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G.R. No. 198660. October 23, 2013.*

TING TING PUA, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES BENITO LO

BUN TIONG and CAROLINE SIOK CHING TENG,
respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; The general rule is that the Supreme Court in
petitions for review on certiorari only concerns itself with questions
of law, not of fact, the resolution of factual issues being the
primary function of lower courts.―The general rule is that this
Court in petitions for review on certiorari only concerns itself with
questions of law, not of fact, the resolution of factual issues being
the primary function of lower courts. However, several exceptions
have been laid down by jurisprudence to allow the scrutiny of the
factual arguments advanced by the contending parties, viz.: (1)
the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings
of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific
evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the
findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the
presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA
are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed
facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of
the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of
both parties. At the very least, therefore, the inconsonance of the
findings of the RTC and the CA regarding the existence of the
loan sanctions the recalibration of the evidence presented by the
parties before the trial court.
Same; Evidence; Presumptions; It has long been established
that where the plaintiff-creditor possesses and submits in evidence
an instrument showing the indebtedness, a presumption that the
credit has not been satisfied arises in her favor.―Certainly, in a
suit for a recovery of sum of money, as here, the plaintiff-creditor
has the

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* THIRD DIVISION.

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Pua vs. Lo Bun Tiong

burden of proof to show that defendant had not paid her the
amount of the contracted loan. However, it has also been long
established that where the plaintiff-creditor possesses and
submits in evidence an instrument showing the indebtedness, a
presumption that the credit has not been satisfied arises in her
favor. Thus, the defendant is, in appropriate instances, required
to overcome the said presumption and present evidence to prove
the fact of payment so that no judgment will be entered against
him.
Same; Same; Same; When an instrument is no longer in the
possession of the person who signed it and it is complete in its
terms “a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until
the contrary is proved.”―The 17 original checks, completed and
delivered to petitioner, are sufficient by themselves to prove the
existence of the loan obligation of the respondents to petitioner.
Note that respondent Caroline had not denied the
genuineness of these checks. Instead, respondents argue that
they were given to various other persons and petitioner had
simply collected all these 17 checks from them in order to damage
respondents’ reputation. This account is not only incredible; it
runs counter to human experience, as enshrined in Sec. 16 of the
NIL which provides that when an instrument is no longer in
the possession of the person who signed it and it is
complete in its terms “a valid and intentional delivery by
him is presumed until the contrary is proved.”
Civil Law; Interest Rates; Article 1956 of the Civil Code,
which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates that no
interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing.―As aptly held by the court a quo, respondents cannot be
obliged to pay the interest of the loan on the ground that the
supposed agreement to pay such interest was not reduced to
writing. Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary
interest, specifically mandates that no interest shall be due unless
it has been expressly stipulated in writing. Thus, the collection of
interest in loans or forbearance of money is allowed only when
these two conditions concur: (1) there was an express stipulation
for the payment of interest; (2) the agreement for the payment of
the interest was reduced in writing. Absent any of these two

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conditions, the money debtor cannot be made liable for interest.

Thus, petitioner is entitled only to the principal amount of the
loan plus the allowable legal interest from the time of the
demand, at the rate of 6% per annum.

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Pua vs. Lo Bun Tiong

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a resolution of the

Supreme Court.
   The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
  Federico N. Alday, Jr. for petitioner.
  Lydio J. Cataluña for respondents.

RESOLUTION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Under consideration is the Motion for Reconsideration
interposed by petitioner Ting Ting Pua (Pua) of our
Resolution dated April 18, 2012 effectively affirming the
Decision1 and Resolution2 dated March 31, 2011 and
September 26, 2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93755, which, in turn, reversed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of
Manila, Branch 29 in Civil Case No. 97-83027.
As culled from the adverted RTC Decision, as adopted
for the most part by the CA, the antecedent facts may be
summarized as follows:
The controversy arose from a Complaint for a Sum of
Money3 filed by petitioner Pua against respondent-spouses
Benito Lo Bun Tiong (Benito) and Caroline Siok Ching
Teng (Caroline). In the complaint, Pua prayed that, among
other things, respondents, or then defendants, pay Pua the
amount of eight million five hundred thousand pesos (PhP
8,500,000), covered by a check. (Exhibit “A,” for plaintiff)

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1 Rollo, pp. 47-65. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and
concurred in by Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Ramon A.
Cruz.
2 Id., at pp. 67-68.
3 Records, pp. 1-4, dated April 11, 1997.

