CHAPTER XII —_—_—- EXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION SYNOPSIS |AMENTARY HISTORY Engiish practice Traditional view Criticism of traditional view Modern view Objections on modern view Indian practice What comprises Parliamentary History Debates on a Bill in the process of its passing Use of debates on a Bill for resolving ambiguity Limitations of debates on a Bill as external aid to construction Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Legislative Bill Use of Statement of Objects and Reasons for resolving ambiguity Limitations of Statement of Objects and Reasons as external aid to construction Reports of Commission, Inquiry committee, Joint Parliamentary Committee or Study Group Use of reports of Commission, Inquiry Committee, Joint Parliamentary Committee or Study Group for resolving ambiguity Cases in which reports of Commission, Inquiry Committee, Joint Parliamentary Committee or Study Group were not admitted HISTORICAL FACTS AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES Limitations of historical facts and surrounding circumstances as external aid to construction SUBSEQUENT SOCIAL POLITICAL AND SCIENTIFIC INVENTIONS DICTIONARIES Use of dictionaries for resolving 2 Limitation of dictionaries as extern TEXT BOOKS STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA When two statutes are Use of statutes in pari materia hep Merits of the rule of reference FROM EARLIER STATUTES pARL! ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND imbiguity al aid to construction not in pari materia for resolving ambiguity to statutes in parl materia (811 )INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 312 Use of earlier statutes for resolving ambiguity Amending Acts HELP FROM SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION INCORPORATION OF EARLIER ACT INTO LATER Effect of incorporation CODIFYING STATUTES Features of coaifying statutes Construction of coaifying statutes CONSOLIDATING STATUTES Features of consolidating statutes Construction of consolidating statutes Distinction between codifying and consolidating statutes CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO Application of contemporanea expositio FOREIGN DECISIONS OR FOREIGN JUDGMENTS CHAPTER SUMMARY __ When outside sources like other statutes or documents etc. are called in aid fe hae Purpose of construing a provision, it is called external aids to cons ion. Various external aids to constructit ir usefuln Srocnresaat Various, ion and their us. ess are (i) PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY It is well known that the most im i is . portant function of Legislature is involved. the laws, In the process of making of a law, various stages are Government metimes, before introducing a Bill in the Parliament, the Parliamentary Co me Commission or an Inquiry Committee or a Joint information, Such Comore Study Group for collecting the background of the contents of thie neve or Committee submits its report. In the light Bill. The legislative proche iat of Proposed law is prepared. It is called in the Parliament, A Bill soy initiated from the time a Bill is introduced - A Bill not only outlines the scheme of law intended to be Parliam iscussiong e,considerati discussed clanec discussions debentiO® stage. At this stage te moved. reid in maintained se Ma, Sendment tothe Bll may 0 Patnment ‘At the thaw readin discussions and debates held in the lace ea > i i i sod the bay lena ce ofEXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION aig Houses oe id other House where similar process is repeated. Unless bo When a Bilis oa a Bill, the Bill cannot be deemed to have been passed Memicsent, It passed by both the Houses, it is sent to President of india ate becomes law when it is assented by the President. All these oo eyhich fA ene and materiel crested during various stages "parliamentary History", ion passes before attaining finality, constitute Now the question is whether the legislative intent can be gathered from the Parliamentary History of the statute and h i is can be helpful for interpreting an ambiguous pd Feat History English Practice (a) Traditional view The English Traditional view outright rejects Parliamentary History as a good aid to construction. According to this view, the intention of framers of law cannot be gathered from Parliamentary History of that law. The Bills in their original form or along with such amendments which have been considered during its progress in Legislature are considered inadmissible as aids to construction. The language used by the Minister during his speech in the Parliament, which came to be enacted as law, is also not accepted as valid aid. The reports of debates held in the Parliament while discussing the Bill and the resolutions passed are also not used for finding out legislative intent. However, the courts are entitled to consider : (1) those external facts which are necessary to understand the subject matter (2) the mischief which i statute (3) the reports of commissions preceding @ statutory measure as used as evidence of surrounding circumstances with reference to which the words in ords in the statute are used. In Black Clawson International