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G.R. No. 170912. April 19, 2010.*

ROBERT DINO, petitioner, vs. MARIA LUISA JUDAL-

LOOT, joined by her husband VICENTE LOOT,
respondents.

Mercantile Law; Negotiable Instruments Law; Checks;

Crossed Checks; The act of crossing a check serves as a warning to
the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose so
that the holder thereof must inquire if he has received the check
pursuant to that purpose, otherwise, he is not a holder in due
course.—The act of crossing a check serves as a warning to the
holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose so
that the holder thereof must inquire if he has received the check
pursuant to that purpose; otherwise, he is not a holder in due
course. Contrary to respondents’ view, petitioner never changed
his theory, that respondents are not holders in due course of the
subject check, as would violate fundamental rules of justice, fair
play, and due process. Besides, the subject check was presented
and admitted as evidence during the trial and respondents did not
and in fact cannot deny that it is a crossed check.
Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; The Court is clothed
with ample authority to entertain issues or matters not raised in
the lower courts in the interest of substantial justice.—In any
event, the Court is clothed with ample authority to entertain
issues or matters not raised in the lower courts in the interest of
substantial justice. In Casa Filipina Realty v. Office of the
President, 241 SCRA 165 (1995), the Court held: “[T]he trend in
modern-day procedure is to accord the courts broad discretionary
power such that the appellate court may consider matters bearing
on the issues submitted for resolution which the parties failed to
raise or which the lower court ignored. Since rules of procedure
are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice,
their strict and rigid application which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Technicality should
not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely
resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.”

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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Mercantile Law; Negotiable Instruments Law; “Holder in Due

Course,” Defined.—Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
defines a holder in due course, thus: “A holder in due course is a
holder who has taken the instrument under the following
conditions:   (a) That it is complete and regular upon its face; (b)
That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and
without notice that it has been previously dishonored, if such was
the fact; (c) That he took it in good faith and for value; (d) That at
the time it was negotiated to him, he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it.”
Same; Same; Checks; Crossed Checks; Principles that must be
considered in the treatment of crossed checks.—In the case of a
crossed check, as in this case, the following principles must
additionally be considered: A crossed check (a) may not be
encashed but only deposited in the bank; (b) may be negotiated
only once—to one who has an account with a bank; and (c) warns
the holder that it has been issued for a definite purpose so that
the holder thereof must inquire if he has received the check
pursuant to that purpose; otherwise, he is not a holder in due
course.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Special Crossed Check,” and
General Crossed Check,” Defined; Crossing a check is done by
placing two parallel lines diagonally on the left top portion of the
check.—Under usual practice, crossing a check is done by placing
two parallel lines diagonally on the left top portion of the check.
The crossing may be special wherein between the two parallel
lines is written the name of a bank or a business institution, in
which case the drawee should pay only with the intervention of
that bank or company, or crossing may be general wherein
between two parallel diagonal lines are written the words “and
Co.” or none at all as in the case at bar, in which case the drawee
should not encash the same but merely accept the same for
deposit. The effect therefore of crossing a check relates to the
mode of its presentment for payment. Under Section 72 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, presentment for payment to be
sufficient must be made (a) by the holder, or by some person
authorized to receive payment on his behalf x x x As to who the
holder or authorized person will be depends on the instructions
stated on the face of the check.

395

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Dino vs. Judal-Loot

Same; Same; Same; Holder in Due Course; The Negotiable

Instruments Law does not provide that a holder who is not a
holder in due course may not in any case recover on the
instrument; The only disadvantage of a holder who is not in due
course is  that the negotiable instrument is subject to defenses as if
it were non-negotiable.—The fact that respondents are not holders
in due course does not automatically mean that they cannot
recover on the check. The Negotiable Instruments Law does not
provide that a holder who is not a holder in due course may not in
any case recover on the instrument. The only disadvantage of a
holder who is not in due course is that the negotiable instrument
is subject to defenses as if it were non-negotiable. Among such
defenses is the absence or failure of consideration, which
petitioner sufficiently established in this case. Petitioner issued
the subject check supposedly for a loan in favor of Consing’s
group, who turned out to be a syndicate defrauding gullible
individuals. Since there is in fact no valid loan to speak of, there
is no consideration for the issuance of the check. Consequently,
petitioner cannot be obliged to pay the face value of the check.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Law Firm of Hermosisima & Inso for petitioner.
  Maderazo & Associates for respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the 16 August 2005

Decision2 and 30 November 2005 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57994. The Court of Appeals
affirmed

_______________

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Rollo, pp. 24-32.   Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas
with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Sesinando E. Villon,
concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 34-36.

