SAFETY REPORT 2017

Issued April 2018

54 th Edition
 NOTICE
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Senior Vice-President
Safety and Flight Operations
International Air Transport Association
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ISBN 978-92-9229-644-5
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Senior Vice-President
Foreword
Dear colleagues,

The top-line safety figures for 2017 convey a persuasive message about our
industry: flying is safe. The reasons are simple. There were no passenger fatalities
on jet transport aircraft last year. The 2017 fatality risk in four regions (Latin
America/Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and
North Asia) was zero. There was a total of 45 accidents worldwide in 2017, down
from an average of 75 per year in each of the preceding five years.

IATA member airlines achieved an even higher level, with zero fatal accidents or
hull losses in 2017 involving either jet or turboprop equipment.

Yet, there is still ample room for improvement. The industry experienced six fatal
accidents last year, and we had some well-publicized events in which the outcomes
could have been far worse than they were. Turboprop operations continue to
account for a disproportionate share of the accident toll. They generated around
20% of all sectors flown last year, yet represented 44% of all accidents and 83%
of all fatal accidents. Two of the five fatal turboprop accidents occurred in North
America, so it is not a challenge that is confined to the developing world.

Cargo operations is another area in need of additional attention. In 2017, there were
13 cargo aircraft accidents, 29% of the total number of accidents. Twelve of the 19
onboard fatalities last year and 35 on-ground fatalities involved cargo aircraft.

Gilberto Lopez Meyer While every accident is different, in 2017, many of the fatal accidents shared
Senior Vice-President some things in common: the airline was not on the IATA Operational Safety Audit
Safety and Flight Operations (IOSA) registry; operations were being conducted in a remote and/or challenging
environment; and, older equipment was involved.

Turning to accident categories, Runway Excursion continued to dominate, with 17

last year; although none involved fatalities, outcomes certainly could have been
different. Controlled Flight into Terrain, Loss of Control - In-flight, and Runway
Undershoot accounted for all the deaths. These four categories must continue to
be the central focus of our operational safety efforts.

It is my privilege to offer you this 54th edition of the IATA Safety Report and to
welcome Stephen Hough as the Chairman of the Accident Classification Technical
Group (ACTG). I encourage you to share the vital information contained in these
pages with your colleagues. I would like to thank the IATA Operations Committee
(OPC), Safety Group (SG), Cabin Operations Safety Technical Group (COSTG) and
all IATA staff involved for their cooperation and expertise, essential for the creation
of this report.

IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 1

As aviation safety
professionals, we
must keep focus and
continue with our
work: the promotion
of safety first.
Chairman
Foreword
There have been many headlines regarding commercial aviation safety in 2017
and how safe it has been. The number of accidents and fatalities has been
extremely low and the statistics you will see in this report reflect that. If we look
at some of the longer-term trends, as opposed to just the last year, we also see
good news. Accidents numbers are reducing while sectors flown are increasing
year after year, demonstrating that the industry is extremely safe. So, something
to celebrate? Well, yes, any improvement in safety and reduction in lives lost is
great news, but (and there is nearly always a ‘but’…) we cannot and shall not pat
ourselves on the back and say “job done” because, of course, it is not.
2017 was a safer year and it is following the trend, but there were many ‘close
calls’, incidents that could easily have become accidents and accidents that
could have had a more severe outcome. In these cases, there were no safety
barriers remaining. It was only a matter of fortunate circumstances or last-
second interventions that prevented the outcomes from being worse. It is here
that hazard identification is of paramount importance in helping us maintain our
low accident rate. Our partner technical group, the IATA Hazard Identification
Technical Group (HITG), is doing great work in this regard, as well as identifying
emerging risks. Ultimately, it is, of course, up to operators worldwide to be
proactive at their level for this to be effective. We can expect that there will be
years in the future when the numbers may go in a direction that we do not want.
They are so low now that it will not take much for it to look like a ‘bad’ year. Our
focus should be on maintaining the overall downward trend in the five-year rate.
As aviation safety professionals (and by the fact you are reading this report you
are likely to be one or at least an interested party), we must keep focus and
Stephen Hough continue with our work: the promotion of safety first. The perception after a
Chairman, IATA Accident ‘good’ year, where little or nothing happens, is that we are safe and the focus,
Classification Technical Group especially in a financially challenging industry, can potentially shift. It is now, in
this moment, that we must build on this success and really maintain our focus.
As we review this year’s report, we see that again Runway Excursion is our
most common accident; these often have differing contributory factors, such
as manual handling, unstable approach, gear/tire failure or a combination of
these. The fatality risk from these kinds of accidents is generally low, but a rate
reduction in this common accident category is an area to concentrate on.

IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 3

Chairman
Foreword, Cont’d

Loss of Control – In-flight has been a focus area for some years after high-profile
accidents. The accidents we see now are of a nature that is not necessarily
what we have considered the recent norm or are training for, the high-altitude
upset, but a loss of control when the crew is faced with an unusual or emergency
situation. Situations that in themselves are recoverable, normally by following
standard operating procedures, are resulting in accidents where crew lose
control of the situation and then the aircraft. Contributory factors to this may be
crew experience, selection, training or reliance on automation.
With fewer accidents, it becomes even more important to gain every lesson from
each one. It is here that I must mention an issue that was highlighted last year:
each accident must be investigated. We have seen far too many occasions where
an accident is not investigated by the state, a report is not issued or the state
investigation is not independent. Those states that lack capability or resources
need assistance from international or regional bodies. A timely, detailed and
factual report is vital to our work, but we are still not achieving transparency and
openness.
This is my first year as Chairman of the Accident Classification Technical Group
(ACTG) and I take over a group that has been expertly guided by my predecessor,
Dr. Dieter Reisinger. Dieter has been Chairman for 12 of the 13 years that he has
been a member of the ACTG. He has been instrumental in ensuring that the
classification and analysis of accidents, and the direction of the ACTG, has been
of the highest order. The quality and standing of this report is very much due to
his hard work, and he has made a great contribution to worldwide aviation safety.
It is an honor to take over from him and a pleasure to continue to work with him
as he remains a member of the group. I endeavor to maintain his high standards
and give him the greatest of thanks.
I also thank the ACTG members, a fine collection of aviation safety professionals
who make this report possible by providing advice, expertise and opinion. Their
support, as member airline representatives, manufactures, union representatives
or safety experts, is invaluable. As is the support of their organizations in allowing
their attendance to further our common goal of improved aviation safety and
fewer accidents.
Lastly, I thank you, the reader, for taking the time and effort to read this report.
It shows that you too are invested and interested in aviation safety. The
understanding of what has gone wrong or could go wrong in the future is still
vitally important, even when so much of what we do goes right.
Fly safely.

IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 4

Safety Report 2017 Executive Summary
International Air Transport Association (IATA) member airlines carried their passengers safely in
2017, without fatal accidents or hull losses. The purpose of this report is not only to point out this
success, but also to identify areas for improvement.

While it is easy to be seduced by what has been called the The accident categories with no fatalities in 2017 were:
safest year on record, the data in this report indicates that there •• Runway Excursion (17)
is room for significant improvement in worldwide industry
safety. Areas for improvement include regions with accident •• In-flight Damage (4)
rates above the global average, types of operation (such as
cargo), older generation turboprops, and notably, operations •• Ground Damage (2)
that do not adhere to the standards of the IATA Operational
Safety Audits (IOSA). •• Hard Landing (2)

IATA has a Six-Point Safety Strategy to continuously drive •• Gear Up Landing/Gear Collapse (5)
enhancements in six key areas:
•• Tail Strike (4)
1. Reduce operational risk
•• Off-Airport Landing/Ditching (1)
2. Enhance quality and compliance
•• Undershoot (2)
3. Advocate for improved aviation infrastructure
•• Runway Collision (2)
4. Support consistent implementation of Safety
Management Systems (SMS) In 2017:
•• The global accident rate was 1.08 per million sectors,
5. Support effective recruitment and training compared to 0.50 for IATA members.

6. Identify and address emerging safety issues •• The all-accident rate for airlines on the IOSA registry was
nearly four times better than that of non-IOSA airlines (0.56
Over the last decade, as detailed in Section 2, Decade vs. 2.17).
Review, the industry continued the 10-year trend of a
declining accident rate and reducing fatality risk. All indicators •• 48.8% of the world’s accidents in 2017 occurred in the Africa
show a downward trend over the past 10 years. IATA and the (AFI) and Asia-Pacific (ASPAC) regions.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are focused on
continuously reducing fatality risks in the industry. •• 24.4% of the world’s accidents in 2017 involved ASPAC-
based operators.
Section 3, 2017 Review, shows that accidents in the runway
environment persist. There were 17 Runway Excursions, •• There were 11 accidents in the AFI region, nine involving AFI-
albeit with zero fatalities, indicating an area where further based operators, including six Runway Excursions.
improvements can be made. The ICAO Global Runway
Safety Action Plan released in November 2017 identifies the •• The largest number of accidents occurred in Generation 2
stakeholder mitigations that must be actioned to address this turboprops and Generation 3 jets.1
issue.
•• There were no fatal accidents in Generation 4 jets or
The accident categories with fatalities in 2017 were: Generation 3 turboprops.1
•• Controlled Flight into Terrain (1), with four crew fatalities and
35 on-ground fatalities •• 44% of the world’s accidents involved turboprops, while the
global turboprop fleet is one fifth the size of the jet fleet.
•• Loss of Control – In-flight (4), with 11 fatalities
•• Four of the six fatal accidents in 2017 were in cargo operations.
•• Undershoot (1), with four fatalities
1 Aircraft Generations, as defined in ICAO Doc 9995, Manual of Evidence–
Based Training.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 5

•• Five of the fatal accidents involved Generation 2 turboprops. Regional Analysis 2017 (Section 5):
•• The accident rate for North American (NAM), European
•• More fatalities (including fatalities on the ground) occurred (EUR), Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) and North
from cargo operations than passenger operations. Asian (NASIA) operators was below the global rate.

•• IATA membership and IOSA accreditation for non-IATA •• The accident rate for operators from the Commonwealth of
members continued to show a strong correlation with Independent States (CIS), Asia-Pacific (ASPAC), Africa (AFI)
improved safety performance. and Latin-America and Caribbean (LATAM/CAR) was above
the global rate, but below the previous five-year rate (2012-
The five-year data analysis (2013 - 2017 Analysis, Section 4) 2016).
shows that the all-accident rate is declining, as is the hull loss
rate, the fatal accident rate and the fatality risk. Not only is the •• AFI operators had nine accidents, including four hull losses.
rate of accidents measured against sectors flown reducing, but As the region with the lowest number of aircraft movements,
the total number of accidents is in decline. this translates into the highest regional operator accident
rate of 2017, 6.87 compared to 2.43 in 2016.
Between 2013 and 2017:
•• The most common accident was Runway/Taxiway Excursion, •• ASPAC operators had 11 accidents, including two hull losses.
followed by Gear Up Landing/Gear Collapse and Hard There was one fatal accident. The ASPAC operator accident
Landings, in that order. rate for 2017 was 1.54, down from 2.33 in 2016.

•• The top three latent conditions contributing to accidents •• CIS operators had five accidents, including three hull losses
were Regulatory Oversight, Safety Management and Flight and two fatal accidents. The CIS operator accident rate for
Operations. 2017 was 4.13, down from 5.15 in 2016.

•• The top three threats were Weather, Aircraft Malfunction and •• EUR operators had six accidents, including one hull loss and
Wind/Wind Shear/Gusts. one fatal accident resulting in the death of 35 persons on the
ground as well as the crew. The EUR operator accident rate
•• The top three errors were Manual Handling/Flight Controls, improved from 1.13 in 2016 to 0.67 in 2017.
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Adherence/Cross-
verification, Callouts, and Pilot-to-Pilot Communication. •• LATAM/CAR operators had six accidents, including one
hull loss, but no fatal accidents. The LATAM/CAR operator
•• The most common undesired aircraft state, from which a accident rate declined from 2.80 in 2016 to 1.88 in 2017.
recovery is still possible, was Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/
Off-center/Crabbed landing, followed by Vertical, Lateral or •• MENA operators had one accident resulting in substantial
Speed Deviation and Unstable Approaches. damage, but no fatalities. The MENA operator accident rate
declined significantly from 5.75 in 2016 to 0.49 in 2017.
•• The most common countermeasures absent in the accidents
were Overall Crew Performance, followed by Monitor/Cross- •• NAM operators had seven accidents with two hull losses,
Check and Leadership. both of which were fatal. Both fatal accidents were
turboprops; one was a cargo operation. The NAM regional
Regional Analysis 2013 - 2017 (Section 5): operator accident rate declined from 0.95 in 2016 to 0.57 in
•• The ASPAC region and ASPAC-based operators had the 2017.
highest total number of accidents, 82 and 81 respectively.
This represents 24% of the total accidents worldwide in the •• NASIA operators had zero accidents with a regional operator
last five years. Indonesian operators had 23 accidents in accident rate of zero.
the period.
Cargo Accidents 2017 (Section 6):
•• There were 13 cargo aircraft accidents, four of which were
fatal, resulting in 12 onboard fatalities and 35 on-ground
fatalities. The 13 accidents represent almost one third of all
accidents.

•• The most common contributory factors to cargo accidents in

2017 were very similar to those listed above in the five-year
analysis.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 6

Cabin Safety (Section 7) includes an in-depth analysis Accident data from 2017 indicates that Loss of Control –
of unruly passengers and shows most passengers behave In-flight (LOC-I) and Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)
appropriately onboard aircraft and unruly passenger reports accidents continue to carry the highest fatality risk. The CFIT
represent a very low percentage of passengers carried. The cargo jet accident, which crashed on a village, had the highest
majority of reports are attributed to intoxication through alcohol number of fatalities in 2017. While operators should continue
or other substances, including sleeping medication. More to train to eliminate these types of accidents, accidents in the
details on the responsible service of alcohol and management of runway environment must not be ignored, even though the
unruly passengers are contained in the IATA Cabin Operations fatality risk is low.
Safety Best Practices Guide, which is distributed free of charge
to all IATA member airlines, and available for purchase from the Incident data shows that precursors to a runway incursion
IATA online store. or excursion occur frequently. The incident in Medan, where
a landing jet clipped wings with a turboprop as it was
The IATA/Industry Accident Classification Technical incorrectly entering the runway, is a prime example. The near
Group (ACTG) classified the accidents for this report and accident was a warning that a loss-of-life event in the runway
compiled the Report Findings and IATA Prevention environment is possible.
Strategies (Section 8). This year, for the first time, the ACTG
distinguished between ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ contributory The STEADES Analysis of Runway Safety (Section 9) looks
factors. This analysis shows that human factors are often at incidents in the runway environment. Strongly supporting the
the weak link. The ACTG believes this points to underlying concerns of the ACTG, the Safety Trends Evaluation, Analysis
failings of selection, training, organizational culture, regulatory and Data Exchange System (STEADES) found that, at the time
oversight, equipment, as well as the use and comprehension the analysis was released, there was one runway incursion
of English. These failings must be addressed to strengthen event reported in the STEADES database every day. While the
the human component of the system. safety barriers were effective in preventing these incidents from
becoming accidents, it must be a priority for the industry to
The ACTG continues to be concerned about the quality reduce the number of these events.
of accident investigations around the world. There are
examples of investigations that appear to invoke the
protections of ICAO Annex 13, but none of the benefits. Such
investigations lack objectivity, transparency, collaboration
and communication. In some cases, the report was not
made public, denying the opportunity to share the learnings
for the benefit of the wider industry.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 7

IATA Safety Strategy
The IATA Six-Point Safety Strategy was developed in REDUCE OPERATIONAL RISK
consultation with the IATA Safety Group (SG) and is endorsed
by IATA’s Operations Committee (OPC). While the strategy is Operational risks are the primary concern of
unchanged from last year, it remains subject to continuous any airline. IATA continues to work with the
review to ensure that it is current and relevant. industry to implement safety programs that
revolve around identifying and controlling
IATA continues to use this safety strategy to drive its action these safety elements. IATA’s data-driven
towards an integrated, data-driven approach for managing assessments and analyses, together with the
safety risks to continuously improve aviation safety. SG, which is comprised of safety experts from member airlines,
have identified key safety issues and decided to focus on them
to improve safety in aviation. We can break down the top safety
issues into:

•• Airport Infrastructure

•• Cabin/Flight Deck Smoke/Fire/Fumes

•• Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)

•• Dangerous Goods

•• Ground Ops and Cargo - Loading Errors/Integrity, Loadsheet.

Third Party Oversight
IATA’S SIX-POINT STRATEGY
•• Human Performance Flight Crew CRM, Competence, Fitness
IATA’s Safety Strategy is a holistic approach to identifying for Duty, Fatigue and Mental Health. Maintenance Error and
organizational and operational safety issues. Its key pillars are Procedural non-compliance
improved technology, regulatory harmonization, training and
awareness. •• Loss of Control – In-flight (LOC-I)

IATA works closely with industry stakeholders to ensure each •• Maintenance Error and Procedural non-compliance
of these pillars is leveraged to address the six safety strategies,
namely: •• Mid-Air Collision (MAC) (Inc. UAV’s) – (ATC: Somalia/
Myanmar)
1. Reduce operational risk
2. Enhance quality and compliance •• Runway Safety including runway excursions and runway
collision, resulting from a runway incursion or Incorrect
3. Advocate for improved aviation infrastructure Landing/Takeoff Surface
4. Support consistent implementation of Safety Management
Systems (SMS) IATA is developing safety performance indicators (SPIs) to
monitor events in these categories and precursors to more
5. Support effective recruitment and training serious incidents and accidents. The approach of measuring
6. Identify and address emerging safety issues safety performance is essential for effective safety management
and decision-making. Furthermore, four of the above are
Each of these key areas breaks down into several sub- accident end states, which IATA is working to address as
categories to address specific aspects of the strategy. follows:

Security is also key to maintaining operations resilient to

threats. Some of the work carried out by IATA in this area is
described in this section.

IATA SAFETY STRATEGY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 8

Loss of Control – In-flight (LOC-I): Runway Safety
Fortunately, LOC-I is a relatively rare occurrence. Of all reported IATA worked closely with ICAO in 2017 to analyze runway safety
accidents from 2013-2017, this type of accident accounted for from Global Aviation Data Management (GADM) programs and
only 9%. Unfortunately, LOC-I generally has a high-severity develop the ICAO Global Runway Safety Action Plan (GRSAP).
outcome; it often has catastrophic results with very few, if This was published in November 2017, coincident with the
any, survivors. Accordingly, 93% of all LOC-I accidents have Second ICAO Runway Safety Symposium in Lima, Peru, which
resulted in fatalities. IATA continues to work with industry to IATA contributed to. Section 9 of this report is dedicated to the
reduce the likelihood of this risk area. Some of the activities are: IATA analysis of Runway Safety data.

•• Reviewing occurrences in the last 10 years The implementation of SMS, the establishment of local Runway
Safety Teams (RST), and technology advances have certainly
•• Understanding common hazards that may lead to LOC-I enabled all stakeholders, including aircraft operators, air
and contributing factors, such as meteorological factors and navigation service providers (ANSPs) and airport operators, to
aircraft malfunction affecting flight control improve runway safety. However, accidents continue to occur
on runways, and the rate and number of runway incursions
•• Understanding manual handling errors and decision-making remain steady. Findings from accident and incident reports have
been used to create new recommendations and associated
Furthermore, IATA Training and Licensing, with the support guidance materials included in the 3rd edition of the European
of its Pilot Training Task Force (PTTF), has developed a Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions (EAPPRI),
manual entitled Guidance Material and Best Practices for the which was issued in 2017. The new recommendations are the
Implementation of Upset Prevention and Recovery Training result of the combined efforts of organizations representing all
(UPRT) to help address factors contributing to LOC-I. areas of air traffic and airport operations. These organizations
include, but are not limited to, airport operators, ANSPs, aircraft
Mitigating LOC-I occurrences will only marginally reduce the operators, and regulators/national aviation authorities. IATA
total number of global aircraft accidents, but it will significantly provided a lead role in coordinating airline contributions. The
reduce the overall number of aircraft accident fatalities. latest edition of EAPPRI provides an opportunity for aviation
industry stakeholders and organizations to refocus, redeploy,
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) and reactivate their runway incursion prevention activities. It
There have been major CFIT accidents in the last five years, also continues to emphasize the need for a mutual exchange of
representing 4% of total accidents during the reporting time information and data between organizations to facilitate lesson
frame from 2013 through 2017. Although the CFIT accident learning and assist in the enhancement of runway safety.
rate has declined, it is still a concern due to the high number of
fatalities this accident category causes. Mid-Air Collision
The EUROCONTROL Safety Improvement Sub-Group (SISG)
To understand and mitigate CFIT accidents, IATA is committed to: identified Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Resolution Advisory (RA) Not Followed as one of the ‘Top 5’ Air
•• Reviewing occurrences in the last ten years Traffic Management (ATM) Operational Safety Priorities in 2017
and launched a study. It was determined in the planning stage
•• Understanding human performance deficiencies of this study that the best source of information is the pilots
themselves. A voluntary online survey was proposed and was
•• Understanding the common hazards that may lead to CFIT supported by IATA and several European aircraft operators.
accidents The survey prompted 3,800 responses from 90 countries. IATA,
together with industry stakeholders, will be working on raising
•• Understanding the contributing factors affecting loss of awareness of the importance of correct compliance with a
situational awareness TCAS RA and eliminating noncompliance. The SG believes
that operators should develop a risk-based TCAS Minimum
IATA encourages mitigations to CFIT, which include, but are not Equipment List (MEL) policy, so that, for example, an aircraft
limited to: cannot dispatch into airspace that uses In-flight Broadcast
Procedures (IFBP) with an unserviceable TCAS.
•• Strong adherence to crew procedures
It is the view of SG members and observers that operators
•• Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (E-GPWS) should use their Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) programs to
and updating the databases monitor pilot response to TCAS RA to ensure that they are
carried out correctly and in a timely manner, addressing any
•• Enhancing Crew Resource Management (CRM); and Pilot identified shortcomings through training and awareness
Monitoring campaigns.

•• Use of the Continuous Descent Final Approach (CDFA)

technique, where a continuous descent is maintained along
a vertical path

•• Implementation of a Performance-based Navigation (PBN)

concept

IATA SAFETY STRATEGY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 9

Safety Predictive Analytics Research Center Fatigue Management
On 7 February 2018, IATA and the Civil Aviation Authority of Flight crew and cabin crewmember fatigue is acknowledged
Singapore (CAAS) announced the signing of a Memorandum of as a hazard that predictably degrades various types of human
Collaboration (MoC) to establish a Safety Predictive Analytics performance and can contribute to aviation accidents and
Research Center (SPARC) in Singapore. The MoC was signed incidents.
by Alexandre de Juniac, Director General and CEO of IATA, and
Kevin Shum, Director General of CAAS. Fatigue management refers to the methods by which operators
and operational personnel address the safety implications of
The intent of SPARC is to leverage operational safety information fatigue. ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
that is available under IATA’s GADM initiative, assess potential support two distinct approaches: the prescriptive fatigue
hazards and identify safety risks, many of which are otherwise management approach and the Fatigue Risk Management
very difficult or impossible to foresee. Affected end users System (FRMS) approach.
across the aviation community can then work collaboratively at
the system level to address and implement appropriate safety Under a prescriptive fatigue management approach, operations
measures to mitigate, or even prevent, occurrences where must remain within prescribed limits established by the
possible. regulator for flight time, flight duty periods, duty periods and
rest periods. In addition, the operator manages fatigue hazards
Ground Operations Safety using the SMS processes that are in place for managing other
The IATA/Industry Airside Safety Group works on ground types of hazards.
safety issues, including, but not limited to:
The FRMS approach represents an opportunity for operators
•• Drug and alcohol policy to use advances in scientific knowledge to improve safety and
increase operational flexibility. A FRMS is a specialized system
•• Human factors training for ground staff that uses SMS principles and processes to specifically identify
and manage crewmember fatigue as a hazard.
•• Occupational health and safety, including hearing protection
With FRMS, the operator must identify and assess potential
•• Airport design fatigue risks prior to conducting operations under the FRMS
as well as identify and assess actual fatigue risks proactively
•• Ground damage to aircraft, including: during operations. Having a FRMS still requires setting
maximum limits, but these are proposed by the operator and
–– Damage severity assessments must be approved by the regulator.

–– Time out of service With the support of the IATA Fatigue Management Task Force
(FMTF), IATA has participated in the development of new
–– Quality and culture of reporting standards published in the cobranded IATA/ICAO/IFALPA
Fatigue Management Guide for Airline Operators. IATA has
–– Costs also proposed a series of guidance materials and information
papers to help the industry implement fatigue management
–– Found versus reported damage principles. All the documents developed with the support of the
IATA FMTF can be download free of charge from www.iata.org.
•• Load sheet and loading errors

•• Maturing SMS in Ground Service Providers ENHANCE QUALITY AND COMPLIANCE

•• Enhancing SMS guidance in the Airport Handling Manual and Regulations must evolve as the industry
IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) standards grows and technologies change. The audit
programs described below aim to increase
•• Supplier safety standards global safety performance and reduce the
number of redundant auditing activities in
•• Ground service equipment under wing policy the industry.

•• Safety promotion through the ‘We are Safety’ campaign IATA Operational Safety Audit
The IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) program is an
•• Enhancement of safety training for ground staff internationally recognized and accepted evaluation system
designed to assess the operational management and control
•• Development of ground safety performance indicators systems of an airline. IOSA is generally recognized as the
‘gold standard’ for operators. All IATA members are IOSA
•• Jet bridge maintenance standards, records and operator registered and must remain registered to maintain IATA
training membership. The IOSA program lessens the burden on the
industry by representing a global standard that is utilized by
•• Airport authority risk assessments numerous regulators to complement their oversight activities
on commercial operators.
•• Gate management

IATA SAFETY STRATEGY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 10

IATA Standard Safety Assessment Program ADVOCATE FOR IMPROVED AVIATION
The IATA Standard Safety Assessment (ISSA) program is INFRASTRUCTURE
a voluntary evaluation program, produced at the request
of the industry, to extend the benefits of operational safety Airline operators are heavily investing in fleet
and efficiency that emanated from the IOSA program to the and network expansion as well as onboard
operators of smaller aircraft that are not eligible for IOSA. avionics. Regions across the world are
experiencing double-digit traffic growth, but
The ISSA program offers entry into an IATA Assessment are faced with bottlenecks and a lack of
Registry to operators that utilize aircraft with a maximum infrastructure to cope with the growth. The
takeoff weight (MTOW) below 5,700 kg. It also offers a one- regulatory framework and Air Traffic Management (ATM)
term registration opportunity to operators of aircraft with an capabilities must evolve in a harmonized context to meet the
MTOW above 5,700 kg. pace of advancing technologies. We also need to ensure that
new entrants and airspace users are safely and efficiently
IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operators integrated into the airspace.
ISAGO improves ground safety and aims to reduce accidents,
incidents and risk in ground operations. ISAGO is a standardized It is important for us as an industry to move towards a future
and structured audit program of Ground Service Providers vision of the ATM system that looks at ATM from a gate-to-
(GSPs); that is, ground handling companies operating at gate perspective. Key drivers for change and operational
airports. It uses internationally recognized operational standards improvements are safety, efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
that have been developed by global experts. The audits are Within that context, IATA is working with member airlines and
conducted by highly trained and experienced auditors. key partners, such as ICAO, the Civil Air Navigation Services
Organization (CANSO), state regulators and ANSPs, to ensure
The latest analysis conducted with IATA Ground Damage that ATM operations and infrastructure improve the level of
data indicated (with clear and strong statistical evidence) that safety, enhance efficiency, reduce CO2 emissions, and are
ISAGO had made a positive impact on safety culture and safety supported by a positive cost-benefit analysis.
performance of the GSPs. ISAGO-registered GSPs exhibited
a better reporting culture, with 70% of their damage incidents Performance-based Navigation with Vertical
reported compared to only 32% for non-ISAGO GSPs. ISAGO Guidance
GSPs also experienced significantly less severe damage. At their 37th General Assembly in September 2010, ICAO
member states agreed to complete a national performance-
IATA Fuel Quality Pool based navigation (PBN) implementation plan as a matter of
The IATA Fuel Quality Pool (IFQP) is a group of more than 170 urgency. The aim was to achieve PBN approach procedures
airlines that work together to assess the implementation of with vertical guidance for all instrument runway ends by 2016.
safety and quality standards and procedures at aviation fuel
facilities. IFQP-qualified inspectors perform the inspections Due to slow progress, IATA continues to engage states, ANSPs,
at airports worldwide, against industry regulations, and the and airlines to accelerate implementation of Approaches
reports are shared among the IFQP members. By providing with Vertical Guidance (APV) procedures and demonstrate
comprehensive training of inspectors and development of the risks associated with the continued use of non-precision
industry-standard inspection procedures, IFQP members approaches.
obtain enhanced safety and improved quality control standards
for fuel facilities at the airport, in compliance with airline Irresponsible Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
regulatory requirements. Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), or drones, represent
a potential hazard to civil aviation, particularly in the case of their
IATA De-Icing/Anti-Icing Quality Control Pool irresponsible use in close proximity to airports and manned
The IATA De-Icing/Anti-Icing Quality Control Pool (DAQCP) aircraft. Small UAS are being used by people unfamiliar with
is a group of more than 100 airlines that audit de/anti-icing the safety risks, or with little awareness of civil aviation and
providers and share the inspection reports and workload at its regulation. As such, it is critical to ensure that the relevant
various locations worldwide. Its main goal is to ensure that safety risk assessment models and proper SMSs are in place for
guidelines, quality control recommendations and standards for UAS operations. Within that context, IATA has been working
de/anti-icing procedures are followed at all airports. with industry partners to ensure awareness of the safety risks
resulting from the operation of small UAS close to aircraft and
IATA Drinking Water Quality Pool airports. All material produced under this campaign can be
The IATA Drinking Water Quality Pool (IDQP) was created by a accessed on the IATA website.
group of airlines to safeguard health on board for passengers
and crew by using the highest standards to ensure water quality. Unmanned Traffic Management and Space Traffic
By sharing inspection reports, the airlines avoid multiple audits Management
of the same provider at the same location. IDQP members To ensure the safe integration of new entrants and new airspace
enjoy substantial financial savings from reductions of airport users, IATA is working with ICAO and key regulatory bodies to
inspection workloads and associated costs. ensure that the system architecture and safety provisions are
available for the safe operation of these new entrants in lower
altitudes as well as in FL600 and above. Work will continue
throughout 2018 with these key stakeholders.

IATA SAFETY STRATEGY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 11

SUPPORT CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF Annex 19 Amendments – Guidance Material
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IATA continued its participation on the ICAO Safety
Management Panel, with a specific focus in 2017 to finalize
The implementation of the various elements the development of ICAO guidance material to support the
of SMS has been ongoing for over 10 years, Annex 19 amendments. The 4th Edition of the ICAO Safety
and as demonstrated through IOSA, most Management Manual is expected to be made available in early
airlines have them in place. However, this 2018. It will be complemented by the ICAO Safety Management
does not mean the work ends. In fact, it is just Implementation (SMI) website that provides examples, tools and
beginning. supporting educational material on an informational basis. The
website is geared to all service providers, and can be found here.
In 2017, the IATA SMS-related activities focused on practical
applications of SMS principles as well as enablers of an effective IATA Issue Review Meeting and Hazard
system. The purpose was to drive effective implementation and Identification Technical Group
use of SMS in the aviation industry. Additionally, continuous The IATA Issue Review Meeting (IRM) is a twice annual safety
monitoring of the findings related to IOSA SMS-designated meeting, where airlines can freely share their experiences so
SARPs helps IATA identify needs to develop targeted that the broader community can learn and work to prevent
supporting guidance and training material. similar events or risks at their own airlines. Not only does this
demonstrate the willingness of our industry to share in the
Specifically, the activities included: interest of safety, but this open review of significant industry
accidents, incidents, potential incidents and risks spanning the
IATA Safety Information Exchange Program entire global sphere of commercial air transportation allows
To promote an open exchange of safety information aimed at real issues to be identified and further analyzed by the IATA
continuously improving aviation safety, IATA has developed a Hazard Identification Technical Group (HITG) and raised to
program to facilitate information sharing and analysis between the IATA SG. This is a key input to the SG’s determination of
states, state-registered airlines, and other key stakeholders. The industry risks that need IATA action.
program establishes a forum where the participants engage in
collaborative activities to identify, analyze and mitigate leading IATA is pleased to report that, in 2017, the decision was made
aviation safety risks. Program involvement is voluntary and at to expand the distribution of IRM Bulletins to a much broader
the sole discretion of the individual participants. audience. Typically only distributed to those who attended the
meeting, the IRM Bulletin provides a summary of the issues
The program model is based on others already in place with discussed at the respective meeting in a de-identified way.
noted achievements in safety advancements, such as the Now, even more organizations can benefit from this meeting.
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) in the USA and
the Brazilian Aviation Safety Team (BAST) in Brazil. Based on We look forward to welcoming you at an upcoming IRM. More
a framework of continuous improvement, this state/industry information on the IRM, HITG and SG can be found here.
partnership is key to set and achieve sustainable and effective
safety goals. SUPPORT EFFECTIVE TRAINING
IATA is working with various stakeholders to facilitate the Training and Licensing
establishment of new state/industry safety teams in 2018. The IATA Training and Licensing portfolio is
a multifaceted portfolio that seeks to improve
Safety Culture – A Key Enabler of Safety safety through enhanced pilot training and
Management qualification. Working with the IATA Pilot
IATA continues to promote the importance of safety culture as Training Task Force, IATA participates in
a primary enabler of effective safety management. In a practical the development of new standards and publishes guidance
sense, all the elements of a SMS can be in place, but if people are materials and best practices to help operators and training
not using or following them, the efforts are futile. The next logical organizations implement these standards.
step for effective implementation is to focus on safety culture.
IATA supports a consistent approach to flight crew training,
IATA has developed and launched the IATA Aviation Safety from the selection process through initial and recurrent
Culture (I-ASC) survey, specifically designed for the aviation training by promoting competency-based training programs
industry. I-ASC results provide insight into the daily challenges such as Multi-Crew Pilot License (MPL) and Evidence-based
and perceived risk areas of frontline and management Training (EBT). IATA also addresses specific areas of training by
employees. It helps organizations identify specific areas proposing UPRT and flight crew monitoring guidance materials.
of improvement and hazards, ultimately contributing to
improvements in safety performance. It also provides Note: All guidance materials developed under IATA Training
organizations with the means to meet ICAO SMS/State Safety and Licensing can be downloaded for free from our webpage.
Program (SSP) requirements to measure and continuously
improve their safety culture. Multi-Crew Pilot License Training
Progress in the design and reliability of modern aircraft, a
Successfully deployed in 2017, as more operators conduct this rapidly changing operational environment, and the need
survey, the results will allow for the added benefit of benchmarking to better address the human factors issue prompted an
capabilities on a global, regional and alliance basis. industry review of pilot training. The traditional hours-based
qualification process fails to guarantee competency in all cases.