Ltd. Vv. Papierwerke Waldhof Aschaffenburg, A.G.," it was held by the House of Lords that the report of a committee presented to Parliament prior to enactment could be looked for finding out the state of the Act and the mischief of law at the time of passing infembal to be remedied by the Parliament but the same report could not be relied upon for finding out the inte! 5 intended to be remediéd by the present tion of Legislature. Thi it the English ‘Traditional Practice, where a report has been Thus, according Wo jament by a committee before making a law, such Teport was held to be valid as > evidence of surrounding circumstances at relevant time but the same was invalidated as far as inferring the legislative intent was concerned. Thus & clear distinction was drawn. On one ‘and the same report was ‘accepted for finding out what was common law fore making of the Act, what was the mischief and defect for which ~ae making of. thet 1, (1975) 1 All ER 810 HL.“ INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES i i dy Parliament ha; law did not provide and what remedy P. 8 esolve anette disease, bate on the other hand, it’s utility as a tool to eather intention of Legislature was negated. » | | (b) Criticism of traditional view This English Practice was subjected to severe criticism. It wag a, that the true spirit of law lies in its reason. If we know what was the dea! sought to be cured by the law and the purpose for which law was made, ther true interpretation can be given to the statute and the ambiguity can be resolved in best possible manner. The report of the committee Teflects th, state of law at the time of passing of the Act and the mischief which wag required to be remedied. As such, the report of the committee lays foundation of new enactment. When it is accepted that the key to opening any law is the reason and the spirit of law and the statute ig best. interpreted when we know why it was enacted, then steps taken foe understanding the object of law and the mischief intended to be dealt with by the statute should be part of process for getting its meaning. Then why the reports of committees should not be used? (c) Modern view The above question could not be satisfactorily answered. Therefore the English Traditional view started losing ground and a modern view gained momentum which considered the material relating to Parliamentary History the mischief. On this basis only, new law has been enacted, The object of new law is to remedy the mischief reflected in the parliamentary material and ‘therefore the intention of Legislature can Le deduced from sot? In Pepper v. Hart,! the above vi i ba reference to parliamentary materia] sea Spee mae i 1 c e construction of legislation which ip roud,be Permitted as an aid to the It was further held that worden eae of bein to words which they cannot bear oe wa Parliament's true intention be enfone sn tne J anacntigen oatEXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION . 315 rising Parliamentary History in resolvin, igui or ch is required in making use of Parliamentary fan, oa eid te construction. The court should decide how much weight at histaaates sch ‘materials and proceed to interpret the law on their basis. PES @ Objections on modern view Certain objections have been raised to this modern t i objection is that the parliamentary material is neither Pay aeangnie wor easily accessible. This objection stands answered by the experience whic ch shows that this position has not raised any practical problems in othe tries. Therefore this objection is nothing but mere baseless apprehension. The second objection was that calling in aid the jiamentary material for construction of a statutory provision amounts to enereahing ae freedom of speech and debates in the Parliament. This jection also wi jected and it was sai i ivi sie arama id that court will be giving effect to Indian Practice There has been fluctuating view of the Supreme Court of India as to admissibility of Parliamentary History as external aid to construction. In some cases, Supreme Court approved invocation of Parliamentary History for resolving the ambiguity but in few cases, it rejected the same outright. It is evident from pronouncements cited hereunder that the Supreme Court was not consistent on this issue. However, the present settled position is that Parliamentary History can be made use of in resolving ambiguities of the language of a provision to a limited extent. In Novartis Ag v. Union of India, the Apex Court interpreted Ss. 5 (since deleted); 3(d), 2(1 )G) & Ga) and 83 of the Patents Act, 1970. In the process of interpretation, the Court took into consideration the parliamentary history for determining precise import of amendments brought about in patent law. What comprises Parliamentary History The "Parliamentary History" mainly includes the debates on a Bill in process of its passing, the statement of objects and reasons ccompanying a legislative Bill and reports of commission, inquiry committee, joint parliamentary committee or study group. ® Debates on a Bill in the process of its passing : When a law is proposed to be enacted, its draft is prepared and is int in ei ‘the Parliament. It