the next day, but
the marriage certificate would only be dated when the marriage license became available.  8

The Office of the Court Administrator found that the respondent judges in that case connived with
the court personnel, who acted as "fixers" in solemnizing marriages.  The judges heedlessly kept
9

solemnizing marriages despite irregularities in the requirements provided under the law. 10
In the Resolution dated July 10, 2007, this Court treated the judicial audit team's memorandum as an
administrative complaint against the respondent judges, including Tormis.  The judges were directed
11

to file their comments on the charges against them.   They were also suspended pending resolution
12

of the case. 13

On August 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepafio of the Office of the
Court Administrator submitted a Memorandum dated August 29, 2007 and Supplemental
Report.   The Report stated that:
14

Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team. The
team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized
under Article 34 of the Family Code. The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number
of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts' custody. There is
also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of
Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses
obtained on the same day. The town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from
Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours. Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more
than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City.   (Citations omitted)
15

The Report included the court employees' admissions of their participation in the alleged misdeeds.
The following personnel substantiated the charges against Tormis:

(1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the Municipal Trial Court in.Cities, Cebu City,
confirmed that she would personally assist couples who wished to be married by checking that their
documents were complete before referring them to the judges, including Tormis; 16

(2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer of Branch 6 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu
City, "narrated several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of marriage
licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were not residents of
Barili."  These marriages were solemnized by Tormis; 
17 18

(3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court, Cebu City, would aid couples in the solemnization of their marriages by referring them to
the judges; 19

(4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City,
"admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage licenses
were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those
towns were not strict about couples' attendance in the family planning seminar"; 20

(5) Marilou Cabafiez, Court Stenographer of Branch 4 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu
City, admitted that she would assist couples and refer them to the judges, including Tormis.21 She
added that "during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go
directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage Solemnization"; 22

(6) Rebecca L. Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City,
admitted that "she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to
get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint
cohabitation for ten pesos (₱10)";  and
23

(7) Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, admitted that she did not examine
marriage applications.24 Couples who were not Barili residents could obtain a marriage license from
her, provided that they had relatives residing in Barili; 25

Affidavits of private individuals were also attached to the records.  Among these individuals was
26

Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera (Baguio-Manera), a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu. Baguio-

Manera claimed that her marriage was solemnized by Tormis with the aid of "Meloy," who asked for
a fee of ₱l,500.00.  She and her then fiance were not required to present a marriage license; they
27

were only directed to bring their birth certificates.  She averred that while Article 34  did not apply to
28 29

them, their marriage certificate was marked with the annotation, "No marriage license was
necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Article 34 of Executive Order No. 209." 30

On November 27, 2007, this Court En Banc issued the Resolution requiring all the judges involved,
including Tormis, to comment on the Supplemental Report.   The Resolution also directed the
31

Process Servicing Unit to furnish all the judges with a copy of the Report.  Further, all the court
32

personnel involved were asked to show cause why they should not be disciplined for their
misconduct.  33
In her comm~nt, Tormis denied the charges against her.  She claimed that the action of the Office of
34

the Court Administrator was an "entrapment."  According to her, there was nothing wrong with
35

solemnizing marriages on the same date the marriage license was issued.  In view of the pro forma
36

affidavits of cohabitation, she relied on the presumption of regularity.  Tormis asserted that she
37

should not be blamed for assuming that the affidavits were true since judges are not handwriting
experts.38

Tormis also claimed that Baguio-Manera's affidavit was hearsay.  She averred that when Baguio-
39

Manera and her husband was asked about the affidavit, they confirmed the truthfulness of their
statements, particularly that they had been living together for five (5) years.40 Lastly, Tormis blamed
the filing clerks for the irregularities in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala. 41

On November 12, 2007, Tormis, together with Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, filed a Memorandum of
Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of the Case.  This Court 42

lifted the suspension of the judges but forbade them from solemnizing marriages.  On December 7,43

2007, both judges moved for early resolution with a waiver of formal and/or further investigation and
to dismiss.  This Court noted their Motion and affirmed the relief they sought, thus allowing the
44

payment of the judges' unpaid salaries and benefits from July 9, 2007. 45

The Office of the Court Administrator, through a memorandum dated June 15, 2010, found Tormis
guilty of

gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for
failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages wherein
one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in
lieu of the required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired
license.46

This Court upheld the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator and noted the individual
liability of the judges:

Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis

Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007
based on the marriage certificates actually examined. However, the monthly report of cases showed
that she solemnized three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007. The
OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court started to use a logbook to keep
track of marriages.

Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing documents
such as the marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of
cohabitation. In several instances, only affidavits were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the
certificate of legal capacity to marry.

Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the validity
of the required documents particularly the marriage license. The judicial audit team found numerous
erasures and superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties' place of residence. In one
instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio on
28 December 2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS
LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it.

The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code
wherein the marriage requirements' authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the
cohabitation of the parties and the given address of the parties.  These irregularities were evident in
1âwphi1

the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who were married on 25 May
2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan,
Cebu City." However, there was an application for marriage license attached to the marriage
certificate showing that Secuya's address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City." 47

This Court ruled that:

3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would
have been DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave
credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from service in
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30- MTCC);

....
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and
Crisanto dela Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of
initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge.48 (Emphasis in the original)

The affidavits of Celerina Plaza (Plaza) and Crisanto Dela Cerna (Dela Cerna) resulted from Marilou
Cabanes' (Cabanes) and Helen Mongaya's (Mongaya) separate supplemental comments on the
charges against them. 49 Cabanes, then Court Stenographer of Branch 4, named Plaza as Tormis'
assistant, in charge of meeting couples at their lobby.so On the other hand, Mongaya, then Court
Interpreter of Branch 4, attached Dela Cerna's affidavit to her comment. 51

Plaza claimed to be Tormis' personal aide since 2002.  She alleged that after Tormis' suspension in
52

2006, she was directed to find couples who wanted to get married.  She was also told to direct the
53

parties to Branch 4 and find Cabanes or "Meloy." 54

In his affidavit, Dela Cerna stated that he was employed as Tormis' personal aide.  He claimed that55

during the investigation, Tormis directed him and Tormis' children to bring all the marriage
certificates from her office to her house. 56

In view of Judge Necessario, et al., the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the case be
docketed as A.C. No. 9920 (Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691) and entitled Office of the Court
Administrator v. Former Judge Rosabella M Tormis. 57

On June 18, 2013, this Court approved the docketing of the case and directed respondent Former
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis to comment on the disbarment charge against her. 58

Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification  dated August 12, 2013 asking the Office of the
59

Court Administrator to state the particular Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility that
she had violated as basis for her disbarment.