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Pua vs. Lo Bun Tiong

During trial, petitioner Pua clarified that the

PhP8,500,000 check was given by respondents to pay the
loans they obtained from her under a compounded interest
agreement on various dates in 1988.4 As Pua narrated, her
sister, Lilian Balboa (Lilian), vouched for respondents’
ability to pay so that when respondents approached her,
she immediately acceded and lent money to respondents
without requiring any collateral except post-dated checks
bearing the borrowed amounts.5 In all, respondents issued
176 checks for a total amount of one million nine hundred
seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP1,975,000). These checks
were dishonored upon presentment to the drawee bank.7
As a result of the dishonor, petitioner demanded
payment. Respondents, however, pleaded for more time
because of their financial difficulties.8 Petitioner Pua
obliged and simply reminded the respondents of their
indebtedness from time to time.9
Sometime in September 1996, when their financial
situation turned better, respondents allegedly called and
asked petitioner Pua for the computation of their loan
obligations.10 Hence, petitioner handed them a
computation dated October 2, 199611 which showed that, at
the agreed 2% compounded interest rate per month, the
amount of the loan payable to petitioner rose to thirteen
million two hundred eighteen thousand five hundred forty-
four pesos and 20/100 (PhP13,218,544.20).12 On receiving
the computation, the re-

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4  TSN, February 5, 1998, pp. 5, 8-9, 11-13.
5  Id., at p. 16.
6  Exhibits “C” to “C-16”; TSN, February 5, 1998, pp. 12-14, 19.
7  Exhibits “E” to “E-11.”
8  TSN, February 5, 1998, p. 20; TSN, October 9, 2002, p. 20; TSN,
April 23, 2003, p. 15.
9  Id., at p. 22; TSN, October 9, 2002, p. 22.
10 TSN, February 5, 1998, p. 22; TSN, March 18, 1998, p. 12.
11 Exhibit “D”; TSN, March 18, 1998, p. 12.
12 Id.; TSN, October 9, 2002, p. 18.

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spondents asked petitioner to reduce their indebtedness to

PhP8,500,000.13 Wanting to get paid the soonest possible
time, petitioner Pua agreed to the lowered amount.14
Respondents then delivered to petitioner Asiatrust
Check No. BND057750 bearing the reduced amount of
PhP8,500,000 dated March 30, 1997 with the assurance
that the check was good.15 In turn, respondents demanded
the return of the 17 previously dishonored checks.
Petitioner, however, refused to return the bad checks and
advised respondents that she will do so only after the
encashment of Asiatrust Check No. BND057750.16
Like the 17 checks, however, Check No. BND057750 was
also dishonored when it was presented by petitioner to the
drawee bank. Hence, as claimed by petitioner, she decided
to file a complaint to collect the money owed her by
respondents.
For the defense, both respondents Caroline and Benito
testified along with Rosa Dela Cruz Tuazon (Tuazon), who
was the OIC-Manager of Asiatrust-Binondo Branch in
1997. Respondents categorically denied obtaining a loan
from petitioner.17 Respondent Caroline, in particular,
narrated that, in August 1995, she and petitioner’s sister,
Lilian, forged a partnership that operated a mahjong
business. Their agreement was for Lilian to serve as the
capitalist while respondent Caroline was to act as the
cashier. Caroline also agreed to use her personal checks to
pay for the operational expenses including the payment of
the winners of the games.18 As the partners anticipated
that Caroline will not always be in town to prepare these
checks, she left with Lilian five (5) pre-signed

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13 TSN, April 16, 1998, p. 5.
14 Id., at pp. 6-7.
15 TSN, June 18, 2003, pp. 4, 7.
16 TSN, February 5, 1998, p. 25; TSN, March 18, 1998, pp. 12-13.
17 TSN, August 13, 2003, p. 6.
18 TSN, July 16, 1998, pp. 5-6.