is called Bill. The ‘odueed in either of the house © 1st. views on the Bill and may even mbers i then present " TOpose polite ‘smendment in the a oe Lorie eee ee aE ted in the Constituent Assembly, on the table of whi e dra I Conetituti ve ema i is ions and debates prior to its ti laid for discussio t Pasting. ‘The eee Wilvered by the members of Constituent ‘Assembly 1. (2013) 6 SCC 1: AIR 2013 SC 1311.316 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES . draft Constitution are generally considered inadm;..; Soe ara construction, though in certain cases, the Supreme 7 has made a reference to such debates to find out the underlying Object purpose. When the speeches of the members of Constituent Assembly ang inadmissible as an external aid to construction, then, on the same line te debates held on a Bill in the Parliament are also not admitted as aid he construction of the statute which was finally enacted. to In Ashwini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose,’ the amendment, considered during the progress of the Bill were also declared inadmiasible a a valid aid to construction. The observations of the Supreme Court are "it was urged that acceptance or rejection of amendments to a Bill in the course of Parliamentary proceedings forms part of the pre-enactment history of a statute and as such might throw valuable light on the intention of the Legislature when the language used in the statute admitted of more than one construction, We are unable to assent to this Proposition. The reason why a particular amendment was proposed or accepted or rejected is often a matter of controversy, and without the speeches bearing upon the motion, it cannot be ascertained with any reasonable degree of certainty. And where the Legislature happens to be bicameral, the second chamber may or may not have known to such reason when it dealt. with the measure." In State of Trav. Co. v. Bombay Co. Ltd.,’ it was held that a speech made in the course of the debate on a Bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the Bill. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord. In Express Newspapers (Put.) Ltd. v. Union of India,’ the Supreme Court substantially modified the principle that speeches of Minister or Members of Parliament cannot be called in aid to resolve the ambiguity. BHAGWATI, J., observed that that there is a consensus of opinion that the circumstances under which a particular word came to be deleted from the original Bill as introduced in the Parliament and the fact of such deletion when the Act to be passed in the final shape are not aids to the construction of the terms of the statute .... It is only when the terms of the statute ate ambiguous or vague that resort may be had to them for the purpose of arriving at the true intention of the Legislature. In K:S. Paripoornan y, State of Kerala, it was h speeches made by Members of Parliament in course of debate on a nad sana admit as aid to construction. But statement made by a Minister in the House had moved the Bill in Parliament can be referred to find out the object of‘ proposed law and to ascertain the mischief sought to be remedied PY legislation. However, such stat i ae senate Hoween statement cannot be relied upon for constr’ 1. AIR 1952 SC 369, 2. AIR 1952 SC 366, 3. AIR 1958 SC 578. 4. AIR 1995 SC 1012” PV. Narsimha Rao vy. State (CBI/SPE),! spe statement made by the Minister in the pr oredr aa ee oe a rag te ate et the legis’) ot be relied on for interpreti ord a BY tment: rpreting provisions of the In Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India,’ it was held that it i settled position that there can be only limited use of parliamentary debates, courts should not normally critically analyze the proceedings of ment. EXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION 317 parlia However, in some recent cases, the view of Supreme court appears to eaned towards use of debates as external aids to construction, as is have | aa evident from following citations : In Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, In re (Gujarat Assembly Blecti » -ctiol matter), the Supreme Court held by majority that one of the con methods to discern the intention behind enacting a provision of the Constitution and also to interpret the same is to look into the historical legislative developments, Constituent Assembly Debates or any enactment preceding the enactment of the constitutional provision. In TMA. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka,‘ it was held the Constituent Assembly Debates can legitimately be taken into consideration for construction of provisions of the Constitution. In Union of India v. Purushottam,’ it was held that modern jurisprudence is tial to perusal of Parliamentary Debates in the context of interpreting statutory provisions although earlier this exercise was looked upon askance. Framers of our Constitution were fully alive to differing and disparate concepts of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict and consciously chose to circumscribe doctrine of double jeopardy only to nnviction under Art. 20(2) of Constitution. prosecution culminating in C01 Use of Debates on a Bill for Resolving Ambiguity of India,® FAZAL ALI, J, In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhary V- Union LI, History including the speech of the Minister 3 which. necessitated the admitted Parliamentary introducing the Bill as evidence of the circumstance 7,7 it was held that the passing of the Act. In R & B Falcon (A) Ply Lid. v. CIE. } ‘ representation made by maker of legislation at the time of introduction of the Bill carries great weight. In Maandvi Cooperative Bank Lid. ¥. Nimesh B. Th en 1. (1998) 4 SCC 626. 