LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE:

EMOTION IN FEMINIST

EPISTEMOLOGY

Alison M. Jaggar

Within th~ western philosophical tradition, ('motions lIsually have be~n con­
sider~d as potLCnti:ll1y or actually subver~ive of knowledge.' From Plato until
the present, with a few Ilotable exceptions, rca son rather than ~m()ti()n has
b~en regarded as the indispl'l1sable faculty for acquiring knowledge.'
~llthough again not lIwariably, the rational has been contrasted
and this ,:olltrasted p:lIr then has often heen linked with
other dichotol1lies. Nor only has reason been contrasted with
has also heen associated with the mental, the culnlral, the
;md the male, whereas emotion has heen associated with the irrational,
the phYSical, the natural, the particular, the private, and, of course, the
I of place to reason
I rather than emotion., it has not ahvays exdudnl emotion cOlTlpletely from the
J reallll of reason. In the /'hLlCdrus, Plato portrayed emotions, such as anger or
I curiosity, as irrational urges (horses) that must always he controlled by rea­
son (the charioteer). On this model, the ellJotlons were not seCll as needing to
I be totill1y surpre~scd hut r:uher as needing direction by reason: for example,
I 111 a genuinely thrcatclllllg situation, It was thought not only Irrational but

I not to be afraid.· The !>plit between reason and ClUotion was not
I ahsolute, therefore, for the (;rel'ks. Instead, the emotions were thought of as
providmg indispensable motive power that needed to be channeled
I . Withol1l horses, after all, the skill of the charioteer wOllld be worthless.

The contrast between reason and emotion was sharpened in the sevCll­

I teenth century by redefining reaSOll as a purely instrumental faculty. For hoth

the Creeks and the medieval philosopher!>, reason had been linked with value
I ohJective st rtKture or order of

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 Al.JSON M. JAGGAR LOVE ANI) KNOWLEDGF

seen as simultaneously namral and morally justified. With the rise of modern My account is exploratory in nahlre and leaves many questions
science, however, the realms of namre and value were separated: n<lture was It is not supported by irrefutable arguments or conclusive proofs; instead,
stripped of value and reconceptualized as an inanimate mechanism of no in­ it should be viewed as a preliminary sketch for an epistemological model
trinsic worth. Values were relocated in human beings, rooted in their prefer­ that will require much further development before its workability can be
ences and emotional responses. The separation of supposedly namral established.
from human v<~llle meant that reason, if it were to provide trustvvorthy in­
sight into reality, had to be uncontaminated by or abstracted from value. In­
creasingly, therefore, though never universally,; reason was reconceptualized
as the ability to make valid inferences from premises established elsewhere, EMOTION
the ability to calculate means bur not to determine ends. 111e validity of log­
ical inferences was thought independent of human attitudes and prefer­ 1. What Are Emotions?
ences; this was now the sense in which reason was taken to be objective and
universal. ' 1be philosophical question: What are emotions? requires both exolicating the
modern redefinition of rationality required a corresponding recono.c'P­ ways in which people ordinarily speak about emotion and
hIalization of emotion. This was achieved by portraying emotions as nonra­ quacy of those ways for expressing and
tional and often irrational urges that regularly swept the body, rather as a Several problems confront someone trying to answer this deceptively
storm sweeps over the land. The common way of referring to the emotions as question. One set of difficulties results from the variety,
the "passions" emphasized that emotions happened to or were imposed upon inconsistency of the ways 1n which emotions arc viewed, in
an individual, something she suffered rather than something she did. scientific contexts. It is, in part, this variety that makes emotions into ,a
epistemolob'Y associated with this new ontology rehabilitated sensory "question" at the same time that it precludes answering that question
perception that, like emotion, typically had been suspected or even discounted simple appeal to ordinary usage. A second set of difficulties is the wide range
the western tradition as a reliable source of knowledge. British empiricism, of phenomena covered by the term "emotion": these extend from apparently
succeeded in the nineteenth century by positivism, took its epistemological instantaneous "knee-jerk" responses of fright to lifelong dedication to an
task to be the formulation of rules of inference that would b'11arantee the deri­ individual or a cause; from highly civilized aesthetic responses to undifferen­
vation of certain knowledge from the "raw data" supposedly given direc.:tly to feelings of hunger and thirst," from background moods such as con­
the senses. Empirical testability became accepted as the hallmark of natural tentment or depression to intense <1m1 focused involvement in an immediate
science; this, in turn, was viewed as the paradi!!,m of genuine situation. It may well be impossible to construct a manageable account of
Epistemolof,'Y was often equated with the philosophy of science, and the emotion to cover such apparently diverse phenomena.
dominant methodology of positivism prescribed that truly scientific knowl­ A further problepl concerns the criteria for preferring one account of emo­
must be capable of intersubje<.tive verification. Because values ;1I1d emo­ tion to another. -Ille more one learns about the ways in which other cultures
tions had been defined as variable and idiosyncratic, positivism stipulated that concephlalize human faculties, the less plausible it becomes that emotions
trustworthy knowledge could be established only by methods that neutralized constitute what philosophers call a "natural kind." Not only do some cul­
values and emotions of individual scientists. tures identify emotions unrecognized in the West, but there is reason to
believe that the concept of emotion itself is a historical invention, like the con­
Recent approaches to epistemology have challenged some fundamental as­
sumptions of the positivist epistemological model. Contemporary theorists of I
cept of intelligence (Lewontin 1982) or even the concept of mind (Rorry
knowledge have undermined once rigid distinLtions betweell analytic
theories and observations, and even between
I
1 For instance, anthropologist Catherine Lutz argues that the "dichot­
omous categories of 'cognition' and 'affect' are themselves Euroamerican
facts and values. However, few challenges have thus far been raised to the I
cultural constructions, master symbols that participate in the fundamental or­
ltT>nrrp,i gap between emotion and knowledge. In this essay, I wish to be­ I
ganization of our ways of looking at ourselves and others (Lutz 1985, 1
uaUlt.lllg this gap through the suggestion that emotions may be helpful both in and outside of social science" (Lutz 1987:308). If this is true, then we
necessary rather than inimical to the constm<.tion of
\i
even more reason to wonder about the adeau:KY of ordinary western

I
147
14 6 I

1.