In the Resolution  dated September 10, 2013, this Court noted the Urgent Motion for Clarification
60

and directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to inform respondent of the particular Canons that she
had violated.

On November 29, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant sent respondent a letter informing her that
the charges in her administrative cases as a judge were the grounds for her disbarment.  It cited 61

A.M. No. 02-9-02- SC,   which provides that administrative cases against judges shall also be
62

considered as disciplinary charges against them as members of the bar.  Some administrative cases
63

against judges stand on grounds that similarly violate the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or on other breaches long recognized as
grounds for discipline of lawyers. The Office of the Bar Confident reiterated that, in those cases the
respondent judge may be directed to comment on the complaint and explain why he or she should
not be punished as a member of the bar. 64

The letter cited the previous administrative charges against respondent, thus:

(a) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691,   where respondent was dismissed from service, had she not been
65

previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817  for gross inefficiency or neglect of duty
66

and gross ignorance of the law by turning solemnization of marriage into a business; 67

(b) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692,  where respondent was suspended for six (6) months without salary for
68

gross misconduct for repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant
with her comment; 69

(c) A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC  and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC,  where respondent was fined ₱5,000.00
70 71

for gross violation of Rule 114, Section 1772 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure by
inappropriately approving the bail posted by an accuse m a criminal case; 73

(d) A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609,  where respondent was severely reprimanded for her "unauthorized
74

receipt of cash bond and keeping the same in her house"; 75

(e) A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817,  where respondent was dismissed from service for gross inefficiency,
76

violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross ignorance of the law;  and 77

(f) A.M. No. MTJ-001337,  where respondent was reprimanded after being found "guilty of improper
78

conduct for trying to influence the course of litigation in Criminal Case No. 99796- 12."  She, 79

together with another judge, was admonished for her "unbecoming conduct as dispensers of
justice."
80
Respondent filed her one-page Comment  on January 10, 2014, asking this Court to grant her
81

peace of mind. She states that she is adopting her Motion for Reconsideration  in A.M. No. MTJ-12-
82 83

1817 as her Comment on the disbarment case against her.  In this Motion, respondent enumerates
84

her previous administrative cases with her justifications.

For A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692, respondent claims that she had furnished the complainant with a copy
of her comment three (3) times.  She avers that the complainant even acknowledged the receipt of
85

her comment through her manifestation, as noted in this Court's July 30, 2003 Resolution.  Despite 86

this, she was still fined ₱2,000.00 for her repeated defiance to this Court's directive to furnish the
complainant with a copy of her comment.  She believed that the case ended upon resolution and
87

upon this Court's noting her payment of the fine. However, she claims that:

[The Supreme Court] made an underground evaluation of the case and made it appear that when
she complied with their Resolution in 2 March 2005 to impose a fine of ₱2,000.00, it was already an
admission that "[s]he (respondent) refused to present proof of service to complainant of her
Comment or she did not furnish complainant with said document[.]" 88

For A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC, respondent claims that this Court
"obviously ignored" her explanation.  She asserts that she was the only available judge at that time
89

since she was working from Mondays through Saturdays and even Sundays due to her load of
cases. 90

For A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609, respondent questions why this Court ruled that she deliberately made
untruthful statements in her Comment with the intent to deceive this Court. 91

For A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, respondent claims that the audit was conducted one (1) day after she
had served a prior suspension.  She argues that since she was not in her court for a long time, she
92

cannot be faulted for knowing nothing about what has been happening in her sala during her
absence.  She alleges that the Clerk of Court, her co-respondent in the case, "could have
93

manipulated it so that even if the cases had already been disposed of some years back he made it
appear that this had remained unacted upon." 94

For A.M. No. MTJ-001337, respondent claims that the dismissal of the judges was based on an
alleged "entrapment." She argues that it was impossible for her to act on the marriage of the
undercover agents because she was in Tacloban City for her high school reunion.  She was merely 95

indicted based on the statements of Plaza and Dela Cerna, who had been intimidated by Atty. Rullyn
Garcia, Office of the Court Administrator judicial audit team head.  On March 18, 2014, this Court
96

noted respondent's Comment and resolved to refer the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
investigation, report, and recommendation.  97

In its Report and Recommendation  dated August 24, 2015, the Office of the Bar Confidant noted
98

that the Office of the Court Administrator, represented by Atty. Miguel Mergal, presented Plaza and
Dela Cerna as their witnesses. Respondent also requested Atty. Rullyn Garcia's presence in the
99

proceedings. 100

However, none of the witnesses participated in the proceedings. Hence, the parties were required to
just submit their respective memoranda for evaluation. 101

The Office of the Court Administrator filed a memorandum  dated February 27, 2015 quoting the
102

facts and ruling in Judge Necessario, et al. It avers that Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies "are
beside the point and these have been rendered moot because of their failure to appear at the
hearings scheduled by the Office of the Bar Confidant."  103

The Office of the Court Administrator argues that respondent should be disbarred due to gross
misconduct for her participation in the solemnization of marriages.   It points out that the various 104

administrative charges against respondent "clearly shows that she does not possess high standards
of competence and reliability required of a practicing lawyer."  105

On the other hand, respondent's memorandum  dated February 26, 2015 mainly anchored on the
106

claim that Atty. Rullyn Garcia's report submitted was falsified.   Respondent claims that Atty. Rullyn
107

Garcia intimidated the court employees and caused them to "admit whatever allegations he brought
up during the investigation."  She prays that the case be dismissed for lack of substantial evidence
108

since Plaza's and Dela Cema's affidavits were not personally attested to by the affiants. 109

The Office of the Bar Confidant, after conducting the proceedings and considering the memoranda
of the parties, recommended that the disbarment case against respondent be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.  It emphasized that formal investigation is indispensable in disbarment
110

proceedings:
For the charge of gross misconduct for the irregularities in the solemnization of marriages as
the basis for this disbarment proceedings.

