Effective April 1, 2021

Safety Report 2020

Issued April 2021

Edition 57
 NOTICE
DISCLAIMER. The information contained in this
publication is subject to constant review in the
light of changing government requirements and
regulations. No subscriber or other reader should
act on the basis of any such information without
referring to applicable laws and regulations and/
or without taking appropriate professional advice.
Although every effort has been made to ensure
accuracy, the International Air Transport Associa-
tion (IATA) shall not be held responsible for any loss
or damage caused by errors, omissions, misprints
or misinterpretation of the contents hereof. Fur-
thermore, the IATA expressly disclaims any and all
liability to any person or entity, whether a purchas-
er of this publication or not, in respect of anything
done or omitted, and the consequences of any-
thing done or omitted, by any such person or en-
tity in reliance on the contents of this publication.

Opinions expressed in advertisements appearing

in this publication are the advertiser’s opinions and
do not necessarily reflect those of IATA. The men-
tion of specific companies or products in adver-
tisement does not imply that they are endorsed or
recommended by IATA in preference to others of a
similar nature that are not mentioned or advertised.

© International Air Transport Association.

All Rights Reserved.

Senior Vice-President
Safety and Flight Operations
International Air Transport Association
800 Place Victoria
P.O. Box 113
Montreal, Quebec
CANADA H4Z 1M1

Safety Report 2020 (Issued April 2021), 57th Edition

ISBN 978-92-9264-412-3
© 2121 International Air Transport Association. All rights reserved.
Printed in Canada
Montreal—Geneva
Senior Vice-President
Foreword

Dear colleagues,
The year 2020 was the most challenging in our industry’s history. Owing to
border closures and related travel restrictions, as well as fears about catching
COVID during air travel, flight operations declined 53% compared to 2019.
During this pandemic crisis, government and industry stakeholders came
together to address the need for flexibility and temporary measures that were
critical to keeping the industry flying. IATA deployed Safety Risk Assessments
and developed extensive Guidance Materials in a number of areas, to support
the industry’s continued safe operation. Additionally, we raised awareness
of emerging safety issues through the publication and dissemination of
Operational Safety Notices highlighting potential risk areas such as unstable
approaches, contaminated aircraft systems, and fatigue.
Looking at the safety performance in 2020:
• The number of total accidents and fatal accidents both declined compared
to 2019.
• Nevertheless, aviation is so safe that even one accident can skew the
accident rate, and this is particularly the case when flight operations are
greatly reduced. In 2020, the accident rate increased to 1.71 per million
sectors from 1.11 in 2019. The rate for IATA members improved to 0.83 from
0.87.
• The industry’s fatality risk increased from 0.09 in 2019 to 0.13 in 2020. This
means on average, a person would need to take a flight every day for 461
years to be involved in an accident with at least one fatality, or 20,392 years
to face a 100% fatal accident.
Gilberto Lopez Meyer
Senior Vice-President • Looking at averages, the data show a continued reduction in accidents,
Safety and Flight Operations when considering a five-year average rate, from 2.24 (2011-2015) to 1.38
International Air Transport Association (2016-2020).
• There were zero Loss of Control — In-flight (LOC-I) accidents (and fatalities)
for the first time in over 15 years. It, however, remains the highest fatality
risk over the last five years, accounting for 698 fatalities. Therefore, focus
remains on the fatality risk associated with this accident category.
The IATA Board of Governors has adopted a new safety goal focused on the
continual reduction in the all-accident rate, highlighting that safety remains our
industry’s #1 priority. A new IATA Safety Strategy has been developed to deliver
on this goal by continuously improving safety performance through an industry
collaborative effort to identify and manage global aviation safety risks.
It is our privilege to offer you this 57th edition of the IATA Safety Report.
I encourage you to share the vital information contained in these pages with
your colleagues. I would like to thank the Accident Classification Technical
Group (ACTG), the Safety, Flight and Ground Operations Advisory Council
(SFGOAC), the Safety Group (SG), the Cabin Operations Safety Technical
Group (COSTG), and all IATA staff involved for their cooperation and expertise,
essential for the creation of this report.
For effective Safety
Leadership in aviation,
airline executives should
set a leadership mindset
that enables safety-focused
behaviors to embed a posi­
tive organizational safety
culture. Applied globally,
this should be supported
by clearly defined safety
accountabilities to enable
an effective safety culture to
exist within each, and every,
aviation service provider
around the world.
Chairman
Foreword

2020 has been an unprecedented year. In economic terms, no industry

has been more severely affected by COVID-19 than aviation. International
passenger demand in 2020 was 75.6% below 2019 levels. Of course with a
drastic reduction in the number of sectors flown, the safety statistics have
also been distorted.
When we look at the contributing factors present in 2020 accidents, manual
handling is at top of the contributing factors associated with flight crew errors.
Other areas of concern are deficient safety management systems, regulatory
oversight, and selection systems, all of them latent conditions present in the
system before the accident happened. These latent conditions have been
present consistently year after year, highlighting the need for improvement
in these areas.
IATA has called on governments to work with airlines to maintain safety
standards and critical skill levels during the pandemic as well as the safe
restart and scale-up of operations during the recovery.
There will be a big challenge ahead to reactivate thousands of grounded
aircraft, managing the qualifications and readiness of millions of licensed
personnel and dealing with a major drain of experienced workers.
Unfortunately, in 2020, we have again seen a commercial transport aircraft
being shot down, this time PS752. The preliminary accident report reveals
that an air defense unit misread the heading of the plane, failed to identify it
as a passenger aircraft and fired two missiles without authorization. Sadly, all
176 persons on board died. As this accident is considered a deliberate act, it
is considered in the aviation security statistics, and therefore is not included
in the final figures of this safety report.

Captain Rubén Morales It is very important for governments, aircraft operators, air navigation service
Chair, IATA Accident Classification providers and other airspace users, to work together to share the most up-
Technical Group to-date conflict zone risk-based information available to assure the safety of
civilian flights.
On a positive note, in November 2020, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) cleared the Boeing 737 MAX to fly for the first time since the plane was
involved in two deadly crashes within five months of each other, leading to
the grounding of the B737 MAX fleet in March 2019.
I would like to thank the members of Accident Classification Technical Group
(ACTG) and IATA staff for producing this report. This year required extra
effort, flexibility and innovation to bring the report to you in a timely manner,
with the same level of quality, despite the travel restrictions imposed as a
consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Safety Report 2020
Executive Summary
In 2020, there were 38 accidents versus 52 in 2019. The number Over the last decade, the industry continued its 10-year trend
of fatal accidents decreased from eight accidents in 2019 to five of declining fatal accident rates and fatality risk. In 2011, there
in 2020. The number of fatalities declined from 240 in 2019 to were 22 fatal accidents that resulted in 492 fatalities. Over
132 in 2020. This includes all deaths from commercial aircraft the past five years, there have been an average of eight fatal
accidents, but excludes unlawful acts. accidents per year for commercial aircraft (passengers and
cargo) resulting in 222 fatalities annually. In 2017, aviation
The global COVID-19 pandemic has had a severe impact on had its safest year on record with only 19 deaths and no fatal
the aviation industry in 2020, causing a significant drop in the passenger jet accidents. IATA continues its focus on supporting
number of commercial flights operated. Just over 22 million aviation stakeholders to continuously reduce industry fatality
flights were operated last year, which is about the same risk.
number as were flown in the 1990s. Commercial flights tracked
worldwide fell about 53% when compared to 2019 due to The accident categories in 2020 listed in order of the
travel restrictions imposed by government and health officials number of fatalities were:
to control the spread of COVID-19. As a result, even with the
lower number of accidents in 2020 when compared to 2019, • In-flight Damage (2) with 104 fatalities
the industry witnessed an increase in the global accident rate
in 2020, up from 1.11 per million sectors in 2019 to 1.71 in 2020. • Runway/Taxiway Excursion (2) with 24 fatalities
However, the five-year average rate (2016-2020) was lower
than that of the previous five-year period (2011-2015) at 1.38 vs. • Controlled Flight into Terrain (1) with 4 fatalities
2.24 accidents per million sectors. The Jet Hull Loss rate per
million sectors was 0.21 in 2020 vs 0.15 in 2019. The top five accident categories in 2020 listed by the frequency
of accidents (including the ones with fatalities) were:
The accidents in 2020 with the highest fatalities included an
aircraft that crashed into a residential area in May, killing 97 • Runway/Taxiway Excursion (9)
passengers and crew (including one person on the ground), and
a runway excursion accident in August, killing 21 passengers • Hard Landing (7)
and crew. The fatality risk was 0.13 in 2020 compared to 0.09
in 2019. • Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse (6)

On 8 January 2020, the world experienced a shocking tragedy • In-flight Damage (5)
with the shooting down of Ukrainian International Airlines
Flight 752, minutes after takeoff from Tehran Imam Khomeini • Ground Damage (3)
International Airport. All 176 people on board perished. Similar
to MH17, this is another tragic example of what can go wrong When considering accidents per region:
around conflict zones. The incident is considered an unlawful
act and is, therefore, included in aviation security statistics and • North Asia (NASIA) operators had zero accidents in 2020.
not in this report.
• 29% of the commercial air transport accidents in 2020
Of the 38 aircraft accidents and 132 fatalities in 2020, involved North American (NAM) operators followed by Asia-
International Air Transport Association (IATA) member airlines Pacific (ASPAC) operators with 18% of total accidents.
had two fatal accidents, which accounted for 100 fatalities.
In 2020, IATA member airlines continued to trend lower than • Africa (AFI) had the highest accident rate with 22.27
the industry at 0.83 accidents per million sectors versus 1.71 accidents per million sectors.
– a pattern also reflected in the five-year average. The full-
year accident rate for IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA)- • IATA membership and IOSA accreditation for non-IATA
registered carriers in 2020 was lower than the rate for non- members continued a strong correlation with improved
IOSA carriers. (1.20 vs 3.29). safety performance.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 5

Cabin Safety: Report Findings and IATA Prevention Strategies:

• 16 of 24 passenger accidents in 2020 resulted in cabin end Accident Classification Technical Group (ACTG) members
state classification. The remaining eight accidents did not reviewed each accident that occurred in 2020 and assigned
have a significant cabin impact. the classifications that are used in this report. The ACTG has
identified a few areas of concern that need to be addressed by
• The time available for cabin crew to prepare, the level of cabin industry stakeholders and provides guidelines on some specific
preparation accomplished, and the method of evacuation or accident categories, such as Loss of Control — In-flight (LOC-I),
disembarkation was assessed for each accident. Where this Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT), Runway Excursion and
was identified, 80% of accidents did not afford any time for others, to support this.
cabin crew to consider any additional cabin preparation.

• IATA published guidance documents relating to cabin

operations and COVID-19 health precautions throughout the
year. These are summarized in this report where risks and
mitigations, as identified through IATA, are presented.

• As the year ended, many airlines reported ongoing issues

with passenger compliance with wearing masks and face
coverings on board. This report includes some observations
and recommendations on this issue.

6 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Managing Safety in Aviation
IATA SAFETY STRATEGY Each of these six key areas breaks down into several
subcategories to address specific aspects of the strategy.
The IATA Board of Governors has adopted a new safety goal Aviation security is also key to maintaining operations resilient
focused on the continual reduction in the aviation all-accident to threats. Some of the work carried out by IATA in this area is
rate and, through this, highlighting how safety remains our described below.
#1 priority.

A new IATA Safety Strategy has been developed around three CONSIDERATIONS ON 2020 AND THE
key pillars to deliver on this goal by continuously improving
safety performance through an industry-led collaborative effort COVID-19 PANDEMIC
to identify and manage global aviation safety risks.
IATA’s 76th Annual General Meeting (AGM) unanimously
1. Safety Leadership – Establishing a leadership mindset approved a resolution reconfirming the airlines’ unwavering
among industry executives that enables desired commitment to safety and sustainability as we endeavor to
organizational behavior to embed; and, effectively reconnect the planet.
implementing a positive safety culture within every aviation
service provider around the world, which is supported by The resolution called on governments to:
clearly defined safety accountabilities.
1. Ensure the industry’s viability with continued financial and
2. Safety Risk - Utilizing an IATA Global Safety Risk regulatory support.
Management Framework to capture, assess, prioritize, and
manage identified industry safety risks and develop safety 2. Aid the industry in reaching its 2050 goal of cutting emissions
improvement programs to meet the industry’s needs. to half of 2005 levels while exploring pathways to net zero
carbon emissions through economic stimulus investments
3. Safety Connect – Creating a connected IATA community in commercializing Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF).
where IATA safety improvement programs actively
engage all IATA members to support them in continuous 3. Work with airlines to ensure safety standards and critical
improvement. skills are maintained both during the crisis and in the
subsequent restart and scale-up of operations.
The strategy was developed in consultation with the IATA Safety
Group (SG) and IATA Safety, Flight and Ground Operations The IATA membership also reiterated its commitment to safety.
Advisory Committee (SFGOAC). During the crisis, this is evidenced in the comprehensive
takeoff guidance published by the International Civil Aviation
With the implementation of this new strategy, IATA will work Organization (ICAO) with the support of IATA and other
toward achieving its set goal for 2021 of reducing the five- industry stakeholders. This lays the foundation for the
year rolling average accident rate per million flights compared harmonized implementation of a multi-layered approach to
to 2020. keeping travelers and crew safe. While 86% of people currently
traveling report that they feel safe with the new measures, there
As the new IATA Safety Strategy evolves and new priorities is still work to be done for universal implementation.
are identified, we remain focused on continuously driving
enhancements through our six-point action plan. The resolution further called on governments to work with
airlines to maintain safety standards and critical skill levels
during the crisis and in a safe restart and scale-up of operations
IATA SIX-POINT ACTION PLAN in the recovery. “We must plan carefully with regulators how to
safely ramp up operations in the eventual recovery. Reactivating
The activities related to these areas focus on specific thousands of grounded aircraft, managing the qualifications
organizational and operational safety issues. IATA works closely and readiness of millions of licensed personnel and dealing
with industry stakeholders to ensure each of these areas is with a major drain of experienced workers will be key to a safe
leveraged to deliver key tangible safety outcomes. restart. From the earliest stages of the crisis, we worked with
ICAO and regulators on a framework to do this. And this work
1. Reduce operational risk
continues as the crisis drags on beyond expectations,” said
2. Support consistent implementation of safety management Alexandre de Juniac, Director General and CEO of IATA.
3. Identify and address emerging safety issues IATA Accident Classification Technical Group (ACTG)
4. Support effective recruitment and training COVID-19 considerations:

5. Enhance quality and compliance The ACTG, based on the accidents analyzed and classified in
6. Advocate for improved aviation infrastructure 2020 and discussions held by its safety experts, provides the
following recommendation for the industry restart in 2021:
MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 7
Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and related travel re- SUPPORT CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF
strictions and lockdowns enforced in most countries, aviation SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
operational professionals worldwide, especially flight crews,
have seen a significant change in their roster. Many of them The aviation industry has been able to
have been grounded, either temporarily or permanently, and manage the COVID-19 pandemic crisis as
most of the airlines still flying have been operating a greatly well as it has through the Safety Management
reduced number of flights. Research has shown that situa- principles that have been developed and
tional awareness, problem-solving and decision-making skills, elements of which that have been put in
among other aspects, can deteriorate due to lack of use. It is place. Although there are varying stages of
most important that airlines identify and mitigate this risk by understanding and implementation around the world, the use
implementing appropriate training and awareness programs of risk management and safety risk assessments to maintain a
for crews returning to work. Fatigue management and opera- focus on safety during such a critical time is a testament to how
tional safety should remain a primary focus, and airlines should far we have come. Additionally, the trust and collaborative
continue to encourage operational personnel to provide timely relationships between regulators and operators that have been
safety reports to ensure no aspect has been overlooked in re- established due to the nature of Safety Management programs
suming flight operations. have certainly helped the aviation industry make timely and
effective decisions during this challenging time.
Flight crew members should not underestimate the
consequences of a long period of grounding or limited flying In 2020, IATA focused a lot of attention on a risk management
on their abilities. Therefore, they should make sure they are framework, which identified critical risks that emerged as a
mentally, emotionally and cognitively fit to resume flying, result of the pandemic. IATA then created timely and relevant
familiar with COVID-19 health and safety arrangements, and guidance material with supporting safety risk assessments for
fully compliant with recency requirements and any applicable operators and other applicable stakeholders to consider when
operating limitations. They should also understand there is managing these newly identified or elevated risks. IATA also
an increased likelihood of operational challenges, including stressed the importance of operators keeping a safety focus
rapid changes in notices to airmen (NOTAMs), technical during this time, which is extremely challenging when trying to
issues associated with prolonged grounding of their aircraft, survive as a business.
disruption to air traffic control (ATC) and airport services, and
changes in flight duty periods. As the Safety Management System (SMS) framework and the
purpose of each element is well understood, IATA is preparing
a multi-year SMS strategy that will not only keep the evolution
REDUCE OPERATIONAL RISK and continuous improvement of Safety Management moving
forward, but also provide the mechanism for operators to
IATA remains focused on its top safety engage more directly with each other and other industry
priorities, which include Runway Excursions, stakeholders in influencing the way forward.
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT), Loss of
Control–In-flight (LOC-I), Mid-Air Collision, IATA Global Safety Risk Management Framework
among others, while continuing to promote
the implementation of new safety initiatives. COVID-19, the upheaval and unprecedented change that
Based on analyses of accident data for commercial air transport it created for the industry cannot be overstated. Managing
operations, IATA and the ACTG have developed the change and subsequent risks in a fluid environment can
recommendations to address: be challenging for even the most mature safety programs.
During this time, IATA has developed a COVID-19 Safety Risk
Loss of Control — In-flight Management Framework to capture, analyze and address new
or emerging safety risks resulting from multiple alleviations,
Controlled Flight into Terrain exemptions and new business models introduced to aviation
since the start of the pandemic.
Runway Excursions
As we look forward to the industry restarting and flourishing,
Unstable Approaches IATA will be leveraging the success of the COVID-19 Risk
Framework through a database solution available to all its
Ground Damage Accidents member airlines to generate a global picture of safety risks
where, in collaboration with its stakeholders, IATA may address
Mid-Air Collisions safety issues on behalf of industry. The IATA Global Safety Risk
Management Framework will utilize the successful roll-out of
Human Factors the COVID-19 Safety Risk Management Framework as the
‘proof of concept’ to capture, analyze, prioritize and implement
safety improvement programs to address identified aviation
safety risks. This will enable prioritization and delivery of aviation
safety improvement programs for the benefit of reducing global
accidents in aviation.

8 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION

Safety Information Exchange and Protection IATA Safety Issue Review Meeting

IATA continued to advocate for and focus initiatives on The IATA Safety Issue Review Meeting (SIRM) is a biannual
safety data and safety information protections, including the industry meeting held each year in the spring and fall. Twenty-
promotion of mechanisms in which safety information could be seven of these meetings have taken place to date, making the
shared among all stakeholders for the purposes of maintaining SIRM one of IATA Safety’s longest running meetings. SIRM’s
or improving safety. IATA continued to work with states and success is predicated on providing an environment where
ICAO through the Safety Management Panel to: participants feel comfortable in sharing their events, issues
and solutions with their fellow safety professionals under the
1. Promote the importance of voluntary reporting systems, the Chatham House Rule.
value they bring to the various Safety Management programs
and the criticality of protecting them, their sources and use. The SIRM brings together airlines and other industry stake-
holders, such as original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
2. Promote the establishment of Collaborative Safety Teams and GSPs. This multi-organizational collaboration has proven
(CSTs) with transparent and controlled governance plans to be an effective means to leverage continuous improvement
as a way for states to support their State Safety Program and is an originator to the emerging global information-shar-
(SSP) obligations while ensuring safety information is shared ing initiatives that are expected to grow significantly, albeit in
in a way in which the context is properly understood and a controlled and appropriate manner. The output of the SIRM
the Annex 19 protections applied. IATA also monitored and meetings are bulletins summarizing the topics and issues pre-
mapped the current global picture of CST developments to sented during the meeting in a de-identified format.
identify where future IATA activities should focus and where
new opportunities may exist. Recognizing that the SIRM community would be unable to meet
in 2020 due to the pandemic and aiming to stay connected and
Although COVID-19 shifted the priorities for many states and support the industry, IATA has worked with the IATA Hazard
operators, trust and collaboration between the two were never Identification Technical Group (HITG) to develop a Special
more critical to effectively and rapidly navigate the challenges Edition of the COVID-19 SIRM Bulletin, covering key risk areas
introduced. This will remain a priority for the Safety Department identified by our members globally. This Special SIRM Bulletin
in 2021. was produced in October 2020 and compiles industry learn-
ings and recommendations, as well as references to some of
Safety Culture – A Key Enabler of Safety Management the most relevant industry material, including best practices
and safety risk assessments completed by IATA to support op-
The COVID-19 pandemic has put enormous pressure on the erations affected by COVID-19. IATA invites the industry to read
entire aviation sector, impacting organizations on economic, the Special SIRM Bulletin and consider contributing to future
operational and organizational levels, as well as having a SIRM Bulletins. For further information or questions, contact us
considerable impact on aviation personnel. Multiple changes at safety@iata.org.
introduced to aviation in the past months have been and will
continue disrupting normal business and safety practices, Fatigue Management
thus increasing the potential for safety risks. As such, IATA
has developed guidance, including safety risk assessments, The COVID-19 pandemic significantly disrupted the airline
to ensure the industry keeps a clear focus on safety during business. Airlines around the world had to cancel flights,
the restart of operations, as airlines remain under enormous temporarily suspend operations and/or continue with limited
economic pressure during such trying times. resources. Some states granted operators alleviations to their
existing Flight and Duty Time Limitations (FTLs) to help prevent
IATA strongly believes in, and continues to advocate for, the crews from being exposed to an increased risk of infection or
fundamental role of safety culture in an effective SMS, upon subject to invasive testing or quarantine while still maintaining
which airlines can rely in times of change and crisis. Guided their existing operations.
by the IATA Aviation Safety Culture (I-ASC) survey findings,
collected since 2016 from over 40 aviation organizations glob- With crews working reduced hours and extended periods
ally, as well as 2020 industry feedback, IATA will focus its 2021 of time off between operational duties, fatigue is not a risk
efforts on some of the critical safety culture drivers, such as that immediately comes to mind. However, during COVID-19
safety leadership. and in the restart to full operations, many challenges related
to fatigue management were introduced, including a shift
Safety leadership is key to ensuring a balance between op- from where the typical fatigue hazards may be coming from.
erational efficiencies and safety is maintained as the industry Recognizing this, the IATA Fatigue Management Technical
begins restarting operations. It is equally essential to ensuring Group created “Guidance for Managing Crew Fatigue During
that SMS principles are consistently applied during the return a Crisis” to assist airlines in recognizing fatigue hazards as
to operations to effectively identify and manage safety risks. In well as provide considerations for airlines on how to effectively
addition, collaboration on safety culture continued with airports manage them during and post COVID-19. IATA also hosted
and ground service providers (GSPs) and will carry on in 2021, one of two webinars in collaboration with ICAO to highlight the
further supporting safety improvements and a harmonized ap- issue. Additionally, IATA issued an Operational Notice to raise
proach to safety culture across the industry. awareness of the issue and urge all operators to consider the
use and effectiveness of their fatigue management strategies
within this new environment. IATA Also highlighted this issue,
via special briefing material or other effective communication,

MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 9

to all concerned operational personnel. To further support IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS EMERGING/
airlines, IATA created an e-learning Fatigue Management EVOLVING SAFETY ISSUES
Fundamentals course that is available today.
Since SMS relies on data to identify emerg-
Expanding the understanding of fatigue risk and effective ing risks, IATA is putting additional effort to
fatigue management techniques will continue to be a focus in improve not only industry access to safety
2021. information, but also its capability for auto-
mation for more efficient safety analyses.
B737 MAX This section provides key highlights and de-
velopments for emerging/evolving operational risks that have
On 18 November 2020, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently generated remarkable activity and media attention.
lifted the grounding order and published an Airworthiness
Directive (AD) and other supporting documents that specify Cargo and Mail Safety and Lithium Batteries
the design changes, pilot training requirements, and de-
preservation maintenance activities operators must complete Throughout 2020, the Cargo Department addressed
prior to Boeing’s 737 MAX aircraft being certified for service. dangerous goods and other issues that emerged as a result of
Design changes include a software update, separation of wires the COVID-19 pandemic. These included the development of
from the cockpit toward the horizontal stabilizer trim motor, an guidance on the:
update to the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM), and testing of the
Angle of Attack (AoA) sensor systems. Pilot training of updated a) Transport of specimens of SARS-CoV-2.
procedures will require two hours per crew in a full-flight
simulator (FFS). b) Carriage of alcohol-based sanitizers. Subsequent changes
were adopted to the 2021-2022 edition of the ICAO Technical
ANAC (National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil) lifted its ground- Instructions through an addendum permitting operators to
ing order on 25 November, the second regulator to do so. On 9 carry on board an aircraft alcohol-based hand sanitizers
December, GOL Airways was the first airline to operate a B737 and cleaning products for use by passengers and crew.
MAX flight with paying passengers since the aircraft type was
grounded. By the end of the year, there were 19 aircraft returned c) Transport of human remains where the cause of death was
to service and actively operating commercial passenger flights COVID-19 in coordination with the Centers for Disease
around the globe. By the end of January 2021, both Transport Control and Prevention (CDC), ICAO and the World Health
Canada and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is- Organization (WHO).
sued their respective ADs and ungrounding orders. Other au-
thorities have gradually been lifting their grounding orders and d) 
Loading of cargo and mail in the passenger cabin in
airspace restrictions since. conjunction with Ground Operations and Safety and Flight
Operations (SFO).
For the first half of 2021, the IATA MAX Task Force will monitor
the progress of the remaining states in issuing ungrounding or- e) Transport of vaccines, including the use of dry ice as a re-
ders and opening up their airspace to the MAX, as well as op- frigerant and safety guidance on the handling of tempera-
erator activities required to bring the aircraft back into service. ture-controlled containers (TCC).
Any issues or risks identified with bringing the aircraft back
into service, including de-preservation and suggested mitiga- f) Mail safety guidelines, including a position paper endorsed
tions, will be communicated to the broader MAX community, by the Universal Postal Union (UPU) containing:
as appropriate.
• Need for collaboration
The IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) has adapted audit
procedures to ensure IOSA auditors verify B737 MAX operators • Training requirements
implement applicable ADs as well as crew training and other
operational requirements. Additionally, IOSA-registered • Safe and secure supply chain
operators are requested to submit an “Operator Questionnaire”
every 60 days, which contains information related to the B737 • Regulated Agent program
MAX return to service. The questionnaires can be requested by
partner airlines and regulators, and are made available upon • Recommendations on screening
authorization by the airline.
• Safe operations

• Civil aviation authorities’ role and control

• Reference to Annex 6, Chapter 15

10 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION

g) Improved standards related to unit load device (ULD) ser- IATA is committed to the Total Systems Approach (TSA), which
viceability requirements for ramp and ground operations, stands for the application of CBTA principles across all aviation
such that the ULD's condition should be continuously mon- disciplines in general, and particularly to a pilot’s entire career.
itored and verified throughout the ULD operational cycle. Hence, the defined competencies for pilots and instructors/
evaluators should be consistently applied throughout pilot
h) Draft is available for carriage checklist for the acceptance aptitude testing, initial (ab initio) training, type rating training
of the turbine engine on engine stand (to be completed and testing, command upgrade, recurrent training (including
in 2021). EBT), as well as instructor and examiner selection and training.

The SAE Aerospace G-27 Committee, which was established IATA also produces guidance materials to address specific
at the request of ICAO, continues its work throughout 2020 areas of pilot training, such as upset prevention and recovery
to develop a performance standard that can be used to test training (UPRT) and flight crew monitoring: IATA Guidance
packages containing lithium batteries. The objective of the Material and Best Practices for the Implementation of UPRT,
standard is to qualify packaging for lithium batteries that, in the 2nd Edition; Guidance Material for Improving Flight Crew
event of a thermal runaway of a lithium cell within the package, Monitoring, 1st Edition.
there would be no hazardous effects outside the package.
COVID-19 Guidance and Best Practices
Due to the travel restrictions associated with the COVID-19
pandemic, the work of the G-27 Committee was conducted To support the industry through the COVID-19 crisis, IATA has
remotely. IATA Cargo is represented on the committee by two been advocating to states for operator training and pilot license
voting members. The completion of the standard to a point at validity extensions as well as pilot recent experience flexibilities;
which it can be submitted for a vote of the G-27 Committee is and proposing alternative solutions to the traditional licensing
not expected before the end of 2021. If the committee votes to and operational requirements when training capacity and
adopt the standard, it will then be submitted to SAE for final operational experience are limited.
approval. Once SAE publishes the final standard, it will then be
considered by the applicable ICAO bodies, likely the Dangerous IATA has been proposing CBTA solutions, adapted to the status
Goods Panel, Flight Operations Panel and Airworthiness Panel, of pilot populations in regard to ICAO’s training and operational
to determine if the standard is suitable for adoption into the standards, to operators and training organizations to manage
ICAO Technical Instructions. the end of the alleviations period while ensuring a safe and
efficient restart of operations. In support of this, the following
The reporting and alert system for incidents involving unde- guidance materials and papers were published in 2020, all of
clared and mis-declared dangerous goods in cargo that was which are available for free download here:
implemented by IATA Cargo in October 2019 now has 39 sub-
scribing airlines. In 2020, 14 reports of incidents involving un- • Guidance for Post-COVID Restart of Operations: CBTA
declared and mis-declared dangerous goods in cargo were re- Training Solutions
ceived and alerts issued to the subscribing airlines. The alerts
enabled the subscribing airlines to take appropriate action in • Managing Pilot Training and Licensing Extensions: Second
accordance with their safety risk assessment. option for National Aviation Authorities to grant alleviations
to avoid the increase in volume of training (“Stacking effect”)
IATA Cargo continues to promote outreach to industry on cargo
and mail safety, dangerous goods and the need for compliance • Virtual Classroom Instruction: Ensuring the quality of training
with the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) or other when classroom instruction is delivered via virtual classroom
standards. However, due to the pandemic in 2020, there were
just three one-day dangerous goods workshops conducted in • ATO-AOC Partnership, including Instructor Provisioning, -
Africa in January. The annual two-day lithium battery workshop COVID-19 Return to Operations
that had been scheduled for Manchester in October 2020 was
instead conducted as a two-hour webinar. Other mail and car- Competency-based Training and Assessment
go safety seminars will resume as soon as the situation permits. Provisions
IATA participated in the revision of the provisions of Annex  1
SUPPORT EFFECTIVE TRAINING -  Personnel Licensing, the Procedures for Air Navigation
Services - Training (PANS-TRG Doc 9868) and Annex 6 Part 1,
IATA Training and Licensing leads and as well as the consequential amendments of related guidance
participates in the development of new materials, including the Manual of Evidence-based Training
training standards and publishes, with the (Doc 9995) and the Manual on Upset Prevention and Recovery
support of the Pilot Training Task Force, Training (Doc 10011).
guidance materials and best practices to
support operators and training organizations These amendments promote the expansion of a harmonized
implement these new standards. Additionally, IATA offers pilot competency set and clarify the role of the competencies
consultancy services to provide practical support for the in the Threat and Error Management (TEM) model. The com­
implementation of the standards related to competency-based petencies of the approved adapted competency model provide
training and assessment (CBTA) programs, including evidence- individual and team countermeasures to threats, errors and
based training (EBT). Contact us for more information. undesired aircraft states. Consequently, IATA Training and Li-
censing is represented and actively involved in the work of the

MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 11

recently reactivated ICAO Personnel Training and Licensing injuries, the cost of ground damage, delays and turnarounds, as
Panel (PTLP), with the goal to develop, maintain and address well as C02 emissions and noise via global standardization and
the evolving needs of provisions and guidance material for per- implementation of innovative solutions.
sonnel licensing, approved training organizations and simula­
tion training devices in the context of the global expansion Priorities in 2020
of CBTA.
With the COVID-19 pandemic resulting in a crisis for the entire
Competency-based Training and Assessment for aviation industry, the IATA Ground Operations priorities have
Instructors and Evaluators focused on supporting our members in dealing with operational
challenges arising from the global reduction of traffic as well as
Given the essential contribution of instructors and evaluators the effective and safe return to service, including onboarding of
(IEs) to flight safety, IATA considers it important to enhance the ground staff.
level of competency of IEs globally. To support this competency
enhancement, IATA published the Guidance Material for IATA Ground Operations has developed extensive guidance
Instructor and Evaluator Training, 1st Edition. The guide material and solutions to address these priorities:
introduces and defines a set of IE competencies to be applied
from the selection process across all types of IE training, from IATA position on ground operations
licensing to operator training, by both operators and training
organizations. The IATA IE competency set has been endorsed The current crisis offers a unique opportunity for the industry
by ICAO and EASA. to adopt common ground handling standards, enabling
standardization, simplification and a high level of safety to
Evidence-based Training be achieved alongside the opportunity to reduce costs and
improve efficiency. IATA, with its key stakeholders, strongly
Evidence-based Training (EBT) was the first recurrent training recommends the industry take this opportunity:
program to apply the principles of CBTA for safe, effective
and efficient airline operations, while addressing relevant • To adopt the IATA Ground Operations Manual (IGOM)
threats. The aim of an EBT program is to identify, develop and standards in lieu of operator-specific requirements.
evaluate the key competencies required by pilots to operate
safely, effectively and efficiently in a commercial air transport • For operators to provide GSPs with clear instructions
environment by managing the most relevant threats and errors whenever there is a variation from the IGOM standards.
based on evidence collected in operations and training.
• To adopt Airport Handling Manual (AHM) Chapter 11 training
IATA is currently reviewing the EBT Data Report, 1st Edition, recommendations.
which constitutes the foundation of the EBT Curriculum
endorsed by ICAO in Doc 9995. The publication of an • For GSPs to utilize IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations
amendment to the EBT Data Report is expected in Q2 2021. (ISAGO) to support a reduction in station audits.

Competency-based Training and Assessment for Ground handling during COVID-19

Technicians
Developed in response to various operational challenges arising
IATA is also part of the ICAO Competency-based Training and from the pandemic, such as new health measures, reduction
Assessment Task Force (CBTA-TF) for Maintenance, which of operations, and long-term storage of ULDs, ground support
is tasked with developing an ICAO framework for technician equipment (GSE) and aircraft.
training. IATA has supported the revision of the provisions of
the Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Training (PANS- Transport of cargo and mail in passenger cabin
TRG Doc 9868) Part III Training and Assessment for Aircraft
Maintenance Personnel. Developed in response to industry demand for transport of
cargo in the passenger cabin, providing simple, common and
The aim of a CBTA program for technicians is to identify, develop consistent considerations and procedures that are applicable
and evaluate the competencies required by commercial aircraft globally.
maintenance personnel to operate safely, effectively and
efficiently. CBTA in maintenance is geared toward individual Aircraft cleaning and disinfection during and post
student performance. The specification of the competency pandemic
to be achieved, the evaluation of the student’s entry level, the
selection of the appropriate training method and training aids, Based on IATA passenger survey results, enhanced aircraft
and the assessment of a student’s performance are the key cleaning and disinfection are one of the key factors helping
factors to the success of such a program. restore passenger confidence to fly. The guidance for aircraft
cleaning and disinfection has been developed with all key
Ground Operations Safety stakeholders and published in IGOM, Ed.10.

Mission and Strategy IATA has cooperated with Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics (RTCA) and European Organization for Civil
The IATA Ground Operations mission and vision is to improve Aviation Electronics (EUROCAE) to develop a global guidance
safety and operational efficiency while fostering a sustainable based on IATA procedures. IATA also lobbies with various
environment. Its strategy is to focus on the reduction of personal authorities to harmonize regulatory requirements globally.
12 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION
Ground handling return to service Digital Load Control

In cooperation with industry experts, guidance for ground Engineering the process for setting and effectively maintaining
handling return to service has been developed. This guidance aircraft data for the weight and balance functions. A new
has been enhanced and included in the AHM, Ed. 41, Chapter digital schema has been created in cooperation with aircraft
6 as a new section “AHM 640 - Pandemic Management”. This manufacturers and users to mitigate load control errors
section provides guidance for management during a pandemic generated by incoherent datasets that are manually loaded into
regarding ceasing, reducing and restarting operations. It Departure Control Systems (DCSs).
includes tools such as checklists and a risk assessment
matrix, helping members to assess and manage pandemic
situations and effectively restart their operations. With respect ENHANCE QUALITY AND COMPLIANCE
to GSE long-term storage and return to service, this material is
published in AHM 918. Regulations must evolve as the industry
grows and technologies change. The IATA
Onboarding of Ground Staff audit programs aim to increase global safety
performance and reduce the number of
As an adjunct to the existing AHM 1110, IATA has developed redundant auditing activities in the industry.
a new section, AHM 1111, which provides guidelines on how
to manage training programs under pandemic situations. In IATA Operational Safety Audit
addition to general principles, it also covers how to conduct
training when: As at 31 December 2020, there were 438 airlines on the
IOSA registry despite the aviation industry having difficult
• Facilities and/or trainers are not available times under COVID-19. In 2020, IOSA introduced the IOSA
Support Program to offer a safety focused, attainable, flexible
• On-the-job training is not possible and effective approach in light of the COVID-19 crisis. The
Support Program includes a series of relief measures for IOSA-
• There is a reduced number of employees registered operators and IOSA auditors to manage the impact
of COVID-19, while maintaining critical safety assurance.
The purpose of this guidance is to ensure safe air transport, as
well as the safety of employees, equipment and aircraft under IOSA Standards Manual
pandemic situations without lowering any safety standards.
• IOSA Standards Manual (ISM), Ed. 14 has been deferred and
Ground Support Equipment the new effective date is anticipated for September 2021.