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the decision of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial

Region, Branch 56, Mandaue City (trial court), with the
deletion of the award of interest, moral damages, attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses. The trial court ruled that
respondents Maria Luisa Judal-Loot and Vicente Loot are
holders in due course of Metrobank Check No. C-MA
142119406 CA and ordered petitioner Robert Dino as
drawer, together with co-defendant Fe Lobitana as
indorser, to solidarily pay respondents the face value of the
check, among others.

The Facts

Sometime in December 1992, a syndicate, one of whose

members posed as an owner of several parcels of land
situated in Canjulao, Lapu-lapu City, approached
petitioner and induced him to lend the group P3,000,000.00
to be secured by a real estate mortgage on the properties. A
member of the group, particularly a woman pretending to
be a certain Vivencia Ompok Consing, even offered to
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the properties,
instead of the usual mortgage contract.4 Enticed and
convinced by the syndicate’s offer, petitioner issued three
Metrobank checks totaling P3,000,000.00, one of which is
Check No. C-MA-142119406-CA postdated 13 February
1993 in the amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to Vivencia
Ompok Consing and/or Fe Lobitana.5
Upon scrutinizing the documents involving the
properties, petitioner discovered that the documents
covered rights over government properties. Realizing he
had been deceived, petitioner advised Metrobank to stop
payment of his checks. However, only the payment of
Check No. C-MA- 142119406-CA was ordered stopped. The
other two checks were already encashed by the payees.

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4 Records, p. 22.
5 Id.

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Meanwhile, Lobitana negotiated and indorsed Check No.

C-MA- 142119406-CA to respondents in exchange for cash
in the sum of P948,000.00, which respondents borrowed
from Metrobank and charged against their credit line.
Before respondents accepted the check, they first inquired
from the drawee bank, Metrobank, Cebu-Mabolo Branch
which is also their depositary bank, if the subject check
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was sufficiently funded, to which Metrobank answered in

the positive. However, when respondents deposited the
check with Metrobank, Cebu-Mabolo Branch, the same was
dishonored by the drawee bank for reason “PAYMENT
STOPPED.”
Respondents filed a collection suit6 against petitioner
and Lobitana before the trial court. In their Complaint,
respondents alleged, among other things, that they are
holders in due course and for value of Metrobank Check
No. C-MA-142119406-CA and that they had no prior
information concerning the transaction between
defendants.
In his Answer, petitioner denied respondents’
allegations that “on the face of the subject check, no
condition or limitation was imposed” and that respondents
are holders in due course and for value of the check. For
her part, Lobitana denied the allegations in the complaint
and basically claimed that the transaction leading to the
issuance of the subject check is a sale of a parcel of land by
Vivencia Ompok Consing to petitioner and that she was
made a payee of the check only to facilitate its discounting.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondents and
declared them due course holders of the subject check,
since there was no privity between respondents and
defendants. The dispositive portion of the 14 March 1996
Decision of the trial court reads:

“In summation, this Court rules for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendants and hereby orders:

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6 Docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-1843.

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Dino vs. Judal-Loot

1.) defendants to pay to Plaintiff, and severally, the amount of

P1,000,000.00 representing the face value of subject Metrobank
check;
2.) to pay to Plaintiff herein, jointly and severally, the sum of
P101,748.00 for accrued and paid interest;
3.) to pay to Plaintiff, jointly and severally, moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00;
4.) to pay to Plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P200,000.00
for attorney’s fees; and
5.) to pay to Plaintiff, jointly and severally, litigation expenses in the
sum of P10,000.00 and costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.”7

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Only petitioner filed an appeal. Lobitana did not appeal

the trial court’s judgment.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding

that respondents are holders in due course of Metrobank
Check No. C-MA-142119406-CA. The Court of Appeals
pointed out that petitioner’s own admission that
respondents were never parties to the transaction among
petitioner, Lobitana, Concordio Toring, Cecilia Villacarlos,
and Consing, proved respondents’ lack of knowledge of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the
person negotiating it. Moreover, respondents verified from
Metrobank whether the check was sufficiently funded
before they accepted it. Therefore, respondents must be
excluded from the ambit of petitioner’s stop payment order.
The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s decision
by deleting the award of interest, moral damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. The Court of
Appeals opined that petitioner “was only exercising
(although incorrectly), what he perceived to be his right to
stop the payment of the check

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7 Rollo, p. 77.