This case was set for hearing. During the scheduled hearing, the representative from OCA
manifested that they are presenting two (2) witnesses in the persons of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto
Dela Cerna. The purposes of their testimonies are for them to substantiate the allegations against
former Judge Tormis, identify and authenticate the existence and veracity of their respective
affidavits submitted to the Court. However, the two witnesses failed to appear during the
proceedings of this case. Thus, their affidavits are considered hearsay and inadmissible in
evidence ... in this proceeding. The affidavit are [sic] not entirely reliable evidence in court due to
their incompleteness and inaccuracies that may have attended in their formulation. The affidavit
does not purport to contain a complete narration of facts and that court testimonies are generally
viewed as more reliable as they are subjected to cross examination from the opposing party ....
Likewise, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, the OCA audit team head, failed to appear. The purpose of his
testimony would be to shed light more on whether the alleged affidavits executed by Celerina Plaza
and Crisanto Dela Cerna were actually and voluntarily submitted to the Court and, if so, who
required them to execute and submit the same to the Court.

....

The determination of the merit of th[ ese] disbarment proceedings may not be relied upon solely on
the premise of the dismissal from the service of former Judge Tormis. As earlier discussed, the
grounds for dismissal from the service of former Judge Tormis, in her capacity as presiding judge, in
administrative matter is different from this disbarment proceedings against her. Otherwise, the Court
would have ruled on the disbarment aspect, which shall be incorporated in the decision of dismissal
from the service of former Judge Tormis in one decision only. As provided for under the
constitutional right to due process, former Judge Tormis should be given full opportunity to be heard
and confront witnesses against her in th[ ese] disbarment proceedings. This constitutional right
should not be denied to former Judge Tormis, who cried for due process since her dismissal from
the service.

....

For the dismissal from the service, in her capacity as judge, for gross inefficiency or neglect
of duty and of gross ignorance of the law in performance of her duties as presiding judge.

Former Judge Tormis cried for justice in dismissing her from service, as presiding judge, without
according her due process. She was not given the opportunity to be heard but the only basis of her
dismissal from the service was the testimonies/allegations against her of some courts [sic]
personnel, who were allegedly intimidated by the judicial audit team, during the judicial audit. She
was not given the chance to confront nor furnished copies of the said court personnel's testimonies.
She was denied her constitutional right against searches and seizures of documents from her sala
when the audit team obtained documents and records, as evidence against her, when they
conducted the investigation in her sala, since she was not informed of the said audit.

In A.M. No. P-08-2520, the Court held that he rights against unreasonable searches and seizures as
provided under Section 2, Article III in the Constitution may be invoked even in administrative
proceedings. The exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Art. III of the Constitution also bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such "right. The fact that the present case is
administrative in nature, does not render the above principle inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta
vs C.A., any violation of the aforestated constitutional right renders the evidence inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceedings.

Records show that all the administrative sanctions against former Judge Tormis were all for simple
gross inefficiency or neglect of duties and gross ignorance of the law in the discharge of her duties
and responsibilities as the presiding judge of the MTCC, Br. 4, Cebu City. Neither of these findings
held her for gross misconduct, which constitute immoral conduct, that would tend to affect her
standing and moral character as an officer of the court and as a member of the Bar. Further, she has
never been found guilty for graft and corruption during her entire service in the judiciary as a
member of the bench in the lower court that would cause her automatically disbarred from the
practice of law.

Finally, the counter-charges of former Judge Tormis against Atty. Rullyn Garcia may not be given
due course in th[ese] proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that the
disbarment case against former JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS be DISMISSED for insufficiency
of evidence.  (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
111
The issues for resolution are as follows:

First, whether the alleged irregularities committed by respondent in the solemnization of marriages,
where she was found guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law,
constitute gross misconduct warranting her disbarment;

Second, whether Plaza's and Dela Cema's affidavits are indispensable in finding that respondent's
acts constitute gross misconduct and merit the penalty of disbarment; and

Lastly, whether respondent's long line of administrative sanctions should affect her standing as a
member of the bar.

Although this Court recognizes the indispensability of the appearance of Plaza and Dela Cerna in
the proceedings before the Office of the Bar Confidant, the disbarment case cannot be dismissed
solely based on this.

An affidavit is commonly recognized as hearsay evidence.  Since it is often prepared not by the
112

affiant but by another person who makes use of his or her own language in writing the statements, it
is generally rejected unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify.  "Courts take judicial
113

notice of the fact that an affidavit does not purport to contain a complete narration of facts."  Court
114

testimonies, therefore, are favored because these can be subjected to cross exammation. 115

Plaza and Dela Cerna failed to appear in the proceedings before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The
Office of the Bar Confidant noted that their testimonies would have supposedly confirmed the charge
against respondent regarding the alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages.  Plaza's
116

and Dela Cema's testimonies would have likewise verified the existence and veracity of their
affidavits.
117

Similarly, Atty. Rullyn Garcia failed to appear in the proceedings. His purported testimony would
have disproved the accusation that Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies were executed with his
intimidation.  Due to their absence, Plaza's and Dela Cema's allegations in their affidavits were
118

rendered inadmissible.  Nevertheless, despite the inadmissibility of the affidavits, this Court
119

in Judge Necessario, et al. upheld the finding of the judicial audit team that respondent committed
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages. This Court ruled that these findings had sufficient
basis and were supported by evidence, pertinent laws, and jurisprudence.  Respondent was held
120

guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law warranting her
dismissal, had she not been previously dismissed from service in another case. 121

The administrative case against respondent in Judge Necessario, et al. Should likewise be

considered as a disciplinary proceeding against her under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which provides:

Some administrative cases against Justices od the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges
of regular and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of
lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary
action against the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The
respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should
not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar.
Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)

While respondent blatantly violated particular Canons of Judicial Ethics with her participation in the
alleged marriage scam, she similarly breached the following Canons on the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

....

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession ....

....
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law[.]