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and consecutively numbered checks19 on the condition that

these checks will only be used to cover the costs of the

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business operations and in no circumstance will the

amount of the checks exceed PhP 5,000.20
In March 1996, however, respondent Caroline and Lilian
had a serious disagreement that resulted in the dissolution
of their partnership and the cessation of their business. In
the haste of the dissolution and as a result of their bitter
separation, respondent Caroline alleged that she forgot
about the five (5) pre-signed checks she left with Lilian.21 It
was only when Lilian’s husband, Vicente Balboa (Vicente),
filed a complaint for sum of money in February 1997
against respondents to recover five million one hundred
seventy-five thousand two hundred fifty pesos (PhP
5,175,250), covering three of the five post-dated and pre-
signed checks.22
Respondent Caroline categorically denied having
completed Check No. BND057750 by using a check writer
or typewriter as she had no check writer and she had
always completed checks in her own handwriting.23 She
insisted that petitioner and her sister completed the check
after its delivery.24 Furthermore, she could not have gone
to see petitioner Pua with her husband as they had been
separated in fact for nearly 10 years.25 As for the 17 checks
issued by her in 1988, Caroline alleged that they were not
intended for Pua but were issued for the benefit of other
persons.26 Caroline postulated that the

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19 TSN, July 16, 1998, p. 5; Exhibits “6” to “10.”
20 TSN, July 16, 1998, p. 7.
21 Id., at p. 9.
22 See Spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng v.
Vicente Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 504.
23 TSN, July 16, 1998, p. 11; TSN, September 10, 2003, pp. 10, 14.
24 TSN, September 10, 2003, pp. 9-11.
25 TSN, July 16, 1998, p. 12.
26 TSN, July 15, 1999, p. 11.

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Pua vs. Lo Bun Tiong

complaint is designed to allow Pua’s sister, Lilian, to

recover her losses in the foreign exchange business she had
with Caroline in the 1980s.
Respondent Benito corroborated Caroline’s testimony
respecting their almost a decade separation.27 As such, he

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could not have had accompanied his wife to see petitioner

to persuade the latter to lower down any alleged
indebtedness.28 In fact, Benito declared, before the filing of
the Complaint, he had never met petitioner Pua, let alone
approached her with his wife to borrow money.29 He
claimed that he was impleaded in the case to attach his
property and force him to enter into an amicable
settlement with petitioner.30 Benito pointed out that Check
No. BND057750 was issued under Asiatrust Account No.
5513-0054-9, which is solely under the name of his wife.31
The witness for the respondents, Ms. Tuazon, testified
that respondent Caroline opened Asiatrust Account No.
5513-0054-9 in September 1994.32 She claimed that the
average maintaining balance of respondent Caroline was
PhP 2,000 and the highest amount issued by Caroline from
her account was PhP 435,000.33 She maintained that
respondent Caroline had always completed her checks with
her own handwriting and not with a check writer. On
October 15, 1996, Caroline’s checking account was closed at
the instance of the bank due to 69 instances of check
issuance against insufficient balance.34

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27 TSN, June 22, 2000, pp. 12-14; TSN, February 4, 2002, p. 20.
28 TSN, August 23, 2000, p. 3.
29  TSN, June 22, 2000, pp. 5-6; TSN, August 23, 2000, p. 3; TSN,
February 4, 2002, pp. 8, 14, 16.
30 TSN, June 22, 2000, p. 6.
31  TSN, June 22, 2000, p. 11; TSN, August 23, 2000, pp. 3, 5-6; TSN,
February 4, 2002, pp. 15-16.
32 TSN, May 29, 2002, p. 18.
33 Id., at p. 15.
34 TSN, May 29, 2002, pp. 20, 24-28, 31.

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After trial, the RTC issued its Decision dated January

31, 2006 in favor of petitioner. In holding thus, the RTC
stated that the possession by petitioner of the checks
signed by Caroline, under the Negotiable Instruments Law,
raises the presumption that they were issued and delivered
for a valuable consideration. On the other hand, the court a
quo discounted the testimony for the defense completely
denying respondents’ loan obligation to Pua.35