 LOVl_ ANll KNOWLFDC

ways of t,)lking ,1bout emotion. 'Yet \\'e have 110 access either to our emo­ observ;niolls. The positivist approach to llnderstJlldll1g ell1otion has been
tions or to those of others, independellt of or ulIl1lediated hv the discourse of called the Dumb View (Spelman 19R2).
our culture. '111e Dumb View of emotion is quite lmten;lhle. For one the same
In the bce of these diffimlt ies, I shall sketch all ,KCOUllt of emotion with or phvsiological response is likely to be ,1S V,lflOllS CIllO­
the following limitations. First, it will operate within til(' context of western on the context of its experience. This is otten ilillstra­
diSCUSSIons of emotion: I shall not question, for instance, whether it would be rderCllce to the famolls Schxhter and Singer
possible or desirable to dispense entirdy WIth anything resembling our con­ were indu(ed in research subjects by thc
cept of emotion. Second, although this accoLlnt ,mel11pts to be consistent with the subjects then <1ttribllted to thclllselves appropriate emotions l1epclll1l1lg on
,1$ much ,)$ possible of western understandings of elllotion, it is mtended to their context (Schachter and Singer 1969). Another problem with the Dumh
cover only a limited domain, not every phenomenon that may he called an View is that identifying emotions with tcelings would Iluke It impossible to
emotion. On the contra ry, it exdudes as genuine emotions both automatic that a person Intght not Ix' aware ot her cmotional state beGlllSe
responses and nonintentional sensations, such as hunger pangs. definition are a lTIatter of conscious awareness. Fin,llk, emotions
I do not pretend to offcr ,1 complete theory of emotion; instead, I fo­ differ from feelings, sensations, or nhvsiolof!ical respollses in that they are dls­
cus on a lew specific aspects of el1lotion that I take to have been ne).',lected or we l11;lY ;lssert truthfully th,lt we
misrepresented, especially in positivist and lleopositivist ,lecounts. cl'rt;lin eycnts, even if at that mo­
would defcnd my approach not only on the ground that it illuminates aspects nor tearful.
of our experil'llce and al."!:ivity th,lt are obs(ured by positivist and nl'Opositiv­ In recent vears, contemporary philosophers 11<I\T tended to
1st cOl1struals but also on the ground that it is less open th,lIl these to ideolog­ Dumh Vicw of emotion and h,1\'e substituted more intentional or
ical abuse. In particular, I believe that recognizillg (errain negiencd aspects of understandings. '111ese newer conceptions elTIphasize th;lt intentional judg­
emotion makcs possible a better and h.:ss idl'Ologically biased account of how ments ;15 well as phvsiological disturb;mces are llltegrJI deillents in emotion.
is, and so oll).',ht to be, constructed. They define or identify Cl1lotiOll~ not by tbe L]lt:1litv or character ot the
iologic11 sen~atjoll that may he associated with thcm but r;lther by their
intl'lltional aspect, the associated judgment. '111lls, it is the contcnt of my as­
2. Enzotions as InteJ1tiunal sociated thought or judgmcnt that determines
and restlessness are defined as ",lllxletv ;lbout
Early positivist ;lpproa(hes to understanding emotion asslll1led that all ade­ of tonight's performance."

quate ac(ount required analytically separating emotion fmm other human Cognitivist accounts of emotion have been criticized as

faculties. Just as positivist accounts of sense perception ;mempted to distin­ to allq!;edlv spontalleous, automatic, or global

the supposedly r,lW dar,) of sensatioll from their (ognitive interpreta­ general feclings of nct:V0llsness, colltelltl'llness, angst, ecstJsy, or terror. Cer­

tions, so positivist ac,,~ounts of emotioll tried to separate emotion (onceptually tainly, these accollnts entail th,lt infants and animals experiellce emotiolls,

from both rcason and sense perception. As part of their sharpening of these at all, in only a primitive, rudiml'nury form. Far frolll b,'ing llll,Kceptable,

distin(tions, positivist wnstruals of emotion tended to identifv emotions however, this entailment is desirable because it suggests th,n humans develop

the physical feelings or involuntarv bodily movelllents that tvpically accom­ and l1Uturc ill elllotiollS as well ,15 ill othn dlllleJ1siollS; they increase the

pany them, such as pangs or qualms, Hushes or trcmors; elllotions were also range, variety, and subtlety of their emotiollal respollses in accortLlllcl'

assimil<lled to the subduing of physiological function or movcment, as in the life experiences and their rdlcctiol1s on these.
case of sadness, depression, or boredom. The cOlltilluing inHul'llcl' of accounts of elllotion arc not without their O\vn problems. A sc­
scientifi,,~ conceptions of emotion can be sem in the tal"!: that" feel­ \vith many is that they end up replicating within the structure
ing" is often used colloquially as a synonym for emOtion, even though the of elllotion the vcry problem they arc trying to solve-namely, that of all
more cmtral meaning of "feeling" is physiological sensation. On such ac­ artificial split between elllotion and thought- beclllsc most cognitivist ac­
counts, emotions were not seen as bl'ing af}()ut anything: instead, they were COunts explain emotioll as having two "components": all affective or fecl­
(ontrasted with ;md sel'n ;)5 pote11lial disruptions of othl'r phenomena that lllg compollent and ,1 (ognitioll that supposedly interprets or
<Ire about some thing, phenolllena, such ;15 rational judglllents, tiJollL'hts. and feelings. 'I11ese accounts, therefore, unwittinglv perpetu;lte the

14R 149
 ALISON M. JAG(;AR L 0 V E ;\ N lJ K N () W L U) (; F

distinction hetween the shared, public, ohjecti\'(: world of verifiable calcula_ as expressions of gnd, respect, contempt, or ~lllger. On an even
tions, observations, and facts and the individual, private, suhjective world of cultures construct divergent understandings of what emotions
feelings and sensations. TIlis sharp dist inl"tion breaks any COn­ are. ror instance, English metaphors and metollymies arc said to reve'll a
ceptual links between our feelings and the "external" world: of anger as a hot tluid, contained in a priv~ltc space within an
still conceived as blind or raw or undifferentiated, thl'll we Glll and liable to dangerous public explosion (Lakoff ~lIld Kovecses
of the notio11 of feelings fitting or failing to tit our perceptml 1987). By colltrast, the Ilongot, a people of the Philippines, apparently do not
is, being appropriate or inappropriate. \Xihen intentiomlity is viewed as understand the self in terms of a puhlic/privatc distinction ,1lld consequently
\cctual cognition and moved to the center of om picture ot do not experience anger as an explOSIve internal force: for them, rather, it is
fective elements Jre push"d to the periphery and become phenomenon for wlllch ~m individual may, for instance, bc
whose n:levance to (motion is obscure or even
quate cognitive account of emotion must overcome this Further aspects of the social construction of emotioll are revealed through
Most cognitivist accounts of elllotion thus remain problematic IIlsorar as refle<.-tioll on emotion's intentl()n~ll structure. If emotions necess'lrily involve
they fail to explain the relation between the cognitive and the affective aspects thell obviously the\' require concepls, which may be seen as so­
of emotion. Moreover, insofar as they prioritize the intellectual over the feel­ cially constructed ways of organizin!', and making sense of the world. for this
ing aspects, they reinforce the traditional western prcterence for mind Over reason, emotions arc slIl1Ult;l11eously made posslhle and limited by the con­
body.' Nevertheless, they do identify a vital feature of emotion overlooked cepulal and linguistic resources of a societv. This philosophical claim is horne
the Dumb View, namely, its intcntionality. oul by empincal ohservation of the cultural variability of ,'motion. Although
there is considerable overlap III the emotions identilied h:; man~' cultures
(Wierzbicka 1986), at least some emotions arc historically or
3. Emotions as Social Constructs speCific, including perhaps l!l11lUi, ,mgst, the Jap;lIll:se am,}i (in which one
to another, affiliative love) and the response of "being a wild pig,'·
We tend to cxperience ollr emotions as IIlVOllllltary mdlvldu.11 responses to which occurs among the Gururumha, a horticultural people livin!', in the
responses that arc often (though, sigl1lticantly, not always) private New Guinea Highlands (Averell 1'JXO: \58). Even apparently universal emo­
in the sense that they are 110t perceived as directlv and imlllnliately by other tions, such as anger or love m~ly vary cro~scu1turally. We have just seen that
people as they arc by the subject of the experience. The apparently individual the Iiongot experience of anger apparentlv is quite different from the modern
and involuntary chara ..ter of our emotional experience is oftell taken as evi­ western experience. Romantic love was invelltcd III the Middle Ages in Eu­
dence that emotions arc presocial, instinctive responses, determined by our rope and since th;lt time has been Illodified considerablv; for instance, it is no
biological constiultion. This inferellce, however, is quite mistaken. Although longer confined to the nobility, and it no longer needs to be extramarital or
it IS prohably true that the physiological disUlrballo.'s characterizing emo­ unconsummated. In some culUlres, romantic love docs not exist at all."
tions-facial grimaces, changes in the metabolic ratc, sweating, trembling, Thus, there are complex linguistiC and other social preconditions for the
tears, and so on-arc continuous with the instinctive responses of our pre­ experience, th;lt is, for the existence of human elllotions. 'n1e emotions that
human ancestors and also that the ontogeny of emotions to some extent re­ we cxperience rdb.1: prev.liling forms of soci;]! lik. For instance, one could
capitulates their phylogeny, maUm: human emotions can he seen as neither not feel or even be betrayed in the ;lhsence of social norms about fidelity: it is
instinctive nor hiologically determmed. Instead, they are socially constru<.-1:ed inconceivable that bctr;lVal or indeed anv distinctively hunun emotion could
on several levels. be experienced by a soli~ary individual il~ sOllle hvpo~heticll presocial state of
Emotions are most obviously socially constructed in that children arc naturc. There is a sense in which any individual's guilt or anger, joy or tri­
taught deliberately what their culture defines as appropriate responses to cer­ umph, presupposes the existence of a social group capable of ieding
tain siUlations: to fear strangers, to enJoy spi<.-y food, or to like swimming in anger, joy, or triumph. This is not to say that group emotions historically pre­
cold water. On a less conscious level, childrcn also kam what thcir culture cede or are logical1y prior to the emotions of individuals; it is to say that
detlnes as the appropriate ways to express the emotions that it recogmzes. AI­ individual experience is simultaneously social experience. '" In later sections, I
there may be crosscultural Similarities in the expression of some ap­ shall explore the epistemological and political implications of this social
universal emotions, there arc also wide divergences in vvhat are rather than individual understanding of emotion.