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Dino vs. Judal-Loot

which he rediscounted.” The Court of Appeals ruled that

petitioner acted in good faith in ordering the stoppage of
payment of the subject check and thus, he must not be
made liable for those amounts.
In its 16 August 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision with modifications, thus:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no reversible

error in the decision of the lower court, WE hereby DISMISS the
appeal and AFFIRM the decision of the court a quo with
modifications that the award of interest, moral damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses be deleted.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”8

In its 30 November 2005 Resolution, the Court of

Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
In denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
the Court of Appeals noted that petitioner raised the
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defense that the check is a crossed check for the first time
on appeal (particularly in the motion for reconsideration).
The Court of Appeals rejected such defense considering
that to entertain the same would be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

RESPONDENTS WERE HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE. THE FACT
THAT METROBANK CHECK NO. 142119406 IS A CROSSED
CHECK CONSTITUTES SUFFICIENT WARNING TO THE
RESPONDENTS TO

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8 Id., at p. 31.

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EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE TO

DETERMINE THE TITLE OF THE INDORSER.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UPON THE GROUND THAT
THE ARGUMENTS RELIED UPON HAVE ONLY BEEN RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME. EQUITY DEMANDS THAT THE COURT
OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE MADE AN EXCEPTION TO
PREVENT THE COMMISSION OF MANIFEST WRONG AND
INJUSTICE UPON THE PETITIONER.9

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

Respondents point out that petitioner raised the defense
that Metrobank Check No. C-MA-142119406-CA is a
crossed check for the first time in his motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. Respondents
insist that issues not raised during the trial cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive
to the elementary rules of fair play, justice and due process.
Respondents further assert that a change of theory on
appeal is improper.
In his Answer, petitioner specifically denied, among
others, (1) Paragraph 4 of the Complaint, concerning the
allegation that on the face of the subject check, no condition
or limitation was imposed, and (2) Paragraph 8 of the

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Complaint, regarding the allegation that respondents were

holders in due course and for value of the subject check. In
his “Special Affirmative Defenses,” petitioner claimed that
“for want or lack of the prestation,” he could validly stop
the payment of his check, and that by rediscounting
petitioner’s check, respondents “took the risk of what might
happen on the check.” Essentially, petitioner maintained
that respondents are not holders in due course of the
subject check, and as such, respondents could not recover
any liability on the check from petitioner.

_______________

9 Id., at pp. 14-15.

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 Indeed, petitioner did not expressly state in his Answer

or raise during the trial that Metrobank Check No. C-MA-
142119406-CA is a crossed check. It must be stressed,
however, that petitioner consistently argues that
respondents are not holders in due course of the subject
check, which is one of the possible effects of crossing a
check. The act of crossing a check serves as a warning to
the holder that the check has been issued for a definite
purpose so that the holder thereof must inquire if he has
received the check pursuant to that purpose; otherwise, he
is not a holder in due course.10 Contrary to respondents’
view, petitioner never changed his theory, that respondents
are not holders in due course of the subject check, as would
violate fundamental rules of justice, fair play, and due
process. Besides, the subject check was presented and
admitted as evidence during the trial and respondents did
not and in fact cannot deny that it is a crossed check.
In any event, the Court is clothed with ample authority
to entertain issues or matters not raised in the lower courts
in the interest of substantial justice.11 In Casa Filipina
Realty v. Office of the President,12 the Court held:

“[T]he trend in modern-day procedure is to accord the courts

broad discretionary power such that the appellate court may
consider matters bearing on the issues submitted for resolution
which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored.
Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, their strict and rigid application which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Technicality
should not be allowed

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10 State Investment House v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72764, 13

July 1989, 175 SCRA 310, 315.
11 Phil. Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Court of Appeals, 242 Phil. 497, 503-
504; 159 SCRA 24, 30 (1988). See also Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
159-A Phil. 863, 889; 64 SCRA 610; 683 (1975).
12 311 Phil. 170, 181; 241 SCRA 165, 174-175 (1995).

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to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the

rights and obligations of the parties.”13

Having disposed of the procedural issue, the Court shall

now proceed to the merits of the case. The main issue is
whether respondents are holders in due course of
Metrobank Check No. C-MA 142119406 CA as to entitle
them to collect the face value of the check from its drawer
or petitioner herein.
Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law defines a
holder in due course, thus:

“A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument

under the following conditions:
(a) That it is complete and regular upon its face;
(b) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and
without notice that it has been previously dishonored, if such was
the fact;
(c) That he took it in good faith and for value;
(d) That at the time it was negotiated to him, he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it.”