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35 The trial court held:
In the present case, the Tiongs dispute Pua’s allegation that they
contracted several loans with the latter. They try to persuade this Court
that the claim holds no water largely because the existence of said loan
has not in the first place been established. Anent such assertion, the
evidence presented before this Court belie such contention.
x x x x
Thus, in a case of an incomplete but delivered negotiable instrument,
the law creates a disputable presumption of valid and regular
delivery in favor of the holder. Furthermore, once issued, the law
likewise gives the holder the benefit of the presumption that said
instrument was issued for a sufficient consideration and that the
signatory thereof has been a party thereto for value. The law
therefore dispenses the party in possession of the duty of proving rightful
delivery as well the fact that it has been issued for a valuable
consideration and participation of the signatory thereof. x x x
In the course of the trial, several checks were presented by Pua.
Seventeen (17) checks were offered as representing the principal amount
of the loan of P1,975,000.00. And the check subject of the herein
controversy was likewise presented as replacement of the 17 dishonored
checks and covering the agreed compounded interest that accrued since
the time of borrowing. Caroline, however, tried to discredit said testimony
through its concocted mahjong business story.
x x x x
[Caroline’s] testimony deserves scant consideration if not, unworthy of
belief. x x x Moreover, defendant Caroline admitted the genuineness
and the due execution of the checks (Exhibit

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Pua vs. Lo Bun Tiong

The trial court, however, refused to order respondents to

pay petitioner the amount of PhP 8,500,000 considering
that the agreement to pay interest on the loan was not
expressly stipulated in writing by the parties. The RTC,
instead, ordered respondents to pay the principal amount
of the loan as represented by the 17 checks plus legal
interest from the date of demand. As rectified,36 the
dispositive portion of RTC’s Decision reads:

Defendant-spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline

Siok Ching Teng, are hereby ordered jointly and solidarily:
1. To pay plaintiff P1,975,000.00 plus 12% interest per
annum from September 30, 1998, until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff attorney’s fees of P200,000.00; and
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3. To pay the costs of the suit.

Aggrieved, respondents went to the CA arguing that the

court a quo erred in finding that they obtained and are
liable for a loan from petitioner. To respondents, petitioner
has not sufficiently proved the existence of the loan that
they suppos-

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C [to] C-16) offered by Pua as those which make up the
P1,975,000 accumulated loan of Caroline Teng. However, despite
such admission she denies that the same were issued in favor of Pua.
According to her these were issued in favor of other people and not the
herein plaintiff. Such denial does not have a leg to stand on. How could all
seventeen (17) checks find their way to Ting Ting Pua’s hands if they were
not indeed personally handed to her? It is highly unlikely for a busy
person like the plaintiff to spend her time appropriating or much less
trouble herself in getting checks which might even place her in serious
trouble and put her business operations in jeopardy. A likely impossibility
is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility. Rollo, pp. 77-82.
(Emphasis supplied.)
36 By Order dated April 10, 2007 to reflect the exact date from which to
reckon the computation of the interest. Records, pp. 621-622.

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edly acquired from her way back in the late 1980s by any
written agreement or memorandum.
By Decision of March 31, 2011, as reiterated in a
Resolution dated September 26, 2011, the appellate court
set aside the RTC Decision holding that Asiatrust Bank
Check No. BND057550 was an incomplete delivered
instrument and that petitioner has failed to prove the
existence of respondents’ indebtedness to her. Hence, the
CA added, petitioner does not have a cause of action
against respondents.37

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37  The Court of Appeals held: For one, Ting Ting has not
established defendants-appellants’ indebtedness to her. She failed
to establish this alleged indebtedness in writing. No proof of any
sort, not even a memorandum or a jotting in a notebook that she
released money in favor defendants-appellants sometime in 1988

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was presented. Thus, the RTC erred when it failed to consider this fact
in giving credence to Ting Ting’s testimony.
Moreover, the seventeen (17) checks, though they may prove to
have been issued for valuable considerations, do not sufficiently
prove [respondents’] indebtedness to Ting Ting. While now in her
possession, Ting Ting failed to establish for whose accounts they were
deposited and subsequently dishonored. If at all, they bolster
[respondents’] position that the seventeen (17) checks were issued and
delivered to different people and not [petitioner]. Especially so that some
of these checks were not even deposited nor dishonored, but remained
stale under circumstances that are not attributable to the fault of
[respondents].
Ting Ting’s handicaps — her having no contract that proves
indebtedness; her lack of memorandum, journal, or evidence proving that
money was actually released to [respondents’] with a needed note on the
amount involved — more than sufficiently prove the absence of
consideration to support the check. And in so failing to dispense with her
burden of proving [respondents’] indebtedness, Ting Ting consequently
has no cause of action to pursue here. Necessarily therefore, her
Complaint filed on April 18, 1997 must be dismissed. Rollo, pp. 63-64
(Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, petitioner came to this Court via a Petition for