2. (2008) 6 SCC 1. 8. (2002) 8 SCC_237,. — A (2009) 8-800 481. “-& @018) 3 SCC 779. at AIR 1951 SC 41. - (2008) 12 SCC 466. 8. (2010) 3 SCC 83. jakore,® theINTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 318 statement of objects and reasons and the speech of Finance Min, course of debate on Bill was relied on. “age Ti, ts ; i jes Ltd.,' the Sy i India v. Martin Lottery Agenct Preme held ear eds of a Minister in House of Parliament may be a vay tool for interpretation of a statute. « the: Aju Cou whi ; ‘ i e Apex Court, while inter). In Novartis Ag v. Union of India, TPretin, Ss. 5 aid), a 6 & (ja) and 83 of the Patents Act, 1970 relieg A Legislative speeches. Roc ee In A.V.S. Narsimha Rao v. State of A.P,” while construing Article 16 3 of the Constitution of India, the debates in the Constituent Assembly Were referred to. . Gh 4 i In Union of India v. Harbhajan Singh,’ extensive references were made to speeches in the Constituent Assembly to support the construction that wealth tax on net wealth including capital value of agricultural lands fe within the residuary power of Parliament. In State of M.P. v. Dadabhoy’s New Chirimiri Ponri Hill Colliery Co, (Put.) Ltd.,5 reference was made to the speech of the Minister introducing the Bill to find out the object intended to be achieved and to support a narrow construction of Section 30-A of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 as amended in 1958. In Indira Sawhney v. Union of India,° while interpreting Article 16 (4) of the Constitution of India, Supreme Court referred to the speech of Dr. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly and observed that "the debates in the Constituent Assembly could be relied upon as an aid to interpretation of a constitutional provision is borne out by a series of decisions of this Court. Since the expression ‘backward classes of citizens’ is not defined in the Constitution, reference to such debates is Permissible to ascertain at any rate the context, background and objective behind them. Particularly where the Court wants to ascertain the ‘original intent’.such reference may be unavoidable". . ‘ ter iy Limitations of Debates on a Bill as External Aid to Construction (a) When the terms of the statute are plain. and clear, debates on @ Bill © Process of its passing cannot be resorted to. (b) Where the words used i ne meaning used in the language bear more than % can be faa nonce there exists an uncertainty, then only debates on @ Bi! into for arriving at true legislative intent. _,, ©) A speech made i oy ie ol indicative of the subjective inters Seuree of the debate on « Bill # on er, in the 1. (2009) 12 sce 209, (2013) 6 sce 1 ; AIR AIR 1970 gc 499. 19 SC 1311 AIR 1972 SC 1061, AIR 1972 sc 614, AIR 1983 Sc 477. PaaepEXTERNAL AIDS To CONS} RUCTION tement of Obj , en’ Jects and Re, asons accompanyin, Legislative Bill is gen: * la ct ot Ope any accompanied by a ot 7 itatemy ines background, sets out prevailing facta and cree tttament thi ces: enactment of proposed law to effectively cont; ces which Necessitat sojeet which is sought to be achieved by ne a evils and underlines Statement of Objects and Reasons a; posed law. As such, the In Ashwini Kumar Ghose vy. Arabinda Bose, and Reasons was ruled out as an ai i PATANJALI SHASTRI, J, observed inte tee cuartruction of the statute. of the reference to the Statement of Objects and Ressona, it peor remembered that it seeks only to explain what reasons induced the mover to introduce the Bill in the House and what objects he sought to achieve. But those objects and reasons may or may not correspond to the objective which the majority of the members had in view when they passed the Bill into the law. The Bill may have undergone radical changes during its passage through the House or Houses, there is no guarantee that the reasons which led to its introduction and the object thereby sought to be achieved have remained the same throughout till the Bill emerges from the House as an Act of the Legislature, for they do not form a part of the Bill and are not voted upon by the members. We, therefore, consider that the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill should be ruled out as an aid to the construction of the statute. i v. State of Kerala,’ it was held that where a ee fame "after eee of the Bill and was in consideration before Parliament, the statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill euld not obviously throw any light on the circumstances in which the provision came to be inserted and enacted. it was held that the statement of 3 In Babua Ram v. State of U-P. ld thatthe statement of i ferred to ascertain mischief soug) roe ty he eaea tle care statement of Objects ee ead Financial Memorandum were looked into for ascertaining 7 a i ac th introduction of the Bill but not as an aid to interpr B ; held In State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee F- Desai,‘ the Apex court hel — 1. AIR 1952 SC 369. : AIR 1995 SC 1012. . (1995) 2 SCC 689. 