Membership in the bar is an essential requirement for membership in the bench.  "[T]he moral
122

fitness of a judge also reflects his [or her] moral fitness as a lawyer.".  Consequently, a judge who
123

violates the code of judicial conduct similarly violates his or her lawyer's oath. 
124

Respondent's act of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in utter disregard of the law and
jurisprudence clearly constitutes gross misconduct. The repetitiveness of her act shows her clear
intent to violate the law. She disregarded the lawyer's oath, which mandates lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. In view of this, either the penalty of suspension or disbarment is
warranted. Rule 138, Section 27 provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member

of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

Gross misconduct is an "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment."  To consider gross misconduct "the elements of
125

corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be
manifest[.]" 
126

The Supplemental Report of the Office of the Court Administrator made the following findings:

III On Judge Rosabella M Tormis

1. Based on the documents, i.e., marriage certificates and other supporting documents, actually
examined, she solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007,
while the monthly reports of cases reflected a total of three hundred and five (305) marriages she
solemnized from 2004 to 2007.

2. It was only last July that her court started using a logbook to record the marriages she
solemnized, which, as of the date of the judicial audit and investigation, reflected a total of sixty-three
(63) marriages for that month.

3. Of the 181 marriages she solemnized, one hundred thirty-one (131), or 72.38% were solemnized
under Article 34 of the Family Code, while fifty (50), or 27.62% were with marriage licenses.

4. Of the 50 marriages with marriage license, forty (40), or 80% marriage licenses were obtained
from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, while the remaining ten (10), or 20%, were obtained from
other local civil registrars.

5. The following marriages were solemnized by her with no or incomplete supporting documents:

....

6. The following marriages were solemnized by her even if the

validity of the supporting documents, especially the marriage licenses

presented, appear to be questionable[.]

7. The authenticity of the requirements for the following marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code, by reason of the (a) circumstances of the cohabitation, (b) minority during the period of
cohabitation, and (c) given address of the contracting parties, appears to be questionable:

8. In almost all of the marriages solemnized by her, there was no proof that the solemnization fee of
₱300.000, as required under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, was paid by the contacting parties.  127

The act of solemnizing marriages without the required marriage license constitutes
misconduct.   The positive testimonies substantiate that respondent solemnized marriages without
128
previously issued licenses; hence, respondent's act deviates from the established rule.  In Aranes v.
129

Occiano: 130

[A] marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except
in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage.  131

Tupal v. Rojo  explained the role of a judge as a solemnizing officer:

132

Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting
parties and examine the requirements they submitted. The parties must have complied with all the
essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage license.

A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and
none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage. Before performing the marriage ceremony,
the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented.

If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no
legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement. Instead, the
parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of
cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other. The judge must also execute a sworn
statement that he personally ascertained the parties' qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage. Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.   (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
133

Although it is true that marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code merit exemption from a
marriage license, respondent should have complied with the mandate of personally ascertaining the
circumstances of cohabitation of the parties. Records reveal that the declarations embodied in the
required joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties do not actually represent the accurate
circumstances of their alleged cohabitation. 134

In addition, there were marriages solemnized by respondent involving foreigners who only submitted
affidavits in lieu of a certificate of legal capacity to marry.  In cases where one or both of the
135

contracting parties are foreigners, Article 21  of the Family Code provides that a certificate of legal
136

capacity to marry is necessary before the acquisition of a marriage license. As the solemnizing
officer, respondent should have ensured that pertinent requirements were secured before the
issuance of the marriage license. Thus, the absence of a certificate of legal capacity to marry should
have prompted her to question the propriety of the issuance.

The connivance between respondent and the court employees is settled. The court employees acted
as "'fixers' and 'facilitators"   that mediated between the judges and the contacting parties. Apparent
137

are the superimpositions and erasures in the addresses of the contracting parties so they would
appear to be residents of either Barili or Liloan, Cebu.  For the contracting parties to easily obtain
138

their marriage license, discrepancies between their true addresses as declared in their marriage
certificates and their addresses in their marriage licenses were made. The contracting parties were
able to get married despite incomplete requirements. Thus, the handwritten marginal notes of
monetary figures attached to the marriage certificates show the presence of consideration. 139

Marriage is recognized under the law as an inviolable social institution, which is the foundation of the
family.  In Beso v. Daguman.
140 141

[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has
surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and
stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every
member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction.  142

Respondent used her authority as a judge to make a mockery of marriage. As a judicial officer, she
is expected to know the law on solemnization of marriages.  "A judge is not only bound by oath to
143

apply the law; he [or she] must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by
the very delicate nature of their office[,] should be more circumspect in the performance of their
duties."
144

Similarly, as a lawyer who is an officer of the court, respondent should have not permitted herself to
be an instrument of any violation of law. Her careless attention in dispensing with the necessary
requirements of marriage and in conniving with court employees to further monetary interests
underscores her utter disregard of the sanctity of marriage.

Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his or her professional dealings or in a private
capacity, is basis for suspension or disbarment.  Possession of good character is a fundamental
145

requirement not only for admission to the bar but also for the continuance of exercising the privilege
to practice law.  However, as a rule, disbarment is only warranted in cases of misconduct that
146

"seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court."147

Respondent's undue haste in repeatedly solemnizing marriages despite incomplete and irregular
requirements shows indifference to her role as an officer of the court. The repetitiveness of her acts
shows her proclivity in transgressing the law and protecting these violations with her authority. A
lawyer, as an officer and an essential partner of the court in the solemn task of giving justice, is
given the grave obligation of maintaining the integrity of the courts. 148 This is especially so with
judges. A judge is "the visible representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will
and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow."  In Samson v. Caballero:
149 150

The first step towards the successful implementation of the Court's relentless drive to purge the
judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of
rules of conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible
representation of the law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law.
The standard of integrity imposed on them is - and should be - higher than that of the average
person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge.
151

Respondent was involved in infractions that warranted her prior administrative sanctions. Her long
line of cases shows her depravity of character, in that she remained undeterred by the past penalties
she had incurred. Considering that she was repeatedly involved in administrative charges, the
severe penalty of disbarment should be meted against her. Disbarment does not equate to a
sanction stripping a lawyer of his or her source of living.  It is intended to "protect the administration
152

of justice that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order
that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them."  As held in Foronda v.
153

Guerrero:  154

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules
of legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. 155

Respondent's conduct has fallen short of the strict standards required by the legal profession.
Hence, her repeated failure to live up to the values expected of her as an officer of the court renders
her unfit to be a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis is DISBARRED from the practice of

law and her name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to
respondent's personal records, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for dissemination to its
chapters and members and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, and to the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

**********

G.R. No. 188289               August 20, 2014

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, 
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision  of the Court of Appeals in
1

CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision  of the Regional Trial
2

Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was
engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:

PHILIPPINES
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. ₱1,693,125.00
located at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc,
Manila (Sampaloc property)
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. ₱400,000.00
m. located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares ₱490,000.00
located at Maria Aurora, Aurora
3
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. ₱175,000.00
located at Sabang Baler, Aurora
3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin ₱750,000.00
Maria Aurora, Aurora
USA
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly
City, California
$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
Furniture and furnishings $3,000

Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000

2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00

Bank of America Checking Account $8,000

Bank of America Cash Deposit

Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00

4
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities $56,228.00

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan from
a bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid
a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand
executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00,
which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3)
that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties
situated in the Philippines.  David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc
5

property, leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on
24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.  The California court granted to
6

Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA. 7

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the
RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to
comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal
properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject
conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children;
4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc
property; and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses. 8

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29
June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership. 9

The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital
infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner
and their two (2) children.

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the
same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.

3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and
respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property
rights over their conjugal properties.

4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2

[M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5
[M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.

5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable
against their conjugal properties.

Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:

Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive
legitimes.10

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are
hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in
the United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras
a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the
parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled
and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;

3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding

paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner
LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must
be annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their share in the income from these
properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the first half of
January of each year, starting January 2008;
 4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia
Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her
two minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said
legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their
share in the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the
petitioner within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;

5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A.
Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from
their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food,
clothing, education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly
allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the
children require and his financial capacity can afford;

6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the
Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and
₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but
the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint
account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or
by their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such
payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of
this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the
Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from
the Clerk of Court only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and

7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by
them individually.11

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by
virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County
of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved.
Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute
community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the
children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute
community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the
solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled
that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because
the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their
national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the
law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot
beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to
prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.

The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for
considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of
equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the
children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the
waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of
the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the
amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the

assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil
Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are
hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and
respondent David A. Noveras;

xxx

4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall
pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be
 annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income
therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of
January, starting 2008;

xxx

6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to
pay the amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive
legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom,
which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s
names. The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt
ofa copy of this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe
Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact.

A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:

8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic)
the amount of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property.

The last paragraph shall read as follows:

Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of
Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street
corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the
children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.

The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED. 12

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California
Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the
pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia
to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering
that the latter was already granted all US properties by the California court.

In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in
the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With
respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal
properties.

At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of
marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,  we stated that:
13

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.14

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must
comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.15

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal
may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The
certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, asthe case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates
to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.

It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,  we relaxed the requirement on certification where
16

we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the divorce and
that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy
of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce
decree was obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption  as the lower courts did with respect to the
17

property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to
begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration
of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code. 18

Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4
and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:

(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction;

(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;

(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;

(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or
her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;

(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has
abused that power; and

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one
year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against
the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of
property. (Emphasis supplied).

The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate
judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court
ratiocinated:

Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid
cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the
allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within
the period of three months from such abandonment.

In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his
hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the
alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their
children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October
2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of
marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the
saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines. 19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled
in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of
the absolute community of properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for
more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had
not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from
her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation
form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California
20

court in June 2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition
for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the
absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
(Emphasis supplied).

Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply:

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In
case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 94.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered
to each of them.

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net
assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has
been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the
net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said
profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at
the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with
whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration
the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the
case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of
Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in
the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s
presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.  While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent
1âwphi1

a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at
least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the
criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In
sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.

xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute
community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their
respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia
should each pay them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom. 21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

000

R. No. 176492               October 20, 2014

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner, 
vs.
LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Marietta N. Barrido questioning
the Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November 16, 2006, and its Resolution  dated
1 2

January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235. The CA affirmed the Decision  of the Regional Trial
3

Court (RTC) ofBacolod City, Branch 53, dated July 21, 2004, in Civil Case No. 03-12123, which
ordered the partition of the subject property.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: In the course of the marriage of respondent
Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a property situated
in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property,
Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a
Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.

Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold to
their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying Article 129 of the
Family Code. It ruled in this wise:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the conjugal

property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a house and lot covered by TCT No.
T-140361 located at Eroreco, Bacolod City, which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the
defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to
remain.

Furthermore, defendant’s counterclaim is hereby granted, ordering plaintiff to pay defendant

₱10,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish and unnecessary inconvenience brought
about by this suit; and an additional ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter others from
following suit; and attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00 and litigation expenses of ₱575.00.

SO ORDERED. 4

Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the Bacolod RTC reversed
the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family
Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido. Its
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 17, 2003 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered ordering the parties:

(1) to equitably partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361;

(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount advanced by them
in payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No. T-140361 with Philippine National Bank;

(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato
pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED. 5
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held that since the
property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also,
although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the
dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property. Barrido
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.

Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She assigned the following
errors in the CA Decision:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTCC HAD
JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOT COVERED BY
TCT NO. T-140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD TO THE CHILDREN, JOSEPH LEO
NONATO AND JOSEPH RAYMUND NONATO.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ARTICLE 129 OF THE
FAMILY CODE HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE, ON THE ASSUMPTION

THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. 6

The petition lacks merit.

Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or
those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.  Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
7

Bilang 129  provides:

8

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit

Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the propertyor interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No.
7691) 9

Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does
not exceed the required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila tofall within the
jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.

The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 36  of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
10

partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 129  provides for the
11

procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers
the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. Article 147 reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed tohave been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall beowned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party.  In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
1âwphi1

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impedimentto marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
or without the benefit of marriage.  It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and
12

the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void.
Here, all these elements are present.  The term "capacitated" inthe first paragraph of the provision
13

pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.  Any impediment to marry has not been
14

shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other
as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 15

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.  Efforts in the care and
16

maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. 17

In the analogous case of Valdez,  it was likewise averred that the trial court failed to apply the
18

correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is
declared void ab initiobecause of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the
contract of marriage.The Court held that the court a quodid not commit a reversible error in utilizing
Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home and all
their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition
of the property that they owned in common, the provisions on coownership under the Civil Code
should aptly prevail.  The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
19

community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and
voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spousesor spouses of void marriages. 20

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence
of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however, claims that the
ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of
Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names of the former
spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that
without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public
document,  making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated.  Unfortunately, Barrido
21 22

failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to
her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and
Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No.
00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*

G.R. No. 171914               July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, 
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval,
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

The Case

The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,  whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification
1

the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati
City.  The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a
2

condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.