50 I 5I
 ALISON M. JAG GAR LOVE AND KNOWU',J)GE

even constnKi: the world. 'I11ey have both mental and physical aspects, each
4. Ernotions as Active Engagernents of which conditions the other. In some res peLts, they are chosen, but ill oth­
ers they are involuntary; they presuppose language and a social order. lllUs,
We often interpret our emotions as experiences that overwhelm us rather they can he attributed only to what are sometimes called "whole persons,"
than as responses we consciously choose: that emotions arc to some extent engaged in the on-going activitY of social life.
is part of the ordinary meaning of the term "emotion.·' Even in
that emotions are not
s. Emotion, Ellaluation, and Observation

responses to various situations to Emotions and values are closely related. The rebtion is so close, that
us to think differentlv about situations. For accounts of what it is to hold or express certain values re­
our response to an phenomena to nothing more than holding or certain
either diven our attention from its more attitudes. When the relevant conception of emotion is the Dumb
sary for some larger good. emotivism certainly is too crude an account of what it is to
Some psychological theories interpret emotions as chosen on an even on this account, the intentionality of value
deeper level-as actions for which the agent disclaims responsibility. For in­ become nothing more than sophisticated grunts and
stance, the psychologist Averell likens the experience of emotion to playing a groans. Nevertheless, the grain of important truth in emotivism is its r,,,-nn,,,_
culturally recognized role: we ordinarily perform so smoothly and automatic­ tion that values presuppose emotions to the extent that emotions provide the
ally that we do not realize we arc giving a performance. He provides many experiential basis for values. If we had no emotional responses to
examples demonstrating that even extreme and apparently totally involving it is inconceivable that we should ever come to value one state of affairs more
displays of emotion in fact are fulK-rional for the individual and/or the soci­ highly than another.
ety. II For example, students requested to record their experiences of anger or Just as values presuppose emotions, so emotions presuppose values. 'I11e
annoyance over a two-week period came to realize that their anger was not object of an emotion-that is, the object of fear, grief, pride, and so on-is a
as uncontrollable and irrational as they had assumed previously, and they complex state of affairs that is appraised or evaluated by the individual. For
noted the usefulness and effectiveness of anger in achieving various social instance, my pride in a friend's achievement necessarily incorporates the value
goods. Averell, notes, however, that emotions are often usehll in attaining judgment that my friend has done something worthy of admiration.
their goals only if they are interpreted as passions rather than as aCi:ions, and Emotions and evaluations, then, are logically or conceptually connected.
he cites the case of one subject led to rdlect on her anger who later wrote Indeed, many evaluative terms derive directly from words for emotions: "de­
that it was less usehll as a defence mechanism when she became conscious of sirable," "admirable," "contemptible," "despicable," " and so
its on. Cettainly it is true (pace J. S. Mill) that the evaluation a situation as
The action/passion dichotomy is too simple for understanding emotion, as desirable or dangerous does not entail that it is universally desired or feared
it is for other aspects of our lives. Perhaps it is more helpful to think of emo­ but it does entail that desire or fear is viewed
tions as habitual responses that we may have more or less sponse to the situation. If someone is
We claim or disclaim resDonsihilitv for responses on our ceived as dangerous, her lack of fear
context. We could never "",>p'·'f'r,,-,> if someone is afraid without evident
aCIIons, for then they would appear can be identified, her tear IS denounced as IrratIonal or
but neither should emotions be seen as every emotion presupposes an evaluation of some aspect
which every evaluation or almraisal of the sit­
will
a predK1:able emotional response to
are seen as necessanly passIve or of the Dumb View of intentional
sponses to the world. Rather, arc ways in which we engage 111 emotion a realization that

IS 2 1.)3
 ALISON M. JAGGAR LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE

influences and indeed partially constitutes emotion. We have seen already recognize that emotion, like sensory perception, is necessary to human sur­
that distinctively human emotions are not simple instinnive responses to situ­ vival. Emotions prompt us to act appropriately, to approach some people
ations or events; instead, they depend essentially on the ways that we perceive and situations and to avoid others, to caress or cuddle, fight or flee. Without
those situations and events, as well on the ways that we have learned or de­ emotion, human life would be unthinkable. Moreover, emotions have an in­
cided to respond to them. Without charaneristically human perceptions of trinsic as well as an instrumental value. Although not all emotions are enjoy­
and engagements in the world, there would be no charaC1:eristically human able or even justifiable, as we shall see, life without any emotion would be life
emotions. without any meaning.
Just as observation directs, shapes, and partially defines emotion, so too Within the context of western culture, however, people have often been en­
emotion directs, shapes, and even partially defines observation. Observation couraged to control or even suppress their emotions. Consequently, it is not
is not simply a passive process of absorbing impressions or recording stimuli; unusual for people to be unaware of their emotional state or to deny it to
instead, it is an aC1:ivity of selec1:ion and interpretation. What is selected and themselves and others. This lack of awareness, especially combined with a
how it is interpreted are influenced by emotional attitudes. On the level of in­ neopositivist understanding of emotion that construes it just as a feeling of
dividual observation, this influence has always been apparent to common which one is aware, lends plausibility to the myth of dispassionate investiga­
sense, noting that we remark on very different features of the world when we tion. But lack of awareness of emotions certainly does not mean that emo­
are happy or depressed, fearful or confident. This influence of emotion on tions are not present subconsciously or unconsciously or that subterranean
perception is now being explored by social scientists. One example is the so­ emotions do not exert a continuing influence on people's articulated values
called Honi phenomenon, named after a subject called Honi who, under and observations, thoughts and actions. I"
identical experimental conditions, perceived strangers' heads as changing in Within the positivist tradition, the influence of emotion is usually seen only
size but saw her husband's head as remaining the same. 12 as distorting or impeding observation or knowledge. Certainly it is true that
The most obvious significance of this sort of example is illustrating how contempt, disgust, shame, revulsion, or fear may inhibit investigation of cer­
the individual experience of emotion focuses our attention selec1:ively, di­ tain situations or phenomena. Furiously angry or extremely sad people often
recting, shaping, and even partially defining our observations, just as our ob­ seem quite unaware of their surroundings or even their own conditions; they
servations direct, shape, and partially define our emotions. In addition, the may fail to hear or may systematically misinterpret what other people say.
example has been taken further in an argument for the social construction of People in love are notoriously oblivious to many aspects of the situation
what are taken in any situation to be undisputed facts, showing how these around them.
rest on intersubjective agreements that consist partly in shared assumptions In spite of these examples, however, positivist epistemology recognizes that
about "normal" or appropriate emotional responses to situations (McLaugh­ the role of emotion in the construnion of knowledge is not invariably delete­
lin 1985). Thus, these examples suggest that certain emotional attitudes are rious and that emotions may make a valuable contribution to knowledge.
involved on a deep level in all observation, in the intersubjeC1:ively verified But the positivist trapition will allow emotion to play only the role of suggest­
and so supposedly dispassionate observations of science as well as in the ing hypotheses for investigation. Emotions are allowed this because the so­
common perceptions of daily life. In the next section, 1 shall elaborate this called logic of discovery sets no limits on the idiosyncratic methods that in­
claim. vestigators may use for generating hypotheses.
When hypotheses are to be tested, however, positivist epistemology im­
poses the much stricter logic of justification. The core of this logic is replic­
ability, a criterion believed capable of eliminating or canceling out what are
EPISTEMOLOGY conceptualized as emotional as well as evaluative biases on the part of indi­
vidual investigators. The conclusions of western science thus are presumed
6. The Myth of Dispassionate Investigation "objenive," precisely in the sense that they are uncontaminated by the sup­

As we have already seen, western epistemology has tended to view emotion

I posedly "subjective" values and emotions that might bias individual investi­
I gators (Nagel 1968:33-34).
with suspicion and even hostility. I I This derogatory western attitude toward But if, as has been argued, the positivist distinction between discovery and
emotion, like the earlier western contempt for sensory observation, fails to I justification is not viable, then such a distinction is incapable of filtering out
j

I54 155

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 Al,lSON M. IfI.(;Gl\l{ LOVE AND KNO\VLED(;E

values In science. For example, although such a spin, when huilt into struct concepru;ll models that delllollstr,lte the mutually constitutive r,\ther
western scientific method, is generally sllccessful in neutralizing the oppositional relation betv..een reason and emotion. Far from
cratic or unconventional values of individual investigators, it Ius been argued the possibility of reliable knowledge, emotion as well as value must be shown
that it does not, indeed cannot, eliminate generally accepted social as necessary to such knowledge. Despite its classical :1ntel'Cdents and like the
TIlese values are implicit in the identification of the prohlems considered wor­ ideal of disinterested enquiry, the ideal of dispassionate enquiry IS an impossi­
of investigation, in the selelliol1 of the hypotheses considered ble dream but a dream nonetheless or perhaps a myth that has exerted enor­
of testing, ami in the solutions to the problems considered worthy of accep­ mous intluence 011 western eplstel11olob'Y. Like all myths. it is a form of
ranee. The science of past centuries provides sample evidence of the inrluence ideology that fulfils certain social and Dolitical functions.
of prevailing social values, whether seventeenth-century atomistic physics
(Merchant 1980) or, competitive interpretations of natural seleltion (Young
1985). 7. The Ideological Function the Myth
Of course, only hindsight allows us to identify clearly the values that
shaped the science of the past and thus to reveal the formative inrluence on So far, I have spoken very generally of people and their emotions, as though
science of pervasive emotional attitudes, attitudes that typically went unre­ everyone experienced similar emotions and dealt with them in similar ways.
marked at the time beclUse they were shared so generally. For instance, It is It is an axiom of feminist theory, however, that all generalizations about
flOW glaringly evident that contempt for (and perhaps tear of) people of color "people" are Sllspect. '\11(' divisions in our society are so deep, p,micularly the
is implicit in nineteenth-century anthropology's interpretation and even con­ divisions of race, class, and gender, that many feminist theorists would claim
struction of anthropological facts. Because we arc closer to that talk about people in gener,ll is ideologlGllly dJngerolis beclllse such talk
is harder for us to see how certain emotions, such as sexual possessiveness or obscures the fact that no one is simplv a person but instead is constituted fun­
the need to dominate others, currently arc accepted as guiding princioles in race, class, and gender. Race, class, ,1Ild gender slwpc every as­
twentieth-century sociobiology or e\Tn defined as p;lrt of re1son within pell of our lives, and our emotional constitution is nm excluded. Recognizing
cal theory and economics this helps liS to sec more clearly the political functions of the myth of the dis-
Values and emotions enter illto the science of the past and the present, not
on the level of scientific practice but also on the merascientific level, as Feminist theorists have pointed out th;lt the western tradition has not seen
answers to V,}fiOliS questions: Wh,lt is science? How should it he practiced? everyone as eqUJlly cmotional. Instead, rC,lson has been associmed with
and What is the status of scientific investigatioll versus nonscientific Illodes of members of dominant political, SOCIal, amI culturJI groups and emotion with
enquiry? for instance, it is claimed with increasing frequency that the modem members of suhordinate groups. Prominent ,1lllong those subordin;He groups
western conception of '>cience, which identifies knowledge with power and in our society are people of color, except for 5UDl,osedlv "inscrutable orien­
views it as a weapon for dominating nature, reflects the imperialism, racism, tals," and women.',
and miso!!Vnv of the socit,ties th;lt created it. Several feminist theorists have Although the emot ionali!v of women IS ,1 familiar cultural stereotype, its

itself may he viewed as an expression of grounding is quite shaky. WonlCl1 appear more emotional than men because

char;Kteristic of m;lles in certain pe­ with some groups of people of color, are permitted and evell re­

riods, sllch ;15 separation anxiety and paranoia (Flax 1983; Bordo 1997) or quin.·d to express emotion more openly. In contemporary western culture,

an obsession with control and fear of contamination (Scheman 1985; Schott inexpressive women are suspect as not being rcal women,
1988). vvhereas men \',;ho express their emotions freely arc suspellcd of heing hOlllo­
Positivism views values and emotions as alien invaders that must he re­ sexual or in some other way deviant from the masculine [deal. Modern west­
pelled by a stril,er ~lpplicati()n of the scientific method. If the foregoing cbims ern men, in contrast with Shakespc<ue's heroes, for instance, arc required to
are correlt, however, the scientific method and even its positivist construals present a facade of coolness, LlCk of excitement, even boredom, to express
themselves incorporate values and emotions. Moreover, such an incor­ emotion only rarely and then for relatively trivial events, such as sporting oc­
seems a necessary feature of all knowledge and conceptions of casions, where expressed elllotions :lre acknowledged to he dramatized and
knowledge. Therefore, rather than repressing emotion in epistemology it is so arc not taken entirely seriously .. OlliS, women in our society form the
necessary to rethink the relation between knowledge and emotion and con­ main group allowed or even expected to feel emotion. A WOfIl,lll may cry in