The e-learning GSE Return to Service course has been devel- • A temporary revision to ISM, Ed. 13 has been issued to
oped and is available to support an effective restart. extend the Active Implementation and Parallel Conformity
Option dates therein.
Enhanced GSE can be a positive contributor to improved safety
– for staff, passengers and aircraft. A recent study conducted • Another temporary revision to ISM, Ed. 13 has been issued
by IATA indicates that if 9% of ground operations were per- to allow operators to satisfy the specification of ORG 3.4.6
formed by enhanced GSE, a reduction of over 13% of instanc- by using alternative internal oversight methods for obtaining
es of damage and 20% of total ground damage cost can be sufficient evidence to effectively assess ongoing conformity
expected. GSE fitted with proximity sensing and warning sys- with IOSA standards.
tems are already well established – major manufacturers report
that at least 80% of the units they now sell are equipped with Extenuating Circumstances Claim for Audit Conduct
these systems – and the trend is increasing. IATA is working on
a model for refining and defining the tangible benefits of using • Until 31 July 2020, operators unable to undergo or complete
enhanced GSE. a registration renewal audit prior to their expiry date were
given the opportunity to submit a claim of Extenuating
IATA Ground Operation Manual Variation Portal Circumstances for Audit Conduct. A validated claim granted
them an additional 180 calendar days following the current
IATA is launching the IGOM Variation Portal to facilitate aircraft expiry date.
ground handling and ease the industry restart process. Some
of the features are: • Following 31 July 2020, this option has remained available for
operators that ceased operations due to COVID-19.
• A digital gap analysis tool: airlines can enter their own vari-
ations from IGOM, making these visible to the end-user and Remote Audit Option
thus easier to implement.
• In July 2020, a reduced scope remote IOSA Audit option has
• A fully traceable notifications and acknowledgement function been introduced. The full scope on-site audit option remains
to simplify communications between ground handers and available.
airlines.
• All IOSA Support Program rules and options are available in
• Customized dashboards to help keep track of stations and the IOSA Program Manual (IPM) Temporary Appendix and
generate reports for management review.
MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 13
 IOSA Auditor Handbook (IAH) Temporary Audit Procedures analysis, followed by necessary corrective actions to address
at www.iata.org/iosa. any deficiencies, resulting in readiness for the operators to go
through the assessment process after the project is finished.
Other Relief Measures and Guidance Support for ISSA is expected to be provided to a maximum of 10
operators. This demonstrates the growing interest of operators
• Four editions of IOSA Guidance for Safety Monitoring under in the ISSA program globally.
COVID-19 have been issued.
IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations
• Risk assessments for the IATA standards and recommended
practice (ISARP) compliance tool have been introduced for ISAGO is a standardized and structured audit program
operators. of GSPs operating at airports. The audits assess a GSP’s
conformance with standards developed by global industry
• IOSA auditor qualification and currency requirements were experts for the management, oversight, and implementation
revised. of ground operations. The standards aim to improve flight
safety and reduce ramp accidents and incidents through full
The IOSA program continued to be acknowledged by numer- implementation of safety management and standardization of
ous regulators and is utilized to complement their oversight procedures on the same level as required of airlines, airports
activities, especially during the COVID-19 crisis. Regulators and other aviation operations. The audits are conducted by
and organizations, including, but not limited to, the Netherlands IATA selected, trained and qualified auditors who are members
Civil Aviation Authority (ILT) and the Civil Aviation Authority of of the IATA Charter of Professional Auditors (CoPA). IATA
Singapore (CAAS) signed a Memorandum of Understanding manages CoPA and continuously evaluates the performance
(MoU) with IATA on the use of the IOSA program. of the auditors.

Among others, IATA is working on the following changes ISAGO is continually enhanced and aligned with industry
to the IOSA program in the coming years: best practices and applicable regulatory provisions to ensure
its overall consistency and relevance. IATA is committed to
• Development of an integrated risk framework to introduce a establishing ISAGO as an accepted alternative means of
risk-based audit approach. compliance for airline regulatory oversight of ground operations.
ISAGO is currently the only global program that is aligned with
• Digital transformation to enable risk-based auditing and to ICAO Doc 10121, Manual on Ground Handling, and requires a
connect operators, regulators, GSPs and other stakeholders GSP to implement an SMS equal to that required by regulators
through a platform approach. of aircraft and airport operators.

IATA Standard Safety Assessment Program ISAGO benefits to the GSP, airline and airport operator
include safer ground operations, fewer accidents and injuries
As at 31 December 2020, there are nine airlines on the IATA - which leads to a reduction in operational costs and improved
Standard Safety Assessment (ISSA) registry and one airline is procedures - and an enhanced understanding of the high-risk
at the final stage of its registration process. Airlines that were in areas in ground operations.
the pipeline in 2020 had to postpone their ISSA assessments
due to the COVID-19 crisis. ISAGO is conducted on a two-year cycle at both headquarters
and station levels of a ground handling company. ISAGO is
In 2020, in alignment with the IOSA program, ISSA introduced applicable to independent ground handlers as well as airline-
the ISSA Support Program. This program introduced relief owned subsidiaries or airline-embedded GSPs, regardless of
measures for ISSA-registered operators and the operators size. The scope of the audit is tailored to the range of activities
interested in joining the ISSA program. conducted by the GSP. Any GSP is welcome to apply for the
ISAGO registration audit.
Considering all the risks and taking appropriate mitigative
actions, ISSA remote assessment was launched on 27 In just over a decade, ISAGO has grown and now reaches every
August 2020. Meanwhile, on-site ISSA assessment remains region of the world. As at 31 December 2020, over 220 GSPs
available for operators. All ISSA Support Program rules and are ISAGO-registered. ISAGO audits have been conducted on
options are available in the ISSA Program Manual (ISPM) the services provided at over 300 stations at over 200 airports
Temporary Appendix and IAH Temporary Audit Procedures at worldwide.
www.iata.org/issa.
More than 500 ISAGO audit reports are available in the ISAGO
The African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) has entrusted Registry platform, accessible to airlines through the ISAGO
IATA to provide technical assistance and support to operators membership program. Airlines may use these ISAGO reports
in Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM) states to in lieu of and to satisfy their oversight obligations of outsourced
achieve ISSA certification, in collaboration with the African ground handling operations and provide input to their SMS.
Airlines Association (AFRAA), with this activity being financed
by resources from the African Development Bank’s grant to IATA Fuel Quality Pool
AFCAC.
The IATA Fuel Quality Pool (IFQP) is a group of more than 180
Overall, the project will look for eligible airlines to undergo airlines that work together to assess the implementation of
preparation for ISSA, performing for each operator an ISSA gap safety and quality standards and procedures at aviation fuel

14 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION

facilities. The IFQP does not set standards, but ensures fuel restrictions and changes in government protocols issued in
quality policies and standards are followed, and major fuel response to health risks.
safety items are addressed, such as compliance with the use of
differential pressure-limiting devices on all monitor-equipped In response to these challenges, IATA initiated the following:
vehicles.
1.  Information/Data Availability
IFQP-qualified inspectors perform inspections against industry
regulations at airports worldwide and the reports are shared IATA developed an information sharing dashboard to provide
among IFQP members. By providing comprehensive training operators with a single location where they could find aviation
of inspectors and development of standardized inspection operational information related to COVID-19 published by
procedures according to airline and regulatory requirements, states. The automated dashboard displays NOTAM information
the IFQP enhances safety and improves quality control on airspace and airports, by both ICAO regions and state
standards of fuel facilities at the airport. Flight Information Region (FIRs). In addition, IATA created the
COVID OPS tool to assist operators by allowing operators
De/Anti-icing Quality Control Pool to ask specific questions related to COVID restrictions. The
questions are distributed to an appropriate IATA subject matter
The IATA De/Anti-icing Quality Control Pool (DAQCP) is a group expert (SME), located in the appropriate region, to provide a
of more than 120 airlines that audit de/anti-icing providers and timely response. Once the question is answered, it is archived
share the inspection reports and workload at various locations for future reference. Moving forward, both the dashboard and
worldwide. The pool’s main goal is to ensure de/anti-icing safe- COVID OPS tool will be incorporated into the revamped IATA
ty guidelines, quality control recommendations, standards and Tactical Operations Portal (ITOP), which is monitored and
procedures are followed at airports worldwide. The inspection supported by IATA Liaison Desk personnel.
checklist is based on the Global De-icing Standard published
by SAE. 2.  Analysis of COVID Risks

IATA Drinking Water Quality Pool COVID-19 led to a different risk landscape which can, by
extension, introduce new operational challenges and safety
The IATA Drinking Water Quality Pool (IDQP) was created by hazards. In addition, the pandemic has revealed gaps that need
a number of airlines to safeguard the health of passengers to be addressed across the aviation supply chain to increase
and crew on board aircraft by using the highest standards to efficiency and decision-making.
ensure water quality. By sharing inspection reports, airlines
avoid multiple audits of the same provider at the same location, To better understand the risks that were caused or amplified
thereby enjoying substantial financial savings from reductions by COVID-19, IATA conducted a Safety Risk Assessment (SRA)
of airport inspection workloads and associated costs. with industry partners. The SRA focused on the following:

1. 
Human factors for dispatchers and Air Traffic Control
ADVOCATE FOR IMPROVED AVIATION Officers (ATCOs) related to the social stress and anxiety
and job insecurity that COVID has caused.
INFRASTRUCTURE
2. 
Maintaining competency and training for dispatchers
Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) and ATCOs. During the pandemic, the lack of facility
are a critical component in the aviation accessibility and the limitations associated with virtual/
supply chain. They provide safe, efficient and remote training has had a major impact on recurrent and
cost-effective Air Traffic Management (ATM) on-the-job training (OJT).
and air navigation infrastructure to airline
operators. Throughout 2020 and entering 3. 
How to ensure a positive aviation and safety culture
into 2021, there were several critical ATM and air navigation during a pandemic when many priorities are shifted.
infrastructure areas identified as needing improvement. IATA
has been working with member airlines, key partners such as 4. 
The interface between ATCOs and pilots given the
ICAO, the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO), changing traffic levels and long periods of limited
state regulators and ANSPs, to ensure ATM operations and operations.
infrastructures would maintain the required level of safety and
efficiency, while maintaining a positive cost-benefit business 5. The impacts of COVID-19 on airport operations, specif-
case and supporting the reduction of CO2 emissions. ically due to long-term parked aircraft, nonstandard air-
craft ground movement, new biosafety measures, and
COVID-19 Impacts on ATM risks of increases in wildlife due to low traffic.

The operational and financial impact of COVID-19 on the The SRAs and educational webinars that followed were used to
aviation industry is unprecedented. Operational working develop bulletins that are available on the IATA website.
environments continue to change along several vectors.
In addition to uncertainty related to flight schedules, new
regulations for short and long-term parked aircraft, biosafety
measures, increased aircraft maintenance and flight planning
challenges, airlines are required to keep track of the many new

MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 15

Rocket Launches and Commercial Space Operations • Increasing coordination between aviation and radio-regula-
tory authority and military.
IATA is concerned by the lack of progress on the development
of regulatory provisions for commercial space activities. It has • Retaining essential conventional navigation infrastructure for
been suggested by some in the industry that these operations contingency support in case of GNSS outages.
should be kept free of provisions that may constrain innovation.
However, given that these activities may include low orbit • Developing mitigation techniques for loss of services.
operations and recoverable vehicles that will transit through
civil operational airspace, the goal should be to develop Additionally, the issue of harmful interference to GNSS has been
provisions and best practices that will permit the integration brought to the attention of and for actions by the International
of these operations into current operations, thereby ensuring Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations Specialized
the continued safe operation of all stakeholders. The manner Agency for information and communication technologies and
in which these operations may be integrated could be similar the global authority on radio spectrum protections.
to the Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) concept being
developed to integrate unmanned aircraft. Protection of Aircraft Radar Altimeters from
Interference
Unauthorized Use of Unmanned Aircraft
Radar altimeters (RAs), operating at 4.2-4.4 GHz, are the
IATA has been working with industry partners to develop only sensors on board a civil aircraft that provide a direct
guidance material that will assist states, airports and ANSPs in measurement of the clearance height of the aircraft over the
developing local procedures that will help them better address terrain or other obstacles (i.e., the Above Ground Level - AGL
events of unauthorized use of unmanned aircraft. The guidance - information). The RA systems’ input is required and used by
material focuses on a collaborative risk assessment approach many aircraft systems when AGL is below 2,500 ft. The RAs
when making decisions about airport operations. The guidance also play a crucial role in providing situational awareness to
is planned to be issued during the first half of 2021. the flight crew. The measurements from the RAs are also used
by Automatic Flight Guidance and Control Systems (AFGCS)
Global Navigation Satellite Systems Interference during instrument approaches, and to control cockpit displays
of crew information from critical systems, such as Predictive
Since the last IATA Safety Report, IATA continues receiving Wind Shear (PWS), the Engine-Indicating and Crew-Alerting
concerning reports on harmful interference to Global System (EICAS), and Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). GNSS is a cornerstone (ECAM) systems. Any failures or interruptions of these RAs
of daily flight and ATM operations, and it provides fundamental can lead to incidents with catastrophic outcomes, potentially
position and timing information to aircraft safety systems (e.g., resulting in multiple fatalities.
Ground Proximity Warning System—GPWS), air traffic services
satellite communications, aircraft navigation (Global Positioning RAs are installed in all types of aircraft, including commercial
System—GPS and Performance-based Navigation—PBN) transport aircraft; business, regional, general aviation airplanes;
and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and both transport and general aviation helicopters. Noting the
applications. Effective protections of GNSS signals and robust safety-critical roles of aircraft RAs in protecting the safety of
and timely mitigations of harmful interference to GNSS are, flights and the traveling public, it is necessary that governments
therefore, necessary. robustly protect the integrity of RAs in service. It is the respon-
sibility and in the best interest of governments to ensure any
IATA, in cooperation with the International Federation of Air deployments of 5G technologies do not cause interference to
Traffic Controllers’ Association (IFATCA) and the International the incumbent RAs and to consult with aviation agencies and
Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA), has raised authorities, incorporating aviation recommendations and fully
awareness and recommendations on this safety-critical issue addressing aviation safety concerns.
to the 40th ICAO Assembly. Resulting from the strong support
by the Assembly and an urgent request by the ICAO Council,
in August 2020, ICAO issued a State Letter emphasizing the
need for:

• Reinforcing communications, navigation and surveillance

(CNS) systems resilience to interference.

• Preventing use of illegal interfering devices.

• Increasing collaboration with radio regulatory and enforce-

ment authorities.

• Reinforcing civil-military coordination to address interference

risks associated with GNSS testing and conflict zones.

16 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION

SECURITY IATA Meteorological Project

The partnership between governments and IATA’s Meteorological (Met) Project seeks to achieve two
the aviation industry is the foundation upon objectives:
which a safe, secure and accessible air
transport network is built. Aviation security • Develop a global, real-time, objective aircraft-sensed
policy must learn from evolving threats. IATA turbulence data sharing platform for airline operational use
supports global standards, but an outcome- to mitigate the impact of turbulence.
based risk-mitigation approach is essential, as every location
has a unique mix of challenges and controls must be applied • Improve weather forecasts by expanding the existing
proportionately where the risk is greatest. World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Aircraft-based
Meteorological Data Relay (AMDAR) program to airlines
Aviation Cyber Security from data sparse areas through the WMO IATA Collaborative
AMDAR Program (WICAP).
To address cyber threats and ensure the civil aviation industry
is resilient to cyber-attacks, in 2019 the ICAO Aviation Cyber IATA has developed a turbulence sharing platform, IATA
Security Strategy was endorsed. Following the outcomes of Turbulence Aware (ITA), to consolidate, standardize and
the ICAO 40th Assembly, the need for taking further action to enable access to worldwide real-time objective turbulence
counter cyber threats by states and industry was emphasized. data collected from multiple airlines around the globe. The
Therefore, IATA worked with ICAO and published an Aviation primary purpose of the ITA system, which became operational
Cyber Security Action Plan, supporting the process of strategy on 1 January 2020, is to provide airline pilots, dispatchers and
adoption. IATA strongly supports the ICAO position as the most operations center personnel with real-time, very detailed
appropriate way to drive coherent global dialogue and action turbulence awareness. The platform supports a global industry
on aviation cyber security (ACyS). IATA is closely collaborat- shift toward data-driven turbulence mitigation. The ITA
ing with the ICAO Secretariat Study Group on Cybersecurity platform provides an open solution to industry that will enable
(SSGC) and Trust Framework Study Group (TFSG) to contrib- any operator to share their data within a global turbulence
ute to the development of the action plan. repository; the aim being that carriers will have access to each
other’s real-time turbulence data so that greater situational
In addition, IATA is developing relevant industry guidance awareness, both pre-flight and in-flight, can be achieved.
documentation for airlines with respect to new cyber provisions
for the IOSA Standards Manual (ISM, Ed. 14). This enables the Turbulence data within the platform is integrated into third-
coordination and calibration, through advocacy, standards party vendor weather, flight planning, trajectory and alerting
and services, to the most appropriate level of holistic cyber tools for operational use by airlines in the program. IATA also
protection for the industry. provides a Turbulence Aware Viewer tool, which may be used
by dispatchers and in flight by pilots. The tool provides a
Conflict Zones visualization of real-time turbulence data over the previous four
hours along with a long-term accessible archive. Post-flight
Safety and security risks associated with conflict zones contin- analytics and manual historical data extraction are all possible
ue to be major concerns for aircraft operators. The downing of a via the viewer tool for analysis of turbulence, wind, temperature
Ukraine International Airlines flight on departure from Teheran and in-flight turbulence safety events.
in January 2020 underscored the imperative that airlines require
access to relevant and corroborated information from govern- The overall benefits of IATA’s Met Project are to improve airline
ments to be able to perform accurate risk assessments. IATA safety performance by decreasing turbulence-related injuries,
has worked toward moderating the most appropriate chang- optimize fuel burn and gain additional operational efficiencies
es to ICAO Annex 6, 15 and 17, specifically consistent with the through more accurate flight planning based on improved
outcomes of the Dutch Safety Board investigation into MH17. forecast and real-time turbulence, wind and temperature data.
Accordingly, IATA’s own IOSA program standards and recom-
mended practices continue to evolve. Concurrently, IATA and
its members support the evolving changes to Annex 6, 15 and
17 in terms of enhanced risk assessment requirements for op-
erators when hostile conflict is occurring and/or likely to occur.

IATA released an open source security incident database that

provides member airlines with a tool that collates a range of
publicly available information and establishes a baseline that
will help airlines carry out the required safety and security risk
assessments.

MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 17

REGIONAL INSIGHT analysis for airports in the five member states: Singapore, Japan,
People’s Republic of China, Indonesia and the Philippines.
Asia-Pacific Region Several regional airlines also participate.
(ASPAC)
Predictive: Global Safety Predictive Analytics Research
Center (SPARC) in Singapore

SFO ASPAC Safety Strategy In 2015, IATA and CAAS jointly initiated a feasibility study for
the application of predictive analytics on aircraft data. The
Developed in conjunction with the Asia-Pacific/North Asia technical feasibility of the project was validated during 2016
Regional Coordination Group (RCG), Safety and Flight and 2017. During 2018, three runway-related machine learning
Operations Asia Pacific (SFO ASPAC) utilizes a risk-based, algorithms were developed. In 2020, IATA signed a Collaborative
data-driven safety strategy with reactive, proactive and Arrangement (CA) with CAAS and the FAA with the objective of
ultimately predictive capabilities that focuses on the top further enhancing the SPARC model’s predictive data analytics
regional fatal accident risks: capabilities.

• Approach and Landing Accidents Reduction (ALAR) The algorithms enable the model to learn from egregious
approaches the key feature(s) that would influence the risk of a
• Loss of Control — In-flight (LOC-I) runway excursion for landing aircraft. In each case, the analysis
from applying the algorithms has identified primary causal
• Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) features of an event and associated confidence levels in the
model’s prediction of their ongoing effect. While the predictive
We are also focused on the emerging Mid-Air Collision (MAC) results varied depending on the prediction point, the predictive
risk using Traffic Collision Avoidance System Resolution confidence exceeded 90% in some cases. It is expected that,
Advisory (TCAS RA) information from Flight Data eXchange as the algorithms are trained using larger volumes of data, their
(FDX) and other sources like ICAO’s Large Height Deviation predictive power will improve.
(LHD) reports.
Enhance Quality and Compliance
SFO ASPAC uses Global Aviation Data Management (GADM)
as a foundational tool for safety analysis, decision-making, and SFO ASPAC continues to promote the use of IOSA and ISAGO
performance monitoring when working with ICAO, individual with airlines and GSPs in ASPAC. There were 71 airlines from
states, airline members and other system stakeholders. GADM the region on the IOSA registry at year end.
enables data-driven risk identification and performance
monitoring. States throughout the region are also regularly encouraged to
consider entering into formal agreements to utilize IATA’s audit
SFO ASPAC liaises and collaborates with key partners like programs to complement their safety oversight activities. During
the Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA) and the US 2020, SFO ASPAC organized virtual collaborative sessions with
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) on selected safety the current regulator signatories of IOSA utilization agreements
initiatives. to provide them with a COVID-19-related program update.

During 2020, SFO ASPAC supported several COVID-19-related

safety initiatives in the region, primarily through ICAO, and Pan-America Region
globally through SFO headquarters in Montreal.

Reactive: with ICAO at Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation

Safety Team
Reduction of fatality risk in the Pan-American Region and
The annual IATA Safety Report is one of the sources of continued improvement of safety performance in the North
information used to produce the annual Asia-Pacific Safety Atlantic and South Atlantic regions remain very high priorities
Report, which is, in turn, used to focus regional initiatives on in addressing the region’s challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic
the top risks. The Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Team introduced a unique situation despite improvements in the risk
(APRAST) continues to develop Safety Enhancement Initiatives profile of the region, whereby the risk footprint remains an area
(SEIs) pertinent to the top three risk areas and encourage their of heighten vigilance.
implementation. SFO ASPAC supports the periodic review of
SEIs conducted by APRAST to ensure currency/relevancy is To maintain heighten vigilance of the region’s risk footprint,
maintained. the Americas Regional Coordinating Groups (RCG's) of IATA
focuses on a data-driven approach to enable the strategic and
Proactive: Asia-Pacific Information Sharing tactical implementation of initiatives. Collaboration with states
Demonstration Project and industry stakeholders remains key toward the level of
vigilance needed for safety improvement opportunities.
The Asia-Pacific Information Sharing Demonstration Project
is an APRAST initiative with a governance board co-chaired
by CAA Singapore and IATA. After earlier finalizing a MAC risk
analysis, the project is currently conducting Go-Around risk

18 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION

North Atlantic and North America (NAT/NAM) Accordingly, ICAO USOAP Critical Elements (CEs) showing
the lowest percentage of effective implementation in the region
The safety performance of the North Atlantic (NAT) High-Level remain CE7 - Surveillance obligations and CE8 - Resolution of
Airspace (HLA), as measured and monitored by the NAT Sys- safety concerns.
tems Planning Group (SPG) for 2019, showed that over 58% of
the key performance indicators (KPIs) were met. The vertical Auditing standards remain a vital part of an airline’s operational
collision risk estimate for 2019 was estimated to be 52.6 x 10-9 safety and efficiency process to ensure the transport of
fatal accidents per flight hour (fapfh). However, with Strategic passengers and goods safely. The region’s partnership with
Lateral Offset Procedure (SLOP), the risk reduced to 12.0 x 10-9 the Latin American and Caribbean Air Transport Association
fapfh, which highlights the importance of SLOP in minimizing (ALTA) and Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC)
the risk of collision in the airspace. Application of SLOP by op- enabled outreach and awareness to operators regarding the
erators continues to show majority utilization of the centerline ISSA program for operators seeking to join the program. The
options, whereas the benefit of the procedure is derived more region’s operators continue to see nonconformity with SMS
from the even distribution of all three options (centerline, 1 Nau- practices as required by IOSA dealing with the management of
tical Mile (NM) or 2NM right of centerline) by operators. The safety risk associated with aircraft operations.
lateral collision risk for 2019 was estimated to be 13.6 x 10-9
fapfh. The vertical and lateral collision risk estimates were lower The technical risk estimates for 2020 satisfy the goal of not
in 2019 compared to 2018. exceeding the target level of safety (TLS) in Reduced Vertical
Separation Minimum (RVSM) airspace for the Caribbean and
In the North American (NAM) region, proactive management South America region. It is important to highlight that, while the
of risk through identification and control of existing and overall technical risk estimate for 2020 did satisfy the TLS goal,
emerging safety issues continues in collaboration with several there were a few FIRs that did not attain the goal. Additionally, in
stakeholders such as the US CAST to reduce risk system-wide RVSM airspace, lack of coordination between facilities remains
with a data-driven approach. Mitigation of identified risks, a major contributing factor to the events recorded.
such as takeoff misconfiguration, has enabled development of
CAST Safety Enhancements (SEs) 227, 228 and 229 and a host In the North Atlantic (NAT), recent initiatives such as the
of other SEs for the associated risk, which are published and Organized Track System (OTS) trial continue to gain momentum
being monitored for overall system improvements. with operators toward elimination of OTS in NAT and attaining
the region’s long-term objectives.
Latin America and Caribbean (LATAM/CAR)
As a result of the global pandemic, safety and operational
Latin American and Caribbean (LATAM/CAR) efforts continue challenges emerged, such as FAA Airspace ATC Zero Events,
to focus on the top four areas of risk: CFIT, MAC, LOC–I and which resulted in airspace closures, often on short notice, cre-
Runway Excursion, led by the Regional Aviation Safety Group – ating challenges by increasing workload complexity for flight
Pan America (RASG-PA). Dependence on the GADM program crews and airline operations centers (AOCs). Implications of
remained a critical aspect in monitoring the region’s safety these airspace closures included lengthy reroutes, increased
performance in coordination with Collaborative Safety Teams fuel burn and en route flight diversions due to insufficient fuel
(CSTs) and being able to drive the IATA RCG objectives towards remaining. In December 2020, the FAA reported 62 facility
implementation of the safety priorities. While the RASG-PA closures for COVID mitigation with an average closure time
continues to focus on its work from a regional perspective, of 1.5 hours for each event. Moreover, multiple facility closures
the work of CSTs, in countries such as Brazil and Mexico occurred on several occasions, further heightening workload
amongst others in the region, remains an instrumental part of complexities while reducing opportunities to complete flights
keeping heightened vigilance in the region's risk footprint and to intended destinations. Moreover, operational safety events
addressing risks with a tailored approach utilizing various data resulting from noncompliance on the use of face masks, com-
sources with GADM being a part of the data pool that is driven munication challenges, fatigue, and lack of recent flight experi-
by airline data. ence have been noted in the region. The associated guidance
has been published and made available by states and industry
Americas Insight Analysis organizations.

Fatality risk in the Pan-America Region showed a decreasing The Pan-America Region is collaborating with South Atlantic
trend across the five-year period analyzed (2015-2019). (SAT) industry stakeholders in continuing efforts to improve the
However, the three-year moving average of the highest-risk safety and efficiency of the SAT area. As part of the improved
accident category for the region showed LOC-I slightly above coordination needed for the SAT, a joint task force (Atlantic
the world average, while CFIT and Runway/Taxiway Excursion Coordination Group) was formed to support improvements
were below the world three-year moving average. Overall, MAC concerning interoperability and safety oversight, including
serious incident data showed a downward trend. enhancement of efficiency in the Europe/South America
airspace corridor.
It is important to highlight that incident data for some countries
in the region continue to show opportunities for safety
improvements. Eight states/territories in the Pan-America
Region are below the 60% level of Effective Implementation
(EI) for the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
according to the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit
Program (USOAP) Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA).

MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 19

Europe Region (EUR) During the period of reduced operations, when airlines have
less safety data from their own operations, and with increased
COVID-19-induced safety risks (i.e., decrease in aviation
personnel currency, higher level of stress and workload),
safety information sharing has never been more important.
Managing the COVID-19 Crisis IATA EUR worked with the regional-based carriers to expand
membership in IATA GADM programs. On 5 March 2020, we
The European Region (EUR) was strongly impacted by the hosted a GADM workshop in IATA’s Madrid office to brief the
COVID-19 crisis in 2020; therefore, our highest priority was to airlines on the peculiarities of the new Incident Data Exchange
ensure cooperation and coordination with the regional organi- (IDX) program and recent updates to the FDX program. By the
zations to work together toward a faster and smoother recovery end of 2020, GADM membership grew by 27 in IDX and 12 in
from the crisis. Europe was the first region to restart operations FDX.
with a full complement of public health safety documents for
a safe journey in the COVID-19 context. IATA has signed a co- IATA EUR has contributed to the second revision of the
operation agreement with EASA for the implementation of the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions.
COVID-19 Aviation Health Safety Protocol to strengthen efforts The new revision has become a global document titled Global
to ensure a consistent and safe travel experience for passen- Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions. IATA has
gers during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result of the coor- been recognized as a validating organization for its contents.
dinated efforts, alleviations requested for airlines were largely
accepted by EASA and EUR states in the first weeks of the cri-
sis to allow for a continuation of safe operations. Through very Commonwealth of
close cooperation with EASA and national regulators, various Independent States (CIS)
safety issues and conditions were highlighted so the airlines’
views and concerns were considered (e.g., exemptions of crew
members from quarantine requirements, allowing crew mem-
bers to travel to simulator sessions, wearing of face masks on Enhancement of Safety Awareness in CIS
the flight deck).
One of the major projects that IATA is contributing to in the Com-
IATA has been recognized as a reliable and trustworthy monwealth of Independent States (CIS) region is the ICAO/In-
partner in the European aviation environment, participating terstate Aviation Committee Technical Project No. RER/01/901
in all COVID-19 consultation processes (very often with tight named “Development of Operational Safety and Continu-
deadlines) aimed at generating guidance materials for the ing Airworthiness for Contracting States of the International
industry to be able to continue operations and recover. Due Agreement” that has been active for 20 years. This is an im-
to the pandemic and as a result of IATA advocacy activities, portant project for all regional stakeholders; it helps to enhance
European regulators decided to postpone most of the safety awareness and allows sharing of industry best practices
regulatory activities that were running or planned as the need on area-specific safety issues with regulators, airlines, airports
to first contain the crisis was obvious. Most of the rulemaking and other organizations within the Russian-speaking states.
tasks that were postponed will need to be reevaluated, given
the new realities and challenges of air transport. Nevertheless, Due to the pandemic, the initial event schedule had to be
safety risk management remained a priority and, among other revised on a case-by-case basis. Some of the workshops had
initiatives, IATA contributed to the work on safety promotion of to be postponed to 2021 while the ones on the most essential
the EASA Commercial Air Transport – Collaborative Analysis topics were conducted in the form of webinars, which, in the
Group (CAT.CAG), notably in highlighting the issues relating to end, allowed us to ensure a wider international participation
unstable approaches. and more international speakers. IATA contributed to the
webinars on Safety Data Processing and State Safety Risk
IATA Safety Programs Management (21-22 October) and Competency-based Training
and Assessment/Evidence-based Training (12, 19 and 26
Although the top industry concern in 2020 was the survival of November). To meet the immediate needs of the industry, two
the industry, safety has always remained one of our highest additional webinars were held to tackle the challenges of the
priorities. One of the important tasks for IATA Europe was to industry restart and recovery during the pandemic (8 July and 5
ensure continuous support, within the IOSA Support Program, November), where IATA shared information on the COVID-19-
for airlines whose IOSA registration was or could have been related safety risks and pertinent guidance material.
affected by the pandemic. There were 164 airlines from the
region on the IOSA registry at year end.

States throughout the region are regularly encouraged to

consider entering into formal agreements to utilize IATA’s audit
programs to complement their safety oversight activities. In
October 2020, IATA signed an MoU with ILT on the use of IOSA
for safety oversight. During 2020, SFO EUR organized virtual
collaborative sessions with current regulator signatories of
IOSA utilization agreements to provide them with a COVID-19-
related program update.

20 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION

Middle East and North • Supported eligible member airlines in MENA to file for
Africa Region (MENA) extensions to their IOSA registration due to extenuating
circumstances (EC). A total of 14 airlines benefited from EC
and received registration extensions.
The aviation industry had one of its worst years in 2020 due to
COVID-19; carriers from Middle East and North Africa (MENA), • Worked with the regional carriers to expand membership
which is part of Africa and Middle East (AME), have been in IATA Global Aviation programs. As a result, membership
challenged by the importance of connecting traffic over Gulf grew by nine additional airlines.
hubs and elsewhere, since long-haul air travel markets have The IOSA program continues to be acknowledged by numerous
been slowest to reopen. As a result, COVID-19 caused major MENA region regulators and is utilized to complement their
disruption of flight operations in MENA. oversight activities. United Arab Emirates General Civil
The focus for 2021 is to support the aviation industry with the Aviation Authority (UAE GCAA) signed a safety MoU with
restart and to achieve a continuous reduction in operational IOSA recognizing the program as an acceptable means to
safety risks. The safety risks identified based on the analysis complement their oversight obligations.
of available safety data in Edition 9 of Middle East (MID) Safety Implementation of the SSP is one of the main challenges
Report include: faced by states in the MID Region. Improvements of SSP
1.  Loss of Control — In-flight (LOC-I) implementation is addressed as a top priority through SEIs.

2. Runway Excursion and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC)

during landing Africa and Indian Ocean
Region (AFI)
3. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)
4. Mid-Air Collision (MAC)
5. Runway Incursion AFI, as part of AME, also experienced major disruptions due
In addition, emerging safety risks were identified as: to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the disruptions, IATA
continued to make substantial contributions to the 6th Edition
• Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) outage of the African Regional Aviation Safety Group (RASG-AFI)
Annual Safety Report, which was issued in July 2020. The
• State Safety Oversight capabilities report tracks Abuja Safety Targets and general safety risks in
the following areas:
• Safety Management
1. Runway-related accidents
• COVID-19 pandemic outbreak
2. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)
IATA MENA continues to work closely with all concerned
stakeholders (states, ICAO and ITU) on measures to ensure 3. Loss of Control–In-Flight (LOC-I)
effective reporting of GNSS interferences and developing
mitigation measures to reduce the effects of the interference. 4. Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS) implementation
The majority of GPS outages were closely linked with political by airlines
conflict in the region. The most affected geographical area was
Eastern Mediterranean, Baghdad and Ankara FIRs. 5. Achieve and maintain zero fatalities in aircraft accidents
The COVID-19 pandemic was addressed in a proactive manner 6. Progressively reduce rate of air proximity (AIRPROX)
as an emerging safety risk in the MID 9th Annual Safety
Report and will be included in 2021 priorities. IATA MENA is 7. Raise awareness and encourage data sharing of incidents
contributing to: and safety concerns via a singular platform

• ICAO MID Regional Recovery Planning Task Force (RPTF), Edition 6 of the RASG-AFI Annual Safety Report had the
leading Workstream 4 (WS 4) Air Navigation Services and Air following general recommendations:
Traffic Management, and providing material input into WS 1
(Public Health Requirements), WS 2 (Operational Safety Mea- • Establishment of effective Runway Safety Teams.
sures) as well as WS 3 (Airport and Passenger Facilitation).
• Active participation of states in Global Aviation Safety.
• Crisis management on operational, crew licensing,
airworthiness, auditing and safety-related industry issues • Resolution of the only remaining Significant Safety Concern
(liaising with regional ICAO toward defined COVID-19 (SSC) in one state (Eritrea) to be prioritized by all stakeholders.
Contingency Related Difference (CCRD) and ICAO Council
Aviation Recovery Task Force (CART) criteria for support) IATA continues to work closely with all key stakeholders to im-
promoting a staggered approach to renewal processes for prove safety in the region. IATA and African Airlines Association
the restart. (AFRAA) joined forces with the African Civil Aviation Commis-
sion (AFCAC) on a three-year safety project. The objective of
the project is to provide technical support to the African air op-
erators of states party to the Single Africa Air Transport Market

MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 21

(SAATM) to ensure they achieve and maintain global aviation • Assisting airlines to coordinate with Air Traffic Management
safety standards. This will be done through a process of identi- Bureau (ATMB), CAAC to exchange ATC safety-related
fying and assessing eligible airlines, conducting gap analyses, information during daily operation.
and recommending corrective actions for each participating
carrier to prepare them for IOSA or ISSA evaluation. • Supporting cargo operations for airlines newly operating in
the region regarding flight permits to ensure the supply chain
The IOSA and ISAGO programs continue to be acknowledged
and transportation of medical supplies.
by numerous AFI region regulators and is utilized to complement
their oversight activities. Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Promoting IOSA and ISAGO
signed a safety MoU with IOSA and ISAGO in February 2020
In September and October 2020, three sessions of IOSA Train-
recognizing the programs as acceptable means to complement
ing Workshop for CAAC were delivered, which were attend-
their oversight obligations.
ed by cabin safety inspectors, principal operations inspectors
IATA AFI also contributed to the following in 2020: (POI) and CCAR-129 inspectors from CAAC headquarters and
regional administrations.
• Worked with AFI regional carriers to expand membership
in IATA Global Aviation programs. As a result, membership In November 2020, two sessions of CAAC Weight and Balance
grew by five additional airlines. Workshop were delivered, which were attended by CAAC
headquarters, GSPs and member airlines.
• Convened the 17th AFI Incident Analysis Group (AIAG/17)
meeting. Despite COVID-19 travel restrictions, the meeting Promoting Flight Operation Safety
was attended by 65 participants. The AIAG/17 meeting To promote the development of EBT in the global aviation
analyzed 71 Undesired Condition Reports (UCRs) and found industry, in November 2020, two sessions of CAAC CBTA
that 79% of the UCRs analyzed were confirmed to be Loss of (EBT) webinars were delivered, which were attended by CAAC
Separation (LoS) events. The goal of the group is to reduce headquarters, EASA, OEMs and member airlines.
the number of AIRPROXs in the airspace.
SFO NASIA cooperated with related organizations (airlines,
Implementation of an SSP is one of the main challenges faced OEMs and MROs) in the domain of maintenance to create
by states in AFI Region. Only one country has thus far reached and promote awareness of parked aircraft return to service
Level 4 in SSP implementation. (RTS) and shared experience and best practices with regional
stakeholders in a timely manner.

North Asia Region SFO NASIA also monitored CCRD alleviations in the region on
(NASIA) a regular basis and updated the policies from CAAs, especially
regarding personnel licenses, medical certificates and MRO
certification.