Antecedents

The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his
first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married
ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10,
1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on
September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children,
namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda,
Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2)
decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in
February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from
the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.

On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit)
at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on
installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas
law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit
was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was
registered bearing the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share
of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold
to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated
that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA
thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a
portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of
ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of
the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the
heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since
they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY.
LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her
½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and
testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her
share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the
¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on
the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be
appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be
ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD. 3

Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
facts,  disposing thusly:
4

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of
the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS
is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;

(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit,
hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";

(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit
and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate
arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 5

Decision of the CA

Both parties appealed to the CA. 6

On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE

TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
 IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AND LUNA;

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE

OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT
THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;

VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF
THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES;
and

IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE

INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE. 7

In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN
THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S
MONEY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD
PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL. 8

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,  holding and ruling:
9

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12,
1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not
terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:

(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS
is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry
of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage) was still subsisting and valid;

(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of
the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first
marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
 Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 11

On March 13, 2006,  the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
12 13

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence,
their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;

B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s
approval of the Agreement;

C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient
proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit;
and

D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the
subject law books. 14

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the
25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher
on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).

The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine,
firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late
Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court

We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia

subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines
on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil
Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to
the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.  Pursuant
15

to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,  even 16

if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.  Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
17

unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against
such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.  Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
18

abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution,  and regards it as a special contract of permanent union
19

between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life.  The non- 20

recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of
the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce
decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.

2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement

was void for lack of court approval

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that
the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce
proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.

The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at
the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they
had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the
Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court
was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed
when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

xxxx

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)

But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna
and Eugenia?

The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an
incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for
their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce.  With
21

the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine
public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and
enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.

3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,

was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976
was void for being bigamous,  on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had
22

not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

The Court concurs with the CA.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of
the Civil Codeclearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the
first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.  A bigamous
23

marriage is considered void ab initio. 24

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its
being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules
on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.  To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of
1âwphi1

her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in
Saguid v. Court of Appeals: 25

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property
is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous
and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property.

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the
plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.  The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the
1âwphi1

relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still
prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact
has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence. 26

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of
the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30;  and that such aggregate contributions of
27

₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00.  The 28

petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of
which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;  that she had the financial capacity to make
29

the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due
to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.

Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this
case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family
Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together
as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144
of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable
to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in
any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article
148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to
be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The
same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of
the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties
were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict
rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in
the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No.
L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:

xxxx

As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to

prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that
the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY.
LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:

"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on
January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit
"7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P"
was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty.
Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also
for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated
December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the
payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not
established. x x x"

SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly,
there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium
unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY.
LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee
or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The
loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty.
Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or
partially. x x x"

The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES
LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled
that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married
to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed. 30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo
them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of
proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,  did not serve the purpose. In
31

contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their
conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the
25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the
respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

888

July 27, 2016

G.R. No. 204494

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners 

vs.
LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
1

the Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution  dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of
2 3

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA affirmed the Decision  dated July 23, 2007 of the
4

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No. 69611.

The Facts

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint  docketed as Civil Case No. 69611
5

against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along with
Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment
of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale  dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial
6

Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002. 7

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surv1vmg spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson
(Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of
their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-
Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship. 8
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan,
Metro Manila, covered by the following Transfer Certificate of Title/s (TCT/s):

1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),

2. TCTNo. 60069/T-301(nowTCTNo. 11106-R),

3. TCTNo. 5109/T-26 (nowTCTNo. 11107),

4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),

5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and

6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R). 9

According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-
listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent,
Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new
certificates of title over the said properties.  When Severina died on September 21, 2002,  Maria
10 11

Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on

October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637 and 8003. 12

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal
properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. 13

In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,  which the trial court considered as the Answer
14

of her husband, Gerard,  Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her
15

mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship which
they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement  executed in 16

November 1980. This was implemented through another Partition Agreement  executed in April 17

1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned to him by virtue of the said
agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by
Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was
described therein as single without reference to any husband. 18

Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their Answer,  stating 19

that Maria Luisa is also not aware that Luis and Severina were married. She is cognizant of the fact
that Luis and Severina lived together as common-law husband and wife - a relationship which was
terminated upon execution of a Partition Agreement. In the Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina
were described as single and they acknowledged that they were living together as common-law
spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition of the properties they owned in common. Hence,
Luis already received his share in the properties  and is estopped from denying the same.  After the
20 21

termination of their cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA), married one
Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa was left under the guardianship and
custody of Severina.  It was after the death of Severina that Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-
22

Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002. The
Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage  (between Luis and 23

Severina) from the Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office. 24

Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary evidence which
included a certified true copy of his marriage contract with Severina,  the Spouses Salgado and
25

Spouses Maya filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.  The Spouses Salgado disputed the
26

validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license as borne out by the
marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed on cross-examination that he did
not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged marriage.  Luis had also admitted the existence,
27

due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement.  The logical conclusion therefore is that
28

the properties disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by Severina as her own, separate and
exclusive properties, which she had all the right to dispose of, without the conformity of Luis. 29

On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the sufficiency of
evidence presented by Luis is evidentiary in nature and may only be controverted by evidence to the
contrary.  The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their separate motions for
30

reconsideration,  which the trial court denied.  Consequently, both the Spouses Salgado and
31 32

Spouses ·Maya filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the CA.  Meanwhile, the Spouses
33

Salgado were deemed to have waived their presentation of evidence when they failed to attend the
scheduled hearings before the trial court.
34
Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence filed by the Spouses Salgado, the
CA Second Division directed the trial court "to properly resolve with deliberate dispatch the demurrer
to evidence in accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by stating
clearly and distinctly the reason therefor on the basis of [the Spouses Salgado's] proffered
evidence[,]"  whereas the CA Ninth Division dismissed the petition of the Spouses Maya and
35

ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate dispatch.36

In an Order  dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA to resolve the
37

demurrer to evidence in more specific terms, denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack of merit
and held that the totality of evidence presented by Luis has sufficiently established his right to obtain
the reliefs prayed for in his complaint.