IATA SAFETY STRATEGY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 12

Therefore, the industry saw a need to develop a new paradigm Guidance Material and Best Practices for the Implementation
for competency-based training and assessment of airline pilots: of UPRT, published in 2015, serves as guidance material
MPL training. for operators to develop an UPRT program as part of their
recurrent training. It can also be considered when including
MPL moves from task-based to competency-based training UPRT in other programs, such as conversion, upgrading and
in a multi-crew setting from the initial stages of training. CRM type rating training. The document specifically focuses on
and Threat and Error Management (TEM) skills are embedded practical guidance for UPRT instructor training. It also includes
throughout the training. Most incidents and accidents in civil recommendations for operators cooperating with Approved
aviation are still caused by human factors such as a lack Training Organizations (ATOs) providing licensing training for
of interpersonal skills (e.g., communication, leadership and their ab initio cadets. It may be used for both traditional and
teamwork), workload management, situational awareness, and competency-based training schemes.
structured decision-making. MPL requires full-time embedded,
as opposed to added on, CRM and TEM training. Flight Crew Monitoring
The need to address flight crew monitoring came from aviation
The second edition and cobranded IATA/IFALPA MPL community consensus around the importance of enhancing
Implementation Guide was published in 2015 to support airlines monitoring skills, based on data analysis from various sources.
during their MPL implementation process. The IATA document, Guidance Material for Improving Flight
Crew Monitoring, published in 2016, provides practical
Evidence-based Training guidance for operators and ATOs for the development of flight
Evidence-based Training (EBT) applies the principles of crew monitoring training. It also highlights how monitoring
competency-based training for safe, effective and efficient is embedded in all pilot competencies, and how these
airline operations while addressing relevant threats. ICAO has competencies serve as countermeasures in the TEM model.
defined competency as the combination of Knowledge, Skills
and Attitudes (KSAs) required to perform tasks to a prescribed Flight Crew Competency Framework
standard under certain conditions. IATA is part of the ICAO Competency-based Training and
Assessment Task Force (CBTA-TF), whose task consists of
The aim of an EBT program is to identify, develop and developing an ICAO airplane pilot competency framework for
evaluate the key competencies required by pilots to operate all pilot licenses, type rating, instrument rating and recurrent
safely, effectively and efficiently in a commercial air transport training. This implies a revision of the provisions related to MPL
environment, by managing the most relevant threats and and EBT, including provisions in Annex 1 - Personnel Licensing,
errors, based on evidence collected in operations and training. the PANS-TRG and Annex 6 Part 1. It also requires the updating
The following documents published by ICAO and IATA allow of related guidance materials, including the Manual of Evidence-
airlines to develop an effective EBT program: based Training (Doc 9995) and the Manual on Upset Prevention
and Recovery Training (Doc 10011). Finally, it involves a proposal
•• ICAO Manual of Evidence-based Training (Doc.9995) to increase the Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD) credit
•• Updates to ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation Services for licensing in Annex 1. This work began in March 2017 and is
- Training (PANS-TRG, Doc 9868) expected to continue until November 2020.
•• IATA/ICAO/IFALPA Evidence-based Training
Implementation Guide Instructor Qualification
•• IATA Data Report for Evidence-based Training Given the essential contribution of instructors and evaluators
(IEs) to flight safety, IATA considered it important to propose
IATA is currently in the process of reviewing the 1st Edition of solutions to enhance globally the level of competency of IEs.
Data Report for EBT. Publication of the 2nd Edition is expected Therefore, the 1st Edition of Guidance Material for Instructor
at the end of 2019. and Evaluator Training introduces and defines a set of IE
competencies to be applied from the selection process across
Pilot Aptitude Testing all types of IE training, from licensing to operator recurrent
Designed to support aviation managers in the field of training, by both operators and ATOs.
pilot selection, Pilot Aptitude Testing (PAT) is a structured,
science-based candidate selection process. PAT helps avoid Engineering and Maintenance Training and
disappointed applicants, wasted training capacity, and early Qualification Requirements
drop out due to medical reasons. Proven to be highly effective The aim of the Engineering and Maintenance (E&M) training
and efficient, PAT provides enhanced safety, lower overall and qualification program is to identify, develop and evaluate
training costs, higher training and operations performance the competencies required by commercial aircraft maintenance
success rates, a more positive working environment and personnel to operate safely, effectively and efficiently. This is
reduced labor turnover. This is becoming particularly important accomplished by managing the most relevant risks, threats and
in view of the projected increased demand for qualified pilots in errors, based on evidence. E&M is geared toward individual
the coming decades. student performance. The specification of the competency
to be achieved, the evaluation of the student’s entry level, the
Upset Prevention and Recovery Training selection of the appropriate training method and training aids,
Loss of Control – In-flight is one of the leading causes of and the assessment of a student’s performance are key factors
fatalities in commercial aviation. This has led the industry to a to the success of E&M.
revision of current training practices and the adoption of new
regulations to address this phenomenon. The IATA manual,

IATA SAFETY STRATEGY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 13

IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS EMERGING/ supporting the development of the changes to Annex 6 and
EVOLVING SAFETY ISSUES the associated guidance material.

This section provides key highlights and Separately, the SAE G-27 Committee, which was established
developments for emerging/evolving at the request of ICAO, is reaching the final stages of its work
operational risks that have recently generated to develop a performance standard that can be used to test
remarkable activity and media attention. packages containing lithium batteries. The purpose of the
Since SMS relies on data to identify emerging committee is to ensure that, in the event of a thermal runaway
risks, IATA is putting additional effort to of a lithium cell in the package, there are no hazardous effects
improve not only access to industry data, but also the capability outside the package.
for automated analysis for more efficient safety analyses.
The SAE G-27 Committee convened through conference calls
Emerging/evolving risks that will increasingly need to be and physical meetings during 2017 to progress the development
considered in the conversation of operational risk for aviation of the performance standard. The work of the G-27 Committee
service providers include: has been supported by a small team tasked with writing the
standard and developing the technical test requirements.
•• Smart Baggage (see also Section 7, Cabin Safety)
At the time of writing, the expected final meeting of the G-27
•• Lithium Batteries Committee is scheduled for February/March 2018 in Brussels.
It is expected that this meeting will produce the draft language
•• Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) for the standard agreed to. If the committee is satisfied with
this draft, the standard will be sent out to the full committee for
•• Cyber Security ballot. If the committee votes to adopt the standard, it will then
be submitted to SAE for final approval. Alongside this process,
Smart Baggage the relevant ICAO body will determine if the standard is suitable
IATA Cargo, through the IATA Dangerous Goods Board, issued for adoption into the ICAO Technical Instructions.
an addendum to the 2018 edition of the Dangerous Goods
Regulations to restrict the carriage of what is known as “smart” IATA Safety and IATA Cargo continue to represent the industry
luggage; that is, luggage that is equipped with lithium batteries in the discussion on the carriage of lithium batteries and
installed in the bag for use as a power bank to charge a Personal participate in the work of the applicable ICAO panels.
Electronic Device (PED) or to power motorized wheels on the
bag. IATA Safety and Flight Operations (SFO) Safety has issued Unmanned Aircraft Systems
a guidance document on managing Smart Baggage with built- UAS represent a potential hazard to civil aviation, particularly in
in lithium batteries and electronics. the case of their irresponsible use in close proximity to airports
and manned aircraft. Small UAS are being used by people
Lithium Batteries unfamiliar with the safety risks, or have little awareness of
Since last year’s IATA Safety Report, there have been several civil aviation and its regulation. As such, it is critical to ensure
developments concerning the carriage of lithium batteries. Two that the relevant risk assessment models and proper safety
guidance documents have been released by IATA SFO Safety, management systems are in place for UAS operations.
as follows:
IATA works closely with key stakeholders, including:
•• Enhanced Security Measures: PEDs in Carry-on Baggage
(Version 1: US restrictions; issued March 2017) •• Airlines for Europe (A4E)

•• Enhanced Security Measures: PEDs in Carry-on Baggage •• Airports Council International Europe (ACI)
(Version 2: US and UK restrictions; issued April 2017)
•• Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO)
In response to the prohibition of certain PEDs in the cabin on
flights into the US and the UK, and the ongoing prohibition of •• European Cockpit Association (ECA)
lithium batteries being carried as cargo on passenger aircraft,
two new ICAO working groups were formed, as follows: •• European Helicopter Association (EHA)

•• Multi-Disciplinary Working Group is tasked with assessing •• International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Association
the risks posed by the carriage of PEDs in aircraft holds and (IFALPA)
developing possible mitigations.
•• International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’
•• Flight Operations Panel Cargo Safety Sub-Group (FLTOPS- Associations (IFATCA)
CSSG) is tasked with developing revisions to Annex 6 (and
associated guidance material) to address the carriage IATA is instrumental in bringing together different aviation
of cargo that has the potential to affect flight safety. This stakeholders to speak with one voice on UAS to ensure that
pertains specifically to dangerous goods, including lithium the relevant authorities are fundamentally aware of the airspace
batteries. Subject matter experts from both the IATA Safety user’s position regarding requirements for the safe operation
and IATA Cargo departments are members of the sub-group and integration of UAS Joint Safety Statements contained
in. This leadership will continue as we navigate through

IATA SAFETY STRATEGY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 14

challenging dialogue related to unsegregated operations By acting on cyber security issues, the new task force can
(manned and unmanned aircraft sharing the same airspace). protect member airlines’ investment in connectivity and
e-enablement, thus reinforcing IATA’s mandate of supporting
ICAO issued a state letter on 20 March 2017 emphasizing state operational efficiency and safety.
responsibilities to protect civil aircraft from ‘pilotless’ aircraft.

The transition from prescriptive to performance-based SECURITY

regulations for UAS and the establishment of acceptable target
levels of safety will set the foundation for the implementation of ICAO Global Aviation Security Plan
future safety initiatives. IATA will continue to actively participate The United Nations Security Council
in policy and operational concept development of technology Resolution 2309 (2016) on Aviation Security
to enhance safety. Priority work areas include: reaffirmed the obligations of all states
to ensure the security of all citizens and
•• Dynamic Geofencing – adaptable virtual barriers that are nationals of other states against terrorist
created using a combination of GPS and radio frequency attacks on air services operating within their territories as well
connections (such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth) to keep UAS from as the safety of their citizens and nationals against terrorist
entering dangerous, restricted or sensitive airspace. attacks conducted against international civil aviation, wherever
these may occur.
•• Detect and Avoid (DAA) technology.
All states have been urged to ensure an effective, risk-based
•• Analysis of UAS incidents and accidents to identify trends and sustainable implementation of ICAO Annex 17 standards
and support SMS/SSP. at all airports within their jurisdiction and to urgently address
any gaps or vulnerabilities that may be identified. In this regard,
Cyber Security it is envisioned that the ICAO Global Aviation Security Plan
In last year’s IATA Safety Report, regarding cyber security, it (GASeP) will provide the necessary mandate leading up to the
was recorded that “IATA…should help airlines identify threats 40th ICAO Assembly in 2019 for states to continue to enhance
and/or risks via the…systems interfaces from application aviation security.
to application and from platform to platform”. Further, it was
reported that IATA should create a list of airline-controlled IATA is a member of the GASeP Task Force, convened under
activities that may be used as an attack vector (Cyber Security, the ICAO AVSEC Panel. The ICAO GASeP was formally
Aviation Cyber and Cyber Threat and Risk to Aircraft Correlating endorsed by the ICAO Council in November 2017 and has
to Safety of Flight). Then, IATA should create an aviation cyber clearly identified priority areas for ICAO, states and industry
forum to foster exchange of information and ideas, increase to collaborate in the enhancement of aviation security. Going
knowledge and subject awareness and facilitate the sharing of forward, relevant IATA Working Groups, Strategic Partners and
best practices. sponsors will be engaged to contribute to the delivery of the
ICAO GASeP.
Following up on that report, IATA has proposed the creation of
a new task force, designed to address these issues, the Aviation Personal Electronic Devices ‘Ban’
Cyber Security Task Force (ACSTF), which will report to the In March 2017, the US Department of Homeland Security
IATA Security Group (SEG). The objective of the ACSTF is to (DHS) issued a security directive to restrict oversized PED
assemble industry expertise in this emerging aviation risk area, items from the cabin of US-bound flights originating from 10
gather information, scope the threat and identify best practices airports throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The UK
for airlines related to the increasing probability of a cyber Department for Transport (DfT) followed a short time thereafter
breach of aircraft systems. It is intended that nominations will with similar restrictions. The extraordinary events surrounding
include not only security managers, but also airline Information the public threat from PEDs continues to raise several pertinent
Technology experts, engineers and experts from Original points for discussion as the industry aims to rally behind the
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). It is envisaged that this task cooperation and enhancement commitments espoused by the
force will run for two years, will meet physically twice a year, ICAO GASeP.
and will hold bi-monthly teleconferences.
Discussions among experts revolved around the nature of the
It remains that safety and security are IATA’s top priorities. Airlines threat information. The effectiveness of existing checkpoint
and OEMs demand the highest safety and security standards screening technologies, the variation of requirements between
and protections for aircraft systems. Connectivity of aircraft states, and the sovereignty of states when implementing
systems, through traditional information technologies, aviation- the standards of ICAO Annex 17 dominated aviation security
specific protocols and radio-frequency (RF) communications, specialist groups. But one of the most important issues
has extended the attack surface to the aircraft itself, both on the raised by the ban has been overlooked – the questions and
ground and in flight. Furthermore, the digital footprint of aircraft challenges raised by the implementation of unilateral measures
has increased and continues to do so. Therefore, the question of an extraterritorial nature. The replacement of a ‘ban’ by
of digital communication between systems, data validity and the US DHS or Transport Security Administration (TSA) with
information/data security (the protection against intentional alternative and/or additional measures imposed on airlines is
interference) has become increasingly relevant. With the central to this argument.
potential for an increased probability of cybersecurity incidents,
safety is a paramount concern. IATA recognizes that governments are responsible for
safeguarding and protecting the civil aviation industry. Thus,

IATA SAFETY STRATEGY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 15

when there is an urgent need for additional security measures managed at central and/or primary checkpoint screening,
to be implemented due to a time-sensitive security threat and/ carried out by authorities and/or organizations contracted by
or vulnerability, the industry is always quick to comply. The authorities with appropriate oversight.
industry fully accepts that short-term, unilateral, extraterritorial
measures are required to protect against a specific threat. Unilateral, extraterritorial security measures instituted by states
However, short-term solutions should not be used as long-term are largely considered beyond the SARPs contained in ICAO
countermeasures for security. Terrorists are not going to stop Annex 17 and may affect existing bilateral aviation agreements
searching for ways to circumvent security systems – the threat between countries. They also cause regulatory risk for airlines
is here to stay. that decided to not implement such measures. Sovereignty
is such that some states preclude airlines from implementing
In response, in May 2017, IATA facilitated a Security Summit in secondary or a carrier’s own requirements. Jurisdictional
Washington, DC, which included SEG member airlines, airports, regulations at the point of departure may place the airline in
associations and regulators. The objective of the Summit was a difficult regulatory compliance position at the point of arrival
to identify measures that could be taken as an alternative to in another country. States need to recognize these measures
any expansion of the ban. These alternative measures would within the SARPs framework by which bilateral agreements
enhance security while reducing the impact on passengers and have been established.
airlines.
Conflict Zones
In June 2017, DHS and TSA released a three-phased strategy July 2017 marked three years since the tragic events of MH17
to enhance US aviation security interests and provided an over Ukraine. In the time since, militarized hostilities have
alternative means for affected carriers to, unlock, the ban. continued and arguably increased in other areas where civil
Following the release of new requirements issued by the aviation aircraft are known to operate. Awareness of the risks
TSA, the SEG has led the consultation efforts with the TSA in are well known to industry and member airlines are actively
understanding the degree of flexibility in the implementation. engaged in undertaking risk assessments prior to the dispatch
This resulted in updated directives, with the latest released in of aircraft based on IOSA standards.
December 2017, where clear alternative means of compliance
for the interim on certain aspects of phase 2 of the measures During the ICAO AVSEC Panel 28 in May 2017, a new
were provided to effected airlines. information sharing standard for the purposes of enhancing
operator risk assessments was supported and included in the
The current unilateral, extraterritorial measures are not a long- proposed Amendment 16 to Annex 17. This new standard was
term solution, even if in some cases they are voluntary for airlines originally proposed by IATA following the recommendations
to implement. Arguably, the measures are also displacing a contained in the MH17 Dutch Safety Board report. Moreover, in
major onus for security, which is the primary responsibility of 2018, ICAO is expected to publish a Risk Assessment Manual
governments, onto the airlines. for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones.

The previous ban of PEDs from the cabin of aircraft required The IATA-hosted Security Forum extranet site is currently being
affected airlines to enforce restrictions by implementing enhanced with a view to promoting qualified links between
additional measures resulting in carriage of PEDs in the hold. airlines and vendors in the provision of security information
Airlines were left to manage residual security and safety risks. sharing.
More recently, the roll out of the new measures continues to
place disproportionate emphasis on airline security measures,
where aspects of the new security directive are arguably a
government responsibility. Identified vulnerabilities and thus
risks to the industry ought to be successfully reduced and

IATA SAFETY STRATEGY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 16

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1
IATA Annual Safety Report
Safety is aviation’s highest priority. More than seventy The IATA Safety Report has been IATA’s flagship
years ago, the global airline industry came together safety document since 1964. This document provides
to create the International Air Transport Association the industry with critical information, derived from the
(IATA). As part of IATA’s mission to represent, lead analysis of aviation accidents, to understand safety
and serve its members, the association partners with risks in the industry and propose mitigations.
aviation stakeholders to collect, analyze and share
safety information. It also advocates global safety The 2017 Safety Report was produced at the beginning
standards and best practices that are firmly founded of 2018 and presents trends and statistics based on
on industry experience and expertise. A vital tool in this knowledge of industry at the time. This report is made
effort is IATA’s Annual Safety Report, which is now in its available to the industry for free distribution.
54th year of publication. This is the definitive yearbook
The Safety Report is a valuable tool as aviation works
to track commercial aviation’s safety performance,
tirelessly to improve its already superb safety record.
challenges and opportunities.

Image courtesy of Embraer

SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 19

SAFETY REPORT METHODS ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION
AND ASSUMPTIONS TECHNICAL GROUP
The Safety Report is produced each year and designed to The IATA Operations Committee (OPC) and its Safety Group
present the best-known information at the time of publication. (SG) created the Accident Classification Technical Group
Due to the nature of accident analysis, certain caveats apply (ACTG) to analyze accidents, identity contributing factors,
to the results of this report. Firstly, that the accidents analyzed determine trends and areas of concern relating to operational
and the categories and contributing factors assigned to those safety, and develop prevention strategies. The results of the
accidents are based on the best available information at the work of the ACTG are incorporated in the annual IATA Safety
time of classification. Secondly, that the sectors used to create Report.
the accident rates are the most up-to-date available at the time
of production. The sector information is updated on a regular It should be noted that many accident investigations are not
basis and takes into account actual and estimated data. As new complete at the time the ACTG meets to classify the year’s events
updates are provided the sector count becomes more accurate and additional facts may be uncovered during an investigation
for previous years, which in turn allows for increased precision that could affect the currently assigned classifications.
in accident rates.
The ACTG is composed of safety experts from IATA,
member airlines, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs),
professional associations and federations as well as other
industry stakeholders. The group is instrumental in the analysis
process and produces a safety report based on the subjective
classification of accidents. The data analyzed and presented
in this report is extracted from a variety of sources, including
FlightGlobal and the accident investigation boards of the states
where the accidents occurred. Once assembled, the ACTG
validates each accident report using their expertise to develop
an accurate assessment of the events.

2017 ACTG members:

Steve Hough (Chairman) Luis Savio dos Santos

SAS EMBRAER
Ruben Morales (Vice-Chairman) Yasuo Ishihara
HONG KONG AIRLINES HONEYWELL
Dieter Reisinger (Former Chairman) Andrea Mulone (Database/Analysis)
AUSTRIAN AIRLINES IATA
Robert Holliday (Secretary)
IATA
Marcel Comeau Michael Henry
AIR CANADA ICAO
Xavier Barriola Arnaud Du Bédat
AIRBUS IFALPA
Denis Landry Takahisa Otsuka
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION (ALPA) JAPAN AIRLINES
Tatyana Morozova Martin Plumleigh
AIR ASTANA JEPPESEN
Ivan Carvalho Peter Krupa
AZUL BRAZILIAN AIRLINES LUFTHANSA
Marion Choudet Ayedh Almotairy
ATR SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES
Robert Aaron Jr. João Romão
THE BOEING COMPANY TAP AIR PORTUGAL
Richard Mayfield Peter Kaumanns
THE BOEING COMPANY VEREINIGUNG COCKPIT
David Fisher Dmitry Ivanov
BOMBARDIER AEROSPACE WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANISATION

SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 20

2
Decade in Review
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND FATALITIES

This section presents yearly accident rates for the past 10 years for each of the following accident metrics: all accidents, fatality risk,
fatal accidents and hull losses, as well as general statistics on the number of fatalities and accident costs.

Image courtesy of Boeing

SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 21

ALL ACCIDENTS
‘All Accidents’ is the most inclusive rate, including all accident types and all severities in terms of
loss of life and damage to aircraft.

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

6.00 Jet and Turboprop | All Accidents
Accidents per Million Sectors

5.00

4.00

3.00

2.00

1.00

-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Jet Aircraft
4.00 Jet Aircraft | All Accidents
Accidents per Million Sectors

3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Turboprop Aircraft
12.00 Turboprop Aircraft | All Accidents
Accidents per Million Sectors

10.00

8.00

6.00

4.00

2.00

-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 22

FATALITY RISK

Fatality Risk: Full-Loss Equivalents (FLE) per 1 Million Sectors. For definition of ‘full-loss equivalent’, please see Annex 1.

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

2.00 Jet and Turboprop | Fatality Risk
FLE per Million Sectors

1.50

1.00

0.50

-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Jet Aircraft
1.00 Jet Aircraft | Fatality Risk
FLE per Million Sectors

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Turboprop Aircraft
3.50 Turboprop Aircraft | Fatality Risk
FLE per Million Sectors

3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 23

FATAL ACCIDENTS

‘Fatal Accidents’ refer to accidents with at least one person on board the aircraft perishing as a
result of the crash.

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

2.00 Jet and Turboprop | Fatal Accidents
Accidents per Million Sectors

1.50

1.00

0.50

-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Jet Aircraft
1.20 Jet Aircraft | Fatal Accidents
Accidents per Million Sectors

1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Turboprop Aircraft
4.00 Turboprop Aircraft | Fatal Accidents
Accidents per Million Sectors

3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 24

HULL LOSSES

‘Hull Losses’ refer to the aircraft being damaged beyond repair or the costs related to the repair
being above the commerical value of the aircraft.

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

5.00 Jet and Turboprop | Hull Losses
Accidents per Million Sectors

4.00

3.00

2.00

1.00

-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Jet Aircraft
3.00 Jet Aircraft | Hull Losses
Accidents per Million Sectors

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Turboprop Aircraft
8.00 Turboprop Aircraft | Hull Losses
Accidents per Million Sectors

7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 25

FATALITIES
The graph below shows the total number of fatalities (line and vertical right axis) and
the number of fatal accidents (stacked bar and vertical left axis) split between aircraft
propulsion type. The reader needs to be aware that the data is not normalized by the
aircraft flight count, therefore discretion should be used. Interpreting and applying this
data should be used in reference to the accident rate graphs presented previously.

Number of Fatalities and Fatal Accidents

Number os Fatalities and Fatal Accidents

30 700
Number of Fatal Accidents

600

Number of Fatalities
25
500
20
400
15
300
10
200
5 100
0 0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Jet Fatal Accidents Turboprop Fatal Accidents

Jet Fatalities Turboprop Fatalities

The graph below shows the constant increase in the number of passengers carried
over the past 10 years as well as a ratio metric related to the number of fatalities by the
number of passengers carried in a specific year.

Number of
Number of Passengers Passengers
Carried Carried per
and Fatalities andPassengers
Fatality Ratio per
Carried
Passengers Carried
4.50 350
Number of Passengers Carried

Fatalities per Billion Passengers

4.00 300
3.50
250
3.00
2.50 200
(Billion)

2.00
Carried

150
1.50
100
1.00
0.50 50
- -
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Passengers Carried Fatalities/Billion Passengers Carried

Passengers Carried Data Source: IATA / Industry Economic Performance

SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 26

ACCIDENT COSTS
The graphs below show the estimated costs for all losses involving jet and turboprop
aircraft over the last 10 years. The figures presented are from operational accidents
and exclude security-related events and acts of violence.

Jet Aircraft
Jet Aircraft
2500
Accident Cost ($M USD)

2000

1500

1000

500

0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Minor Liability Passenger Liability Substantial Damage Hull Losses

Source: Ascend FlightGlobal

Turboprop Aircraft
Turboprop Aircraft
500
450
Accident Cost ($M USD)

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Minor Liability Passenger Liability Substantial Damage Hull Losses

Source: Ascend FlightGlobal

SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 27

 Safety in numbers
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3
2017 in Review
COMMERCIAL AIRLINES OVERVIEW

FLEET SIZE, HOURS AND SECTORS FLOWN

Jet Turboprop Total

World Fleet 26,150 5,567 31,717

Sector Landings (Millions) 35.0 6.9 41.9

Source: Ascend - a FlightGlobal Advisory Service

Note: World fleet includes in-service and stored aircraft operated by commercial airlines as of year end.

CARGO OPERATING FLEET

Jet Turboprop

Percentage of Operating Fleet in All-Cargo Use 7.4% 19.4%

Source: Ascend - a FlightGlobal Advisory Service

Note: World fleet includes in-service and stored aircraft operated by commercial airlines as of year end.

SECTION 3 – 2017 IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 29

REGIONAL BREAKDOWN

AFI ASPAC CIS EUR LATAM/CAR MENA NAM NASIA

Jet - Sector Landings (Millions) 0.61 5.50 1.09 7.57 2.46 1.90 10.11 5.69
Turboprop - Sector Landings (Millions) 0.70 1.65 0.12 1.37 0.73 0.12 2.13 0.09

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
Note: Summaries of all the year’s accidents are presented in Annex 3.

NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS

Jet Turboprop Total

Total 25 20 45
Hull Losses 4 9 13
Substantial Damage 21 11 32
Fatal 1 5 6
Full-Loss Equivalents 1.0 3.0 4.0
Fatalities* 4 15 19
Fatalities of people not on board the aircraft 35 0 35

*People on board only

ACCIDENTS PER OPERATOR REGION

AFI ASPAC CIS EUR LATAM/CAR MENA NAM NASIA

Total 9 11 5 6 6 1 7 0
Hull Losses 4 2 3 1 1 0 2 0
Substantial Damage 5 9 2 5 5 1 5 0
Fatal 0 1 2 1 0 0 2 0
Full-Loss Equivalents 0.0 0.7 1.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
Fatalities 0 2 10 4 0 0 3 0

SECTION 3 – 2017 IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 30

ALL ACCIDENTS

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 4.13
NAM NASIA
0.67 5.15
0.57 0.00
1.13 4.35
0.95 0.19
1.70
1.20 MENA 0.62
0.49
5.75
3.23 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 1.54
1.88 6.87 2.18
World IATA 2.80 2.43 2.79
Member
2.16 8.06
1.08 0.50 2017
1.65 1.55 2016
1.99 1.19 ’12-’16

Jet Aircraft

CIS
EUR 2.76
NAM NASIA
0.53 2.85
0.49 0.00
1.07 2.35
0.85 0.20
1.35
0.69 MENA 0.34
0.53
5.55
2.97 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 1.45
0.81 3.29 1.36
World IATA 2.80 0.00 2.27
Member
1.58 4.05
0.72 0.39 2017
1.33 1.51 2016
1.33 1.07 ’12-’16

Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 16.44
NAM NASIA
1.46 26.59
0.94 0.00
1.47 20.59
1.41 0.00
3.49
3.31 MENA 13.09
0.00
9.09
6.85 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 1.82
5.48 9.98 4.64
World IATA 2.80 4.55 4.34
Member
3.88 11.56
2.90 1.95 2017
3.19 2.12 2016
4.89 2.80 ’12-’16

SECTION 3 – 2017 IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 31

FATALITY RISK

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 1.04
NAM NASIA
0.11 0.67
0.08 0.00
0.11 1.21
0.09 0.00
0.05
0.14 MENA 0.07
0.00
0.52
0.35 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.09
0.00 0.00 0.25
World IATA 0.55 0.00 0.28
Member
0.27 1.73
0.09 0.00 2017
0.18 0.09 2016
0.24 0.06 ’12-’16

Jet Aircraft

CIS
EUR 0.00
NAM NASIA
0.13 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.13 0.51
0.00 0.00
0.06
0.04 MENA 0.00
0.00
0.56
0.12 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
World IATA 0.70 0.00 0.13
Member
0.15 0.74
0.03 0.00 2017
0.11 0.05 2016
0.09 0.02 ’12-’16

Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 10.33
NAM NASIA
0.00 6.89
0.49 0.00
0.00 6.90
0.47 0.00
0.00
0.52 MENA 3.42
0.00
0.00
3.42 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.40
0.00 0.00 1.02
World IATA 0.00 0.00 0.72
Member
0.63 2.60
0.43 0.00 2017
0.51 0.71 2016
0.87 0.55 ’12-’16

SECTION 3 – 2017 IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 32

FATAL ACCIDENTS

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 1.65
NAM NASIA
0.11 0.86
0.16 0.00
0.11 1.57
0.09 0.00
0.05
0.16 MENA 0.10
0.00
0.52
0.35 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.14
0.00 0.00 0.29
World IATA 0.62 0.00 0.36
Member
0.33 2.06
0.14 0.00 2017
0.20 0.09 2016
0.28 0.07 ’12-’16

Jet Aircraft

CIS
EUR 0.00
NAM NASIA
0.13 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.13 0.59
0.00 0.00
0.06
0.04 MENA 0.00
0.00
0.56
0.12 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
World IATA 0.80 0.00 0.22
Member
0.18 0.74
0.03 0.00 2017
0.12 0.05 2016
0.11 0.03 ’12-’16

Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 16.44
NAM NASIA
0.00 8.86
0.94 0.00
0.00 9.50
0.47 0.00
0.00
0.63 MENA 4.36
0.00
0.00
3.42 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.61
0.00 0.00 1.16
World IATA 0.00 0.00 0.79
Member
0.78 3.21
0.72 0.00 2017
0.58 0.71 2016
1.05 0.66 ’12-’16

SECTION 3 – 2017 IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 33

HULL LOSSES

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 2.48
NAM NASIA
0.11 2.57
0.16 0.00
0.23 3.31
0.35 0.00
0.24
0.36 MENA 0.19
0.00
1.57
0.92 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.28
0.31 3.05 0.73
World IATA 0.62 0.81 0.72
Member
0.78 4.97
0.31 0.00 2017
0.50 0.37 2016
0.67 0.24 ’12-’16

Jet Aircraft

CIS
EUR 0.92
NAM NASIA
0.13 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.27 1.17
0.32 0.00
0.14
0.22 MENA 0.00
0.00
1.67
0.74 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.18
0.41 0.00 0.58
World IATA 0.80 0.00 0.48
Member
0.53 2.21
0.11 0.00 2017
0.39 0.30 2016
0.33 0.17 ’12-’16

Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 16.44
NAM NASIA
0.00 26.59
0.94 0.00
0.00 20.59
0.47 0.00
0.73
0.98 MENA 8.73
0.00
0.00
3.42 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.61
0.00 5.70 1.16
World IATA 0.00 1.52 1.45
Member
1.55 7.38
1.30 0.00 2017
1.01 1.41 2016
2.18 1.15 ’12-’16

SECTION 3 – 2017 IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 34

IATA Member Airlines vs. Nonmembers – Total Accident Rate by Region
In an effort to better indicate the safety performance of IATA member airlines vs. nonmembers, IATA has determined the total
accident rate for each region and globally. IATA member airlines outperformed nonmembers in the AFI, ASPAC, CIS and LATAM/
CAR regions.

2017 Accident Rate: IATA Member Airlines vs. Nonmembers

12
Accidents per Million Sectors Flown

10
8
6
4
2
-

IATA NON-IATA

IOSA-Registered Airlines vs. Non-IOSA – Total Accidents and Fatalities by Region

In an effort to better indicate the safety performance of IOSA-registered airlines vs. non-IOSA, IATA has determined the total
accident rate for each region and globally. IOSA-registered airlines outperformed non-registered ones in the AFI, ASPAC, CIS and
LATAM/CAR regions. The non-IOSA-registered airline accident rate was two times higher than for IOSA-registered airlines in 2017.

2017 Accident Rate: IOSA-Registered vs. Non-Registered

12
Accidents per Million Sectors Flown

10
8
6
4
2
-

IOSA NON-IOSA

SECTION 3 – 2017 IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 35

NETWORK
NETWORK
CONNECT
CONNECT
SUCCEED
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JOIN US – BECOME AN IATA STRATEGIC PARTNER

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Claim your stake in the aviation industry’s fu- As an IATA Strategic Partner, you get to:
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Become an IATA Strategic Partner today!
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4
In-Depth Accident Analysis 2013 to 2017
INTRODUCTION TO THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT

The Human Factors Research Project at the University of Texas DEFINITIONS

in Austin developed Threat and Error Management (TEM) as
a conceptual framework to interpret data obtained from both Latent Conditions: Conditions present in the system before
normal and abnormal operations. For many years, IATA has the accident, made evident by triggering factors. These
worked closely with the University of Texas Human Factors often relate to deficiencies in organizational processes and
Research Team, the International Civil Aviation Organization procedures.
(ICAO), member airlines and manufacturers to apply TEM to its
many safety activities. Threat: An event or error that occurs outside the influence
of the flight crew, but which requires flight crew attention and
management to properly maintain safety margins.
THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK Flight Crew Error: An observed flight crew deviation from
organizational expectations or crew intentions.

Undesired Aircraft State (UAS): A flight crew-induced

aircraft state that clearly reduces safety margins; a safety
compromising situation that results from ineffective threat/
error management. An UAS is recoverable.

End State: An end state is a reportable event. An end state is

unrecoverable.

Distinction between ‘Undesired Aircraft State’ and ‘End State’:

An UAS is recoverable (e.g., an unstable approach from which
a go-around would recover the situation). An End State is
unrecoverable (e.g., a runway excursion where the aircraft
comes to rest off the runway).

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 37
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONAL AND FLIGHT CREW-AIMED
COUNTERMEASURES
At the request of member airlines, manufacturers and other
organizations involved in the Safety Report, IATA developed an Every year, the ACTG classifies accidents and, with the benefit of
accident classification system based on the TEM framework. hindsight, determines actions or measures that could have been
The purpose of the taxonomy is to: taken to prevent an accident. These proposed countermeasures
are in two categories, systemic countermeasures and last-
•• Acquire more meaningful data line-of-defense countermeasures that frontline personnel
could action. Systemic countermeasures can be put in place
•• Extract further information/intelligence by operators or state regulators. These countermeasures are
based on activities, processes or systemic issues internal to
•• Formulate relevant mitigation strategies/safety the airline operation or state’s oversight activities. Frontline
recommendations personnel countermeasures are primarily directed towards
flight crew, which may have been effective in managing the
Unfortunately, some accident reports do not contain sufficient threat or errors identified in the accident analysis.
information at the time of the analysis to adequately assess
contributing factors. When an event cannot be properly Countermeasures for other personnel, such as air traffic
classified due to a lack of information, it is classified under controllers, ground crew, cabin crew or maintenance staff are
the insufficient information category. Where possible, these important, but they are not considered at this time.
accidents have been assigned an End State. It should also be
noted that the contributing factors that have been classified Each event was coded with potential countermeasures that,
do not always reflect all the factors that played a part in an with the benefit of hindsight, could have altered the outcome
accident, but rather those known at the time of the analysis. of events. A statistical compilation of the countermeasures is
presented in Section 8 of this report.
Important note: In the in-depth analysis presented in
Sections 4 through 6, the percentages shown with regards to
contributing factors (e.g., % of threats and errors noted) are ANALYSIS BY ACCIDENT CATEGORY AND
based on the number of accidents in each category. Accidents REGION
classified as “insufficient information” are excluded from this
part of the analysis. The number of “insufficient information” This section presents an in-depth analysis of 2013 to 2017
accidents is noted at the bottom of each analysis section of occurrences by accident category and regional distribution.
contributing factors in Addendums A, B and C. However, Definitions of these categories can be found in Annex 2. The
accidents classified as “insufficient information” are part of the countries that make up each of the IATA regions can be found
overall statistics (e.g., % of accidents that were fatal or resulted in Annex 1 – Definitions. An in-depth regional analysis can be
in a hull loss). found in Section 5.

Annex 1 contains definitions and detailed information regarding Referring to these accident categories helps an operator to:
the types of accidents and aircraft that are included in the Safety
Report analysis as well as the breakdown of IATA regions. •• Structure safety activities and set priorities

The complete IATA TEM-based accident classification system •• Recall key risk areas, when a type of accident does not occur
for flight is presented in Annex 2. in a given year

•• Provide resources for well-identified prevention strategies

•• Address these categories both systematically and

continuously within the airline’s safety management system

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 38
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www.iata.org/i-asc
2017 Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 45 Accident Count % of Total 2017
Number of fatalities: 19 IATA Member 24%
Full-Loss Equivalents 9%
Fatal 13%
Hull Losses 29%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

71% 29% 0% 56% 44%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Primary
Contributing factors

Latent Conditions

CIS N/A
EUR
NAM 5 NASIA
7 6 3 0
5 6 0
MENA
1
2 Threats
ASPAC Air Traffic Services:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 11
6
9 11 11%
7
11

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
64%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2017)
Undesired Aircraft State
45% Vertical/Lateral/Speed
40% Deviation:
(% to total accidents)
Accident Frequency

35%
30% Undershoot, 4 33%
25% Loss of Control – In-flight, 11
20% Controlled Flight into
Terrain, 4
15% Countermeasure
10%
5% Overall Crew Performance:
0% 25%
- 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
factors see section 8
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each ➤ See detailed view
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 40
2017 Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate*: 1.08 Accident Rate* 2017
IATA Member 0.50
Fatality Risk** 0.09
Fatal 0.14
Hull Losses 0.31

Jet Turboprop
0.72 2.90 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2017) Regional Accident Rate (2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accidents per Million Sectors

40%
8.0
35%
7.0
30%
6.0
25%
5.0
20%
4.0
15%
3.0
10%
2.0
5% 1.0
0% -
RWY/TWY EXC
G UP LDG/CLPSE
IN-F DAMAGE
TAILSTRIKE
LOC-I
UNDERSHOOT
GND DAMAGE
HARD LDG
RWY COLL
CFIT
OFF AIRP LDG
OTHER
MID-AIR COLL

AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM

MENA

NAM

NASIA
Note: End State names have been abbreviated.
Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal)

30 Not Fatal

25 Fatal

20

15

10

0
PRF ESD TXO TOF RTO ICL ECL CRZ DST APR GOA LND TXI AES PSF FLC GDS

Refer to List of Phase of Flight definitions for full names

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 41
2013-2017 Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 340 Accident Count % of Total 2013-2017
Number of fatalities: 1176 IATA Member 32%
Full-Loss Equivalents 11%
Fatal 13%
Hull Losses 31%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

76% 22% 3% 58% 42%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding.
Statistics include a propeller accident happened in 2016.