SFO NASIA continues to implement a risk-based, data-driven Promoting Cabin Safety

safety strategy to promote the overall safety performance of In August 2020, SFO NASIA and Civil Aviation University of
the region. As such, SFO NASIA pays attention to the demand China (CAUC) jointly held an online workshop entitled Cabin
from member airlines and the cooperation with the regional Safety and Operations During and Post Pandemic, which
CAAs. To face the challenges brought on by COVID-19, SFO was attended by IATA headquarters, CAAC headquarters and
NASIA keeps close cooperation with member airlines, ICAO airlines in the region.
and all regional stakeholders in the domains of audit programs,
safety information sharing, GADM, COVID-19 Safety Risk Promoting Metric System Change
Management Framework, etc. The followings are achievements Participated in the research arranged by CAAC of metric
highlighted in 2020. system changing and assisted in completing the preliminary
study report of phase 2019-2020, which has been submitted
Enhancing safety information sharing
to State Air Traffic Control Commission Office (SATCCo) for
SFO NASIA enhanced safety information sharing (i.e., operation review.
notices, SIRM Bulletins, operational-related guidance) within
the region and received positive feedback. Promoting WGS-84 Compliance
The Provisions on the Scope of State Secrets in the Man-
Promoting GADM
agement of Surveying and Mapping Geographic Information
GADM made significant progress in 2020; seven airlines in was jointly issued by the Ministry of Natural Resources of the
the region joined the program, including from the Chinese People’s Republic of China and the National Administration of
mainland, Hong Kong SAR and Chinese Taipei. Through IATA State Secrets Protection, effective from 1 July 2020, which has
advocacy, the concept of safety information exchange has improved the accuracy of the names and coordinates of key
been gradually accepted. military and national security facilities.
Enhancing the service of IATA China ATFM Liaison Desk Promoting IATA Turbulence Aware
SFO NASIA expanded its service to all airlines to promote IATA Turbulence Aware (ITA) has made positive progress in
safety performance, including: 2020, when five airlines in the region signed the trial contract.

• Coordinating with authorities regarding crew restriction

issues and providing support for urgent requests.
22 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  MANAGING SAFETY IN AVIATION
1

IATA 2020 Safety Report

Safety is aviation’s highest priority. More than 75 The IATA Safety Report has been IATA’s flagship
years ago, the global airline industry came together in safety document since 1964. The document provides
Havana, Cuba, to create the International Air Transport the industry with critical information, derived from the
Association (IATA). As part of IATA’s mission to represent, analysis of aviation accidents, to understand safety risks
lead and serve its members, the association partners and propose mitigations. The 2020 Safety Report was
with aviation stakeholders to collect, analyze and share produced at the beginning of 2021 and presents trends
safety information. It also advocates for global safety and statistics based on knowledge of the industry at
standards and best practices that are firmly founded that time.
on industry experience and expertise. A vital tool in this
effort is IATA’s annual Safety Report, which is now in The IATA Safety Report is a valuable tool as aviation
its 57th year of publication. It is the definitive yearbook works tirelessly to improve its already superb safety
to track commercial aviation’s safety performance, record. This report is made available to the industry for
challenges and opportunities. free distribution.

Image courtesy of Airbus

SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 23

SAFETY REPORT METHODS ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION
AND ASSUMPTIONS TECHNICAL GROUP
The IATA Safety Report is produced each year and is The Accident Classification Technical Group (ACTG) was
designed to present the best-known information at the time created to analyze accidents, identify contributing factors,
of publication. Due to the nature of accident analysis, certain determine trends and areas of concern relating to operational
caveats apply to the results of this report. First, the accidents safety, and develop prevention strategies. The results of the
analyzed and the categories and contributing factors assigned work of the ACTG are incorporated in this annual IATA Safety
to those accidents are based on the best available information Report. It should be noted that many accident investigations
at the time of classification. Second, the sectors used to create are not complete at the time the ACTG meets to classify the
the accident rates are the most up-to-date available from year’s events and additional facts may be uncovered during
OAG at the time of production. Third, results of analysis from an investigation that could affect the currently assigned
2016–2020 reports are used as benchmarks for comparison; classifications.
however, historical numbers presented in this 2020 report may
not exactly match earlier editions due to data updates during The ACTG is composed of safety experts from IATA,
the intervening period. member airlines, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs),
professional associations and federations as well as other
industry stakeholders. The group is instrumental in the analysis
process and produces a safety report based on the subjective
classification of accidents. The data analyzed and presented
in this report is extracted from a variety of sources. Once
assembled, the members of the ACTG validate each accident
report using their expertise to develop an accurate assessment
of the events.

2020 ACTG members:

Capt. Ruben Morales Capt. Sam Goodwill Capt. Suha Senol

(Chair) THE BOEING COMPANY TURKISH AIRLINES
HONG KONG EXPRESS
Mr. Eric East Capt. B. Pete Kaumanns
Capt. Takahisa Otsuka THE BOEING COMPANY VEREINIGUNG COCKPIT
(Vice-Chair)
JAPAN AIRLINES Mr. David Monteith Mr. Greg Brock
DE HAVILLAND WORLD METEOROLOGICAL
ORGANIZATION
Mr. Luis Savio dos Santos
EMBRAER Capt. Mark Searle
Dr. Dieter Reisinger IATA
AUSTRIAN AIRLINES Ms. Huanmei Yang
ICAO Mr. Gabriel Acosta
Mr. Marcel Comeau IATA
AIR CANADA Capt. Arnaud Du Bédat
IFALPA Mr. Andrea Mulone
Mr. Xavier Barriola IATA
AIRBUS Mr. Martin Plumleigh
JEPPESEN Ms. Hanada Said
Capt. Jeff Mee IATA
ALPA Capt. Peter Krupa
LUFTHANSA Ms. Anna Bernhardt
Ms. Tatyana Morozova IATA
AIR ASTANA Capt. Andreas Poehlitz
LUFTHANSA
Mr. Nicolas Bornand
AIR FRANCE Mr. David Fisher
MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES
Ms. Alice Calmels REGIONAL JET (MHIRJ)
ATR
Capt. HockKeat Ho
Capt. Jorge Robles SINGAPORE AIRLINES
AVIANCA CARGO - TAMPA
Capt. Antonio Jose dos Santos Gomes
Capt. Ivan Carvalho TAP AIR PORTUGAL
AZUL BRAZILIAN AIRLINES

24 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION

2

Decade in Review
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND FATALITIES

This section presents yearly accident rates for the past 10 years for each of the following accident metrics: all
accidents, fatality risk, fatal accidents and hull losses, as well as general statistics on the number of fatalities and
accident costs.

Image courtesy of Embraer

SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 25

ALL ACCIDENTS
‘All Accidents’ is the most inclusive rate, including all accident types and all severities in terms of
loss of life and damage to aircraft.

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

5.00
Accidents per Million

4.00

3.00
Sectors

2.00

1.00

-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Jet Aircraft

5.00
Accidents per Million

4.00

3.00
Sectors

2.00

1.00

-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Turboprop Aircraft

12.00
Accidents per Million

10.00

8.00
Sectors

6.00
4.00

2.00
-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

26 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW

FATALITY RISK

Fatality Risk: Full-Loss Equivalents (FLE) per million sectors. For a definition of ‘full-loss equivalent’, see Annex 1.

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

2.00
FLE per Million Sectors

1.50

1.00

0.50

-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Jet Aircraft

1.00
FLE per Million Sectors

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Turboprop Aircraft

3.50
FLE per Million Sectors

3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 27

FATAL ACCIDENTS

Fatal Accidents are those where at least one person on board the aircraft perished as a result.

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

2.00
Accidents per Million

1.50
Sectors

1.00

0.50

-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Jet Aircraft

1.00
Accidents per Million

0.80

0.60
Sectors

0.40

0.20

-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Turboprop Aircraft

4.00
Accidents per Million

3.00
Sectors

2.00

1.00

-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

28 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW

HULL LOSS

‘Hull Loss’ refers to the aircraft being damaged beyond repair or the costs related to the repair
being above the commerical value of the aircraft.

Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

5.00
Accidents per Million

4.00

3.00
Sectors

2.00

1.00

-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Jet Aircraft

3.00
Accidents per Million

2.50

2.00
Sectors

1.50
1.00

0.50
-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

Turboprop Aircraft

8.00
Accidents per Million

6.00
Sectors

4.00

2.00

-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Industry IATA Non-IATA IOSA Non-IOSA

SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 29

FATALITIES
The graph below shows the total number of fatalities (line and vertical right axis) and
the number of fatal accidents (stacked bar and vertical left axis) split between aircraft
propulsion. The reader needs to be aware that the data is not being normalized by the air-
craft flight count; therefore, discretion should be used. Interpreting and applying this data
should be used in reference to the accident rate graphs presented on the previous pages.

Number of Fatalities and Fatal Accidents

25 600
Number of Fatal Accidents

20 500

Number of Fatalities
400
15
300
10
200
5 100

0 0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Jet Fatal Accidents Turboprop Fatal Accidents

Jet Fatalities Turboprop Fatalities

The graph below shows the constant increase in passengers carried over the year and a
ratio metric related to the number of fatalities by the number of passengers carried on a
specific year. The sharp drop in 2020 is due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Number of Passengers Carried and Fatality Ratio per Passenger Carried

5.00 250
Fatalities per Billion Passengers
Number of Passengers Carried

4.50
4.00 200
3.50
3.00 150
(Billion)

Carried

2.50
2.00 100
1.50
1.00 50
0.50
- -
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Passengers Carried Fatalities/Billion Passengers Carried

Passengers Carried Data Source: IATA / Industry Economic Performance

30 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 2 – DECADE IN REVIEW

3

2020 in Review
COMMERCIAL AIRLINES OVERVIEW

FLEET SIZE AND SECTORS FLOWN

Jet Turboprop Total

World Fleet 34,097 3,452 37,549

Sector Landings (Millions) 19.1 3.1 22.2

Source: OAG, ch-aviation

Note: World Fleet includes in-service and stored aircraft operated by commercial airlines as at year-end.

CARGO OPERATING FLEET

Jet Turboprop

Percentage of Operating Fleet in All-Cargo Use 9.5% 9.4%

Source: ch-aviation
Note: Operating Fleet includes in-service and stored aircraft operated by commercial airlines as at year-end.

SECTION 3 – 2020 IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 31

REGIONAL BREAKDOWN

AFI ASPAC CIS EUR LATAM/ MENA NAM NASIA

CAR

Jet - Sector Landings (Millions) 0.30 3.20 0.73 3.18 1.13 0.97 5.52 4.03

Turboprop - Sector Landings (Millions) 0.31 1.00 0.09 0.63 0.43 0.02 0.57 0.08

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
Note: Summaries of all the year’s accidents are presented in Annex 3.

NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS

Jet Turboprop Total

Total 27 11 38

Hull Losses 4 5 9

Substantial Damage 23 6 29

Fatal 3 2 5

Full-Loss Equivalents 1.1 1.9 3.0

Fatalities* 121 11 132

Fatalities of people not on board the aircraft 1 0 1

*People on board only

ACCIDENTS PER OPERATOR REGION

AFI ASPAC CIS EUR LATAM/ MENA NAM NASIA

CAR

Total 6 7 5 5 3 1 11 0

Hull Losses 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 0

Substantial Damage 2 5 4 4 2 1 11 0

Fatal 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0

Full-Loss Equivalents 1.9 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Fatalities 11 118 0 3 0 0 0 0

32 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 3 – 2020 IN REVIEW

ALL ACCIDENT RATE
Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
2020 vs 2019
EUR 6.07
NAM NASIA accident rate
1.31 4.04
1.81 0.00
0.40 4.99
1.27 0.15 2020
0.88
1.11 MENA 0.13 2019
1.01 ’16-’20
0.44
1.75 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 1.67
1.93 9.86 0.99
World IATA 1.73 6.03 1.64
Members
2.11 5.81
1.71 0.83
1.11 0.87
1.38 0.96

Jet Aircraft

CIS
EUR 6.86 2020 vs 2019
NAM NASIA accident rate
1.57 2.94
1.45 0.00
0.47 3.98
1.07 0.15 2020
0.87
0.96 MENA 0.13 2019
1.03 ’16-’20
0.47
1.63 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 1.56
0.89 6.64 0.64
World IATA 0.37 5.57 1.41
Members
1.43 4.00
1.42 0.83
0.78 0.81
1.09 0.90

Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 0.00 2020 vs 2019
NAM NASIA accident rate
0.00 15.79
5.22 0.00
0.00 15.39
2.41 0.00 2020
1.01
2.22 MENA 0.00 2019
0.00 ’16-’20
0.00
3.41 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 2.00
4.69 13.02 2.19
World IATA 6.60 6.47 2.36
Members
4.37 7.49
3.50 0.82
2.89 1.75
2.90 1.77

SECTION 3 – 2020 IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 33

FATALITY RISK
Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
2020 vs 2019
EUR 0.00
NAM NASIA accident rate
0.00 0.88
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.77
0.08 0.00 2020
0.04
0.05 MENA 0.00 2019
0.00 ’16-’20
0.00
0.20 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.26
0.00 3.08 0.00
World IATA 0.00 1.34 0.16
Members
0.16 1.16
0.13 0.06
0.09 0.10
0.13 0.06

Jet Aircraft

CIS
EUR 0.00 2020 vs 2019
NAM NASIA accident rate
0.01 0.47
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.25
0.09 0.00 2020
0.05
0.02 MENA 0.00 2019
0.00 ’16-’20
0.00
0.11 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.34
0.00 0.00 0.00
World IATA 0.00 1.39 0.10
Members
0.22 0.28
0.06 0.07
0.07 0.11
0.07 0.05

Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 0.00 2020 vs 2019
NAM NASIA accident rate
0.00 5.28
0.00 0.00
0.00 6.10
0.01 0.00 2020
0.00
0.21 MENA 0.00 2019
0.00 ’16-’20
0.00
1.44 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.00
0.00 6.10 0.00
World IATA 0.00 1.29 0.37
Members
0.00 2.02
0.60 0.00
0.23 0.00
0.49 0.24

34 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 3 – 2020 IN REVIEW

FATAL ACCIDENTS
Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
2020 vs 2019
EUR 0.00
NAM NASIA accident rate
0.26 2.69
0.00 0.00
0.00 1.31
0.15 0.00 2020
0.10
0.10 MENA 0.00 2019
0.00 ’16-’20
0.00
0.20 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.48
0.00 3.29 0.00
World IATA 0.00 1.34 0.26
Members
0.24 1.21
0.23 0.13
0.17 0.12
0.20 0.08

Jet Aircraft

CIS
EUR 0.00 2020 vs 2019
NAM NASIA accident rate
0.31 1.47
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.45
0.09 0.00 2020
0.11
0.04 MENA 0.00 2019
0.00 ’16-’20
0.00
0.11 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.62
0.00 0.00 0.00
World IATA 0.00 1.39 0.19
Members
0.31 0.28
0.16 0.14
0.10 0.13
0.11 0.07

Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 0.00 2020 vs 2019
NAM NASIA accident rate
0.00 15.79
0.00 0.00
0.00 10.12
0.48 0.00 2020
0.00
0.40 MENA 0.00 2019
0.00 ’16-’20
0.00
1.44 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.00
0.00 6.51 0.00
World IATA 0.00 1.29 0.47
Members
0.00 2.10
0.64 0.00
0.55 0.00
0.64 0.24

SECTION 3 – 2020 IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 35

HULL LOSS
Jet & Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
2020 vs 2019
EUR 1.21
NAM NASIA accident rate
0.26 3.36
0.00 0.00
0.00 2.34
0.07 0.15 2020
0.12
0.13 MENA 0.03 2019
0.00 ’16-’20
0.00
0.41 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.48
0.64 6.57 0.12
World IATA 0.29 1.34 0.37
Members
0.49 2.67
0.41 0.13
0.23 0.24
0.34 0.17

Jet Aircraft

CIS
EUR 1.37 2020 vs 2019
NAM NASIA accident rate
0.31 2.21
0.00 0.00
0.00 1.20
0.09 0.15 2020
0.14
0.10 MENA 0.03 2019
0.00 ’16-’20
0.00
0.34 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.62
0.00 0.00 0.00
World IATA 0.00 1.39 0.30
Members
0.39 0.28
0.21 0.14
0.15 0.21
0.20 0.15

Turboprop Aircraft

CIS
EUR 0.00 2020 vs 2019
NAM NASIA accident rate
0.00 15.79
0.00 0.00
0.00 13.75
0.00 0.00 2020
0.00
0.30 MENA 0.00 2019
0.00 ’16-’20
0.00
1.44 ASPAC
LATAM/CAR AFI 0.00
2.35 13.02 0.55
World IATA 1.32 1.29 0.58
Members
0.73 4.93
1.59 0.00
0.69 0.58
1.07 0.49

36 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 3 – 2020 IN REVIEW

 IATA Member Airlines vs. Nonmembers — Total Accident Rate by Region
In an effort to better indicate the safety performance of IATA member airlines vs. nonmembers, IATA has determined the total
accident rate for each, regionally and globally. IATA member airlines outperformed nonmembers in the AFI, ASPAC, CIS, LATAM/
CAR, MENA and NAM regions.

2020 Accident Rate: IATA Member Airlines vs. Nonmembers

12
Sectors Flown

10
of Accidents

6
per Million
Accidents Number

-
S
C

IA
A

LD
AR
I
AF

PA

CI

EU

EN

S
NA

OR
/C

NA
AS

M
AM

W
T
LA

IATA NON-IATA

IOSA-Registered Airlines vs. Non-IOSA —Total Accidents and Fatalities by Region

In an effort to better indicate the safety performance of IOSA-registered airlines vs. non-IOSA, IATA has determined the total
accident rate for each, regionally and globally. IOSA-registered airlines outperformed non-registered airlines in the AFI, ASPAC,
CIS, LATAM/CAR, MENA and NAM regions. The non-IOSA-registered airline accident rate was about four times higher than for
IOSA-registered airlines in 2020.

2020 Accident Rate: IOSA-Registered vs. Non-Registered

12
Sectors Flown

10
of Accidents

6
per Million
Accidents Number

-
M
A

LD
AR
S
I

IA
AF

PA

CI

EU

EN

NA

OR
/C

NA
AS

M
AM

W
T
LA

IOSA NON-IOSA

SECTION 3 – 2020 IN REVIEW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 37

 KEEP IT SAFE
Operating safely and efficiently reduces the risk of incidents. It
also helps reduce costs, while building public trust and positive
sentiment. IATA Consulting develops tailored solutions based
on global industry best practices to improve your operations
and safety performance levels.

Evidence-Based Training (EBT) / Competency-Based Airline Staffing Forecast

Training and Assessment (CBTA). Aircraft Movement Forecast
IOSA Civil Aviation Master Plan (CAMP)
Operational Authorizations (TCO, CCAR 129, Part 129) CAA State Safety Program
ISAGO Safety Oversight
Airport / Airline Risk Assessment Airspace Optimization
Safety Data Analytics ATM Master Plan
Operational Efficiency & Cost Management AIS to AIM Performance Assessment
Fuel Efficiency and Transition Planning
Maintenance Cost Benchmarking

Get on the right path

iata.org/consulting
4

In-Depth Accident Analysis

2016 to 2020
INTRODUCTION TO THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT

The Human Factors Research Project at the University DEFINITIONS

of Texas in Austin developed Threat and Error
Management (TEM) as a conceptual framework to Latent Conditions: Conditions present in the system before the
interpret data obtained from both normal and abnormal accident, made evident by triggering factors. These often relate
operations. For many years, IATA has worked closely to deficiencies in organizational processes and procedures.
with the University of Texas Human Factors Research
Team, ICAO, IATA member airlines and OEMs to apply Threat: An event or error that occurs outside the influence of
the flight crew, but which requires flight crew attention and
TEM to its many safety activities. management to properly maintain safety margins.

Flight Crew Error: An observed flight crew deviation from

THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT organizational expectations or crew intentions.
FRAMEWORK Undesired Aircraft State (UAS): A flight crew-induced
aircraft state that clearly reduces safety margins; a safety
compromising situation that results from ineffective TEM. An
UAS is recoverable.

End State: An end state is a reportable event. An End State is

unrecoverable.

Distinction between ‘Undesired Aircraft State’ and ‘End State’:

An UAS is recoverable (e.g., an unstable approach from which
a go-around would recover the situation). An End State is
unrecoverable (e.g., a runway excursion where the aircraft
comes to rest off the runway).

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 39
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM ANALYSIS BY ACCIDENT CATEGORY AND
REGION
At the request of member airlines, manufacturers and other
organizations involved in the Safety Report, IATA developed an This section presents an in-depth analysis of 2016 to 2020
accident classification system based on the TEM framework. occurrences by accident category and regional distribution.
The purpose of the taxonomy is to: Definitions of these categories can be found in Annex 2. The
countries that make up each of the IATA regions can be found
• Acquire more meaningful data in Annex 1. An in-depth regional analysis can be found in
Section 5.
• Extract further information/intelligence
Referring to the accident categories helps an operator to:
• Formulate relevant mitigation strategies/safety
recommendations • Structure safety activities and set priorities.

Unfortunately, some accident reports do not contain sufficient • Recall key risk areas (i.e., when a type of accident does not
information at the time of the analysis to adequately assess occur in a given year).
contributing factors. When an event cannot be properly
classified due to a lack of information, it is classified under • Provide resources for well-identified prevention strategies.
the Insufficient Information category. Where possible, these
accidents have been assigned an End State. It should also be • Address the categories, both systematically and continuous-
noted that the contributing factors that have been classified ly, within the airline’s safety management system (SMS).
do not always reflect all the factors that played a part in an
accident, but rather those known at the time of the analysis.

Important note: In the in-depth analysis presented in Chapters

4 and 5, the percentages shown with regard to contributing
factors (e.g., % of threats and errors noted) are based on the
number of accidents in each category. Accidents classified
as Insufficient Information are excluded from this part of the
analysis. The number of Insufficient Information accidents is
noted at the bottom of each analysis of contributing factors.
However, accidents classified as Insufficient Information are
part of the overall statistics (e.g., % of accidents that were fatal
or resulted in a hull loss).

Annex 1 contains definitions and detailed information regarding

the types of accidents and aircraft included in the Safety
Report as well as the breakdown of IATA regions. The complete
IATA TEM-based accident classification system for flight is
presented in Annex 2.

40 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
2020 Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 38 Accident Count % of Total 2020
Number of fatalities: 132 IATA Member 34%
Full-Loss Equivalents 8%
Fatal 13%
Hull Losses 24%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

63% 37% 0% 71% 29%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 5 NASIA
EUR
11 3 0
5
7 1
7

MENA
1
3
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 6 7
3 6 7
International Waters or
Location Unknown
4
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2020)

30%
Accident Frequency (%

Runway / Taxiway
from t ot al accident s)

25% Excursion, 24 In-flight Damage, 104

20%
15%
Controlled Flight Into
10% Terrain (CFIT), 4
5%
0%
- 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
Fat alit y Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

42 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
2020 Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate: 1.71 Accident Rate* 2020
IATA Member 0.83
Fatality Risk** 0.13
Fatal 0.23
Hull Losses 0.41

Jet Turboprop
1.42 3.50 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Number of accidents per 1 million flights **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2020) Regional Accident Rate (2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accident per million sectors

30%
12.0
25%
10.0
20%
8.0
15% 6.0
10% 4.0
5% 2.0
0% -
MID-AIR COL L
GND DAMAGE

OFF AIRP LDG

HARD LDG

TAILSTRIKE
UNDERSHOOT
RWY/TWY EXC

CFIT
LOC-I
OTHER
G UP LDG/CLPSE

RWY COLL
IN-F DA MAGE

AFI

ASPAC

EUR

LATAM

NAM
CIS

ME NA

NASIA
Note: End State names have been abbreviated.
Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal)

30 Non Fatal
Nonfatal
25 Fatal
Fatal

20

15

10

0
PRF ESD TXO TOF RTO ICL ECL CRZ DST APR GOA LND TXI AES PSF FLC GDS

Refer to list of Phase of Flight definitions for full names

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 43
2020 Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

2020 Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS

Percentage Contribution

Safety Management 47%

Regulatory Oversight 45%
Flight Operations 34%
Selection Systems 34%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 29%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 26%
Maintenance Operations 21%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 21%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 13%
Change Management 8%
Dispatch 5%
Design 5%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 3%
Flight Watch/Following/Support 3%
Technology & Equipment 3%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 39%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 29%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 26%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 13%
Callouts 13%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 8%
ATC 5%
Crew to External Communication 5%
Briefings 5%
Normal Checklist 3%
Documentation 3%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 3%
Wrong Altimeter Reference Settings (QNH, QFE) 3%
Automation 3%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 3%

44 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

2020 Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 45%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 39%
Aircraft Malfunction 34%
Airport Facilities 26%
Maintenance Events 21%
Gear/Tire 21%
Poor Visibility/IMC 21%
Thunderstorms 18%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 16%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 11%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 11%
Nav Aids 8%
Hydraulic System Failure 8%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 5%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 5%
Foreign Objects, FOD 5%
Brakes 5%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 5%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 5%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Air Traffic Services 5%
Dispatch / Paperwork 3%
Lack of Visual Reference 3%
Extensive / Uncontained Engine Failure 3%
Flight Controls 3%

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 45

2020 Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 29%

Unstable Approach 29%
Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landinging 29%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 29%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 26%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 16%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 11%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 8%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 5%
Weight & Balance 5%
Landing Gear 3%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 3%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 26%

Monitor/Cross-check 21%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 18%
Captain should show leadership 11%
Leadership 11%
Communication Environment 8%
Workload Management 5%
Plans Stated 5%
Taxiway/Runway Management 5%
FO is assertive when necessary 5%
Evaluation of Plans 5%
SOP Briefing/Planning 3%
Inquiry 3%

Note: one accident was not classified due to insufficient data; this accident was subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

46 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

 Evidence-
Based
Training (EBT)
The aim of an EBT program is to identify, develop and evaluate the competencies required by pilots to
operate safely, effectively and efficiently in a commercial air transport environment. This is accomplished
by managing the most relevant threats and errors based on evidence collected in operations and training.

Why? IATA’s Role?

Overall flight crew performance is the primary Since 2008, IATA has led the development of EBT and has
contributing factor to accidents and incidents. supported its implementation across the world. EBT was
The EBT initiative proposes an innovative pilot endorsed by ICAO in 2013, mixed EBT has been possible in
training methodology, which arose from Europe since 2016, and EASA enabled full EBT
concerns that traditional recurrent training and implementation in 2020. Over 50 airlines are engaged in the
licensing were no longer meeting the needs of development of EBT for their own organizations and are in
airline pilots. various stages of readiness. A team of current and
experienced IATA captains can assist airlines, ATOs and CAAs
with all aspects of EBT implementation.

IATA Consulting can assist you with

every aspect of EBT implementation

EBT Pre-Implementation EBT Program Design

Deliver awareness workshop(s) to top management Support your EBT program design.
and operational staff.
Assess organization (AOC-ATO) needs.
Propose options and associated EBT implementation plan. EBT Tools
Obtain buy-in from your CAA. Propose technical solutions for training data
Support internal EBT awareness and communication plan. collection and analysis.

Competencies for Pilots and Instructors EBT Monitoring

Support the definition and implementation of your pilot Propose technical solutions for training data
and instructor competency grading system. collection and analysis.
Train and assess your EBT instructor core group in Adjustment and continuous improvement of the
accordance with your competency performance standards. training program

CONTACT
If you need help to qualify a lead, prepare a proposal or
want more information on EBT, contact EBT@IATA.org
2016-2020 Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 262 Accident Count % of Total 2016-2020
Number of fatalities: 1,112 IATA Member 40%
Full-Loss Equivalents 10%
Fatal 15%
Hull Losses 24%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

79% 21% 1% 66% 34%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 30 NASIA
EUR
58 25 4
34
46 5
38

MENA
16
20
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 32 56
32 37 56
International Waters or
Location Unknown
35
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

35%
Accident Frequency (%

Runway / Taxiway
30%
from total accidents )

Excursion, 79 Loss of Control In-flight,

698
25% Hard Landing, 41
20% In-flight Damage, 106
15%
Controlled Flight Into Terrain
10% Undershoot, 5
(CFIT), 76

5% Other End State, 76

0%
- 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
Fatality Ris k

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

48 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
2016-2020 Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate: 1.33 Average Accident Rate* 2016-2020
IATA Member 0.96
Fatality Risk** 0.13
Fatal 0.19
Hull Losses 0.33

Jet Turboprop
1.05 2.83 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accident per million sectors

30% 6.00
25% 5.00
20% 4.00
15% 3.00
10% 2.00
5% 1.00
0% -
AFI

EUR

NAM
CIS

ME NA

NASIA
ASPAC

LATAM/CAR
IN-F DAMA GE

RWY COLL
G UP LDG/CLPSE
RWY /TWY EXC

LOC-I

OTHER
CFIT
UNDERSHOOT
HARD LDG
GND DAMAGE

MID-AIR COLL
TAILSTRIKE

OFF AIRP LDG

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

1.80 70
160 Non Fatal
Nonfatal 1.60
140 60
Fatal
Fatal
Number of Accidents

1.40
120 50
1.20
Accident Rate

100 1.00 40
80 0.80 30
60 0.60
20
40 0.40
0.20 10
20
0 - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
TXO

ECL

GDS
PRF
ESD

TOF

CRZ
DST
APR

LND
TXI

PSF
FLC
RTO

GOA

AES
ICL

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 49
2016-2020 Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

2016-2020 Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Safety Management 37%
Regulatory Oversight 35%
Flight Operations 27%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 19%
Selection Systems 17%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 16%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 12%
Maintenance Operations 12%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 11%
Design 7%
Ground Operations 4%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%
Dispatch 4%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 3%
Technology & Equipment 3%
Change Management 3%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 2%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 2%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 41%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 33%
Callouts 14%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 13%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 11%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 8%
Abnormal Checklist 4%
Crew to External Communication 4%
Automation 4%
Normal Checklist 3%
Briefings 3%
ATC 3%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 3%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 3%
Documentation 3%
Ground Navigation 2%
Maintenance 1%

50 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

2016-2020 Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 37%
Aircraft Malfunction 31%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 25%
Airport Facilities 21%
Thunderstorms 16%
Gear/Tire 15%
Poor Visibility/IMC 14%
Maintenance Events 14%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 11%
Operational Pressure 9%
Nav Aids 6%
Ground Events 6%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 6%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 6%
Fatigue 6%
Lack of Visual Reference 6%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Air Traffic Services 5%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 5%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 4%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 4%
Dispatch/Paperwork 4%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 4%
Traffic 3%
Icing Conditions 3%
Hydraulic System Failure 3%
Terrain/Obstacles 3%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 3%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 2%
Brakes 2%
MEL Item 2%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 1%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 1%
Foreign Objects, FOD 1%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 1%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 1%
Flight Controls 1%
Structural Failure 1%

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 51

2016-2020 Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 26%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 22%
Unstable Approach 18%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 17%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 16%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 15%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 12%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 6%
Engine 5%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 5%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 4%
Flight Controls/Automation 3%
Weight & Balance 2%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 2%
Ramp Movements, including when under marshalling 2%
Landing Gear 1%
Systems 1%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 29%

Monitor/Cross-check 23%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 18%
Leadership 16%
Captain should show leadership 15%
Taxiway/Runway Management 9%
Workload Management 8%
FO is assertive when necessary 7%
Communication Environment 6%
Automation Management 5%
Evaluation of Plans 5%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 4%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 3%
Plans Stated 1%
Inquiry 1%
SOP Briefing/Planning 1%

Note: 28 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

52 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

A continuous, systematic
review of Safety Risks is
essential during a period
of change to effectively
manage aviation hazards
and risks through
effective mitigations
and safety improvement
programs to meet the
industry's needs.

IATA Safety
2016-2020 Fatal Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 38 Accident Count % of Total 2016-2020
Number of fatalities: 1,112 IATA Member 24%
Full-Loss Equivalents 69%
Fatal 100%
Hull Losses 92%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

61% 39% 0% 47% 53%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 9 NASIA
EUR
6 8 0
3
6 0
2

MENA
2
2
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 6 8
4 8 8
International Waters or
Location Unknown
4
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

60% Undershoot, 5
Accident Frequency (%
from total accidents )

50% Runway / Taxiway

Excursion, 79
40%
Hard Landing, 41
30%
Other End State, 76 In-flight Damage, 106 Loss of Control In-flight,
20% 698
Controlled Flight Into
10% Terrain (CFIT), 76
0%
- 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
Fatality Ris k

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

54 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
2016-2020 Fatal Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate: 0.19 Average Accident Rate* 2016-2020
IATA Member 0.08
Fatality Risk** 0.13
Fatal 0.19
Hull Losses 0.18

Jet Turboprop
0.11 0.64 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accident per million sectors

1.60
50%
1.40
40% 1.20
1.00
30%
0.80
20% 0.60
0.40
10%
0.20
0% 0.00
AFI

EUR

NAM
CIS

ME NA

NASIA
ASPAC

LATAM/CAR
RWY /TWY EXC

OTHER
IN-F DAMA GE

RWY COLL
MID-AIR COLL
HARD LDG
GND DAMAGE

TAILSTRIKE
OFF AIRP LDG

G UP LDG/CLPSE
LOC-I

CFIT
UNDERSHOOT

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

0.30 12
10
9 0.25 10
Fatal
Number of Accidents

8
Accident Rate

7 0.20 8
6
5 0.15 6
4
0.10 4
3
2 0.05 2
1
0 - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
TXO

ECL

GDS
PRF
ESD

TOF

CRZ
DST
APR

LND
TXI

PSF
FLC
RTO

GOA

AES
ICL

Accident Count Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 55
2016-2020 Fatal Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

2016-2020 Fatal Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Safety Management 71%
Regulatory Oversight 65%
Flight Operations 50%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 41%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 41%
Selection Systems 35%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 32%
Dispatch 18%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 15%
Ground Operations 9%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 9%
Change Management 9%
Design 9%
Maintenance Operations 9%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 9%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 6%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 3%
Flight Watch/Following/Support 3%
Technology & Equipment 3%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 3%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 56%
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 50%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 35%
Callouts 32%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 26%
Crew to External Communication 15%
Abnormal Checklist 15%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 12%
Briefings 12%
ATC 12%
Documentation 12%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 9%
Normal Checklist 6%
Maintenance 3%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 3%
Dispatch 3%
Automation 3%

56 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

2016-2020 Fatal Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 53%
Aircraft Malfunction 32%
Poor Visibility/IMC 32%
Operational Pressure 29%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 21%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 18%
Thunderstorms 18%
Fatigue 18%
Air Traffic Services 15%
Dispatch/Paperwork 15%
Lack of Visual Reference 15%
Terrain/Obstacles 12%
Nav Aids 9%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 9%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 9%
Maintenance Events 9%
Icing Conditions 9%
Airport Facilities 9%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 9%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 6%
Ground Events 6%
Structural Failure 3%
Crew Incapacitation 3%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 3%
Hydraulic System Failure 3%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 3%
MEL Item 3%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 3%

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 57

2016-2020 Fatal Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 47%

Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 47%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 32%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 29%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 26%
Unstable Approach 24%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 21%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 12%
Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 12%
Weight & Balance 9%
Flight Controls/Automation 9%
Engine 9%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 3%
Unauthorized Airspace Penetration 3%
Landing Gear 3%
Systems 3%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 53%

Monitor/Cross-check 50%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 44%
Leadership 44%
Captain should show leadership 41%
Communication Environment 26%
FO is assertive when necessary 26%
Workload Management 21%
Evaluation of Plans 15%
Automation Management 15%
Taxiway/Runway Management 12%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 12%
Plans Stated 9%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 6%
SOP Briefing/Planning 6%
Inquiry 6%

Note: four accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

58 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

 Experience the benefits of SMS
and QMS data integration.

Developed in collaboration with airlines and available

in the six official ICAO languages, IMX gathers all of
your quality management system (QMS) and safety
management system (SMS) data in a single platform
with a user-friendly interface, enabling you to manage,
analyze, and communicate better.

By using IMX, operators can save considerable time

and resources by establishing compliance baselines
and managing components associated with their QMS
and SMS.