Review on Certiorari38 alleging grievous reversible error on
the part of the CA in reversing the findings of the court a
quo.
As adverted to at the outset, the Court, in a Minute
Resolution dated April 18, 2012, resolved to deny the
petition.39
In this Motion for Reconsideration,40 petitioner pleads
that this Court take a second hard look on the facts and
issues of the present case and affirm the RTC’s case
disposition. Petitioner argues, in the main, that the finding
of the appellate court that petitioner has not established
respondents’ indebtedness to her is not supported by the
evidence on record and is based solely on respondents’
general denial of liability.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued in their
Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration dated October
6, 2012 that the CA correctly ruled that Asiatrust Check
No. BND057550 is an incomplete instrument which found
its way into petitioner’s hands and that the petitioner
failed to prove respondents’ indebtedness to her. Petitioner,
so respondents contend, failed to show to whom the 17 1988
checks were delivered, for what consideration or purpose,
and under whose account said checks were deposited or
negotiated.
Clearly, the issue in the present case is factual in nature
as it involves an inquiry into the very existence of the debt
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supposedly owed by respondents to petitioner.

The general rule is that this Court in petitions for
review on certiorari only concerns itself with questions of
law, not of fact,41 the resolution of factual issues being the
primary func-

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38 Dated November 17, 2011; Rollo, pp. 8-42.
39 Rollo, p. 112.
40 Id., at pp. 113-140.
41  Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme
Court.—A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court
of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Su-

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Pua vs. Lo Bun Tiong

tion of lower courts.42 However, several exceptions have

been laid down by jurisprudence to allow the scrutiny of
the factual arguments advanced by the contending parties,
viz.: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on
which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of
absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the
CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both parties.43 At the very
least, therefore, the inconsonance of the findings of the
RTC and the CA re-

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preme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which
must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same

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provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or

proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis supplied.)
42 Express Investments III Private Ltd. v. Bayan Telecommunications,
Inc., G.R. Nos. 175418-20, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 50; citing Dela
Rosa v. Michaelmar Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 182262, April 13, 2011, 648
SCRA 721, 729 and Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512,
May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 281, 293-294.
43 Cereno v. CA, G.R. No. 167366, September 26, 2012, 682 SCRA 18,
citing International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. FGU Insurance
Corporation, G.R. No. 161539, June 28, 2008, 556 SCRA 194, 199; Abalos
and Sps. Salazar v. Heirs of Vicente Torio, G.R. No. 175444, December 14,
2011, 662 SCRA 450, 456-457, citing Spouses Andrada v. Pilhino Sales
Corporation, G.R. No. 156448, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 1, 10.

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Pua vs. Lo Bun Tiong

garding the existence of the loan sanctions the

recalibration of the evidence presented by the parties
before the trial court.
In the main, petitioner asserts that respondents owed
her a sum of money way back in 1988 for which the latter
gave her several checks. These checks, however, had all
been dishonored and petitioner has not been paid the
amount of the loan plus the agreed interest. In 1996,
respondents approached her to get the computation of their
liability including the 2% compounded interest. After
bargaining to lower the amount of their liability,
respondents supposedly gave her a postdated check bearing
the discounted amount of the money they owed to
petitioner. Like the 1988 checks, the drawee bank likewise
dishonored this check. To prove her allegations, petitioner
submitted the original copies of the 17 checks issued by
respondent Caroline in 1988 and the check issued in 1996,
Asiatrust Check No. BND057750. In ruling in her favor,
the RTC sustained the version of the facts presented by
petitioner.
Respondents, on the other hand, completely deny the
existence of the debt asserting that they had never
approached petitioner to borrow money in 1988 or in 1996.
They hypothesize, instead, that petitioner Pua is simply
acting at the instance of her sister, Lilian, to file a false
charge against them using a check left to fund a gambling
business previously operated by Lilian and respondent
Caroline. While not saying so in express terms, the