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
61
26 NASIA
33%
62 16 11
58 52 10
MENA
26
26 Threats
ASPAC Meteorology:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 81
33
40 82 29%
39
55

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
2 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Manual Handling/Flight
Note: An-74 Hard Landing. Location: Barneo Ice Base (International Waters) Controls:
B777 (MH370). Location: unknown
B1900, presumingly crashed near Sao Tome and Principe. Wreckage not known to have been found 34%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State
30% Long/Floated/Bounced/
Runway / Taxiway Excursion, 8 Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
(% of total accidents)

25%
Accident Frequency

landing:
In-flight Damage, 1 Loss of Control – In-flight, 690
20%
24%
15% Undershoot, 4

10% Other End State, 318

Controlled Flight into
Countermeasure
5% Terrain, 154
Overall Crew Performance:
0%
- 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 21%
Fatality Risk

For more info regarding primary contributing

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 42
2013-2017 Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate*: 1.76 Accident Rate* 2013-2017
IATA Member 1.10
Fatality Risk** 0.19
Fatal 0.23
Hull Losses 0.55

Jet Turboprop
1.25 4.11 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accidents per Million Sectors

25% 7.00

6.00
20%
5.00
15%
4.00
10% 3.00

2.00
5%
1.00
0%
-
RWY/TWY EXC
G UP LDG/CLPSE
HARD LDG
IN-F DAMAGE
GND DAMAGE
LOC-I
TAILSTRIKE
CFIT
UNDERSHOOT
RWY COLL
OTHER
OFF AIRP LDG
MID-AIR COLL

AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
Note: End State names have been abbreviated.
Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

200 Not Fatal 2.50 90

180 80
160 Fatal 2.00 70
Number of Accidents

140
Accident Rate

60
120 1.50
50
100
40
80 1.00
60 30
40 0.50 20
20 10
0 - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 43
2013-2017 Fatal Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 45 Accident Count % of Total 2013-2017
Number of fatalities: 1176 IATA Member 13%
Full-Loss Equivalents 85%
Fatal 100%
Hull Losses 100%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

44% 51% 4% 29% 69%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
3
8 NASIA
40%
10 6 2
9 2 2
MENA
2
4 Threats
ASPAC Meteorology:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 9
3
8 7 40%
3
11

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
1 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Note: B777 (MH370). Location: unknown SOP Adherence/Cross-
B1900, presumingly crashed near Sao Tome and Principe. Wreckage not known to have been found verification:
50%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State
80% Vertical/Lateral/Speed
70% Deviation:
(% of total accidents)

Undershoot, 4
Accident Frequency

60%
Runway / Taxiway
33%
50% Excursion, 8
Other End State, 318
40% In-flight Damage, 1 Loss of Control – In-flight,
30% Controlled Flight 690
into Terrain, 154 Countermeasure
20%
10% Leadership:
0% 33%
- 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
factors see section 8
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 44
2013-2017 Fatal Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate*: 0.23 Accident Rate* 2013-2017
IATA Member 0.08
Fatality Risk** 0.20
Fatal 0.23
Hull Losses 0.23

Jet Turboprop
0.08 0.90 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accidents per Million Sectors

70% 1.60

60% 1.40

50% 1.20

40% 1.00

30% 0.80

20% 0.60

10% 0.40
0.20
0%
0.00
LOC-I
CFIT
OTHER
UNDERSHOOT
RWY/TWY EXC
IN-F DAMAGE
TAILSTRIKE
GND DAMAGE
RWY COLL
HARD LDG
MID-AIR COLL
G UP LDG/CLPSE
OFF AIRP LDG

AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
Note: End State names have been abbreviated.
Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

12 0.45 16
Fatal
0.40 14
10
Number of Accidents

0.35 12
8
Accident Rate

0.30
10
0.25
6 8
0.20
4 6
0.15
0.10 4
2
0.05 2
0 - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

Accident Count Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Hull Loss Rate

Note: The fatal accident rate and the hull loss rate share the same values

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 45
2013-2017 Nonfatal Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 295 Accident Count % of Total 2013-2017
Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 33%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0%
Fatal 0%
Hull Losses 21%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

80% 18% 2% 63% 37%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
58
18 NASIA
32%
52 10 9
49 50 8
MENA
24
22 Threats
ASPAC Aircraft Malfunction:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 72
30
32 75 28%
36
44

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
1 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
35%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

35% Long/Floated/Bounced/
Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
30% landing:
(% of  total  accidents)
Accident Frequency

25%
26%
20%
Not Applicable. Graph only displays accidents involving fatalities.
15%
Countermeasure
10%
5% Overall Crew Performance:

0% 19%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
factors see section 8
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 46
2013-2017 Nonfatal Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate*: 1.53 Accident Rate* 2013-2017
IATA Member 1.03
Fatality Risk** 0.00
Fatal 0.00
Hull Losses 0.33

Jet Turboprop
1.17 3.21 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accidents per Million Sectors

30% 6.00

5.00

20% 4.00

3.00

10% 2.00

1.00

0% 0.00
AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
RWY/TWY EXC
G UP LDG/CLPSE
HARD LDG
IN-F DAMAGE
GND DAMAGE
TAILSTRIKE
UNDERSHOOT
RWY COLL
OTHER
CFIT
OFF AIRP LDG
LOC-I
MID-AIR COLL

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

200 2.50 80
Not Fatal
180 70
160 2.00
Number of Accidents

60
140
Accident Rate

1.50 50
120
100 40
80 1.00 30
60 20
40 0.50
10
20
0 - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

Accident Count Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 47
2013-2017 IOSA Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 150 Accident Count % of Total 2013-2017
Number of fatalities: 614 IATA Member 72%
Full-Loss Equivalents 6%
Fatal 7%
Hull Losses 19%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

91% 9% 1% 83% 17%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
42
5 NASIA
24%
29 6 5
28 32 4
MENA
16
15 Threats
ASPAC Aircraft Malfunction:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 33
12
8 34 28%
17
13

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
1 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
30%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State
25% Long/Floated/Bounced/
Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

20% landing:
Loss of Control – In-flight,
15% 53 20%
Controlled Flight
10% into Terrain, 2

Countermeasure
5%
Overall Crew Performance:
0%
- 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 19%
Fatality Risk

For more info regarding primary contributing

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 48
2013-2017 IOSA Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate*: 1.16 Accident Rate* 2013-2017
IATA Member 1.10
Fatality Risk** 0.07
Fatal 0.08
Hull Losses 0.22

Jet Turboprop
1.07 2.08 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accidents per Million Sectors

20% 3.50
18%
3.00
16%
14% 2.50
12% 2.00
10%
8% 1.50
6% 1.00
4%
0.50
2%
0% 0.00
AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
IN-F DAMAGE

MID-AIR COLL
G UP LDG/CLPSE
HARD LDG
RWY/TWY EXC
GND DAMAGE
TAILSTRIKE
LOC-I
RWY COLL
UNDERSHOOT
CFIT
OTHER

OFF AIRP LDG

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

80 Not Fatal 1.80 45

70 1.60 40
Fatal
1.40 35
Number of Accidents

60
1.20 30
Accident Rate

50
1.00 25
40
0.80 20
30
0.60 15
20 0.40 10
10 0.20 5
0 - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 49
2013-2017 Non-IOSA Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 190 Accident Count % of Total 2013-2017
Number of fatalities: 562 IATA Member 0%
Full-Loss Equivalents 15%
Fatal 18%
Hull Losses 40%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

64% 32% 4% 38% 60%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
19
21 NASIA
42%
33 10 6
30 20 6
MENA
10
11 Threats
ASPAC Meteorology:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 48
21
32 48 30%
22
42

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
1 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
37%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

35% Long/Floated/Bounced/
30% Runway / Taxiway Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

Excursion, 8 Loss of Control – In-flight, landing:

25% 83

20% Controlled Flight

27%
15% into Terrain, 31

10% Countermeasure
5%
Overall Crew Performance:
0%
- 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 22%
Fatality Risk

For more info regarding primary contributing

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 50
2013-2017 Non-IOSA Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate*: 2.99 Accident Rate* 2013-2017
IATA Member 0.00
Fatality Risk** 0.45
Fatal 0.53
Hull Losses 1.21

Jet Turboprop
1.77 5.21 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accidents per Million Sectors

35% 12.00
30% 10.00
25%
8.00
20%
6.00
15%
4.00
10%
5% 2.00

0% 0.00
AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
RWY/TWY EXC
G UP LDG/CLPSE
LOC-I
HARD LDG
GND DAMAGE
IN-F DAMAGE
CFIT
UNDERSHOOT
RWY COLL
TAILSTRIKE
OTHER
OFF AIRP LDG
MID-AIR COLL

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

120 Not Fatal 4.50 60

4.00
100 Fatal 50
Number of Accidents

3.50
Accident Rate

80 3.00 40
2.50
60 30
2.00
40 1.50 20
1.00
20 10
0.50
0 - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 51
Controlled Flight into Terrain – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 1 Number of fatalities: 4 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 13 Number of fatalities: 154 IATA Member 0% 15%
Full-Loss Equivalents 100% 66%
Fatal 100% 77%
Hull Losses 100% 92%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 0% 100% 0% 100% 0%
2013-2017 31% 62% 8% 23% 77%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
1
4 NASIA
78%
3 2 1
2 1 1
MENA
0
1 Threats
ASPAC Meteorology:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 1
1
2 1 56%
1
4

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
SOP Adherence/Cross-
verification:
67%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

20% Vertical/Lateral/Speed
NASIA, 48 Deviation:
(% of total accidents)

CIS, 34
Accident Frequency

15% EUR, 4 56%

10% NAM, 6
AFI, 8

Countermeasure
5%
ASPAC, 54
Monitor/Cross-check:
0% 56%
- 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 52
Controlled Flight into Terrain – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.02 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.07 IATA Member 0.00 0.02
Fatality Risk** 0.02 0.04
Fatal 0.02 0.05
Hull Losses 0.02 0.06

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.03 0.00 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.02 0.29
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

8 0.80 2017
Fatal
7 0.70
Not Fatal 2013 - 2 017
6 0.60
5 0.50
4 0.40
3 0.30
2 0.20
1 0.10
0 -
AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

120% 2017 0.18 7

0.16 6
100% 2013 - 2017
0.14
Number of Accidents

5
80%
Accident Rate

0.12
0.10 4
60%
0.08 3
40% 0.06
2
0.04
20% 1
0.02
0% - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 53
Loss of Control – In-flight – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 4 Number of fatalities: 11 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 29 Number of fatalities: 690 IATA Member 0% 17%
Full-Loss Equivalents 64% 67%
Fatal 100% 93%
Hull Losses 100% 97%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 50% 50% 0% 0% 100%
2013-2017 55% 41% 3% 31% 69%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Flight Operations:

EUR
NAM
2
4 NASIA
30%
6 4 1
6 1 1
MENA
3
4 Threats
ASPAC Aircraft Malfunction:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 7
1
5 6 39%
1
6

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
SOP Adherence/Cross-
verification:
39%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

20% Vertical/Lateral/Speed
NASIA, 43
CIS, 68 Deviation:
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

NAM, 19
15%
MENA, 110 AFI, 61
26%
10%
ASPAC, 266
Countermeasure
5% EUR, 118
LATAM, 5 Overall Crew Performance:
0% 35%
- 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 54
Loss of Control – In-flight – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.10 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.15 IATA Member 0.00 0.05
Fatality Risk** 0.06 0.10
Fatal 0.10 0.14
Hull Losses 0.10 0.15

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.00 0.58 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.06 0.58
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

9 0.90 2017
Fatal
8 0.80
7 Not Fatal 0.70 2013 - 2017
6 0.60
5 0.50
4 0.40
3 0.30
2 0.20
1 0.10
0 -
AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

60% 0.25 9
2017
8
50% 2013 - 2 017 0.20 7
Number of Accidents

6
Accident Rate

40%
0.15
5
30%
4
0.10
20% 3
0.05 2
10%
1
0% - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 55
Mid-air Collision – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 0 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 1 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 0% 0%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 0% 0%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2013-2017 100% 0% 0% 100% 0%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS At least three accidents

NAM EUR
0 NASIA required to display
0 0 0 0 classification
0 0 0
MENA
0
0 Threats
ASPAC At least three accidents
LATAM/CAR
AFI 0 required to display
0
1 0 classification
0
1

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors

Note: This report only considers fatalities on board of commercial revenue flights. However, it is important to
At least three accidents
highlight that in 2016 a mid-air collision involving a commercial jet and a noncommercial aircraft (HS-125 ambulance required to display
configuration) resulted in the crash and death of all on board of the HS-125. The B737 suffered substantial damage. classification

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)

Undesired Aircraft State

35% At least three accidents

required to display
30% classification
(% of  total  accidents)
Accident Frequency

25%
20% No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
Countermeasure
10%
At least three accidents
5%
required to display
0% classification
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
factors see section 8
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 56
Mid-air Collision – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.00 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.01 IATA Member 0.00 0.00
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.00
Fatal 0.00 0.00
Hull Losses 0.00 0.00

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.00 0.00 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.01 0.00
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

1.2 Not Fatal 0.18 2017

0.16
1
0.14 2013 - 2 017
0.8 0.12
0.6 0.10
0.08
0.4 0.06
0.2 0.04
0.02
0 -
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)
Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

120% 2017 0.03 1.2

100% 2013 - 2 017
0.03 1
Number of Accidents

80%
Accident Rate

0.02 0.8
60% 0.02 0.6

40% 0.01 0.4

20% 0.01 0.2

0% - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 57
Runway/Taxiway Excursion – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 17 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 76 Number of fatalities: 8 IATA Member 12% 20%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 1%
Fatal 0% 1%
Hull Losses 35% 36%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 65% 35% 0% 53% 47%
2013-2017 74% 26% 0% 55% 43%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
8
6 NASIA
45%
6 3 4
5 7 4
MENA
4
4 Threats
ASPAC Meteorology:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 19
11
18 21 45%
11
21

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
38%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

60% Long/Floated/Bounced/
Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
(% of total accidents)

50%
Accident Frequency

LATAM, 8 landing:
40% 43%
30%
20% Countermeasure
10% Overall Crew Performance:
0% 28%
- 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.035
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 58
Runway/Taxiway Excursion – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.41 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.39 IATA Member 0.09 0.15
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.00
Fatal 0.00 0.01
Hull Losses 0.14 0.14

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.26 1.16 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.26 0.96
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

70 Fatal 5.00 2017

60 4.50
Not Fatal 4.00 2013 - 2 017
50 3.50
40 3.00
2.50
30
2.00
20 1.50
10 1.00
0.50
0
-
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)
Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

90% 2017 0.60 20

80% 18
2013 - 2 017 0.50 16
70%
Number of Accidents

60% 0.40 14
Accident Rate

12
50%
0.30 10
40%
8
30% 0.20 6
20% 4
0.10
10% 2
0% - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 59
In-flight Damage – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 4 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 36 Number of fatalities: 1 IATA Member 50% 58%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 3%
Fatal 0% 3%
Hull Losses 0% 11%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 100% 0% 0% 100% 0%
2013-2017 86% 14% 0% 86% 14%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Design:
EUR
NAM
7
2 NASIA
15%
9 1 1
9 7 1
MENA
3
3 Threats
ASPAC Aircraft Malfunction:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 10
2
2 10 32%
3
2

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
SOP Adherence/Cross-
verification:
15%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

18% Unnecessary Weather

NAM, 1 Penetration:
16%
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

14% 6%
12%
10%
8%
6% Countermeasure
4%
2% Leadership:
0% 3%
- 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 60
In-flight Damage – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.10 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.19 IATA Member 0.09 0.21
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.01
Fatal 0.00 0.01
Hull Losses 0.00 0.02

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.11 0.00 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.20 0.15
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

9 0.90 2017
Fatal
8 0.80
7 Not Fatal 0.70 2013 - 2 017
6 0.60
5 0.50
4 0.40
3 0.30
2 0.20
1 0.10
0 -
AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

30% 0.30 12
2017
25% 2013 - 2 017 0.25 10
Number of Accidents

0.20 8
Accident Rate

20%

15% 0.15 6

10% 0.10 4

5% 0.05 2

0% - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 61
Ground Damage – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 2 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 32 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 50% 50%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 0% 13%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 100% 0% 0% 100% 0%
2013-2017 91% 6% 3% 84% 16%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
8
2 NASIA
21%
7 1 0
8 7 0
MENA
5
3 Threats
ASPAC Ground Events:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 5
3
2 4 21%
5
4

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
SOP Adherence/Cross-
verification:
11%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

35% Ramp Movements:

30% 11%
(% of  total  accidents)
Accident Frequency

25%
20%
Not Applicable. Graph only displays accidents involving fatalities.
15%
Countermeasure
10%
Overall Crew Performance:
5%
0% 14%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 62
Ground Damage – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.05 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.17 IATA Member 0.05 0.16
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.00
Fatal 0.00 0.00
Hull Losses 0.00 0.02

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.06 0.00 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.17 0.15
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

12 0.90 2017
Not Fatal
0.80
10
0.70 2013 - 2 017
8 0.60
6 0.50
0.40
4 0.30
2 0.20
0.10
0 -
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)
Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

60% 2017 0.40 14

50% 2013 - 2 017 0.35 12

Number of Accidents

0.30
10
40%
Accident Rate

0.25
8
30% 0.20
6
20% 0.15
4
0.10
10%
0.05 2
0% - 0
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 63
Undershoot – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 3 Number of fatalities: 4 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 13 Number of fatalities: 4 IATA Member 33% 31%
Full-Loss Equivalents 13% 3%
Fatal 33% 8%
Hull Losses 33% 38%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 33% 67% 0% 33% 67%
2013-2017 69% 23% 8% 46% 54%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
0
2 NASIA
55%
4 1 0
4 0 0
MENA
0
0 Threats
ASPAC Meteorology:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 5
0
2 5 64%
0
3

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
45%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

9% CIS, 4 Vertical/Lateral/Speed
8% Deviation:
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

7%
6%
64%
5%
4%
3%
Countermeasure
2%
1% Overall Crew Performance:
0%
- 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.080 36%
Fatality Risk

For more info regarding primary contributing

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 64
Undershoot – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.07 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.07 IATA Member 0.05 0.04
Fatality Risk** 0.01 0.00
Fatal 0.02 0.01
Hull Losses 0.02 0.03

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.03 0.29 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.04 0.20
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

12 0.90 2017
Fatal
0.80
10 Not Fatal 2013 - 2 017
0.70
8 0.60
0.50
6
0.40
4 0.30
0.20
2 0.10
0 -
AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

90% 0.14 6
2017
80% 0.12
2013 - 2 017 5
70%
Number of Accidents

0.10
60% 4
Accident Rate

50% 0.08
3
40% 0.06
30% 2
0.04
20%
0.02 1
10%
0% - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 65
Hard Landing – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 2 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 44 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 50% 41%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 0% 20%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 100% 0% 0% 50% 50%
2013-2017 82% 16% 2% 66% 34%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Flight Operations:

EUR
NAM
19
4 NASIA
21%
1 3 2
1 15 1
MENA
2
1 Threats
ASPAC Meteorology:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 14
1
1 17 40%
1
4

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
1 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Note: An-74 Hard Landing. Location: Barneo Ice Base (International Waters) Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
70%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

35% Long/Floated/Bounced/
Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
30% landing:
(% of  total  accidents)
Accident Frequency

25%
51%
20%
No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
Countermeasure
10%
Overall Crew Performance:
5%
0% 30%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 66
Hard Landing – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.05 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.23 IATA Member 0.05 0.18
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.00
Fatal 0.00 0.00
Hull Losses 0.00 0.05

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.03 0.14 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.18 0.44
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

45 0.80 2017
Not Fatal
40 0.70
35 2013 - 2017
0.60
30 0.50
25
0.40
20
0.30
15
10 0.20
5 0.10
0 -
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)
Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

120% 2017 0.50 18

0.45 16
100% 2013 - 2 017
0.40 14
Number of Accidents

80% 0.35 12
Accident Rate

0.30
10
60% 0.25
8
0.20
40% 6
0.15
0.10 4
20%
0.05 2
0% - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 67
Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 5 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 53 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 40% 26%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 20% 19%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 80% 20% 0% 40% 60%
2013-2017 77% 21% 2% 47% 51%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Maintenance Operations:

EUR
NAM
10
2 NASIA
28%
12 1 2
11 10 2
MENA
7
7 Threats
ASPAC Gear/Tire:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 6
10
4 5 77%
11
6

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
2%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

35% Long/floated/bounced/firm/
off-center/crabbed land:
30%
2%
(% of  total  accidents)
Accident Frequency

25%
20%
No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
Countermeasure
10%
N/A
5%
0%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 68
Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.12 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.27 IATA Member 0.09 0.14
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.00
Fatal 0.00 0.00
Hull Losses 0.02 0.05

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.06 0.43 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.16 0.79
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

45 Not Fatal 0.90 2017

40 0.80
35 0.70 2013 - 2017
30 0.60
25 0.50
20 0.40
15 0.30
10 0.20
5 0.10
0 -
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)
Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

90% 0.50 18
2017
80% 0.45 16
2013 - 2017 0.40
70% 14
Number of Accidents

0.35 12
Accident Rate

60%
0.30
50% 10
0.25
40% 8
0.20
30% 0.15 6
20% 0.10 4
10% 0.05 2
0% - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 69
Tailstrike – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 4 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 20 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 50% 50%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 0% 5%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 100% 0% 0% 100% 0%
2013-2017 85% 15% 0% 80% 20%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Flight Operations:

EUR
NAM
4
0 NASIA
16%
10 0 0
8 3 0
MENA
0
2 Threats
ASPAC Meteorology:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 5
1
0 5 16%
2
0

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
47%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

35% Long/Floated/Bounced/
Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
30% landing:
(% of  total  accidents)
Accident Frequency

25%
26%
20%
No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
Countermeasure
10%
Overall Crew Performance:
5%
0% 21%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 70
Tailstrike – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.10 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.10 IATA Member 0.09 0.10
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.00
Fatal 0.00 0.00
Hull Losses 0.00 0.01

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.11 0.00 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.10 0.12
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

18 0.30 2017
Not Fatal
16 2013 - 2017
0.25
14
12 0.20
10
0.15
8
6 0.10
4
0.05
2
0 -
AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

120% 0.30 12
2017
100% 2013 - 2017 0.25 10
Number of Accidents

80% 0.20 8
Accident Rate

60% 0.15 6

40% 0.10 4

20% 0.05 2

0% - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 71
Off-Airport Landing/Ditching – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 1 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 2 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 0% 0%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 0% 0%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 0% 100% 0% 0% 100%
2013-2017 0% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS At least three accidents

NAM EUR
0 NASIA required to display
0 0 0 0 classification
0 0 0
MENA
0
0 Threats
ASPAC At least three accidents
LATAM/CAR
AFI 0 required to display
1
1 0 classification
1
1

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
At least three accidents
required to display
classification

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)

Undesired Aircraft State

35% At least three accidents

required to display
30% classification
(% of  total  accidents)
Accident Frequency

25%
20%
No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
Countermeasure
10%
At least three accidents
5%
required to display
0% classification
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 72
Off-Airport Landing/Ditching – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.02 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.01 IATA Member 0.00 0.00
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.00
Fatal 0.00 0.00
Hull Losses 0.00 0.00

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.00 0.14 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.01 0.03
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

1.2 Not Fatal 0.35 2017

0.30 2013 - 2017
1
0.25
0.8
0.20
0.6
0.15
0.4
0.10
0.2 0.05
0 -
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)
Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

120% 2017 0.03 1.2

100% 2013 - 2017
0.03 1
Number of Accidents

80%
0.02 0.8
Accident Rate

60%
0.02 0.6
40%
0.01 0.4
20%
0.01 0.2
0%
- 0
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 73
Runway Collision – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 2 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 12 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 0% 17%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 0% 17%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 100% 0% 0% 50% 50%
2013-2017 100% 0% 0% 33% 67%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
1
0 NASIA
58%
3 0 0
3 0 0
MENA
0
0 Threats
ASPAC Airport Perimeter Control/
LATAM/CAR
AFI 5 Fencing/Wildlife Control:
1
2 5
2
2 42%
International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Air Traffic Control:
8%

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)

Undesired Aircraft State

35% Runway/Taxiway Incursion:

30% 17%
(% of  total  accidents)
Accident Frequency

25%
20%
No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
Countermeasure
10%
Inquiry:
5%
0% 8%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 74
Runway Collision – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.05 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.06 IATA Member 0.00 0.02
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.00
Fatal 0.00 0.00
Hull Losses 0.00 0.01

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.03 0.14 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.03 0.23
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) Accidents per Million Sectors

6 Not Fatal 0.35 2017

5 0.30 2013 - 2017

0.25
4
0.20
3
0.15
2
0.10
1 0.05
0 -
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) 5-Year Trend (2013-2017)
Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

60% 0.12 4.5

2017
4
50% 2013 - 2017 0.10
3.5
Number of Accidents

0.08 3
Accident Rate

40%
2.5
30% 0.06
2
20% 0.04 1.5
1
10% 0.02
0.5
0% - 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 75
Jet Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 25 Number of fatalities: 4 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 198 Number of fatalities: 744 IATA Member 32% 47%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 1%
Fatal 4% 7%
Hull Losses 16% 23%

Passenger Cargo Ferry

2017 84% 16% 0%
2013-2017 84% 15% 1%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
43
14 NASIA
29%
34 13 6
31 33 5
MENA
23
21 Threats
ASPAC Meteorology:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 50
18
10 51 30%
24
18

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
2 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Note: An-74 Hard Landing. Location: Barneo Ice Base (International Waters) Manual Handling/Flight
B777 (MH370). Location: unknown Controls:
35%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State
25% Long/Floated/Bounced/
Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

20% landing:
Other End State, 310
15% Loss of Control – In-flight, 407 26%
10% Controlled Flight
into Terrain, 27
Countermeasure
5%
Overall Crew Performance:
0%
- 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 20%
Fatality Risk

For more info regarding primary contributing

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 76
Jet Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.72 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 1.25 IATA Member 0.39 1.02
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.01
Fatal 0.03 0.08
Hull Losses 0.11 0.29

Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accidents per Million Sectors

25% 4.00 2017

3.50
20% 2013 - 2017
3.00
2.50
15%
2.00
10% 1.50
1.00
5%
0.50

0% -
AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
RWY/TWY EXC
IN-F DAMAGE
HARD LDG
GND DAMAGE
G UP LDG/CLPSE
TAILSTRIKE
LOC-I
UNDERSHOOT
OTHER
RWY COLL
CFIT
MID-AIR COLL
OFF AIRP LDG

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

70% 1.60 50
2017
1.40 45
60% 2013 - 2017 40
Number of Accidents

1.20
50% 35
Accident Rate

1.00 30
40%
0.80 25
30% 20
0.60
20% 15
0.40
10
10% 0.20 5
0% - -
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 77
Turboprop Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 20 Number of fatalities: 15 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 141 Number of fatalities: 428 IATA Member 15% 10%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 2%
Fatal 25% 22%
Hull Losses 45% 43%

Passenger Cargo Ferry

2017 55% 45% 0%
2013-2017 65% 30% 5%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
18
12 NASIA
40%
28 3 5
27 19 5
MENA
3
5 Threats
ASPAC Aircraft Malfunction:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 30
15
30 30 39%
15
37

International Waters or
Location Unknown
Region of Operator
0 Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Note: B1900, presumingly crashed near Sao Tome and Principe. Manual Handling/Flight
Wreckage not known to have been found. Controls:
32%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State
30% Vertical/Lateral/Speed
Runway / Taxiway
25% Loss of Control – In-flight, 283 Deviation:
(% of total accidents)

Excursion, 8
Accident Frequency

20% Undershoot, 4
Controlled Flight
19%
Other End State, 4 into Terrain, 127
15%
In-flight Damage, 1
10%
Countermeasure
5%
Overall Crew Performance:
0%
- 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 22%
Fatality Risk

For more info regarding primary contributing

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 78
Turboprop Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 2.90 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 4.11 IATA Member 1.95 2.15
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.07
Fatal 0.72 0.90
Hull Losses 1.30 1.75

Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accidents per Million Sectors

25% 25.00 2017

20% 20.00 2013 - 2017

15% 15.00

10% 10.00

5% 5.00

0% -
AFI

ASPAC

CIS

EUR

LATAM/CAR

MENA

NAM

NASIA
RWY/TWY EXC
G UP LDG/CLPSE
LOC-I
HARD LDG
CFIT
RWY COLL
UNDERSHOOT
IN-F DAMAGE
GND DAMAGE
OTHER
TAILSTRIKE
OFF AIRP LDG
MID-AIR COLL

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017) Five-Year Trend (2013-2017)

Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used

60% 2017 7.00 45

6.00 40
50% 2013 - 2017
35
Number of Accidents

5.00
40% 30
Accident Rate

4.00 25
30%
3.00 20
20% 15
2.00
10
10% 1.00 5
0% - -
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2013 TO 2017 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 79
In 2017 operators accident
rates in NAM, EUR, MENA
and NASIA were below
the global rate and above
the global rate in CIS,
ASPAC, AFI and LATAM.
5
In-Depth Regional Accident Analysis
Following the same model as the in-depth analysis by accident Note: IATA determines the accident region based on the
category presented in Section 4, this section presents an operator’s “home” country as specified in the operator’s Air
overview of occurrences and their contributing factors broken Operator Certificate (AOC).
down by the region of the involved operator(s).
For example, if a Canadian-registered operator has an accident
The purpose of this section is to identify issues that operators in Europe, this accident is considered a North American
located in the same region may share, in order to develop accident.
adequate prevention strategies.
For a complete list of countries assigned per region,
please consult Annex 1.

Image courtesy of Bombardier

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 81
Africa Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 9 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 40 Number of fatalities: 74 IATA Member 22% 15%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 18%
Fatal 0% 20%
Hull Losses 44% 50%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 56% 44% 0% 22% 78%
2013-2017 55% 35% 10% 25% 75%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions
CIS Regulatory Oversight:
EUR
0 NASIA
NAM 0
0 0 57%
0 0
– 0
0 – MENA
0 –
–
0
– Threats
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR Aircraft Malfunction:
40 0
0 40 0 29%
0 57 –
–
International Waters or
Location Unknown
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
0 Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
Note: B1900, presumingly crashed near Sao
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions) Manual Handling/Flight
Tome and Principe. Wreckage not
known to have been found. Controls:
19%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State
60% Long/Floated/Bounced/
Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
50%
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

Controlled Flight landing:

into Terrain, 8
40% Loss of Control – In-flight, 61 29%
30%
Other End State, 4
20% Countermeasure
10% Captain Should Show
Leadership:
0%
- 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 14%
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 82
Africa Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 6.87 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 6.64 IATA Member 3.22 2.32
Fatality Risk** 0.00 1.19
Fatal 0.00 1.33
Hull Losses 3.05 3.32

Jet Turboprop
2017 3.29 9.98 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 3.56 9.33
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal)

50% 30 Not Fatal

40% 25 Fatal

20
30%
15
20%
10
10%
5

0% 0
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS
RWY/TWY EXC
LOC-I
G UP LDG/CLPSE
UNDERSHOOT
CFIT
RWY COLL
IN-F DAMAGE
GND DAMAGE
OTHER
MID-AIR COLL
OFF AIRP LDG
HARD LDG
TAILSTRIKE

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Accidents per Million Sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

14.00 16 70% 2017

12.00 14 60% 2013 - 2017
Number of Accidents

12 50%
10.00
Accident Rate

10
8.00 40%
8
6.00 30%
6
4.00 20%
4
2.00 2 10%

- - 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 83
Asia/Pacific Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 11 Number of fatalities: 2 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 80 Number of fatalities: 559 IATA Member 27% 33%
Full-Loss Equivalents 6% 8%
Fatal 9% 10%
Hull Losses 18% 24%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 82% 18% 0% 73% 27%
2013-2017 85% 15% 1% 63% 38%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions
CIS Regulatory Oversight:
EUR
0 NASIA
NAM 0
0 0 58%
0 0
– 0
2 – MENA
0 –
–
1
– Threats
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR Meteorology:
0 81
0 0 77 25%
0 – 82
–
International Waters or
Location Unknown
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
1 Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions) Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
43%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State
30% Long/Floated/Bounced/
Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
25%
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

Controlled Flight landing:

into Terrain, 54 Loss of Control – In-flight, 266
20%
29%
15% Other End State, 243

10% Countermeasure
5% Overall Crew Performance:
0% 25%
- 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 84
Asia/Pacific Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 1.54 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 2.49 IATA Member 1.05 2.14
Fatality Risk** 0.09 0.20
Fatal 0.14 0.25
Hull Losses 0.28 0.59

Jet Turboprop
2017 1.45 1.82 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 2.05 3.84
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal)

30% 60 Not Fatal

50 Fatal

20% 40

30

10% 20

10

0% 0
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS
RWY/TWY EXC
HARD LDG
IN-F DAMAGE
LOC-I
G UP LDG/CLPSE
UNDERSHOOT
GND DAMAGE
TAILSTRIKE
RWY COLL
OTHER
CFIT
OFF AIRP LDG
MID-AIR COLL

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Accidents per Million Sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

3.50 25 80% 2017

3.00 70%
2013 - 2017
20
Number of Accidents

60%
2.50
Accident Rate

15 50%
2.00
40%
1.50 10 30%
1.00 20%
5
0.50 10%
- - 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 85
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 5 Number of fatalities: 10 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 26 Number of fatalities: 106 IATA Member 20% 4%
Full-Loss Equivalents 25% 24%
Fatal 40% 31%
Hull Losses 60% 69%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 60% 40% 0% 60% 40%
2013-2017 58% 35% 8% 54% 46%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions
CIS Regulatory Oversight:
EUR
26 NASIA
NAM 0
14 0 32%
0 2
16 0
0 – MENA
0 –
–
2
– Threats
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR Meteorology:
0 0
0 7 0 55%
0 – –
–
International Waters or
Location Unknown
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
1 Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
Note. An-74 Hard Landing. Location: Barneo Ice
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions) Manual Handling/Flight
Base (International Waters).
Controls:
36%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State
30% Long/Floated/Bounced/
Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
(% of total accidents)

25% Loss of Control – In-flight, 68

Accident Frequency

landing:
20%
Undershoot, 4 27%
15%
10% Controlled Flight
into Terrain, 34 Countermeasure
5% Overall Crew Performance:
0%
- 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
14%
Fatality Risk
For more info regarding primary contributing
The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 86
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 4.13 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 4.41 IATA Member 1.45 0.30
Fatality Risk** 1.04 1.04
Fatal 1.65 1.36
Hull Losses 2.48 3.05

Jet Turboprop
2017 2.76 16.44 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 2.65 19.55
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal)

30% 12 Not Fatal

10 Fatal

20% 8

10% 4

0% 0
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS
RWY/TWY EXC
LOC-I
HARD LDG
CFIT
GND DAMAGE
IN-F DAMAGE
G UP LDG/CLPSE

OTHER
MID-AIR COLL
UNDERSHOOT

RWY COLL
OFF AIRP LDG
TAILSTRIKE

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Accidents per Million Sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

6.00 7 45% 2017

40%
5.00 6 2013 - 2017
35%
Number of Accidents

5
4.00 30%
Accident Rate

4 25%
3.00
3 20%
2.00 15%
2
10%
1.00 1 5%
- - 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 87
Europe Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 6 Number of fatalities: 4 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 61 Number of fatalities: 122 IATA Member 50% 49%
Full-Loss Equivalents 17% 5%
Fatal 17% 5%
Hull Losses 17% 15%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 83% 17% 0% 67% 33%
2013-2017 84% 15% 2% 70% 30%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions
CIS Flight Operations:
EUR
0 NASIA
NAM 61
1 0 18%
0 46
– 0
3 52 MENA
0 –
–
0
– Threats
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR Meteorology:
0 0
0 4 3 32%
4 – –
–
International Waters or
Location Unknown
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
0 Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions) Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
40%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State
40% Long/Floated/Bounced/
35% Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

30% Loss of Control – In-flight, landing:

25% 118
28%
20% Controlled Flight
15% into Terrain, 4

10% Countermeasure
5% Overall Crew Performance:
0%
- 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
26%
Fatality Risk