Find out more and request a free trial:

www.iata.org/imx
2016-2020 Nonfatal Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 224 Accident Count % of Total 2016-2020
Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 43%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0%
Fatal 0%
Hull Losses 13%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

82% 17% 1% 70% 30%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 21 NASIA
EUR
52 17 4
31
40 5
36

MENA
14
18
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 26 48
28 29 48
International Waters or
Location Unknown
31
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

35%
Accident Frequency (%

30%
from t ot al accident s)

25%
20%
15% No passenger and/or crew fatalities
10%
5%
0%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fat alit y Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

60 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
2016-2020 Nonfatal Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate: 1.14 Accident Rate* 2016-2020
IATA Member 0.88
Fatality Risk** –
Fatal –
Hull Losses 0.15

Jet Turboprop
0.94 2.18 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accident per million sectors
5.00
40%
4.50
4.00
30% 3.50
3.00
20% 2.50
2.00
1.50
10% 1.00
0.50
0% 0.00
AFI

EUR

NAM
CIS

ME NA

NASIA
ASPAC

LATAM/CAR
RWY /TWY EXC

OTHER
IN-F DAMA GE

RWY COLL
G UP LDG/CLPSE

HARD LDG
GND DAMAGE
TAILSTRIKE

MID-AIR COLL
OFF AIRP LDG
LOC-I
CFIT
UNDERSHOOT

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (nonfatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used
1.60 60
160 Non Fatal
Nonfatal
1.40
140 50
Number of Accidents

1.20
120
Accident Rate

40
1.00
100
0.80 30
80
0.60
60 20
0.40
40
10
20 0.20

0 - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
PRF

TOF

DST

LND
TXI

FLC
TXO

RTO

ECL

GOA

AES

GDS
ICL
ESD

CRZ

APR

PSF

Accident Count Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 61
2016-2020 Nonfatal Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

2016-2020 Nonfatal Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Safety Management 31%
Regulatory Oversight 30%
Flight Operations 23%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 15%
Selection Systems 14%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 13%
Maintenance Operations 13%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 11%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 7%
Design 6%
Ground Operations 3%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 3%
Technology & Equipment 2%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 2%
Change Management 1%
Dispatch 1%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 1%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 1%
Cabin Operations 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 39%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 29%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 10%
Callouts 10%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 9%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 7%
Automation 4%
Abnormal Checklist 2%
Normal Checklist 2%
Ground Navigation 2%
Crew to External Communication 2%
Briefings 1%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 1%
ATC 1%
Documentation 1%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 1%
Wrong Altimeter Reference Settings (QNH, QFE) 1%
Maintenance 1%

62 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

2016-2020 Nonfatal Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 35%
Aircraft Malfunction 31%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 25%
Airport Facilities 23%
Gear/Tire 18%
Thunderstorms 15%
Maintenance Events 15%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 13%
Poor Visibility/IMC 11%
Ground Events 6%
Nav Aids 6%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 5%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 5%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 5%
Operational Pressure 5%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 4%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 4%
Lack of Visual Reference 4%
Traffic 4%
Air Traffic Services 3%
Fatigue 3%
Hydraulic System Failure 3%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 2%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 2%
Icing Conditions 2%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 2%
Brakes 2%
Dispatch/Paperwork 2%
MEL Item 2%
Foreign Objects, FOD 1%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 1%
Flight Controls 1%
Terrain/Obstacles 1%
Primary Flight Control 1%
Secondary Flight Control 1%
Dangerous Goods 1%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 1%
Structural Failure 1%

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 63

2016-2020 Nonfatal Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 28%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 18%
Unstable Approach 17%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 15%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 14%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 12%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 6%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 5%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%
Engine 4%
Ramp Movements, including when under marshalling 2%
Flight Controls/Automation 2%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 2%
Landing Gear 1%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%
Weight & Balance 1%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 1%
Systems 1%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 25%

Monitor/Cross-check 18%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 13%
Leadership 11%
Captain should show leadership 10%
Taxiway/Runway Management 9%
Workload Management 5%
FO is assertive when necessary 3%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 3%
Automation Management 3%
Evaluation of Plans 3%
Communication Environment 3%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 2%
Inquiry 1%

Note: 24 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

64 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

2016-2020 IOSA Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 133 Accident Count % of Total 2016-2020
Number of fatalities: 691 IATA Member 79%
Full-Loss Equivalents 7%
Fatal 9%
Hull Losses 17%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

93% 7% 0% 86% 14%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 10 NASIA
EUR
35 12 4
24
24 5
28

MENA
11
12
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 9 31
9 9 31
International Waters or
Location Unknown
12
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

66 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
2016-2020 IOSA Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate: 0.97 Accident Rate* 2016-2020
IATA Member 0.97
Fatality Risk** 0.06
Fatal 0.09
Hull Losses 0.16

Jet Turboprop
0.90 1.68 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accident per million sectors

20% 3.50
18%
3.00
16%
14% 2.50
12%
2.00
10%
8% 1.50
6% 1.00
4%
0.50
2%
0% 0.00

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
HARD LDG

OFF AIRP LDG

RWY/TWY EXC

UNDERSHOOT

CFIT
IN-F DAMAGE

G UP LDG/CLPSE
GND DAMAGE
TAILSTRIKE
LOC-I

RWY COLL

MID-AIR COLL
OTHER

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

1.40 40
80 Non Fatal
Nonfatal 35
70 Fatal 1.20
Fatal
Number of Accidents

60 30
1.00
Accident Rate

50 25
0.80
40 20
0.60
30 15
0.40
20 10
10 0.20 5
0 - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R

S
DS Z
RT F

CRL
EC L

S
O

C
A

AE I

F
ES F

D
D

APT

TX
TO

PS
PR

IC

GD
FL
LN
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 67
2016-2020 IOSA Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

2016-2020 IOSA Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 28%
Safety Management 28%
Flight Operations 25%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 21%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 18%
Selection Systems 15%
Maintenance Operations 11%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 10%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 9%
Design 8%
Ground Operations 3%
Change Management 3%
Technology & Equipment 3%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 2%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 2%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 2%
Cabin Operations 1%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 44%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 34%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 16%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 14%
Callouts 14%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 10%
Automation 6%
Abnormal Checklist 4%
Crew to External Communication 3%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 3%
Ground Navigation 3%
Normal Checklist 3%
Briefings 2%
ATC 2%
Documentation 1%
Maintenance 1%
Wrong Altimeter Reference Settings (QNH, QFE) 1%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 1%

68 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

2016-2020 IOSA Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 38%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 27%
Aircraft Malfunction 27%
Airport Facilities 18%
Thunderstorms 17%
Poor Visibility/IMC 16%
Gear/Tire 16%
Maintenance Events 14%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 10%
Ground Events 7%
Fatigue 6%
Operational Pressure 6%
Lack of Visual Reference 6%
Traffic 6%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 6%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 6%
Air Traffic Services 5%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 5%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 4%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 4%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 3%
Nav Aids 3%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 3%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 2%
Hydraulic System Failure 2%
Dispatch/Paperwork 2%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 2%
Terrain/Obstacles 2%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 2%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 2%
Foreign Objects, FOD 2%
Icing Conditions 2%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 1%
Dangerous Goods 1%
MEL Item 1%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 1%

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 69

2016-2020 IOSA Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 29%

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 27%
Unstable Approach 21%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 20%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 19%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 16%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 8%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 6%
Flight Controls/Automation 6%
Engine 4%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 4%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 3%
Ramp Movements, including when under marshalling 3%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 1%
Weight & Balance 1%
Systems 1%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%
Landing Gear 1%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 33%

Monitor/Cross-check 23%
Leadership 21%
Captain should show leadership 19%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 16%
Workload Management 10%
FO is assertive when necessary 9%
Communication Environment 9%
Automation Management 7%
Taxiway/Runway Management 7%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 5%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 3%
Evaluation of Plans 2%
Plans Stated 2%
SOP Briefing/Planning 1%
Inquiry 1%

Note: eight accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

70 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Safety Connect
supports the delivery
of a connected IATA
community where IATA
safety improvement
programs actively
support IATA members,
and the wider industry,
to continually reduce
the likelihood of aviation
incidents and accidents.

IATA Safety
2016-2020 Non-IOSA Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
Number of accidents: 129 Accident Count % of Total 2016-2020
Number of fatalities: 421 IATA Member 0%
Full-Loss Equivalents 14%
Fatal 20%
Hull Losses 33%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

64% 35% 2% 47% 53%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
20 NASIA
NAM 13 0
EUR 0
23
10
22
10

MENA
5
8 ASPAC
AFI 25
LATAM/CAR 23 25
23 28
International Waters or
Location Unknown
23
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

72 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
2016-2020 Non-IOSA Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
Accident rate: 2.18 Accident Rate* 2016-2020
IATA Member –
Fatality Risk** 0.30
Fatal 0.44
Hull Losses 0.71

Jet Turboprop
1.52 3.47 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accident per million sectors

40% 10.00
35% 9.00
30% 8.00
7.00
25%
6.00
20% 5.00
15% 4.00
3.00
10%
2.00
5% 1.00
0% 0.00

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
HARD LDG

OFF AIRP LDG

RWY/TWY EXC

UNDERSHOOT

CFIT
G UP LDG/CLPSE

IN-F DAMAGE

TAILSTRIKE
GND DAMAGE
LOC-I

RWY COLL

MID-AIR COLL
OTHER

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

3.50 35
90 Non Fatal
Nonfatal
80 3.00 30
Fatal
Fatal
Number of Accidents

70 2.50 25
Accident Rate

60
2.00 20
50
40 1.50 15
30 1.00 10
20
0.50 5
10
0 - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R

S
DS Z
RT F

CRL
EC L

S
O

GDC
A

AE I

F
ES F

D
D

APT

TX
TO

PS
PR

IC

FL
LN
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 73
2016-2020 Non-IOSA Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

2016-2020 Non-IOSA Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Safety Management 46%
Regulatory Oversight 43%
Flight Operations 29%
Selection Systems 19%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 17%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 16%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 14%
Maintenance Operations 14%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 11%
Dispatch 8%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 5%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 5%
Ground Operations 5%
Design 5%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 3%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 3%
Technology & Equipment 2%
Change Management 2%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 1%
Flight Watch/Following/Support 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 37%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 33%
Callouts 13%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 9%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 8%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 6%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 5%
Documentation 5%
Abnormal Checklist 5%
Crew to External Communication 5%
ATC 4%
Briefings 4%
Normal Checklist 3%
Automation 2%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 2%
Dispatch 1%
Maintenance 1%
Ground Navigation 1%

74 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

2016-2020 Non-IOSA Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 37%
Aircraft Malfunction 36%
Airport Facilities 24%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 22%
Maintenance Events 15%
Gear/Tire 15%
Thunderstorms 15%
Poor Visibility/IMC 13%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 13%
Operational Pressure 11%
Nav Aids 10%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 9%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 7%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 6%
Dispatch/Paperwork 5%
Air Traffic Services 5%
Lack of Visual Reference 5%
Icing Conditions 5%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 5%
Ground Events 5%
Fatigue 5%
Hydraulic System Failure 4%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 4%
Terrain/Obstacles 4%
Brakes 4%
MEL Item 3%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 3%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 3%
Flight Controls 2%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 2%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 2%
Structural Failure 2%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 2%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 1%
Secondary Flight Controls 1%
Foreign Objects, FOD 1%
Traffic 1%
Crew Incapacitation 1%
Primary Flight Controls 1%

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 75

2016-2020 Non-IOSA Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 24%

Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 17%
Unstable Approach 15%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 15%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 15%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 14%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 12%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 6%
Engine 5%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 5%
Weight & Balance 4%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 4%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 3%
Landing Gear 2%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%
Unauthorized Airspace Penetration 1%
Systems 1%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 25%

Monitor/Cross-check 22%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 20%
Taxiway/Runway Management 12%
Leadership 10%
Captain should show leadership 10%
Evaluation of Plans 7%
Workload Management 5%
FO is assertive when necessary 5%
Communication Environment 4%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 4%
Automation Management 3%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 3%
Inquiry 2%
Plans Stated 1%
SOP Briefing/Planning 1%

Note: 20 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

76 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Loss of Control — In-flight – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 0 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 19 Number of fatalities: 698 IATA Member 0% 26%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 70%
Fatal 0% 84%
Hull Losses 0% 95%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2016-2020 68% 32% 0% 58% 42%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 4 NASIA
EUR
3 4 0
1
3 0
1

MENA
2
2
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 2 4
3 2 4
International Waters or
Location Unknown
3
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

20%
Accident Frequency (%

NAM, 6
from total accidents)

15% CIS, 96
MENA, 62

10% LATAM, 117

AFI, 176
5% ASPAC, 239

0% EUR, 2
- 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

78 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Loss of Control — In-flight – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate: – Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate: 0.10 IATA Member – 0.05
Fatality Risk** – 0.07
Fatal – 0.08
Hull Losses – 0.09

Jet Turboprop
2020  – – Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.07 0.26
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) Accident per million sectors

7 Fatal 0.70 2020

Fatal
6 Nonfatal
Non Fatal 0.60
2016 - 2020
5 0.50
4 0.40
3 0.30
2 0.20
1 0.10
0 -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
GO R

AE I
D

S
Z
F

L
L

S
O

C
A
F

F
D
TX
TO

DS

PS
PR

CR

AP
EC
IC

GD
ES

FL
RT

LN
TX

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

0.25 9
35% 2020 8
30% 2016 - 2020 0.20
Number of Accidents

7
25% 6
Accident Rate

0.15
20% 5
4
15% 0.10
3
10% 2
0.05
5% 1
0% - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R
F

AE I
D

S
Z
RT F

CRL
L

S
O

C
A

F
TX
PR

TO

DS

PS
AP
EC

LN
IC

GD
ES

FL
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 79
Loss of Control — In-flight – Contributing Factors

Loss of Control — In-flight

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Safety Management 63%
Flight Operations 53%
Regulatory Oversight 53%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 47%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 37%
Selection Systems 37%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 37%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 16%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 16%
Ground Operations 16%
Dispatch 16%
Design 11%
Change Management 11%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 5%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 5%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 5%
Maintenance Operations 5%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 5%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 47%

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 47%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 32%
Abnormal Checklist 21%
Callouts 21%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 16%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 11%
Automation 11%
Documentation 11%
Normal Checklist 5%
Maintenance 5%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 5%
Crew to External Communication 5%

80 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Loss of Control — In-flight

THREATS
Percentage Contribution
Meteorology 47%
Aircraft Malfunction 37%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 26%
Poor Visibility/IMC 21%
Icing Conditions 16%
Fatigue 16%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 16%
Lack of Visual Reference 16%
Operational Pressure 16%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 16%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 11%
Ground Events 11%
Dispatch/Paperwork 11%
Maintenance Events 11%
Airport Facilities 5%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 5%
Air Traffic Services 5%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 5%
Thunderstorms 5%
MEL Item 5%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 42%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 37%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 26%
Flight Controls/Automation 21%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 16%
Weight & Balance 11%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 5%
Systems 5%
Unstable Approach 5%
Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 5%
Engine 5%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution
Overall Crew Performance 53%
Monitor/Cross-check 47%
Leadership 42%
Captain should show leadership 37%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 32%
Workload Management 26%
FO is assertive when necessary 21%
Communication Environment 16%
Automation Management 16%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 5%
Taxiway/Runway Management 5%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 5%
SOP Briefing/Planning 5%
Evaluation of Plans 5%

Note: all of the accidents were classified.

See overview of LOC-I and
Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy. related ACTG recommendations

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 81

Controlled Flight into Terrain – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 1 Number of fatalities: 4 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 5 Number of fatalities: 76 IATA Member 0% 20%
Full-Loss Equivalents 100% 73%
Fatal 100% 80%
Hull Losses 100% 80%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  0% 100% 0% 0% 100%
2016-2020 40% 60% 0% 20% 80%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 0 NASIA
EUR
0 1 0
1
0 0
0

MENA
1
1
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 1 1
1 1 1
International Waters or
Location Unknown
1
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

8%
Accident Frequency (%

MENA, 66
from total accidents)

6%
EUR, 4
AFI, 4
4%
ASPAC, 2
2%

0%
- 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.200
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

82 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Controlled Flight into Terrain – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  0.05 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  0.03 IATA Member – 0.01
Fatality Risk** 0.05 0.02
Fatal 0.05 0.02
Hull Losses 0.05 0.02

Jet Turboprop
2020  – 0.32 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.01 0.13
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) Accident per million sectors

3.5 Fatal 1.80

Fatal 2020
3 Nonfatal
Non Fatal 1.60
1.40 2016 - 2020
2.5
1.20
2 1.00
1.5 0.80
0.60
1
0.40
0.5 0.20
0 -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
GO R

AE I
D

S
Z
F

L
L

S
O

C
A
F

F
D
TX
TO

DS

PS
PR

CR

AP
EC
IC

GD
ES

FL
RT

LN
TX

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

0.05 2.5
120% 2020
100% 2016 - 2020 0.04 2
Number of Accidents
Accident Rate

80%
0.03 1.5
60%
0.02 1
40%
0.01 0.5
20%

0% - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R
ES F

AE I
D

S
DSZ
RT F

CRL
EC L

S
O

GDC
A

F
TX
PR

TO

PS
AP

LN
IC

FL
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

Note: The fatal accident rate and hull loss rate share the same value.

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 83
Controlled Flight into Terrain – Contributing Factors

Controlled Flight into Terrain

LATENT CONDITIONS

Percentage Contribution

Flight Operations 100%

Regulatory Oversight 100%
Safety Management 80%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 80%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 60%
Selection Systems 60%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 40%
Dispatch 20%
Flight Watch/Following/Support 20%
Technology & Equipment 20%

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 100%
Poor Visibility/IMC 100%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 60%
Lack of Visual Reference 60%
Operational Pressure 60%
Nav Aids 60%
Terrain/Obstacles 60%
Air Traffic Services 40%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 20%
Fatigue 20%
Dispatch/Paperwork 20%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 20%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 20%
Airport Facilities 20%

84 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Controlled Flight into Terrain

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 80%

Callouts 60%
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 40%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 20%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 20%
Briefings 20%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Unnecessary Weather Penetration 80%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 60%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 40%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 40%
Engine 40%
Unstable Approach 20%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 20%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 100%

Monitor/Cross-check 100%
Overall Crew Performance 80%
Leadership 60%
Captain should show leadership 60%
FO is assertive when necessary 60%
Communication Environment 20%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 20%
Automation Management 20%

Note: all of the accidents were classified.

See overview of CFIT and
Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy. related ACTG recommendations

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 85

Mid-Air Collision – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 0 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 0 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 0% 0%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 0% 0%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2016-2020 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

There were no accidents during the reporting period.

86 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Mid-Air Collision – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:   – Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:   – IATA Member – 0%
Fatality Risk** – 0%
Fatal – 0%
Hull Losses – 0%

Jet Turboprop
2020  – – Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 – –
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

There were no accidents during the reporting period.

Mid-Air Collision – Contributing Factors

At least three accidents are required before the accident classification is provided.
See overview of Mid-Air Collision
and related ACTG recommendations

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 87
Runway/Taxiway Excursion – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 9 Number of fatalities: 24 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 70 Number of fatalities: 79 IATA Member 22% 26%
Full-Loss Equivalents 1% 1%
Fatal 22% 9%
Hull Losses 44% 27%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  78% 22% 0% 67% 33%
2016-2020 81% 19% 0% 60% 40%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 8 NASIA
EUR
10 7 2
6
8 1
5

MENA
3
3
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 12 18
11 14 20
International Waters or
Location Unknown
12
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

60%
LATAM, 1
Accident Frequency (%

50% ASPAC, 72
from total accidents)

NAM, 1
40%
CIS, 2
30%
20%
10% EUR, 3

0%
- 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

88 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Runway/Taxiway Excursion – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate: 0.41 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate: 0.36 IATA Member 0.13 0.16
Fatality Risk** 0.01 0.00
Fatal 0.09 0.03
Hull Losses 0.18 0.10

Jet Turboprop
2020  0.31 0.95 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.25 0.90
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) Accident per million sectors

70 Fatal
Fatal 2.50 2020
60 Nonfatal
Non Fatal
2.00 2016 - 2020
50
40 1.50
30 1.00
20
0.50
10
0 -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
GO R

AE I
D

S
Z
F

L
L

S
O

C
A
F

F
D
TX
TO

DS

PS
PR

CR

AP
EC
IC

GD
ES

FL
RT

LN
TX

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

0.45 18
100% 2020
0.40 16
2016 - 2020
Number of Accidents

80% 0.35 14
0.30 12
Accident Rate

60% 0.25 10
0.20 8
40%
0.15 6

20% 0.10 4
0.05 2
0% - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R
ES F

AE I
D

S
DSZ
RT F

CRL
EC L

S
O

C
A

F
TX
PR

TO

PS
AP

LN
IC

GD
FL
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 89
Runway/Taxiway Excursion – Contributing Factors

Runway/Taxiway Excursion

LATENT CONDITIONS

Percentage Contribution

Safety Management 45%

Regulatory Oversight 43%
Flight Operations 30%
Selection Systems 20%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 17%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 15%
Maintenance Operations 12%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 10%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 10%
Technology & Equipment 5%
Design 3%
Change Management 3%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 55%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 42%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 23%
Callouts 20%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 13%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 10%
Automation 7%
Briefings 5%
Normal Checklist 5%
Crew to External Communication 5%
ATC 5%
Abnormal Checklist 3%
Ground Navigation 2%

90 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Runway/Taxiway Excursion

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Airport Facilities 55%

Meteorology 55%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 37%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 37%
Thunderstorms 30%
Aircraft Malfunction 23%
Poor Visibility/IMC 17%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 15%
Operational Pressure 12%
Maintenance Events 8%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 8%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 7%
Fatigue 7%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 7%
Icing Conditions 7%
Nav Aids 7%
Air Traffic Services 5%
Gear/Tire 5%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 5%
MEL Item 5%
Brakes 3%
Hydraulic System Failure 3%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 3%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 3%
Terrain/Obstacles 3%
Primary Flight Controls 2%
Lack of Visual Reference 2%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 2%
Crew Incapacitation 2%
Flight Controls 2%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 2%

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 91

Runway/Taxiway Excursion

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 40%

Unstable Approach 23%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 23%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 23%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 23%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 17%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 13%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 13%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 12%
Engine 5%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 5%
Flight Controls/Automation 3%
Unauthorized Airspace Penetration 2%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 38%

Taxiway/Runway Management 28%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 25%
Monitor/Cross-check 22%
Leadership 17%
Captain should show leadership 15%
Workload Management 12%
Communication Environment 7%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 5%
Automation Management 5%
Evaluation of Plans 5%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 3%
Plans Stated 2%
FO is assertive when necessary 2%

Note: 10 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

See overview of Runway/Taxiway Excursion

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy. and related ACTG recommendations

92 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

In-flight Damage – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 5 Number of fatalities: 104 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 34 Number of fatalities: 106 IATA Member 40% 59%
Full-Loss Equivalents 37% 8%
Fatal 40% 12%
Hull Losses 40% 18%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  60% 40% 0% 80% 20%
2016-2020 85% 15% 0% 82% 18%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 4 NASIA
EUR
11 3 0
4
10 0
5

MENA
1
1
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 5 7
2 6 7
International Waters or
Location Unknown
2
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

25%
NAM, 2
Accident Frequency (%
from total accidents)

20% AFI, 7
15% ASPAC, 97

10%

5%

0%
- 0.020 0.040 0.060 0.080 0.100 0.120 0.140 0.160 0.180
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

94 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
In-flight Damage – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate: 0.23 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate: 0.17 IATA Member 0.13 0.18
Fatality Risk** 0.08 0.01
Fatal 0.09 0.02
Hull Losses 0.09 0.03

Jet Turboprop
2020  0.21 0.32 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.17 0.19
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) Accident per million sectors

12 Fatal 1.80
Fatal 2020
10 Nonfatal
Non Fatal 1.60
1.40 2016 - 2020
8 1.20
6 1.00
0.80
4 0.60
2 0.40
0.20
0 -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
GO R

AE I
D

S
Z
F

L
L

S
O

C
A
F

F
D
TX
TO

DS

PS
PR

CR

AP
EC
IC

GD
ES

FL
RT

LN
TX

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

35% 0.30 12
2020
30% 2016 - 2020 0.25 10
Number of Accidents

25% 0.20 8
Accident Rate

20%
0.15 6
15%
0.10 4
10%
5% 0.05 2

0% - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R
F

AE I
D

S
Z
RT F

CRL
L

S
O

C
A

F
TX
PR

TO

DS

PS
AP
EC

LN
IC

GD
ES

FL
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 95
In-flight Damage – Contributing Factors

In-flight Damage

LATENT CONDITIONS

Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 34%

Safety Management 28%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 16%
Design 13%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 13%
Maintenance Operations 13%
Flight Operations 6%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 6%
Ground Operations 3%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 3%
Change Management 3%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 3%
Dispatch 3%
Selection Systems 3%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 3%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 3%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 9%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 9%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 3%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 3%
Callouts 3%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 3%
Briefings 3%
ATC 3%
Crew to External Communication 3%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 3%
Documentation 3%
Normal Checklist 3%

96 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

In-flight Damage

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 53%

Maintenance Events 22%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 22%
Meteorology 19%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 19%
Airport Facilities 16%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 13%
Gear/Tire 13%
Thunderstorms 13%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 9%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 9%
Foreign Objects, FOD 6%
Structural Failure 6%
Ground Events 6%
Brakes 6%
Hydraulic System Failure 6%
Dispatch/Paperwork 6%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 6%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 6%
Flight Controls 3%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 3%
Secondary Flight Controls 3%
Poor Visibility/IMC 3%

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 97

In-flight Damage

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Unnecessary Weather Penetration 16%

Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 9%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 9%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 6%
Landing Gear 3%
Weight & Balance 3%
Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 3%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 3%
Unstable Approach 3%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 6%

Evaluation of Plans 6%
Inquiry 3%
Workload Management 3%
FO is assertive when necessary 3%
Leadership 3%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 3%
Monitor/Cross-check 3%
Captain should show leadership 3%
Plans Stated 3%
Overall Crew Performance 3%
Communication Environment 3%
SOP Briefing/Planning 3%

Note: two accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

98 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

A commitment to “Every company desires safe operations, but
the challenge is to translate this desire into
action. Written rules, standards and proce-
safety should not dures, while important and necessary, are
not enough. Companies must develop a cul-

be a priority, but a ture in which the value of safety is embedded

in every level of the workforce.

value that shapes We define culture as the unwritten standards

and norms that shape mind-sets, attitudes
and behaviours.
decision-making A culture of safety starts with leadership, be-
cause leadership drives culture and culture
all the time, at drives behavior. Leaders influence culture
by setting expectations, building struc-

every level. ture, teaching others and demonstrating

stewardship.

Tillerson, R., quoted in International Association of Oil and A commitment to safety and operational
Gas Producers, Shaping safety culture through safety integrity begins with management. But man-
leadership. OGP Report No. 452 (P.2). October 2013. agement alone cannot drive the entire cul-
ture.

For a culture of safety to flourish, it must be

embedded throughout the organization.”
Ground Damage – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 3 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 22 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 67% 68%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 0% 0%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  33% 67% 0% 100% 0%
2016-2020 86% 14% 0% 91% 9%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 3 NASIA
EUR
7 2 0
5
6 1
9

MENA
1
2
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 3 2
1 1 0
International Waters or
Location Unknown
1
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

35%
Accident Frequency (%

30%
from t ot al accident s)

25%
20%
No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
10%
5%
0%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fat alit y Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

100 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Ground Damage – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  0.14 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  0.11 IATA Member 0.13 0.14
Fatality Risk** – –
Fatal – –
Hull Losses – –

Jet Turboprop
2020  0.16 – Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.12 0.06
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) Accident per million sectors

8 Fatal 3.00
Fatal 2020
7 Nonfatal
Non Fatal 2.50 2016 - 2020
6
5 2.00
4 1.50
3
1.00
2
0.50
1
0 -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
GO R

AE I
D

S
Z
F

L
L

S
O

C
A
F

F
D
TX
TO

DS

PS
PR

CR

AP
EC
IC

GD
ES

FL
RT

LN
TX

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

0.25 10
70% 2020
60% 2016 - 2020 0.20 8
Number of Accidents

50%
Accident Rate

0.15 6
40%
30% 0.10 4
20%
0.05 2
10%
0% - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R
F

AE I
D

S
Z
RT F

CRL
L

S
O

C
A

F
TX
PR

TO

DS

PS
AP
EC

LN
IC

GD
ES

FL
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

Note: The fatal accident rate, fatality risk, and hull loss rate share the same value.

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 101
Ground Damage – Contributing Factors

Ground Damage

LATENT CONDITIONS

Percentage Contribution

Ground Operations 33%

Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 28%
Safety Management 22%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 17%
Regulatory Oversight 11%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 6%
Maintenance Operations 6%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 6%
Design 6%
Flight Operations 6%

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Ground Events 44%

Traffic 39%
Maintenance Events 11%
Airport Facilities 11%
Meteorology 11%
Aircraft Malfunction 11%
Operational Pressure 6%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 6%
Air Traffic Services 6%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 6%
Dangerous Goods 6%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 6%
Poor Visibility/IMC 6%
Hydraulic System Failure 6%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 6%

102 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Ground Damage

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Ground Navigation 17%

Callouts 6%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 6%
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 6%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Ramp Movements, including when under marshalling 17%

Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 11%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 6%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Taxiway/Runway Management 11%

Overall Crew Performance 11%
Leadership 6%
Captain should show leadership 6%

Note: four accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

See overview of Ground Damage

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy. and related ACTG recommendations

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 103

Undershoot – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 2 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 8 Number of fatalities: 5 IATA Member 50% 38%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 5%
Fatal 0% 25%
Hull Losses 0% 38%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  100% 0% 0% 100% 0%
2016-2020 75% 25% 0% 63% 38%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 3 NASIA
EUR
1 2 0
0
1 0
0

MENA
0
0
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 2 2
0 3 2
International Waters or
Location Unknown
0
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

12%
Accident Frequency (%

10%
from total accidents)

8%
ASPAC, 1
6%
CIS, 4
4%
2%
0%
- 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.080
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

104 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Undershoot – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate: 0.09 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate: 0.04 IATA Member 0.06 0.03
Fatality Risk** – 0.00
Fatal – 0.01
Hull Losses – 0.02

Jet Turboprop
2020  0.10 – Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.03 0.10
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) Accident per million sectors

7 Fatal
Fatal 1.80 2020
6 Nonfatal
Non Fatal 1.60
1.40 2016 - 2020
5
1.20
4 1.00
3 0.80
2 0.60
0.40
1 0.20
0 -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
GO R

AE I
D

S
Z
F

L
L

S
O

C
A
F

F
D
TX
TO

DS

PS
PR

CR

AP
EC
IC

GD
ES

FL
RT

LN
TX

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

0.10 3.5
120% 2020
3
100% 2016 - 2020 0.08
Number of Accidents

2.5
Accident Rate

80%
0.06 2
60%
0.04 1.5
40% 1
0.02
20% 0.5
0% - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R
ES F

AE I
D

S
DSZ
RT F

CRL
EC L

S
O

C
A

F
TX
PR

TO

PS
AP

LN
IC

GD
FL
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 105
Undershoot – Contributing Factors

Undershoot

LATENT CONDITIONS

Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 57%

Safety Management 57%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 43%
Flight Operations 43%
Selection Systems 29%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 29%
Technology & Equipment 14%

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Nav Aids 71%

Meteorology 71%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 57%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 57%
Poor Visibility/IMC 43%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 29%
Lack of Visual Reference 29%
Operational Pressure 29%
Airport Facilities 29%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 29%
Thunderstorms 29%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 14%
Air Traffic Services 14%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 14%

106 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Undershoot

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 57%

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 43%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 43%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 29%
Wrong Altimeter Reference Settings (QNH, QFE) 14%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 14%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 57%

Unstable Approach 57%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 43%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 43%
Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 14%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 43%

Monitor/Cross-check 43%
Leadership 29%
Communication Environment 29%
FO is assertive when necessary 29%
Automation Management 14%
Captain should show leadership 14%

Note: one accident was not classified due to insufficient data; this accident was subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 107

Hard Landing – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 7 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 28 Number of fatalities: 41 IATA Member 29% 61%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 2%
Fatal 0% 4%
Hull Losses 0% 7%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  100% 0% 0% 71% 29%
2016-2020 89% 11% 0% 79% 21%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 2 NASIA
EUR
4 2 1
5
2 1
7

MENA
2
1
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 1 12
1 2 12
International Waters or
Location Unknown
1
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

30%
Accident Frequency (%

25%
from total accidents)

20% CIS, 41
15%
10%
5%
0%
- 0.020 0.040 0.060 0.080 0.100
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

108 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Hard Landing – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  0.32 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  0.14 IATA Member 0.13 0.16
Fatality Risk** – 0.00
Fatal – 0.01
Hull Losses – 0.01

Jet Turboprop
2020  0.26 0.64 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.13 0.19
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) Accident per million sectors

30 Fatal
Fatal 1.00 2020
Nonfatal 0.90
25 Non Fatal 0.80 2016 - 2020
20 0.70
0.60
15 0.50
0.40
10 0.30
0.20
5
0.10
0 -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
GO R

AE I
D

S
Z
F

L
L

S
O

C
A
F

F
D
TX
TO

DS

PS
PR

CR

AP
EC
IC

GD
ES

FL
RT

LN
TX

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

120% 0.35 12
2020
2016 - 2020 0.30 10
100%
Number of Accidents

0.25
8
Accident Rate

80%
0.20
60% 6
0.15
40% 4
0.10
20% 0.05 2

0% - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R
ES F

AE I
D

S
DSZ
RT F

CRL
EC L

S
O

C
A

F
TX
PR

TO

PS
AP

LN
IC

GD
FL
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 109
Hard Landing – Contributing Factors

Hard Landing

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Flight Ops: Training Systems 32%
Flight Operations 32%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 25%
Selection Systems 25%
Safety Management 21%
Regulatory Oversight 11%
Technology & Equipment 4%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 4%

THREATS
Percentage Contribution
Meteorology 61%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 57%
Thunderstorms 36%
Poor Visibility/IMC 18%
Lack of Visual Reference 14%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 7%
Nav Aids 7%
Fatigue 7%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 4%
Operational Pressure 4%
Aircraft Malfunction 4%

110 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Hard Landing

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 89%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 46%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 32%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 21%
Callouts 18%
Automation 7%
Crew to External Communication 7%
Maintenance 4%
ATC 4%
Normal Checklist 4%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 4%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 71%

Unstable Approach 54%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 54%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 54%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 46%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 14%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 7%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 7%
Engine 7%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 43%

Monitor/Cross-check 29%
Captain should show leadership 18%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 18%
Leadership 14%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 14%
Automation Management 7%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 4%

Note: all of the accidents were classified.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 111

Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 6 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 36 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 50% 36%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 17% 11%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  50% 50% 0% 67% 33%
2016-2020 72% 25% 3% 58% 42%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 2 NASIA
EUR
9 1 0
7
7 0
7

MENA
5
6
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 2 2
9 3 2
International Waters or
Location Unknown
10
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

35%
Accident Frequency (%

30%
from t ot al accident s)

25%
20%
No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
10%
5%
0%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fat alit y Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

112 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  0.27 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  0.18 IATA Member 0.19 0.12
Fatality Risk** – –
Fatal – –
Hull Losses 0.05 0.02

Jet Turboprop
2020  0.21 0.64 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.13 0.48
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) Accident per million sectors

35 Fatal
Fatal 1.40 2020
30 Nonfatal
Non Fatal 1.20
2016 - 2020
25 1.00
20 0.80
15 0.60
10 0.40
5 0.20
0 -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
GO R

AE I
D

S
Z
F

L
L

S
O

C
A
F

F
D
TX
TO

DS

PS
PR

CR

AP
EC
IC

GD
ES

FL
RT

LN
TX

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

0.30 12
100% 2020
2016 - 2020 0.25 10
Number of Accidents

80%
0.20 8
Accident Rate

60%
0.15 6
40% 0.10 4

20% 0.05 2

0% - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R
ES F

AE I
D

S
DSZ
RT F

CRL
EC L

S
O

C
A

F
TX
PR

TO

PS
AP

LN
IC

GD
FL
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

Note: The fatal accident rate and fatality risk share the same value.

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 113
Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse – Contributing Factors

Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse

LATENT CONDITIONS

Percentage Contribution

Maintenance Operations 41%

Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 35%
Safety Management 29%
Regulatory Oversight 29%
Design 21%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 9%
Flight Operations 9%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 6%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 6%
Selection Systems 6%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 3%
Dispatch 3%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 3%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 3%
Cabin Operations 3%

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 85%

Gear/Tire 85%
Maintenance Events 47%
Hydraulic System Failure 6%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 3%
Meteorology 3%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 3%
Thunderstorms 3%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 3%
Airport Facilities 3%
Dispatch/Paperwork 3%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 3%
Nav Aids 3%
Operational Pressure 3%
Poor Visibility/IMC 3%

114 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Abnormal Checklist 6%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 6%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 3%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Landing Gear 6%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 3%
Unstable Approach 3%
Systems 3%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 3%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 6%

Overall Crew Performance 3%
Communication Environment 3%
Workload Management 3%
FO is assertive when necessary 3%
Captain should show leadership 3%
Monitor/Cross-check 3%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 3%
Evaluation of Plans 3%
Leadership 3%

Note: two accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 115

Tail Strike – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 2 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 21 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 50% 52%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 0% 0%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  50% 50% 0% 100% 0%
2016-2020 90% 10% 0% 86% 14%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 2 NASIA
EUR
9 2 0
5
5 1
4

MENA
0
3
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 0 3
2 0 3
International Waters or
Location Unknown
3
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

35%
Accident Frequency (%

30%
from t ot al accident s)

25%
20%
No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
10%
5%
0%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fat alit y Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

116 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Tail Strike – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  0.09 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  0.11 IATA Member 0.06 0.10
Fatality Risk** – –
Fatal – –
Hull Losses – –

Jet Turboprop
2020  0.10 – Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.11 0.10
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) Accident per million sectors

20 Fatal
Fatal 0.35 2020
Nonfatal
Non Fatal 0.30
15 2016 - 2020
0.25
0.20
10
0.15

5 0.10
0.05
0 -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
GO R

AE I
D

S
Z
F

L
L

S
O

C
A
F

F
D
TX
TO

DS

PS
PR

CR

AP
EC
IC

GD
ES

FL
RT

LN
TX

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

0.20 9
80% 2020
8
70% 2016 - 2020
Number of Accidents

0.15 7
60%
6
Accident Rate

50% 5
40% 0.10
4
30% 3
20% 0.05 2
10% 1
0% - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R
F

AE I
D

S
Z
RT F

CRL
L

S
O

C
A

F
TX
PR

TO

DS

PS
AP
EC

LN
IC

GD
ES

FL
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

Note: The fatal accident rate, fatality risk, and hull loss rate share the same value.

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 117
Tail Strike – Contributing Factors

Tail Strike

LATENT CONDITIONS

Percentage Contribution

Flight Operations 32%

Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 16%
Safety Management 16%
Regulatory Oversight 11%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 11%
Dispatch 5%
Selection Systems 5%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 5%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Manual Handling/Flight Controls 84%

SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 63%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 32%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 21%
Documentation 11%
Callouts 11%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 11%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 11%
Automation 5%
Normal Checklist 5%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 5%

118 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Tail Strike

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 42%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 37%
Poor Visibility/IMC 11%
Fatigue 11%
Dispatch/Paperwork 11%
Thunderstorms 5%
Terrain/Obstacles 5%
Ground Events 5%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 5%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 63%

Abrupt Aircraft Control 37%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 37%
Unstable Approach 26%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 21%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 11%
Weight & Balance 11%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 5%
Flight Controls/Automation 5%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 5%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Monitor/Cross-check 47%
Overall Crew Performance 42%
Leadership 26%
Captain should show leadership 26%
Workload Management 16%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 16%
Communication Environment 11%
FO is assertive when necessary 11%
Automation Management 11%
Evaluation of Plans 5%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 5%

Note: two accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 119

Off-Airport Landing/Ditching – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 0 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 1 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 0% 0%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 0% 0%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2016-2020 0% 100% 0% 0% 100%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 0 NASIA
EUR
0 0 0
0
0 0
0

MENA
0
0
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 0 0
1 0 0
International Waters or
Location Unknown
1
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

35%
Accident Frequency (%

30%
from t ot al accident s)

25%
20%
No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
10%
5%
0%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fat alit y Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

120 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Off-Airport Landing/Ditching – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  – Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  0.01 IATA Member – –
Fatality Risk** – –
Fatal – –
Hull Losses – –

Jet Turboprop
2020  – – Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 – 0.03
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) Accident per million sectors

1.2 Fatal 0.08

Fatal 2020
1 Nonfatal
Not Fatal 0.07
0.06 2016 - 2020
0.8
0.05
0.6 0.04
0.4 0.03
0.02
0.2 0.01
0 -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
GO R

AE I
D

S
Z
F

L
L

S
O

C
A
F

F
D
TX
TO

DS

PS
PR

CR

AP
EC
IC

GD
ES

FL
RT

LN
TX

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

0.03 1.2
120% 2020
2016 - 2020 0.02 1
100%
Number of Accidents

0.8
Accident Rate

80% 0.02
0.6
60%
0.01
40% 0.4
0.01 0.2
20%

0% - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R
ES F

AE I
D

S
DSZ
RT F

CRL
EC L

S
O

C
A

F
TX
PR

TO

PS
AP

LN
IC

GD
FL
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

Note: The fatal accident rate, fatality risk, and hull loss rate share the same value.