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appellate court considered respondents’ denial as worthy of

belief.
After another circumspect review of the records of the
present case, however, this Court is inclined to depart from
the findings of the CA.
Certainly, in a suit for a recovery of sum of money, as
here, the plaintiff-creditor has the burden of proof to show
that defendant had not paid her the amount of the
contracted loan. However, it has also been long established
that where the plaintiff-creditor possesses and submits in
evidence an instrument showing the indebtedness, a
presumption that the
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credit has not been satisfied arises in her favor. Thus, the
defendant is, in appropriate instances, required to
overcome the said presumption and present evidence to
prove the fact of payment so that no judgment will be
entered against him.44
In overruling the trial court, however, the CA opined
that petitioner “failed to establish [the] alleged
indebtedness in writing.”45 Consequently, so the CA held,
respondents were under no obligation to prove their
defense. Clearly, the CA had discounted the value of the
only hard pieces of evidence extant in the present case —
the checks issued by respondent Caroline in 1988 and 1996
that were in the possession of, and presented in court by,
petitioner.
In Pacheco v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court has
expressly recognized that a check “constitutes an evidence
of indebtedness”47 and is a veritable “proof of an
obligation.”48 Hence, it can be used “in lieu of and for the
same purpose as a promissory note.”49 In fact, in the
seminal case of Lozano v. Martinez,50 We pointed out that a
check functions more than a promissory note since it not
only contains an undertaking to pay an amount of money
but is an “order addressed to a bank and partakes of a
representation that the drawer has funds on deposit
against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure
payment upon its presentation to the bank.”51 This Court
reiterated this rule in the relatively recent Lim v.
Mindanao Wines and Liquour Galleria stating that “[a]
check, the entries of which are in writing, could prove a
loan transac-
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44  Francisco, Ricardo J., EVIDENCE: RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES,
RULES 128-134 (3rd ed., 1996), pp. 386-387; citations omitted.
45 Rollo, p. 63.
46 377 Phil. 627; 319 SCRA 595 (1999).
47 Id., at p. 637; p. 603.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 No. L-63419, December 18, 1986, 146 SCRA 323.
51 Id., emphasis supplied.

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tion.”52 This very same principle underpins Section 24 of

the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL):

Section 24. Presumption of consideration.—Every

negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been
issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose
signature appears thereon to have become a party for value.

Consequently, the 17 original checks, completed and

delivered to petitioner, are sufficient by themselves to
prove the existence of the loan obligation of the
respondents to petitioner. Note that respondent Caroline
had not denied the genuineness of these checks.53
Instead, respondents argue that they were given to various
other persons and petitioner had simply collected all these
17 checks from them in order to damage respondents’
reputation.54 This account is not only incredible; it runs
counter to human experience, as enshrined in Sec. 16 of the
NIL which provides that when an instrument is no
longer in the possession of the person who

_______________
52 G.R. No. 175851, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 628, citing Gaw v. Chua,
574 Phil. 640, 654; 551 SCRA 505, 519 (2008).
53 TSN, July 15, 1999, pp. 10-11.
Atty. Abdul:  I am showing to you, Madam Witness, several
checks which were previously marked as Exhibit C, C-1, C-2, C-3
and up to Exhibit C-16 inclusive, signed by Caroline Lo, can you
please tell the Honorable Court whose checks are those?
[Caroline]: Me sir.
Atty. Abdul:  And the signatures Caroline Lo are your
signatures?
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[Caroline]: Yes sir.
Atty. Abdul:  And that you issued these checks in favor of the
plaintiffs in payment of your obligation to the said plaintiff?
[Caroline]:  I issued these checks not for [her] but for other
persons, for different depositors.
54 Id.

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signed it and it is complete in its terms “a valid and

intentional delivery by him is presumed until the
contrary is proved.”
The appellate court’s justification in giving credit to
respondents’ contention that the respondents had delivered
the 17 checks to persons other than petitioner lies on the
supposed failure of petitioner “to establish for whose
accounts [the checks] were deposited and subsequently
dishonored.”55 This is clearly contrary to the evidence on
record. It seems that the appellate court overlooked the
original copies of the bank return slips offered by petitioner
in evidence. These return slips show that the 1988 checks
issued by respondent Caroline were dishonored by the
drawee bank[s] because they were “drawn against
insufficient funds.”56 Further, a close scrutiny of these
return slips will reveal that the checks were deposited
either in petitioner’s account57 or in the account of her
brother, Ricardo Yulo — a fact she had previously testified
to explaining that petitioner indorsed some checks to her
brother to pay for a part of the capital she used in her
financing business.58
As for the Asiatrust check issued by respondent Caroline
in 1996 to substitute the compounded value of the 1988
checks, the appellate court likewise sympathized with
respondents’ version of the story holding that it is
buttressed by respondents’ allegations describing the same
defense made in the two related cases filed against them by
petitioner’s brother-in-law, Vicente Balboa. These related
cases consisted of a criminal case for violation of BP 2259
and a civil case for collection

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55 Rollo, p. 64.
56 See Exhibits “E” to “E-11.”
57 Under the name Ting Ting Yulo, as acknowledged by respondents.