For more info regarding primary contributing

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 88
Europe Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.67 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 1.43 IATA Member 0.67 1.36
Fatality Risk** 0.11 0.07
Fatal 0.11 0.07
Hull Losses 0.11 0.21

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.53 1.46 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 1.20 2.65
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal)

40% 40 Not Fatal

35
Fatal
30% 30
25
20% 20
15
10% 10
5
0% 0
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS
HARD LDG
G UP LDG/CLPSE
GND DAMAGE
RWY/TWY EXC
IN-F DAMAGE
TAILSTRIKE
LOC-I
OTHER
RWY COLL
CFIT

MID-AIR COLL
UNDERSHOOT

OFF AIRP LDG

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Accidents per Million Sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

3.00 25 70% 2017

2.50 60% 2013 - 2017

20
Number of Accidents

50%
2.00
Accident Rate

15 40%
1.50
10 30%
1.00
20%
0.50 5
10%

- - 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 89
Latin America & the Caribbean Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 6 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 33 Number of fatalities: 84 IATA Member 0% 24%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 7%
Fatal 0% 9%
Hull Losses 17% 30%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 50% 50% 0% 33% 67%
2013-2017 76% 24% 0% 55% 45%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions
CIS Safety Management:
EUR
0 NASIA
NAM 0
0 0 35%
0 1
– 0
0 – MENA
0 –
–
0
– Threats
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR Aircraft Malfunction:
0 0
33 0 0 42%
32 – –
39
International Waters or
Location Unknown
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
0 Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions) SOP Adherence/Cross-
verification:
15%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

40% Long/Floated/Bounced/
35% Runway / Taxiway Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

Excursion, 8 landing:
30%
25% Other End State, 71
15%
20%
15%
Loss of Control – In-flight, 5
10% Countermeasure
5% Overall Crew Performance:
0%
- 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 19%
Fatality Risk

For more info regarding primary contributing

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 90
Latin America & the Caribbean Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 1.88 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 2.12 IATA Member 0.00 0.82
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.14
Fatal 0.00 0.19
Hull Losses 0.31 0.64

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.81 5.48 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 1.53 3.94
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal)

40% 20 Not Fatal

18
16 Fatal
30% 14
12
20% 10
8
6
10%
4
2
0% 0
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS
RWY/TWY EXC
G UP LDG/CLPSE
GND DAMAGE
IN-F DAMAGE
CFIT
TAILSTRIKE
LOC-I
OTHER
OFF AIRP LDG
HARD LDG
RWY COLL
MID-AIR COLL
UNDERSHOOT

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Accidents per Million Sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

3.50 10 90% 2017

9 80%
3.00 2013 - 2017
8 70%
Number of Accidents

2.50 7 60%
Accident Rate

2.00 6 50%
5
1.50 40%
4
30%
1.00 3
2 20%
0.50 10%
1
- - 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 91
Middle East & North Africa Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 1 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 26 Number of fatalities: 110 IATA Member 0% 58%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 8%
Fatal 0% 8%
Hull Losses 0% 27%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 100% 0% 0% 100% 0%
2013-2017 92% 4% 4% 88% 12%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions
CIS Safety Management:
EUR
0 NASIA
NAM 0
1 0 36%
0 1
– 0
0 – MENA
26 –
–
20
26 Threats
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR Aircraft Malfunction:
0 0
0 4 0 36%
0 – –
–
International Waters or
Location Unknown
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
0 Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions) Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
32%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

35% Loss of Aircraft Control while

30% on the Ground:
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

25% Loss of Control – In-flight, 110 18%

20%
15%
10% Countermeasure
5%
Overall Crew Performance:
0%
- 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 27%
Fatality Risk

For more info regarding primary contributing

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 92
Middle East & North Africa Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.49 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 2.85 IATA Member 0.00 2.07
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.22
Fatal 0.00 0.22
Hull Losses 0.00 0.77

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.53 0.00 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 2.69 5.15
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal)

14 Not Fatal
30%
12
Fatal
10
20%
8
6
10% 4
2
0% 0
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS
G UP LDG/CLPSE
GND DAMAGE
RWY/TWY EXC
IN-F DAMAGE
LOC-I
HARD LDG
OTHER

MID-AIR COLL
CFIT
UNDERSHOOT

RWY COLL
TAILSTRIKE
OFF AIRP LDG

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Accidents per Million Sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

7.00 12 120% 2017

6.00 10 100% 2013 - 2017
Number of Accidents

5.00 80%
Accident Rate

8
4.00
6 60%
3.00
4 40%
2.00
1.00 2 20%

- - 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 93
North America Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 7 Number of fatalities: 3 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 62 Number of fatalities: 26 IATA Member 29% 27%
Full-Loss Equivalents 15% 14%
Fatal 29% 16%
Hull Losses 29% 32%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 86% 14% 0% 71% 29%
2013-2017 71% 29% 0% 55% 45%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions
CIS Regulatory Oversight:
EUR
0 NASIA
NAM 0
0 0 17%
62 2
– 1
52 – MENA
0 –
58
3
– Threats
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR Aircraft Malfunction:
0 0
0 0 1 38%
3 – –
–
International Waters or
Location Unknown
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
0 Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions) Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
25%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

25% Vertical/Lateral/Speed
Deviation:
(% of total accidents)

Loss of Control – In-flight,

Accident Frequency

20% In-flight Damage, 1

19
19%
15%
Controlled Flight
10% into Terrain, 6
Countermeasure
5%
Monitor/Cross-check:
0%
- 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 13%
Fatality Risk

For more info regarding primary contributing

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 94
North America Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.57 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 1.07 IATA Member 0.42 0.81
Fatality Risk** 0.08 0.15
Fatal 0.16 0.17
Hull Losses 0.16 0.34

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.49 0.94 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.72 2.54
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal)

30 Not Fatal
30%
25 Fatal

20% 20

15

10% 10

0% 0
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS
G UP LDG/CLPSE
TAILSTRIKE
IN-F DAMAGE
GND DAMAGE
LOC-I
RWY/TWY EXC
UNDERSHOOT
CFIT
RWY COLL
OTHER
HARD LDG
OFF AIRP LDG
MID-AIR COLL

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Accidents per Million Sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

1.80 20 60% 2017

1.60 18
50% 2013 - 2017
16
Number of Accidents

1.40
14 40%
Accident Rate

1.20
12
1.00
10 30%
0.80
8
0.60 20%
6
0.40 4 10%
0.20 2
- - 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 95
North Asia Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 0 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 11 Number of fatalities: 91 IATA Member 0% 45%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 14%
Fatal 0% 18%
Hull Losses 0% 27%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2017 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2013-2017 73% 27% 0% 55% 45%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions
CIS Flight Operations:
EUR
0 NASIA
NAM 0
0 11 40%
0 0
– 9
1 – MENA
0 10
–
0
– Threats
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR Meteorology:
0 0
0 0 1 60%
0 – –
–
International Waters or
Location Unknown
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
0 Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence Flight Crew Errors
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions) Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
60%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

45% Operation Outside Aircraft

40% Limitations:
(% of total accidents)
Accident Frequency

35%
30% Controlled Flight 40%
into Terrain, 48
25%
Loss of Control – In-flight, 43
20%
15%
10% Countermeasure
5% Monitor/Cross-check:
0%
- 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 70%
Fatality Risk

For more info regarding primary contributing

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number factors see section 8
of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each
category (value displayed). The graph does not display accidents without fatalities. ➤ See detailed view

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 96
North Asia Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2017 Accident rate: 0.00 Accident Rate* 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Accident rate: 0.47 IATA Member 0.00 0.25
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.07
Fatal 0.00 0.09
Hull Losses 0.00 0.13

Jet Turboprop
2017 0.00 0.00 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2013-2017 0.26 10.91
*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal)

8 Not Fatal
40%
7
Fatal
30% 6
5
20% 4
3
10% 2
1
0% 0
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS
RWY/TWY EXC
HARD LDG
G UP LDG/CLPSE
LOC-I
IN-F DAMAGE
CFIT
UNDERSHOOT
GND DAMAGE
OFF AIRP LDG
OTHER
TAILSTRIKE
MID-AIR COLL
RWY COLL

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Accidents per Million Sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

1.20 5 70% 2017

4 60%
1.00 2013 - 2017
Number of Accidents

4
50%
Accident Rate

0.80 3
3 40%
0.60
2 30%
0.40 2
20%
1
0.20 10%
1
- - 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accident Rate

Hull Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 97
 Quality and Safety
in one click!

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Operators invest considerable time and resources in managing the diverse components and the volume of data associated
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Developed in collaboration with airlines and available in the six official ICAO languages, IATA Integrated Management
Solutions (IMX) eliminates this time-consuming challenge and enables your organization to effectively manage all the key
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Find out more and request a free trial:

www.iata.org/imx
6
Analysis of Cargo Aircraft Accidents
2017 CARGO OPERATOR OVERVIEW

CARGO VS. PASSENGER OPERATIONS FOR JET AIRCRAFT

HL / SD / Acc /
Total
Fleet Size HL 1000 SD 1000 1000
Acc
ACTF ACTF ACTF
Cargo 2,123 3 1.41 1 0.47 4 1.88
Passenger 24,027 1 0.04 20 0.83 21 0.87
Total 26,150 4 0.15 21 0.80 25 0.96

HL = Hull Loss SD = Substantial Damage

Note: Fleet Size includes both in-service and stored aircraft operated by commercial airlines.
Cargo aircraft are defined as dedicated cargo, mixed passenger/cargo (combi) or quick-change configurations.

CARGO VS. PASSENGER OPERATIONS FOR TURBOPROP AIRCRAFT

HL / SD / Acc /
Total
Fleet Size HL 1000 SD 1000 1000
Acc
ACTF ACTF ACTF
Cargo 1,279 6 4.691 3 2.346 9 7.04
Passenger 4,288 3 0.7 8 1.87 11 2.57
Total 5,567 9 1.617 11 1.976 20 3.59

HL = Hull Loss SD = Substantial Damage

Note: Fleet Size includes both in-service and stored aircraft operated by commercial airlines.
Cargo aircraft are defined as dedicated cargo, mixed passenger/cargo (combi) or quick-change configurations.

SECTION 6 – ANALYSIS OF CARGO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 99
Cargo Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2017 Number of accidents: 13 Number of fatalities: 12 Accident Count % of Total 2017 ‘13-‘17
2013-2017 Number of accidents: 75 Number of fatalities: 119 IATA Member 0% 13%
Full-Loss Equivalents 24% 28%
Fatal 31% 31%
Hull Losses 69% 59%

Jet Turboprop
2017 31% 69%
2013-2017 40% 57%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2013-2017)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts Top Contributing
factors

Latent Conditions

CIS Regulatory Oversight:

EUR
NAM
9
9 NASIA
37%
18 2 3
15 8 2
MENA
1
3 Threats
ASPAC Aircraft Malfunction:
LATAM/CAR
AFI 12
8
15 13 37%
10
21

International Waters or
Location Unknown Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence
1 Flight Crew Errors
Note: An74 Hard Landing. Location: Barneo Ice Base (International Waters) Manual Handling/Flight
Controls:
37%
Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2013-2017)
Undesired Aircraft State

35% Long/Floated/Bounced/
Firm/Off-center/Crabbed
30%
(% of total accidents)

Loss of Control – In-flight,

Accident Frequency

In-flight Damage, 7% landing:

16%
25%
20% Undershoot, 4%
Controlled Flight
into Terrain, 11% 27%
15% Other End
10% State, 4% Countermeasure
5% Overall Crew Performance:
0%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
22%
Fatality Ratio (People Perished/Total People Carried)
For more info regarding primary contributing
Note: Since the sector count broken down by cargo flights is not available, rates cold not be calculated. The ‘fatality risk’ factors see section 8
rate was therefore substituted by a ‘fatality ratio’ value, which is the total number of fatalities divided by the total number
of people carried. Although this removes the effect of the percentage of people who perished in each fatal crash, it can ➤ See detailed view
still be used as a reference to determine which accident categories contributed the most to the amount of fatalities on
cargo flights. Accident categories with no fatalities are not displayed.

SECTION 6 – ANALYSIS OF CARGO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 100
Cargo Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate*: – Accident Rate* 2017
IATA Member –
Fatality Risk** –
Fatal –
Hull Losses –

Cargo
– Cargo accident rates are not available
Note: the number of sectors for cargo flights is not available and therefore the rate calculation is not being shown

Accident Category Distribution (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total Number of Accidents (Fatal vs. Nonfatal)

45 Not Fatal
30%
40
25% 35 Fatal

20% 30
25
15% 20
10% 15
10
5%
5
0% 0
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS
RWY/TWY EXC
LOC-I
G UP LDG/CLPSE
CFIT
HARD LDG
IN-F DAMAGE
OTHER
UNDERSHOOT
TAILSTRIKE
GND DAMAGE
OFF AIRP LDG
MID-AIR COLL
RWY COLL

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to List of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Five-Year Trend (2013-2017) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2013-2017)

See Annex 1 for the definitions of different metrics used Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

70% 2017
20
Accidents per Million Sectors

18 60% 2013 - 2017

16
50%
14
12 40%
10
30%
8
6 20%
4
10%
2
- 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRF
ESD
TXO
TOF
RTO
ICL
ECL
CRZ
DST
APR
GOA
LND
TXI
AES
PSF
FLC
GDS

All Accident Count

SECTION 6 – ANALYSIS OF CARGO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 101
COSC – your source for real cabin safety answers
The IATA Cabin Operations and Safety Conference (COSC) brings together working experts
from airlines, academia and IATA to respond to your reality.

Plenary sessions relating actual airline experience. Workshops led by cabin safety specialists. Direct answers to your personalized
questions from authorities in subjects ranging from human trafficking and unruly passengers, to safety culture and audit
readiness, with our speed networking feature. The IATA COSC has the answers to important questions in cabin
operations and safety, to enable you to tackle any challenge.
w!
No
Join us in Bangkok, 8-10 May inclusive.
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7
Cabin Safety
CABIN SAFETY CABIN SAFETY PROMOTION
Cabin Safety is a broad subject, encompassing cabin Safety promotion is a major component of SMS and the
ergonomics and design, normal and emergency operating sharing of safety information is an important focus for IATA.
procedures, cabin crew standards and requirements, continuous The organization of global conferences and regional seminars
assessment of risks associated with onboard product and brings together a broad spectrum of experts and stakeholders
service, rules and regulations, security requirements, unruly to exchange cabin safety information.
passenger management and injury prevention.
The global IATA Cabin Operations Safety Conference enters its
Everything in an aircraft cabin involves an underlying aspect fifth year in 2018 and has become an established and popular
of safety and there is always the potential for an abnormal venue for the exchange of ideas by, and education, of Cabin
situation to escalate into an emergency. Therefore, it is Safety specialists: www.iata.org/cabin-safety-conference. The
sometimes difficult to understand and objectively measure the format of this event aims to educate and inform delegates,
direct positive impact cabin safety risk assessment, regulations, with plenary and interactive workshops, focusing on the issues
policies, procedures and training can have on safe operations. identified through IATA’s activities as needing attention.

An effective and integrated Safety Management System (SMS)

within an airline will help ensure that safety is considered at IATA CABIN OPERATIONS SAFETY TECHNICAL
all stages of onboard service design. An effective open safety GROUP
culture will also give cabin crew the confidence to report safety
incidents and errors, confident in the knowledge that these While IATA represents all its member airlines, the Cabin
reports are used to enhance safety. Operations Safety Technical Group (COSTG) is established to
maintain a close working link with the operational environment.
IATA’s role is to keep airlines informed of regulatory changes, The members of COSTG are industry experts in cabin safety
give advice on best practices as well as new and emerging areas of interest and include safety investigators, policymakers,
issues in cabin safety, and to act as a resource for help. IATA cabin crew trainers and safety auditors. A global representation
Cabin Safety continues to achieve these objectives using a of member airlines is maintained and membership is reviewed
variety of methods, communication tools and resources for every two years.
airlines

Image courtesy
SECTION 7 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017
of–Airbus
page 103
COSTF Members (2018-2019)

Lisa Mounce Catherine Chan (Chair) Johnny Chin (Vice-Chair)

AMERICAN AIRLINES CATHAY PACIFIC SINGAPORE AIRLINES
Yuriy Tsybulskiy Anabel Brough Lerato Luti
AIR ASTANA EMIRATES AIRLINE SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS
Christiane Raspa Jonathan Jasper (Secretary) Martin Ruedisueli
AIR CANADA IATA SWISS INTERNATIONAL AIR LINES
Anne Frederique Houlbreque Berry Ochieng’ Carlos Mouzaco Dias
AIR FRANCE KENYA AIRWAYS TAP PORTUGAL
Gennaro Anastasio Alexandra Wolf Mary Gooding
ALITALIA LUFTHANSA VIRGIN ATLANTIC AIRWAYS
Ruben Inion Rosnina Abdullah Sophie O’Ferrall
AUSTRIAN AIRLINES MALAYSIA AIRLINES BERHAD VIRGIN AUSTRALIA
Matthew Whipp Warren Elias
BRITISH AIRWAYS QATAR AIRWAYS

The COSTG mandate includes reviewing and updating the HEALTH AND SAFETY GUIDELINES –
IOSA standards relating to cabin operations, updating all IATA PASSENGERS AND CREW
Cabin Safety guidance materials, keeping IATA Cabin Safety
informed of emerging risks within cabin operations, and In the airline industry, health-related issues concerning
identifying key safety performance indicators that can be used passengers or crew are crucial in most activities: aircraft
to assess the efficacy of current procedures and mitigations operations, passenger transport, cargo, etc. They cover
matters as diverse as duty time limitation, transmission of
communicable diseases and disinfection.
IATA CABIN OPERATIONS SAFETY BEST
PRACTICES GUIDE (4th EDITION) IATA’s Medical Advisory Group creates guidelines regarding the
health and safety of passengers and crew, and regularly reviews
The IATA Cabin Operations Safety Best Practices Guide is the recommendations on the carriage of emergency medical
intended to give airlines the tools they need to create and equipment, medications and first aid kits. These guidelines and
update safety procedures and policies, using a global range of many others are available at: www.iata.org/health.
references and expert opinions.

Written and updated annually by a global team of cabin safety IOSA AND CABIN OPERATIONS SAFETY
professionals, this guide includes standards and recommended
practices from the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), ICAO IOSA Standards Manual (ISM) includes Section 5 – Cabin
and other regulators, combined with the extensive operational Operations (CAB), which contains key elements of cabin safety,
experience of member airlines. It suggests and gives guidance such as the IATA Standards and Recommended Practices
in the appropriate risk assessments to demonstrate the (ISARPs) for:
incorporation of SMS within cabin operations.
•• Management and Control
As with all safety-related reference documents, it is important
to keep up-to-date with any changes and new requirements. •• Training and Qualification
This latest edition integrates all existing IATA Cabin Safety
guidance material and toolkits, and includes new guidance on •• Line Operations
the acceptance of noncertified comfort devices, smart luggage,
ICAO-recommended brace positions, the management of •• Cabin Systems and Equipment
medical emergencies, unruly passengers and other cabin-
related security procedures. This and other IATA guidance These standards are reviewed annually and updated where
materials are available at: www.iata.org/cabin-safety. necessary to enhance the understanding and application of
safety standards globally. For more information on IOSA and to
download the latest version of the ISM, go to: www.iata.org/iosa.

SECTION 7 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 104

ACCIDENTS – CABIN END STATES •• Evacuation (land): Passengers and/or crew evacuate the
aircraft via escape slides/slide rafts, doors, emergency exits,
This section of the Safety Report highlights the categories of or gaps in the fuselage; usually initiated in life-threatening
cabin safety end states that resulted from an accident. Only and/or catastrophic events.
those that were classified as an accident in accordance with
the IATA definition are included in this analysis. •• Evacuation (water): Passengers and/or crew evacuate the
aircraft via escape slides/slide rafts, doors, emergency exits,
The following definitions apply to the end states in this section: or gaps in the fuselage and into or onto water.

•• Normal Disembarkation: Passengers and/or crew exit the •• Hull Loss/Nil Survivors: Aircraft impact resulting in a
aircraft via boarding doors during normal operations. complete hull loss with no survivors.

•• Rapid Deplaning: Passengers and/or crew rapidly exit The factors contributing to most of the accidents detailed in
the aircraft via boarding doors and jet bridges or stairs, as a the charts and graphs in this section are not attributed to cabin
precautionary measure. operations or the actions taken inside the cabin by the crew.
The statistics do show, however, the result of an accident and
•• Abnormal Disembarkation: Passengers and/or crew exit highlight where cabin crew may have had a positive impact
the aircraft via boarding doors (normally assisted by internal on the outcome and survivability of the aircraft occupants.
aircraft or exterior stairs) after a nonlife-threatening and non- These statistics can also be used to help airlines and training
catastrophic aircraft incident or accident and when away organizations to identify suitable practical training scenarios
from the boarding gates or aircraft stands (e.g., on a runway and training discussions.
or taxiway).

SECTION 7 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 105

 Cabin End States

2017 2015-2017

Total ‘Passenger-only’ Accidents 32 138

The total number of accidents in 2017 is 32, down from 49 in has been added to data from 2015 and 2016. This combined
2016. With so few accidents to review, it is not possible to identify three-year figure of 138 accidents is used in the following tables.
trends or patterns and draw conclusions. Therefore, this figure

2015-2017
Normal Abnormal Hull Loss/
Land Evacuation Water Evacuation Total
Disembarkation Disembarkation Nil survivors
All 51 15 47 1 3 117
IATA Member 28 5 14 1 1 49
IOSA-Registered 37 8 18 1 1 65
Fatal 0 0 2 1 3 6
Hull Loss 2 0 16 1 3 22
Jet 45 7 29 0 2 83
Turboprop 6 8 17 1 1 33

Cabin End State – Jet and Turboprop Aircraft Cabin End State – Jet

Water Evacuation, 1% Hull Loss/Nil Survivors, Water Evacuation, 0% Hull Loss/Nil Survivors, 2%
2%

Normal Land
Disembarkation, Evacuation, Normal
Land Evacuation,
44% 35% Disembarkation,
40%
54%

Rapid Deplaning,
Rapid Deplaning, Abnormal 0% Abnormal Disembarkation, 9%
0% Disembarkation, 13%



In 63% of jet aircraft accidents, passengers were able to The majority of passenger jet aircraft are typically larger than
disembark the aircraft in an orderly manner using boarding turboprops and, therefore, more likely to be fitted with escape
doors, either normally (54%) or abnormally (9%). Evacuation slides. Where there is no immediate danger to the occupants,
procedures were necessary during 35% of accidents. it is usually preferred to use normal disembarkation methods
to protect from the risks involved in using evacuation slides or
sliding off wings.

SECTION 7 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 106

Cabin End States (cont’d)

Cabin End State - Turboprop

Water Evacuation, 3% Hull Loss/Nil Survivors, 3% Normal disembarkation was possible in 18% of accidents with
turboprop aircraft. Abnormal disembarkation methods were
Normal Disembarkation, used in 24% of accidents and 52% resulted in an evacuation
18% on land.
Abnormal On these smaller aircraft, evacuation to the ground is easier
Disembarkation, 24%
to facilitate as evacuation systems such as integral steps pose
less risk to the occupants. The distinction between abnormal
Land Evacuation, disembarkation and evacuation is, therefore, less obvious.
52% Rapid Deplaning,
0%

Cabin End States per Phase of Flight (2015-2017)

PRF ESD TXO TOF RTO ICL ECL CRZ DST APR GOA LND TXI AES PSF FLC GDS

Total Accidents 3 5 6 12 3 9 3 5 3 4 3 77 3 0 0 0 0

Normal Disembarkation 100% 80% 50% 25% 0% 56% 100% 60% 33% 75% 33% 26% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Abnormal Disembarkation 0% 0% 17% 8% 0% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Rapid Deplaning 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Land Evacuation 0% 0% 17% 25% 100% 11% 0% 0% 0% 25% 33% 44% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Water Evacuation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Hull Loss/Nil Survivors 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 33% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Total Accidents: 136

Note: please refer to Annex 1 for definition of each phase of flight

Percentages are calculated based on the total number of accidents, not all of which are classified with a cabin end state, therefore sum may not add to 100%.

The above table shows the distribution of cabin end states per Landing is by far the most critical stage for cabin crew to be
phase of flight. The table’s first row shows the total number of prepared for an accident. Other important phases are Takeoff
accidents for 2015-2017. Two accidents did not identify a phase of and Initial Climb.
flight and are, therefore, not included in this set. The other rows
During the Takeoff and Landing stages, cabin crew are
show the cabin end state per phase of flight.
positioned at their crew seats and ready to act. The following
table shows the importance of cabin crew mental preparedness
for an evacuation at these most critical stages of flight.

SECTION 7 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 107

Cabin End States (cont’d)

Accident End States and Cabin End States (2015-2017)

Normal Abnormal Rapid Land Water Hull Loss/

Total
Disembarkation Disembarkation Deplaning Evacuation Evacuation Nil Survivors
Runway / Taxiway Excursion 26 0 6 0 20 0 0
Hard Landing 21 15 1 0 5 0 0
In-flight Damage 17 14 1 0 2 0 0
Gear-up Landing / Gear Collapse 16 1 5 0 10 0 0
Ground Damage 10 9 0 0 1 0 0
Undershoot 6 2 1 0 3 0 0
Runway Collision 5 2 1 0 2 0 0
Tailstrike 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of Control – In-flight 5 0 0 0 3 1 1
Other End State 3 1 0 0 1 0 1
Controlled Flight Into Terrai 2 1 0 0 0 0 1
Mid-air Collision 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Off-Airport Landing / Ditching 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

This table shows the type of accidents with their associated accident types in order of frequency and demonstrates that
Cabin End State and provides operators with useful information most accidents happened on landing.
for cabin crew training exercises and discussion. It lists the

SECTION 7 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 108

Incidents

With few accidents to review, it is very difficult to identify trends UNRULY PASSENGER REPORTS
or areas for focused attention. IATA Cabin Safety, therefore,
regularly looks closely at incident data to identify where its There were 9,837 validated reports of unruly behavior identified
activities may make a positive impact to enhance safety. on board aircraft during 2016, during 13,390,969 flights carried
out by STEADES members. This demonstrates a global rate of
IATA Global Aviation Data Management (GADM) includes a approximately 0.7 incidents per 1,000 sectors, or approximately
business intelligence tool called the Safety Trend Evaluation, one incident per 1,424 sectors. This shows an improvement
Analysis and Data Exchange System (STEADESTM) that compared to previously published figures for 2015 of one
provides access to data, analysis and global safety trends incident per 1,280 flights. However, unlike previous years,
on established key performance indicators in comparison to the total for 2016 excludes incidents that occurred before the
worldwide benchmarks. passenger boarded the aircraft.

The STEADES database is comprised of de-identified safety Levels of Unruly Behavior

incident reports from over 198 participating airlines throughout For this analysis, the established levels of disruptive behavior
the world, with an annual reporting rate now exceeding are levels 1 – 4, described as follows:
200,000 reports. This data is regularly used by IATA Cabin
Safety to support ongoing advocacy initiatives in relation to Level 1 incidents include verbal aggression toward crewmembers
unruly passengers, as well as identify any trends that may or other passengers, noncompliance with safety regulations such
require existing Cabin Safety guidance to be expanded. as smoking in the lavatories, refusing to comply with the fasten
seatbelt signs, and standing during taxi in to retrieve personal
Examples of existing STEADES cabin safety analyses include: items. Such incidents accounted for 86% of total reports.

•• Inadvertent slide deployments (ISDs) Level 2 incidents create fear or require cabin crew intervention
to de-escalate the situation. These reports represent 12% of total
•• Fire, smoke and fume events reports, an increase of one percentage point over figures for 2015.

•• Passenger and cabin crew injuries Level 3 incidents are those where a direct threat to the safety
of another person is reported. 0.7% of reports were classified
•• Turbulence injuries or incidents as Level 3 behavior. While this may seem insignificant, these 66
reports relate to occasions where life was threatened on board
•• Unruly passenger incidents an aircraft.

•• Operational pressure Level 4 incidents, which include attempts to enter the flight
deck, are rare and 0.2% of reports in this dataset indicated
At the time of writing this report, the submission of incident such behavior, mostly unintentional. Of these 20 reports,
data is not complete for 2017. Therefore, 2016 data is used for three reports were identified as intentional attempts to cause
the following unruly passenger analysis. disruption without involving weapons, five reports were
attributed to mental health conditions, four reports attributed
to intoxication, three reports wanted to complain to the
captain regarding disruption of service, two reports mistook
the flight deck door for a lavatory door, and three reports were
unexplained intentional attempts to enter the flight deck while
on the ground, therefore posing minimal risk to the flight.

Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4

Minor Moderate Serious Flight deck breach

•• Noncompliant with safety •• Physically aggressive •• Dangerous •• Attempt to enter the flight
regulations and policies •• Obscene or lewd physical •• Display of or use of weapon deck
•• Suspicious behavior contact •• Intent or threat to injure •• Act of sabotage
•• Boisterous/lively/excitable •• Causing damage to aircraft •• Credible threat of unlawful
•• Argumentative fixtures or equipment seizure of the aircraft

SECTION 7 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 109

Incidents (cont’d)

Types of Behavior Demonstrated with safety regulations and a dispute with another passenger.
Classifications are not unique. For example, a passenger’s The following chart shows a breakdown of all different types of
unruly behavior could include intoxication, noncompliance unruly behavior as a percentage of total reports.

Levels Behavior types

Security threat or suspicious

Level 3, Inappropriate behavior,
Level 2, behavior, 210, 2%
66, 0.7% Level 4, 372, 4%
1,201, 12%
20, 0.2% Pet/Emotional support
Child/infant, animal, 80, 1%
397, 4%
Alcohol/
Intoxication,
Compliance with 3,251, 31%
fasten seatbelt
signs, 711, 7%

Dispute between
passengers,
Level 1, 823, 8%
8,463, 86%

Compliance with Compliance with

other regulations, smoking regulations,
1,776, 17% 2,740, 26%

SECTION 7 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 110

Incidents (cont’d)

Alcohol/Intoxication Summary
Reports of intoxication include those attributed to alcohol and/ Unruly passenger behavior remains a concern for many
or other substances. In some cases, the interaction between airlines and IATA continues to support initiatives to ratify the
alcohol and medication, such as sleeping tablets, has been 2014 Montreal Protocol and to moderate the purchase and
identified as the suspected cause of the unruly behavior. consumption of alcohol at airports and on board aircraft.
Intoxication is included in 31% of all reports of unruly behavior.
A more detailed analysis of all aspects of unruly passenger
Approximately 28% of reports of intoxication included reports in this dataset, including findings and recommendations,
passengers consuming alcohol that was not served to them by is available to participants in IATA’s Global Aviation Data
cabin crew, contrary to airline policy. Management program, through the members’ website.

Approximately 14% of all incidents involving intoxication

displayed behavior that was physical in nature and posed a
significant safety risk to the aircraft, passengers or crew (i.e.,
Level 2 and above). A little over half (52%) of the 169 reports
where a passenger was physically restrained by the cabin crew
cited intoxication as a contributory factor.

Intoxication - Contributing Factors (2016) Intoxication - Level of Behavior Shown (2016)

Intoxication - Contributing factors Intoxication - level of behavior shown

3,500 3,251 3,000 2,844

3,000
2,500

2,500
2,000
2,000
1,500
1,500

925 1,000
1,000
444
500 500
187
18 6
0 0
Alcohol/Intoxication Consuming own alcohol Medication Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4

SECTION 7 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 111

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8
Report Findings and IATA Prevention Strategies
TOP FINDINGS, 2013-2017 PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURES
Of the 340 accidents between 2013 and 2017: Every year, the IATA Accident Classification Technical Group
(ACTG) classifies accidents and, with the benefit of hindsight,
•• 32% involved IATA members
determines actions or measures that could have been taken
•• 13% were fatal to prevent an accident. These proposed countermeasures can
include issues within an organization or a country, or involve
•• 76% involved passenger aircraft, 22% involved cargo aircraft
performance of frontline personnel, such as pilots or ground
and 3% involved ferry flights (note: numbers don’t add up to
personnel. They are valid for accidents involving both Eastern
100% due to rounding)
and Western-built jet and turboprop aircraft.
•• 58% involved jet aircraft and 42% involved turboprops
This section presents countermeasures and the percentage
•• 31% resulted in a hull loss
of accidents that ACTG analysis determined may have
•• 68% resulted in substantial damage been prevented if the countermeasures had been actioned
•• 55% occurred during landing beforehand. The intention is to help operators, regulators
and flight crews enhance safety by strengthening these
•• 22% of the fatal accidents occurred during approach countermeasures.

Countermeasures are aimed at two levels:

Top Three Contributing Factors
•• The operator or the state responsible for oversight. These
Latent Conditions 1. Regulatory oversight countermeasures are based on activities, processes and
(deficiencies in…) 2. Safety management systemic issues internal to airline operation or state oversight
3. F
 light operations activities.
Threats 1. Meteorology
•• Flight crew. These countermeasures are to help flight crew
(Environmental) 2. Wind/Wind shear/Gusts
3. Airport facilities
manage threats or errors during operations.

Threats 1. Aircraft malfunction

(Airline) 2. Gear/Tire
3. Maintenance events
Flight crew errors 1. Manual handling/
relating to latent Flight controls
conditions 2. S OP adherence/
(deficiencies in…) Cross-verification
3. C allouts and pilot-to-pilot
communication
Undesired aircraft 1. Long, floated, bounced, firm, off-
states center or crabbed landing
2. V ertical/Lateral/Speed deviation
3. U nstable approach
End states 1. Runway excursion
2. G
 ear-up landing/Gear collapse
3. H
 ard landing

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 113
COUNTERMEASURES FOR THE OPERATOR AND THE STATE

Subject Description % of accidents

where counter-
measures could
have been effective
(2013-2017)
Regulatory States must be responsible for establishing a safety program, in order 33%
oversight by to achieve an acceptable level of safety, encompassing the following
the state of responsibilities:
the operator
•• Safety regulation
•• Safety oversight
•• Accident/incident investigation
•• Mandatory/voluntary reporting systems
•• Safety data analysis and exchange
•• Safety assurance
•• Safety promotion

Safety The operator should implement a safety management system (SMS) 27%
management accepted by the state that, as a minimum:
system
(operator) •• Identifies safety hazards
•• Ensures that remedial action necessary to maintain an acceptable level
of safety is implemented
•• Provides for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the
safety level achieved
•• Aims to make continuous improvements to the overall level of safety

Flight operations: •• Omitted training 12%

Training systems •• Language skills deficiencies
•• Qualifications and experience of flight crews
•• Operational needs leading to training reductions
•• Deficiencies in assessment of training or training resources such as
manuals or Competency-based Training (CBT) devices.

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 114
COUNTERMEASURES FOR FLIGHT CREWS

Subject Description % of accidents

where counter-
measures could
have been effective
(2013-2017)
Overall crew Overall, crew members should perform well as risk managers, including 21%
performance flight, cabin and ground crew as well as their interactions with air traffic
control (ATC).

Monitor/Cross- Crewmembers should actively monitor and cross-check flight path, aircraft 17%
check performance, systems and other crewmembers to ensure aircraft position,
settings and crew actions are verified.

Contingency Crewmembers should develop effective strategies to manage threats to 7%

management safety.

Leadership •• Captain Should Show Leadership and coordinate flight deck activities 8%
•• First Officer should be assertive when necessary and be able to take
over as the leader

Taxiway/Runway Crewmembers use caution and keep watch outside when navigating 5%
management taxiways and runways

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 115
LOSS OF CONTROL - IN-FLIGHT attitude exercises that are realistic to include extremes of
center of gravity, weight, altitude and control status.
In 2017, 9% of accidents were because of a loss of control -
in-flight (LOC-I), resulting in 58% of the onboard fatalities. •• Train flight crews on the onset of somatogravic illusion, the
The operators were not IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA)- feeling where the perceived and actual acceleration vectors
accredited airlines. In the last five years (2013-2017), there have differ considerably, which can create spatial disorientation
been 29 LOC-I accidents with 690 fatalities. and lead to loss of control.