4. (2002) 2 SCC 318 : AIR 2002 SC 456. s' the Statement of Objects‘ ‘20 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES ji i ibtedly an aid to construc: t statement of objects and reasons is undoubt ; ction ne that by itself cannot be termed to be and by itself me interpreted, It is a useful guide but the interpretations and the intent shall have ty be gathered from the entirety of the statute. h Khemchand & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, it wa, held that tae Onjocte and Reasons are not voted upon by legislature. Thus, if enactment is otherwise within constitutionally permissible limits, divergence between Objects to the Bill and tenor of the Act cannot be a ground for declaring said law unconstitutional. In Bhaiji v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla,? it was held that reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons is permissible for understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute sought to remedy. The weight of judicial authority leans in favour of the view that the Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be utilized for the Purpose of restricting and controlling the plain meaning of the language employed by the Legislature in drafting a statute and excluding from its operation such transactions which it plainly covers. In State Bank’s Staff Union (Madras Circle)-v. Union of India, it was held that it is cardinal rule of interpretation that the objects and reasons of a statute are to be looked into as an extrinsic aid to find out the legislative intent only when the meaning of the statute by its ordinary language is obscure or ambiguous. But if the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous then the statute itself declares the intention of the legislature and in such a case it would not to be Permissible for the court to interpret the statute by examining the objects and reasons of the statute in question. In Raymond Ltd. v. State of Chattisgarh, statement of objects and rea: a ‘ment of objects and reasons is relevant only when the language used in the statute is not clear and two meanings are possible. me cae Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, it was held that ice mnent of objects and reasons cannot be used to determine the id rene an effect of the substantive Provisions of a statute, but it can antecedent ato es om Purpose ‘of understanding the background, the thee and the evil whig fa nae circumstances in relation to the ute sought to remedy, 1. (2015) 4 $cc 770, 2. (2003) 1 SCC 692, 8. (2005) 7 Sco 584, 4. (2007) 3 scc 79, 5. (2008) 5 SCC 176 : AIR 2008 sc 6. (2008) 13 Scc 5, reeEXTERNAL AIDS To. CONSTRUCTION In State of Tamil Nadu v. Kg tatement of objects and reasons appended, Sunde S74 to the construction of the Act to be " 321 7," it was hel the ani 2 pul is not admission an it can be used for limited In K. Joseph v. Custodian,? it was held that while i i I ase; sa le int and applying provisions of a statute, objects and reasons are to ieee for harmonious construction of different provisions of enactment. Use of Statement of Objects and Reasons for Resolving Ambiguity Statement of Objects and Reasons can be legitimately looked into for the limited purpose of ascertaining the background of law and the mischief sought to be remedied but cannot be utilized as external aid to resolve an ambiguity in the statute. Some of those cases in which Statement of Objects and Reasons was referred to by the Supreme Court are cited below. In State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose,* the reasonableness of restrictions imposed by the Act on fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) -(f) of the Constitution was in question. The Statement of Objects and Reasons was referred to for judging the same. JUSTICE S.R. DAS observed that it is well settled that the Statement of Objects and Reasons is not admissible as an aid to the construction of a statute. He further added "I am not therefore referring to it for the purpose ee construing any part of the Act or of ascertaining the moaning of any wo used in the Act but I am referring it only for limited purpose of secartaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated ihe span a to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of evi! w remedy." me i, i introduced in Indian Devi,* Section 16 (3) was int 1 1 oar Med aay of Amending Act of 1937. In this section, the rds “any tb aivigual’ and ‘such individual" were used whieh © 7 . (onstrued in this case. The Coane Male assessee only or a femé ef these terms, To cshwer this qu Statement of Objects and Reasons apPen —Stement of Objects an¢ 1. AIR 2011 SC 9470 : 2011 (8) SCC 737. % (2011) 3 soc 994 ; AIR 2011 SC 832. & AIR 1954 SC 92. 