15 6 157
 ALI SON M. J AGGAR I
LOVE AN n KN OWLEDGE

the face of
merely sets his jaw.
and a man of may geStiCulate, but a white man
.,I
8. Emotional Hegemony and Ernotional Subl'ersion

White men's control of their emotional may go to the extremes mature human emotions are neither instirK1:ive nor
of repressing their emotions, failing to develop emotionally, or even losing the I
although they may have developed out of presocial,
capacity to experience many emotions. Not uncommonly these men are un­ I
responses. Like everything else that is human, emotions in part are
amstructed; like all social constru~1:S, are historical
able to identify what they are feeling, and even they may be surprised, on oc­
casion, by their own apparent lack of emotional response to a simation, such
I
bearing the marks of the society that constru~1:ed them. Within the very lan­
as death, where emotional reaction is perceived appropriate. In some married I
guage of emotion, in our basic definitions and explanations of what it is to
couples, the wife implicitly is assigned the job of feeling emotion for both of feel pride or embarrassment, resentment or contempt, cultural norms and ex­
them. White, college-educated men increasingly enter therapy in order to pe~1:ations are embedded. Simply describing ourselves as angry, for instance,
learn how to "get in touch with" their emotions, a project other men may presupposes that we view ourselves as having been wronged, victimized by
ridimlc as weakness. In therapeutic situations, men may learn that they are the violation of some social norm. "Ibus, we ahsorh the standards and values
as emotional as women but adept at identifying their own or others' of Ollr society in the very process of learning the language of emotion, and
emotions. In consequence, their emotional development may be relatively those standards and values are built into the foundation of our emotional
this mav lead to moral or insensitivity. Paradoxically, constitution.
awareness of their own emotional responses Within a hierarchical society, the norms and values that predominate tend
more intluenced by emotion rather than less. to serve the interest of the dominant group. Within a capitalist, white su­
lilllOUWl there is no reason to suppose that the thoughts and a~1:ions of and male-dominant the predominant values will tend to
women are any more influenced by emotion than the thoughts and actions of we are all likely to de­
men, the stereotypes of cool men and emotional women continue to flourish an emotional constitution for feminism. Whatever
because they are confirmed by an uncritical daily experience. In these circum­ our color, we are likely to feel has called "visceral
stances, where there is a differential assignment of reason and emorian, it is racism"; whatever our sexual (WIl'nt1tllm to be homophobic;
easy to see the ideological function of the myth of the dispassionate investiga­ whatever our class, we are likely to be at least somewhat ambitious and com­
tor. It fun~1:ions, obviously, to bolster the epistemic authority of the currently petitive; whatever our sex, we are likely to feel contempt for women. "Ine
dominant groups, composed largely of white men, and to discredit the obser­ emotional responses may be so deeply rooted in us that they are relatively im­
vations and claims of the currently subordinate groups including, of course, pervious to intelle~1:ual argument and may recur even when we pay lip service
the observations and claims of many people of color and women. lbe more to changed intelle~1:Ual convictions. 'Y
forcefully and vehemently the latter groups express their observations and By forming our emotional constimtion in particular ways, our society helps
the more emotional they appear and so the more easily they are dis­ to ensure its own perpetuation. 'Ine dominant values are implicit in responses
credited. The allee:ed eoistemic authority of the dominant groups then taken to be preculiural or acultural, our so-called gut responses. Not only do
these conservative responses hamper and disrupt our attempts to live in or
alternative social forms, but also, and insofar as we take them to be
natural reSDonses. they blinker us theoreticallv. For instance. thev limit our

to
more "subjective," biased, and irrational. In our present social context, there­ evitable universal human motivations; in sum, they blind us to the
fore, the ideal of the dispassionate investigator is a c1assist, racist, and espe­ of alternative ways of living.
cially masculinist myth. IK ~111is picture may seem at first to support the positivist claim that the intru­
sion of emotion only disrupts the process of seeking knowledge and distorts
the results of that process. The picmre, however, is not complete; it ignores
the fa~1: that people do not always experience the conventionally acceptable

15 8
I
59

 LOVI AND KNOWLllH;F

emotions. They may feci S;1t1sia<'lion rather than emharr;lSSl1lent when their 9. Outlaw Emotions and Feminist Theory
leaders make fools of themselves. 'I1KY may feel rcsmtlllcnt rather tban grati­
tude for welfare payments and h;lllJ-111e-dowl1s. 'Ihn lllay be attracteJ to 'IlK' 111o"t obvious way in which fcl11ll1ist and other outbw emotions can
forbidden modes of sexual expression. Thev mav feci rcvulsion for socially in dcveloping alternatives to pn:vailing conceptions of reality is lw l1lotivating
sanctioned ways of treating children or animal;,. In other words, the new investigatiolls. '] his is possible because, as we saw earlier, emotiolls lll~ly
ony that our society exercises over people's emotional constitution is not he long-term as well as momentarv; it makes sense to say that someone con­
total. tinlles to be shocked or saddened by a situation, even if shc is at the moment
who experience cOllventlon;1l1y unacccptahle, or what I call "Ol1t­ bu!!,hing heartily. As we havc seen already, theorcrical inwstigation is alw'avs
law," emotions often arc subordinated individuals who pav a di~proportion and observatioJl is alway;, selective. Feminist emotions provide a
high price for maintaining the status quo. 'Il1c social situation of sllch motivation for investig;ltion and so help to determine the sdcction of
people makes them un;1hle to experience the conventionally prescrifx:d emo­ as well :1~ the method hy which they ,1re investl!!,ated. Snsan Criffin
tions: for instancc, people of color are more Iikdy to experience anger than makes the same point when she characterizes feminist theory as toll owing ";1
amusement when a r,Kist joke is recounted, and women subjected to male direction determined bv pain, and trauma, and compassion and outrage"
sexual banter arc less likely to be flattered than uncomfortable or eYen akl1d. (Griffin 1979:3]).
When l1lKonventional emotional responses arc experienced by isolated in­ As well as motivanng critical research, outlaw emotions may also enable us
diViduals, those concerned may be confused, unable to name their experience; to perceive the world differently from its portr.wal ill conventional descrip­
they m;lY even doubt their own sanity. Women may come to believe that tions. They llJay provide the first indiCltions that sOlllethin!!, is wron!!, with
are "emotionally disturbed" and that the elllb~lrrassment or fear aroused the way alleged h<.1S have heen constructed, with accepted understandlll!!s of
in them by male sexual innuendo is prudery or paranoia. When cert~lin emo­ how
tions are shared or validated by others, however, the basis exists for
a subculu1re defined by perceptions, norms, and values that
pose the prevailing perceptions, norms, and values. By rctlcLL on our initiallv pU7lJin!!, irritahilitv, revulsion, :mger, or fear mav we
for such a subculture, outbw emotions may be [)()IIti~:;lI bring to consciousness our "gut-kvd" awareness that we arc in :1 situation of
logically subversive. coercion, cruelty, inJustice, or dan!!,cr. 'nms, conventionally inexplicable emo­
Outlaw cmotions are distll1g11ished by their incoll1p:ltibility with the domi­ tions, particularly, though not
nant perceptions and values, and some, though certainly not all, of these Ollt­ lead us to make subversiw obsl'r.ations that challenge domimnr
law emotions arc potentially or actually femlllist ('motions. Emotions become of the status qllO. Thev l11av help us to rC:llize that \vhat arc taken
feminist when they incorporate feminist perceptions and v;1111cs, lust as emo­ to be bl1s h~lVe becll constructed in ;1 wa\' that obscures the realitv of suhor­
, ,