The graph below indicates the percentage of all accidents that •• Ensure flight crews have a comprehensive understanding
were LOC-I over the past ten years. of automation, flight director, and manual handling mode
selection and control.
Loss of Control – In-flight
14% 0.50 •• Where possible, ensure that simulators have the latest
upgrades to simulate high-altitude handling and upset

Accidents per Million Sectors

0.45
12%
0.40
10% 0.35 recovery.
Frequency (%)

8% 0.30

6%
0.25 •• Incorporate procedures to allow for manual flying of the
0.20
4% 0.15 airplane in line operations, under specified circumstances.
2%
0.10 Flight crews should be encouraged to use manual control and
0.05
to exercise these skills on a regular basis. The Federal Aviation
0% -
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Administration (FAA)’s Safety Alerts for Operators (SAFO)
% Contribution Accident Rate
13002 Manual Flying Skills outlines recommendations, as
for example, endorsed by European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
A discussion of loss of control usually starts with the premise
of dependency on automation. However, in 2017, the four •• Efforts to restore or establish and maintain manual flying
accidents were on early generation turboprops: two L410s, one skills must be comprehensive and ongoing.
SD330 and an ATR42. While they have automation, they are not
the latest generation of technology. The circumstances were: •• Be mindful of the limitations of simulators to represent
an engine going into un-commanded beta range on approach, conditions out of the flight envelope and the possibility of
a go-around, a non-precision approach and a suspected icing providing negative training.
on departure.
•• Incorporate, where applicable, the Commercial Aviation
While aircraft malfunction and weather were contributing Safety Team (CAST) safety enhancements.
factors, the latent conditions of training, checking, standard
operating procedures (SOPs) leading to manual handling,
communication and application of SOPs are high on the CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN
errors list leading to the undesired aircraft states of speed and
vertical/lateral flight path deviations. In 2017, there was one Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)
accident resulting in four onboard fatalities and 35 fatalities on
Recommendations to operators: the ground. In the last five years (2013-2017), there have been
•• Ensure flight crews have and maintain the necessary manual 13 CFIT accidents with 154 fatalities.
handling skills for all foreseeable in-flight scenarios.
The graph below indicates the percentage of all accidents that
•• Ensure operations are conducted in accordance with SOPs. were CFIT over the past ten years.

•• Ensure flight crews have the necessary communication and Controlled flight into Terrain
crew resource management (CRM) skills. 12% 0.35
Accidents per Million Sectors

10% 0.30
•• Conduct training on energy management in a variety of 0.25
Frequency (%)

8%
scenarios, including, but not limited to: high altitude, low 0.20
speed, engine failure, un-commanded engine conditions, 6%
0.15
go-arounds, non-precision approaches and icing conditions. 4%
0.10
2% 0.05
•• Consult the IATA Guidance Material and Best Practices
0% -
for the Implementation of Upset Prevention and Recovery 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Training (UPRT), the ICAO manual on UPRT as well as Flight
% Contribution Accident Rate
Safety Foundation, Skybrary and other resources.

•• Implement UPRT where possible. The most common threats identified in CFIT accidents were the
lack of visual reference and navigation aids. Latent conditions
•• Carry out training scenarios under degraded flight control that contributed to the realization of these threats were
protection. Periodic simulator training should include unusual regulatory oversight (78%), technology and equipment (56%),
SMS (44%), and flight operations training and checking (44%).

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 116
There is a very strong correlation between the lack of •• Train flight crews to respect weather minima and not to
instrument landing systems (ILS) or state-of-the-art approach penetrate weather unnecessarily.
procedures, such as performance-based navigation (PBN).
The malfunction or lack of ground-based navigation aids was •• Train flight crews to go around from an unstable approach.
a contributing factor in 56% of the CFIT accidents in the 2013-
2017 period, an improvement of eight percentage points over •• Train and ensure effective implementation of SOPs,
the 2012-2016 period. flight crew monitoring, cross-checking and pilot-to-pilot
communication in all approaches when weather and visibility
The installation/availability of precision approach aids would are factors.
make a difference, but the threats can also be identified,
assessed and managed, both in terms of the operation and its •• Use a Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program
oversight, by the frontline personnel adhering to SOPs. 44% to monitor compliance and reinforce a policy of go-around
of the CFIT accidents in the last five years penetrated weather from an unstable approach.
unnecessarily and 22% would have been prevented by a go-
around from an unstable approach. Monitoring and cross- •• Consult the IATA Guidance Material for Improving Flight
checking was identified as a countermeasure that may have Crew Monitoring.
been effective in preventing 56% of CFIT accidents. 77% of
CFIT accidents involved turboprops between 2013 and 2017. Recommendations to regulators/states:
IATA will be drilling into the data behind this statistic to search •• Implement precision approaches or PBN approaches to
for factors that can be addressed. reduce the risk of CFIT accidents.

Recommendations to operators: •• Adopt CANPA for non-precision approaches.

•• Use SMS principles to assess and mitigate risks in operations
to airfields with non-precision or circling approach •• Mandate the use of TAWS in air transport aircraft.
procedures.
•• Provide to manufacturers the respective terrain data when a
•• Implement Continuous Angle Non-Precision Approaches new airport opens.
(CANPA) for a more stable descent profile than traditional
“dive and drive” methods used for non-precision approaches. •• Comply with ICAO recommendations and guidelines
regarding PBN implementation.
•• Consider replacing circling approaches in favor of using Area
Navigation (RNAV) or Required Navigation Performance
(RNP) approaches. RUNWAY/TAXIWAY EXCURSIONS
•• Train flight crews to respond immediately to a hard Enhanced In 2017, there were 17 runway/taxiway excursion accidents with
Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) warning, and zero fatalities. They consisted of eight veer offs, eight overruns
respect and respond to EGPWS soft warnings. and one taxiway excursion. In the last five years (2013-2017), there
have been 76 runway excursion accidents with eight fatalities.
•• Train flight crews to understand the limitations of EGPWS
in scenarios such as non-precision approaches. Mandate The graph below indicates the percentage of all accidents that
procedures that ensure EGPWS databases are kept accurate were runway/taxiway excursions over the past ten years.
and up-to-date. In other words, as soon as the database
update is available. The current grace period is potentially a Runway / Taxiway Excursions
latent failure in the system. In addition, the latest modifications 40% 1.00

are incorporated in their particular Terrain Awareness Warning 35% 0.90 Accidents per Million Sectors
0.80
System (TAWS) or EGPWS computer and with Global 30%
0.70
Frequency (%)

Positioning System (GPS) providing aircraft position data 25% 0.60

20% 0.50
directly to the computer. 0.40
15%
0.30
10%
•• Airlines are encouraged to use simulators to show their 5%
0.20
0.10
crews exactly how close terrain is when the EGPWS warning 0% -
occurs to reinforce the need for an immediate response to 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
the warning to avoid the terrain. Time for reorientation is only % Contribution Accident Rate
available when the warning has ceased.

•• Where possible, aircraft should be equipped with approved In this category, the most common latent issues are regulatory
GPS so that accurate positioning and altitude data is available. oversight (45%), SMS (42%) and flight operations training and
checking (22%). These systemic issues are compounded by
•• Risk assess retrofitted navigation systems so that navigation the most common threats of: weather (45%), airport facilities
source switching does not become a hazard. (32%) wind and wind shear (25%) and contaminated runway
surface (25%). The resulting flight crew errors were: manual
•• Ensure that flight crews are trained to understand the source handling (38%), SOP adherence (32%) and callouts (12%).
of information driving terrain and navigation displays to The most common recoverable undesired aircraft states were:
ensure that accurate information is followed. long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing (43%),

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 117
speed or lateral/vertical path deviation (18%) and a continued •• Train pilots in crosswind and tailwind landings up to the
landing from an unstable approach (13%). maximum manufacturer-certified winds.

Recommendations to operators: •• Encourage airlines to develop campaigns to establish SOPs.

•• Train flight crew to go-around from a long/floated/bounced/
firm/off-center/crabbed landing. •• Review the ICAO Global Runway Safety Action Plan
released in November 2017, which identifies the stakeholder
•• Implement a policy of go-around from an unstable approach. mitigations to runway safety issues.

•• Train flight crews to monitor and make effective callouts •• Adopt the ICAO global format for runway surface condition
and pilot-to-pilot interactions to ensure a stable approach is reporting, which will become effective in November 2020.
achieved or a go-around is performed.
•• Install Runway End Safety Area (RESA), arrestor beds
•• Define the touchdown aiming point as the target. and similar runway excursion prevention technologies
and infrastructure to help reduce the severity of runway
•• Implement a policy of landing in the touchdown zone or excursions.
consider performing a go-around.
•• Allow the use of reverse thrust for safety or landing
•• Use a FOQA program to monitor compliance and reinforce a performance improvement. Noise considerations must be
policy of go-around from an unstable approach. secondary.

•• Use a FOQA program to monitor long landings. •• Incorporate, where applicable, the CAST safety enhancements.

•• Review the ICAO Global Runway Safety Action Plan

released in November 2017, which identifies the stakeholder AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL FAILURES AND SAFETY
mitigations to runway safety issues. MAINTENANCE
•• Familiarize themselves and flight crews with the ICAO global In 2017, there were five accidents in the gear up/gear collapsed
format for runway surface condition reporting, which will landing category, with zero fatalities. In the last five years
become effective in November 2020. (2013-2017), there have been 53 accidents in the gear up/gear
collapsed landing category with zero fatalities.
•• Train pilots to make an early decision to use the maximum
available deceleration capability of the aircraft whenever The graph below indicates the percentage of all accidents that
landing performance is compromised. were gear up/gear collapsed landings over the past ten years.

•• Adopt landing performance prediction technology, where Gear-up / Gear Collapse Landing
practicable. 25% 0.60

Accidents per Million Sectors

20% 0.50
•• Instruct flight crews and dispatchers to calculate stopping
Frequency (%)

0.40
distances on every landing. 15%
0.30
10%
•• Review the IATA Runway Excursion Risk Reduction Toolkit 0.20

on www.iata.org and the runway safety I-kit., which contains 5% 0.10

available Runway Safety Products. 0% -
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
•• Consult the 3rd edition of the IATA/CANSO/IFALPA/IFATCA % Contribution Accident Rate
Unstable Approaches – Risk Mitigation, Procedures and
Best Practices
Maintenance was a latent condition in 28% of events over the
•• Consult the 3rd edition of the European Action Plan for the last five years. In 77% of accidents, gear or tire malfunction
Prevention of Runway Incursions (EAPPRI), was a factor. Only 2% of accidents were the result of manual
handling.
•• Incorporate, where applicable, the CAST safety enhancements.
Recommendations to operators:
•• Deploy on board technology, as feasible, to reduce or prevent •• Functional check flights (FCF) or shakedown cruises after
landing overruns. heavy aircraft maintenance are recommended to verify that
the aircraft is operating normally.
Recommendations to regulators and industry:
•• Encourage implementation of SMS for all airlines. •• Ensure all flight crew fully understand the Minimum
Equipment List (MEL) and apply operational risk factors to
•• Encourage a policy of rejected landing in the case of long MEL go-no-go decision-making.
landings.

•• Require training in bounced landing recovery techniques.

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 118
Recommendations to Maintenance Repair Operator •• Clearly define limits for wind and gusts in the Operations
(MRO)/Airline Maintenance: Manual.
•• Implement a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) system for
their maintenance activity. •• Review the ICAO Global Runway Safety Action Plan
released in November 2017, which identifies the stakeholder
•• Address procedural noncompliance in maintenance. mitigations to runway safety issues.

•• Address maintenance error and human factors issues. Recommendations to airports:

•• Provide a meteorological office that issues alerts of low-
•• Ensure all maintenance staff fully understand the MEL and level wind shear and turbulence within three nautical miles
also discuss with the flight crew operational risk factors of the runway thresholds for relay by air traffic controllers to
specific to the operation. approaching and departing aircraft.

•• Disseminate ATS observations and forecasts to aircraft pilots

CONTINUATION OF AIRLINE OPERATION and flight dispatchers for preflight planning.
DURING SEVERE WEATHER
•• Issue alerts for low-level wind shear and turbulence within
Airline operations may be completely suspended by severe three nautical miles of the runway thresholds for relay by air
weather in some parts of the world. Meteorology was identified traffic controllers to approaching and departing aircraft.
as a factor in 26% of accidents in 2017 and 29% of accidents
during the five-year period of 2013 to 2017. Unnecessary
weather penetration was a factor in 11% of the accidents in 2017. CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The graph below shows the rate of accidents where Overall crew performance was identified as an absent
meteorology as a contributing factor was present. countermeasure in 2% of accidents in 2017 and 21% over the
last five years (2013-2017). Social and communication skills
Unecessary Weather Penetration are a vital part of overall crew performance. Ultimately, an
0.18 electronic system cannot be designed for every possible threat
0.16 and efficient crew interaction is critical for the mitigation of
Accidents per Million Sectors

0.14 potential threats.

0.12
0.1 CRM and Threat and Error Management (TEM) continues to
0.08 be an important factor in aviation safety, especially in more
0.06
conservative social environments. While implemented at many
0.04
operators, CRM is not universally applied, and many airlines
0.02
have ineffective or unformalized CRM training programs in
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
place. As the worldwide recruitment of new pilots grows
enhancing or re-establishing CRM/TEM training is necessary
to ensure competence is established through training rather
Airports are encouraged to provide aviation weather services than experience.
to Air Traffic Services (ATS) units, airline operators, flight
crewmembers, dispatchers and airport management by In cultural environments where a high social gradient exists,
supplying the necessary meteorological information in a strict SOPs help establish clear lines of communication and
timely and accurate manner. Flight crews also need to be allow for first officers to pass critical situational information to
able to identify and avoid poor weather conditions whenever the captain without compromising their position or causing the
possible and applicable. The ACTG believes that there is a captain to “lose face”. The ACTG identified aircraft accidents
need for improved real-time weather information available in where a third person on the flight deck may have exacerbated
the cockpit, improved awareness of weather phenomena by all this effect. It is also true that there are examples of aircraft
key personnel involved with the planning and execution of a incidents where the third person has been beneficial. Effective
flight, and technology development for advanced forecast and crew pairing with respect to seniority and experience can
presentation of weather pertinent to a particular flight. promote optimal conditions for crew performance.

Recommendations to operators: Recommendations to operators:

•• Consider tools that allow dispatch offices to provide crews •• CRM training should include and emphasize assertiveness
with the most up-to-date weather information possible. and identify specific cases where the social gradient or rank
distance between the captain and first officer is high enough
•• Ensure that airport ATS observations and forecasts are to impede effective communications. Focus on specific
disseminated to aircraft pilots and flight dispatchers for cultural factors when applicable.
preflight planning.
•• Encourage captains to allow first officers to demonstrate
•• Develop a contingency plan, involving dispatch and crew assertiveness and leadership. Communicate that despite
support, that clearly defines guidance at an organizational rank or position, the captain is still human and capable of
level on who is responsible to cease operations. making mistakes. Ensure that captains understand they are
not infallible.

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 119
•• Specific callouts of information or decision requirements Airlines should not limit training scenarios to the initiation of
at critical points in the flight may help the first officer to a go-around at the approach minimum or missed approach
overcome the social gradient between crewmembers. point. Training scenarios should focus on current operational
Properly developed SOPs with clear instructions may threats as well as traditional situations.
empower first officers to take over the flight controls when
the situation requires assertiveness. Recommendations to operators:
•• Airlines are recommended to modify their approach
•• A process for debriefing CRM issues that arose during line procedures to call out “STABILIZED” or “GO-AROUND” at a
operations will give the pilot essential feedback on his or her given point to ensure a timely go-around is carried out. While
performance. a “STABLE” or “STABILIZED” callout might be required at
either 1,000 feet or 500 feet above touchdown, the “GO-
•• Develop a defined role for a third pilot on the flight deck to AROUND” command can and must be made at any time
create an understanding of that person’s role and prevent prior to deployment of thrust reversers (if installed).
any unwanted side effects, which could potentially inhibit the
normal interaction of the operating pilots. •• When developing crew training programs, operators are
encouraged to create unexpected go-around scenarios at
•• Consult the IATA Guidance Material for Improving Flight intermediate altitudes with instructions that deviate from
Crew Monitoring. the published procedure; this addresses both go-around
decision-making and execution. The training should also
include go-around execution with all engines operating,
GO-AROUNDS including level-off at a low altitude and go-arounds from
long flares and bounced landings. Operators should also
Failure to go around after a destabilized approach was a consider go-arounds, not only at heavy weight and one
contributing factor in 11% of the accidents between 2013 and engine inoperative, which are the typical scenarios, but
2017. While focus on go-arounds is of extreme importance, the also at light weight with both engines operative in order to
handling of the aircraft after a go-around is initiated needs to be experience the higher dynamics. Crews should fly the go-
a topic of discussion, especially in circumstances not foreseen around pitch and Flight Director bars and adapt the thrust to
during simulator training. remain within flight parameters.

The chart below shows the rate of accidents where failure to go •• Training should emphasize the significance of thrust reverser
around after destabilized approach was a contributing factor. deployment for a go-around decision. From a technical point
of view, a go-around may always be initiated before reverser
Failure to GOA after Destabilized Approach
deployment and never after reverser application, subject to
0.25
other considerations.
Accidents per Million Sectors

0.2
•• Introduce destabilized approach simulator training scenarios,
0.15 which emphasize that deviations from the stabilized approach
profile at low altitudes — below minimum descent altitude
0.1 (MDA) or decision height (DH) — should require execution
of a go-around.
0.05

•• Airlines should incorporate training on somatogravic illusions

0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 during the initiation of a go-around. Simulators that combine
the possibilities of both the hexapod and the human centrifuge
are already available and in use, (e.g., for military training). They
Although normally practiced during annual and initial training, can be used to demonstrate the illusions during go-around
the go-around procedure is rarely flown in line operations and initiation and train pilots for a correct reaction to the head-up
can be a challenging maneuver. Crews must be sufficiently illusion. As a preventive means, crews are recommended to
familiar with flying go-arounds through initial and recurrent brief the go-around, not delay it, respect minima, monitor the
training. flight parameters, and fly the go-around pitch and the Flight
Director bars, where available.
Somatogravic head-up illusions during the unfamiliar forward
acceleration in a go-around can lead to the incorrect perception •• A no-fault go-around policy should be promoted by the
by the flight crew that the nose of the aircraft is pitching up. operators.
This illusion can cause pilots to respond with an inappropriate
nose-down input on the flight controls during the execution of •• Consult the 3rd edition of the IATA/CANSO/IFALPA/IFATCA
a go-around. Such responses have led to periodic accidents. Unstable Approaches – Risk Mitigation, Procedures and
Best Practices
There are also cases when the crew engage the autopilot
to reduce the workload, but instead put the aircraft in an Recommendations to industry
undesired situation due to a lack of situational awareness with •• Authorities should examine if initial go-around altitudes
the automation. may be increased, wherever possible, to give flight crews
additional time to both reconfigure the aircraft and adjust to
their new situation.

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 120
•• Industry should support the development of operationally •• Not to rely solely on ground marshals or wing walkers for
feasible simulators that can generate sustained g-forces obstacle avoidance and/or clearance while taxiing.
for generic go-around training with regard to somatogravic
illusions. •• Turboprops can be especially prone to ground damage.
Several cases of turboprops taxiing into ground carts were
•• Air traffic controllers should be reminded that any aircraft noted.
might execute a balked landing or missed approach. This
will involve startle and surprise for the ATC, just as it might •• ATC clearance to taxi is not an indication that it is safe to
for the flight crew involved. The ATC should understand that begin taxiing; surroundings must be monitored at all times.
the flight crew will immediately be involved in stabilizing the
flight path, changing configuration, and communicating with Ground staff should be informed to respect lines and other
each other. The flight crew will communicate with ATC as markings depicting protected zones. As surface markings can
soon as they are able, and ATC should be prepared to clear differ from one airport to another, the ground crew is better
other traffic and provide or approve an altitude and direction positioned to ensure the safe positioning of the aircraft when
of flight. They should also understand that the aircraft approaching a parking spot or gate. Issues such as ground
might be entering a fuel critical state, such that routing and vehicles failing to give right-of-way to moving aircraft as well
sequencing for diversion or subsequent landing must be as movable stands, carts and other equipment being placed
without undue delay. incorrectly, not being removed, or blowing into moving aircraft
continue to affect safety on the ground.
•• Consult the 3rd edition of the IATA/CANSO/IFALPA/IFATCA
Unstable Approaches – Risk Mitigation, Procedures and Ground markings should be clear and well understood by ramp
Best Practices workers. Confusing and/or overlapping lines can contribute to
improperly positioned aircraft and result in ground damage.
Lines can be difficult to see in wet conditions; this can be
GROUND OPERATIONS AND GROUND helped by using contrast painting (i.e., a black border to taxi
DAMAGE PREVENTION lines where the surface is concrete).

In 2017, there were two accidents categorized as ground Damage to composite materials will not necessarily show visible
damage. There were 32 such accidents between 2013 and 2017. signs of distress or deformation. Engineering and maintenance
must remain on constant vigilance when dealing with newer
The graph below indicates the percentage of ground damage aircraft that contain major composite structures.
accidents over the previous ten years and its rate in accidents
per million sectors. The downward trend, however, needs to be Due to hesitation of some ground staff in submitting ground
treated carefully because it does not include damage caused damage reports, the data available is not enough to be more
by ground operations-related incidents that do not fit the effective in finding accident precursors, identifying hazards and
accident criteria. Ground damage continues to be a major cost mitigating risks.
for operators and requires a cooperative safety approach with
all involved parties, including airlines, ground service providers, All service providers, such as aircraft operators, maintenance
airport authorities and government. organizations, ATS providers and airport operators need to
Ground Damage
be compliant with ICAO SMS Doc. 9859 to strengthen the
concept of a proactive and predictive approach to reducing
18% 0.60
ground damage events.
Accidents per Million Sectors

16%
0.50
14%
IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) certifications
Frequency (%)

12% 0.40
10%
0.30
may benefit all service providers in understanding high-risk
8%
areas within ground operations at all airports.
6% 0.20
4%
2%
0.10 Recommendations to operators:
0% - •• Ensure crews receive taxi training that includes time spent in
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
real aircraft (with wing walkers indicating the actual position
% Contribution Accident Rate of the wings to the pilot) to help accurately judge the size of
the aircraft and its handling on the ground.

Actual hands-on experience with a real aircraft is required •• Ensure crews inform ATC of aircraft position while waiting to
to accurately gauge the size and position of the wings and enter the ramp area in preparation for a final parking slot to
airframe when moving on the ramp. This is particularly true as increase situational awareness and indicate that the aircraft
new aircraft with larger wingspans are being added to airline may not be fully clear of the taxiway.
fleets. The risk of ground events is expected to increase as
growth in traffic outpaces growth in airport capacity, resulting •• Consider the utilization of stop locations for aircraft entering
in more aircraft operating in a limited space. the ramp like those used while leaving ramp areas. Stop
locations should ensure adequate clearance from movement
Crews need to exercise increased vigilance during taxi areas while transitioning from ground control.
operations in congested airports, near challenging gates,
stands or other obstacles. Operators and crews should note:

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 121
•• Crew training with regards to effective communication during Meteorological phenomena and other factors that lead to a
the taxi and brake setting procedure should be applied and (late) destabilization of the final approach have again been
reinforced. identified as typical precursors of hard landings that led to
accidents. Additionally, hard landings often either lead to or
•• Inform crews of the unique nature of composite materials have been the result of bounced landings. For this reason in
and reinforce that severely damaged composite materials particular, the importance of flying stabilized approaches all the
may show no visible signs of distress. way to the landing, as well as the recovery of bounced landings,
continue to be critical areas for crew training activities. At the
•• Train crews regarding the handling and responsibilities of same time, there are still limitations in the ability of simulators
taxi instructions. The taxi clearance does not ensure that no to induce occurrences such as bounced landings at a level of
obstacles are present for the crew. fidelity that is sufficiently high to avoid the danger of ‘negative
training’.
•• Ensure compliance with ICAO Doc. 9859.
Recommendations to operators:
•• Encourage all ground staff to report all ground damage •• Focus training for the correct landing parameters (e.g., pitch,
events, incidents or violations through the Safety Reporting power, visual picture) on every landing. This is to develop
System and/or Aviation Confidential Reporting System sufficient awareness and motor skills to always perform the
(ACRS). landing the way the airplane manufacturer recommends
and to always land at the correct location on the runway,
Recommendations to industry: regardless of how favorable or unfavorable the conditions
•• Chart providers are encouraged to include as much are. Focus also must be on the fact that the landing is to be
information as possible on charts while maintaining legibility. rejected should the aforementioned landing parameters not
Additionally, potential hazards and areas of confusion must be met.
be identified clearly.
•• Modify their approach procedures to include a callout such
•• Manufacturers are asked to investigate the use of technology as “STABILIZED” or “GO-AROUND” at a certain gate to
to assist crews in determining the proximity of aircraft to ensure a timely go-around is carried out. Emphasis should
obstacles. also be put on pilots to understand that a destabilization can
occur at any altitude and that the set parameters are to be
met at all times after the gate and until landing.
HARD LANDING
•• Encourage early disconnection of the Auto Pilot. There are
There were two hard landing events in 2017 compared to 44 events when the crew has no time to enter into the aircraft
in the previous five years. The graph below shows that the loop by disconnecting at low altitudes, such as 200 feet,
industry is back to low levels of events after a spike in 2015. particularly in adverse conditions such as crosswind or
gusts, in which case the approach may destabilize on very
Hard Landing short final.
30% 0.50
Accidents per Million Sectors

25%
0.45
0.40
•• Work with simulator manufacturers to overcome the
0.35 challenges of simulating common precursors to hard
Frequency (%)

20%
0.30 landings in the training environment.
15% 0.25
0.20
10% 0.15 Recommendations to industry:
5% 0.10 •• Regulators are encouraged to evaluate landing training
0.05
0% -
requirements.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

% Contribution Accident Rate

Frequent contributing factors to hard landings in the last five

years were:

•• Manual handling of the aircraft: 70%

•• Long, floated or bounced landing: 51%

•• Meteorology: 40%

•• Flight operations (training systems): 19%

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 122
RUNWAY COLLISION FINAL STATEMENT
There was one runway collision event in 2017, which counted as So, while the data supports 2017 being a very safe year due
two accidents because two aircraft were involved: a landing jet to a variety of issues, including industry approaches and the
and a turboprop lining up after misinterpreting or not clarifying collaborative aspects of industry safety groups, there is clearly
a clearance. This was almost a catastrophic runway incursion, a great deal of room for improvement.
as the two aircraft wingtips collided causing substantial
damage to both. However, although the data shows a declining number of
accidents and fatalities, there were a high number of serious
The IATA STEADES incident database indicates that there is a events which could easily have made 2017 one of the worst
minor runway incursion incident occurring once every day on years in aviation safety. It is incumbent on all of us to reflect
average. This level of incident occurrence is a precursor to an on what went right and continue to apply those positive areas
accident. while eliminating the negative before an accident occurs.

Recommendations to industry: Pilot Experience

•• All stakeholders should work together to eliminate all forms In addition to the historical data, looking ahead, ab initio
of runway incursion incidents. programs in the worldwide pilot community will see an influx of
new pilots in the coming years. Ensuring that training programs
are equipped to ensure without compromise that new pilots are
IN-FLIGHT DECISION-MAKING equipped with the necessary competencies is an urgent priority
for the industry. This must include high levels of CRM and TEM
Looking back at a year such as 2017, with few accidents, leads training. There have been documented accident investigations
one to learn from what went right. The industry is undergoing where one of the pilots had not received this training.
a shift from the avoidance of risk to making sure everything
goes right. What went well and why did it go well? With over English Language
100,000 flights every day, why did most of them go right? What While English is the language of pilots, the industry has
can we learn from this? For example, the auto land operational significant concerns regarding the comprehension of same.
philosophy ensures that the environment, equipment testing, For example, crews may be able to read a checklist and comply
training and regulations are controlled to achieve a modus with English proficiency requirements. However, testing should
operandi that virtually can’t go wrong. Humans are expected look deeper to ensure clear understanding of what a procedure
to operate into more challenging airfields in more challenging actually means.
conditions, and this is where the in-flight risk management and
decision-making comes into play. Regulators
Regulatory oversight tops the list of latent conditions leading
Many airlines offer strategies to their pilots for decision-making to accidents, closely followed by SMS. The ACTG believes that
in abnormal conditions and failure cases. They are sound risks and hazards can be identified in the systems of airlines by
concepts based on TEM models and they are demonstrated to the state and the airline taking an active part in the application
crews on a regular basis. One operator provides flight crew with of sound safety management principles in both the oversight of
an app to enter risk factors and identify points in the planned operators and the management of airlines. In other words, where
trip where risk is elevated, allowing them to plan ahead. As the this latent condition exists, the operation is set up to fail before
accident analyses show, making the right decision at the right it starts and the addition of a few catalyst contributory factors
time can be critical for the safe completion of the flight. results in an accident. It is no coincidence that the subsequent
investigation lacks objectivity and sometimes leads to criminal
Recommendations to operators: charges against the pilot. Regulators must recognize that they
•• Create and train a model for in-flight decision-making in have a role to influence the safety of every flight through their
normal daily operations, including alternate assessment of actions on every detail of the system that supports those flights.
weather, capacity, support and inbound delays, together with Notwithstanding the regulatory environment, operators must
a diversions strategy. recognize the benefits of a SMS and the enhancements to
safety and efficiency that an SMS will bring.
•• Train flight crews on dynamic risk assessment of likely
scenarios they will face; this can be built into real-time Line Accident Investigations
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) exercises. The ACTG continues to be concerned about the quality of
accident investigations around the world. There are examples
•• Provide full-time flight support to facilitate sound and safe of investigations that appear to invoke the protections of ICAO
operational decision-making. Annex 13, but none of the benefits. Examples include a lack
objectivity, transparency, collaboration and communication with
key stakeholder expertise, such as manufacturers. In some cases,
the final report is not circulated for comment prior to publication.
There are also instances when the report is not made public to
share the learnings for the benefit of the wider industry.

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 123
The Weakest Link Training is a repeated theme throughout this report. This year, the
Training humans is still the weakest link in aviation safety. ACTG divided contributing factors into primary and secondary.
Overreliance on automation continues to manifest itself in From one year of data, this shows the most common primary
serious industry incidents and will need further addressing by contributor is manual handling and the most common missing
regulatory agencies around the world. countermeasure is the performance of the flight crew, both as
a team and individuals. Both these factors indicate a clear need
More industry events are being coupled with known industry for more training and they may even point further back into the
concerns, such as the “startle effect”, failure to adapt to system at initial pilot selection. The most common undesired
automation being unavailable and not being given CBT instead aircraft states, from which the situation could be recovered and
of standardized “one-size-fits-all” training. More serious the accident prevented, were speed and vertical/lateral flight
industry events are being caused by pilots’ failure to perform an path deviations, unnecessary weather penetration as well as
accepted industry maneuver – the go-around – when dictated long, floated, bounced landings and unstable approaches.
by regulators, their airlines and accepted industry parameters. Again, all point at flight crew training to embed the ability to
A go-around must be viewed everywhere as a safety maneuver recognize a situation from which an escape can and must be
and never used to sanction pilots. made, as well as, of course, the capacity to conduct the required
maneuver safely.
Selection and Training
While manufacturers have either fitted or retrofitted revenue
aircraft with the latest safety devices to assist crews with
making proper and more timely decisions, those devices are
not always used to their full potential. This is directly due to
a lack of training to assist an airline’s crews with becoming
comfortable with the operation of these known and proven
safety devices.

SECTION 8 – REPORT FINDINGS AND IATA PREVENTION STRATEGIES IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 124
9
STEADES Analysis of Runway Safety
Accident End States - 2017 - Approach & Landing
2017 RUNWAY SAFETY STATISTICS
3.2%
3.2%
Runway Safety occurrences remained one of the top safety Runway / Taxiway
Excursion
risks to the aviation industry during 2017 and a continued focus 6.5%
of IATA’s Safety and Flight Operations (SFO) team. Runway Gear-up Landing /
Gear Collapse
Safety comprises several accident end states, including:
9.7% Tail Strike
41.9%
•• Runway and taxiway excursions Loss of Control - In-flight
9.7% Undershoot
•• Runway collision Hard Landing
In-flight Damage
•• Runway undershoot 12.9%
12.9% Off-Airport Landing /
Ditching
•• Hard landings

•• Tail strikes
Figure 1. Distribution of accident end states, 2017
Source: IATA Accident Database
•• Gear-up landing/Gear collapse
Safety data from IATA’s Global Aviation Data Management
Despite there being no associated fatalities in 2017, runway (GADM) Accident Database showed that the largest proportion
excursions were the most common accident end state and of all commercial aircraft accidents occurred during the
a continued area of concern for the industry. Runway Safety approach and landing phases of flight, accounting for 63% of
events occurred more frequently than Loss of Control – In- the total accidents recorded from 2013 to 2017.
flight (LOC-I) (see Figure 1) and, in 2017, continued to be
featured as one of IATA’s top safety issues. During 2017, Of the Runway Safety events included in IATA’s Accident
SFO continued to collaborate with external stakeholders on Database, runway and taxiway excursions continue to be the
several industry initiatives to drive towards reducing this key most common accident end state.
operational safety metric.
•• Runway excursions occur when an aircraft departs the end
or the side of a runway surface and can occur on either
takeoff or landing.

•• Runway excursion data excludes accidents where the

aircraft did not initially land on a runway surface and takeoff
excursions that did not start on a runway (e.g., inadvertent
takeoffs from taxiways).

SECTION 9 – STEADES ANALYSIS OF RUNWAY SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 125
Runway Safety Threat and Error Management The ACTG has also reviewed several accidents that were
A review of 2017 accidents recorded in IATA’s Accident classified as LOC-I, which evolve, in general, from several
Database and coded by the Accident Classification Technical factors. Among the most prevalent are:
Group (ACTG) revealed the top threats encountered by aircraft
involved in Runway Safety events. The most important were 1. Reluctance of aircrew to reassess or disable automated
environmental factors, specifically wind shear and gusty functions of the aircraft
conditions, which counted as a threat in 18% of the recorded
accidents. Second in importance were issues with the airport 2. Reluctance to assume manual control of the aircraft
markings and signage, optical illusions or visual misperception,
along with other factors; each of these contributed to 12% of 3. Weather-related phenomena and spatial disorientation
accidents (see Table 1).
THREATS % As evidenced by the accident threat and error statistics,
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 18% enhancing pilot manual handling skills and strict adherence to
Other 12% SOPs will play a major role in preventing future accidents.
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 12%
Optical illusion / visual misperception 12%
Gear/Tire 9% STEADES DATA ANALYSIS
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 9%
Maintenance events 6% In 2017, IATA’s GADM department completed an analysis on
Air Traffic Services 6% behalf of the Flight Safety Foundation and EUROCONTROL
Thunderstorms 6% to understand the 5-year trends of runway incursions and
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 6% excursions.
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 3%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 3% Runway Incursions
Aircraft 3% Classified as an undesired aircraft state, runway incursions
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 3% have the potential to lead to accident end states. The ACTG
Fatigue 3% has coded two accidents in the last five years that identified
Poor visibility / Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) 3%
runway incursions as an undesired aircraft state, which led to
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 3%
an accident, in both cases a runway collision. Both accidents
Operational Pressure 3%
occurred in Asia-Pacific (ASPAC), one in 2016 and the other
Traffic 3%
Lack of Visual Reference 3%
in 2017.

Table 1. Runway Safety Events, Top Threats, 2017 A review of the Safety Trend Evaluation, Analysis and Data
Source: IATA Accident Database Exchange System (STEADES) database produced a dataset
of over 6,500 reports and resulted in 1,971 classified runway
Table 2 lists the top errors that further contributed to 2017’s incursions from January 2012 to December 2016. 90% (1,781)
Runway Safety events. The ACTG found pilot manual handling of these reports contained information regarding the region
and incorrect flight control inputs were apparent in 30% of of occurrence, with North America (NAM) (41%) and Europe
cases. Unintentional noncompliance with standard operating (EUR) (35%) incurring the highest number of occurrences
procedures (SOPs) and/or cross-verification contributed to (Figure 2).
15% of accidents. Failure to go around following an unstable
approach was a contributing factor in 9% of events. UNDEFINED
NASIA
AFI
10% 2%
2%
ERRORS % CIS
Manual Handling / Flight Controls 30% 1%
Unintentional noncompliance 15% ASPAC
DEFINED 7%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 15% 90%
Callouts 15% NAM
Intentional noncompliance 12% 41%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 9%
EUR
Ground Navigation 6% 35%
Systems / Radios / Instruments 3%
Normal Checklis 3%
Briefings 3%
Air Traffic Control (ATC) 3% LATAM
MENA
Unknown 3% 5% 7%

Table 2. Runway Safety Events, Top Errors, 2017

Source: IATA Accident Database
Figure 2. Region of Occurrence
Source: STEADES Database

At the time the analysis was released, it was found that, on

average, there was one runway incursion event reported in the
STEADES database every day.