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58 TSN, October 9, 2002, pp. 19-20; TSN, August 13, 2003, pp. 9-10.
59  These cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 277576 to 78 in
the MTC of Manila. On appeal, the RTC docketed the case as Criminal
Case Nos. 02-204544-46.

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of sum of money60 involving three (3) of the five (5)

consecutively numbered checks she allegedly left with
Lilian.61 It should be noted, however, that while
respondents were exculpated from their criminal liability,62
in Sps. Benito Lo Bun

_______________
60  Docketed as Civil Case No. 97-82225 in the RTC of Manila. On
appeal, it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 61457. See Exhibit “G.”
61 The CA held:
Second, defendants-appellants insists that the subject check bearing
the amount of Eight Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P8,500,000.00) was never issued in favor of plaintiff-appellee, but was
actually one of the five (5) blank checks which Caroline pre-signed and left
with Lilian sometime in January 1996, but because of a squabble between
the two, both decided to fold up their mahjong business without Caroline
retrieving the five (5) blank checks left in Lilian’s possession. Caroline
even claimed that the payee “CASH,” the amount of “Eight Million Five
Hundred Thousand Only,” its numerical expression “P8,500,000.00,” and
the date “March 30, 1997” were all typewritten insertions of the subject
check, and are thus contrary to her usual manner of issuing checks.
Third, a separate civil case was filed against defendants-appellants
involving three (3) of the five (5) checks referred to by Caroline as those
which she pre-signed and left with Lilian on account of their mahjong
business.
Fourth, Caroline’s allegation that she pre-signed five (5) blank checks
and left with Lilian was further bolstered in her Counter-Affidavit she
filed relative to a preliminary investigation on a case filed by Vicente
Balboa, Lilian’s husband. Indicated therein were the Asia Trust Bank
blank checks bearing the numbers BNDO57546, BNDO57547,
BNDO57548, BNDO57549, and BNDO57550, the last check being the
same check offered in evidence in this case. Rollo, pp. 61-62.
62  The MTC acquitted Caroline of the offenses charged for failure of
the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The MTC,
however, found Caroline civilly liable in favor of respondent for the
amounts covered by these checks. On appeal to the RTC, the civil liability
was deleted on the ground that a civil case for collection of money

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involving the same checks were filed prior to the filing of the criminal
case. See Respondents’ Exhibit “2.”

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Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng v. Vicente Balboa,63

this Court sustained the factual findings of the appellate
court in the civil case finding respondents civilly liable to
pay the amount of the checks.
It bears to note that the Decision of the appellate court
categorically debunked the same defense advanced by
respondents in the present case primarily because of
Caroline’s admission to the contrary. The Decision of the
appellate court found without any reversible error by this
Court reads, thus:

The claim of Caroline Siok Ching Teng that the three (3)
checks were part of the blank checks she issued and
delivered to Lilian Balboa, wife of plaintiff-appellee, and
intended solely for the operational expenses of their
mahjong business is belied by her admission that she issued
three (3) checks (Exhs. “A”, “B” “C”) because Vicente showed
the listing of their account totaling P5,175,250.00 (TSN,
November 17, 1997, p. 10).64 x x x

Clearly, respondents’ defense that Caroline left blank

checks with petitioner’s sister who, it is said, is now
determined to recoup her past losses and bring financial
ruin to respondents by falsifying the same blank checks,
had already been thoroughly passed upon and rejected by
this Court. It cannot, therefore, be used to support
respondents’ denial of their liability.
Respondents’ other defenses are equally unconvincing.
They assert that petitioner could not have accepted a check
worth PhP 8.5 million considering that she should have
known that respondent Caroline had issued several checks
for

_______________
63  566 Phil. 492, 501; 542 SCRA 504, 507 (2008). The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads: “WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. The Decision dated November 20, 2002 and Resolution dated
April 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.”
64 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 61457, pp. 7-8; exhibit “G.”