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 121
Off-Airport Landing/Ditching – Contributing Factors

Off-Airport Landing/Ditching

At least three accidents are required before the accident classification is provided.
This category only contained one accident in the past 5 years.

122 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Runway Collision – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 2 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 7 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 0% 14%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 50% 29%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  0% 100% 0% 50% 50%
2016-2020 71% 29% 0% 43% 57%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 0 NASIA
EUR
2 0 0
0
2 0
0

MENA
0
0
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 2 3
0 2 3
International Waters or
Location Unknown
0
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

35%
Accident Frequency (%

30%
from t ot al accident s)

25%
20%
No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
10%
5%
0%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fat alit y Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

124 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Runway Collision – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  0.09 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  0.04 IATA Member – 0.01
Fatality Risk** – –
Fatal – –
Hull Losses 0.05 0.01

Jet Turboprop
2020  0.05 0.32 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.02 0.13
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal) Accident per million sectors

2.5 Fatal
Fatal 1.80 2020
Nonfatal
Not Fatal 1.60
2 1.40 2016 - 2020
1.20
1.5
1.00
0.80
1
0.60
0.5 0.40
0.20
0 -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
GO R

AE I
D

S
Z
F

L
L

S
O

C
A
F

F
D
TX
TO

DS

PS
PR

CR

AP
EC
IC

GD
ES

FL
RT

LN
TX

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

0.10 3.5
60% 2020
3
50% 2016 - 2020 0.08
Number of Accidents

2.5
Accident Rate

40% 0.06 2
30% 1.5
0.04
20% 1
0.02
10% 0.5

0% - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
GO R
F

AE I
D

S
Z
RT F

CRL
L

S
O

C
A

F
TX
PR

TO

DS

PS
AP
EC

LN
IC

GD
ES

FL
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

Note: The fatal accident rate and fatality risk share the same value.

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 125
Runway Collision – Contributing Factors

Runway Collision

LATENT CONDITIONS

Percentage Contribution

Regulatory Oversight 71%

Safety Management 43%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 29%
Flight Operations 14%
Change Management 14%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 14%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 14%
Maintenance Operations 14%

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Air Traffic Services 43%

Airport Facilities 43%
Poor Visibility/IMC 29%
Meteorology 29%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 29%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 14%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 14%
Icing Conditions 14%
Traffic 14%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 14%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 14%
Foreign Objects, FOD 14%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 14%

126 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Runway Collision

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution

Briefings 14%
Crew to External Communication 14%
Callouts 14%
Ground Navigation 14%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 14%
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 14%
ATC 14%

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Runway/Taxiway Incursion 29%

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 14%
Ramp Movements, including when under marshalling 14%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 29%

Inquiry 14%
Monitor/Cross-check 14%
Evaluation of Plans 14%
Taxiway/Runway Management 14%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 14%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 14%

Note: all of the accidents were classified.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 127

Jet Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 27 Number of fatalities: 121 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 174 Number of fatalities: 853 IATA Member 44% 52%
Full-Loss Equivalents 4% 3%
Fatal 11% 10%
Hull Losses 15% 19%

Passenger Cargo Ferry

2020  70% 30% 0%
2016-2020 84% 16% 0%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 21 NASIA
EUR
43 20 4
27
31 5
31

MENA
14
17
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 11 37
17 13 37
International Waters or
Location Unknown
20
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

30%
Accident Frequency (%

25% Runway / Taxiway Excursion, 25

from total accidents)

In-flight Damage, 98 Loss of Control

20%
In-flight, 613
15% Hard Landing, 41

10% Other End State, 71

Undershoot, 1
5% Controlled Flight Into
Terrain (CFIT), 4
0%
- 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

128 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Jet Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate: 1.42 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate: 1.05 IATA Member 0.83 0.89
Fatality Risk** 0.05 0.03
Fatal 0.16 0.11
Hull Losses 0.21 0.20

Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accident per million sectors

30% 8.00
2020
25% 7.00
2016 - 2020
6.00
20%
5.00
15% 4.00
3.00
10%
2.00
5% 1.00
0% -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
UNDERSHOOT

CFIT
IN-F DAMAGE

GND DAMAGE
TAILSTRIKE
LOC-I

RWY COLL

MID-AIR COLL
OTHER
HARD LDG

OFF AIRP LDG

RWY/TWY EXC

G UP LDG/CLPSE

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

70% 1.60 50
2020
1.40
60% 2016 - 2020 40
Number of Accidents

1.20
50%
Accident Rate

1.00 30
40%
0.80
30% 20
0.60
20% 0.40
10
10% 0.20
0% - -
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
APR
CRZ

TXI
PRF

TOF

GOA
ICL
ECL
TXO

RTO

AES

GDS
ESD

LND
DST

FLC
PSF

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 129
Jet Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

Jet Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Safety Management 36%
Regulatory Oversight 33%
Flight Operations 24%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 19%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 17%
Selection Systems 15%
Maintenance Operations 13%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 11%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 9%
Design 9%
Ground Operations 4%
Dispatch 4%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%
Technology & Equipment 4%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 3%
Change Management 2%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 2%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 1%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 45%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 35%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 15%
Callouts 14%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 14%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 9%
Automation 6%
Crew to External Communication 4%
Normal Checklist 3%
ATC 3%
Abnormal Checklist 3%
Briefings 2%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 2%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 2%
Ground Navigation 2%
Documentation 2%
Maintenance 1%
Wrong Altimeter Reference Settings (QNH, QFE) 1%
Dispatch 1%

130 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Jet Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 37%
Aircraft Malfunction 29%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 26%
Airport Facilities 22%
Maintenance Events 17%
Thunderstorms 16%
Gear/Tire 15%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 14%
Poor Visibility/IMC 12%
Operational Pressure 8%
Ground Events 7%
Lack of Visual Reference 6%
Fatigue 6%
Nav Aids 5%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 5%
Air Traffic Services 5%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 4%
Traffic 4%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 4%
Icing Conditions 4%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 4%
Hydraulic System Failure 4%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 4%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 4%
Dispatch/Paperwork 3%
MEL Item 2%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 2%
Brakes 2%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 2%
Flight Controls 1%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 1%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 1%
Foreign Objects, FOD 1%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 1%
Structural Failure 1%
Primary Flight Controls 1%
Dangerous Goods 1%
Secondary Flight Controls 1%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 1%

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 131

Jet Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 28%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 24%
Unstable Approach 21%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 19%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 16%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 13%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 12%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 6%
Flight Controls/Automation 4%
Engine 3%
Weight & Balance 2%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 2%
Ramp Movements, including when under marshalling 2%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 2%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 1%
Systems 1%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%
Landing Gear 1%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 30%

Monitor/Cross-check 22%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 17%
Leadership 17%
Captain should show leadership 16%
Taxiway/Runway Management 12%
Workload Management 9%
Automation Management 7%
Communication Environment 6%
FO is assertive when necessary 6%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 4%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 4%
Evaluation of Plans 4%
Plans Stated 2%
SOP Briefing/Planning 1%
Inquiry 1%

Note: 13 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

132 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

A bi-annual industry meeting for The SIRM is held under the Chatham House
safety professionals: air carriers, Rule, which means this is a protected forum
airports, manufacturers, and for participants to openly discuss safety risks,
ground service providers. hazards, lessons learned from accidents
and incidents, and the shared results of
Date of the next SIRM to be safety studies.
announced.

Special COVID-19 Bulletin

Lessons learned from today’s Download a copy
operational experiences and
de-identified case studies.
For more information or to contribute to the next
edition of the Bulletin, please contact IATA SIRM
Turboprop Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 11 Number of fatalities: 11 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 88 Number of fatalities: 259 IATA Member 9% 16%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 2%
Fatal 18% 23%
Hull Losses 45% 35%

Passenger Cargo Ferry

2020  45% 55% 0%
2016-2020 67% 31% 2%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 9 NASIA
EUR
15 5 0
7
15 0
7

MENA
2
3
AFI ASPAC
LATAM/CAR 21 19
15 24 19
International Waters or
Location Unknown
15
0 Region of Operator
Region of Occurrence

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

40%
Runway / Taxiway Excursion, 54
Accident Frequency (%
from total accidents)

30%
In-flight Damage, 8
Undershoot, 4 Loss of Control
20% Other End State, Controlled Flight In-flight, 85
5 Into Terrain (CFIT),
10% 72

0%
- 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

134 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020
Turboprop Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate: 3.50 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate: 2.83 IATA Member 0.82 1.82
Fatality Risk** – 0.06
Fatal 0.64 0.64
Hull Losses 1.59 1.00

Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.

*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Accident per million sectors

40% 18.00
2020
35% 16.00
30% 14.00 2016 - 2020
25% 12.00
10.00
20%
8.00
15%
6.00
10% 4.00
5% 2.00
0% -

CIS

LATAM/CAR
ASPA C
AFI

MENA

NASIA
EUR

NAM
UNDERSHOOT
CFIT
IN-F DAMAGE

TAILSTRIKE
GND DAMAGE
LOC-I

RWY COLL

MID-AIR COLL
OTHER
HARD LDG

OFF AIRP LDG

RWY/TWY EXC
G UP LDG/CLPSE

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020) Five-Year Trend (2016-2020)

Total number of accidents See Annex 1 for the definitions of metrics used

4.00 25
80% 2020
3.50
70% 2016 - 2020 20
Number of Accidents

60% 3.00
Accident Rate

50% 2.50 15
40% 2.00
1.50 10
30%
20% 1.00
5
10% 0.50
0% - -
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
APR
CRZ

TXI
PRF

TOF

ICL
ECL

GOA
TXO

RTO

AES

GDS
ESD

LND
DST

FLC
PSF

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 4 – IN-DEPTH ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 2016 TO 2020 IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 135
Turboprop Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

Turboprop Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 39%
Safety Management 38%
Flight Operations 32%
Selection Systems 22%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 20%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 19%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 14%
Maintenance Operations 11%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 9%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%
Ground Operations 4%
Dispatch 4%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 3%
Design 3%
Change Management 3%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 3%
Cabin Operations 1%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 1%
Flight Watch/Following/Support 1%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 1%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 32%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 30%
Callouts 12%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 8%
Abnormal Checklist 7%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 7%
Failure to GOA after abnormal runway contact 5%
Briefings 4%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 3%
Normal Checklist 3%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 3%
Documentation 3%
ATC 3%
Crew to External Communication 3%
Ground Navigation 1%

136 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Turboprop Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 38%

Meteorology 38%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 22%
Poor Visibility/IMC 20%
Airport Facilities 19%
Gear/Tire 16%
Thunderstorms 15%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 11%
Nav Aids 9%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 9%
Operational Pressure 9%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 8%
Terrain/Obstacles 8%
Maintenance Events 7%
Fatigue 5%
Air Traffic Services 5%
Lack of Visual Reference 5%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 5%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 5%
Dispatch/Paperwork 5%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 4%
Ground Events 4%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 4%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 4%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 4%
Icing Conditions 3%
Crew Incapacitation 1%
Foreign Objects, FOD 1%
Structural Failure 1%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 1%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 1%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 1%
Brakes 1%
Traffic 1%
Hydraulic System Failure 1%

SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 137

Turboprop Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 20%

Abrupt Aircraft Control 19%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 19%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 18%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 14%
Unstable Approach 12%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 9%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 9%
Engine 8%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 8%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%
Landing Gear 3%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 3%
Flight Controls/Automation 1%
Systems 1%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 1%
Unauthorized Airspace Penetration 1%
Weight & Balance 1%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 27%

Monitor/Cross-check 23%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 19%
Captain should show leadership 14%
Leadership 14%
FO is assertive when necessary 8%
Communication Environment 7%
Evaluation of Plans 7%
Workload Management 5%
Taxiway/Runway Management 4%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 4%
Inquiry 1%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 1%

Note: 15 accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

Refer to the list of Accident Classification Taxonomy.

138 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 4 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

5

In-Depth Regional Accident Analysis

Following the same model as the in-depth analysis Note: IATA determines the accident region based
by accident category presented in Chapter 4, this on the operator’s “home” country as specified in the
chapter presents an overview of occurrences and their operator’s Air Operator Certificate (AOC). For example,
contributing factors broken down by the region of the if a Canadian-registered operator has an accident in
involved operator(s). The purpose of this chapter is to Europe, this accident is considered a North American
identify issues that operators located in the same region accident. For a complete list of countries assigned per
may share, in order to develop adequate prevention region, consult Annex 1.
strategies.

Image courtesy of Boeing

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 139
Africa Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 6 Number of fatalities: 11 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 32 Number of fatalities: 198 IATA Member 17% 28%
Full-Loss Equivalents 31% 18%
Fatal 33% 19%
Hull Losses 67% 41%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  17% 83% 0% 33% 67%
2016-2020 59% 41% 0% 34% 66%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 0 NASIA
EUR
0 0 0
0
0 – 1
1
– –
–
MENA
0
0
–
ASPAC
AFI 0
LATAM/CAR
32 0
0 30
International Waters or
0 –
Location Unknown 37
–
0
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions)

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

50%
Accident Frequency (%

In-flight Damage, 7
from total accidents)

40%
Loss of Control
30% In-flight, 176
Controlled Flight Into
20% Terrain (CFIT), 4

10%

0%
- 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

140 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
Africa Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  9.86 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  5.34 IATA Member 3.27 3.21
Fatality Risk** 3.08 0.98
Fatal 3.29 1.00
Hull Losses 6.57 2.17

Jet Turboprop
2020  6.64 13.02 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 3.84 6.72
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal)

50% 16 Not Fatal

Nonfatal
14 Fatal
Fatal
40% 12
10
30%
8
20% 6
4
10%
2
0% 0
HARD LDG

OFF AIRP LDG

RWY/TWY EXC

UNDERSHOOT

CFIT
IN-F DAMAGE
GND DAMAGE

TAILSTRIKE
G UP LDG/CLPSE

LOC-I
RWY COLL

MID-AIR COLL

S
OTHER

CR L
L

S
O

C
GO R
A
F

AE I

F
D

D
DSZ
RT F

TX

PS
PR

EC
IC

GD
TO

AP

FL
LN
ES
TX

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Accident per million sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

12.00 10 60% 2020

10.00 8 50% 2016 - 2020
Number of Accidents

8.00
Accident Rate

40%
6
6.00 30%
4
4.00 20%

2.00 2
10%

- - 0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CR L
EC L
O

GD C
GO R
A
ES F

AE I

F
D

D
T

S
DSZ
RT F

S
TX

PS
PR

IC
TO

AP

FL
LN
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 141
AFI Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

Africa Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 57%
Safety Management 52%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 39%
Change Management 13%
Selection Systems 13%
Flight Operations 13%
Maintenance Operations 9%
Dispatch 9%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 9%
Design 9%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 9%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%
Ground Operations 4%
Technology & Equipment 4%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%
Flight Watch/Following/Support 4%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 26%
Documentation 9%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 9%
Crew to External Communication 9%
ATC 9%
Ground Navigation 4%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 4%
Automation 4%
Abnormal Checklist 4%

142 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Africa Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Airport Facilities 35%

Meteorology 26%
Aircraft Malfunction 22%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 22%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 17%
Nav Aids 17%
Thunderstorms 17%
Gear/Tire 13%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 13%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 13%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 9%
Poor Visibility/IMC 9%
Maintenance Events 9%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 9%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 4%
Brakes 4%
Dangerous Goods 4%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 4%
Dispatch/Paperwork 4%
Lack of Visual Reference 4%
Foreign Objects, FOD 4%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 4%
Ground Events 4%
Terrain/Obstacles 4%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 4%
Hydraulic System Failure 4%

SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 143

Africa Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Unnecessary Weather Penetration 22%

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 17%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 9%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 9%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 9%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 9%
Ramp Movements, including when under marshalling 4%
Flight Controls/Automation 4%
Weight & Balance 4%
Unstable Approach 4%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 4%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 22%

Overall Crew Performance 17%
Captain should show leadership 13%
Leadership 13%
Monitor/Cross-check 13%
Taxiway/Runway Management 13%
Workload Management 9%
Automation Management 9%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 9%
Evaluation of Plans 4%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 4%

Note: nine accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

144 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

 BE AWARE!
GET READY!

ICAO Global Reporting

Format applicable as of
4 November 2021!
Runway excursions remain one of the top challenges to aviation, with serious impacts in terms
of safety and cost.

The assessment and reporting of Runway Surface Conditions (RSC) are being addressed by
ICAO through the implementation of a revised Global Reporting Format (GRF). This
methodology for harmonized and global implementation will be applicable from 4 November
2021.

In a joint effort between IATA and ICAO, we developed an e-learning course to assist flight crew,
dispatchers and operational staff to understand and use the new RSC reporting
requirements as outlined in ICAO Circular 355 (Assessment, Measurement and Reporting of
Runway Surface Conditions) and ICAO Doc 10064 (Aeroplane Performance Manual [APM]).

Upon completing this course, you will have the skills to:

Explain the need and fundamental requirements for a harmonized GRF for Runway
Condition Assessment and Reporting

Summarize the end-to-end process for Runway Condition Assessment and Reporting

Describe the factors that require adjustments to braking and acceleration performance
to account for runway conditions

Use a Runway Condition Report to assess takeoff and landing performance

For more information, please visit

iata.org/training-talp38
Asia/Pacific Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 7 Number of fatalities: 118 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 56 Number of fatalities: 411 IATA Member 29% 39%
Full-Loss Equivalents 16% 9%
Fatal 29% 14%
Hull Losses 29% 21%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  86% 14% 0% 71% 29%
2016-2020 88% 13% 0% 66% 34%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 0 NASIA
EUR
0 0 0
0
0 – 0
2
– –
–
MENA
0
0
–
ASPAC
AFI 56
LATAM/CAR
0 54
0 0
International Waters or
0 56
Location Unknown –
–
0
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions)

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

40%
Runway / Taxiway Excursion, 72
Accident Frequency (%
from total accidents)

30%
Controlled Flight Into
Terrain (CFIT), 2 Loss of Control
20% Undershoot, 1
In-flight, 239
In-flight Damage, 97
10%

0%
- 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

146 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
Asia/Pacific Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  1.67 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  1.62 IATA Member 0.79 1.49
Fatality Risk** 0.26 0.15
Fatal 0.48 0.23
Hull Losses 0.48 0.35

Jet Turboprop
2020  1.56 2.00 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 1.39 2.39
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal)

40% 40 Not Fatal

Nonfatal
35 Fatal
Fatal
30% 30
25
20% 20
15
10% 10
5
0% 0
OFF AIRP LDG
HARD LDG

UNDERSHOOT
CFIT
RWY/TWY EXC

IN-F DAMAGE

TAILSTRIKE
G UP LDG/CLPSE
GND DAMAGE
LOC-I
RWY COLL

MID-AIR COLL
OTHER

S
CR L
L

S
O

C
GO R
A
F

AE I

F
D

D
DSZ
RT F

TX

PS
PR

EC
IC

GD
TO

AP

FL
LN
ES
TX

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Accident per million sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

2.50 18
80% 2020
16
2.00 14 70% 2016 - 2020
Number of Accidents

12 60%
Accident Rate

1.50 50%
10
8 40%
1.00
6 30%
0.50 4 20%
2 10%
- -
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 0%
CR L
EC L
O

GD C
GO R
A
ES F

AE I

F
D

D
T

S
DSZ
RT F

S
TX

PS
PR

IC

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

TO

AP

FL
LN
TX

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate

Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 147
ASPAC Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

Asia/Pacific Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 52%
Safety Management 44%
Flight Operations 31%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 29%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 21%
Selection Systems 19%
Maintenance Operations 15%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 13%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 12%
Change Management 4%
Technology & Equipment 4%
Design 4%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 2%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 56%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 44%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 29%
Callouts 29%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 21%
Crew to External Communication 10%
Ground Navigation 8%
Abnormal Checklist 6%
ATC 6%
Briefings 4%
Maintenance 4%
Normal Checklist 4%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 2%
Automation 2%

148 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Asia/Pacific Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 38%
Aircraft Malfunction 27%
Thunderstorms 25%
Poor Visibility/IMC 21%
Airport Facilities 21%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 17%
Maintenance Events 13%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 10%
Air Traffic Services 10%
Nav Aids 10%
Lack of Visual Reference 10%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 10%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 10%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 8%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 8%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 8%
Operational Pressure 6%
Gear/Tire 6%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 6%
Traffic 4%
Terrain/Obstacles 4%
Fatigue 4%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 2%
Crew Incapacitation 2%
Foreign Objects, FOD 2%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 2%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 2%
Dispatch/Paperwork 2%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 2%

SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 149

Asia/Pacific Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 40%

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 37%
Unstable Approach 33%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 29%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 23%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 17%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 13%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 8%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 8%
Engine 8%
Ramp Movements, including when under marshalling 6%
Runway/Taxiway Incursion 4%
Flight Controls/Automation 4%
Landing Gear 2%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 2%
Unauthorized Airspace Penetration 2%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 46%

Monitor/Cross-check 37%
Leadership 23%
Captain should show leadership 21%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 17%
Taxiway/Runway Management 15%
Workload Management 12%
FO is assertive when necessary 12%
Communication Environment 8%
Automation Management 6%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 6%
Inquiry 4%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 4%
SOP Briefing/Planning 2%
Evaluation of Plans 2%
Plans Stated 2%

Note: four accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

150 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

It is possible to fly
without motors,
but not without
knowledge and skill.
Wilbur Wright
Letter to Octave Chanute (13 May 1900)
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 5 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 30 Number of fatalities: 168 IATA Member 40% 30%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 17%
Fatal 0% 30%
Hull Losses 20% 50%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  40% 60% 0% 100% 0%
2016-2020 67% 30% 3% 70% 30%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 30 NASIA
EUR
0 22 0
0
0 25 0
1
– –
–
MENA
0
2
–
ASPAC
AFI 0
LATAM/CAR
0 0
0 5
International Waters or
0 –
Location Unknown –
–
0
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions)

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

35%
Runway / Taxiway
Accident Frequency (%

30%
from total accidents)

Excursion, 2 Loss of Control

25%
Undershoot, 4 In-flight, 96
20%
15% Hard Landing, 41
10%
5% Other End State, 5
0%
- 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

152 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  6.07 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  4.89 IATA Member 3.43 2.39
Fatality Risk** – 0.85
Fatal – 1.47
Hull Losses 1.21 2.44

Jet Turboprop
2020  6.86 – Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 3.77 15.85
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal)

30% 16 Not Fatal

Nonfatal
14 Fatal
Fatal
12
20% 10
8
6
10%
4
2
0% 0
HARD LDG

OFF AIRP LDG

RWY/TWY EXC

UNDERSHOOT

CFIT
IN-F DAMAGE

GND DAMAGE
TAILSTRIKE

G UP LDG/CLPSE
LOC-I

RWY COLL
MID-AIR COLL

S
OTHER

CR L
L

S
O

C
GO R
A
F

AE I

F
D

D
DSZ
RT F

TX

PS
PR

EC
IC

GD
TO

AP

FL
LN
ES
TX

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Accident per million sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

7.00 9
70% 2020
6.00 8
60% 2016 - 2020
7
Number of Accidents

5.00 50%
6
Accident Rate

4.00 5 40%
3.00 4
30%
3
2.00 20%
2
1.00 1 10%
- - 0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CR L
EC L
O

GD C
GO R
A
ES F

AE I

F
D

D
T

S
DSZ
RT F

S
TX

PS
PR

IC
TO

AP

FL
LN
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 153
CIS Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

Commonwealth of Independent States Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Safety Management 41%
Regulatory Oversight 33%
Flight Operations 30%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 26%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 15%
Maintenance Operations 11%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 7%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 7%
Ground Operations 7%
Selection Systems 7%
Design 4%
Dispatch 4%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 4%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 4%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 4%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 4%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 52%
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 41%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 11%
Normal Checklist 7%
Callouts 7%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 7%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 7%
Documentation 4%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 4%
Briefings 4%
Wrong Altimeter Reference Settings (QNH, QFE) 4%
Abnormal Checklist 4%

154 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Commonwealth of Independent States Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 52%
Airport Facilities 44%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 33%
Aircraft Malfunction 33%
Thunderstorms 30%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 26%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 19%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 15%
Gear/Tire 11%
Icing Conditions 11%
Poor Visibility/IMC 11%
Maintenance Events 11%
Air Traffic Services 11%
Operational Pressure 11%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 7%
Hydraulic System Failure 7%
Nav Aids 7%
MEL Item 7%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 7%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 7%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 7%
Ground Events 7%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 7%
Flight Controls 4%
Secondary Flight Controls 4%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 4%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 4%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 4%
Fatigue 4%
Dispatch/Paperwork 4%
Brakes 4%

SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 155

Commonwealth of Independent States Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Unnecessary Weather Penetration 22%

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 22%
Unstable Approach 19%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 15%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 15%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 11%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 11%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 11%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 7%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 4%
Systems 4%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 30%

In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 26%
Captain should show leadership 15%
Leadership 15%
Monitor/Cross-check 15%
Taxiway/Runway Management 11%
Communication Environment 7%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 7%
Evaluation of Plans 7%
Workload Management 4%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 4%
FO is assertive when necessary 4%
SOP Briefing/Planning 4%

Note: three accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

156 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

 Data Insight

Turbulence Aware

ENHANCE SAFETY

OPTIMIZE FUEL CONSUMPTION

IMPROVE REAL-TIME SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Turbulence Aware
Provides airline pilots and operation centers with real-time objective,
in situ turbulence information

A global real-time turbulence data exchange platform

A community of airlines around the globe sharing turbulence data

Collects, consolidates, deidentifies and shares turbulence data

Airlines are free to integrate the data into their existing operational tools

Email iataturbulence@iata.org to learn more

www.iata.org/turbulence-aware
Europe Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 5 Number of fatalities: 3 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 34 Number of fatalities: 9 IATA Member 80% 65%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 6%
Fatal 20% 9%
Hull Losses 20% 12%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  80% 20% 0% 100% 0%
2016-2020 85% 15% 0% 79% 21%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 0 NASIA
EUR
0 2 0
34
0 – 0
28
– –
38
MENA
0
3
–
ASPAC
AFI 0
LATAM/CAR
0 0
0 1
International Waters or
0 –
Location Unknown –
–
0
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions)

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

25%
Runway / Taxiway
Accident Frequency (%
from total accidents)

20% Excursion, 3
Controlled Flight Into
15% Terrain (CFIT), 4

10%
Loss of Control
5% In-flight, 2

0%
- 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

158 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
Europe Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  1.31 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  0.81 IATA Member 1.63 0.95
Fatality Risk** 0.00 0.05
Fatal 0.26 0.07
Hull Losses 0.26 0.10

Jet Turboprop
2020  1.57 – Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.76 1.13
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal)

30% 25 Not Fatal

Nonfatal
Fatal
Fatal
20
20%
15

10
10%
5

0% 0
HARD LDG

OFF AIRP LDG

UNDERSHOOT
RWY/TWY EXC

CFIT
G UP LDG/CLPSE

GND DAMAGE

TAILSTRIKE
IN-F DAMAGE
LOC-I

RWY COLL
MID-AIR COLL
OTHER

S
CR L
L

S
O

C
GO R
A
F

AE I

F
D

D
DSZ
RT F

TX

PS
PR

EC
IC

GD
TO

AP

FL
LN
ES
TX

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Accident per million sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

1.40 12
90% 2020
1.20 10 80% 2016 - 2020
Number of Accidents

1.00 70%
8
Accident Rate

60%
0.80
6 50%
0.60 40%
4 30%
0.40
2 20%
0.20
10%
- - 0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CR L
EC L
O

GD C
GO R
A
ES F

AE I

F
D

D
T

S
DSZ
RT F

S
TX

PS
PR

IC
TO

AP

FL
LN
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 159
EUR Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

Europe Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Safety Management 25%
Flight Operations 25%
Selection Systems 22%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 22%
Regulatory Oversight 19%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 19%
Design 9%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 9%
Ground Operations 9%
Maintenance Operations 9%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 6%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 6%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 3%
Change Management 3%
Technology & Equipment 3%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 47%
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 41%
Callouts 19%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 13%
Automation 13%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 9%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 3%
Briefings 3%
ATC 3%
Abnormal Checklist 3%
Crew to External Communication 3%

160 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Europe Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 44%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 34%
Aircraft Malfunction 31%
Gear/Tire 19%
Fatigue 19%
Poor Visibility/IMC 16%
Airport Facilities 16%
Operational Pressure 13%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 13%
Ground Events 9%
Maintenance Events 9%
Thunderstorms 9%
Lack of Visual Reference 9%
Air Traffic Services 6%
Traffic 6%
Brakes 3%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 3%
Icing Conditions 3%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 3%
MEL Item 3%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 3%
Hydraulic System Failure 3%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 3%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 3%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 3%

SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 161

Europe Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 31%

Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 28%
Unstable Approach 25%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 25%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 22%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 9%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 9%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 6%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 6%
Landing Gear 3%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 3%
Weight & Balance 3%
Engine 3%
Flight Controls/Automation 3%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 41%

Monitor/Cross-check 25%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 19%
Leadership 16%
Captain should show leadership 13%
Automation Management 9%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 6%
Taxiway/Runway Management 6%
Communication Environment 6%
Plans Stated 3%
FO is assertive when necessary 3%

Note: two accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

162 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Latin America & the Caribbean Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 3 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 32 Number of fatalities: 189 IATA Member 33% 16%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 9%
Fatal 0% 13%
Hull Losses 33% 22%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  67% 33% 0% 33% 67%
2016-2020 81% 19% 0% 53% 47%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 0 NASIA
EUR
0 0 0
0
0 – 0
0
– –
–
MENA
0
0
–
ASPAC
AFI 0
LATAM/CAR
0 0
32 0
International Waters or
32 –
Location Unknown –
35
0
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions)

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

50%
Accident Frequency (%
from total accidents)

40% Runway / Taxiway Excursion, 1

Loss of Control
30%
Other End State, In-flight, 117
20% 71

10%

0%
- 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

164 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
Latin America & the Caribbean Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  1.93 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  2.13 IATA Member 0.99 0.50
Fatality Risk** – 0.18
Fatal – 0.27
Hull Losses 0.64 0.47

Jet Turboprop
2020  0.89 4.69 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 1.49 4.23
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal)

40% 25 Not Fatal

Nonfatal
Fatal
Fatal
20
30%
15
20%
10
10%
5

0% 0
OFF AIRP LDG

HARD LDG
RWY/TWY EXC

UNDERSHOOT
CFIT
G UP LDG/CLPSE

TAILSTRIKE
IN-F DAMAGE

GND DAMAGE
LOC-I

RWY COLL

MID-AIR COLL
OTHER

S
CR L
L

S
O

C
GO R
A
F

AE I

F
D

D
DSZ
RT F

TX

PS
PR

EC
IC

GD
TO

AP

FL
LN
ES
TX

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Accident per million sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

3.00 10 120% 2020

2.50 8 100% 2016 - 2020
Number of Accidents

2.00
Accident Rate

80%
6
1.50 60%
4
1.00 40%
0.50 2
20%
- - 0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
APR
CRZ

TXI
PRF

TOF

GOA
ICL
ECL
TXO

RTO

AES

GDS
ESD

LND
DST

FLC
PSF

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 165
LATAM / CAR Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

Latin America & the Caribbean Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Regulatory Oversight 38%
Safety Management 38%
Flight Operations 31%
Selection Systems 28%
Dispatch 21%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 21%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 17%
Dispatch Ops: SOPs & Checking 14%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 10%
Maintenance Operations 10%
Design 10%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 10%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 7%
Cabin Operations 3%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 24%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 24%
Documentation 10%
Wrong Weight & Balance/Fuel Information 10%
Callouts 10%
Abnormal Checklist 7%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 7%
ATC 3%
Briefings 3%
Dispatch 3%
Crew to External Communication 3%
Normal Checklist 3%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 3%

166 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Latin America & the Caribbean Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 38%

Meteorology 21%
Maintenance Events 21%
Dispatch/Paperwork 17%
Gear/Tire 17%
Operational Pressure 14%
Airport Facilities 14%
Poor Visibility/IMC 10%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 10%
Nav Aids 7%
Lack of Visual Reference 7%
Thunderstorms 7%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 7%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 7%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 3%
Ground Events 3%
Optical Illusion/visual misperception 3%
Hydraulic System Failure 3%
Terrain/Obstacles 3%
Electrical Power Generation Failure 3%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 3%
Airport Perimeter Control/fencing/wildlife control 3%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 3%
Brakes 3%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 3%
Air Traffic Services 3%
Manuals/Charts/Checklists 3%

SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 167

Latin America & the Caribbean Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 14%

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 14%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 14%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 14%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 10%
Weight & Balance 10%
Landing Gear 3%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 3%
Unstable Approach 3%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 3%
Systems 3%
Engine 3%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 3%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Monitor/Cross-check 21%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 21%
Overall Crew Performance 17%
Captain should show leadership 10%
Leadership 10%
FO is assertive when necessary 10%
Workload Management 10%
Evaluation of Plans 7%
Communication Environment 7%
Inquiry 3%
Plans Stated 3%
Taxiway/Runway Management 3%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 3%

Note: three accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

168 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

During times of significant
change, it is important
that managing fatigue and
operational safety remain a
primary focus for operators.
As such Operators must
continue encouraging
their crew members to
provide fatigue and safety
reports without fear of
consequence.

IATA / IFALPA Joint Statement (2020)

Managing crew fatigue during industry recovery from pandemic
Middle East & North Africa Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 1 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 16 Number of fatalities: 128 IATA Member 0% 69%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 13%
Fatal 0% 13%
Hull Losses 0% 25%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  100% 0% 0% 100% 0%
2016-2020 94% 0% 6% 88% 13%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 0 NASIA
EUR
0 1 0
0
0 – 0
0
– –
–
MENA
16
14
20
ASPAC
AFI 0
LATAM/CAR
0 0
0 1
International Waters or
0 –
Location Unknown –
–
0
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions)

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

40%
Accident Frequency (%
from total accidents)

Controlled Flight Into

30%
Terrain (CFIT), 66
Loss of Control
20% In-flight, 62

10%

0%
- 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

170 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
Middle East & North Africa Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  1.01 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  1.70 IATA Member – 1.45
Fatality Risk** – 0.21
Fatal – 0.21
Hull Losses – 0.42

Jet Turboprop
2020  1.03 – Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 1.57 3.89
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal)

40% 9 Not Fatal

Nonfatal
8 Fatal
Fatal
30% 7
6
5
20%
4
3
10% 2
1
0% 0
HARD LDG

OFF AIRP LDG

UNDERSHOOT
RWY/TWY EXC

CFIT

IN-F DAMAGE
GND DAMAGE
TAILSTRIKE
G UP LDG/CLPSE

LOC-I

RWY COLL
MID-AIR COLL
OTHER

S
L
L

S
O

C
GO R
A
F

AE I

F
D

D
T
Z
F

TX

PS
PR

EC
IC

GD
TO

DS
CR

AP

FL
RT

LN
ES
TX

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Accident per million sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

7.00 12
120% 2020
6.00 10
100% 2016 - 2020
Number of Accidents

5.00
8
Accident Rate

80%
4.00
6 60%
3.00
4 40%
2.00
1.00 2 20%
- - 0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
APR
CRZ

TXI
PRF

TOF

GOA
ICL
ECL
TXO

RTO

AES

GDS
ESD

LND
DST

FLC
PSF

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

Note: The fatal accident rate and fatality risk share the same value.