SECTION 9 – STEADES ANALYSIS OF RUNWAY SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 126
Runway Excursions
Runway excursions are an accident end state with a low fatality Hull Loss Substantial Damage
risk, but high frequency of occurrence. Due to their significance
as safety incidents and accidents, they continue to receive 12 11 11
attention. Figure 3 shows the number of accidents related to 9 9 9
10
runway excursions from January 2013 to December 2017.
8 7 7
6
6 4
4 3
20 18 17
16 2
13 0
15 12

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017
10

5
Figure 5. Runway Excursion Accidents by Severity
- Source: Accident Database
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Runway Safety Technologies and Systems
Runway Safety Technologies and Systems were introduced
in 2009, alerting pilots to potential runway incursions and
Figure 3. Frequency of Runway Excursions by Year excursions. The primary aim is to improve pilot situational
Source: Accident Database
awareness and, if necessary, provide active protection. These
From 2013 to 2017, the highest accident rate was found for systems are provided as standard on new production aircraft
operators in Africa (AFI), with 2.99 runway excursions per one and may be retrofitted to some approved older aircraft types
million sectors; and the lowest was found for NAM operators in service:
with 0.10 per million sectors. It is worth noting that EUR, NAM
and North Asia (NASIA) outperformed the global runway/ •• Runway Overrun Protection Systems (ROPS)
taxiway excursion accident rate of 0.39 (Figure 4).
•• Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS)

2.99 •• Runway Status Lights (RWSL)

These technologies are not without their own challenges

and the STEADES database holds several reports outlining
occurrences involving these protection systems. A study
1.02 completed in 2016 found that 82% of the reports contained
0.71 information regarding the perceived accuracy of the warnings
0.59 0.44 (Figure 6).
0.19 0.10 0.17

Figure 4. Runway Excursion Rates by IATA Region of Operator,

2013-2017. Source: Accident Database

Of the total number of runway excursions during the five-year

period (76), 27 runway excursions resulted in hull loss, while 49
sustained substantial damage (Figure 5). One runway excursion
resulted in a total of eight fatalities.

Figure 6. Runway Safety Nets – Warning Accuracy

Source: STEADES Database

SECTION 9 – STEADES ANALYSIS OF RUNWAY SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 127
Further analysis found 72% of the report summaries provided The Way Forward
information on the countermeasures undertaken by the pilots, In the highly automated world of today’s aviation, ensuring
for both correct and perceived false warnings. With go-arounds pilots retain their manual handling skills remains a challenge.
performed in 35% of correct warning reports, 19 of these were Findings from different resources and research studies theorize
due to unstable approach (Figure 7). the reasons for the degradation of pilots’ manual handling skills
may be due to:

•• Pilots’ reliance on automation

False
96% 4% •• Lack of knowledge and skills for manual flight operations
Warning

•• Lack of opportunity to practice manual flying

•• Inadequate pilot and flight deck monitoring

Correct
35% 65%
Warning
•• Auto-flight mode confusion errors

0 50 100 150 200

•• Fatigue

Go-around Ignore warning Rejected Takeoff •• Operators’ policies encouraging the use of automation

•• Nonadherence to SOPs
Figure 7. Runway Safety Nets – Countermeasures
Source: STEADES Database Enhancing manual handling skills and improving adherence to
SOPs will play the biggest role in preventing accidents. IATA,
15% (53) of report summaries had information regarding the together with the support of Safety Group members and the
errors that led up to the warning. Most reports listed incorrect Pilot Training Task Force, will be conducting a survey into
aircraft configuration and incorrect pilot manual handling as attitudes and airline processes to address the maintenance of
the main two contributing factors (Figure 8). manual handing flying skills and the effectiveness of Evidence-
based Training. This study will form part of a wider piece of
work to address this accident contributory factor.

In December 2017, IATA published the third edition of the

IATA/CANSO/IFALPA/IFATCA Unstable Approaches – Risk
Mitigation Policies, Procedures and Best Practices. Written
in collaboration with key industry stakeholders to address the
challenges surrounding unstable approaches, the publication
emphasizes the importance of pilots, air traffic controllers
and airport staff working together, along with regulators,
training organizations and industry associations, to strengthen
measures and procedures to reduce unstable approaches.

The Second ICAO Global Runway Safety Symposium was held

in Peru in November 2017, and served as a medium to review
and agree on the way forward for addressing runway safety
as a priority for the global aviation community. Additionally, the
Figure 8. Runway Safety Nets – Errors Leading to the Warning aim of this symposium was to improve runway safety worldwide
Source: STEADES Database. through global collaboration and an exchange of strategies and
best practices.

One of the important outcomes of this symposium was the

publication of the collaborative ICAO Global Runway Safety
Action Plan, which was agreed upon by the Global Runway
Safety Partners. This plan provides recommended actions
for all runway safety stakeholders, including airports, aircraft
manufactures, operators, states, and air navigation service
providers, to apply runway safety enhancement and risk
reduction measures, with an overall goal of reducing the global
runway safety accident rate.

In addition to enhancing pilot manual handling skills, the

implementation of advanced safety technologies has enabled all
stakeholders, including aircraft operators, air navigation service
providers and airport operators to improve runway safety.

SECTION 9 – STEADES ANALYSIS OF RUNWAY SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 128
10
GSIE Harmonized Accident Rate
In the spirit of promoting aviation safety, the Department of operations worldwide. The joint analysis includes accidents
Transportation of the United States, the Commission of the meeting the ICAO Annex 13 criteria for all typical commercial
European Union, the International Air Transport Association airline operations for scheduled and nonscheduled flights.
(IATA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a Global Starting in 2013, ICAO and IATA have increasingly harmonized
Safety Information Exchange (GSIE) on 28 September 2010 the accident analysis process and have developed a common
during the 37th Session of the ICAO Assembly. The objective list of accident categories to facilitate the sharing and integration
of the GSIE is to identify information that can be exchanged of safety data between the two organizations.
between the parties to enhance risk reduction activities in the
area of aviation safety. At the time of publication of this report, ICAO data was not
available. Therefore, the analysis of the harmonized accident
The GSIE developed a harmonized accident rate beginning rate will be published later in an addendum.
in 2011. This was accomplished through close cooperation
between ICAO and IATA to align accident definitions, criteria and The tables on the following pages show full details of the GSIE
analysis methods used to calculate the harmonized rate, which harmonized categories.
is considered a key safety indicator for commercial aviation

Image courtesy of ATR

SECTION 10 – GSIE HARMONIZED ACCIDENT RATE IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 129
GSIE HARMONIZED ACCIDENT CATEGORIES

Category Description

Controlled Flight into Terrain Includes all instances where the aircraft was flown into terrain in a controlled manner, regardless
(CFIT) of the crew’s situational awareness. Does not include undershoots, overshoots or collisions with
obstacles on takeoff and landing, which are included in Runway Safety.

Loss of Control – In-flight Loss of control in-flight that is not recoverable.

(LOC-I)

Runway Safety (RS) Includes runway excursions and incursions, undershoot/overshoot, tail strike and hard landing
events.

Ground Safety (GS) Includes ramp safety, ground collisions as well as all ground servicing, preflight, engine start/
departure and arrival events. Taxi and towing events are also included.

Operational Damage (OD) Damage sustained by the aircraft while operating under its own power. This includes in-flight
damage, foreign object debris (FOD) and all system or component failures.

Injuries to and/or Incapacitation All injuries or incapacitations sustained by anyone coming into direct contact with any part of
of Persons (MED) the aircraft structure. Includes turbulence-related injuries, injuries to ground staff coming into
contact with the structure, engines or control surfaces of the aircraft and on-board injuries or
incapacitations and fatalities not related to unlawful external interference.

Other (OTH) Any event that does not fit into the categories listed above.

Unknown (UNK) Any event where the exact cause cannot be reasonably determined through information or
inference, or when there are insufficient facts to make a conclusive decision regarding classification.

Category CICTT* Occurrence Categories IATA Classification End States

Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) CFIT, CTOL CFIT

Loss of Control – In-flight (LOC-I) LOC-I LOC-I

Runway Safety (RS) RE, RI, ARC, USOS Runway Excursion, Runway Collision,
Tailstrike, Hard Landing, Undershoot,
Gear-up Landing / Gear Collapse

Ground Safety (GS) G-COL, RAMP, LOC-G Ground Damage

Operational Damage (OD) SCF-NP, SCF-PP In-flight Damage

Injuries to and/or Incapacitation of CABIN, MED, TURB None (excluded from IATA Safety Report)
Persons (MED)

Other (OTH) All other CICTT Occurrence Categories All other IATA End States

Unknown (UNK) UNK Insufficient Data

* CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team

SECTION 10 – GSIE HARMONIZED ACCIDENT RATE IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 130
Addendum A
Primary Contributing Factors – Section 4

2017 Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

— —

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Air Traffic Services 11%

Aircraft 11%
Aircraft Malfunction - Other 11%
Brakes 11%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - Poor braking action 11%
Environmental - Other 11%
Primary Flight Controls 11%
Traffic 11%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 11%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 64%

Ground Navigation 9%
Failure to Go Around (GOA) 9%
SOP adherence/Cross-verification – Intentional 9%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 9%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 131
2017 Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 33%

Unnecessary Weather Penetration 22%
Long/floated/bounced Landing 22%
Unstable Approach 11%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach. 11%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 25%

Captain Should Show Leadership 25%
In-flight decision-making/Contingency management 25%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 25%

Note: The primary contributing factor frequency calculation is based on the total number of primary contributing factors per each category identified.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 132
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

2013-2017 Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 33%
Safety Management 27%
Flight Operations 18%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 12%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 12%
Selection Systems 8%
Design 8%
Maintenance Operations 7%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 7%
Management Decisions 6%
Technology & Equipment 4%
Change Management 3%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 2%
Dispatch 2%
Ground Operations 2%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 2%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 1%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 1%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 34%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 27%
Callouts 8%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 8%
Automation 4%
Abnormal Checklist 3%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 2%
Crew to External Communication 2%
Normal Checklist 1%
Air Traffic Control 1%
Briefings 1%
Ground Crew 1%
Ground Navigation 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 133
2013-2017 Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 29%
Aircraft Malfunction 29%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 16%
Gear/Tire 15%
Airport Facilities 13%
Maintenance Events 12%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 11%
Lack of Visual Reference 10%
Nav Aids 9%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 9%
Thunderstorms 8%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 7%
Air Traffic Services 6%
Operational Pressure 6%
Fatigue 5%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Ground Events 5%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 5%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 4%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 4%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 3%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 3%
Terrain/Obstacles 2%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 2%
Dispatch/Paperwork 2%
Icing Conditions 1%
Traffic 1%
Brakes 1%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 1%
Hydraulic System Failure 1%
Secondary Flight Controls 1%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 1%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 1%
Flight Controls 1%
Crew Incapacitation 1%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 134
2013-2017 Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 24%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 19%
Unstable Approach 13%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 11%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 8%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 8%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 7%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 5%
Engine 4%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%
Flight Controls/Automation 3%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 3%
Ramp Movements 2%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 1%
Weight & Balance 1%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 21%

Monitor/Cross-check 17%
Leadership 8%
Captain Should Show Leadership 6%
Taxiway/Runway Management 5%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 5%
Automation Management 4%
Workload Management 4%
Communication Environment 3%
Evaluation of Plans 2%
Inquiry 1%

Note: 61 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 135
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

2013-2017 Fatal Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 40%
Flight Operations 37%
Safety Management 37%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 27%
Selection Systems 23%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 20%
Management Decisions 17%
Technology & Equipment 17%
Dispatch 7%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 7%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 7%
Design 3%
Change Management 3%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 50%
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 27%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 27%
Callouts 20%
Abnormal Checklist 13%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 10%
Automation 7%
Air Traffic Control 3%
Briefings 3%
Dispatch 3%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 3%
Crew to External Communication 3%
Documentation 3%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 136
2013-2017 Fatal Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 40%
Aircraft Malfunction 33%
Lack of Visual Reference 30%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 23%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 23%
Nav Aids 23%
Fatigue 20%
Thunderstorms 20%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 17%
Operational Pressure 17%
Air Traffic Services 13%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 10%
Dispatch/Paperwork 7%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 7%
Terrain/Obstacles 7%
Maintenance Events 7%
Icing Conditions 3%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 3%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 3%
Structural Failure 3%
Gear/Tire 3%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 137
2013-2017 Fatal Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 33%

Unnecessary Weather Penetration 30%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 20%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 17%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 10%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 10%
Engine 10%
Unstable Approach 10%
Flight Controls/Automation 7%
Weight & Balance 3%
Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 3%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Monitor/Cross-check 33%
Leadership 33%
Overall Crew Performance 33%
Captain Should Show Leadership 27%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 20%
Communication Environment 17%
Workload Management 10%
Automation Management 10%
Evaluation of Plans 7%
Inquiry 3%
Plans Stated 3%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 138
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

2013-2017 Nonfatal Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 32%
Safety Management 25%
Flight Operations 16%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 10%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 10%
Maintenance Operations 8%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 8%
Design 8%
Selection Systems 6%
Management Decisions 5%
Technology & Equipment 3%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 2%
Change Management 2%
Ground Operations 2%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 1%
Dispatch 1%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 1%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 1%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 35%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 24%
Callouts 7%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 5%
Automation 3%
Abnormal Checklist 2%
Normal Checklist 2%
Crew to External Communication 2%
Ground Navigation 1%
Ground Crew 1%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 1%
Air Traffic Control 1%
Briefings 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 139
2013-2017 Nonfatal Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 28%

Meteorology 28%
Gear/Tire 17%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 17%
Airport Facilities 15%
Maintenance Events 13%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 10%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 8%
Lack of Visual Reference 8%
Nav Aids 7%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 7%
Thunderstorms 7%
Ground Events 6%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 6%
Air Traffic Services 6%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 5%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 5%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 4%
Operational Pressure 4%
Fatigue 3%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 3%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 2%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 2%
Traffic 2%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 2%
Brakes 2%
Terrain/Obstacles 2%
Dispatch/Paperwork 1%
Hydraulic System Failure 1%
Icing Conditions 1%
Crew Incapacitation 1%
Flight Controls 1%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 1%
Secondary Flight Controls 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 140
2013-2017 Nonfatal Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 26%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 18%
Unstable Approach 13%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 11%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 7%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 6%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 5%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 5%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%
Engine 3%
Ramp Movements 2%
Flight Controls/Automation 2%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 1%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 1%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 19%

Monitor/Cross-check 14%
Taxiway/Runway Management 6%
Leadership 5%
Captain Should Show Leadership 4%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 3%
Automation Management 3%
Workload Management 3%
Communication Environment 2%
Evaluation of Plans 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 141
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

2013-2017 IOSA Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 24%
Safety Management 19%
Flight Operations 16%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 12%
Design 10%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 10%
Maintenance Operations 9%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 9%
Selection Systems 6%
Management Decisions 5%
Technology & Equipment 5%
Change Management 4%
Ground Operations 2%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 2%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 2%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 1%
Cabin Operations 1%
Cabin Ops: SOPs & Checking 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 30%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 24%
Callouts 11%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 10%
Automation 6%
Abnormal Checklist 4%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 3%
Ground Navigation 1%
Crew to External Communication 1%
Ground Crew 1%
Normal Checklist 1%
Air Traffic Control 1%
Briefings 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 142
2013-2017 IOSA Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 28%

Meteorology 28%
Gear/Tire 19%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 17%
Maintenance Events 16%
Airport Facilities 11%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 11%
Air Traffic Services 10%
Ground Events 8%
Nav Aids 7%
Lack of Visual Reference 7%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 7%
Thunderstorms 7%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 6%
Fatigue 6%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 6%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Operational Pressure 5%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 5%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 4%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 2%
Traffic 2%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 2%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 1%
Dispatch/Paperwork 1%
Terrain/Obstacles 1%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 1%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 1%
Brakes 1%
Dangerous Goods 1%
Secondary Flight Controls 1%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 1%
Hydraulic System Failure 1%
Icing Conditions 1%
Flight Controls 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 143
2013-2017 IOSA Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 20%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 18%
Unstable Approach 12%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 9%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 9%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 6%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 6%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 4%
Engine 4%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%
Ramp Movements 4%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 3%
Flight Controls/Automation 3%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 1%
Proceeding toward wrong taxiway/runway 1%
Weight & Balance 1%
Wrong taxiway/ramp/gate/hold spot 1%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 19%

Monitor/Cross-check 17%
Leadership 10%
Captain Should Show Leadership 8%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 6%
Automation Management 6%
Communication Environment 6%
Workload Management 5%
Taxiway/Runway Management 4%

Note: 11 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation
of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 144
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

2013-2017 Non-IOSA Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 42%
Safety Management 33%
Flight Operations 20%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 13%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 11%
Selection Systems 10%
Management Decisions 8%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 6%
Design 5%
Maintenance Operations 5%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%
Dispatch 4%
Technology & Equipment 4%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 2%
Change Management 1%
Ground Operations 1%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 1%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 1%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 37%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 30%
Callouts 6%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 5%
Abnormal Checklist 2%
Crew to External Communication 2%
Air Traffic Control 1%
Automation 1%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 1%
Briefings 1%
Normal Checklist 1%
Ground Navigation 1%
Ground Crew 1%
Documentation 1%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 1%
Dispatch 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 145
2013-2017 Non-IOSA Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 30%
Aircraft Malfunction 29%
Airport Facilities 16%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 15%
Lack of Visual Reference 13%
Gear/Tire 12%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 11%
Nav Aids 11%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 11%
Thunderstorms 9%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 8%
Maintenance Events 8%
Operational Pressure 6%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 5%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 5%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 4%
Fatigue 4%
Terrain/Obstacles 3%
Air Traffic Services 3%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 3%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 3%
Icing Conditions 2%
Dispatch/Paperwork 2%
Ground Events 2%
Brakes 2%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 2%
Crew Incapacitation 1%
Hydraulic System Failure 1%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 1%
Traffic 1%
Flight Controls 1%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 1%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 1%
Secondary Flight Controls 1%
Primary Flight Controls 1%
Structural Failure 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 146
2013-2017 Non-IOSA Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 27%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 20%
Unstable Approach 14%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 13%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 10%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 9%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 6%
Engine 4%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 4%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%
Flight Controls/Automation 2%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 2%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 1%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%
Weight & Balance 1%
Ramp Movements 1%
Unauthorized Airspace Penetration 1%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 22%

Monitor/Cross-check 16%
Taxiway/Runway Management 6%
Leadership 6%
Captain Should Show Leadership 5%
Evaluation of Plans 4%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 4%
Workload Management 2%
Automation Management 2%
Inquiry 1%
Plans Stated 1%
Communication Environment 1%
SOP Briefing/Planning 1%

Note: 50 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 147
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Controlled Flight into Terrain

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 78%

Technology & Equipment 56%
Safety Management 44%
Flight Operations 44%
Selection Systems 33%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 33%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 22%
Management Decisions 22%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Nav Aids 56%

Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 56%
Meteorology 56%
Lack of Visual Reference 56%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 44%
Fatigue 33%
Air Traffic Services 22%
Thunderstorms 22%
Operational Pressure 22%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 11%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 11%
Airport Facilities 11%
Terrain/Obstacles 11%
Dispatch/Paperwork 11%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 11%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 11%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 11%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 148
Controlled Flight into Terrain

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 67%

Callouts 22%
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 11%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 56%

Unnecessary Weather Penetration 44%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 22%
Unstable Approach 22%
Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 11%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Monitor/Cross-check 56%
Overall Crew Performance 33%
Leadership 22%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 22%
Automation Management 11%
Captain Should Show Leadership 11%

Note: four accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 149
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Loss of Control – In-flight

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Flight Operations 30%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 22%
Safety Management 22%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 17%
Selection Systems 17%
Regulatory Oversight 17%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 9%
Management Decisions 9%
Dispatch 4%
Change Management 4%
Design 4%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution
Aircraft Malfunction 39%
Meteorology 30%
Lack of Visual Reference 22%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 22%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 17%
Nav Aids 13%
Operational Pressure 13%
Fatigue 13%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 13%
Thunderstorms 9%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 9%
Air Traffic Services 9%
Maintenance Events 9%
Gear/Tire 4%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 4%
Terrain/Obstacles 4%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 4%
Icing Conditions 4%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 150
Loss of Control – In-flight

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 39%

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 35%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 30%
Callouts 22%
Abnormal Checklist 22%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 13%
Automation 13%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 26%

Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 22%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 17%
Engine 13%
Flight Controls/Automation 13%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 13%
Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 4%
Weight & Balance 4%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 4%
Unstable Approach 4%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 35%

Leadership 30%
Captain Should Show Leadership 26%
Monitor/Cross-check 26%
Communication Environment 17%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 13%
Automation Management 9%
Workload Management 9%

Note: six accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 151
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Mid-air Collision

At least three accidents are required before the accident classification is provided.
This category only contained one accident in the past five years.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 152
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Runway/Taxiway Excursion

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 45%

Safety Management 42%
Flight Operations 22%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 18%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 17%
Selection Systems 8%
Change Management 5%
Management Decisions 3%
Design 3%
Technology & Equipment 2%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 2%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 2%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 38%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 32%
Callouts 12%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 7%
Automation 5%
Normal Checklist 2%
Ground Navigation 2%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 153
Runway/Taxiway Excursion

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 45%
Airport Facilities 32%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 25%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 25%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 15%
Lack of Visual Reference 13%
Aircraft Malfunction 13%
Thunderstorms 12%
Nav Aids 10%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 10%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 8%
Fatigue 8%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 7%
Air Traffic Services 7%
Terrain/Obstacles 3%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 3%
Operational Pressure 3%
Brakes 2%
Primary Flight Controls 2%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 2%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 2%
Icing Conditions 2%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 2%
Maintenance Events 2%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 2%
Flight Controls 2%
Crew Incapacitation 2%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 154
Runway/Taxiway Excursion

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 43%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 18%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 13%
Unstable Approach 12%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 10%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 8%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 8%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 7%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 7%
Engine 5%
Flight Controls/Automation 2%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 28%

Monitor/Cross-check 20%
Taxiway/Runway Management 18%
Leadership 8%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 7%
Captain Should Show Leadership 7%
Automation Management 3%
SOP Briefing/Planning 2%
Workload Management 2%
Evaluation of Plans 2%

Note: 16 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 155
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

In-flight Damage

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Design 15%
Safety Management 6%
Maintenance Operations 6%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 6%
Regulatory Oversight 6%
Management Decisions 3%
Flight Operations 3%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 3%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 32%

Maintenance Events 15%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 12%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 12%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 9%
Airport Facilities 6%
Thunderstorms 6%
Meteorology 6%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 3%
Gear/Tire 3%
Ground Events 3%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 3%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 3%
Brakes 3%
Dangerous Goods 3%
Dispatch/Paperwork 3%
Structural Failure 3%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 156
In-flight Damage

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 15%

Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 3%
Callouts 3%
Automation 3%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 6%

Unnecessary Weather Penetration 6%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 3%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Captain Should Show Leadership 3%

Leadership 3%
Evaluation of Plans 3%
Communication Environment 3%
Automation Management 3%

Note: two accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 157
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Ground Damage

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 21%

Safety Management 14%
Ground Operations 11%
Design 7%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 7%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 7%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 4%
Maintenance Operations 4%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Ground Events 21%

Aircraft Malfunction 18%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 11%
Maintenance Events 11%
Traffic 7%
Brakes 7%
Hydraulic System Failure 7%
Operational Pressure 4%
Air Traffic Services 4%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 4%
Airport Facilities 4%
Secondary Flight Controls 4%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 4%
Gear/Tire 4%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 158
Ground Damage

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 11%

Crew to External Communication 7%
Abnormal Checklist 7%
Ground Crew 7%
Normal Checklist 4%
Air Traffic Control 4%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 4%
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 4%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 11%

Ramp Movements 11%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 7%
Proceeding toward wrong taxiway/runway 4%
Engine 4%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 14%

Monitor/Cross-check 14%
Taxiway/Runway Management 7%
Workload Management 4%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 4%
Leadership 4%

Note: four accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 159
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Undershoot

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 55%

Safety Management 45%
Flight Operations 27%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 18%
Management Decisions 18%
Technology & Equipment 9%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 9%
Change Management 9%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 64%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 36%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 36%
Nav Aids 36%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 36%
Airport Facilities 27%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 27%
Lack of Visual Reference 18%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 18%
Icing Conditions 9%
Thunderstorms 9%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 9%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 160
Undershoot

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 45%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 45%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 18%
Callouts 9%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 64%

Unnecessary Weather Penetration 27%
Unstable Approach 18%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 9%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 9%
Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 9%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 36%

Monitor/Cross-check 18%
Leadership 18%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 9%
Captain Should Show Leadership 9%

Note: two accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 161
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Hard Landing

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 21%
Flight Operations 21%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 19%
Safety Management 14%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 12%
Selection Systems 12%
Management Decisions 5%
Technology & Equipment 2%
Dispatch 2%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 2%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution
Meteorology 40%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 30%
Lack of Visual Reference 9%
Thunderstorms 9%
Operational Pressure 7%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 7%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 7%
Airport Facilities 5%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 5%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 5%
Nav Aids 5%
Dispatch/Paperwork 2%
Fatigue 2%
Aircraft Malfunction 2%
Gear/Tire 2%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 162
Hard Landing

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 70%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 28%
Callouts 7%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 2%
Automation 2%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 51%

Unstable Approach 33%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 26%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 21%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 21%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 7%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 5%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 5%
Engine 2%
Flight Controls/Automation 2%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 30%

Monitor/Cross-check 16%
Automation Management 2%
Workload Management 2%
Leadership 2%
Taxiway/Runway Management 2%
Evaluation of Plans 2%
Captain Should Show Leadership 2%

Note: one accident was not classified due to insufficient data; this accidents was subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 163
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 28%

Maintenance Operations 28%
Design 19%
Regulatory Oversight 14%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 9%
Safety Management 9%
Management Decisions 5%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 2%
Cabin Ops: SOPs & Checking 2%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 2%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 2%
Cabin Operations 2%
Flight Operations 2%
Dispatch 2%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 77%

Gear/Tire 77%
Maintenance Events 40%
Operational Pressure 2%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 2%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 2%
Hydraulic System Failure 2%
Nav Aids 2%
Airport Facilities 2%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 164
Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 2%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 2%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 2%
Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 2%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

— —

Note: 10 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 165
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Tailstrike

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Flight Operations 16%

Flight Ops: Training Systems 16%
Regulatory Oversight 11%
Change Management 11%
Safety Management 5%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 16%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 11%
Lack of Visual Reference 5%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 5%
Fatigue 5%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 5%
Nav Aids 5%
Terrain/Obstacles 5%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 47%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 26%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 16%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 5%
Callouts 5%
Normal Checklist 5%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 166
Tailstrike

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 26%

Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 16%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 11%
Unstable Approach 11%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 11%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 5%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 5%
Weight & Balance 5%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 21%

Monitor/Cross-check 16%
Communication Environment 11%
Automation Management 11%
Captain Should Show Leadership 5%
Leadership 5%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 5%
Workload Management 5%

Note: one accident was not classified due to insufficient data; this accident was subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 167
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Off-Airport Landing/Ditching

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Selection Systems 100%

Regulatory Oversight 100%
Flight Operations 100%
Dispatch 100%
Management Decisions 100%
Safety Management 100%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

— —

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

— —

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

— —

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

— —

Note: one accident was not classified due to insufficient data; this accident was subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 168
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Runway Collision

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 58%

Safety Management 33%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 8%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 8%
Management Decisions 8%
Maintenance Operations 8%
Flight Operations 8%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 42%

Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 33%
Airport Facilities 33%
Air Traffic Services 25%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 25%
Meteorology 25%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 17%
Lack of Visual Reference 17%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 8%
Icing Conditions 8%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 8%
Terrain/Obstacles 8%
Traffic 8%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 169
Runway Collision

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 8%

Briefings 8%
Ground Navigation 8%
Callouts 8%
Crew to External Communication 8%
Air Traffic Control 8%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Runway/Taxiway Incursion 17%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 8%
Ramp Movements 8%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 8%

Inquiry 8%
Monitor/Cross-check 8%

Note: all of the accidents were classified.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 170
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Jet Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 29%
Safety Management 25%
Flight Operations 16%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 12%
Design 10%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 9%
Selection Systems 8%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 8%
Maintenance Operations 8%
Technology & Equipment 5%
Management Decisions 5%
Change Management 3%
Ground Operations 3%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 2%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 2%
Dispatch 2%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 2%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 1%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 1%
Cabin Operations 1%
Cabin Ops: SOPs & Checking 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 35%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 29%
Callouts 10%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 8%
Automation 5%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 2%
Abnormal Checklist 2%
Normal Checklist 2%
Crew to External Communication 2%
Briefings 1%
Air Traffic Control 1%
Ground Crew 1%
Ground Navigation 1%
Documentation 1%
Dispatch 1%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 171
Jet Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 30%
Aircraft Malfunction 22%
Maintenance Events 16%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 16%
Airport Facilities 15%
Gear/Tire 13%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 10%
Lack of Visual Reference 10%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 10%
Thunderstorms 9%
Air Traffic Services 8%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 8%
Nav Aids 8%
Fatigue 7%
Ground Events 7%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 6%
Operational Pressure 5%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 5%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 4%
Terrain/Obstacles 2%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 2%
Traffic 2%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 2%
Dispatch/Paperwork 2%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 2%
Secondary Flight Controls 1%
Brakes 1%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 1%
Hydraulic System Failure 1%
Flight Controls 1%
Icing Conditions 1%
Crew Incapacitation 1%
Dangerous Goods 1%
Primary Flight Controls 1%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 1%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 1%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 172
Jet Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 26%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 20%
Unstable Approach 13%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 11%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 7%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 7%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 6%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%
Engine 3%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 3%
Ramp Movements 3%
Flight Controls/Automation 3%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 2%
Weight & Balance 1%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 1%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%
Unauthorized Airspace Penetration 1%
Wrong taxiway/ramp/gate/hold spot 1%
Proceeding toward wrong taxiway/runway 1%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 20%

Monitor/Cross-check 17%
Leadership 8%
Taxiway/Runway Management 7%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 6%
Captain Should Show Leadership 6%
Automation Management 5%
Workload Management 4%
Communication Environment 3%
Evaluation of Plans 1%
Inquiry 1%
Plans Stated 1%
SOP Briefing/Planning 1%

Note: 20 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 173
Addendum A
Top Contributing Factors – Section 4

Turboprop Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 40%
Safety Management 29%
Flight Operations 21%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 16%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 11%
Management Decisions 10%
Selection Systems 9%
Maintenance Operations 6%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 6%
Technology & Equipment 4%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 4%
Design 3%
Dispatch 2%
Change Management 1%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 1%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 32%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 25%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 7%
Callouts 5%
Abnormal Checklist 4%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 2%
Crew to External Communication 2%
Automation 2%
Air Traffic Control 1%
Briefings 1%
Ground Navigation 1%
Ground Crew 1%
Normal Checklist 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 174
Turboprop Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 39%

Meteorology 28%
Gear/Tire 19%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 17%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 13%
Nav Aids 11%
Airport Facilities 11%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 11%
Lack of Visual Reference 10%
Thunderstorms 7%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 7%
Operational Pressure 7%
Maintenance Events 6%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 5%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 4%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 3%
Air Traffic Services 3%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 3%
Brakes 2%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 2%
Ground Events 2%
Icing Conditions 2%
Fatigue 2%
Dispatch/Paperwork 2%
Terrain/Obstacles 2%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 2%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 1%
Structural Failure 1%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 1%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 1%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 1%
Hydraulic System Failure 1%

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 175
Turboprop Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 19%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 19%
Unstable Approach 12%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 11%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 11%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 8%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 8%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 7%
Engine 6%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 4%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 2%
Flight Controls/Automation 2%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 1%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%
Ramp Movements 1%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 22%

Monitor/Cross-check 16%
Leadership 8%
Captain Should Show Leadership 6%
Workload Management 3%
Communication Environment 3%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 3%
Evaluation of Plans 3%
Automation Management 2%
Taxiway/Runway Management 1%
Inquiry 1%

Note: 40 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM A – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 176
Addendum B
2017 Primary Contributing Factors

Accident Primary Contributing Factors Distribution

THREATS
12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
Manual Ground Failure to GOA Intentional Failure to GOA
Handling / Navigation after
Flight Controls destabilization
on approach

ADDENDUM B – 2017 PRIMARY & SECONDARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 177
Accident Primary Contributing Factors Distribution

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

COUNTERMEASURES
30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
Overall Crew Captain should In-flight decision- First Officer is
Performance show leadership making/contingency assertive when
management necessary

LATENT CONDITIONS

No Latent Conditions in
Primary Contributing Factors Distribution

ADDENDUM B – 2017 PRIMARY & SECONDARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 178
Addendum B
2017 Secondary Contributing Factors

Accident Secondary Contributing Factors Distribution

THREATS

12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

20%
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%

ADDENDUM B – 2017 PRIMARY & SECONDARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 179
Accident Secondary Contributing Factors Distribution

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

COUNTERMEASURES

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

ADDENDUM B – 2017 PRIMARY & SECONDARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 180
Accident Secondary Contributing Factors Distribution

LATENT CONDITIONS

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

ADDENDUM B – 2017 PRIMARY & SECONDARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 181
Addendum C
Top Contributing Factors – Section 5

Africa Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 57%

Safety Management 48%
Management Decisions 14%
Technology & Equipment 10%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 10%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 10%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 5%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 5%
Maintenance Operations 5%
Flight Operations 5%
Selection Systems 5%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 19%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 14%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 10%
Callouts 5%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 5%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 182
Africa Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 29%

Gear/Tire 24%
Maintenance Events 19%
Airport Facilities 19%
Nav Aids 14%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 14%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 14%
Meteorology 14%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 14%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 10%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 10%
Ground Events 10%
Crew Incapacitation 5%
Lack of Visual Reference 5%
Hydraulic System Failure 5%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 5%
Secondary Flight Controls 5%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 5%
Thunderstorms 5%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 5%
Operational Pressure 5%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 183
Africa Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 29%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 24%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 10%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 5%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 5%
Unauthorized Airspace Penetration 5%
Engine 5%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 5%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 5%
Flight Controls/Automation 5%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 5%
Unstable Approach 5%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Captain Should Show Leadership 14%

Leadership 10%
Overall Crew Performance 10%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 5%
Monitor/Cross-check 5%

Note: 19 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 184
Addendum C
Top Contributing Factors – Section 5

Asia/Pacific Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 58%

Safety Management 40%
Flight Operations 22%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 18%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 11%
Selection Systems 10%
Maintenance Operations 6%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 6%
Management Decisions 4%
Design 4%
Change Management 3%
Technology & Equipment 3%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 1%
Ground Operations 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 43%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 38%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 13%
Callouts 10%
Abnormal Checklist 4%
Crew to External Communication 4%
Air Traffic Control 3%
Ground Crew 3%
Automation 3%
Ground Navigation 3%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 1%
Briefings 1%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 185
Asia/Pacific Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 25%
Airport Facilities 18%
Nav Aids 17%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 17%
Aircraft Malfunction 17%
Lack of Visual Reference 13%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 10%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 10%
Thunderstorms 8%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 8%
Maintenance Events 8%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 7%
Fatigue 6%
Air Traffic Services 6%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 6%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 6%
Gear/Tire 6%
Ground Events 6%
Operational Pressure 4%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 4%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 4%
Terrain/Obstacles 3%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 3%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 3%
Dangerous Goods 1%
Crew Incapacitation 1%
Traffic 1%
Brakes 1%
Hydraulic System Failure 1%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 1%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 186
Asia/Pacific Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 29%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 24%
Unstable Approach 22%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 18%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 7%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 6%
Ramp Movements 6%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 4%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 3%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 3%
Flight Controls/Automation 3%
Engine 3%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 3%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 3%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 25%

Monitor/Cross-check 19%
Leadership 11%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 7%
Taxiway/Runway Management 6%
Captain Should Show Leadership 6%
Communication Environment 4%
Automation Management 4%
Workload Management 3%
Inquiry 1%

Note: eight accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcu-
lation of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 187
Addendum C
Top Contributing Factors – Section 5

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 32%

Safety Management 27%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 14%
Flight Operations 14%
Selection Systems 9%
Maintenance Operations 5%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 36%

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 36%
Callouts 5%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 5%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 27%

Unnecessary Weather Penetration 27%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 23%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 5%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 5%
Unstable Approach 5%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 188
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 55%
Aircraft Malfunction 36%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 36%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 23%
Lack of Visual Reference 18%
Airport Facilities 18%
Thunderstorms 18%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 14%
Nav Aids 9%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 9%
Air Traffic Services 9%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 9%
Gear/Tire 9%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 9%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 9%
Operational Pressure 9%
Maintenance Events 9%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 5%
Terrain/Obstacles 5%
Dispatch/Paperwork 5%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 5%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 14%

Taxiway/Runway Management 9%
Evaluation of Plans 5%
Captain Should Show Leadership 5%
Automation Management 5%
Leadership 5%

Note: four accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 189
Addendum C
Top Contributing Factors – Section 5