4 AIR 1957 SC 832. i reme n eat Sathe Bill of Amending Act. On322 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES t of Objects and Reasons, it was revealed that ther Penne Siidshrend pravies that the husbands used to enter into noming| partnership with their wives and fathers used to admit their minor children to the benefit of the partnerships. In this manner, the aire income for taxation purposes used to be substantially reduced. The Lagi lature intended to curb this practice and to remedy this evil by way of intro Peat Section 1g (8) to the Act which provided for inclusion of ‘the income derived by the wif, or a minor child, in the computation of total income of the male assessee. In the light of this, BHAGWATI, J., observed that these words are restricted in their meaning to "males" only. In Telco v. Gram Panchayat, Pimpri, Waghere,' Section 89 of the Bombay Panchayat Act, 1933 provided for levy of tax on ‘houses’. By way of an amendment, the word ‘house’ was replaced by the word ‘building’. The Statement of Objects and Reasons clarified that the amendment was made for the reason that the Panchayat could not levy the tax on building. Supreme Court refused to accept it. It was held that the word ‘houses’ as originally used, was comprehensive enough to include all the buildings including factory buildings. The amendment only made explicit what was implicit. In Novartis Ag v. Union of India,? the Apex Court interpreted Ss. 5 (since deleted), 3(d), 2(1 )G) & (ja) and 83 of the Patents Act, 1970. In the process of interpretation, the Court took into consideration the statement of objects and reasons for determining precise import of amendments brought about in patent law. In Utkal Contractors and Joinery Put. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, it was held that Orissa Forest Produce (Control of. Trade) Act, 1981 was applicable only to forest produce grown on private lands. The Act has no application to forest produce grown in Government forests. In holding go, the Statement of Objects and Reasons was used. on In Bharat Glass Tube Ltd, v. Gopal Glass Works Ltd.,‘ the Statement of seat ae aoa taken into consideration to ascertain purpose of _,i2 Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India,® Section 498-A of the EXtian Penal Code was interpreted by the Supreme Court in the light of et ct for which Section 498-A, 1, AIR 1976 SC 2463, 2. (2018) 6 Scc 1: AIR 8. (1987) 3 SCC 279, 4. (2008) 10 SCC 657 : AIR 2008 Sc : 2 5. (2008) 6 SCC 281, "m 2013 SC 1311,PATERNAL AIDS To cont UCTION ypc was introduced is amply j 323 Ressons while enacting the Griminat di the Statement of op; 1983. As clearly stated therein the increars (S8cMd Amendment, and a matter of serious concern. The extent of tha the Number of do D Act 46 of the Joint Committee of the Houses to oo vit Bas been comme oath is Prohibition Act, 1961. In some cases, crucitnnsy Be Work of the pee relatives of the husband which culminate 2, of the husband ‘and the helpless woman concerned, constitute only . Suicide by or Murder of the cruelty. The avowed object is to combat, menace of P a involving euch In Department of Forests yy, EK doh wry death and cruelty, statutory provisions being plain and clear, ee it was held that the and Reasons of statute) cannot be not relied aa al aid (Statement of Objects From the various judgments settled now that the Statement of Objesty he Supreme Court, itis well an aid to the construction of a tatate But it veasons is not admissible as look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons for thee oemmsible to out its history, why it came to be enacted. Su cite Ca Purpose of finding that Statement of Objects and Reasons would Sontcal ee sae iY down enactment. Instead it has been laid down that the Statement of Obje end Reasons is meant for introducing a particular piece of legislation os ener be used for interpreting the legislation, if the words used therein are clear enough. Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be used for arriving at correct interpretations of the sections. Courts have to interpret the sections as they find them, and not by the Statement of Objects and Reasons. It is true that for interpreting the provisions of a statute, the Statement of Objects and Reasons could not be strictly relevant, nor could it influence or decide the meaning of the provisions of the Act. However it is equally well known method of trying to interpret a statute to see what is the mischief that was prevalent, which was sought to be eradicated and what was the object in view of Legislature and to examine whether in provision found in the statute, that object has been carried out. As regards the propriety of reference to Statement of Objects and Reasons, it must be remembered that it seeks only to explain what reasons induced the mover to introduce the Bill in bjects he sought to achieve, but those Objects and mi ee a oe Fe oe eapend with the objective which the majority of Pi y when they passed it into law. The Bill pampbery of hougop hed Maul during its passage through House or may have undergone radical chang’ ge through House Hi i arantee that the reason: d introdectinn au Te seta thereby sought to be achieved, have remained the jects and Reasons appended to the Bil throughout. The Statement of