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 171
MENA Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

Middle East & North Africa Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Safety Management 47%
Flight Operations 33%
Regulatory Oversight 33%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 27%
Selection Systems 20%
Design 20%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 13%
Maintenance Operations 13%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 7%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 7%
Ops Planning & Scheduling 7%
Technology & Equipment 7%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 7%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 47%
Callouts 27%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 20%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 13%
Automation 13%
Briefings 7%
Abnormal Checklist 7%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 7%

172 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Middle East & North Africa Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Aircraft Malfunction 40%

Gear/Tire 33%
Meteorology 27%
Maintenance Events 27%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 20%
Operational Pressure 13%
Poor Visibility/IMC 13%
Ground Events 7%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 7%
Fatigue 7%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 7%
Icing Conditions 7%
Hydraulic System Failure 7%
Lack of Visual Reference 7%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 7%
Terrain/Obstacles 7%
Air Traffic Services 7%
Avionics/Flight Instruments 7%
Airport Facilities 7%

SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 173

Middle East & North Africa Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 27%

Engine 20%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 20%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 13%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 13%
Unstable Approach 7%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 7%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 7%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 7%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 7%
Flight Controls/Automation 7%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 7%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 20%

Monitor/Cross-check 20%
Taxiway/Runway Management 13%
Communication Environment 13%
Captain should show leadership 13%
Leadership 13%
FO is assertive when necessary 13%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 13%
Workload Management 7%
Evaluation of Plans 7%
Automation Management 7%
Re-Active - Contingency Management 7%

Note: one accident was not classified due to insufficient data; this accident was subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

174 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

IN A COMPETITIVE
INDUSTRY

As we return to the skies, our

passengers will demand a safe
and high-quality service. Airlines
need safety and quality in every
aspect of operations, from back-end
processes to customer-facing
staff. It is not just a matter of
differentiation. Providing safe,
quality services is an essential
part of air transport.
CLASSROOM COURSES
IATA offers a wide variety of
courses in safety and quality IN-HOUSE TRAINING
management.
SELF-STUDY COURSES

www.iata.org/safety-training
North America Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 11 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 58 Number of fatalities: 9 IATA Member 27% 40%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 5%
Fatal 0% 10%
Hull Losses 0% 14%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  73% 27% 0% 73% 27%
2016-2020 76% 24% 0% 74% 26%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 0 NASIA
EUR
58 0 0
0
46 – 1
6
46 –
–
MENA
0
1
–
ASPAC
AFI 0
LATAM/CAR
0 1
0 0
International Waters or
3 –
Location Unknown –
–
0
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions)

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

25%
Runway / Taxiway
Accident Frequency (%
from total accidents)

20% Excursion, 1
Loss of Control
15% In-flight, 6

In-flight Damage, 2
10%

5%

0%
- 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
Fatality Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

176 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
North America Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:  1.81 Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  1.04 IATA Member 0.70 0.95
Fatality Risk** – 0.06
Fatal – 0.11
Hull Losses – 0.14

Jet Turboprop
2020  1.45 5.22 Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.91 1.73
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal)

30% 35 Not Fatal

Nonfatal
30 Fatal
Fatal
25
20%
20
15
10%
10
5
0% 0
HARD LDG

OFF AIRP LDG

RWY/TWY EXC

UNDERSHOOT
CFIT
IN-F DAMAGE

TAILSTRIKE
G UP LDG/CLPSE
GND DAMAGE

LOC-I
RWY COLL

MID-AIR COLL
OTHER

S
CR L
L

S
O

C
GO R
A
F

AE I

F
D

D
DSZ
RT F

TX

PS
PR

EC
IC

GD
TO

AP

FL
LN
ES
TX

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Accident per million sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

2.00 18
70% 2020
16
60% 2016 - 2020
14
Number of Accidents

1.50
12 50%
Accident Rate

10 40%
1.00
8
30%
6
0.50 4 20%
2 10%
- - 0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CR L
EC L
O

GD C
GO R
A
ES F

AE I

F
D

D
T

S
DSZ
RT F

S
TX

PS
PR

IC
TO

AP

FL
LN
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 177
NAM Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

North America Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS
Percentage Contribution
Safety Management 24%
Flight Operations 22%
Regulatory Oversight 20%
Maintenance Operations 15%
Maintenance Ops: SOPs & Checking 13%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 13%
Mgmt Decisions, incl. regul. decision (cost cut) 9%
Selection Systems 9%
Ground Ops: SOPs & Checking 7%
Ground Operations 7%
Flight Ops: Training Systems 7%
Ground Ops: Training Systems 6%
Design 4%
Maintenance Ops: Training Systems 2%
Technology & Equipment 2%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 37%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 24%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 11%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 9%
Callouts 4%
Briefings 2%
Systems/Radios/Instruments 2%
Automation 2%
Normal Checklist 2%
Abnormal Checklist 2%

178 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

North America Aircraft Accidents

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 39%
Aircraft Malfunction 33%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 30%
Gear/Tire 20%
Maintenance Events 15%
Poor Visibility/IMC 13%
Airport Facilities 13%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 11%
Thunderstorms 9%
Ground Events 9%
Traffic 7%
Fatigue 6%
Operational Pressure 6%
Icing Conditions 6%
Ground-based Nav Aid Malfunction or not available 4%
Structural Failure 4%
Extensive/Uncontained Engine Failure 4%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 4%
Nav Aids 4%
Wildlife/Birds/Foreign Object 4%
Foreign Objects, FOD 2%
Terrain/Obstacles 2%
MEL Item 2%
Primary Flight Controls 2%
Hydraulic System Failure 2%
Dispatch/Paperwork 2%
Flight Controls 2%
Inad overrun area/trench/ditch/prox of structures 2%
Spatial Disorientation/somatogravic illusion 2%
Contained Engine Failure/Powerplant Malfunction 2%
Poor sign/lighting, faint markings,rwy/txy closure 2%
Lack of Visual Reference 2%

SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 179

North America Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution

Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 20%

Abrupt Aircraft Control 19%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 19%
Unstable Approach 13%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 11%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 9%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 9%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 4%
Flight Controls/Automation 4%
Brakes/Thrust Reversers/Ground Spoilers 4%
Rejected Takeoff after V1 2%
Controlled Flight Towards Terrain 2%
Engine 2%

COUNTERMEASURES

Percentage Contribution

Overall Crew Performance 19%

Monitor/Cross-check 17%
Leadership 15%
Captain should show leadership 15%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 11%
Evaluation of Plans 7%
Workload Management 7%
Taxiway/Runway Management 6%
FO is assertive when necessary 6%
Automation Management 6%
Communication Environment 6%
Pro-active: In-flight decision-making 4%

Note: five accidents were not classified due to insufficient data; these accidents were subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

180 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

North Asia Aircraft Accidents – Accident Count
2020 Number of accidents: 0 Number of fatalities: 0 Accident Count % of Total 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Number of accidents: 4 Number of fatalities: 0 IATA Member 0% 100%
Full-Loss Equivalents 0% 0%
Fatal 0% 0%
Hull Losses 0% 25%

Passenger Cargo Ferry Jet Turboprop

2020  0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2016-2020 100% 0% 0% 100% 0%
Note: the sum may not add to 100% due to rounding

Number of Accidents per Region (2016-2020)

The accident rate based on region of occurrence is not available, therefore the map only displays counts

CIS
NAM 0 NASIA
EUR
0 0 4
0
0 – 3
0
– 5
–
MENA
0
0
–
ASPAC
AFI 0
LATAM/CAR
0 1
0 0
International Waters or
0 –
Location Unknown –
–
0
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers
Number of Accidents of Reported Region’s Carriers by Region of Occurrence
Number of Accidents that Occurred in Reported Region
(includes accidents of carriers from other regions)

Accident Category Frequency and Fatality Risk (2016-2020)

35%
Accident Frequency (%

30%
from t ot al accident s)

25%
20%
No passenger and/or crew fatalities
15%
10%
5%
0%
- 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Fat alit y Risk

The graph shows the relationship between the accident category frequency and the fatality risk, measured as the number of full-loss
equivalents per 1 million flights. The size of the bubble is an indication of the number of fatalities for each category (value displayed).
The graph does not display accidents without fatalities.

182 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
North Asia Aircraft Accidents – Accident Rate*
2020 Accident rate:   – Accident Rate* 2020 ‘16-‘20
2016-2020 Accident rate:  0.14 IATA Member 0.00 0.17
Fatality Risk** 0.00 –
Fatal 0.00 –
Hull Losses 0.00 0.04

Jet Turboprop
2020  – – Accident rates for Passenger, Cargo and Ferry are not available.
2016-2020 0.15 –
*Total number of accidents calculated per 1 million flights    **Number of full-loss equivalents per 1 million flights

Accident Category Distribution (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Distribution of accidents as percentage of total Total number of accidents (fatal vs. nonfatal)

60% 2.5 Not Fatal

Nonfatal
Fatal
Fatal
50% 2

40%
1.5
30%
1
20%
0.5
10%

0% 0
HARD LDG

OFF AIRP LDG

UNDERSHOOT
RWY/TWY EXC

CFIT
IN-F DAMAGE

GND DAMAGE

TAILSTRIKE
G UP LDG/CLPSE
LOC-I
RWY COLL

MID-AIR COLL

S
OTHER

CR L
EC L

S
O

GDC
GO R
A
ES F

AE I

F
D

D
T
DSZ
RT F

TX

PS
PR

IC
TO

AP

FL
LN
TX

Note: End State names have been abbreviated.

Refer to list of Acronyms/Abbreviations section for full names.

Regional Accident Rate (2016-2020) Accidents per Phase of Flight (2016-2020)

Accident per million sectors Distribution of accidents as percentage of total

0.35 3 60% 2020

0.30 2016 - 2020
2 50%
Number of Accidents

0.25
Accident Rate

40%
0.20 2
30%
0.15 1
0.10 20%
1
0.05 10%

- - 0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CR L
EC L
O

GD C
GO R
A
ES F

AE I

F
D

D
T

S
DSZ
RT F

S
TX

PS
PR

IC
TO

AP

FL
LN
TX

All Accident Count All Accident Rate

Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate

Note: The fatal accident rate and fatality risk share the same value.

SECTION 5 – IN-DEPTH REGIONAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 183
NASIA Aircraft Accidents – Contributing Factors

North Asia Aircraft Accidents

LATENT CONDITIONS

Percentage Contribution

Flight Ops: Training Systems 67%

Flight Operations 67%
Selection Systems 67%
Safety Management 33%
Flight Ops: SOPs & Checking 33%

THREATS

Percentage Contribution

Meteorology 100%
Wind/Windshear/Gusty Wind 100%
Thunderstorms 67%
Airport Facilities 33%
Contaminated Runway/Taxiway - poor braking action 33%
Aircraft Malfunction 33%
Poor Visibility/IMC 33%
Operational Pressure 33%
Fire/Smoke (Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo) 33%
Ground Events 33%

FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Percentage Contribution
Manual Handling/Flight Controls 100%
SOP Adherence/SOP Cross-verification 67%
Failure to GOA after destabilization on approach 67%
Normal Checklist 33%
Pilot-to-Pilot Communication 33%

184 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

North Asia Aircraft Accidents

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATE

Percentage Contribution
Unstable Approach 67%
Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing 67%
Unnecessary Weather Penetration 67%
Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation 67%
Abrupt Aircraft Control 67%
Continued Landing after Unstable Approach 67%
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations 67%
Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground 33%
Engine 33%

COUNTERMEASURES
Percentage Contribution
Overall Crew Performance 67%
In-flight Decision-making/contingency management 33%
Workload Management 33%
Monitor/Cross-check 33%

Note: one accident was not classified due to insufficient data; this accident was subtracted from the total accident count in the calculation of
contributing factor frequency.

SECTION 5 – CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 185

IATA
CABIN
OPERATIONS
SAFETY
CONFERENCE
THE LEADING EVENT FOR
CABIN SAFETY PROFESSIONALS

www.iata.org/cabin-safety-conference
6

Cabin Safety
IATA CABIN SAFETY CABIN SAFETY PROMOTION
Cabin safety is at the heart of every activity in the cabin. While Safety promotion is a major component of SMS and the shar-
heavily regulated, there is usually a degree of flexibility for airlines ing of safety information is an important focus for IATA. The or-
to make their own decisions on products and services offered ganization of global conferences and regional seminars brings
to passengers, as long as safety is considered and managed together a broad spectrum of experts and stakeholders to ex-
effectively. change cabin safety information.

IATA’s role in the area of cabin safety is to keep airlines informed The global IATA Cabin Operations Safety Conference has
of regulatory changes, best practices, new and emerging is- become an established and popular venue for the exchange of
sues, and to act as a resource for help. As the COVID-19 pan- ideas and education of cabin safety specialists. The format of
demic evolved in 2020, IATA worked hard to identify the risks this event aims to educate and inform delegates, with plenary
posed by the presence of the virus and the associated sudden and interactive workshops focusing on the issues identified
reduction of air traffic, furloughing of crews, reduced training through IATA’s activities as needing attention.
and increased aircraft storage. To help manage these new risks
appropriately, IATA provided a variety of guidance documents. With international travel restrictions and the spread of COVID-19,
the 2020 event was postponed until 2021. Instead, IATA pro-
Incorporating a Safety Management System (SMS) within duced a series of webinars aimed at helping industry manage
Cabin Operations is actively encouraged by IATA and we the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and advocat-
create and maintain standards and guidance for airlines to help ed for a common approach to managing these risks worldwide.
them to do so effectively. Comprehensive risk assessments are
used to help identify where new processes and procedures
are needed and IATA has included examples in the COVID-19 IATA CABIN OPERATIONS SAFETY TECHNICAL
operational guidance materials issued during 2020.
GROUP
This section of the IATA Safety Report is intended to provide the
reader with an update of the activities of IATA Cabin Safety in The IATA Cabin Operations Safety Technical Group (COSTG)
2020, all of which are aimed at supporting IATA members world- is established to maintain a close working link with the opera-
wide and driving improvement to cabin operations and safety. tional environment.

The members of the COSTG are industry experts in the cabin

safety environment and include safety investigators, policy-
makers, cabin crew trainers and safety auditors. A global repre-
sentation of member airlines is maintained, and membership is
reviewed every two years.

The COSTG mandate includes reviewing and updating the

IOSA standards relating to cabin operations, updating all IATA
Cabin Safety guidance materials, keeping IATA Cabin Safety
informed of emerging risks within cabin operations and identi-
fying key safety performance indicators (SPIs) that can be used
to assess the efficacy of current procedures and mitigations.

SECTION 6 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 187

COSTG MEMBERS

Retirements during 2020 Continuing members during 2020

IATA would like to acknowledge the input of the following Artem Fillipov
individuals who have moved on from their position on COSTG AIR ASTANA
during 2020:
Anne Frederique Houlbreque
Christiane Raspa AIR FRANCE
AIR CANADA
Gennaro Anastasio
Lisa Mounce ALITALIA
AMERICAN AIRLINES
Matthew Whipp
Rosnina Abdullah BRITISH AIRWAYS
MALAYSIA AIRLINES BERHAD
Catherine Chan (Chair)
Johnny Chin CATHAY PACIFIC
SINGAPORE AIRLINES
Anabel Brough
Lerato Luti EMIRATES AIRLINE
SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS
Berry Ochieng’
Mary Gooding KENYA AIRWAYS
VIRGIN ATLANTIC AIRWAYS
Julia Arnds
LUFTHANSA

New members during 2020 Warren Elias

QATAR AIRWAYS
IATA welcomes the following new members who have
been successful in their application to join the COSTG. Martin Ruedisueli
SWISS INTERNATIONAL AIR LINES
Dorota Kaczmarczyk
AIR CANADA Carlos Mouzaco Dias
TAP PORTUGAL
Ioana Stoian
BLUE AIR Sophie O’Ferrall
VIRGIN AUSTRALIA
Edwin Fernandez
DELTA AIRLINES

Kris Hutchings
WESTJET

Esra Kav
TURKISH AIRLINES

Renata Garcia
GOL AIRLINES

188 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 6 – CABIN SAFETY

IATA CABIN OPERATIONS SAFETY BEST These standards are reviewed annually by the COSTG and
PRACTICES GUIDE updated where necessary to enhance the understanding and
application of safety standards globally. For more information
The IATA Cabin Operations Safety Best Practices Guide is on IOSA and to download the latest version of the ISM, go to:
intended to give airlines the tools they need to create and www.iata.org/iosa.
update safety procedures and policies, using a global range
of references and expert opinions. It is provided free of charge Within the revision to the ISM Ed. 14, which will become effective
to IATA member airlines and available for purchase on the during 2021, the most notable changes to CAB standards are:
IATA Store.
CAB 1.6.5 and 1.6.7 — On board manuals: Updated to adapt
This guide is normally updated annually by members of the to the increasing provision of electronic manuals on board
COSTG. It includes standards and recommended practices through portable electronic devices. In many cases, this
from the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), ICAO and other negates the need for a hard copy of the operations manuals
regulators, combined with the extensive operational experience on board, provided access to electronic devices is maintained.
of our member airlines.
CAB 3.2.6 — Cabin crew seated during taxi: Updated to give
Before embarking on an update to the guide, we look at clearer definitions of service and safety procedures, to help
areas for improvement across the IOSA auditing findings and ensure only safety-related duties are carried out during taxi and
observations and seek feedback from our stakeholders and cabin crew are seated without delay.
participants at the IATA Cabin Operations Safety Conference.
We can then tailor any amendments to provide further up-to- CAB 3.4.10 — Passenger briefings: Updated to include a
date guidance in any areas that may need it. variety of methods for passenger briefing as complimentary to
the use of the passenger address (PA) system. Briefings can be
With the COVID-19 pandemic, the annual review of the guid- delivered using seat messaging through IFE, announcements,
ance will take place at a later time, as we have been focused individual personal briefings, etc. This is now also reflected in
on delivering much needed COVID-19 cabin-related guidance, CAB 3.4.4 Cabin turbulence procedures.
which we hope will be of a temporary nature. While the industry
gradually returns to its new normal, the Best Practices Guide
will be updated to incorporate those items that we anticipate ACCIDENTS – CABIN END STATES
will remain valid as the pandemic subsides.
This section of the IATA Safety Report highlights the categories
of cabin safety end states that resulted from an accident. Only
HEALTH AND SAFETY GUIDELINES – those that were classified as an accident in accordance with
PASSENGERS AND CREW the IATA definition are included in this analysis.

IATA’s Medical Advisory Group creates guidelines regarding the The following definitions apply to the end states in this section:
health and safety of passengers and crew and regularly reviews
the recommendations on the carriage of emergency medical • Normal Disembarkation: Passengers and/or crew exit the
equipment, medications and first aid kits. These guidelines and aircraft via boarding doors during normal operations.
many others are available at: www.iata.org/health.
• Rapid Deplaning: Passengers and/or crew rapidly exit the
Throughout 2020, this group has worked to advise industry on aircraft via boarding doors and jet bridges or stairs, as a
COVID-19-related issues such as infection prevention and con- precautionary measure.
trol in the aircraft environment and identification of risks within
the cabin with the aim to help restore passenger confidence by • Abnormal Disembarkation: Passengers and/or crew exit
demonstrating that the cabin is a safe environment. the aircraft via boarding doors (normally assisted by internal
aircraft or exterior stairs) after a non-life-threatening and
non-catastrophic aircraft incident or accident and when
IOSA AND CABIN OPERATIONS SAFETY away from the boarding gates or aircraft stands (e.g., on a
runway or taxiway).
The IOSA Standards Manual (ISM) includes Section 5 – Cabin
Operations (CAB), which contains key elements of cabin safety, • Evacuation (land): Passengers and/or crew evacuate the
such as the IATA Standards and Recommended Practices aircraft via escape slides/slide rafts, doors, emergency exits,
(ISARPs) for: or gaps in the fuselage; usually initiated in life-threatening
and/or catastrophic events.
• Management and control
• Evacuation (water): Passengers and/or crew evacuate the
• Training and qualification aircraft via escape slides/slide rafts, doors, emergency exits,
or gaps in the fuselage into or onto water.
• Line operations
• Hull Loss/Nil Survivors: Aircraft impact resulting in a
• Cabin systems and equipment complete hull loss and/or no survivors.

SECTION 6 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 189

Cabin End States

2020 2018-2020

Total ‘Passenger-only’ Accidents 24 124

There were 24 passenger-only accidents in 2020. In order to are related to hard landings, tail strike or other incidents where
identify patterns or trends, this figure is added to the previous damage was identified afterwards and there was no impact to
two years data to create the following charts. cabin operations at the time of the event.

Unusually during 2020, one third (8) of these 24 passenger aircraft Overall, cabin end state classifications were identified in 102 of
accidents did not receive a cabin end state classification as they the 124 accidents in the data set for 2018 - 2020.

2018-2020
Normal Abnormal Hull Loss/
Land Evacuation Water Evacuation Total
Disembarkation Disembarkation Nil survivors
All 29 12 50 3 8 102
IATA Member 17 7 19 1 3 47
IOSA-Registered 21 9 28 1 4 63
Fatal 0 1 7 2 8 18
Hull Loss 0 0 10 2 8 20
Jet 24 10 32 2 6 74
Turboprop 5 2 18 1 2 28

Cabin End State – Jet and Turboprop Aircraft Cabin End State – Jet

Hull Loss/Nil
Survivors, 8% Normal Water Evacuation, 3% Hull Loss/Nil Survivors, 8%
Disembarkation,
Water 28% Normal
Evacuation, 3% Land Evacuation, Disembarkation,
Abnormal 43% 32%
Disembarkation, 12%
Land Abnormal
Evacuation, Rapid Deplaning, 1% Disembarkation, 13%
Rapid Deplaning,
48% 1%

Passengers were able to disembark from the aircraft in an In 45% of jet aircraft accidents, passengers were able to
orderly manner using boarding doors, either normally (28%) or disembark the aircraft in an orderly manner using boarding
abnormally (12%) in 40% of these accidents. doors, either normally (32%) or abnormally (13%). Evacuation
procedures were carried out during 43% of accidents on jet
Rapid deplaning procedures are a hybrid of evacuation and aircraft.
normal procedures, where disembarkation is carried out as a
precaution. 1% of these accidents identified this cabin end state
classification.

Land evacuation procedures were used in 48% of these

accidents, while 3% required an evacuation on water.

190 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 6 – CABIN SAFETY

Cabin End State - Turboprop

Hull Loss/Nil Survivors, 7%

Water Evacuation, 4%
Normal Disembarkation, 18%

Abnormal
Disembarkation, 7%

Land Evacuation, 64% Rapid Deplaning, 0%

In turboprop aircraft accidents, normal disembarkation was On these smaller aircraft, evacuation to the ground is easier
possible in 18% of cases. Abnormal disembarkation methods to facilitate as evacuation systems such as integral steps pose
were used in 7% of accidents and 64% resulted in an evacuation less risk to the occupants. The distinction between abnormal
on land. disembarkation and evacuation is, therefore, less apparent than
with larger jet aircraft.

Cabin End States per Phase of Flight (2018-2020)

PRF ESD TXO TOF RTO ICL ECL CRZ DST APR GOA LND TXI AES PSF FLC GDS

Total Accidents 4 2 2 15 1 6 1 3 2 3 1 78 5 1 0 0 0

Normal Disembarkation 25% 0% 100% 47% 0% 17% 100% 0% 50% 0% 100% 18% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Abnormal Disembarkation 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Rapid Deplaning 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Land Evacuation 0% 0% 0% 20% 100% 17% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 54% 20% 100% 0% 0% 0%

Water Evacuation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 67% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Hull Loss/Nil Survivors 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 33% 0% 67% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
PRF ESD TXO TOF RTO ICL ECL CRZ DST APR GOA LND TXI AES PSF FLC GDS

Not Fatal Fatal

Total Accidents: 124

Note: Refer to Annex 1 for definition of each phase of flight

Percentages are calculated based on the total number of accidents, not all of which are classified with a cabin end state; therefore, sum may not add to 100%.

The above table shows the distribution of cabin end states per Fatalities were identified in accidents that occurred at the take-
phase of flight. There were 22 accidents in which the cabin off, initial climb, cruise, approach and landing phases. In all but
end state classification could not be clearly identified from the one of these accidents, cabin crew were secured in their crew
report; therefore, the columns do not always calculate to a total seats and carrying out a silent review of safety procedures to
of 100%. increase readiness for evacuation should the need arise (Ref IATA
Cabin Operations Safety Best Practices Guide, Section 12.6).

SECTION 6 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 191

Accident End States and Cabin End States (2018-2020)

Normal Abnormal Rapid Land Water Hull Loss/

Total
Disembarkation Disembarkation Deplaning Evacuation Evacuation Nil Survivors

Runway / Taxiway Excursion 34 0 2 0 31 1 0

In-flight Damage 13 9 2 0 1 0 1

Tailstrike 12 12 0 0 0 0 0

Gear-up Landing / Gear Collapse 12 0 4 0 8 0 0

Hard Landing 10 3 3 0 4 0 0

Ground Damage 7 4 1 0 2 0 0

Loss of Control In-flight 7 0 0 0 1 0 6

Undershoot 4 0 0 0 3 1 0

Other End State 2 1 0 1 0 0 0

Controlled Flight Into Terrain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1

Off-Airport Landing / Ditching 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Runway Collision 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mid-Air Collision 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

This table shows accident classifications and their associated Water evacuation remains a very low probability with only two
Cabin End State, in order of frequency and can provide useful events in this dataset, but as the severity is high, procedures
information for cabin crew training exercises and discussion. and training are focused on giving cabin crew the tools they
may need to manage such rare situations. In these incidents,
It shows, for example, that the most common event is a runway water evacuation was necessary following undershoot or
excursion and that this will most likely result in a land evacuation runway excursion during the landing phase.
or abnormal disembarkation.
Note that within the full 2018-2020 dataset there are three water
It also shows that gear collapse accidents resulted in eight evacuation accidents, but one was not attributed to one of these
land evacuation responses and four abnormal disembarkation accident end states.
events.

192 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 6 – CABIN SAFETY

Cabin Preparation Time At the same time, while measures such as physical distancing
within public places and the wearing of masks was becoming
Cabin Preparation Time – commonplace to help mitigate against the potential spread
Long, 13% of infection, airlines needed to work hard to introduce new
processes and procedures to restore confidence in air travel,
Cabin Preparation Time – reassuring travelers that the cabin environment is safe.
Short, 7%
With the drastic reduction in operations, several exemptions
to cabin crew recurrent safety training requirements were
granted to address the immediate impact. Operators should be
prepared to manage cabin crew skills atrophy, which may be
caused by:
Cabin Preparation Time –
Nil, 80% • Reduced training schedules or increased time between
recurrent training.

• Reduced operational experience, overall or on a specific

aircraft type that has been placed into temporary storage.
In each of the 16 passenger aircraft accidents during 2020 where
a cabin end state was assigned, the amount of time available • Different cabin crew operational experience, for example,
for the cabin crew to prepare the cabin and passengers after carrying cargo in the cabin instead of passengers.
identification of an abnormal state was also determined.
Alignment and harmonization
As most accidents occurred during approach or landing, in
80% of occurrences the cabin crew had no time or opportunity To help address the issues faced by airlines due to the variety
to prepare over and above the normal cabin secure procedures. of interpretations of standards and recommendations on how
best to manage the potential of infection spread through air
In three of the accidents cabin crew were able to consider travel, IATA actively participated in several global activities in
undertaking additional cabin preparation over the standard an effort to ensure global recommendations were harmonized
cabin secure procedures for landing, in one case up to 10 as far as practicable.
minutes, and in two cases longer. However, as the abnormal
aircraft state occurred during preparation for landing, cabin IATA has published the Health Standards Checklist that
crew had in most cases already secured the cabin. includes aspects of cabin operations within Section 1.8. These
voluntary standards are based on global recommendations
Level of Cabin Preparation within the ICAO CART publications.

Cabin crew were able to carry out emergency procedures in IATA also produced and published a range of guidance
preparation for evacuation in one accident in 2020. In this case, materials, the following of which relate to cabin operations.
the flight crew performed a go-around and several aircraft
maneuvers before landing, allowing time and opportunity for Guidance for cabin operations
cabin crew to brief and prepare passengers for subsequent This guidance covers all aspects of cabin operations that are
evacuation. affected by the pandemic, from assessing the risks per route
and identifying appropriate mitigation, to in-flight service, cabin
In all other accidents, the cabin was prepared as per standard waste management and unruly passengers. As the situation
procedure for normal takeoff or landing. evolved, the guidance was updated several times to include
new risks that were identified as airlines continued operations.
This highlights that travelers should pay attention to the normal
briefings provided before takeoff and they should not rely on the Guidance for crew health precautions
likelihood of additional briefings or preparation being carried This guidance includes measures to be taken pre, during and
out before an evacuation becomes necessary. While some after duty by airline crews operating during the pandemic.
believe that passenger briefings are no longer required upon
every departure, they are in most cases the only opportunity for Guidance for carriage of cargo in the passenger cabin
cabin crew to prepare passengers for a subsequent evacuation. As the need for transporting medical supplies and equipment
surpassed the need for passenger travel, many airlines offered
The Impact of COVID-19 on Cabin Operations to use their aircraft to transport such items. A task force was
set up within IATA to identify the risks and potential mitigations
The spread of COVID-19 during 2020 caused an unprecedent- and give structured advice to airlines allowing them to safely
edly sudden reduction in air traffic and the volume of passen- use the aircraft cabin to transport cargo. This guidance was
gers carried. Consequently, many airlines downsized their op- updated frequently to incorporate changes made by regulators.
erations dramatically, laid off workers and disposed of aircraft
through early retirement or temporary storage.

SECTION 6 – CABIN SAFETY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 193

Guidance for flight operations • Of the passengers who did not comply with the requirements,
This guidance incorporates recommendations on the use between 20% and 30% of them also refused to comply with
of aircraft air conditioning systems, and identification and other safety procedures or appeared to be intoxicated.
mitigation of risks surrounding the aircraft operation. It also
includes some practical recommendations for flight crew to • As more passengers are vaccinated or recovered from
take in order to minimize their risk of exposure to the virus COVID-19, they may consider that they do not need to wear
during operations. a mask, which adds to the complexity for passenger-facing
workers.
Guidance for aircraft cleaning
Ensuring a clean environment is key to restoring passenger • Management of passenger compliance with wearing face
confidence in air travel and mitigating any potential spread of coverings is sometimes problematic. Cabin crew might
infection within the aircraft cabin. IATA’s Ground Operations avoid challenging passengers who are not wearing masks to
team worked closely with internal and external groups, including avoid confrontation and escalation of a situation, particularly
aircraft manufacturers, standard setting organizations, health where the risk is seen as a social compliance issue rather
authorities and regulators, to produce this guidance. than directly endangering the safety of the aircraft.

Guidance for accessible air travel • All respondents considered their existing unruly passenger
Before the pandemic broke, IATA was already working on policies and procedures to be adequate for handling such
many aspects of improving the experience of passengers with cases and rarely called for assistance from the authorities.
disabilities. These challenges were considered throughout Authorities are generally only called when a passenger
the activities of 2020 and this guidance includes advice for continues to ignore repeated requests for compliance or acts
airlines to ensure all passengers are afforded the same levels of in a manner that directly affects the safety or security of the
protection and reassurance during the pandemic. aircraft and its occupants.

Communications materials • In regions where mask wearing is not mandated by law, it has
IATA published multiple communications materials to often become politicized and affects the travelers’ perception
help promote the concept that the aircraft cabin is a safe of freedom and personal rights. The airline staff are faced
environment. A variety of infographics and videos on issues with enforcing compliance with very little perceived backup
such as health requirements, cabin air circulation and the from the authorities. Nevertheless, where authorities were
requirements for wearing masks are available for airlines to use called to assist, in most cases their responses were deemed
and promote to travelers. to be supportive, appropriate, and consistent.

Unruly passengers Each airline is required to perform its own risk assessment
carefully to formulate appropriate mitigations to minimize
The issue of unruly passengers and compliance with safety transmission risks on board their aircraft. This risk assess-
regulations has been an ongoing area of focus for IATA. ment would be based on many factors including, for example,
Historically, our data has been captured within the STEADES their own cabin configuration and layout, passenger booking
program, but during 2020 this was transitioned to the Incident figures, in-flight services and state health regulations. The de-
Data Exchange (IDX) program. cisions for appropriate policies and procedures will, therefore,
differ between airlines.
With COVID-19 impacting airline operations dramatically, this
had a knock-on effect to the transition process to IDX, which IATA continues to promote the wearing of face coverings until
does not yet have a sample size of data that allows for in-depth such time as the infection is under control and passenger vol-
analysis of the current situation in relation to unruly passengers. umes indicate confidence in air travel. IATA’s guidance material
In addition, compliance with wearing masks is a new category also includes consideration of staggering or reducing in-flight
of unruly behavior and we have no historical data with which services to minimize the number of passengers removing their
to compare. face coverings simultaneously and the duration of exposure to
potential transmission risks.
Masks and face coverings
In January 2021, all members of the IATA COSTG were asked
to provide data relating to passengers who refused to comply
with requirements for wearing masks to support our ongoing
activities in harmonization of global standards in this area.
The available data are not yet enough to definitively provide a
globally comparable rate to earlier analysis, however, the key
observations include:

• Most passengers comply with the requirement to wear a

mask or face covering on board, however, there is a marked
regional difference in rates of those who do not. Asian
airlines reported a very low rate of noncompliance at 0.23
incidents per 10,000 flights, while European and North
American airlines reports varied from 3 to 166 incidents per
10,000 flights.

194 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 6 – CABIN SAFETY

7

Report Findings
TOP FINDINGS: 2016-2020
Covering a five-year period, the 2016-2020 Accident End State Distribution,
as a percentage of the total, as assigned by the ACTG, was as follows:

2016-2020 Global Accidents - Percent

Runway/Taxiway Excursion
Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse
In-flight Damage
Hard Landing
Ground Damage
Tailstrike
Loss of Control – In-flight
Undershoot
Runway Collision
Other
Controlled Flight into Terrain
Off-Airport Landing/Ditching
Mid-Air Collision
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

Note: Five accidents could not be classified due to insufficient information.

SECTION 7 – REPORT FINDINGS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 195

The Accident End State Distribution, as a percentage of the total of the 38 accidents
that occurred in 2020, as assigned by the ACTG, was as follows:

Runway/Taxiway Excursion 24%

Hard Landing 19%
Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse 16%
In-flight Damage 14%
Ground Damage 8%
Tailstrike 5%
Undershoot 5%
Runway Collision 5%
Controlled Flight into Terrain 3%
Mid-Air Collision 0%
Off-Airport Landing/Ditching 0%
Loss of Control – In-flight 0%
Other 0%
0 5 10 15 20 25

Runway Excursion 4 44%

of total
Runway Excursion Lateral 5 56%
Runway/Taxiway Excursion
Taxiway Excursion 0 0%
Note: One accident could not be classified due to insufficient information.

The accident end states with associated fatalities in 2020 were:

• In-flight Damage (2) with 104 fatalities
• Runway/Taxiway Excursion (2) with 24 fatalities
• Controlled Flight into Terrain (1) with 4 fatalities
With a full breakdown of each accident end state to follow, the table below
provides an overview of 2020’s performance compared to the five-year average.

2020 vs 2016-2020

2020 Comparison vs 5Y 5 Y Average (2016-2020)

Number of accidents 38 ▼ 52
Fatality Risk 0.13 = 0.13
% of accidents involving IATA members 34% ▼ 40%
% of fatal accidents 13% ▼ 15%
% aircraft propulsion - Jet 71% ▲ 66%
% aircraft propulsion - Turboprop 29% ▼ 34%
% type of operations - Passenger 63% ▼ 79%
% type of operations - Cargo 37% ▲ 21%
% Hull losses 24% = 24%

196 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 7 – REPORT FINDINGS

LOSS OF CONTROL — IN-FLIGHT • Refer to IATA Guidance Material and Best Practices for the
Implementation of Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
Background (REV 2).
Loss of Control — In-flight (LOC-I) refers to accidents in which
the flight crew was unable to maintain control of the aircraft in • Consult the 3rd edition of the Airplane Upset Prevention and
flight, resulting in an unrecoverable deviation from the intended Recovery Training Aid (AUPRTA), which emphasizes both
flight path. LOC-I can result from a wide range of contributing recognition and prevention.
factors that include, among others, engine failures, icing, stalls,
spatial disorientation, and other human factors. Reducing this • Incorporate, where applicable, the Commercial Aviation
accident category, through understanding of contributing Safety Team (CAST) safety enhancements (SEs). All SEs,
factors and intervention strategies, is an industry priority. including 192-211 on Airplane State Awareness, are available
on Skybrary.
Discussion
Although the LOC-I category represented only 7% of all Pilots can prevent and overcome LOC-I accidents through, but
accidents during the last five years (2016-2020), it resulted in not limited to:
the highest percentage of fatal accidents (42%) and fatalities
(63%). Among all accident end states, LOC-I is the greatest • Increase awareness of the precursors leading to an upset or
factor leading to fatalities. LOC-I, therefore, deserves the stall.
highest attention that the commercial aviation safety sector
can pay to it. • Take definitive action to recover from an upset.

To assist the commercial aviation industry’s awareness of • Increase awareness of the flight phases where poor
LOC-I hazards and risks, IATA has developed an accident monitoring can be most problematic.
analysis report using data from LOC-I accidents. LOC-I is
an avoidable hazard, and it is hoped that the contents of the • Strategically plan workload to maximize monitoring during
interactive LOC-I Accident Analysis Report will help achieve AOV.
the goal of building pilot awareness of the conditions that can
lead to loss of control. In addition, it should be mentioned that • Emphasize the briefing on pre-flight and, in certain phases,
maintaining high pilot competency standards through training impending night or Instrument Meteorological Conditions
that includes Crew Resource Management (CRM) and basic (IMC) entries that complicate situational awareness and
manual flying skills is the most effective barrier against LOC-I recovery.
accidents. The report presents data from 64 LOC-I accidents
that occurred over 10 years, spanning 2009 through 2018. • Increase awareness and understanding of certain controls
and displays, such as the Flight Modes Annunciator (FMA)
Recommendations on the Primary Flight Display (PFD)/Electronic Attitude
Some of the recommendations for operators to consider are: Director Indicator (EADI).

• Conduct training on energy management in a variety of • Constant awareness of stall margin throughout all phases of
scenarios and flight phases, including, but not limited flight.
to: engine failure, thrust loss, and abnormal engine
configurations. • Download the LOC-I Accident Analysis Report to get an
evaluation of the risk factors from LOC-I accidents and infor-
• Institute Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) mation designed to aid the industry in the implementation of
using Full Flight Simulator (FFS) training modules as mitigation strategies.
recommended in ICAO AC-RASG-AFI-01, 2018, Model AFI Back to Managing Safety in Aviation
Advisory Circular on Loss of Control — In-flight (LOC-I) and
Upset Prevention and Recovery Training.

• Provide classroom and simulator/in-aircraft training to flight

crew on a regular basis that provides a positive experience
considering the flight characteristics and performance of the
aircraft being flown by the pilots.

• Include and emphasize training for pilots to monitor the

aircraft flight path and system, and encourage manual
intervention, as appropriate.

• Reinforce workload management as well as task allocation

and prioritization to maximize monitoring during Areas of
Vulnerability (AOV).

• Ensure training is completed within the validated training

envelop of the Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD).

SECTION 7 – REPORT FINDINGS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 197

CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN Furthermore, industry partners have taken strong measures to
address the issue using EGPWS (or TAWS). While this system
Background cannot completely eradicate CFIT accidents, it has helped
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) is when an aircraft collides reduce the number by providing accurate advanced warning of
during flight with a terrain, water, or obstacle without indication rising terrain close to the runway environment. This advanced
of loss of control. Over the last five years, from 2016 to 2020, technology represents an efficient countermeasure to CFIT by
five CFIT accidents occurred, including four fatal accidents enhancing the pilot’s situational awareness. Loss of situational
resulting in 76 fatalities. The number of CFIT accidents was awareness is one of the main risks a pilot can face, including
down from 27 over the previous five-year period (2011-2015), a distraction that diverts pilot attention from monitoring the
including 24 fatal accidents resulting in 371 fatalities. There was instruments or scanning visually the aircraft environment.
one fatal accident in 2020 with four fatalities. There are many factors that can distract a pilot and managing
0.05 2.5 them are of paramount importance: workload management,
managing fatigue, flight preparation and conducting effective
0.04 2 briefings. Technology implementation, such as synthetic vision

Number of Accidents
systems (augmented reality simulating terrain projected on
Accident Rate

0.03 1.5 the navigation display/cockpit windshield during approach)

can also improve flight crew situational awareness and help
0.02 1 mitigate CFIT.