Europe Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Flight Operations 18%

Flight Ops: Training Systems 16%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 11%
Regulatory Oversight 11%
Safety Management 11%
Design 9%
Selection Systems 7%
Ground Operations 5%
Technology & Equipment 5%
Change Management 5%
Maintenance Operations 4%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 4%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 2%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 2%
Dispatch 2%
Management Decisions 2%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 40%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 28%
Callouts 11%
Automation 5%
Abnormal Checklist 4%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 2%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 2%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 190
Europe Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 32%
Aircraft Malfunction 25%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 23%
Gear/Tire 16%
Fatigue 9%
Airport Facilities 9%
Thunderstorms 9%
Ground Events 9%
Air Traffic Services 9%
Operational Pressure 7%
Lack of Visual Reference 7%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 5%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 5%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 4%
Maintenance Events 4%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 4%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 2%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 2%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 2%
Icing Conditions 2%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 2%
Brakes 2%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 2%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 2%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 2%
Traffic 2%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 2%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 191
Europe Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 28%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 19%
Unstable Approach 18%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 16%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 9%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 9%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 9%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 7%
Engine 4%
Proceeding toward wrong taxiway/runway 2%
Ramp Movements 2%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 2%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 2%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 26%

Monitor/Cross-check 16%
Leadership 5%
Captain Should Show Leadership 5%
Taxiway/Runway Management 5%
Automation Management 4%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 2%

Note: four accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 192
Addendum C
Top Contributing Factors – Section 5

Latin America & the Caribbean Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 35%

Safety Management 35%
Flight Operations 19%
Dispatch 15%
Management Decisions 15%
Selection Systems 12%
Maintenance Operations 12%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 12%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 12%
Design 12%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 12%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 4%
Cabin Operations 4%
Cabin Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 4%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 4%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 15%

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 15%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 8%
Air Traffic Control 4%
Crew to External Communication 4%
Dispatch 4%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 4%
Documentation 4%
Callouts 4%
Briefings 4%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 4%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 193
Latin America & the Caribbean Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 42%

Maintenance Events 31%
Gear/Tire 23%
Airport Facilities 19%
Meteorology 15%
Operational Pressure 12%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 12%
Thunderstorms 8%
Dispatch/Paperwork 8%
Nav Aids 8%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 8%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 4%
Traffic 4%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 4%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 4%
Ground Events 4%
Fatigue 4%
Brakes 4%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 4%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 4%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 4%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 4%
Lack of Visual Reference 4%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 4%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 4%
Air Traffic Services 4%
Hydraulic System Failure 4%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 194
Latin America & the Caribbean Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 15%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 8%
Weight & Balance 8%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 8%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 4%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 4%
Engine 4%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 4%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 4%
Unstable Approach 4%
Ramp Movements 4%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 19%

Monitor/Cross-check 12%
Taxiway/Runway Management 8%
Captain Should Show Leadership 4%
Workload Management 4%
Communication Environment 4%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 4%
Evaluation of Plans 4%
Plans Stated 4%
Inquiry 4%
Leadership 4%

Note: seven accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcu-
lation of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 195
Addendum C
Top Contributing Factors – Section 5

Middle East & North Africa Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Safety Management 36%

Regulatory Oversight 27%
Design 23%
Flight Operations 23%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 18%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 14%
Maintenance Operations 14%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 14%
Selection Systems 14%
Technology & Equipment 5%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 5%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 5%
Management Decisions 5%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 32%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 27%
Callouts 18%
Automation 9%
Normal Checklist 9%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 9%
Abnormal Checklist 9%
Ground Crew 5%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 5%
Crew to External Communication 5%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 196
Middle East & North Africa Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 36%

Maintenance Events 27%
Meteorology 23%
Gear/Tire 23%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 14%
Air Traffic Services 14%
Airport Facilities 9%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 9%
Operational Pressure 9%
Lack of Visual Reference 9%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 5%
Fatigue 5%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 5%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 5%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 5%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Brakes 5%
Icing Conditions 5%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 5%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 5%
Ground Events 5%
Dispatch/Paperwork 5%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 5%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 197
Middle East & North Africa Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 18%

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 18%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 14%
Engine 14%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 14%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 9%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 9%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 5%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 5%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 5%
Flight Controls/Automation 5%
Unstable Approach 5%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Monitor/Cross-check 27%
Overall Crew Performance 23%
Leadership 14%
Taxiway/Runway Management 14%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 14%
Workload Management 9%
Captain Should Show Leadership 9%
Communication Environment 5%
SOP Briefing/Planning 5%
Evaluation of Plans 5%
Automation Management 5%

Note: four accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 198
Addendum C
Top Contributing Factors – Section 5

North America Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 17%

Flight Operations 13%
Design 10%
Management Decisions 10%
Maintenance Operations 10%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 10%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 8%
Technology & Equipment 8%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 6%
Safety Management 6%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 2%
Change Management 2%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 2%
Ground Operations 2%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 2%
Selection Systems 2%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 2%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 25%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 19%
Callouts 6%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 4%
Automation 4%
Normal Checklist 4%
Ground Navigation 2%
Briefings 2%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 2%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 199
North America Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 38%

Meteorology 33%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 23%
Gear/Tire 23%
Lack of Visual Reference 15%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 15%
Maintenance Events 10%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 10%
Nav Aids 10%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 8%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 8%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 6%
Fatigue 6%
Airport Facilities 6%
Terrain/Obstacles 6%
Air Traffic Services 6%
Thunderstorms 4%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 4%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 4%
Icing Conditions 4%
Ground Events 2%
Traffic 2%
Operational Pressure 2%
Primary Flight Controls 2%
Flight Controls 2%
Dispatch/Paperwork 2%
Structural Failure 2%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 2%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 200
North America Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 19%

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 13%
Unstable Approach 8%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 8%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 6%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 4%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 4%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 4%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%
Flight Controls/Automation 4%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 2%
Wrong taxiway/ramp/gate/hold spot 2%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 2%
Engine 2%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Monitor/Cross-check 13%
Overall Crew Performance 10%
Captain Should Show Leadership 6%
Workload Management 6%
Communication Environment 6%
Automation Management 6%
Leadership 6%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 4%
Evaluation of Plans 2%

Note: 14 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 201
Addendum C
Top Contributing Factors – Section 5

North Asia Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Flight Operations 40%

Flight Ops: Training Systems 40%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 30%
Regulatory Oversight 30%
Safety Management 30%
Selection Systems 20%
Maintenance Operations 10%
Change Management 10%
Management Decisions 10%
Operations Planning & Scheduling 10%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 10%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 60%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 50%
Aircraft Malfunction 30%
Thunderstorms 30%
Maintenance Events 10%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 10%
Secondary Flight Controls 10%
Flight Controls 10%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 10%
Gear/Tire 10%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 10%
Nav Aids 10%
Airport Facilities 10%

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 202
North Asia Aircraft Accidents

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 60%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 30%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 20%
Automation 10%
Abnormal Checklist 10%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution
Abrupt Aircraft Control 40%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 40%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 30%
Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 30%
Unstable Approach 20%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 10%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 10%
Flight Controls/Automation 10%
Engine 10%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 10%
Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground 10%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution
Monitor/Cross-check 70%
Overall Crew Performance 50%
Leadership 20%
Workload Management 20%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 10%
Communication Environment 10%
Evaluation of Plans 10%
Automation Management 10%
Captain Should Show Leadership 10%

Note: one accident was not classified due to insufficient data; this accident was subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM C – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 203
Addendum D
Top Contributing Factors – Section 6

Cargo Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 37%

Safety Management 31%
Flight Operations 16%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 14%
Maintenance Operations 10%
Selection Systems 10%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 10%
Technology & Equipment 8%
Management Decisions 6%
Design 4%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%
Dispatch 4%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 4%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 2%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 37%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 25%
Callouts 8%
Automation 4%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 2%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 2%
Abnormal Checklist 2%

ADDENDUM D – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 204
Cargo Aircraft Accidents

THREATS
Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 37%

Meteorology 31%
Wind/Wind shear/Gusty wind 20%
Lack of Visual Reference 20%
Gear/Tire 18%
Airport Facilities 18%
Fatigue 12%
Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions 12%
Nav Aids 10%
Ground-based nav aid malfunction or not available 10%
Contaminated runway/taxiway - poor braking action 8%
Operational Pressure 8%
Poor/faint marking/signs for runway/taxiway closure 8%
Thunderstorms 8%
Maintenance Events 8%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 6%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 6%
Air Traffic Services 4%
Terrain/Obstacles 4%
Airport Perimeter Control/Fencing/Wildlife Control 4%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 4%
Dispatch/Paperwork 4%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 4%
Inadequate overrun area/trench/ditch/proximity of structures 2%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 2%
Structural Failure 2%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 2%
Flight Controls 2%
Secondary Flight Controls 2%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 2%

ADDENDUM D – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 205
Cargo Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/Floated/Bounced/Firm/Off-center/Crabbed landing 27%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 25%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 18%
Unstable Approach 16%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 10%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 8%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 8%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 6%
Engine 4%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%
Weight & Balance 2%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 2%
Flight Controls/Automation 2%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 22%

Monitor/Cross-check 16%
Captain Should Show Leadership 6%
First Officer is assertive when necessary 6%
Leadership 6%
Automation Management 6%
Workload Management 4%
Taxiway/Runway Management 2%
Evaluation of Plans 2%

Note: 24 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calcula-
tion of contributing factor frequency.

ADDENDUM D – PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 206
Addendum E
Fatality Risk

Definition Examples
In 2015, IATA added another measure of air carrier safety to The following tables illustrate two examples:
its annual Safety Report: fatality risk. This measure seeks to
answer the following question: what was the exposure of a Case 1: There were a total of four accidents during the period:
passenger or crewmember to a catastrophic accident, where all
people on board perished? % of People-Onboard Full-Loss
Accident
Who Perished Equivalent
The equation to calculate the fatality risk is Q = V/N, where: #1 0% 0
#2 100% 1
•• N is the number of flights or sectors conducted during the
period #3 50% 0.5
#4 50% 0.5
•• V is the total number of “full-loss equivalents” among the N
Total Full-Loss Equivalent 2
flights or sectors
Number of Sectors 3,000,000
The full-loss equivalent for a given flight is the proportion of Fatality Risk 0.00000067
passengers and crew who do not survive an accident. For
Fatality Risk (normalized per 1 million sectors) 0.67
example:

•• If a flight lands safely, the full-loss equivalent is zero In Case 1, there were a total of four accidents out of three
million sectors. Of these four accidents, one had no fatalities,
•• If a flight results in an accident in which all passengers and one was a complete full loss with all on board killed, and two
crew are killed, the full-loss equivalent is one in which half on board perished. In total, there were two full-
loss equivalents out of three million sectors, which equates to
•• If a flight results in an accident in which half of passengers 0.67 full-loss equivalents per million sectors. In other words, the
and crew are killed, the full-loss equivalent is 0.5 exposure of all passengers and crew who flew on those sectors
to a catastrophic accident was 1 in 1.5 million flights.
V is the sum of all full-loss equivalents calculated for all N
flights. In other words, the fatality risk rate (Q) is the sum of
the individual accident full-loss equivalents divided by the total
number of flights.

ADDENDUM E – FATALITY RISK IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 207

Addendum E
Fatality Risk (cont’d)

Case 2: There were a total of six accidents: Considerations

% of People-Onboard Full-Loss It is important to note that the calculation of fatality risk does
Accident
Who Perished Equivalent not consider the size of the airplane, how many people were
#1 0% 0 on board, or the length of the flight. Rather, what is key is the
percentage of people, from the total carried, who perished. It
#2 10% 0.1
does not consider if the accident was on a long-haul flight on a
#3 20% 0.2 large aircraft where 25% of the passengers did not survive, or
#4 50% 0.5 on a small commuter flight with the same ratio. The likelihood
of perishing is the same.
#5 30% 0.3
#6 40% 0.4 Fatality risk, or full-loss equivalent, can easily be mistaken to
Total Full-Loss Equivalent 1.5 represent the number of fatal accidents (or the fatal accident
rate). Although fatality risk only exists once there is a fatal
Number of Sectors 3,000,000
accident, they are not the same. While a fatal accident indicates
Fatality Risk 0.0000005 an accident where at least one person perished, the full-loss
Fatality Risk (normalized per 1 million sectors) 0.50 equivalent indicates the proportion of people on board who
perished.

In Case 2, there were a total of six accidents out of three Fatality risk provides a good baseline for comparison between
million sectors. Of these six accidents, five experienced some accident categories. For example, Loss of Control – In-flight
fatalities, but there was no complete full loss. The total of the (LOC-I) is known to have a high fatality risk, but a low frequency
full-loss equivalents was 1.5. This equates to a fatality risk of of occurrence. Runway Excursion, on the other hand, has a low
0.50 per million sectors. The exposure, in this case, was of one fatality risk, but a high frequency of occurrence. It is possible,
catastrophic accident per two million flights. therefore, for the Runway Excursion category to have the same
fatality risk as LOC-I if its frequency of occurrence is high
When comparing the above cases, the risk of perishing on a enough so that the generally small full-loss equivalent for each
randomly selected flight is lower in Case 2 even though there individual accident produces the same total full-loss equivalent
were more accidents with fatalities. Case 1 had fewer fatal number as LOC-I (per million sectors).
accidents, but they were more severe. Therefore, the odds of a
passenger or crew losing their life on a given flight (fatality risk) Finally, as seen throughout the report, the aviation industry is
is higher in Case 1 than in Case 2. reaching a point where the fatality risk and the fatal accident
rate are converging. Much work has been done in improving
aviation safety worldwide and, in most cases, the fatal accident
rate has been declining over the years. The convergence of
fatality risk and fatal accident rate may indicate, although
it is not possible to confirm, that the accident prevention
efforts have been effective in mitigating the causes of most
accidents. Even as accident rates reach historic lows, the work
of safety professionals across the commercial aviation industry
continues to be as important today as it was in the past.

ADDENDUM E – FATALITY RISK IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 208

A1
Annex 1 – Definitions
Abnormal Disembarkation:  Passengers and/or crew exit the Evacuation (Land): passengers and/or crew evacuate aircraft
aircraft via boarding doors (normally assisted by internal aircraft or via escape slides/slide rafts, doors, emergency exits, or gaps in
exterior stairs) after an aircraft incident or accident and when away fuselage (usually initiated in life-threatening and/or catastrophic
from the boarding gates or aircraft stands (e.g., onto a runway or events).
taxiway), only in a nonlife-threatening and non-catastrophic event.
Evacuation (Water): passengers and/or crew evacuate aircraft
Accident: IATA defines an accident as an event where ALL of the via escape slides/slide rafts, doors, emergency exits, or gaps in
following criteria are satisfied: fuselage and into or onto water.
Fatal Accident: an accident where at least one passenger or
•• Person(s) have boarded the aircraft with the intention of flight crewmember is killed or later dies of their injuries resulting from an
(either flight crew or passengers). operational accident. Events such as slips and falls, food poisoning,
turbulence or accidents involving onboard equipment, which
•• The intention of the flight is limited to normal commercial may involve fatalities, but where the aircraft sustains minor or no
aviation activities, specifically scheduled/charter passenger or damage, are excluded.
cargo service. Executive jet operations, training, maintenance/
test flights are all excluded. Fatality: a
 passenger or crewmember who is killed or later dies
of their injuries resulting from an operational accident. Injured
•• The aircraft is turbine-powered and has a certificated Maximum persons who die more than 30 days after an accident are excluded.
Takeoff Weight (MTOW) of at least 5,700 kg (12,540 lbs.). Fatality Risk: t he sum of full-loss equivalents per 1 million sectors.

•• The aircraft has sustained major structural damage that Full-Loss Equivalent: a number representing the equivalent of
adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight a catastrophic accident where all people on board died. For an
characteristics of the aircraft and would normally require major individual accident, the full-loss equivalent is a value between
repair or replacement of the affected component exceeding $1 0 and 1 representing the ratio between the number of people
million USD or 10% of the aircraft’s hull reserve value, whichever who perished and the number of people on board the aircraft.
is lower, or the aircraft has been declared a hull loss. In a broader context, the full-loss equivalent is the sum of each
accident’s full-loss equivalent value.
Accident Classification:  the process by which actions,
omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which led Hazard: condition, object or activity with the potential of causing
to an accident are identified and categorized. injuries to persons, damage to equipment or structures, loss of
material, or reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function.
Aircraft: t he involved aircraft, used interchangeably with
airplane(s). Hull Loss:  an accident in which the aircraft is destroyed or
substantially damaged and is not subsequently repaired for
Air Traffic Service Unit: as defined in applicable ATS, Search and whatever reason, including a financial decision of the owner.
Rescue and overflight regulations.
Hull Loss/Nil Survivors: A ircraft impact resulted in complete hull
Cabin Safety-related Event:  accident involving cabin loss and no survivors (used as a Cabin End State).
operational issues, such as a passenger evacuation, onboard
fire, decompression or ditching, which requires actions by the IATA Accident Classification System: r efer to Annexes 2 and 3
operating cabin crew. of this report.

Captain:  the involved pilot responsible for the operation and IATA Regions: IATA determines the accident region based on the
safety of the aircraft during flight time. operator’s home country as specified in the operator’s Air Operator
Certificate (AOC). For example, if a Canadian-registered operator
Commander: t he involved pilot, in an augmented crew, responsible has an accident in Europe, this accident is counted as a ‘North
for the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight time. American’ accident. For a complete list of countries assigned per
Crewmember: a  nyone on board a flight who has duties connected region, please consult the following table:
with the sector of the flight during which the accident happened. It
excludes positioning or relief crew, security staff, etc. (see definition
of “Passenger” below).

ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 209

IATA REGIONS

Region Country Region Country Region Country

AFI Angola Swaziland CIS Armenia
Benin Tanzania, United Republic of Azerbaijan
Botswana Togo Belarus
Burkina Faso Uganda Georgia
Burundi Zambia Kazakhstan
Cameroon Zimbabwe Kyrgyzstan
Cape Verde ASPAC Australia 1
Moldova, Republic of
Central African Republic Bangladesh Russian Federation
Chad Bhutan Tajikistan
Comoros Brunei Darussalam Turkmenistan
Congo, Democratic Cambodia Ukraine
Republic of Fiji Islands Uzbekistan
Congo India EUR Albania
Côte d’Ivoire Indonesia Andorra
Djibouti Japan Austria
Equatorial Guinea Kiribati Belgium
Eritrea Korea, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ethiopia Lao People’s Democratic Bulgaria
Gabon Republic Croatia
Gambia Malaysia Cyprus
Ghana Maldives Czech Republic
Guinea Marshall Islands Denmark3
Guinea-Bissau Micronesia, Federated Estonia
Kenya States of
Finland
Lesotho Myanmar
France4
Liberia Nauru
Germany
Madagascar Nepal
Greece
Malawi New Zealand2
Holy See (Vatican City
Mali Pakistan State)
Mauritania Palau Hungary
Mauritius Papua New Guinea Iceland
Mozambique Philippines Ireland
Namibia Samoa Italy
Niger Singapore Israel
Nigeria Solomon Islands Kosovo
Rwanda Sri Lanka Latvia
São Tomé and Príncipe Thailand Liechtenstein
Senegal Timor-Leste Lithuania
Seychelles Tonga Luxembourg
Sierra Leone Tuvalu Macedonia, the former
Somalia Vanuatu Yugoslav Republic of

South Africa Vietnam Malta

South Sudan Monaco

ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 210

 Region Country Region Country
Montenegro Saint Vincent and the
Netherlands5 Grenadines

Norway Suriname

Poland Trinidad and Tobago

Portugal Uruguay

Romania Venezuela

San Marino MENA Afghanistan

Serbia Algeria

Slovakia Bahrain

Slovenia Egypt

Spain Iran, Islamic Republic of

Sweden Iraq

Switzerland Jordan

Turkey Kuwait

United Kingdom6 Lebanon

LATAM/ Antigua and Barbuda Libya

CAR Argentina Morocco

Bahamas Oman

Barbados Palestinian Territories

Belize Qatar

Bolivia Saudi Arabia

Brazil Sudan

Chile Syrian Arab Republic

Colombia Tunisia

Costa Rica United Arab Emirates

Cuba Yemen

Dominica NAM Canada

Dominican Republic United States of America7

Ecuador NASIA China8

El Salvador Mongolia

Grenada Korea, Democratic

People’s Republic of
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia

ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 211

 1
Australia includes: 6
United Kingdom includes:

Christmas Island Akrotiri and Dhekelia

Cocos (Keeling) Islands Anguilla
Norfolk Island Bermuda
Ashmore and Cartier Islands British Indian Ocean Territory
Coral Sea Islands British Virgin Islands
Heard Island and McDonald Islands Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
2
New Zealand includes: Gibraltar
Montserrat
Pitcairn
Cook Islands
Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha
Niue
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
Tokelau
Turks and Caicos Islands
British Antarctic Territory
3
Denmark includes: Guernsey
Isle of Man
Faroe Islands Jersey
Greenland
7
United States of America include:
4
France includes:
American Samoa
French Guiana Guam
French Polynesia Northern Mariana Islands
French Southern Territories Puerto Rico
Guadalupe Virgin Islands, U.S.
Martinique United States Minor Outlying Islands
Mayotte
New Caledonia 8
China includes:
Saint-Barthélemy
Saint Martin (French part)
Chinese Taipei
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Hong Kong
Reunion
Macao
Wallis and Futuna

5
Netherlands include:

Aruba
Curacao
Sint Maarten

ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 212

Incident: an occurrence, other than an accident, associated Phase of Flight: the phase of flight definitions developed and
with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the applied by IATA are presented in the table on the following page.
safety of operation.
Rapid Deplaning: p  assengers and/or crew rapidly exit the
In-flight Security Personnel: an individual who is trained, aircraft via boarding doors and a jet bridge or stairs, as a
authorized and armed by the state and is carried on board precautionary measure.
an aircraft and whose intention is to prevent acts of unlawful
interference. Risk: the assessment, expressed in terms of predicted
probability and severity, of the consequence(s) of a hazard,
Investigation: a process conducted for accident prevention, taking as reference the worst foreseeable situation.
which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the
drawing of conclusions (including the determination of causes) Safety: the state in which the risk of harm to persons or property
and, when appropriate, the making of safety recommendations. is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level
through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk
Investigator in Charge: a person charged, based on his or management.
her qualifications, with the responsibility for the organization,
conduct and control of an investigation. Sector: the operation of an aircraft between takeoff at one
location and landing at another (other than a diversion).
Involved: directly concerned, or designated to be concerned,
with an accident or incident. Serious Injury: an injury sustained by a person in an accident
and which meets one of the following:
Level of Safety: how far safety is to be pursued in a given
context, assessed with reference to an acceptable risk, based •• Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing
on the current values of society. within seven days from the date the injury was received

Major Repair:  a repair that, if improperly done, might •• Results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of
appreciably affect mass, balance, structural strength, fingers, toes or nose)
performance, power plant operation, flight characteristics, or •• Involves lacerations that cause severe hemorrhage, or nerve,
other qualities affecting airworthiness. muscle or tendon damage
Nonoperational Accident: this definition includes acts of •• Involves injury to any internal organ
deliberate violence (sabotage, war, etc.) and accidents that
occur during crew training, demonstration and test flights. •• Involves second or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting
Sabotage is believed to be a matter of security rather than more than 5% of the surface of the body
flight safety and crew training. Demonstration and test flying •• Involves verified exposure to infectious substances or
are considered to involve special risks inherent to these types injurious radiation
of operations. Also included in this category are:
Serious Incident:  an incident involving circumstances
•• Nonairline-operated aircraft (e.g., military or government- indicating that an accident nearly occurred. Note: the difference
operated, survey, aerial work or parachuting flights) between an accident and a serious incident lies only in the
•• Accidents where there was no intention of flight result).

Normal Disembarkation: passengers and/or crew exit the Substantial Damage: d  amage or structural failure, which
aircraft via boarding doors during normal operations. adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight
characteristics of the aircraft, and which would normally require
Occurrence:  any unusual or abnormal event involving an major repair or replacement of the affected component.
aircraft, including, but not limited to, an incident.
Notes:
Operational Accident:  an accident that is believed to 1. Bent fairing or cowling, dented skin, small punctured holes
represent the risks of normal commercial operation, generally in the skin or fabric, minor damage to landing gear, wheels,
accidents that occur during normal revenue operations or tires, flaps, engine accessories, brakes, or wing tips are not
positioning flights. considered “substantial damage” for the purpose of this
Operator: a person, organization or enterprise engaged in, or Safety Report.
offering to engage in, aircraft operations. 2. The ICAO Annex 13 definition is unrelated to cost and
Passenger: anyone on board a flight who, as far as may be includes many incidents in which the financial consequences
determined, is not a crewmember. Apart from normal revenue are minimal.
passengers, this includes off-duty staff members, positioning Unstable Approach: a  n approach where the IATA Accident
and relief flight crew members, etc., who have no duties Classification Technical Group (ACTG) has knowledge about
connected with the sector of the flight during which the accident vertical, lateral or speed deviations in the portion of the flight
happened. Security personnel are included as passengers as close to landing.
their duties are not concerned with the operation of the flight.
Note: this definition includes the portion immediately prior to
Person: any involved individual, including airport and ATS touchdown and, in this respect, the definition might differ from
personnel. other organizations. However, accident analysis gives evidence
that a destabilization just prior to touchdown has contributed to
accidents in the past.

ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 213

PHASE OF FLIGHT DEFINITIONS

Flight Planning (FLP) T  his phase begins when the flight crew Descent (DST) This phase begins when the crew departs the
initiates the use of flight planning information facilities and cruise altitude for an approach at a destination; it ends when the
becomes dedicated to a flight based upon a route and airplane; crew initiates changes in aircraft configuration and/or speeds to
it ends when the crew arrives at the aircraft for the planned flight facilitate a landing on a specific runway. It may also end by the
or the crew initiates a ‘Flight Close’ phase. crew initiating an ‘En Route Climb’ or ‘Cruise’ phase.
Preflight (PRF) T  his phase begins with the arrival of the flight Approach (APR) T  his phase begins when the crew initiates
crew at an aircraft for the flight; it ends when a decision is made changes in aircraft configuration and/or speeds enabling
to depart the parking position and/or start the engine(s). It may the aircraft to maneuver to land on a specific runway; it ends
also end by the crew initiating a ‘Post-flight’ phase. Note: the when the aircraft is in the landing configuration and the crew is
Preflight phase assumes the aircraft is sitting at the point at dedicated to land on a specific runway. It may also end by the
which the aircraft will be loaded or boarded, with the primary crew initiating a Go-around phase.
engine(s) not operating. If boarding occurs during this phase, Go-around (GOA) T  his phase begins when the crew aborts
it is done without any engine(s) operating. Boarding with any the descent to the planned landing runway during the Approach
engine(s) operating is covered under ‘Engine Start/Depart’. phase; it ends after speed and configuration are established at
Engine Start/Depart (ESD) T  his phase begins when the flight a defined maneuvering altitude or to continue the climb for the
crew take action to have the aircraft moved from the parked purpose of cruise (same as the end of ‘Initial Climb’).
position and/or take switch action to energize the engine(s); it Landing (LND) This phase begins when the aircraft is in the
ends when the aircraft begins to move under its own power or landing configuration and the crew is dedicated to touch down
the crew initiates an ‘Arrival/Engine Shutdown’ phase. Note: the on a specific runway; it ends when the speed permits the aircraft
Engine Start/Depart phase includes the aircraft engine(s) start- to be maneuvered by means of taxiing for arrival at a parking
up whether assisted or not and whether the aircraft is stationary area. It may also end by the crew initiating a “Go-around” phase.
with more than one engine shutdown prior to ‘Taxi-out’ (i.e.,
Taxi-in (TXI)  This phase begins when the crew begins to
boarding of persons or baggage with engines running). It includes
maneuver the aircraft under its own power to an arrival area for
all actions of power back to position the aircraft for Taxi-out.
parking; it ends when the aircraft ceases moving under its own
Taxi-out (TXO) This phase begins when the crew moves the power with a commitment to shut down the engine(s). It may
aircraft forward under its own power; it ends when thrust is also end by the crew initiating a ‘Taxi-out’ phase.
increased for ‘Takeoff’ or the crew initiates a ‘Taxi-in’ phase.
Arrival/Engine Shutdown (AES) This phase begins when the
Note: this phase includes taxi from the point of moving under
crew ceases to move the aircraft under its own power and a
the aircraft’s own power, up to and including entering the
commitment is made to shut down the engine(s); it ends with
runway and reaching the Takeoff position.
a decision to shut down ancillary systems to secure the aircraft.
Takeoff (TOF) This phase begins when the crew increases the It may also end by the crew initiating an ‘Engine Start/Depart’
thrust for liftoff; it ends when an ‘Initial Climb’ is established or phase. Note: the Arrival/Engine Shutdown phase includes
the crew initiates a ‘Rejected Takeoff’ phase. actions required during a time when the aircraft is stationary
Rejected Takeoff (RTO) T his phase begins when the crew with one or more engines operating while ground servicing
reduces thrust to stop the aircraft before the end of the Takeoff may be taking place (i.e., deplaning persons or baggage with
phase; it ends when the aircraft is taxied off the runway for a ‘Taxi- engine(s) running and/or refueling with engine(s) running).
in’ phase or when the aircraft is stopped and engines shutdown. Post-flight (PSF) This phase begins when the crew commences
Initial Climb (ICL) This phase begins at 35 feet above the the shutdown of ancillary systems of the aircraft to leave the
runway elevation; it ends after the speed and configuration are flight deck; it ends when the flight and cabin crew leave the
established at a defined maneuvering altitude or to continue aircraft. It may also end by the crew initiating a ‘Preflight’ phase.
the climb for cruising. It may also end by the crew initiating an Flight Close (FLC) This phase begins when the crew initiates
‘Approach’ phase. Note: maneuvering altitude is that needed a message to the flight-following authorities that the aircraft is
to safely maneuver the aircraft after an engine failure occurs, secure and the crew is finished with the duties of the past flight;
or predefined as an obstacle clearance altitude. Initial Climb it ends when the crew has completed these duties or begins to
includes such procedures applied to meet the requirements of plan for another flight by initiating a ‘Flight Planning’ phase.
noise abatement climb or best angle/rate of climb.
Ground Servicing (GDS) T his phase begins when the
En Route Climb (ECL) T his phase begins when the crew aircraft is stopped and available to be safely approached by
establishes the aircraft at a defined speed and configuration, ground personnel for the purpose of securing the aircraft and
enabling the aircraft to increase altitude for cruising; it ends with the performing the duties applicable to the arrival of the aircraft
aircraft establishing a predetermined constant initial cruise altitude (i.e., aircraft maintenance, etc.); it ends with completion of the
at a defined speed or by the crew initiating a ‘Descent’ phase. duties applicable to the departure of the aircraft or when the
Cruise (CRZ) This phase begins when the crew establishes the aircraft is no longer safe to approach for the purpose of ground
aircraft at a defined speed and predetermined constant initial servicing (e.g., prior to crew initiating the ‘Taxi-out’ phase).
cruise altitude and proceeds in the direction of a destination; it Note: the GDS phase was identified by the need for information
ends with the beginning of the ‘Descent’ phase for an approach that may not directly require the input of flight or cabin crew. It
or by the crew initiating an ‘En Route Climb’ phase. is acknowledged as an entity to allow placement of the tasks
required of personnel assigned to service the aircraft.

ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 214

A2
Annex 2
Accident Classification Taxonomy
1. LATENT CONDITIONS
Definition: Conditions present in the system before the accident and triggered by various possible factors.

Latent Conditions
(deficiencies in…) Examples

Design ÊÊ Design shortcomings

ÊÊ Manufacturing defects

Regulatory Oversight ÊÊ Deficient regulatory oversight by the state or lack thereof

Management Decisions ÊÊ Cost cutting

ÊÊ Stringent fuel policy
ÊÊ Outsourcing and other decisions, which can impact operational safety

Safety Management Absent or deficient:

ÊÊ Safety policy and objectives
ÊÊ Safety risk management (including hazard identification process)
ÊÊ Safety assurance (including Quality Management)
ÊÊ Safety promotion

Change Management ÊÊ Deficiencies in monitoring change; in addressing operational needs created by,
for example, expansion or downsizing
ÊÊ Deficiencies in the evaluation to integrate and/or monitor changes to establish
organizational practices or procedures
ÊÊ Consequences of mergers or acquisitions

Selection Systems ÊÊ Deficient or absent selection standards

Operations Planning and ÊÊ Deficiencies in crew rostering and staffing practices

Scheduling ÊÊ Issues with flight and duty time limitations
ÊÊ Health and welfare issues

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 215
1. LATENT CONDITIONS (CONT’D)

Technology and ÊÊ Available safety equipment not installed (EGPWS, predictive wind-shear, TCAS/ACAS,
Equipment etc.)

Flight Operations See the following breakdown

Flight Operations: ÊÊ Deficient or absent:

Standard Operating 1. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Procedures and 2. Operational instructions and/or policies
Checking 3. Company regulations
4. Controls to assess compliance with regulations and SOPs

Flight Operations: ÊÊ Omitted training, language skills deficiencies, qualifications and experience of flight
Training Systems crews, operational needs leading to training reductions, deficiencies in assessment
of training or training resources such as manuals or CBT devices

Cabin Operations See the following breakdown

Cabin Operations: ÊÊ Deficient or absent:

Standard Operating 1. SOPs
Procedures and 2. Operational instructions and/or policies
Checking 3. Company regulations
4. Controls to assess compliance with regulations and SOPs

Cabin Operations: ÊÊ Omitted training, language skills deficiencies, qualifications and experience of cabin
Training Systems crews, operational needs leading to training reductions, deficiencies in assessment
of training or training resources such as manuals or CBT devices

Ground Operations See the following breakdown

Ground Operations: ÊÊ Deficient or absent:

SOPs and Checking 1. SOPs
2. Operational instructions and/or policies
3. Company regulations
4. Controls to assess compliance with regulations and SOPs

Ground Operations: ÊÊ Omitted training, language skills deficiencies, qualifications and experience of ground
Training Systems crews, operational needs leading to training reductions, deficiencies in assessment of
training or training resources such as manuals or CBT devices

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 216
1. LATENT CONDITIONS (CONT’D)

Maintenance
Operations See the following breakdown

Maintenance ÊÊ Deficient or absent:

Operations: 1. SOPs
SOPs and Checking 2. Operational instructions and/or policies
3. Company regulations
4. Controls to assess compliance with regulations and SOPs
ÊÊ Includes deficiencies in technical documentation, unrecorded maintenance and
the use of bogus parts/unapproved modifications

Maintenance ÊÊ Omitted training, language skills deficiencies, qualifications and experience of

Operations: maintenance crews, operational needs leading to training reductions, deficiencies
Training Systems in assessment of training or training resources such as manuals or CBT devices

Dispatch See the following breakdown

Dispatch: ÊÊ Deficient or absent:

Standard Operating 1. SOPs
Procedures and 2. Operational instructions and/or policies
Checking 3. Company regulations
4. Controls to assess compliance with regulations and SOPs

Dispatch: ÊÊ Omitted training, language skills deficiencies, qualifications and experience of

Training Systems dispatchers, operational needs leading to training reductions, deficiencies in
assessment of training or training resources such as manuals or CBT devices

Flight Watch ÊÊ Flight Watch/ Flight Following

Other ÊÊ Not clearly falling within the other latent conditions

Note: All areas such as Training, Ground Operations or Maintenance include outsourced functions for which the operator has
oversight responsibility.

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 217
2. THREATS
Definition: An event or error that occurs outside the influence of the flight crew, but which requires crew attention and
management if safety margins are to be maintained.

Mismanaged threat: A threat that is linked to or induces a flight crew error.