oeieeetroction of a statute. Though it on rppicranccr ger ag pase nid of Objects and Resecps 95 a0 a i ini ing of any particular words use construction or for ascertaining the meaning, any particular words voihe me Court referr n t the Act of statute, nevertneee Eenditions prevailing at a ees a ted the sponsor erithe ‘Bill to introduce the same and e “gency of evil which he sought to remedy: 1, (2011) 10 SCC 794.4 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES Limitations of Statement of Objects and Reasons as External Aid ty Construction ji ferred to for the lim; (a) Statement of Objects and Reasons can be refe rr the lim purpose of finding out the background of law, mischief that was prevalet and was sought to be cured and the object behind the enactment. (b) Statement of Objects and Reasons is not admissible as an aid t, the construction of a statute. (c) Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be used to frustrate the provisions of the enactment particularly when the words used therein are sufficiently clear. (d) “Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be used for deriving legislative intent and to interpret the sections accordingly. Courts have to interpret the sections as they find them and not by the Statement of Objects and Reasons. (c) Reports of Commission, Inquiry Committee, Joint Parliamentary Committee or Study Group Sometimes, before introducing a Bill in the Parliament for a proposed law, the Government appoints a Commission or an Inquiry Committee or a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) or a Study Group (SG) for collecting the background information leading to legislation. The terms of reference of such Commission or Committee or JPC or SG are deternfined. The purpose of constituting such Commission or Committee or JPC or SG is to take stock of prevailing circumstances and the evils which need to be cured by way of enactment. Such Commission or Committee or JPC or SG is asked to submit its report to the Government within a stipulated time. Sometimes Government itself issues a "White Paper’ in which the facts leading to enactment of a statute are contained in detail. The question remains what is the evidentiary value of such reports or white paper and whether they can be pressed into service for ascertaining the meaning of a word used in the language or for construing a statutory provision of the enactment which came to be passed in the light of such reports/white paper. In several cases, the Supreme Court referred to such reports for a 7 e . ports understanding the surrounding circumstances and the mischief prevailing 8 the time of passing of the Act. This could enlighten the purpose for which lew yas ae And if the purpose of enactment is clear, it becomes easier t0 a true legislative intent and to attribute meaning to a word oF expression or to resolve an ambiguity in the language. Use . 7 of eee ts Commission, Inquiry Committee, Joi! spr tary an tee or Study Group for Resolving Ambiguity Commies, eps in qihicn, the reports of Commission, Inquiry are cited below - ‘liamen: ‘ommittee or Study Group were consider __OET, MP v. Sodra Devi, it was held by the Supreme Court ths! 1, AIR 1957 SC 832,EXTERNAL Alps To CoNstRUCTION words "any individual" and “such ii a restricted in their Meaning to " a pequity Report was referred to, In Mohd. Hanif Qureshi y, State . islations which banned of Bik : 325 dividual" ‘maleg" ®ppearing only. In holding, Ta ® ides i i i © in India, report on Mi 5 Hides in India, the First and Second Fis » Teport on Marketing of Nutrition Advisory Committee on Haan eee Memorandum of Nutrition in India, Report of Cattl is-a-vis Animal le Pr it Committee of the Government of India, 1948 te and Development In Express Newspapers (Put) Ltd. v. Uni ia,? Court referred the Press Commission’s Report. No ai Spree In Madanlal F. Dudhediya v. Changdeo Sugar Mills Lid.,> a Committee was appointed to bring about changes in Company Law. Based on the report of this Committee, Amending: Act [No. 65 of 1960] was passed. Supreme Court made a reference of this report. In B'S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay,' the Supreme Court held that report of the Committee, report of Joint Parliamentary Committee and the report of the Commission constituted for collecting the information leading to the legislation are permissible external aids to construction of the Act. In Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Bihari Khare,’ the Law Commission had Prepared a report on Benami transactions. Based on this report, Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 was enacted. In this case, while holding that Section 4 of the Act is retrospective in nature, the Supreme Court relied upon this report. The Court observed that where a persscular, enactment = amendment is the result of recommendation of the Law Commission ia, it may be permissible to refer to the relevant provision. |. v. Union of India,’ the In Shriram Chits And Investments (P) Ltd. v. he idi ii in question. Supreme Court referred te et Peniae Ath Te amunitiae prepared in 1972, the ee of is Cor nmnitte of Parliament, the report of the mend OUD on Non-Banking Fie ‘ ial Intermediaries constituted by 7 Banking ission and the 1 f Raj Committee. In consideration of ene : the Sun the repr ‘apheld the reasonableness and validity o ‘i juprem: AIR 1958 SC 731. IR 1958 SC 578. 