Why did Pakistan lose the war of 1971?
Ahmad Faruqui
SEPTEMBER 12, 2017
As I did in the discussion of the 1965 war, I am going to cite from some experts whose objectivity about
Pakistan’s capabilities is beyond reproach.
Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan: It’s Army, and the Wars Within, Oxford University
Press, 2008.
Contrary to popular belief, 1971 witnessed not one but three major conflicts in the
subcontinent: one was a civil war within Pakistan. Another was a war with India… (and the third
was) a Pakistani riposte from West Pakistan into Indian territory that began on 3 December
1971. (T)he result for Pakistan was abject failure, as the military regime blundered from a
muddled campaign in the Eastern Wing to a fruitless adventure in the west. Lack of a clear and
attainable goal for the war in the west reflected another failure of command and execution. …
(Besides the HRC report, commissioned by President Bhutto) The Pakistan Army did commission
its own review of the war… it was not distributed widely… The review was very critical and
incisive… Unequivocally, the GHQ declared that ‘()he war on the West Pakistan borders was
started much too late to influence the battle of East Pakistan. By 3 Dec(ember) 1971, (the)
enemy had gained a firm foothold on the soil of East Pakistan, destroyed our air force in that
sector and paralysed all communications in that wing… Had a more broad based policy
formulation machinery existed, a timely and correct decision may have been taken which may
have helped either to avert total disaster in East Pakistan or may have put us in a better
bargaining position.’ … The gap between perception and reality is epitomized in General
Yahya’s statement to the Hamoodur Rehman Commission and in his deposition to the Lahore
High Court of 1978… (he) maintains firmly that India launched the attacks on the western front
on 3 December, and that with ‘regard to the military defence of Pakistan, the strategy was
framed with the proposition that fight shall take place with India on the borders of both wings.
Our main aim was to continue fighting… A detailed analysis of the air, sea and land operations
by the GHQ’s own team also lead to some broad conclusions that were devastating… Air
support was deemed inadequate and delays in provision of ground support for the Pakistan
Army did allow it to fight defensive battles.
Most of the formations have complained that it had taken 4 to 6 hours for their air requests to
be met.’ The critique did not spare the army’s own operations… (The) lack of training of armour
and infantry to fight as a cohesive team showed in almost all aspects… Commanders and staff at
all levels in the army were unaware of the capabilities of armour… The infantry was ill-trained,
under-equipped, and not ready for war. New battalions were sent into action within six months
of training… No wonder then that the Pakistan Army failed to live up to expectations in its area
of expertise. As usual, a cloak of secrecy was placed over the Pakistan Army’s shortcomings,
whereas public discussion and debate would have allowed lessons to be learned and applied.
Brian Cloughley, “A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections,” Fifth Edition,
Carrel Books, 2016.1
After it became clear that East Pakistan would fall to Indian forces in late November 1971,
Pakistan opened another front in the border between West Pakistan and India.) The campaign
(in the West) was a disaster for Pakistan. Poor planning; indecision about deployment; hasty
and countermanded regrouping; inadequate or even non-existent coordination between
formations; inability to seize the moment for exploitation; lack of cooperation between GHQ
and air HQ; bungling of movement control procedures — the list of failures is long.
Had nothing been done in the years 1965-71 to hone the skills of the Pakistan Army? It certainly
seemed so.
Feroze Hassan khan, Eatıng Grass
A Pakistani military crackdown on March 25, 1971 would prove to be the proverbial last straw.
The strike on Bengali dissidents morphed into a civil war, and refugees poured into India… Delhi
finally intervened militarily, resulting in a major war in November and December 1971… (T)he
Pakistani army launched an attack from West Pakistan in the hope of reversing the Indian
advances. It did not succeed… The war now was reaching a peak and spreading in both wings of
Pakistan. The Indian navy successfully conducted a blockade of all ports of East Pakistan and in
the west, effectively attacking the Pakistani coastline and destroying key targets around Karachi
and other Pakistani lifelines. Within three days the Indian Air Force was able to establish air
superiority, and both wings of Pakistan’s territory were strategically dissected and isolated. The
only choice left to Pakistan was to launch a riposte with the last reserves of the its strike corps
in West Pakistan… India then launched the final assault on the capital of East Pakistan on
December 15. The next day (General) Niazi surrendered.
Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country, Penguins Books, 2011.
A common definition of tragedy is that of a noble figure betrayed and destroyed by some inner
flaw. The Pakistani military is in some ways an admirable institution, but it suffers from one
tragic feature which has been with it from the beginning, which has defined its whole character
and world view, which has done terrible damage to Pakistan and which would in some
circumstances destroy and its army altogether. This is the military’s obsession with India in
general, and Kashmir in particular. Speaking of the average Pakistani officer of today, General
Naqvi told me:
“He has no doubt in his mind that the adversary is India, and that the whole raison d’etre of the
army is to defend against India. His image of Indians is of an anti-Pakistani, anti-Muslim,
treacherous people. So he feels that he must be always ready to fight against India.” (Defense
analyst Ziad Hamid’s) views were the following: “We say that if India tries to break up Pakistan
by supporting insurgents like the Baloch nationalists then our response should be to break up
India. In any case, we owe them payback for what they did do to us in East Pakistan… India is
not nearly as strong as it looks. The fault lines of the Indian Federation are much deeper than
those of Pakistan.”
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan, MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000.
In 1971, a civil war broke in East Pakistan out after the Government of Pakistan, based in the
West, decided on 25 March to take military action against the party that had won the national
elections. By the second week of April, the Army was able to assert its control over the major
cities but not in the rural areas.) The initial success of the Army was not sustained for a number
of reasons. First, the Army authorities lacked public support… Second, the military action
transformed the resistance movement into a war of liberation. … Third, India’s role was critical
to sustaining the insurgency and contributed to tilting the balance against Pakistan… Pakistan
began a desperate search for political settlement in August-September, primarily on the advice
of friendly countries including China, the US and Iran. … By November, India had come to the
conclusion that it would have to undertake direct military action to dislodge the Pakistan
military from East Pakistan… (India’s) strategy was to build enough pressure on the Pakistan
Army so that it would make a retaliatory move on the West Pakistan-India border, thereby
giving a justification for an all-out invasion of East Pakistan. This strategy paid off (and Pakistan
walked right into the trap). On 3 December, Pakistan launched an air and ground attack in the
west to relieve pressure on its troops in the east. This led to a full-fledged war in both the
regions.
The Pakistani troops — outnumbered, outgunned and outmaneuvered — could not withstand
the well-coordinated and massive Indian advance in the east… For all practical purposes, the
Pakistani troops had no air cover. Similarly, the performance of the Pakistani navy was dismal…
On 16 December, the Pakistani commander surrendered to his Indian counterpart… and
Bangladesh came into being.
The Yahya rule was the most turbulent period in Pakistan’s history. He assumed power as a
caretaker ruler with a promise to restore civilian and democratic rule. (Instead, he ended up
plunging) the country into a bloody civil war and presid(ing) over the break-up of Pakistan.