tions are sexist or racist when they incorporate sexist or racist perceptions dinated people, l'spl'ciallv WOlllen's rl';llitv.
~lIld values. for example, anger bccomes feminist anger whl'll it involves the But why should we trust the emotional responses of WOIl1l'll and other
perception that the persistent importuning endured by one woman lS a single subordinated groups? How em \eVl' determine which olltbw emotiolls are to
instance of a widespread pattern of sexual harassment, and pride becomes he endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? III what sense can we say
feminist pride when it is evoked by realizing that a certain person's ;lChieve­ that SOllle emotional responses are more appropri:1tl' than others- \'\/hat rea­
ment was possible only because that individual overcame speciflcally gen­ son is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the
de red obstacles to Sllccess. perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, arc to be preferred to perceptions
Outlaw emotions stand in a dialectical rebtion to critical social theory: at inform(·d hv mnventioll:ll emotiolls? Here I call indicate only the gmeral di­
least some are necessary to develop a critical perspe<.tlve on the world, but rection of an answer, whosc full elaboration must ~lwait another occasion."
also presuppose at least the beginnings of such a perspective. Feminists I suggest that emotiolls arc appropriate if they are characteristic of a soci­
need to be aware of how we em draw on some of our outlaw emotions in ety in which all hlll1UIl:> (and perhaps sOllle nonhuman life, too) thnve, or if
construlting feminist theory and :1Iso of how the increasing sODhistiGuion of the\" are conducive to establishing such a society. For instance, it is appropn­
feminist theory can contribute to the ate to feel JOY when we are developing or l'xercizing our creative powers, and
rcconstrw.1ion of Ollr emotional constitution. it is appropri;1te to fed ;l11gcr :1I1d perhaps dis!!llst in those situations where

1(,0 1 (, I
 LUVr" AND KNOWLEDCE

hUrTuns are denied their full creativity or fn:edom. Similarly, it is appropriate

to feci fear if those capacities arc threatened in us. 1(J. Some Implicatio11S 0(' Recognizing the t~pistemic Potential
lbis suggestion obviously is extremely vague, vergmg on the Ernotion
How can we apply it in situations where there is disagreement over
is or is not disgusting or exhilarating or unjust? Here I Accepting that e1ppropnate emotions arc indispensable to reliable
for which I have argued elsewhere: the perspective on reality available from does not mean, of course, that uncritical feeimg may be suhstituted for sup­
the standpoint of the oppressed, which in part at least is the standpoint of posedly dispassionate investigation. Nor does it mean that the emotional re­
women, is a perspective that offers a less partial and distorted and therefore sponses of women and other members of the underclass arc to he trllsted
more reliable view (Jaggar 19H3:chap. 1 J). Oppressed people have a kind of without question. Although our el11otions are epistemologically
epistemological privilege insofar as thev have easier access to this sr,lndpoim they are not epistcmologically indisputable. Like all our faculties,
and therefore a better cbanec of asccrtaining tbe possible bcginnings of a misleading, and their data, like all dat~l, arc always suhject to reinterpretation
societv in wbich all could thnvc. For this reason, I would claim that the emo· and revision. Because emotions are not prcsocial, physiological responses to
tiona( responses of oppressed peopk' in general, and often of women in par· unequivocal situations, they are open to challenge 011 variolls grounds. 'llll'y
ticular, are more likely to be appropriate th~ln the emotional responses of the may be dishonest or sdf-deceptive, they may incorporate m;1ccurate or
dominant class. 111~lt is, they are more likely to incorporate reliabk perCl'ptions, or they may he constituted by oppressive values.
of situations. indispensability of appropriate emotions to knowledge 111eans no more
Even in contemporary science, where the ideology of (lJspassl()n~1te enquiry no less) th~1I1 that dlscord;1I1t emotions should he attended to seriously and rc·
is almost overwhelming, it is possible to discover J few examples that seL'm to speLtfully rather than condel11ned, ignored, dlscollnted, or suppressed.
support the chim that certain emotions are more appropriate thall othL'rs in as appropriate emotions may contribute to the developmcnt of knowl·
both a moral and epistemological Sl'I1se. For instance, Hilary Rose claims that edge, so the growth of knowledge may contribute to the dcvclopml'l1t of ap'
women's practice of caring, even though warped by its containment in the propriate emotions. For instance, the powerful insights of fel11ini~t theory
alienated context of a coercive sexlwl division of labor, nevertheless has gen· often stimulate new emotional responses to past and present sitlwtions. Inevi·
crated more accurate and less oppressive undt'rstandings of women's tably, our emotions are affected by the knowledge that the \\7omen on our
functions, such as menstruation (Rose 191:\3). Certain emotions may be both are paid systematically less tban the men, that one gIrl in four is sub­
morally appropriate and epistemologically advantageous in approaching the jected to sexual abuse lrom heterosexual men in her own family, and that
and even tbe inanimate world. Jam' Goodall's scientific contribu­ few women rCeleb orga,m in heterosexual intercourse. We arc likely to fed
tion to our understanding of chimp~1nzee behavior seems to have been made emotions toward older WOl11el1 or people of color as we reevaluate
possible only by her amazing empathy with or even love for these JllImals our standards of sexual attractivencss or acknowledge that black is heautiful.
(Goodall 191:\7). In her study of Barbara McClintock, Evelyn Fox Keller de­ The new emotIons evoked by feminist insights are likely in turn to stimulate
scribes McClintock's rdation to the objects of her research-gr~lins of maize feminist observations ;md insights, and these may generate new direc­
and their gcnetic properties-~ls a relation of affe<.tion, empathv, and "the tions in both theory and politic11 pr:1\.1Ice. The feedback loop hetween our
hIghest form of love: love that allows for intimacy without the annihibtion of emotional constitution and our theorizing is continuous; each
difference." She notes that McClintock's "vocahulary is consistl'l1tiy a vocah· modifies the other, in principle insep:.1rable from it.
of affec"tion, of kinship, of empathy" (Keller 19H4: 1(4). Examples like "11K' case and speed \\'ith which we un rceducate our emotions nnfortll­
these prompt Hilary Rosl' to assert that a feminist science of nature needs to is not great. Emotions arc only partially within our control as mdividu­
draw on heart as well as hand and brain. als. Although affected by new information, thesc habitual responses are l10t
. unlearned. Even when \.\'e COIll{' to believe conSCIously that our fear
or sl1;l111e or revulsion is u11\\'arranted, we may still continue to experience
emotions inconsistcnt with our consciolls politics. We may still continue to be
anxIous for male <lpproval, competitive with ollr comrades and sisters, and
with our lovers. "J1wsl' unwelcomc, because apparently inappropri-