1962 SC 1543. 1984 SC 684. 1989 SC 1247. 1992 or 9nR2 1 2, z BEEE 8, 4 5, a326 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES Fund Act, 1982. . 7 5 ia,’ i held by thi In M. Ismail Faruqqui v. Union of India,* it was held by the Su Court that white paper issued by the government detailing the facts lenght to the enactment of the statute js also admissible for understanding he background. Therefore, extensive reference was made by the Supreme Court to the white paper in understanding the background of Ram Janms Bhumi—Babri Masjid despute. In Raj Kishore v. Union of India, Procedure, 1973 was interpreted by the proceedings under this section do not amo this inference, the court made reference to Law In Samantha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court interpreted para 5 (2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution o/ India. For this purpose, the court made reference to the reports of Drafting Committee and Sub-Committees of the Constituent Assembly, the Draft Constitution and the changes made thereafter in giving the Constitution the final shape. In Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi,* the question before the Supreme Court was interpretation of Section 53-A of ee cas of Property set ae in doing so, the court referred to the contained in the report of the Special C i the Government of India. This ‘Sport was in fact the ee ee Section 53-A. The Supreme Court held that the document or report preceding me legislation can legitimately be taken into consideration while ee Bi ie a of an Act. Section 53-A was inserted in the Transfe Prope! on the basis of recommendations of the Special Committee set up by the Government of India. Th i ittee’s which is refl rae eaeeeee Obs lia. The Special Committee's shows that one of the purposes of Drjects ofthe Amending Act, 192 protection'to a tranafarde wha'in of Sueing Section 53-A was to provide possession, san. of the property, even = eh Performance of the contract had taken perriaiice has’ expired. Th e limitation to bring a suit for specific interpreted in the light wat erefore, Section 53-A is required to be See ee a tet, ee eaapmendatin of dik Spedal Comme, Ser mace vat ede eee Auetig ch 0 Oe plea taken in defence by a tr -A itself does not put any restriction to 58-A even if the peri y a transferee to protect his i tion has expi period of limitation to bri fee under See expired. ring a suit for specific performan® Cones in Which Report: Parliamentary Commltice Commission, Inquiry Committee: Joint or Study Group Were Not Admitted In certain cases, S admit such reports for rosciving | aoe took a different view and to ambiguity. Some examples are cited below‘ 2 Section 309 of the Code of Criminaj Supreme Court. It was held that unt to an inquiry. In arriving at Commission’s 41st Report,EXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION a tn OT. A Seared that the Rice and Oil Mille Contractor Coy! the suprel : Teport of special committee appointe Syren on ani roi fe i wih pecae nF the Act. , ‘ot be utilized for interpreting the In Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of India,? i * purposes of proper construction, such a mae fata at invert ad ee the te itted even. though the Court is entitled to look into the a dis veumstances or historical facts for purposes of discernin, surrounding scumsiht to be remedied g the mischief or In Maharani Kusumkumari v. Kusumkumari ia? to rel : mari Jadeja,> the Supreme Onur refused rely on the report of Law Commission as an external aid to (ii) HISTORICAL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING The state of things/affairs existing at the time when a |: are called "Historical Facts and Surrounding A a ll which prevailed at the time when statute was passed also fall within the "Historical Facts and Surrounding Circumstances". In ambit of the term fact, such evils are sought to be remedied by the enactment. The method of historical interpretation is employed when the language of the statute does not give any clue as to the intention of the Legislature. In this method, the courts consider the circumstances prevailing at the time of original enactment and decipher the intention. This intention is given effect to. In Heydon’s case it was laid down that “for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial, restricting or enlarging the Common Law, four things are to be discussed and considered :— (a) What was the common law before the making of the Act (b) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide | (c) What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease (d) The true reason of the remedy cama - = j shall always mare such con! on as wppren the of all the jute gvance the remedy and suppress subtle invent for continuance of the mischief. , i it i sary to understant Thereft ‘Je interpreting a statute, it 15 neces i. subject ore eee the statute ‘and for this purpose the Court may take 1. AIR 1971 SC 1015. % AIR 1990 SC 2114. 8. (4991) 1 SCC 582.