0.01 0.5 Other efforts include the development of guidance material to

assist operators in implementing specific training programs
- 0 and procedures relating to EGPWS. In order for operators to
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 derive the greatest safety benefit from the system, it is essential
to have a training program in place to ensure flight crew can
All Accident Count All Accident Rate
respond effectively to the system warnings, and are aware of
Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate all factors that can reduce the effectiveness and degradation
Hull-Loss Rate of the system. Furthermore, operators should have procedures
Note: The hull loss rate line overlaps the fatal rate line. in place to ensure the EGPWS software and terrain databases
are current and that the equipment remains serviceable at all
Historical data, over 15 years, shows a general downward trend times. These recommendations and additional information can
for global CFIT accidents. The reduction in CFIT accidents can be found in the IATA and Honeywell guidance and best prac-
be associated with many causal factors, one of which is the tices material on performance assessment of pilot response to
widespread adoption of Ground Proximity Warning System Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS).
(GPWS) and the improved Enhanced Ground Proximity
Warning System (EGPWS), also known as Terrain Awareness Data shows that a good number of CFIT accidents occur in
Warning System (TAWS). the approach and landing phases of flight, implementation of
precision approaches or performance-based navigation (PBN)
Discussion approaches is an effective method to reduce the risk of CFIT
Although few in number, the outcome of CFIT accidents is accidents. Authorities and operators are, therefore, encouraged
almost always catastrophic, and can cause a high number to comply with ICAO recommendations and guidelines regard-
of fatalities. As such, IATA will continue identifying the risks ing PBN implementation, particularly Approaches with Vertical
through its Flight Data eXchange (FDX) and other monitoring Guidance (APV). Installation of lighting systems such as a visu-
programs, and reduce the number of accidents by raising al glideslope indicator (VGSI) or a visual approach slope indi-
awareness of the precursors and promoting safety measures. cator system (VASIS) is another method to promote a Contin-
FDX is an aggregated de-identified database of Flight Data uous Descent Final Approach (CDFA) technique that will help
Analysis/Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FDA/FOQA)- contribute to a stabilized approach. IATA encourages pilots,
type events that allows IATA to identify commercial flight safety air traffic controllers, manufacturers, operators, regulators, air
issues that may not be visible to an airline with a dataset limited navigation service providers (ANSPs) and other stakeholders
to its own operations. The chart below shows the eventful rate to consult the 3rd edition of the IATA/IFALPA/IFATCA/CANSO
of CFIT/TAWS trend from January 2016 to November 2020. The Unstable Approaches: Risk Mitigation Policies, Procedures and
FDX Eventful Rate is represented by the number of eventful Best Practices.
flights per 1,000 flights in the FDX program.
10
9
8
7
6
CFIT Rate

5
4
3
2
1
0
Jan-2016 Jan-2017 Jan-2018 Jan-2019 Jan-2020

Note: This trend excludes corporate jets.

198 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 7 – REPORT FINDINGS
The following table shows the common contributing factors to be found. Training, whether it is academic or simulator training,
CFIT accidents from 2016 to 2020. should allow pilots to experience realistic situations that require
timely decisions and correct responses. Simulator sessions
providing pilots the opportunity to practice CFIT prevention
Latent Conditions Regulatory oversight
strategies, including escape maneuvering, should be given
Flight Ops SOPs and checking
Safety management
during initial and transition training as well as part of recurrent
training.
Threats Meteorology
Poor Visibility/IMC Another important element of continued improvement in
Lack of visual reference CFIT accidents is the collection and sharing of flight data to
Ground-based NAV aid malfunction identify hazards and mitigate related risks that can lead to an
or not available accident. The use of flight data monitoring (FDM) is essential as
Undesired Aircraft Controlled flight towards terrain it identifies potential hazards in flight operations and provides
States Vertical/lateral/speed deviation accurate quantitative data. It also provides a good indicator
Unnecessary weather penetration of undesired aircraft states such as operation outside aircraft
limitations. Lastly, the effective implementation of competency-
Errors SOP adherence/SOP cross- based training and assessment (CBTA) and evidence-based
verification training (EBT) will further enhance the knowledge, skill
Manual handling and attitude of pilots leading to higher standards and safer
Callouts operations. Back to Managing Safety in Aviation

Countermeasures Monitor/Cross-check
In-flight decision-making/
Contingency management RUNWAY/TAXIWAY EXCURSIONS
Overall crew performance
Captains should show leadership Background
Despite the challenges brought about by the pandemic, run-
way/taxiway excursions remain one of IATA’s top priorities. Al-
though there has been a significant reduction in air travel, run-
IATA has also published a detailed interactive analysis report way/taxiway excursions continue to occur. In fact, the Runway/
on CFIT accidents using 10-year data that can be found here. Taxiway Excursion category had the highest frequency of ac-
In this report, about 47% of CFIT accidents showed that cidents in 2020. Some risks might have been increased due
pilots did not adequately respond to TAWS warnings. The to changes in runway and taxiway utilization, different traffic
mismanagement of threats and/or errors by pilots implies patterns, lower frequency of flights and others.
that pilot performance remains a major causal factor in CFIT
accidents despite mitigation efforts. Despite the efforts to improve this accident category, the
runway/taxiway excursion trend rate has stagnated in a range
Recommendations between 0.30 and 0.40 per million sectors over the past five
The role of the competencies within the TEM model has been years. The rate for 2020 was 0.41 per million sectors and it
formalized at the international level with ICAO Doc 9868 (PANS- continues to be the highest end state accident rate. All of
TRG) Amendment 7, which states that pilot competencies the nine accidents attributed as runway excursions in 2020
provide individual and team countermeasures to threats and occurred during the landing phase of flight, except for a
errors resulting in undesired aircraft states and that CRM skills single takeoff excursion. Two runway excursions were fatal jet
are embedded in the pilot competency framework model. accidents, resulting in 24 fatalities. Seven of the nine accidents
The training programs, as a mitigation to CFIT, should place were passenger aircraft, and were split between five jets and
emphasis on pilot competencies, in particular application of two turboprops.
procedures, situational awareness, leadership, teamwork and
workload management. Hence, enhancing pilot performance 0.45 18
and competency, both in normal and abnormal circumstances, 0.40 16
will empower pilots to intervene with greater confidence and
Number of Accidents

0.35 14
competence to prevent threats and/or hazards that could lead 0.30 12
Accident Rate

to high-risk outcomes. Operators must ensure their training 0.25 10

programs robustly address potential deficiencies, highlight 0.20 8
environmental threats, include technical/nontechnical factors
0.15 6
such as human factors, reinforce operator SOPs, educate
0.10 4
about fatigue, and train CRM techniques for the most effective
prevention and threat mitigation strategies. 0.05 2
- 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
In the context of COVID-19, IATA has proposed training solu-
tions to maintain and recover pilot competence. Consult the All Accident Count All Accident Rate
information presented here. Fatality Risk Fatal Accidents Rate
Hull-Loss Rate
For all in-flight CFIT warnings resulting in near misses, or
even false warnings, pilots should submit occurrence reports
to enable investigations to be undertaken so deficiencies can

SECTION 7 – REPORT FINDINGS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 199

Discussion can be attributed to any number of human factors further
Aside from two events involving mechanical failures, the 2020 compounded by additional threats such as gusty winds or
runway excursion accidents share some common contributing contaminated runways. There are an increasing number of
factors that can broadly be described in two general areas that technological solutions available to assist pilots in the decision-
frequently overlap: meteorological-related conditions and flight making process, including, but not limited to, the use of energy-
crew performance. These common factors were identified by based technologies to alert pilots of a possibly impending
the ACTG in the TEM framework as follows: runway excursion and command the flight crew to go-around
or utilize deceleration devices.
Common runway excursion threats:
Although advances in automation and system technologies
• Contaminated Runway/Taxiway – poor braking have without a doubt brought greater opportunity for safe
flight, the consequent lack of manual flying skills and correct
• Wind/windshear/gusty wind decision-making under high workload and often ‘cascading’
events must be addressed. To address this concern and gain
• Thunderstorms greater insight and understanding of this issue, IATA conducted
a survey on “Aircraft Handling and Manual Flying Skills” to
Common runway excursion errors: capture subjective feedback from pilots about their manual
flying practices during everyday line operations and during
• Manual handling/flight controls operator training. The report can be found here.

• Poor CRM behavior Additionally, stabilized approach criteria have been a

long-standing mitigation tool and are considered by the ACTG
• Failure to go-around after destabilization on approach to be part of every operator’s SOPs, which is why “continued
landing after unstable approach” and “failure to go-around af-
Most of the accidents from this year featured adverse weather ter destabilized approach” are frequently common contributing
reports of rain or snow and gusting winds. Aside from the factors to this type of accident. Simulator training can be an ef-
effects of rain or snow on visibility, runway contamination fective countermeasure to prepare crews in a safe environment
continues to represent a major risk for runway excursions. for adverse weather conditions, which are seldom seen in nor-
Runway friction is important to both aircraft deceleration and mal operation and can require performance near the limits of
lateral control; as such, timely, accurate and practical reporting the aircraft and runway conditions. Training in decision-making,
for pilot assessment and decision-making is crucial. The crew coordination and monitoring as well as go-around prior
development and use of a global reporting format (GRF), which to as well as after touchdown are also important mitigating as-
provides a standardized method for use in takeoff and landing pects to be considered.
performance, will help mitigate the risk of runway excursions
through the harmonized observation and reporting of runway A healthy SMS should include an FDM program to identify
surface conditions. This new methodology was scheduled to negative trends and potentially provide insights into the
be implemented in November 2020, but in response to the circumstances of incidents with qualitative data. The FDM
COVID-19 pandemic and the associated challenges facing the data should be used to drive changes to training and operating
aviation industry, ICAO has delayed the applicability date of the procedures to correct negative trends before accidents occur.
GRF until 4 November 2021. Normally, at larger airports and for commercial operators, the
system favors stabilized approach criteria in that traffic volume
Impact with snowbanks and a wet runway or windrows is sufficient that ATC directs speed and altitude reductions,
contributed to four of the runway excursion accidents in 2020. sequences traffic for ILS approaches with sufficient distance to
Flight crews base their performance calculations on a standard make the energy management problem easier for flight crews
runway environment; therefore, changes to the runway width to control. Since the outbreak of COVID-19 and the subsequent
or surrounding clear area can have an impact on performance. reduction in travel, most pilots have seen a major reduction
A less-than-standard-width runway may impact crosswind in flight hours and many regulators have allowed exemptions
limitations and restrict takeoff and landing weight. Clearly to currency regulations, all of which serve to erode the skills
written and timely notices to pilots, either through the Notice necessary for smooth operations. To compound the situation,
to Airmen (NOTAM) system, automatic terminal information sparse air traffic results in more expeditious routing and less
service (ATIS) or air traffic control (ATC), would help flight prompting by ATC, requiring pilots to rely more on their training
crews in this decision-making process. and skill than in the past. Difficulty in maintaining situational
awareness may be further complicated by distractions in the
One of the most common undesired aircraft states attributed cockpit as pilots are concerned about their health, layoffs or
to runway excursion accidents by the ACTG is “long/floated/ even bankruptcy. Maintaining a sterile cockpit and adhering to
bounced/firm/off-center/crabbed landing,” which is often SOPs is important in mitigating these threats. IATA, through the
the result of the most common error: “manual handling/ FDX database, has noted a significant increase in the number of
flight controls.” It is the responsibility of the flight crew for the unstable approaches, as noted in Operational Notice 002/2020.
aircraft to arrive at the runway on speed, in the touchdown Key contributing factors identified were high airspeed and low
zone and with directional control. On every landing, the crew engine thrust, symptoms of poor energy management and
is faced with the task of energy management, to descend precursors to runway excursion accidents. Refer to Unstable
and decelerate from the high-energy cruise phase of flight to Approaches content in the same section.
landing. Often, long, floated or bounced landings are a result
of poor energy management and an unstable approach, which

200 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 7 – REPORT FINDINGS

Recommendations recommend the pilot maintain a stabilized approach or execute
Numerous Safety Enhancements (SEs) have been developed a go-around, which is an essential safety maneuver for all
by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) to mitigate flight crew. In this case, the pilot executing the go-around is
the risks of runway excursions. These enhancements address considered to have demonstrated good situational awareness,
domains such runway safety areas, including, but not limited decision-making and professionalism.
to, implementation of arrester beds, SOPs, training, proactive
safety programs, aircraft design, communication between ATC Discussion
and flight crews, airport operating procedures, landing distance Unstable approaches significantly increase the risk of accidents
assessment, and the use of available airplane stopping devices during the approach and landing phases of flight. Looking at
for landing scenarios with reduced or minimized landing dis- accident data for 2020 and the last five years, it is apparent that
tance margins. Since these SEs are aimed at reducing runway unstable approach is a factor in a number of accidents. Refer
excursions, IATA encourages all stakeholders to review and in- to the table below.
corporate, where applicable, these SEs.
END STATES 2020 2016 UAS UAS ERROR
-2020 UNSTABLE CONTINUED FAILURE TO G/A AFTER
The rate of runway excursion accidents is the highest in APP LDG AFTER DESTABILIZATION
UNSTABLE ON APP
comparison to other end states, but typically has a low APP
likelihood of fatality. This is due to overrun safety areas and
RWY/TWY EXCURSION 9 70 33% (14) 37% (14) 47% (14)
clear areas surrounding most runways. The fatalities from two
HARD LANDING 7 28 36% (15) 34% (13) 30% (9)
of the accidents in 2020 are attributed to runway excursions
TAILSTRIKE 2 21 12% (5) 11% (4) 6% (2)
and damage occurring to the aircraft as it traveled through the
UNDERSHOOT 2 8 10% (4) 11% (4) 6% (2)
runway safety area down steep terrain or through structures
beyond the perimeter. The improper or insufficient use of LOC-I 0 19 2% (1) 3% (1) 3% (1)
deceleration devices are contributing factors. In some cases, it IN-FLIGHT DAMAGE 5 34 2% (1) 3% (1) 3% (1)
would have been possible for the aircraft to have stopped or at GEAR-UP LANDING /
6 36 2% (1) - -
GEAR COLLAPSE
least departed the runway at a reduced speed had deceleration
CFIT 1 5 - - -
devices been used to their full potential. It is, therefore,
important to mitigate fatalities from runway excursions by MAC 0 0 - - -
maintaining adequate runway overrun areas as required by GROUND DAMAGE 3 22 - - -
ICAO Annex 14 Vol. 1. Arresting systems, such as Engineered OFF-AIRPORT LANDING /
0 1 - - -
DITCHING
Material Arresting Systems (EMAS), have also proven to
mitigate damage by decelerating and safely stopping aircraft RUNWAY COLLISION 2 7 - - -
that overrun the runway end. A description of these systems
and some guidelines for their use is available in a dedicated Looking at data from the last five years (2016-2020), we can see
IFALPA Briefing Leaflet, which can be downloaded here. that unstable approaches have been a contributing factor for
the following types of accidents (End States):
The Global Runway Safety Action Plan (GRSAP), which was
developed by Runway Safety Partners, should be consulted • Runway / Taxiway Excursion (33%)
for recommendations on runway safety areas as well as other
guidance created with the aid of industry partners on preventing • Hard Landing (36%)
runway excursions. Likewise, EUROCONTROL, in partnership
with industry stakeholders, has recently issued guidance and • Tailstrike (12%)
best practices recommendations in their Global Action Plan for
the Prevention of Runway Excursions. • Undershoot (10%)

Continuous improvements to stable approach criteria and • LOC-I (2%)

policy compliance, including the discontinuation of an unstable
approach, will reduce the risk of an accident. The 3rd edition of • In-flight Damage (2%)
the IATA, CANSO, IFATCA and IFALPA Unstable Approaches:
Risk Mitigation Policies, Procedures and Best Practices • Gear-up Landing / Gear Collapse (2%)
publication addresses the problems surrounding unstable
approaches, a major contributor to accidents. Associated with these accidents is the fact that the flight crew
Back to Managing Safety in Aviation have decided to continue these unstable approaches instead
of executing a go-around. It seems evident that this is a very
important issue that the industry must continue to address and
UNSTABLE APPROACHES
make efforts to mitigate the inherent risks. Furthermore, the
Background risks of unstable approaches during 2020 continue, according
Despite improvements in the safety of operations, there remains to the FDX. The data shows, when comparing unstable events
the risk of an approach and landing accident. A stable approach on a monthly basis in 2020 vs. 2019 and 2018, it was apparent
means that the aircraft will arrive at the runway in the correct that the unstable approach rate increased sharply in April
configuration, at the correct speed and power setting, and on 2020 and returned to acceptable levels until November and
the correct lateral and vertical path. An unstable approach is December when a new upward trend is evident.
where one or more of these parameters is incorrect, and as
a result carries an increased risk of an approach and landing
incident and/or accident. Recognized industry practice is to

SECTION 7 – REPORT FINDINGS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 201

 25 6. Loss of situational awareness.
Sum of FDX Event Rate
(per 1000 FDX flights)

20
7. Flight crew fatigue.
15
8. Poor visibility and visual illusions.
10

5 9. Lack of monitoring by the pilots, including both Pilot Flying

(PF) and Pilot Monitoring(PM).
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2018 2019 2020 Recommendations
Unstable Approach Trend Rate – Global • Consult with the recommendations listed in the 3rd edition of
the IATA, CANSO, IFATCA and IFALPA Unstable Approaches:
Most airlines and other aviation organizations specify minimum Risk Mitigation Policies, Procedures and Best Practices.
acceptable criteria for the continuation of an approach to land.
These criteria are detailed in the 3rd edition of the IATA, CANSO, • Aircraft operators should implement policies and define
IFATCA and IFALPA Unstable Approaches: Risk Mitigation clear criteria for the execution of stabilized approaches and
Policies, Procedures and Best Practices, which also makes mandate flight crews to execute a go-around if the approach
reference to the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Approach-and- is not within stabilized approach criteria through a non-
Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Briefing Note 7-1, which punitive go-around policy. These policies should enable
suggests that “all flights must be stabilized by 1,000 feet above every flight crew member on the flight deck to call for a go-
airport elevation in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) around at any time, unless an emergency situation dictates
and 500 feet above airport elevation in visual meteorological otherwise.
conditions (VMC)”.
• Aircraft operators should publish SOPs and guidance as
If an approach is not stable by a certain height above the ground, well as provide training highlighting the importance of active
as specified in the company’s SOPs, the pilot must execute a monitoring and effective intervention by the PM, independent
go-around. Failure to go-around from an unstable approach or of rank and experience, during descent, approach, approach
an approach that becomes unstable is an intentional violation path management and landing.
of SOPs.
• Initial and recurrent simulator training should be provided
Variations in required stabilization altitudes between opera- on the competencies for safe go-around execution at
tors, between approach types (precision/non-precision) and various stages during the approach and landing, including
between meteorological conditions (IMC/VMC) could be a shortly prior or during touchdown (before activation of thrust
cause for potential confusion. Some applications of the stable reversers).
approach principle do not distinguish between VMC and IMC
approaches; this makes it easier to track compliance using • Aircraft operators should use their FDM programs to monitor
FDM, whereas different altitudes require the FDM analyst to and categorize unstable approaches using standardized
know which type of approach was being conducted and under criteria whenever provided by the industry (e.g., IATA FDX).
what conditions.
• Aircraft operators should monitor go-around policy
Some operators also specify aircraft status at a 'should' gate compliance through their FDM programs and establish go-
ahead of the 'must' gate envisaged by the FSF system. This is around safety performance indicators (SPIs) for monitoring
typically 500 feet above the 'must' gate; for example, a 'should' through their SMS. In addition to monitoring go-arounds,
gate at 1,000 ft. above ground level (AGL) followed by a 'must' aircraft operators should also monitor discontinued
gate at 500 ft. AGL. Failure to satisfy the former requires that approaches.
corrective action be feasible and taken, whereas failure to
satisfy the latter requires a go-around. • Aircraft operators should:

Globally, the main contributing factors for unstable approaches – Define an unstable approach followed by a landing as a
include, but are not limited to: mandatory reporting event by the flight crew.

1. Adverse weather (e.g., strong or gusty winds, wind shear, – Minimize the need to report a go-around due to an
turbulence). unstable approach unless there is another significant
event in relation to the go-around (e.g., flap overspeed).
2. ATC pressure to maximize number of movements (e.g., high
approach speed). • ANSPs should ensure the importance of stabilized
approaches and aircraft energy management are included
3. Late change of runway. in initial and recurrent training of ATCOs. Aircraft operators
should implement policies for flight crews not to accept
4. Speed restriction inappropriate to the type of aircraft and/or ATC procedures and clearances that have the potential to
to the weather conditions prevailing at the airport (e.g., low increase the risk of being unstable at the landing gate.
ceiling, poor visibility, tailwind at altitude).
• Like other alerting systems that are currently in use (ACAS/
5. Commercial pressure to maintain schedule. TCAS, EGPWS, windshear) the aviation industry should

202 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 7 – REPORT FINDINGS

 develop on board real-time performance monitoring and period (2011-2015), with one fatal accident in 2011 that resulted
alerting systems that will assist the flight crew with the land/ in three fatalities. Historically, ground damage accidents tend to
go-around decision when the approach is not stabilized. have a very low hull loss accident rate with 0.06 hull loss acci-
dents per million sectors over the 10-year period (2011-2020). In
• Regulatory authorities should assess the performance of 2020, there were three ground damage accidents, down from
aircraft operators’ processes for: four accidents in 2019. There were no hull loss ground damage
accidents nor fatal ground damage accidents in the reporting
– Safety data collection (e.g., flight data monitoring and
period from 2016-2020.
reporting).
0.25 10
– Identification and analysis of precursors and causal 9
factors. 0.20 8

Numbe r of Accidents
7
– Participation in safety data sharing programs (e.g., EASA

Acciden t Rate
0.15 6
Data4Safety, IATA Global Aviation Data Management
5
(GADM)). 0.10 4

• For more detailed information, check GAPPRE (Global 3

Action Plan for Prevention of Runway Excursions) 0.05 2

1
Back to Managing Safety in Aviation - 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
All Accident Count All Accident Rate

GROUND DAMAGE ACCIDENTS

Looking at the common factors of the three ground damage
Background accidents in 2020, in the latent conditions for ground
Damage to aircraft occurring while on the ground, including operations, safety management was cited as a contributing
occurrences during (or as a result of) ground handling factor in 33% of all ground damage accidents. Looking at the
operations, collision while taxiing to/from a runway in use different threats, 33% were attributed to dangerous goods,
(excluding a runway collision), foreign object damage, and fire/ hydraulic system failure, maintenance events and air traffic
smoke/fumes. services. The common contributing factors cited in ground
damage accidents in 2020 are as shown in the following table:
Other events included in this classification are:
Latent Conditions
• Collisions with aircraft, persons, animals, ground vehicles, Safety Management
obstacles, buildings, structures, etc. while on a surface other
Threats Dangerous Goods
than the runway used for landing or intended for takeoff.
Hydraulic System Failure
Maintenance Events
• Collisions that occur while servicing, boarding, loading, and
Air Traffic Services
deplaning the aircraft.
Undesired Aircraft Loss of Aircraft Control While on the
• Propeller/fan blade strikes. States Ground
Operation Outside Aircraft Limitations
• Pushback/power back/towing events.

• Jet blast and ground handling occurrences. Other threats found in accidents were classified by ACTG from
the perspectives of service providers and airports/regulators.
• Aircraft external pre-flight configuration errors (e.g., improper
loading and improperly secured doors and latches) that lead Service provider threats:
to subsequent events.
• High turnover of personnel
• Includes all parking areas (e.g., ramps, gates, tiedowns).
• Lack of positive safety culture implementation
Note: Ground collisions resulting from events categorized under
Runway Collision are excluded from this category.
• Lack of SMS implementation, or no interface with airline
As specified in Annex 1, IATA has several ways to classify an
accident, one of which is by the cost of the damage to the air- SMS:
craft: the aircraft has sustained major structural damage that
adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight • Operational pressure/growth with no infrastructure growth
characteristics of the aircraft and would normally require ma-
jor repair or replacement of the affected component exceeding • Insufficient training/qualifications do not expire/no recurrent
US$1 million or 10% of the aircraft’s hull reserve value, whichev- training
er is lower, or the aircraft has been declared a hull loss.
• Lack of technological innovation on ground service equip-
Discussion ment (GSE)
Over the last five years (2016-2020), 22 ground damage acci-
dents have occurred, down from 49 over the previous five-year
SECTION 7 – REPORT FINDINGS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 203
Airport/Regulator threats:
• Infrastructure deficiencies and outdated aeronautical TCAS RA Descending 0.100
below FL 100
information publication (AIP)
• Unofficial communication of threats (e.g., use of safety
bulletins instead of NOTAMs) TCAS RA above FL 100 0.210

• No endorsement of a higher level of safety standards (e.g.,

IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) and/or
TCAS RA Climbing
IATA Ground Operations Manual (IGOM)) 0.051
below FL 100
• After coordination with IATA Ground Operations Safety,
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
taking into consideration the operational challenges arising
from the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequently massive Mac Overall Category Rate
number of aircraft parked in unusual places (e.g., taxiways
and runways). Implementing a TCAS monitoring program can bring safety to
the next level. Collecting and analyzing TCAS events, through
Recommendations an FDM program, is essential to provide insight into flight op-
The ACTG decided to propose the following recommendations erations for safety improvement. The results of these analyses
to airlines, service providers, airports and regulators to reduce typically discuss technical and operational issues related to
the number and severity of ground damage accidents: the use and operation of the TCAS system. Additionally, the
SMS should consider addressing through training (ground and
• To adopt IGOM standards in lieu of operator-specific flight) the findings that are related to flight crew performance.
requirements.
• For operators to provide ground service providers (GSPs) To prevent accidents, it is essential to learn from previous
with clear instructions whenever there is a variation from the accidents, incidents and undesired aircraft states reported
IGOM standards. via Air Safety Reports such as TCAS RAs. That being said, the
following event provides a valuable learning opportunity to
• To adopt the IATA Airport Handing Manual (AHM) Chapter 11 reduce the risk of accidents in future: an A321 nearly collided
training recommendations. with a glider in the vicinity of a commercial airport in Europe
• For GSPs to utilize ISAGO to support a reduction in station while being vectored for final approach. Both planes were flying
audits. legally in airspace category E, where they both were allowed to
operate, but unaware of each other. In the country of occurrence,
• Implementation of SMS. gliders are granted exemptions from using a transponder. Also,
• Operators should ensure their flight crew are familiar with the the often-used GNSS-based Portable Collision Avoidance
airport maneuvering area and procedures; especially during System (known as FLARM for “Flight Alarm”) does not interact
construction and unusual circumstances (i.e., parked aircraft with airliners’ ACAS. As FLARM does not generate information
due to COVID-19). on the ATC’s radar screens, ‘see and avoid’ remains the only
Back to Managing Safety in Aviation (and often ineffective) barrier to prevent MAC. Two safety
recommendations from the German BFU (Federal Bureau of
Air Accident Investigation) have not been addressed by the
MID-AIR COLLISION governing entities since they were introduced in 2017:

Background 1. The mandatory use of a transponder above 5,000 ft. mean

Even though Mid-Air Collisions (MAC) occur rarely, the sea level (MSL)/3,500 ft. GND.
outcome is almost certainly catastrophic. The industry has
made great effort over the past decades to prevent accidents 2. Take steps to ensure commercial IFR flights are only
in this category. But that does not mean in any way that we can operated in airspace where traffic information is available,
ease up on our efforts; there are still things left to be done. separation is provided from all other traffic, and where TCAS
is effective to prevent MAC.
Discussion
Once again in 2020, we have not seen any accidents in this Unfortunately, blind spots in the airspace structure
category, which is good news. But it is worth taking a look at and legislation/regulation will remain until these safety
the data in IATA’s FDX database. FDX is an aggregated de- recommendations have been implemented and closed.
identified database of FDA/FOQA-type events that allows
IATA to identify commercial flight safety issues that may not be IATA continues to urge operators to use their FDM programs
visible to an airline with a dataset limited to its own operations. to monitor pilot response to TCAS RAs. The assessment of the
pilot’s compliance to ACAS orders should be made on a regular
From the aggregated de-identified FDX data on TCAS RA, 2,555 basis to determine if there are any safety issues that could be
events occurred between January 2016 and December 2020 at mitigated via training.
the time of publication. Analyzing this data, the altitude bands
where the TCAS RA events occurred were determined. As can Operational experience has shown that the correct response
be seen, the highest rate of events occurred above 10,000 feet by flight crew is dependent on the effectiveness of the initial
when the aircraft was neither descending nor climbing. The and recurrent training in TCAS procedures. In the event of an
rate calculated was 0.210 per 1,000 flights. RA, any delayed or incorrect flight crew response negates the

204 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 7 – REPORT FINDINGS

effectiveness of the RA. Their actions will be the most important HUMAN FACTORS IN ACCIDENTS
factors affecting the performance of the TCAS system. Many of
the safety issues identified in operations can be inferred to a Background:
general lack of knowledge about the ACAS system, including After analysis and review of the last two years of accidents
its capabilities, benefits, limitations, and the associated opera- and their primary contributing factors, we can conclude that
tional procedures. human error remains as a primary indicator. As the complexity
of the cockpit environment has evolved and automation has
For these reasons, it is essential that pilots and controllers be increased, human factors, especially those safety-related,
trained on TCAS operations. Academic training as well as flight require a multi-disciplinary approach. Additionally, human
training in FSTDs will enhance flight crew understanding of factors in maintenance play an important role in a number of
how the TCAS system works, how they should respond to RAs, aviation incidents and accidents. This may be attributed to
and the limitations of TCAS systems. It should be noted that maintenance tasks either not performed correctly or omitted
some FSTDs have limited capabilities to display realistic traffic due to human errors.
situations and are not always able to provide scenarios during
a turn or even during climb/descend. For example, an FSTD’s Some of the main human factors analyzed included, but were
TCAS scenario is often designed to be triggered and delivered not limited to:
under specific circumstances (i.e., unaccelerated level flight). As
• Lack of or poor communication
a consequence, the flight crew is able to recognize in advance
the TCAS RA event within the flight profile. The traffic popping • Complacency, distraction and lack of or poor assertiveness
up on the TCAS display will most likely become an intruder
in short order. The surprise effect that is often observed in • Situational awareness
real-world TCAS RAs is not contained in this kind of training. • Fatigue and stress
As technology advances rapidly, FSTD manufacturers are
encouraged to enhance the capabilities of their simulation • Workload management
devices to deliver more realistic scenarios, taking into account • Non-compliance with SOPs and norms
the expertise and safety recommendations of the operators.
• Low resilience (poor response to pressure)
A mentally unprepared crew faced with unknown TCAS
• Low maintenance performance: non-adherence to SOPs
scenarios could feel pressed to conduct an individual ‘on-
and lack of supervision
the-go’ risk evaluation during the event, with a possible
underestimation of the risk and subsequent non-adherence to • Performance of Air Traffic Controller/Air Traffic Management
TCAS RAs.
Discussion:
Recommendations: The list above indicates a predominant number of factors
• Flight crews should not delay the response or decide not related to non-technical skills, which demonstrates a need to
to respond to an RA. IATA recommends all operators and enhance not only technical training, but also human factors
flight crew to consult the Performance Assessment of Pilot training to bring a change in mindset, attitude and culture of
Compliance with TCAS using FDM guidance material - individuals.
2nd Edition.
The poor decision-making process highlighted as one of the
• Flight crews should refrain from switching their TCAS to ‘TA
major contributing factors in recent accidents shall involve a
only’ and always use TCAS TA/RA mode, especially during
systematic approach to mental process that gathers the non-
approaches in high-density airspaces.
technical skills mentioned above.
• FSTD manufacturers, airplane operators and ATCs should
work together to develop realistic TCAS training scenarios Recommendation:
that provide a wide variety of real-world scenarios. It is strongly recommended that the enhancement and opti-
mization of human performance be a priority in airline training
• Existing FSTDs should be upgraded to be able to provide programs. In this way, CRM/TEM ground training, line-oriented
these scenarios. flight training (LOFT) simulator training with updated scenarios
• TCAS training should be improved to address these to address airline reported events, Line Operations Safety Au-
realistic scenarios as well as special cases (e.g., low-level dit (LOSA) programs, and FDM/FOQA trends will capture all
TCAS descend RA, TCAS scenarios during parallel runway threats presented in operations. An important approach is the
operations). presence of a solid and proactive positive (just) culture policy
where flight crew are encouraged to raise errors with confi-
• Where commercial airline traffic is present, the regulator dence that this will be non-punitive.
should ensure the ACAS systems of all traffic is compatible
with each other and every traffic type known to the ATC unit. The COVID-19 outbreak has brought unprecedented challeng-
This also applies to unmanned aircraft. es to the industry. The structures and policies in place for SMS
Pilots have to be able to easily determine on their charts where shall support and encourage organizational adaptation, a posi-
the boundaries are between controlled and non-controlled tive and open reporting culture, and foster flight crew resilience
airspaces. and team building. Therefore, a strong defense barrier to all the
aforementioned challenges is a vibrant SMS program with a
Back to Managing Safety in Aviation healthy focus on human factors.
Back to Managing Safety in Aviation

SECTION 7 – REPORT FINDINGS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 205

 A Big Step Forward
for Operators
with Small Aircraft

IATA Standard Safety Assessment (ISSA) Program

Operators with smaller aircraft can enjoy all the benefits of an IATA Building on a proven international model
Safety Assessment. Created to meet the needs of operators not ISSA builds on IATA’s internationally recognized IOSA, assessing
eligible for IATA’s Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) program, the documentation and implementation of each requirement and
IATA Standard Safety Assessment (ISSA) program opens the door assessing the organization and management system of the
to aircraft operating below 5,700 kg Maximum Takeoff Weight as operator. Assessment standards are derived directly from
well as to those whose business model does not allow conformity IOSA Standards and Recommended Practices, introducing
with the IOSA requirements. elements of the ICAO Safety Management System (SMS).

For more information, visit us at

iata.org/ISSA or contact issa@iata.org
ISSA
8

Global Aviation Data Management

In 2020, GADM focused on growing the membership for the In 2020, GADM released various focus area dashboards
Incident and Flight Data Exchange programs, while continuing allowing users to access safety and security information, while
with the development of new aviation safety analytics for our helping them to identify emerging safety trends and risks
industry users. provoked by the global COVID-19 crisis.

Additionally, our service delivery and data management Accident Data Exchange (ADX)
processes were further streamlined to optimize new member
onboarding and shorten the data processing cycle to monthly The Accident Database also underwent a major transformation
from quarterly. in 2020, and a revamped version of the platform is currently
available to all GADM participants.
The GADM team held a series of webinars in 2020 and will
continue to do so, ensuring the continuous delivery of valuable The Accident Data Exchange (ADX) complements the IATA
insights on safety and security occurrences. Safety Report by providing easy access to all commercial
aviation accidents since 2005 that meet the IATA Accident
For more information, visit the GADM website. Inclusion Guidelines.

Incident Data Exchange (IDX) ADX provides rate-based information, which consists of
normalizing accident numbers with global sectors to perform
The new IDX was launched at the end of 2019 to replace analyses that are statistically relevant.
and expand on the former safety occurrence databases –
Safety Trend Evaluation, Analysis and Data Exchange System In addition, ADX allows to easily extract statistics based on
(STEADES) and Ground Damage Database (GDDB). In 2020, many variables, such as airport, aircraft, date, country, phase of
the focus was onboarding airlines, GSPs and airport operators flight, accident category, severity, type of operations, and much
into the new platform. more.

The IDX program is a worldwide, aggregated, de-identified GADM Data Science

database of safety and security occurrence reports in the
areas of flight operations, cabin operations, ground operations, GADM aims to develop data science capabilities and implement
maintenance, engineering and more. machine learning technologies to derive fast and cost-effective
solutions for safety and security risk identification.
In just one year, the IDX program managed to create a customer
base of 69 participants, which represents more than 10% of Starting in 2020, the GADM team collaborated with the Institute
worldwide commercial aviation traffic. for Data Valorization (IVADO) and several universities, working
on the following research projects:
IDX benefits include the ability for users to:
• Natural Language Processor Application for Incident Report
• Access de-identified safety and security information. Analysis (University of Montreal)

• Benchmark themselves at the regional and global level. • Correlative Flight Parameter Analysis (Polytechnique
Montreal)
• Anticipate operational challenges and risks at specific
airports.

• Identify critical incident trends while setting targets for

improvement.

SECTION 8 – GLOBAL AVIATION DATA MANAGEMENT IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 207
The engagement with academia enabled the GADM team to Flight Data Exchange (FDX)
apply cutting-edge technologies into data-sharing programs.
For example, GADM developed a machine learning model FDX is IATA’s premier global flight data sharing program. The
that identifies the correlations between features and unstable program counted over 100 active member airlines at the close
approaches by airport and altitude. This provides visibility to of 2020. The membership of the program is diverse and comes
the hidden factors and their complex interactions, supporting from different regions of the world, thus making the program
analysts to understand the underlying patterns of unstable truly global.
approaches.
The FDX program offers member airlines access to in-depth
Based on the accomplishments, the research block for 2021 is analytics in areas of risk as well as the ability to benchmark their
planned to develop an automated anomaly detection model, operations against other operators in the world from a regional
supporting the proactive risk identification so GADM can or global perspective. The FDX platform is developed to be
discover meaningful precursors before major incidents occur. easy to navigate by providing member airlines with improved
visualizations and refined filter criteria.
Montreal is not only known as a global center of aviation,
but also as an artificial intelligence hub and leading research The program offers secure handling of flight data in a
center. To bring together various actors in the aviation industry confidential and safe manner under strict guidance from IATA
and exchange knowledge and best practices of analytics governance protocols, ISO data governance standards as well
and digital intelligence, GADM plays an active role in the as international data protection standards.
community of interest in aviation, fostering an ecosystem
between researchers, start-ups and aviation industry players For further information about any of our programs, email
in Montreal. gadm@iata.org.

208 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  SECTION 8 – GLOBAL AVIATION DATA MANAGEMENT
Addendum A

Fatality Risk

Definition Examples
In 2015, IATA added another measure of air carrier safety to The following tables illustrate two examples:
its annual Safety Report: fatality risk. This measure seeks to
answer the following question: what was the exposure of a Case 1: There were a total of four accidents during the period:
passenger or crew member to a catastrophic accident, where
all people on board perished? Accident
% of People-Onboard Full-Loss
Who Perished Equivalent
The equation to calculate the fatality risk is Q = V/N, where: #1 0% 0
#2 100% 1
• N is the number of flights or sectors conducted during the
period #3 50% 0.5
#4 50% 0.5
• V is the total number of “full-loss equivalents” among the
Total Full-Loss Equivalent 2
N flights or sectors
Number of Sectors 3,000,000
The full-loss equivalent for a given flight is the proportion of Fatality Risk 0.00000067
passengers and crew who do not survive an accident. For
Fatality Risk (normalized per 1 million sectors) 0.67
example:

• If a flight lands safely, the full-loss equivalent is zero. In Case 1, there were a total of four accidents out of three
million sectors. Of these four accidents, one had no fatalities,
• If a flight results in an accident in which all passengers and one was a complete hull loss with all on board killed, and two
crew are killed, the full-loss equivalent is one. in which half on board perished. In total, there were two full-
loss equivalents out of three million sectors, which equates to
• If a flight results in an accident in which half of passengers 0.67 full-loss equivalents per million sectors. In other words, the
and crew are killed, the full-loss equivalent is 0.5. exposure of all passengers and crew who flew on those sectors
to a catastrophic accident was 1 in 1.5 million flights.
V is the sum of all full-loss equivalents calculated for all
N flights. In other words, the fatality risk rate (Q) is the sum of
the individual accident full-loss equivalents divided by the total
number of flights.