162. I (q
 ALISON M. JAGGAR LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE

ate emotions, should not be suppressed or denied; instead, they should be slich emotions, in themselves and in part because of their social re­
acknowledged and subjected to critical scrutiny. The persistence of SLlch recal­ sponsibility for caretaking, emotional nurturance. It is tme
citrant emotions probably demonstrates how fundamentally we have been women, like all subordinated peoples, .
constituted by the dominant world view, but it may also indicate superficial­ proximity with their master~, often engage in emotional and even
ity or other inadequacy in our emerging theory and politics." We can only self-deception as the price of their survival. Even so, women may be less
start from where we who have been created in a cruelly racist, other subordinated groups to engage in denial or sUDDression of outlaw
capitalist, and male-dominated society that has shaped our bodies and our emotions. Women's work of emotional nUrrllrance has
our our values and our emotions. our language and our in recognizing hidden emotions and in
systl:ms of of those emotions. -I11is emotional acumen can now be re(:og.fll,~ed
111e alternative eDistemolOl.~ical models that I would suggest disDlav the as a skill in political analysis and validated as giving women a advan­
tage in both understanding the mechanisms of domination and envisioning
arc as our emotional responses to the world freer ways to live.
and how our changing emotional re­
would demonstrate the need
. on the outer world but also
on ourselves and our relation to that world, to examine critically our social 11. CONCLUSION
our al1:ion5, our values, our perceptions, and our emotions. 'Ihe
models also show how feminist and other critical social theories are indis­ The claim that emotion is vital to systematic knowledge is only the most ob­
pensable psychotherapeutic tools because they provide some insights neces­ vious contrast between the conception of theoretical investigation that I have
sary to a full understanding of oLlr emotional consti111tion. 111Lls, the models sketched here and the conception provided by positivism. For instance, the al­
would explain how the reconstruction of knowledge is inseparable from the ternative approach emphasizes that what we identify as emotion is a concep­
reconstmction of ourselves. tual abstraction from a complex process of human ,lctiviry that also involves
A corollary of the reflexivity of feminist and other critical theory is that it acting, sensing, <lIld evaluating. "I11is proposed account of theoretical con­
requires a much broader constmal than positivism accepts of the process of struction demonstrates the simultaneolls necessity for and interdependence of
theoretic<ll investigation. In particular, it requires acknowledging that a neces­ faculties that our culture has abstracted and separated from each other: emo­
sary pan of theoretical process is critical self-examination. Time spel1l in ana­ tion and reason, evaluation and perception, observation and action. The
lyzing emotions and uncovering their sources should be viewed, therefore, model of knowing suggested here is nonhierarchical and
neither as irrelevant to theoretical investigation nor even as a prerequisite for instead, it is appropriately symbolized
it; it is not a kind of of the emotional decks, "dealing with" our upward spiral. Emotions are neither more basic than
emotions so that they not inHuence Ollr thinking. Instead, we must recognize
. . nor are
that our efforts to reinteroret and refine our emotions arc necessary to our refleLls an aspect of human
as our efforts to reeducate our emotions are nec­ to borrow a famous phrase from a iViarxian context,
Critical reHection on emotion is not a self­ of these faculties is a necessary condition for the
and Dolitical action. It is itself a kind
social the ""'r."."t"'1i~P
within the west­

tage. We can now sec that women's subversive insights owe much to wom­
en's outlaw emotions, themselves appropriate responses to the situations of I
women's subordination. In addition to their propensity 10 experience outlaw
emotions, at least on some level, women are relatively adept at identifying I
I
r64
I 16 5
I
I

1.
 ALISON M. JACCAl< LOVE AND KNOWl.ED(;1'

6. ror instance, Juitus ;\loravcsik has char'H.:rerized as emotions what 1 would caLi
NOTES hunger and thirst, appetite, that are not desires for any particular food or
drink (Mor'l\'csik 19H2:207-224). I mysdf think tbat such states, which Moravcslk
I wish to thank the on l\lrlter drafts also calls instincts or appentes, are understood better as sensations than emonons. In
other words, I would view so~called instinctive, t1onll1temional fedings as the biologt­
cal raw mJtenal frolll wbich full-fledged buman emotions
7. Even adherents of the Dumb View recognize, of course, that emotions are not
entirely random or unrelated to an individual's Judgments and beliefs; in other words,
Nicholson, Bob
note th'lt people ,1re angry or eXl:ited ut;out sometillllg, ;lfraid or proud ol some­
man, Karsten Stmhl, lO'H! Tronto, Daisy Quarm, Naomi Quinn, ,md Alison thing. On the Dumb View, however, the illdgtnents or beliefs associated with an emo­
am also eratefnl to Illy wileaples in the fall I ';)85 Women's Smdies Ch'lir Semill<1r ,It tion an: sel'll as its causes and thus '15 related to it
Rutgers UniversIty, and to audiences at Duke X. Cheshire Calhoun poimed this out to nK' in private correspondence.
University Centre, Holxnt and William Smith

9. Rewgnition of the many levels on whICh emotions <Ire soci'lily constructed

University of North CHolin'l at Chapel

raises tbe question whether It makes sense even to speak of the posslbilitv of universal
spollses to earlier versions of this chapter. In addition, I received Illany
emotions, Although :1 full answer to this question is
ments frolll memhers of the Canadian
one might ,pecubte that nwny of what we westerners Identify as emotiolls bave hlllc~
shldents in Lisa Heldke's delsses 111 feminist epistemology 'It Carleton College emd tional analogues in other (ultllfes. In other words, it may be tbat people in everY ntl~
Northwestern lJrll\wsitv. ·Ilunks, too, to Delia (
ture might behave 111 ways that fulfil <11 least some sooal fUllctions of our angrY or
able environllll'llt in which I wrote the first draft.
fearful behavior.
A similar version of this l'ssay appeared
10. The relationsbip hetwel'll the emotional expenence of an individual and the
l/une 198';)). Reprintcd hv
emotional experience of the group to which the individual lx'iongs may perhaps be
clarified by analoj.,'Y with the relation between a word and the Iangnage of which it is
I. PhIlosophers who do not conform to this gcnerellization and cOlNiwte pelrt ot ;1 part. That the word has mealllng presupposes it's ,1 part of ,1 linguistic svstel11 with~
what SW,'ln Bordo c111s a "recessiw,' tre1(.iItion in westem phllosophv indude HIITT1l: out which It has no meaning; vet the langu'1ge Itself has 110
,md Niet'(sche, Dewev and James (Bordo 1987: 114- II Hl,
the Illeaning of the words of which It is composed together with their grammatical or­
2. '111e western tradition 'IS a whole has heen

\Xlords ;lnd language pre,uppose and Illutually constiulte each other.