In the case of a crossed check, as in this case, the

following principles must additionally be considered: A
crossed check (a) may not be encashed but only deposited in
the bank; (b) may be negotiated only once—to one who has
an account with a bank; and (c) warns the holder that it
has been issued for a definite purpose so that the holder
thereof must inquire if he has received the check pursuant
to that purpose; otherwise, he is not a holder in due
course.14

_______________

13 Id.
14 State Investment House v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note
10; Bataan Cigar and Cigarette Factory, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
93048, 3 March 1994, 230 SCRA 643, 648.
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Dino vs. Judal-Loot

Based on the foregoing, respondents had the duty to

ascertain the indorser’s, in this case Lobitana’s, title to the
check or the nature of her possession. This respondents
failed to do. Respondents’ verification from Metrobank on
the funding of the check does not amount to determination
of Lobitana’s title to the check. Failing in this respect,
respondents are guilty of gross negligence amounting to
legal absence of good faith,15 contrary to Section 52(c) of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. Hence, respondents are not
deemed holders in due course of the subject check.16
State Investment House v. Intermediate Appellate
Court17 squarely applies to this case. There, New Sikatuna
Wood Industries, Inc. sold at a discount to State
Investment House three post-dated crossed checks, issued
by Anita Peña Chua naming as payee New Sikatuna Wood
Industries, Inc. The Court found State Investment House
not a holder in due course of the checks. The Court also
expounded on the effect of crossing a check, thus:

“Under usual practice, crossing a check is done by placing two

parallel lines diagonally on the left top portion of the check. The
crossing may be special wherein between the two parallel lines is
written the name of a bank or a business institution, in which
case the drawee should pay only with the intervention of that
bank or company, or crossing may be general wherein between
two parallel diagonal lines are written the words “and Co.” or
none at all as in the case at bar, in which case the drawee should
not encash the same but merely accept the same for deposit.
The effect therefore of crossing a check relates to the mode of
its presentment for payment. Under Section 72 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, presentment for payment to be sufficient must
be made (a) by the holder, or by some person authorized to receive

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15 Vicente R. de Ocampo & Co. v. Gatchalian, No. L-15126, 30 November 1961,

3 SCRA 596, 603.
16 State Investment House v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 10.
17 Id., at pp. 316-317.

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payment on his behalf x x x As to who the holder or authorized

person will be depends on the instructions stated on the face of
the check.
The three subject checks in the case at bar had been crossed
generally and issued payable to New Sikatuna Wood Industries,
Inc. which could only mean that the drawer had intended the
same for deposit only by the rightful person, i.e., the payee named
therein. Apparently, it was not the payee who presented the same
for payment and therefore, there was no proper presentment, and
the liability did not attach to the drawer.
Thus, in the absence of due presentment, the drawer did not
become liable. Consequently, no right of recourse is available to
petitioner against the drawer of the subject checks, private
respondent wife, considering that petitioner is not the proper
party authorized to make presentment of the checks in question.”

In this case, there is no question that the payees of the

check, Lobitana or Consing, were not the ones who
presented the check for payment. Lobitana negotiated and
indorsed the check to respondents in exchange for
P948,000.00. It was respondents who presented the subject
check for payment; however, the check was dishonored for
reason “PAYMENT STOPPED.” In other words, it was not
the payee who presented the check for payment; and thus,
there was no proper presentment. As a result, liability did
not attach to the drawer. Accordingly, no right of recourse
is available to respondents against the drawer of the check,
petitioner herein, since respondents are not the proper
party authorized to make presentment of the subject check.
However, the fact that respondents are not holders in
due course does not automatically mean that they cannot
recover on the check.18 The Negotiable Instruments Law
does not provide that a holder who is not a holder in due
course may not in any case recover on the instrument. The
only disadvantage of a holder who is not in due course is
that the negotiable

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18 Bataan Cigar and Cigarette Factory, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra

note 14 at 649.

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Dino vs. Judal-Loot

instrument is subject to defenses as if it were non-

negotiable.19 Among such defenses is the absence or failure
of consideration,20 which petitioner sufficiently established
in this case. Petitioner issued the subject check supposedly

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for a loan in favor of Consing’s group, who turned out to be

a syndicate defrauding gullible individuals. Since there is
in fact no valid loan to speak of, there is no consideration
for the issuance of the check. Consequently, petitioner
cannot be obliged to pay the face value of the check.
Respondents can collect from the immediate indorser,21
in this case Lobitana. Significantly, Lobitana did not
appeal the trial court’s decision, finding her solidarily liable
to pay, among others, the face value of the subject check.
Therefore, the trial court’s judgment has long become final
and executory as to Lobitana.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE
the 16 August 2005 Decision and 30 November 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
57994.
SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Abad and Perez, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.

Notes.—If instruments payable to named payees or to

their order have not been indorsed in blank, only such
payees or their indorsees can be holders and entitled to
receive payment in their own right. (Bank of the Philippine
Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 534 SCRA 620 [2007]) 

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19 Id., citing Chan Wan v. Tan Kim and Chen So, 109 Phil. 706 (1960).
20 Section 28, Negotiable Instruments Law.
21 Bataan Cigar and Cigarette Factory, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra.

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