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision  in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage between
38

Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the
presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive as to the fact of marriage.  The trial court
39

also based its ruling in Geronimo v. CA where the validity of marriage was upheld despite the
40

absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract.  The trial court thus declared that
41

the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be
disposed of by Severina without the consent of her husband, Luis. 42

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Luis] and against [the
Spouses Salgado] ordering as follows:

1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of

the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of Sale, all dated January 23, 2002 executed by [Severina] in favor of
[Jo-Ann];

2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of

the three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R covering the subject properties, all issued
in the name of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila;

3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R (formerly
TCT Nos. 5109, 20618 and 60069, respectively) to the conjugal community of properties between
[Luis] and [Severina].

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 43

On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision  which ordered the "ANNULMENT,
44

VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis executed by [Maria Luisa] dated
October 25, 2002 x x x."  The RTC also ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued by virtue of the
45

said Deeds. 46

The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective motions for reconsideration on
September 11, 2007  and August 28, 2007,  respectively, which the RTC denied in the Omnibus
47 48

Order  dated October 30, 2007 for lack of merit. This prompted the Spouses Salgado and Spouses
49

Maya to file their separate notices of appeal before the CA on December 13, 2007  and April 24,
50

2009,  respectively.
51

Ruling of the CA

The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise Agreement  which was approved
52

by the CA in its Decision  dated October 26, 2011. This resulted in the termination of the Spouses
53

Maya's appeal. 54

On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision,  dismissing the appeal of the Spouses Salgado.
55

The fallo reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is DISMISSED. The Decision dated

July 23, 2007 of the [RTC] of Pasig is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED. 56
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not
present and formally offer any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence
presented by Luis.  The CA further explained that "the best evidence to establish the absence of a
57

marriage license is a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the parties to the Marriage
Contract did not secure a marriage license or at the very least a certification from the said office that
despite diligent search, no record of application for or a marriage license was issued on or before
December 28, 1966 in favor of Luis and Severina. Again, Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same
by their failure to secure the said certification and present evidence during the trial." 58

The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for reconsideration  which the CA denied
59

through its Resolution  dated November 26, 2012.

60

The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising the core issue of whether the CA
committed reversible error in affirming the RTC decision which declared the marriage between Luis
and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.

Ruling of the Court

The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for want
of marriage license based on the Marriage Contract  presented by Luis which has adequately
61

established its absence. 62

Luis, in his Comment,  opposes the filing of the present petition on the ground that it raises a
63

question of fact, which cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. He also countered that
the Spouses Salgado did not present any evidence to support their theory.  If the existence of the
64

marriage license is in issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses Salgado to show the lack of marriage
license by clear and convincing evidence. 65

Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition, the Court shall first tackle the
procedural issue raised by Luis which pertains to the propriety of the filing of this petition for review
on certiorari.

Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law, mainly, whether the
absence of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a marriage contract which states that
no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on account of the marriage being of an
exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is,
as a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions  recognized by the Court,
66

such as when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 67

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its
celebration  on December 28, 1966.
68

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53  of the Civil Code, and the
69

absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character,  renders the marriage void ab
70

initio pursuant to Article 80(3 ). It sets forth:

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)

"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages."  To reiterate, in any of the aforementioned marriages of
71

exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed with.

The marriage is not of an

exceptional character
A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage
license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited
to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the
reason therefor. The pertinent portion of the marriage contract is quoted as follows:

[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x x, 19 x x x in favor of, said
parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage license was exhibited to me, this marriage being of an
exceptional character performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x. 72

The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a
public document, the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also
a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. This is pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the
1997 Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract are prima facie proof that
at the time of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the
reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity
with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary
to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be
considered as a purely religious ceremony.

The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a
marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the
subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are
exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent
religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the
parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law
(civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each
other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage
appearing on the records. This was also consistently affirmed by Luis in open court:

Atty. Francisco:

Q- You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A certifying that you were
married to the late [Severina].

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Do you recall when this marriage took place?

A- As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my daughter get (sic) one (1) year
old. That was 1966 December something like 28, because she was born December 30, the death
of Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So, before she turned one (1) year old two (2) days before
we got married here in San Juan.

Q- So, when was she born if you can recall?

A- Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.

Q- If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?

A- It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan. 73

xxxx
[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination that you were married to
[Severina]?

A: Yes sir.

Q: When do you say you marr[ied] her?

A: Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is December 28,
1966. (Emphasis ours)
74

Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the
parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but
a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the
Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the provision, which are: prior civil marriage
between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied with. There is no prior
ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is
required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.

Absence of marriage license

The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of
the marriage license?

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage license
was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code,
when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in their case, it is the burden of Luis to prove that
they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of their
marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption does not
hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which on its face has established
that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license
issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage contract was not explained at all. Neither
the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No other witness also testified to
prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify regarding its issuance. He
admitted that he did not apply for one, and is uncertain about the documents they purportedly
submitted in the Municipal Hall. As he revealed in his testimony:

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place between you and [Severina]?

A TTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor?

ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a wedding that took place, Your
Honor.

COURT: Answer.

What preparations were done?

A- There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the Mayor during that time and
the Mayor is a close friend of ours.  So, when he knew that we are traveling, we are going to
1âwphi1

Thailand with the invitation of a friend to work with him in Thailand, he told us you better get
married first before you travel because your daughter will be illegitimate. 75

xxxx

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?

A- We did not.

Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?

A- No.
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS

[Q-] There was no marriage license?

A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license.

COURT:

Not necessarily.

A- But, I don't know whether there was an application for the license because it was at the house of
the Mayor.

COURT:

But in this particular case before you went to the house of the Mayor for the solemnization of
your marriage, did you apply for a marriage license?

A- No.  76

x x xx

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF

[LUIS]:

Q- Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were asked by counsel as well
as a question was raised by the Honorable Court whether or not you applied for a marriage
license when you got married on December 28, 1966 allegedly with [Severina]. Can you tell
the Court what you meant by that?

COURT:

By what?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Whether he applied?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization of the marriage, you answered
No.

WITNESS:

I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit or application before we
went to the house of the Mayor to get marry (sic) but that was about - - I cannot recall if that
past (sic) a week or 2 days or 3 days ago.