Environmental Threats Examples

Meteorology See the following breakdown

ÊÊ Thunderstorms

ÊÊ Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions

ÊÊ Wind/wind shear/gusty wind

ÊÊ Icing conditions

ÊÊ Hail

Lack of Visual ÊÊ Darkness/black hole effect

Reference ÊÊ Environmental situation, which can lead to spatial disorientation

Air Traffic Services ÊÊ Tough-to-meet clearances/restrictions

ÊÊ Reroutes
ÊÊ Language difficulties
ÊÊ Controller errors
ÊÊ Failure to provide separation (air/ground)

Wildlife/ ÊÊ Self-explanatory
Birds/Foreign Objects

Airport Facilities See the following breakdown

ÊÊ Poor signage, faint markings

ÊÊ Runway/taxiway closures

ÊÊ Contaminated runways/taxiways
ÊÊ Poor braking action

ÊÊ Trenches/ditches
ÊÊ Inadequate overrun area
ÊÊ Structures in close proximity to runway/taxiway

ÊÊ Inadequate airport perimeter control/fencing

ÊÊ Inadequate wildlife control

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 218
2. THREATS (CONT’D)

Navigational Aids See the following breakdown

ÊÊ Ground navigation aid malfunction

ÊÊ Lack or unavailability (e.g., ILS)

ÊÊ NAV aids not calibrated – unknown to flight crew

Terrain/Obstacles ÊÊ Self-explanatory

Traffic ÊÊ Other aircraft striking other aircraft (e.g., during runway incursion)
ÊÊ Ground vehicles hitting aircraft

Runway Surface ÊÊ Aircraft

Infringement ÊÊ Vehicle
ÊÊ Wildlife
ÊÊ Other

Other ÊÊ Not clearly falling within the other environmental threats

Airline Threats Examples

Aircraft Malfunction See breakdown (on the next page)

MEL Item ÊÊ MEL items with operational implications

Operational Pressure ÊÊ Operational time pressure

ÊÊ Missed approach/diversion
ÊÊ Other non-normal operations

Cabin Events ÊÊ Cabin events (e.g., unruly passenger)

ÊÊ Cabin crew errors
ÊÊ Distractions/interruptions

Ground Events ÊÊ Aircraft loading events

ÊÊ Fueling errors
ÊÊ Agent interruptions
ÊÊ Improper ground support
ÊÊ Improper deicing/anti-icing

Dispatch/Paperwork ÊÊ Load sheet errors

ÊÊ Crew scheduling events
ÊÊ Late paperwork changes or errors

Maintenance Events ÊÊ Aircraft repairs on ground

ÊÊ Maintenance log problems
ÊÊ Maintenance errors

Dangerous Goods ÊÊ Carriage of articles or substances capable of posing a significant risk to health,
safety or property when transported by air

Manuals/ ÊÊ Incorrect/unclear chart pages or operating manuals

Charts/Checklists ÊÊ Checklist layout/design issues

Other ÊÊ Not clearly falling within the other airline threats

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 219
2. THREATS (CONT’D)

Aircraft Malfunction
Breakdown
(Technical Threats) Examples

Extensive/Uncontained ÊÊ Damage due to non-containment

Engine Failure

Contained Engine ÊÊ Engine overheat

Failure / ÊÊ Propeller failure
Power plant Malfunction ÊÊ Failure affecting power plant components

Gear/Tire ÊÊ Failure affecting parking, taxi, takeoff or landing

Brakes ÊÊ Failure affecting parking, taxi, takeoff or landing

Flight Controls See the following breakdown

Primary Flight Controls ÊÊ Failure affecting aircraft controllability

Secondary Flight ÊÊ Failure affecting flaps, spoilers

Controls

Structural Failure ÊÊ Failure due to flutter, overload

ÊÊ Corrosion/fatigue
ÊÊ Engine separation

Fire/Smoke ÊÊ Fire due to aircraft systems

in Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo ÊÊ Other fire causes

Avionics, Flight ÊÊ All avionics except autopilot and FMS

Instruments ÊÊ Instrumentation, including standby instruments

Autopilot/FMS ÊÊ Self-explanatory

Hydraulic System ÊÊ Self-explanatory

Failure

Electrical Power ÊÊ Loss of all electrical power, including battery power

Generation Failure

Other ÊÊ Not clearly falling within the other aircraft malfunction threats

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 220
3. FLIGHT CREW ERRORS
Definition: An observed flight crew deviation from organizational expectations or crew intentions.
Mismanaged error: An error that is linked to or induces additional error or an undesired aircraft state.

Aircraft Handling Errors Examples

Manual Handling/Flight ÊÊ Hand flying vertical, lateral, or speed deviations

Controls ÊÊ Approach deviations by choice (e.g., flying below the glide slope)
ÊÊ Missed runway/taxiway, failure to hold short, taxi above speed limit
ÊÊ Incorrect flaps, speed brake, autobrake, thrust reverser or power settings

Ground Navigation ÊÊ Attempting to turn down wrong taxiway/runway

ÊÊ Missed taxiway/runway/gate

Automation ÊÊ Incorrect altitude, speed, heading, autothrottle settings, mode executed, or entries

Systems/ ÊÊ Incorrect packs, altimeter, fuel switch settings, or radio frequency dialed
Radios/Instruments

Other ÊÊ Not clearly falling within the other errors

Procedural Errors Examples

Standard Operating ÊÊ Intentional or unintentional failure to cross-verify (automation) inputs

Procedures Adherence / ÊÊ Intentional or unintentional failure to follow SOPs
Standard Operating ÊÊ PF makes own automation changes
Procedures Cross- ÊÊ Sterile cockpit violations
verification

Checklist See the following breakdown

Normal Checklist ÊÊ Checklist performed from memory or omitted

ÊÊ Wrong challenge and response
ÊÊ Checklist performed late or at wrong time
ÊÊ Checklist items missed

Abnormal Checklist ÊÊ Checklist performed from memory or omitted

ÊÊ Wrong challenge and response
ÊÊ Checklist performed late or at wrong time
ÊÊ Checklist items missed

Callouts ÊÊ Omitted takeoff, descent, or approach callouts

Briefings ÊÊ Omitted departure, takeoff, approach, or handover briefing; items missed

ÊÊ Briefing does not address expected situation

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 221
3. FLIGHT CREW ERRORS (CONT’D)

Documentation See the following breakdown

ÊÊ Wrong weight and balance information, wrong fuel information

ÊÊ Wrong ATIS, or clearance recorded

ÊÊ Misinterpreted items on paperwork

ÊÊ Incorrect or missing log book entries

Failure to Go Around ÊÊ Failure to go around after destabilization on approach

ÊÊ Failure to go around after a bounced landing

Other Procedural ÊÊ Administrative duties performed after top of descent or before leaving active runway
ÊÊ Incorrect application of MEL

Communication Errors Examples

Crew to External
Communication See breakdown

With Air Traffic Control ÊÊ Flight crew to ATC – missed calls, misinterpretation of instructions, or incorrect read-
backs
ÊÊ Wrong clearance, taxiway, gate or runway communicated

With Cabin Crew ÊÊ Errors in Flight to Cabin Crew communication

ÊÊ Lack of communication

With Ground Crew ÊÊ Errors in Flight to Ground Crew communication

ÊÊ Lack of communication

With Dispatch ÊÊ Errors in Flight Crew to Dispatch communication

ÊÊ Lack of communication

With Maintenance ÊÊ Errors in Flight to Maintenance Crew communication

ÊÊ Lack of communication

Pilot-to-Pilot ÊÊ Within flight crew miscommunication

Communication ÊÊ Misinterpretation
ÊÊ Lack of communication

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 222
4. UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATES (UAS)
Definition: A flight-crew-induced aircraft state that clearly reduces safety margins; a safety-compromising situation that results from
ineffective error management. An undesired aircraft state is recoverable.

Mismanaged UAS: A UAS that is linked to or induces additional flight crew errors.

Undesired Aircraft
States Breakdown

Aircraft Handling ÊÊ Abrupt aircraft control

ÊÊ Vertical, lateral or speed deviations

ÊÊ Unnecessary weather penetration

ÊÊ Unauthorized airspace penetration

ÊÊ Operation outside aircraft limitations

ÊÊ Unstable approach

ÊÊ Continued landing after unstable approach

ÊÊ Long, floated, bounced, firm, porpoised, off-center landing

ÊÊ Landing with excessive crab angle

ÊÊ Rejected takeoff after V1

ÊÊ Controlled flight towards terrain

ÊÊ Other

Ground Navigation ÊÊ Proceeding towards wrong taxiway/runway

ÊÊ Wrong taxiway, ramp, gate or hold spot

ÊÊ Runway/taxiway incursion

ÊÊ Ramp Movements, including when under marshalling

ÊÊ Loss of Aircraft Control while on the Ground

ÊÊ Other

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 223
4. UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATES (UAS) (CONT’D)

Incorrect Aircraft ÊÊ Brakes, thrust reversers, ground spoilers

Configurations
ÊÊ Systems (fuel, electrical, hydraulics, pneumatics, air conditioning, pressurization/
instrumentation)

ÊÊ Landing gear

ÊÊ Flight controls/automation

ÊÊ Engine

ÊÊ Weight & balance

ÊÊ Other

5. END STATES
Definition: An end state is a reportable event. It is unrecoverable.

End States Definitions

Controlled Flight into ÊÊ In-flight collision with terrain, water, or obstacle without indication of loss of control
Terrain

Loss of Control – In-flight ÊÊ Loss of aircraft control while in flight

Runway Collision ÊÊ Any occurrence at an airport involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle,
person or wildlife on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and
takeoff of aircraft and resulting in a collision

Mid-air Collision ÊÊ Collision between aircraft in flight

Runway/Taxiway ÊÊ A veer off or overrun off the runway or taxiway surface

Excursion

In-flight Damage Damage occurring while airborne, including:

ÊÊ Weather-related events, technical failures, bird strikes and fire/smoke/fumes

Ground Damage Damage occurring while on the ground, including:

ÊÊ Occurrences during (or as a result of) ground handling operations
ÊÊ Collision while taxiing to or from a runway in use (excluding a runway collision)
ÊÊ Foreign object damage
ÊÊ Fire/smoke/fumes

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 224
5. END STATES (CONT’D)

Undershoot ÊÊ A touchdown off the runway surface

Hard Landing ÊÊ Any hard landing resulting in substantial damage

Gear-up Landing/ ÊÊ Any gear-up landing/collapse resulting in substantial damage

Gear Collapse (without a runway excursion)

Tailstrike ÊÊ Tailstrike resulting in substantial damage

Off-Airport Landing/ ÊÊ Any controlled landing outside of the airport area

Ditching

6. FLIGHT CREW COUNTERMEASURES

The following list includes countermeasures that the flight crew can take. Countermeasures from other areas, such as ATC, ground
operations personnel and maintenance staff, are not considered at this time.

Team Climate

Countermeasure Definition Example Performance

Communication Environment for open communication is Good cross talk – flow of information is fluid,
Environment established and maintained clear, and direct

No social or cultural disharmonies; right

amount of hierarchy gradient

Flight crew member reacts to assertive

callout of other crew member(s)

Leadership See the following breakdown

Captain Should Show Leadership and In command, decisive, and encourages crew
coordinate flight deck activities participation

First Officer (FO) is assertive when FO speaks up and raises concerns

necessary and is able to take over as the
leader

Overall Crew Overall, crew members should perform well Includes Flight, Cabin, Ground crew as well
Performance as risk managers as their interactions with ATC

Other Not clearly falling within the other categories

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 225
6. FLIGHT CREW COUNTERMEASURES (CONT’D)

Planning

SOP Briefing The required briefing should be interactive Concise and not rushed – bottom lines are
and operationally thorough established

Plans Stated Operational plans and decisions should be Shared understanding about plans –
communicated and acknowledged “Everybody on the same page”

Contingency Crew members should develop effective ÊÊ Threats and their consequences are
Management strategies to manage threats to safety anticipated
ÊÊ Use all available resources to manage
threats

Other Not clearly falling within the other categories

Execution

Monitor/ Crew members should actively monitor Aircraft position, settings, and crew actions
Cross-check and cross-check flight path, aircraft are verified
performance, systems and other crew
members

Workload Management Operational tasks should be prioritized ÊÊ Avoid task fixation

and properly managed to handle primary ÊÊ Do not allow work overload
flight duties

Automation Automation should be properly managed ÊÊ Brief automation setup

Management to balance situational and/or workload ÊÊ Effective recovery techniques from
requirements anomalies

Taxiway/Runway Crew members use caution and keep watch Clearances are verbalized and understood –
Management outside when navigating taxiways and airport and taxiway charts or aircraft cockpit
runways moving map displays are used when needed

Other Not clearly falling within the other categories

Review/Modify

Evaluation of Plans Existing plans should be reviewed and Crew decisions and actions are openly
modified when necessary analyzed to make sure the existing plan is
the best plan

Inquiry Crew members should not be afraid to “Nothing taken for granted” attitude –
ask questions to investigate and/or clarify crew members speak up without hesitation
current plans of action

Other Not clearly falling within the other categories

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 226
7. ADDITIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS

Additional
Classification Breakdown

Insufficient Data Accident does not contain sufficient data to be classified

Incapacitation Crew member unable to perform duties due to physical or psychological impairment

Fatigue Crew member unable to perform duties due to fatigue

Spatial Disorientation SGI is a form of spatial disorientation that occurs when a shift in the resultant gravitoinertial
and Spatial/ force vector created by a sustained linear acceleration is misinterpreted
Somatogravic Illusion as a change in pitch or bank attitude
(SGI)

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 227
The all accident rate for
airlines on the IOSA registry
was nearly four times better
than that of non-IOSA
airlines (0.56 vs. 2.17).
A3
Annex 3 – Accidents Summary
DATE MANUFACTURER AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION OPERATOR LOCATION PHASE SERVICE PROPULSION SEVERITY SUMMARY

02-01-17 Aircraft Let L-410 9Q-CZR Doren Air Congo Shabunda, DR Congo LND Cargo Turboprop Hull Loss The aircraft ran off the side of the runway after directional control
Industries (LET) was lost on landing

03-01-17 Airbus A321 VP-BES Aeroflot Russian Kaliningrad-Khrabrovo, LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a runway excursion on landing
Airlines Russia Damage

10-01-17 Airbus A320 RP-C8613 Philippine Airlines Kalibo, Philippines LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a runway excursion on landing
Damage

16-01-17 Boeing B747-400 TC-MCL myCARGO Airlines Bishkek - Manas GOA Cargo Jet Hull Loss The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact and post impact fire
International, Kyrgyzstan when it crashed into a residential district

28-01-17 Boeing B737-400 HK-5197 Aer Caribe Leticia, Colombia LND Cargo Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a runway excursion on landing
Damage

30-01-17 Airbus A320 RP-C8975 Philippines Manila - Ninoy Aquino LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a hard landing
AirAsia International, Philippines Damage

23-02-17 De Havilland Dash 8-400 G-JECP Flybe Amsterdam - Schiphol, LND Passenger Turboprop Substantial The aircraft suffered a gear collapse on landing
(Bombardier) Netherlands Damage

28-02-17 Boeing B767-300 N351AX Omni Air Azraq Airbase, Jordan LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a tailstrike on landing
International Damage

08-03-17 Boeing MD-80-83 N786TW Ameristar Detroit - Willow Run, RTO Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft overran the runway after initiating a rejected takeoff
(Douglas) Charters MI, USA Damage

20-03-17 ATR ATR 42-500 PR-TTH Total Linhas Urucu Airport, Coari, Brazil LND Passenger Turboprop Substantial The aircraft veered off the left side of the runway on landing
Aereas Damage

20-03-17 Antonov An-26 S9-TLZ South Sudan Wau, South Sudan LND Passenger Turboprop Hull Loss The aircraft collided with a fire truck on landing
Supreme Airlines

27-03-17 Boeing B737-400 EP-TBJ Taban Airlines Ardabil Airport, Iran LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft encountered tire burst while landing and the right-
Damage hand main landing gear retracted

28-03-17 Boeing B737-300 OB-2036-P Peruvian Air Line Jauja-Francisco Carlé LND Passenger Jet Hull Loss The aircraft burst into flames following a runway veer-off and gear
Airport, Peru collapse

01-04-17 Aircraft Let L-410 5X-EIV Eagle Air Yei Airport, South Sudan TOF Passenger Turboprop Substantial The aircraft suffered a runway excursion after failing to lift off
Industries (LET) Damage

ANNEX 3 – ACCIDENTS SUMMARY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 229

 DATE MANUFACTURER AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION OPERATOR LOCATION PHASE SERVICE PROPULSION SEVERITY SUMMARY

02-04-17 Airbus A319 C-GBHN Air Canada Jetz Tampa International PRF Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered damage after a vehicle collided with it during
Airport, USA Damage pre-departure procedures

08-04-17 Boeing B737-800 9M-MXX Malaysia Airlines Sibu, Malaysia LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft ran off the side of the runway on landing
Damage

10-04-17 Boeing B757-200 G-LSAI Jet2 Alicante Airport, Spain LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a tailstrike on landing
Damage

05-05-17 Shorts Shorts 330 N334AC Air Cargo Carriers Charleston - Yeager, LND Cargo Turboprop Hull Loss The aircraft impacted trees and went down the hill to the left of the
WV, USA runway located on top of the hill. The aircraft was destroyed.

27-05-17 Aircraft Let L-410 9N-AKY Goma Air Lukla-Tenzing-Hillary APR Cargo Turboprop Hull Loss The aircraft was destroyed when it impacted trees during landing
Industries (LET) Airport, Nepal

31-05-17 Boeing B737-300 PK-CJC Sriwijaya Air Manokwari-Rendani LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a runway excursion on landing
Airport, Indonesia Damage

02-06-17 Fairchild Metro XA-UAJ Aeronaves TSM Tampico-Gen F Javier Mina APR Cargo Turboprop Substantial The aircraft crashed during a forced landing
(Swearingen) Airport, Mexico Damage

03-06-17 Fokker Fokker F27 5Y-FMM Aero-Pioneer of Garbaharey Airport, LND Cargo Turboprop Substantial The aircraft collided with a building during landing
Friendship Africa Somalia Damage
600

10-06-17 Antonov An-32 HK-4833 Aer Caribe Tarapaca, Colombia LND Passenger Turboprop Substantial The aircraft suffered a runway excurion on landing
Damage

23-06-17 Airbus A321 N315DN Delta Air Lines Hartsfield - Jackson LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a tailstrike on landing
Atlanta International, USA Damage

27-06-17 Airbus A330-200 G-VYGL Jet2 Tenerife Sur Reina Sofia, LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft became disabled on the runway after bursting two
Spain Damage tires on landing

18-07-17 Boeing B737-300 PK-YGG Tri MG Airlines Wamena, Indonesia LND Cargo Jet Hull Loss The aircraft suffered a runway excursion on landing

27-07-17 Airbus A320 UR-AJC Atlasglobal En Route ICL Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered hail strike during initial climb
Ukraine Damage

29-07-17 Antonov An-74 UR-CKC Cavok Air Sao Tome and Principe TOF Cargo Jet Hull Loss The aircraft overran the runway after a rejected takeoff due to a
flock of birds

03-08-17 Boeing B737-900 PK-LJZ Lion Air Kuala Namu International TXI Passenger Jet Substantial Substantial damage in a ground collision accident
Airport, Indonesia Damage

03-08-17 ATR ATR 72 PK-WFF Wings Air Kuala Namu International TXO Passenger Turboprop Substantial Substantial damage in a ground collision accident
Airport, Indonesia Damage

22-08-17 Airbus Airbus A350 ET-ATR Ethiopian Airlines Addis Ababa - Bole TXO Passenger Jet Substantial Substantial damage in a ground collision accident
International, Ethiopia Damage

28-08-17 Antonov An-26 EK-26006 Coco Aviation Maban Airstrip, South LND Cargo Turboprop Hull Loss The aircraft caught fire after a runway excursion on landing
Sudan

ANNEX 3 – ACCIDENTS SUMMARY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 230

 DATE MANUFACTURER AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION OPERATOR LOCATION PHASE SERVICE PROPULSION SEVERITY SUMMARY

05-09-17 Boeing B737-800 VT-AYB Air India Express Cochin International LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a taxiway excursion after landing
Airport, India Damage

10-09-17 Antonov Antonov 9S-AFL Serve Air Goma - International, LND Cargo Turboprop Hull Loss The aircraft suffered a runway excursion
An-26 DR Congo

15-09-17 Airbus A321 N137AA American Airlines Grantley Adams, Barbados LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered tail damage on landing
Damage

20-09-17 Convair Convair XA-UNH Aeronaves TSM Saltillo - Plan de LND Cargo Turboprop Substantial The aircraft suffered a gear-up landing
CV-640 Guadelupe, Mexico Damage

30-09-17 Airbus A380-800 F-HPJE Air France En Route CRZ Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered an engine failure and engine inlet separation
Damage

13-10-17 Airbus A320 RP-C3237 Cebu Pacific Air Iloilo, Philippines LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a runway excursion on landing
Damage

14-10-17 Antonov An-26 ER-AVB Valan Abidjan, Ivory Coast APR Cargo Turboprop Hull Loss The aircraft was destroyed after it came to a stop in the sea
International
Cargo Charter

08-11-17 BAE Systems BAE 146-200 ZS-ASW Airlink En Route DST Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered an uncontained engine failure
Damage

10-11-17 De Havilland Dash 8-400 G-JEDU Flybe Belfast, Northern Ireland ICL Passenger Turboprop Substantial The aircraft suffered a nose gear problem during initial climb
(Bombardier) Damage

15-11-17 Aircraft Let L-410 RA-67047 Khabarovsk Nelkan, Russia APR Passenger Turboprop Hull Loss The aircraft impacted the ground short of runway
Industries (LET) Airlines

19-11-17 ATR ATR 72 VH-FVZ Virgin Australia Canberra, Australia LND Passenger Turboprop Substantial The aircraft suffered a hard landing accident
Damage

25-11-17 ATR ATR 72 9G-SBF Starbow Accra - Kotoka TOF Passenger Turboprop Substantial The aircraft suffered a runway excursion during takeoff
International, Ghana Damage

13-12-17 ATR ATR 42-300 C-GWEA West Wind Fond-du-Lac, SK, Canada ICL Passenger Turboprop Hull Loss The aircraft suffered an impact with terrain shortly after takeoff
Aviation

ANNEX 3 – ACCIDENTS SUMMARY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 231

Turboprop operations
accounted for 20% of all
sectors flown last year,
yet represented 44% of
all accidents and 83% of
all fatal accidents.
A4
Annex 4 – Table of Sectors
This table provides a breakdown of the sectors used in the production of rates for this report by aircraft type and year.
It is up-to-date as at the time of report production.

MANUFACTURER MODEL 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Aerospatiale 262 670 - - - -

Airbus A300 180,019 158,134 143,185 144,730 144,512

Airbus A310 57,431 53,113 43,018 33,672 24,333

Airbus A318 107,144 107,726 99,492 93,341 97,596

Airbus A319 2,259,530 2,324,184 2,354,105 2,330,692 2,261,704

Airbus A320 5,208,440 5,681,627 6,261,586 6,754,887 6,910,849

Airbus A321 1,169,492 1,330,011 1,547,023 1,838,889 2,127,029

Airbus A330 830,472 908,831 985,090 1,023,167 1,082,471

Airbus A340 171,823 148,458 130,867 117,029 103,876

Airbus A350 - 49 5,009 31,847 117,280

Airbus A380 56,136 71,207 89,214 107,284 119,868

Aircraft Industries (LET) 410 116,155 121,446 121,400 118,875 115,331

Antonov An-12 5,500 4,626 3,676 3,485 4,574

Antonov An-124 6,242 5,970 5,909 6,477 7,210

Antonov An-140 3,891 1,876 864 555 552

Antonov An-148 14,932 14,879 20,638 22,188 25,506

Antonov An-158 2,462 7,332 8,285 10,370 6,920

Antonov An-22 - - - 33 76

Antonov An-225 47 30 48 48 48

Antonov An-24 38,086 33,825 32,378 31,893 29,428

Antonov An-26 20,623 19,627 19,698 20,428 20,602

ANNEX 4 – TABLE OF SECTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 233

 MANUFACTURER MODEL 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Antonov An-28 4,147 3,762 3,725 3,512 3,195

Antonov An-3 700 695 692 697 695

Antonov An-30 842 942 860 782 780

Antonov An-32 5,114 5,500 5,122 4,754 5,428

Antonov An-38 3,056 2,445 1,600 1,584 994

Antonov An-72 / An-74 3,365 3,854 3,644 3,611 3,625

ATR ATR 42 350,192 354,614 334,467 342,366 345,593

ATR ATR 72 997,084 1,186,989 1,196,735 1,323,089 1,425,175

Avro RJ100 136,494 151,011 145,960 139,044 113,083

BAE Systems 146 53,879 50,997 44,974 38,925 45,029

BAE Systems ATP 25,617 29,607 27,288 20,055 19,816

BAE Systems Jetstream 31 267,886 276,864 275,839 257,096 245,815

BAE Systems Jetstream 41 96,550 95,733 79,936 79,806 89,083

BAE Systems (Hawker Siddeley) 748 13,032 12,637 11,431 11,569 11,658

Boeing 707 68 - - - -

Boeing 717 276,326 266,898 264,908 296,841 297,770

Boeing 727 59,819 42,357 37,502 35,626 28,359

Boeing 737 8,711,945 9,120,978 9,557,600 10,250,149 10,953,200

Boeing 747 369,840 340,625 326,334 307,544 300,207

Boeing 757 761,006 708,178 623,897 621,925 623,098

Boeing 767 798,008 809,573 663,517 707,923 887,704

Boeing 777 815,441 863,851 922,483 995,245 1,071,469

Boeing 787 43,580 122,504 218,003 313,032 403,149

Boeing (Douglas) DC-10 49,694 44,784 40,015 34,451 29,409

Boeing (Douglas) DC-3 7,028 8,181 9,453 10,065 9,300

Boeing (Douglas) DC-8 2,184 981 455 205 233

Boeing (Douglas) DC-9 74,046 33,955 32,151 32,564 30,644

Boeing (Douglas) MD-11 104,291 95,002 79,684 75,043 75,108

Boeing (Douglas) MD-80 701,594 612,615 586,866 580,088 593,900

Boeing (Douglas) MD-90 107,591 108,547 109,502 103,160 94,342

Bombardier C Series - - - 2,757 31,500

ANNEX 4 – TABLE OF SECTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 234

 MANUFACTURER MODEL 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Canadair (Bombardier) CRJ 2,479,228 2,381,484 2,322,681 2,371,668 2,389,183

Canadair (Bombardier) CL-415 2,592 2,796 2,917 2,925 2,919

CASA / lAe 212 36,510 30,305 30,523 33,089 31,562

CASA / lAe 235 5,910 6,525 7,090 7,102 7,092

Comac ARJ21 - - 226 3,168 5,859

Convair 580 37,699 37,324 36,189 32,124 27,904

Convair 640 4,180 4,849 4,920 4,859 4,744

De Havilland (Bombardier) DHC-6 775,401 790,750 821,902 844,605 844,838

De Havilland (Bombardier) DHC-7 48,320 44,708 35,836 25,325 22,739

De Havilland (Bombardier) DHC-8 1,759,579 1,733,225 1,731,313 1,718,466 1,768,818

De Havilland (Bombardier) DHC-5 1,281 1,547 1,084 986 -

Embraer 110 Bandeirante 53,152 52,231 54,894 55,650 53,692

Embraer 120 Brasilia 186,468 176,733 94,985 94,327 96,769

Embraer 135 200,214 206,515 225,922 234,443 225,591

Embraer 140 169,317 111,320 40,591 31,126 14,404

Embraer 145 1,181,763 1,073,134 846,029 739,647 708,784

Embraer 170 339,713 326,566 321,732 293,214 277,377

Embraer 175 310,485 389,442 476,608 626,154 760,991

Embraer 190 814,416 892,461 922,952 883,642 860,921

Embraer 195 207,588 217,987 245,064 281,331 299,819

Evektor EV-55 Outback EV55 - - - - 3,302

Fairchild (Swearingen) Metro 809,564 774,333 757,614 748,054 710,714

Fairchild Dornier 228 184,945 185,027 180,332 183,246 190,735

Fairchild Dornier 328 70,147 66,788 61,899 60,867 56,386

Fairchild Dornier 328JET 45,636 54,767 55,419 53,572 53,624

Fokker 100 198,592 182,038 156,617 136,843 125,055

Fokker 50 110,013 78,348 66,457 70,025 43,299

Fokker 70 69,988 56,567 54,868 48,010 22,304

Fokker F27 9,376 6,502 4,015 3,184 3,571

Fokker F28 2,392 457 357 357 -

Gippsland Aeronautics N22B / N24A Nomad 306 306 417 441 440

ANNEX 4 – TABLE OF SECTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 235

 MANUFACTURER MODEL 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Grumman G73 Turbo Mallard 5,945 5,946 5,945 5,966 5,946

Gulfstream Aerospace (Grumman) G-I 7,329 6,576 5,471 5,258 5,237

Harbin Y12 16,550 16,246 17,319 17,100 18,077

Hawker Beechcraft 1900 1,061,194 1,073,525 1,050,529 1,006,076 983,231

Hawker Beechcraft C99 208,940 205,171 204,479 201,499 198,779

Ilyushin Il-114 1,219 1,292 1,292 1,296 1,293

Ilyushin Il-18 2,366 2,192 2,036 2,282 1,801

Ilyushin Il-62 3,322 2,819 2,198 2,284 2,489

Ilyushin Il-76 22,309 21,703 20,527 19,466 19,928

Ilyushin Il-96 6,551 3,934 3,854 4,204 4,213

Lockheed Martin L-1011 Tristar 790 - - - -

L-182 / L-282 / L-382

Lockheed Martin 28,659 25,121 25,593 24,572 24,147
(L-100) Hercules

Lockheed Martin L-188 347 962 1,132 1,896 2,137

NAMC YS-11 4,958 3,720 3,721 3,452 4,276

Saab 2000 50,969 53,744 52,346 44,927 45,851

Saab 340 333,776 306,297 294,106 283,533 299,391

Shorts 330 13,927 12,662 9,767 5,869 4,152

Shorts 360 64,915 63,555 59,135 60,970 63,748

Shorts Skyvan (SC-7) 10,182 8,711 8,755 8,253 8,090

Sukhoi Superjet 100 13,226 33,615 61,979 86,985 116,543

Tupolev Tu-134 17,550 14,473 14,066 12,469 10,916

Tupolev Tu-154 28,242 18,871 13,191 10,022 6,457

Tupolev Tu-204 / Tu-214 12,212 11,770 10,980 9,616 10,573

Xian MA-60 8,014 9,277 9,527 10,042 11,343

Yakovlev Yak-40 31,592 27,099 24,105 22,864 23,137

Yakovlev Yak-42 / Yak-142 20,801 20,580 19,905 16,079 13,734

Source: Ascend - A Flightglobal Advisory Service

ANNEX 4 – TABLE OF SECTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 236

LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

Accident Category Abbreviation

Abbreviation Full Name

RWY/TWY EXC Runway/Taxiway Excursion
G UP LDG/CLPSE Gear Up Landing/Gear Collapse
GND DAMAGE Ground Damage
HARD LDG Hard Landing
IN-F DAMAGE In-Flight Damage
LOC-I Loss of Control – In-Flight
CFIT Controlled Flight into Terrain
TAILSTRIKE Tailstrike
UNDERSHOOT Undershoot
OTHER Other End State
OFF AIRP LDG Off-Airport Landing
MID-AIR COLL Mid-Air Collision
RWY COLL Runway Collision

List of Acronyms

Acronym Meaning
ARC Abnormal Runway Contact
ACTG Accident Classification Technical Group
AFI Africa
ANSPs Air Navigation Service Providers
AOC Air Operator Certificate
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Services
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ACTF Aircraft
A4E Airlines for Europe
ACI Airports Council International
APR Approach (IATA Phase of Flight)
APV Approaches with Vertical Guidance

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List of Acronyms (Cont’d)

Acronym Meaning
ATOs Approved Training Organizations
RNAV Area Navigation
AES Arrival/Engine Shutdown (IATA Phase of Flight)
ASPAC Asia-Pacific
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information System
ACRS Aviation Confidential Reporting System
ACSTF Aviation Cyber Security Task Force
AVSEC Aviation Security
BAST Brazilian Aviation Safety Team
CAB Cabin Operations
COSC Cabin Operations and Safety Conference
COSTG Cabin Operations Safety Technical Group
CABIN Cabin Safety Events
CSSG Cargo Safety Sub-Group
CICTT CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CANSO Civil Air Navigation Services Organization
CAAS Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
CTOL Collision with obstacle(s) during takeoff and landing
CAST Commercial Aviation Safety Team
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CBTA-TF Competency-based Training and Assessment Task Force
CBT Competency based Training
Cont’d Continued
CANPA Continuous Angle Non-Precision Approaches
CDFA Continuous Descent Final Approach
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain
CRM Crew Resource Management
CRZ Cruise (IATA Phase of Flight)
DAQCP Deicing/Anti-Icing Quality Control Pool
DH Decision Height
DfT Department for Transport
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DST Descent (IATA Phase of Flight)
DAA Detect and Avoid
ECL En Route Climb (IATA Phase of Flight)
ESD Engine Start/Depart (IATA Phase of Flight)

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List of Acronyms (Cont’d)

Acronym Meaning
E&M Engineering and Maintenance
EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
E-GPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
EUR Europe
EAPPRI European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
ECA European Cockpit Association
EHA European Helicopter Association
EBT Evidence-based Training
FMTF Fatigue Management Task Force
FRMS Fatigue Risk Management System
FAA Federal Aviation Administration (U.S.)
FO First Officer
FLC Flight Close (IATA Phase of Flight)
FDA Flight Data Analysis
FDM Flight Data Monitoring
FMS Flight Management System
FLTOPS-CSSG Flight Operations Panel Cargo Safety Sub-Group
FOQA Flight Operations Quality Assurance
FLP Flight Planning
FSTD Flight Simulation Training Devices
FOD Foreign Object Debris
FLE Full-Loss Equivalents
FCF Functional Check Flights
G UP LDG/CLPSE Gear Up Landing/Gear Collapse
GADM Global Aviation Data Management
GASeP Global Aviation Security Plan
GPS Global Positioning System
GRSAP Global Runway Safety Action Plan
GSIE Global Safety Information Exchange
GOA Go-around (IATA Phase of Flight)
G-COL Ground Collision
GND DAMAGE Ground Damage
RAMP Ground Handling
GS Ground Safety
GSPs Ground Service Providers
GDS Ground Servicing (IATA Phase of Flight)

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List of Acronyms (Cont’d)

Acronym Meaning
HARD LDG Hard Landing
HITG Hazard Identification Technical Group
HL Hull Loss
I-ASC IATA Aviation Safety Culture
IDQP IATA Drinking Water Quality Pool
IFQP IATA Fuel Quality Pool
IOSA IATA Operational Safety Audit
ISAGO IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations
ISSA IATA Standard Safety Assessment
ISARPs IATA Standards and Recommended Practices
ISM IATA Standards Manual
IN-F DAMAGE In-flight Damage
ISDs Inadvertent Slide Deployments
IFBP In-flight Broadcast Procedure
ICL Initial Climb (IATA Phase of Flight)
MED Injuries to and/or Incapacitation of Persons
IEs Instructors and Evaluators
ILS Instrument Landing Systems
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IMX Integrated Management Solution
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IFALPA International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Association
IFATCA International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations
ISO International Standards Organization
IRM Issue Review Meeting
KSAs Knowledge, Skills and Attitudes
LND Landing (IATA Phase of Flight)
LATAM/CAR Latin-America and Caribbean
LOSA Line Operations Safety Audit
LOFT Line Oriented Flight Training
LOC-G Loss of Control – Ground
LOC-I Loss of Control – In Flight
MRO Maintenance Repair Operator
MTOW Maximum Takeoff Weight
MoC Memorandum of Collaboration
MoU Memorandum of Understanding

LIST OF ACRONYMS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 240

List of Acronyms (Cont’d)

Acronym Meaning
MID-AIR COLL Mid-Air Collision
MENA Middle Eastern and North Africa
MDA Minimum Decent Altitude
MEL Minimum Equipment List
MPL Multi-Crew Pilot License
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board (U.S.)
NavAids Navigational Aids
NAM North America
NASIA North Asia
OFF AIRP LDG Off Airport Landing
OD Operational Damage
OPS Operations
OPC Operations Committee
OEMs Original Equipment Manufacturers
OTH Other
PBN Performance-based Navigation
PED Personal Electronic Device
PAT Pilot Aptitude Testing
PTTF Pilot Training Task Force
PSF Post-Flight (IATA Phase of Flight)
PRF Preflight (IATA Phase of Flight)
PANS-TRG Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Training
RF Radio-frequency
RTO Rejected Takeoff (ATA Phase of Flight)
RNP Required Navigation Performance
RAAS Runway Awareness and Advisory System
RWY COLL Runway Collision
RESA Runway End Safety Area
RE Runway Excursion
RI Runway Incursion
ROPS Runway Overrun Protection Systems
RS Runway Safety
RST Runway Safety Team
RWSL Runway Status Lights
RWY/TWY EXC Runway/Taxiway Excursion
SAFO Safety Alerts for Operators
SFO Safety and Flight Operations

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List of Acronyms (Cont’d)

Acronym Meaning
SG Safety Group
SISG Safety Improvement Sub-Group
SMI Safety Management Implementation
SMS Safety Management System
SPIs Safety Performance Indicators
SPARC Safety Predictive Analytics Research Center
STEADES Safety Trends Evaluation, Analysis and Data Exchange System
SEG Security Group
SAE G-27 Society of Automotive Engineers
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SARPs Standards and Recommended Practices
SSP State Safety Program
SD Substantial Damage
SCF-NP System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Powerplant)
SCF-PP System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Powerplant)
TAILSTRIKE Tails Strike
TOF Takeoff (IATA Phase of Flight)
TXI Taxi-in (IATA Phase of Flight)
TXO Taxi-out (IATA Phase of Flight)
TAWS Terrain Awareness Warning System
TEM Threat and Error Management
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
TCAS RA Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory
TSA Transport Security Administration
TURB Turbulence Encounter
USOS Undershoot/Overshoot
UAS Undesired Aircraft State
UNK Unknown
UK United Kingdom
UAS Unmanned Aircraft Systems
UPRT Upset Prevention and Recovery Training

LIST OF ACRONYMS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2017 – page 242

Published in Canada ISBN 978-92-9229-644-5