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PhP 25,000 each in favor of Lilian and all of them had

bounced.65 Needless to state, an act done contrary to law
cannot be sustained to defeat a legal obligation; repeated
failure to honor obligations covered by several negotiable
instruments cannot serve to defeat yet another obligation
covered by another instrument.
Indeed, it seems that respondent Caroline had displayed
a cavalier attitude towards the value, and the obligation
concomitant with the issuance, of a check. As attested to by
respondents’ very own witness, respondent Caroline has a
documented history of issuing insufficiently funded checks
for 69 times, at the very least.66 This fact alone bolsters
petitioner’s allegation that the checks delivered to her by
respondent Caroline were similarly not funded.
In Magdiwang Realty Corp. v. Manila Banking Corp.,
We stressed that the quantum of evidence required in civil
cases — preponderance of evidence — “is a phrase which,
in the last analysis, means probability to truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.”67 Based on the evidence submitted
by the parties and the legal presumptions arising
therefrom, petitioner’s evidence outweighs that of
respondents. This preponderance of evidence in favor of
Pua requires that a judgment ordering respondents to pay
their obligation be entered.
As aptly held by the court a quo, however, respondents
cannot be obliged to pay the interest of the loan on the
ground that the supposed agreement to pay such interest
was not reduced to writing. Article 1956 of the Civil Code,
which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates
that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly
stipulated in

_______________
65 TSN, July 16, 1998, p. 17. Exhibits “6” to “10.”
66 TSN, May 29, 2002, pp. 20, 24-28, 31.
67 G.R. No. 195592, September 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 251, 265, emphasis
supplied.

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writing.68 Thus, the collection of interest in loans or

forbearance of money is allowed only when these two
conditions concur: (1) there was an express stipulation for
the payment of interest; (2) the agreement for the payment
of the interest was reduced in writing.69 Absent any of
these two conditions, the money debtor cannot be made
liable for interest. Thus, petitioner is entitled only to the
principal amount of the loan plus the allowable legal
interest from the time of the demand,70 at the rate of 6%
per annum.71
Respondent Benito cannot escape the joint and solidary
liability to pay the loan on the ground that the obligation
arose from checks solely issued by his wife. Without any
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the proceeds
of the loan redounded to the benefit of their family. Hence,
the conjugal partnership is liable therefor.72 The
unsupported allegation that respondents were separated in
fact, standing alone, does

_______________
68  See also Pan Pacific Service Contractors, Inc. and Ricardo Del
Rosario v. Equitable PCI Bank, formerly The Philippine Commercial
International Bank, G.R. No. 169975, March 18, 2010, 616 SCRA 102.
69 Prisma Construction and Development Corporation and Rogelio S.
Pantaleon v. Arthur Menchavez, G.R. No. 160545, March 9, 2010, 614
SCRA 590; citing Tan v. Valdehueza, 160 Phil. 760, 767; 66 SCRA 61, 66
(1975) and Ching v. Nicdao, G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA
316, 361.
70  See Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78, 95; citing Article 1169 of the Civil
Code, which provides: “Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in
delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from
them the fulfillment of their obligation.”
71 See Circular No. 799 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas which took
effect on July 1, 2013.
72  Article 121, Family Code: The conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: x x x (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited
x  x  x. See also Carlos v. Abelardo, G.R. No. 146504, April 9, 2002, 380
SCRA 361.

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not persuade this Court to solely bind respondent Caroline

and exempt Benito. As the head of the family, there is more
reason that respondent Benito should answer for the
liability incurred by his wife presumably in support of their
family.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court dated April 18,
2012 is set aside and a new one entered REVERSING and
SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated March 31, 2011 and
the Resolution dated September 26, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93755. The Decision in Civil
Case No. 97-83027 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the
City of Manila, Branch 29 is REINSTATED with
MODIFICATION.
Accordingly, respondents Benito Lo Bun Tiong and
Caroline Siok Ching Teng are ordered jointly and solidarily
to pay petitioner PhP 1,975,000 plus 6% interest per
annum from April 18, 1997, until fully paid, and
P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.

Peralta, Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Motion for Reconsideration granted.

Notes.―In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised by the parties and passed upon by the Supreme
Court. (Dueñas vs. Guce-Africa, 603 SCRA 11 [2009])
Time and again, the Supreme Court has held that its
jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 is limited only to questions of law, save for certain
exceptions. (Air France Philippines/KLM Air France vs. De
Camilis, 603 SCRA 684 [2009])
――o0o――

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