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you used we, whom are you referring
to?

A- [Severina].

Q- And, yourself?

A- Yes.

Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the
solemnization of the marriage?
A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office of the
[M]ayor or Office of the Chief of Police.  I cannot recall. It is inside the Munisipyo of San
1awp++i1

Juan.

Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?

A- The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our marriage. They let us signed
(sic) an application or affidavit. I cannot recall what it is.  (Emphasis ours)
77

In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to consider the glaring
statements in the marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer
and that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, the latter
statement being fallacious. Both the RTC and CA upheld the fact of marriage based on the marriage
contract but simply glossed over the part stating that the marriage is of an exceptional character. It is
inevitable to deduce that this is not a case of mere non-recording of the marriage license number on
the marriage contract, as was in Geronimo. 78

The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the case under review, hence,
inapplicable. In Geronimo, despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage
contract presented by therein petitioner (brother of the deceased), there was no statement therein
that the marriage is of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also testified that the deceased
and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband of the deceased was able to
produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section
where the marriage license number appears.

"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties."  Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the
79

marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional
character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other
than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license
and is thus, void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, the Court similarly declared that a marriage solemnized
80

without a marriage license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu of a
marriage license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation. In
declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the notion that all the formal and essential requisites
of marriage were complied with. The Court held that to permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. It was further explained:

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties'
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither
did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license.

xxxx

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in
the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is
as if there was no affidavit at all.
81

The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract because these
refer to the absence of a formal requisite of marriage. "The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a
pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing
a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception."  "The
82

requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic 'autonomous social institution."'
83

Partition Agreement is Valid

Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation, Luis and Severina
executed a notarized Partition Agreement  in November 1980, which divided their properties
84

between them without court intervention. Luis sought to annul such agreement on the ground that
"the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the
parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon
judicial approval, without which it is void."
85

The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, the Court held that "[i]n a void marriage, regardless of
86

the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article
147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code x x x."  It provides:
87

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their .ioint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.  (Emphasis ours)
88

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of
their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid
marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,  in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the
89

pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage
license."  "Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
90

their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property

acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."' 91

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the
properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that
"partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may
be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval
for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis
and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement.  It 92

also remains uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in the Partition
Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have the said agreement declared null and void or
annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least,
voidable.

All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of marriage license or
certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the license,  such certification is not the only proof that could
93

validate the absence of a marriage license.

In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract that no marriage
license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment therein that the
marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, are circumstances which
cannot be disregarded. Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis' failure to assert his marriage to
Severina during the latter's lifetime is suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981, and until Severina' s
death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled with her.  All those years, he never presented
94

himself to be the husband of Severina. Not even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage.
During trial, he never presented any other witness to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to
Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly contracted a subsequent marriage abroad.
Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence he himself had
presented.

"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead
or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which
was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well." 95

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution
dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

888888888

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 201061               July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, 
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March
2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that
on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981,
Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together
as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of
their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;

(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered
in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice
and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents
against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice
and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the
partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his
petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court
denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any
evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The
trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July
2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November
2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence,
prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave
weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for
the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to
Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court
ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice
and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for
spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support
for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named
in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was
not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by
Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to
Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own
money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their
purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos.
61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units
were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under
TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal
state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was
married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in
the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while
Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982
at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further
declared NONEXISTENT.

Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT
Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949,
188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627,
194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638,
194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan
and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry
of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from
these thirty-seven (37) titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties
acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties
of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these
five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from
these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No.
61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the
petitioner.

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-
ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared
FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the
petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and
distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No.
02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10.

Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties’ children.

No other relief granted.

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General
and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.

SO ORDERED.6

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order
dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision
before the Court of Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted
that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of
evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would
be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her
evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed
despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on
his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or
dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article
148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution
in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in
the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally.
However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage
with Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof
of bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the
case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification
declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be
solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by
them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to
the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall
accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-
existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification
the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her
right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and
Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution.

It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but
is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was
scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4
and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at
Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally
that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the
date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the
trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s
prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had
been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at her
instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she
still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed
to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued
failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of
interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she
was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial
of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary
restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect
marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial
proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin
because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally
further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her
marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in
acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that
Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their
father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally
claims that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally
further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with
Azucena.

First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial
court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally
entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II
of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series
issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance,
the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and
Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license.12

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record
was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J.
Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and
Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected
social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as
Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a
proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the
informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and
Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March
1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without
a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar
of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also
non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of
Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.  The trial court
1âwphi1

stated:

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be
null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of
their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was
contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because
there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally
married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner
has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be
invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license.
The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired
by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the
trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more
in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered
in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property
covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title
"married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in
the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do
not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can
be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from
hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her
evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his
decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence
to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be
inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge
Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to
present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against
Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his
voluntary inhibition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

88888888888888

The Supreme Court (SC) has pronounced that there is no need for a missing soldier to be declared
presumptively dead before his spouse could collect benefits from the Philippine Veterans’ Affairs Office
(PVAO) or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

This was despite denying the petition of Estrellita Tadeo-Matias, who admittedly just wanted to claim
benefits, to have her husband Wilfredo Matias declared presumptively dead for having gone missing since
1979.

In a recent 21-page decision, the SC 3rd Division sustained the Court of Appeals’ March 20, 2017 ruling
that denied Tadeo-Matias’ petition. It affirmed the Tarlac City Regional Trial Court (RTC) gravely abused
its discretion when it granted the petition in a January 15, 2012 decision.

This was because the petition, whose sole objective was to declare Matias dead under the Civil Code, was
“not a viable suit in our jurisdiction,” as established by long-standing jurisprudence.

But, the SC said it had to address the “misconception” that Tadeo-Matias needed a court declaration to
secure her husband’s death benefits. It said Tadeo-Matias had been “misguided” and forced to prosecute
“an otherwise simple claim for death benefits either before the PVAO or the AFP.”

It said the PVAO and the AFP “can make their own determination, on the basis of evidence presented by
the claimant,” on whether the spouse could secure the serviceman’s death benefits under Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code without having to go to court.

“The Court is hopeful that by the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would
no longer be replicated in the future,” read the decision penned by Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco
Jr.