Its historv may he vil'wed :lS a continuous r",lrc1U!J110

both individual and group emotion presuppose ,md mutually nmsUhlte each other.
ror a surn'v of this frolll a fcminlst
I ';)rl"1. 11. Averell cites dissoci;nive reactions hy mtlitary 1""NlIm/,l
3. TIlLIS, fear or other emotions were seen as rational in somc cin:ul11stal1o:s. To Force gnse and shows how
illustrate tillS pom!, Vlck\ Spelman quotes ArIStotle as "lying (in the Nic/io/lluduUII Sihl:1tLonS while or blame
bInes, Bk. IV, cl1. 5): "IAnvonel who does not get angrv when there IS reason to be (Averell 19H(): 157).
angry, or wbo does not gl't angry in the right way at tbe right time and with the nght 12. These and similar are descrihed 111 Kilpatrick 1961 :ch. 10, cited by
is ,I dolt" (Soc/man 19H2: I
19H5:296.
4. Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant are among the who did 13. '111c positivist :lltitude toward emotion, wbich requires that lde;ll Illvesng;llllrS
not endorse a whallv stripped~dowll, instrumentalist
be both dlslI1terested and dispassionate, may be a modern vanant of older tradItions
5. Thc reloGltion ot values in hum:1I1 ;1ttitlldes and
in western philosophv tbelt recommended people ,eek to minimize their t'111otiOlWI
grounds for beG111Se could lwve heen conceIved as responses to the world and develop instead theIr powers of rationality and purl'
in a common or universal human ne1tnre. fact, however, the
rather than the cOllll11onahtv, of human and responses was 14, It is 110W widely accepted that the suppression Hul! reprl'ssion of emotion has
values gr'lduallv came to he viewed as particular, :llld eH'n damagmg if not explosive consequences, There is general acknowledgment that no
rather than as Ullivcrs,ll and ohll'ltive.n1e to the of human one em aVOId at some tilllc experiencing emotions she or he finds 11I1pleas:1I1t, and
desires was the supposedly univers'll urge to and the motive to m:lximize onc's there is e1iso increasing recognition that the deni,ll of such emotions IS hkcly to result
own utility, whatever that consisted in. T11c 'lild dIsorders of thought ,1L1d bch:wIor, in proJeLtlllg one's own emotions on
was seen as perhaps the be- them to in'1ppropriate situations, or in psychosolmltLc ailments,
caw,c it W:1S a nrecondition for ot her desi res. which purports to helD individuals reco!!llizl' and "deal with" their

166 16
 ALISON M. JACGAR [OVE AND KNOWIFDCI

emotions, has become an enormoLis indmtrv, espl'ci'lllv in the l Jnitcd State>;, In mllch ditfen:nCf':s. ror instaIKL', girls r.Hher tlun .m: (;lII~llt tcar ;md lhsgu,t

however, cmotions still are conccivt'd as feelings or pas­ ;lIld sl"lkes, .lffcetion for Huflv ;1Ilil11;1Is, ,h;lIl1(, for th'ir naked bodlcs.

disturbances th.u .1ft1ict individuals or interfere with their capacity 1llCI! r'ltiJer than womcil whose sl'xlial rl'­

.md 'Ktiol1. Different therapies, therefore, Iwve developed a wide \'Isllal ,md sOllltrlllle'i \lolelll porllogr'lphv. Girl"

variety of techniques for cncournging pcople to "discharge" or "vent" their for othL'rs: hovs and men arc taue.ht 10

liN ,1S thev would dmin an ,1bscl'ss. Oncl' emotions have hem dischargl'd or vented,
are supposed to be expl'ricnced Il'ss or l'ven to v;mish entlrdv, and con, tor lower-cbss and some nOllwhitl' mell
exert less int1l1l'11ce on individu'1ls' thoughts and actions, TIllS approach becallse the e,-pres,ion of ell1otion is
dearly demonstrates its klT1ship with the "tolk" Men ot the upper d;IS,I'S k'ln! to mltiy.lte ,III :1ttitude of
and It equally dearly retains the tnlditional westenl dctachl'll amusemellt. As WI' shall see shortlv, diftcrenccs III the emotional constitutioll
thM el11otloll is inillllcal to ratlon'll thought .1Ild action. 111l1s, stich '1pproaches tall to of v<lrious p;roups may he l'pisten101oglGlIh siPli1iGlnt in so far as they both presup­
challenge and il1~k~cd provide covert support for thl' view that knowers are pose and faciliwte differclIt W'lys of perceiving thl' world.
not onlv dislllterested hilt .llso di,passHmmc,
20. i\ lleCl'SS;11""\ condition for l'xperil'l1clIlg tel11lllist l'lllotions IS th,lt Ol1e aln';ldv bc
IS. E, V. Spelman (1982) Illustrates thIS point with a l]uot,ltion from thl: well­ a felllini,t 111 ,OIllC ,l'IlSl', evell If Olll' docs l10t cOl!sciollsh Wl';1[ that bbci. gut mall:
known (ontel11pOr'II)' philosopher, R. S. Peters, who wrote "we spe'lk 0/ emotional women ,md soml' l1Ien, cvell those who would dcny th;lt thev ~lre femllli'it, stilll'xpni­
outhursts, reactiolls, upheavals and women" the Aristotl'ildll ence emotion, cOlllp;lIihle \\ 1Ih tCIIlllllst \"lIIlCS. For illStann:, thn m,1\ he In
New Senes, vol. 62.).
the pcrceptioll that sOl1leone IS bcmg mlstrcatcd Ilist !wcatN: she is ~l WOIll,1I1, or
16. It seeills likelv th,l[ the conspicuous ab,ellcL' of elTIOllon showil bv Mrs, m,IV wke speci'1l 111 the ;lChlL'\Ul1l'lIt o! <1 WOIll'll1. It those who expericnce such
Thatcher is a dchherMe stratq..' V she finds neCl'SS;1rV to counter the puhlic perception of emotiolls ,1[l' ullwilling to rl'lOp;lllZL' thell1 ;1, fellllllist, their emotion, .1rl· proh;lhk de­
women as too el11otional for political leadership. '111l' strategy results III her hemg per­ scribed better <1S potentiallv tcminist or prdc1l1illlst l'motiol1\.
ceived a, ,1 forl!lIlbhlc le'lder, hut an Iron I r:1thl'r th.ll1 a r<:,ll woman. lronicallv, 21. I OWL' this ,U,l:;gCStlOIl to :\ tIl'CI'l Lllld.
Nl'iI Killilock, IcadlT of the British Llbour P;1!tv and 'Ihatchcr\ m;1l11 opponent III the
22. \XI!lhll1 ,1 temillist context, Ben'lllel' !-'Ishn SllK~ests th'lt W(' foclls partlClIl'lr ,It­
1987 C;cner'll Elccllon, was 'lhle to lllUster LOnsidlT<1ble ,uppon through telni­ ten non on our emotions o! guilt and ,hame ,IS part ot .1 cntiul rcev,lluatiol1 of our
siou collllllcrcials portr.mng him in the stercotvpicailv feminiue roll' of C<lring ahout polinc11 ideals ,HId our political pr;ILTice (Fi,her 19S4l.
the llllfortul1<lte VIctims of TI1'lIciwr ecollomics. UltimalL'iy, however, tillS ,upport \hlS
[lot suffiCient to desln)\' public conndence in \lr,. ThatchlT\ "n1.1"culine" cOlllpett'llce
and gam Killl!oek the ciectlon.
17. On till' rare occt...ion, when a white 1ll~1I1 crics, he i, t'll1h'lrras.,ed and ted, con REFERENC
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