210 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  ADDENDUM A – FATALITY RISK

Addendum A

Fatality Risk (cont’d)

Case 2: There were a total of six accidents: Considerations

% of People Onboard Full-Loss It is important to note that the calculation of fatality risk does
Accident
Who Perished Equivalent not consider the size of the airplane, how many people were
#1 0% 0 on board, or the length of the flight. Rather, what is key is the
percentage of people, from the total carried, who perished. It
#2 10% 0.1
does not consider whether the accident was on a long-haul
#3 20% 0.2 flight on a large aircraft where 25% of the passengers did not
#4 50% 0.5 survive, or on a small commuter flight with the same ratio. The
likelihood of perishing is the same.
#5 30% 0.3
#6 40% 0.4 Fatality risk, or full-loss equivalent, can easily be mistaken to
Total Full-Loss Equivalent 1.5 represent the number of fatal accidents (or the fatal accident
rate). Although fatality risk only exists once there is a fatal
Number of Sectors 3,000,000
accident, they are not the same. While a fatal accident indicates
Fatality Risk 0.0000005 an accident where at least one person perished, the full-loss
Fatality Risk (normalized per 1 million sectors) 0.50 equivalent indicates the proportion of people on board who
perished.

In Case 2, there were a total of six accidents out of three Fatality risk provides a good baseline for comparison between
million sectors. Of these six accidents, five experienced some accident categories. For example, Loss of Control — In-flight
fatalities, but there was no complete full loss. The total of the (LOC-I) is known to have a high fatality risk, but a low frequency
full-loss equivalents was 1.5. This equates to a fatality risk of of occurrence. Runway Excursion, on the other hand, has a low
0.50 per million sectors. The exposure, in this case, was of one fatality risk, but a higher frequency of occurrence. It is possible,
catastrophic accident per two million flights. therefore, for the Runway Excursion category to have the same
fatality risk as LOC-I if its frequency of occurrence is high
When comparing the above cases, the risk of perishing on a enough so that the generally small full-loss equivalent for each
randomly selected flight is lower in Case 2 even though there individual accident produces the same total full-loss equivalent
were more accidents with fatalities. Case 1 had fewer fatal number as LOC-I (per million sectors).
accidents, but they were more severe. Therefore, the odds of a
passenger or crew losing their life on a given flight (fatality risk)
is higher in Case 1 than in Case 2.

ADDENDUM A – FATALITY RISK IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 211

Annex 1 – Definitions
Abnormal Disembarkation:  Passengers and/or crew exit the Fatality: Passenger or crew member who is killed or later dies
aircraft via boarding doors (normally assisted by internal aircraft or of their injuries resulting from an operational accident. Injured
exterior stairs) after an aircraft incident or accident and when away persons who die more than 30 days after an accident are excluded.
from the boarding gates or aircraft stands (e.g., onto a runway or
Fatality Risk: Sum of full-loss equivalents per 1 million sectors,
taxiway); only in a non-life-threatening and non-catastrophic event.
measuring the exposure of a passenger or crew member to a
Accident: IATA defines an accident as an event where ALL of non-survivable accident. A full-loss equivalent is related to the per-
the following criteria are satisfied: centage of people on board who perished. Refer to Addendum A
for additional information.
• Person(s) have boarded the aircraft with the intention of flight
(either flight crew or passengers). Full-Loss Equivalent: N  umber representing the equivalent of
a catastrophic accident where all people onboard died. For an
• The intention of the flight is limited to normal commercial aviation
individual accident, the full-loss equivalent is a value between
activities, specifically scheduled/charter passenger or cargo
0 and 1, representing the ratio between the number of people
service. Executive jet operations, training, and maintenance/test
who perished and the number of people on board the aircraft.
flights are excluded.
In a broader context, the full-loss equivalent is the sum of each
• The aircraft is turbine-powered and has a certificated Maximum accident’s full-loss equivalent value. Refer to Addendum A for
Takeoff Weight (MTOW) of at least 5,700 kg (12,540 lb.). additional information.
• The aircraft has sustained major structural damage that Hazard: Condition, object or activity with the potential of causing
adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight injuries to persons, damage to equipment or structures, loss of
characteristics of the aircraft and would normally require major material, or reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function.
repair or replacement of the affected component exceeding
$1  million USD or 10% of the aircraft’s hull reserve value, Hull Loss: A ccident in which the aircraft is destroyed or
whichever is lower, or the aircraft has been declared a hull loss. substantially damaged and is not subsequently repaired for
whatever reason, including a financial decision of the owner.
Accident Classification: P  rocess by which actions, omissions,
events, conditions, or a combination thereof, that led to an accident Hull Loss/Nil Survivors: Accident resulting in a complete hull loss
are identified and categorized. with no survivors (used as a Cabin End State).

Aircraft: Involved aircraft, used interchangeably with airplane(s). IATA Accident Classification System: Refer to Annexes 2 and 3
of this report.
Cabin Safety-related Event: Accident involving cabin operational
issues (e.g., passenger evacuation, onboard fire, decompression, IATA Regions: IATA determines the accident region based on the
ditching) that requires actions by the operating cabin crew. operator’s home country as specified in the operator’s Air Operator
Certificate (AOC). For example, if a Canadian-registered operator
Captain: Involved pilot responsible for the operation and safety of has an accident in Europe, this accident is counted as a ‘North
the aircraft during flight time. American’ accident. For a complete list of countries assigned per
Commander: Involved pilot, in an augmented crew, responsible region, consult the following table:
for the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight time.
Crew member: Anyone on board a flight who has duties connected
with the sector of the flight during which the accident happened. It
excludes positioning or relief crew, security staff, etc. (see definition
of “Passenger” below).
Evacuation (Land): P  assengers and/or crew evacuate the aircraft
via escape slides/slide rafts, doors, emergency exits or gaps in the
fuselage (usually initiated in life-threatening and/or catastrophic
events).
Evacuation (Water): P assengers and/or crew evacuate the
aircraft via escape slides/slide rafts, doors, emergency exits or
gaps in the fuselage and into or onto water.
Fatal Accident: A  ccident where at least one passenger or crew
member is killed or later dies of their injuries, resulting from an
operational accident. Events such as slips, trips and falls, food
poisoning, or injuries resulting from turbulence or involving
onboard equipment, which may involve fatalities, but where the
aircraft sustains minor or no damage, are excluded.

ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 213

IATA REGIONS

Region Country Region Country Region Country

AFI Angola Swaziland CIS Armenia
Benin Tanzania, United Republic of Azerbaijan
Botswana Togo Belarus
Burkina Faso Uganda Georgia
Burundi Zambia Kazakhstan
Cameroon Zimbabwe Kyrgyzstan
Cape Verde ASPAC Australia1 Moldova, Republic of
Central African Republic Bangladesh Russian Federation
Chad Bhutan Tajikistan
Comoros Brunei Darussalam Turkmenistan
Congo, Democratic Cambodia Ukraine
Republic of Fiji Islands Uzbekistan
Congo India EUR Albania
Côte d’Ivoire Indonesia Andorra
Djibouti Japan Austria
Equatorial Guinea Kiribati Belgium
Eritrea Korea, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ethiopia Lao People’s Democratic Bulgaria
Gabon Republic Croatia
Gambia Malaysia Cyprus
Ghana Maldives Czech Republic
Guinea Marshall Islands Denmark3
Guinea-Bissau Micronesia, Federated Estonia
Kenya States of
Finland
Lesotho Myanmar
France4
Liberia Nauru
Germany
Madagascar Nepal
Greece
Malawi New Zealand2
Holy See (Vatican City
Mali Pakistan State)
Mauritania Palau Hungary
Mauritius Papua New Guinea Iceland
Mozambique Philippines Ireland
Namibia Samoa Italy
Niger Singapore Israel
Nigeria Solomon Islands Kosovo
Rwanda Sri Lanka Latvia
São Tomé and Príncipe Thailand Liechtenstein
Senegal Timor-Leste Lithuania
Seychelles Tonga Luxembourg
Sierra Leone Tuvalu Macedonia, the former
Somalia Vanuatu Yugoslav Republic of

South Africa Vietnam Malta

South Sudan Monaco

214 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS

 Region Country Region Country
Montenegro Saint Vincent and the
Netherlands5 Grenadines

Norway Suriname

Poland Trinidad and Tobago

Portugal Uruguay

Romania Venezuela

San Marino MENA Afghanistan

Serbia Algeria

Slovakia Bahrain

Slovenia Egypt

Spain Iran, Islamic Republic of

Sweden Iraq

Switzerland Jordan

Turkey Kuwait

United Kingdom6 Lebanon

LATAM/ Antigua and Barbuda Libya

CAR Argentina Morocco

Bahamas Oman

Barbados Palestinian Territories

Belize Qatar

Bolivia Saudi Arabia

Brazil Sudan

Chile Syrian Arab Republic

Colombia Tunisia

Costa Rica United Arab Emirates

Cuba Yemen

Dominica NAM Canada

Dominican Republic United States of America7

Ecuador NASIA China8

El Salvador Mongolia

Grenada Korea, Democratic

People’s Republic of
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia

ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 215

 1 Australia includes: 6 United Kingdom includes:

Christmas Island Akrotiri and Dhekelia

Cocos (Keeling) Islands Anguilla
Norfolk Island Bermuda
Ashmore and Cartier Islands British Indian Ocean Territory
Coral Sea Islands British Virgin Islands
Heard Island and McDonald Islands Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
2 New Zealand includes: Gibraltar
Montserrat
Pitcairn
Cook Islands
Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha
Niue
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
Tokelau
Turks and Caicos Islands
British Antarctic Territory
3 Denmark includes: Guernsey
Isle of Man
Faroe Islands Jersey
Greenland
7 United States of America include:
4 France includes:
American Samoa
French Guiana Guam
French Polynesia Northern Mariana Islands
French Southern Territories Puerto Rico
Guadalupe Virgin Islands, U.S.
Martinique United States Minor Outlying Islands
Mayotte
New Caledonia 8 China includes:
Saint-Barthélemy
Saint Martin (French part)
Chinese Taipei
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Hong Kong
Reunion
Macao
Wallis and Futuna

5 Netherlands include:

Aruba
Curacao
Sint Maarten

216 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS

Incident: O
 ccurrence, other than an accident, associated with the Phase of Flight: T  he phase of flight definitions developed and
operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of applied by IATA are presented in the table on the following page.
operation. Rapid Deplaning: Passengers and/or crew rapidly exit the aircraft
In-flight Security Personnel: Individual who is trained, authorized via boarding doors and a jet bridge or stairs, as a precautionary
and armed by the state and is carried on board an aircraft and measure.
whose intention is to prevent acts of unlawful interference. Risk: A
 ssessment, expressed in terms of predicted probability and
Investigation: P rocess conducted for accident prevention, which severity, of the consequence(s) of a hazard, taking as reference the
includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of worst foreseeable situation.
conclusions (including the determination of causes) and, when Safety: S
 tate in which the risk of harm to persons or property
appropriate, the making of safety recommendations. is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level
Investigator in Charge: Person charged, based on their qualifi- through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk
cations, with the responsibility for the organization, conduct and management.
control of an investigation. Sector: O
 peration of an aircraft between takeoff at one location
Involved: Directly concerned, or designated to be concerned, with and landing at another (other than a diversion).
an accident or incident. Serious Injury: Injury sustained by a person in an accident and
Level of Safety: How far safety is to be pursued in a given context, which meets one of the following:
assessed with reference to an acceptable risk, based on the • Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing
current values of society. within seven days from the date the injury was received.
Major Repair: A repair that, if improperly done, might appreciably
• Results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of
affect the mass, balance, structural strength, performance, power
fingers, toes or nose).
plant operation, flight characteristics, or other qualities affecting
the airworthiness of an aircraft. • Involves lacerations that cause severe hemorrhage or nerve,
Non-operational Accident: I ncludes accidents resulting from acts muscle or tendon damage.
of deliberate violence (e.g., sabotage, war) and accidents that occur • Involves injury to any internal organ.
during crew training, demonstrations and test flights. Violence is
believed to be a matter of security rather than flight safety. Crew • Involves second or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting
training, demonstrations and test flights are considered to involve more than 5% of the surface of the body.
special risks inherent with these types of operations. Also included • Involves verified exposure to infectious substances or
in this category are: injurious radiation.
• Non-airline-operated aircraft (e.g., military or government-
Serious Incident:  Incident involving circumstances indicating
operated, survey, aerial work or parachuting flights).
that an accident nearly occurred. Note: the difference between an
• Accidents where there was no intention of flight. accident and a serious incident lies only in the result.
Normal Disembarkation: P  assengers and/or crew exit the aircraft Substantial Damage:  Damage or structural failure, which
via boarding doors during normal operations. adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight
characteristics of the aircraft, and which would normally require
Occurrence: A  ny unusual or abnormal event involving an aircraft,
major repair or replacement of the affected component.
including, but not limited to, an incident.
Notes:
Operational Accident: A ccident that is believed to represent the
• Bent fairing or cowling, dented skin, small punctured holes
risks of normal commercial operation; generally an accident that
in the skin or fabric, minor damage to landing gear, wheels,
occurs during normal revenue operations or a positioning flight. tires, flaps, engine accessories, brakes, or wing tips are not
Operator: P erson, organization or enterprise engaged in, or considered “substantial damage” for the purpose of this
offering to engage in, aircraft operations. Safety Report.
Passenger: Anyone on board a flight who, as far as may be • The ICAO Annex 13 definition is unrelated to cost and
determined, is not a crew member. Apart from normal revenue includes many incidents in which the financial consequences
passengers, this includes off-duty staff members, positioning and are minimal.
relief flight crew members, etc., who have no duties connected
with the sector of the flight during which the accident happened. Unstable Approach: A pproach where the IATA ACTG has
Security personnel are included as passengers as their duties are knowledge about vertical, lateral or speed deviations in the
not concerned with the operation of the flight. portion of the flight close to landing. Note: this definition includes
the portion immediately prior to touchdown and in this respect
Person: Any involved individual, including airport and Air Traffic
the definition might differ from other organizations. However,
Service (ATS) personnel.
accident analysis gives evidence that a destabilization just prior to
touchdown has contributed to accidents in the past.

ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 217

PHASE OF FLIGHT DEFINITIONS

Flight Planning (FLP) T  his phase begins when the flight crew Descent (DST) This phase begins when the crew departs the
initiates the use of flight planning information facilities and cruise altitude for an approach at a destination; it ends when the
becomes dedicated to a flight based upon a route and airplane; crew initiates changes in aircraft configuration and/or speeds to
it ends when the crew arrives at the aircraft for the planned flight facilitate a landing on a specific runway. It may also end by the
or the crew initiates a ‘Flight Close’ phase. crew initiating an ECL or CRZ phase.
Preflight (PRF) T  his phase begins with the arrival of the flight Approach (APR) This phase begins when the crew initiates
crew at an aircraft for the flight; it ends when a decision is made changes in aircraft configuration and/or speeds enabling
to depart the parking position and/or start the engine(s). It may the aircraft to maneuver to land on a specific runway; it ends
also end by the crew initiating a ‘Post-flight’ phase. Note: the when the aircraft is in the landing configuration and the crew is
PRF phase assumes the aircraft is sitting at the point at which dedicated to land on a specific runway. It may also end by the
the aircraft will be loaded or boarded, with the primary engine(s) crew initiating a ‘Go-around’ phase.
not operating. If boarding occurs during this phase, it is done Go-around (GOA) This phase begins when the crew aborts the
without any engine(s) operating. Boarding with any engine(s) descent to the planned landing runway during the APR phase; it
operating is covered under ‘Engine Start/Depart’. ends after speed and configuration are established at a defined
Engine Start/Depart (ESD) This phase begins when the flight maneuvering altitude or to continue the climb for the purpose of
crew take action to have the aircraft moved from the parked cruise (same as the end of ICL.
position and/or take switch action to energize the engine(s); it Landing (LND) This phase begins when the aircraft is in the
ends when the aircraft begins to move under its own power or the landing configuration and the crew is dedicated to touch down
crew initiates an ‘Arrival/Engine Shutdown’ phase. Note: the ESD on a specific runway; it ends when the speed permits the aircraft
phase includes the aircraft engine(s) start-up whether assisted to be maneuvered by means of taxiing for arrival at a parking
or not and whether the aircraft is stationary with more than one area. It may also end by the crew initiating a GOA phase.
engine shutdown prior to ‘Taxi-out’ (i.e., boarding of persons or
Taxi-in (TXI)  This phase begins when the crew begins to
baggage with engines running); it includes all actions of power
maneuver the aircraft under its own power to an arrival area for
back to position the aircraft for Taxi-out.
parking; it ends when the aircraft ceases moving under its own
Taxi-out (TXO) This phase begins when the crew moves the power with a commitment to shut down the engine(s). It may
aircraft forward under its own power; it ends when thrust is also end by the crew initiating a TXO phase.
increased for ‘Takeoff’ or the crew initiates a ‘Taxi-in’ phase.
Arrival/Engine Shutdown (AES) This phase begins when the
Note: this phase includes taxi from the point of moving under the
crew ceases to move the aircraft under its own power and a
aircraft’s own power, up to and including entering the runway
commitment is made to shut down the engine(s); it ends with
and reaching the Takeoff position.
a decision to shut down ancillary systems to secure the aircraft.
Takeoff (TOF) T  his phase begins when the crew increases the It may also end by the crew initiating an ESD phase. Note: the
thrust for lift-off; it ends when an ‘Initial Climb’ is established or AES phase includes actions required during a time when the
the crew initiates a ‘Rejected Takeoff’ phase. aircraft is stationary with one or more engines operating while
Rejected Takeoff (RTO) T his phase begins when the crew ground servicing may be taking place (i.e., deplaning persons or
reduces thrust to stop the aircraft before the end of the Takeoff baggage with engine(s) running and/or refueling with engine(s)
phase; it ends when the aircraft is taxied off the runway for a ‘Taxi- running).
in’ phase or when the aircraft is stopped and engines shutdown. Post-flight (PSF) This phase begins when the crew commences
Initial Climb (ICL) This phase begins at 35 feet above the the shutdown of ancillary systems of the aircraft to leave the
runway elevation; it ends after the speed and configuration are flight deck; it ends when the flight and cabin crew leave the
established at a defined maneuvering altitude or to continue aircraft. It may also end by the crew initiating a PRF phase.
the climb for cruising. It may also end by the crew initiating an Flight Close (FLC) T  his phase begins when the crew initiates
‘Approach’ phase. Note: maneuvering altitude is that needed a message to the flight-following authorities that the aircraft is
to safely maneuver the aircraft after an engine failure occurs, secure and the crew is finished with the duties of the past flight;
or predefined as an obstacle clearance altitude. ICL includes it ends when the crew has completed these duties or begins to
such procedures applied to meet the requirements of noise plan for another flight by initiating a FLP phase.
abatement climb or best angle/rate of climb.
Ground Servicing (GDS) T  his phase begins when the aircraft
En Route Climb (ECL) T his phase begins when the crew is stopped and available to be safely approached by ground
establishes the aircraft at a defined speed and configuration, personnel for the purpose of securing the aircraft and performing
enabling the aircraft to increase altitude for cruising; it ends with the the duties applicable to the arrival of the aircraft (i.e., aircraft
aircraft establishing a predetermined constant initial cruise altitude maintenance); it ends with completion of the duties applicable
at a defined speed or by the crew initiating a ‘Descent’ phase. to the departure of the aircraft or when the aircraft is no longer
Cruise (CRZ) T  his phase begins when the crew establishes the safe to approach for the purpose of ground servicing (e.g.,
aircraft at a defined speed and predetermined constant initial prior to crew initiating the TXO phase). Note: the GDS phase
cruise altitude and proceeds in the direction of a destination; it was identified by the need for information that may not directly
ends with the beginning of the ‘Descent’ phase for an approach require the input of flight or cabin crew. It is acknowledged as
or by the crew initiating an ECL phase. an entity to allow placement of the tasks required of personnel
assigned to service the aircraft.

218 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS

Annex 2
Accident Classification Taxonomy
1. LATENT CONDITIONS

Definition: Conditions present in the system before the accident and triggered by various possible factors.

Latent Conditions
(deficiencies in…) Examples

Design Ê Design shortcomings

Ê Manufacturing defects

Regulatory Oversight Ê Deficient regulatory oversight by the state or lack thereof

Management Decisions Ê Cost cutting

Ê Stringent fuel policy
Ê Outsourcing and other decisions, which can impact operational safety

Safety Management Absent or deficient:

Ê Safety policy and objectives
Ê Safety risk management (including hazard identification process)
Ê Safety assurance (including Quality Management)
Ê Safety promotion

Change Management Ê Deficiencies in monitoring change; in addressing operational needs created by,
for example, expansion or downsizing
Ê Deficiencies in the evaluation to integrate and/or monitor changes to establish
organizational practices or procedures
Ê Consequences of mergers or acquisitions

Selection Systems Ê Deficient or absent selection standards

Operations Planning and Ê Deficiencies in crew rostering and staffing practices

Scheduling Ê Issues with flight and duty time limitations
Ê Health and welfare issues

Technology and Ê Available safety equipment not installed (EGPWS, predictive wind shear, TCAS/ACAS,
Equipment etc.)

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 219
1. LATENT CONDITIONS (CONT’D)

Flight Operations See the following breakdown

Flight Operations: Ê Deficient or absent:

Standard Operating 1. Standard operating procedures (SOPs)
Procedures and 2. Operational instructions and/or policies
Checking 3. Company regulations
4. Controls to assess compliance with regulations and SOPs

Flight Operations: Ê Omitted training, language skills deficiencies, qualifications and experience of flight
Training Systems crews, operational needs leading to training reductions, deficiencies in assessment
of training or training resources such as manuals or CBT devices

Cabin Operations See the following breakdown

Cabin Operations: Ê Deficient or absent:

Standard Operating 1. SOPs
Procedures and 2. Operational instructions and/or policies
Checking 3. Company regulations
4. Controls to assess compliance with regulations and SOPs

Cabin Operations: Ê Omitted training, language skills deficiencies, qualifications and experience of cabin
Training Systems crews, operational needs leading to training reductions, deficiencies in assessment
of training or training resources such as manuals or CBT devices

Ground Operations See the following breakdown

Ground Operations: Ê Deficient or absent:

SOPs and Checking 1. SOPs
2. Operational instructions and/or policies
3. Company regulations
4. Controls to assess compliance with regulations and SOPs

Ground Operations: Ê Omitted training, language skills deficiencies, qualifications and experience of ground
Training Systems crews, operational needs leading to training reductions, deficiencies in assessment of
training or training resources such as manuals or CBT devices

220 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW
1. LATENT CONDITIONS (CONT’D)

Maintenance
Operations See the following breakdown

Maintenance Ê Deficient or absent:

Operations: 1. SOPs
SOPs and Checking 2. Operational instructions and/or policies
3. Company regulations
4. Controls to assess compliance with regulations and SOPs
Ê Includes deficiencies in technical documentation, unrecorded maintenance and
the use of bogus parts/unapproved modifications

Maintenance Ê Omitted training, language skills deficiencies, qualifications and experience of

Operations: maintenance crews, operational needs leading to training reductions, deficiencies
Training Systems in assessment of training or training resources such as manuals or CBT devices

Dispatch See the following breakdown

Dispatch: Ê Deficient or absent:

Standard Operating 1. SOPs
Procedures and 2. Operational instructions and/or policies
Checking 3. Company regulations
4. Controls to assess compliance with regulations and SOPs

Dispatch: Ê Omitted training, language skills deficiencies, qualifications and experience of

Training Systems dispatchers, operational needs leading to training reductions, deficiencies in
assessment of training or training resources such as manuals or CBT devices

Flight Watch Ê Flight Watch/ Flight Following

Other Ê Not clearly falling within the other latent conditions

Note: All areas such as Training, Ground Operations or Maintenance include outsourced functions for which the operator has
oversight responsibility.

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 221
2. THREATS

Definition: An event or error that occurs outside the influence of the flight crew, but which requires crew attention and
management if safety margins are to be maintained.

Mismanaged threat: A threat that is linked to or induces a flight crew error.

Environmental Threats Examples

Meteorology See the following breakdown

Ê Thunderstorms

Ê Poor visibility/Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)

Ê Wind/wind shear/gusty wind

Ê Icing conditions

Ê Hail

Lack of visual reference Ê Darkness/black hole effect

Ê Environmental situation, which can lead to spatial disorientation

Air Traffic Services Ê Tough-to-meet clearances/restrictions

Ê Reroutes
Ê Language difficulties
Ê Controller errors
Ê Failure to provide separation (air/ground)

Wildlife/ Ê Self-explanatory
Birds/Foreign Objects

Airport Facilities See the following breakdown

Ê Poor signage, faint markings

Ê Runway/taxiway closures

Ê Contaminated runways/taxiways
Ê Poor braking action

Ê Trenches/ditches
Ê Inadequate overrun area
Ê Structures in close proximity to runway/taxiway

Ê Inadequate airport perimeter control/fencing

Ê Inadequate wildlife control

222 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW
2. THREATS (CONT’D)

Navigational Aids See the following breakdown

Ê Ground navigation aid malfunction

Ê Lack or unavailability (e.g., Instrument Landing System)

Ê NAV aids not calibrated – unknown to flight crew

Terrain/Obstacles Ê Self-explanatory

Traffic Ê Aircraft striking other aircraft (e.g., during runway incursion)

Ê Ground vehicles hitting aircraft

Runway Surface Ê Aircraft

Incursion Ê Vehicle
Ê Wildlife
Ê Other

Other Ê Not clearly falling within the other environmental threats

Airline Threats Examples

Aircraft Malfunction See breakdown (on the next page)

MEL Item Ê Minimum Equipment List (MEL) items with operational implications

Operational Pressure Ê Operational time pressure

Ê Missed approach/diversion
Ê Other non-normal operations

Cabin Events Ê Cabin events (e.g., unruly passenger)

Ê Cabin crew errors
Ê Distractions/interruptions

Ground Events Ê Aircraft loading events

Ê Fueling errors
Ê Agent interruptions
Ê Improper ground support
Ê Improper deicing/anti-icing

Dispatch/Paperwork Ê Load sheet errors

Ê Crew scheduling events
Ê Late paperwork changes or errors

Maintenance Events Ê Aircraft repairs on ground

Ê Maintenance log problems
Ê Maintenance errors

Dangerous Goods Ê Carriage of articles or substances capable of posing a significant risk to health,
safety or property when transported by air

Manuals/ Ê Incorrect/unclear chart pages or operating manuals

Charts/Checklists Ê Checklist layout/design issues

Other Ê Not clearly falling within the other airline threats

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 223
2. THREATS (CONT’D)

Aircraft Malfunction
Breakdown
(Technical Threats) Examples

Extensive/Uncontained Ê Damage due to non-containment

Engine Failure

Contained Engine Ê Engine overheat

Failure / Ê Propeller failure
Power plant Malfunction Ê Failure affecting power plant components

Gear/Tire Ê Failure affecting parking, taxi, takeoff or landing

Brakes Ê Failure affecting parking, taxi, takeoff or landing

Flight Controls See the following breakdown

Primary Flight Controls Ê Failure affecting aircraft controllability

Secondary Flight Ê Failure affecting flaps, spoilers

Controls

Structural Failure Ê Failure due to flutter, overload

Ê Corrosion/fatigue
Ê Engine separation

Fire/Smoke Ê Fire due to aircraft systems

in Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo Ê Other fire causes

Avionics, Flight Ê All avionics except autopilot and the Flight Management System (FMS)
Instruments Ê Instrumentation, including standby instruments

Autopilot/FMS Ê Self-explanatory

Hydraulic System Ê Self-explanatory

Failure

Electrical Power Ê Loss of all electrical power, including battery power

Generation Failure

Other Ê Not clearly falling within the other aircraft malfunction threats

224 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW
3. FLIGHT CREW ERRORS

Definition: An observed flight crew deviation from organizational expectations or crew intentions.
Mismanaged error: An error that is linked to or induces additional error or an undesired aircraft state.

Aircraft Handling Errors Examples

Manual Handling/Flight Ê Hand flying vertical, lateral, or speed deviations

Controls Ê Approach deviations by choice (e.g., flying below the glide slope)
Ê Missed runway/taxiway, failure to hold short, taxi above speed limit
Ê Incorrect flaps, speed brake, autobrake, thrust reverser or power settings

Ground Navigation Ê Attempting to turn down wrong taxiway/runway

Ê Missed taxiway/runway/gate

Automation Ê Incorrect altitude, speed, heading, autothrottle settings, mode executed, or entries

Systems/ Ê Incorrect packs, altimeter, fuel switch settings, or radio frequency dialed
Radios/Instruments

Other Ê Not clearly falling within the other errors

Procedural Errors Examples

Standard Operating Ê Intentional or unintentional failure to cross-verify (automation) inputs

Procedures Adherence / Ê Intentional or unintentional failure to follow SOPs
Standard Operating Ê Pilot flying makes own automation changes
Procedures Cross- Ê Sterile cockpit violations
verification

Checklist See the following breakdown

Normal Checklist Ê Checklist performed from memory or omitted

Ê Wrong challenge and response
Ê Checklist performed late or at wrong time
Ê Checklist items missed

Abnormal Checklist Ê Checklist performed from memory or omitted

Ê Wrong challenge and response
Ê Checklist performed late or at wrong time
Ê Checklist items missed

Callouts Ê Omitted takeoff, descent, or approach callouts

Briefings Ê Omitted departure, takeoff, approach, or handover briefing; items missed

Ê Briefing does not address expected situation

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 225
3. FLIGHT CREW ERRORS (CONT’D)

Documentation See the following breakdown

Ê Wrong weight and balance information, wrong fuel information

Ê Wrong Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS), or clearance recorded

Ê Misinterpreted items on paperwork

Ê Incorrect or missing log book entries

Failure to Go Around Ê Failure to go around after destabilization on approach

Ê Failure to go around after a bounced landing

Other Procedural Ê Administrative duties performed after top of descent or before leaving active runway
Ê Incorrect application of MEL

Communication Errors Examples

Crew to External
Communication See breakdown

With Air Traffic Control Ê Flight crew to ATC – missed calls, misinterpretation of instructions, or incorrect read-
backs
Ê Wrong clearance, taxiway, gate or runway communicated

With Cabin Crew Ê Errors in Flight to Cabin Crew communication

Ê Lack of communication

With Ground Crew Ê Errors in Flight to Ground Crew communication

Ê Lack of communication

With Dispatch Ê Errors in Flight Crew to Dispatch communication

Ê Lack of communication

With Maintenance Ê Errors in Flight to Maintenance Crew communication

Ê Lack of communication

Pilot-to-Pilot Ê Within Flight Crew miscommunication

Communication Ê Misinterpretation
Ê Lack of communication

226 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW
4. UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATES (UAS)

Definition: A flight-crew-induced aircraft state that clearly reduces safety margins; a safety-compromising situation that results from
ineffective error management. An UAS is recoverable.

Mismanaged UAS: A UAS that is linked to or induces additional flight crew errors.

Undesired Aircraft
States Breakdown

Aircraft Handling Ê Abrupt aircraft control

Ê Vertical, lateral or speed deviations

Ê Unnecessary weather penetration

Ê Unauthorized airspace penetration

Ê Operation outside aircraft limitations

Ê Unstable approach

Ê Continued landing after unstable approach

Ê Long, floated, bounced, firm, porpoised, off-center landing

Ê Landing with excessive crab angle

Ê Rejected takeoff after V1

Ê Controlled flight toward terrain

Ê Other

Ground Navigation Ê Proceeding toward wrong taxiway/runway

Ê Wrong taxiway, ramp, gate or hold spot

Ê Runway/Taxiway Incursion

Ê Ramp Movements, including when under marshalling

Ê Loss of Aircraft Control While on the Ground

Ê Other

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 227
4. UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATES (UAS) (CONT’D)

Incorrect Aircraft Ê Brakes, thrust reversers, ground spoilers

Configurations
Ê Systems (fuel, electrical, hydraulics, pneumatics, air conditioning, pressurization/
instrumentation)

Ê Landing gear

Ê Flight controls/automation

Ê Engine

Ê Weight and balance

Ê Other

5. END STATES
Definition: An end state is a reportable event. It is unrecoverable.

End States Definitions

Controlled Flight into Ê In-flight collision with terrain, water, or obstacle without indication of loss of control
Terrain

Loss of Control — In-flight Ê Loss of aircraft control while in flight

Runway Collision Ê Any occurrence at an airport involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle,
person or wildlife on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and
takeoff of aircraft and resulting in a collision

Mid-Air Collision Ê Collision between aircraft in flight

Runway/Taxiway Ê A veer off or overrun off the runway or taxiway surface

Excursion

In-flight Damage Damage occurring while airborne, including:

Ê Weather-related events, technical failures, bird strikes and fire/smoke/fumes

Ground Damage Damage occurring while on the ground, including:

Ê Occurrences during (or as a result of) ground handling operations
Ê Collision while taxiing to or from a runway in use (excluding a runway collision)
Ê Foreign object damage
Ê Fire/smoke/fumes

228 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW
5. END STATES (CONT’D)

Undershoot Ê A touchdown off the runway surface

Hard Landing Ê Any hard landing resulting in substantial damage

Gear-up Landing/ Ê Any gear-up landing/collapse resulting in substantial damage

Gear Collapse (without a runway excursion)

Tail Strike Ê Tail strike resulting in substantial damage

Off-Airport Landing/ Ê Any controlled landing outside of the airport area

Ditching

6. FLIGHT CREW COUNTERMEASURES

The following list includes countermeasures that the flight crew can take. Countermeasures from other areas, such as ATC, ground
operations personnel and maintenance staff, are not considered at this time.

Team Climate

Countermeasure Definition Example Performance

Communication Environment for open communication is Good cross-talk – flow of information is fluid,
Environment established and maintained clear, and direct

No social or cultural disharmonies; right

amount of hierarchy gradient

Flight crew member reacts to assertive

callout of other crew member(s)

Leadership See the following breakdown

Captain should show leadership and In command, decisive, and encourages crew
coordinate flight deck activities participation

First Officer (FO) is assertive when FO speaks up and raises concerns

necessary and is able to take over as the
leader

Overall Crew Overall, crew members should perform well Includes Flight, Cabin, Ground crew as well
Performance as risk managers as their interactions with ATC

Other Not clearly falling within the other categories

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 229
6. FLIGHT CREW COUNTERMEASURES (CONT’D)

Planning

SOP Briefing The required briefing should be interactive Concise and not rushed – bottom lines are
and operationally thorough established

Plans Stated Operational plans and decisions should be Shared understanding about plans –
communicated and acknowledged “Everybody on the same page”

Contingency Crew members should develop effective Ê Threats and their consequences are
Management strategies to manage threats to safety: anticipated
• Proactive: In-flight decision-making Ê Use all available resources to manage
• Reactive: Contingency management threats

Other Not clearly falling within the other categories

Execution

Monitor/ Crew members should actively monitor Aircraft position, settings, and crew actions
Cross-check and cross-check flight path, aircraft are verified
performance, systems and other crew
members

Workload Management Operational tasks should be prioritized Ê Avoid task fixation

and properly managed to handle primary Ê Do not allow work overload
flight duties

Automation Automation should be properly managed Ê Brief automation setup

Management to balance situational and/or workload Ê Effective recovery techniques from
requirements anomalies

Taxiway/Runway Crew members use caution and keep watch Clearances are verbalized and understood –
Management outside when navigating taxiways and airport and taxiway charts or aircraft cockpit
runways moving map displays are used when needed

Other Not clearly falling within the other categories

Review/Modify

Evaluation of Plans Existing plans should be reviewed and Crew decisions and actions are openly
modified when necessary analyzed to make sure the existing plan is
the best plan

Inquiry Crew members should not be afraid to “Nothing taken for granted” attitude –
ask questions to investigate and/or clarify crew members speak up without hesitation
current plans of action

Other Not clearly falling within the other categories

230 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW
7. ADDITIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS

Additional
Classification Breakdown

Insufficient Data Accident does not contain sufficient data to be classified

Incapacitation Crew member unable to perform duties due to physical or psychological impairment

Fatigue Crew member unable to perform duties due to fatigue

Spatial Disorientation SGI is a form of spatial disorientation that occurs when a shift in the resultant gravitoinertial
and Spatial/ force vector created by a sustained linear acceleration is misinterpreted
Somatogravic Illusion as a change in pitch or bank attitude
(SGI)

ANNEX 2 – ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION TAXONOMY FLIGHT CREW IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 231
IMPROVE YOUR
SAFETY CULTURE
WITH MEASUREABLE,
ACTIONABLE AND
COMPARABLE
RESULTS

Improving your The first industry-wide solution

organization’s specifically designed to measure
safety culture safety culture
Is your safety culture I-ASC was developed to address the industry’s need
improving? Do you have to measure and demonstrate continuous
reliable KPIs to identify improvement of safety culture, using a standardized
methodology and performance indicators. The
gaps and measure
electronic survey facilitates an effective SMS
progress? How does your and contributes to achieving improved safety
safety culture compare with performance, by enabling participants to
the rest of the industry? measure and benchmark their safety
culture against their peers across the
industry using comparable KPIs.

Find out more on how your organization can benefit:

www.iata.org/i-asc
Annex 3 – Accidents Summary
DATE MANUFAC� AIRCRAFT REGIS� OPERATOR LOCATION PHASE SERVICE PROPUL� SEVERITY SUMMARY
TURER TRATION SION

20-01-07 Boeing B737-800 TC-CCK Pegasus Sabiha Gokcen, LND Passenger Jet Substantial Runway excursion on landing
Turkey Damage

20-01-19 Fairchild Metro C-GWVH Perimeter Shamattawa, LND Passenger Turboprop Substantial The aircraft lost directional control
(Swearingen) Manitoba, Canada Damage during the landing rollout and went off
the runway

20-01-27 Boeing MD-83 EP-CPZ Caspian Bandar Mahshahr, LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft overran runway on landing
(Douglas) Airlines Iran Damage

20-02-01 Boeing B747-400 TC-MCT ACT Airlines Dammam/King Fahd TOF Freighter Jet Substantial Tail strike on departure
Int'l , Saudi Arabia Damage

20-02-03 Boeing B767-300 C-GHOZ Air Canada Madrid/Barajas , TOF Passenger Jet Substantial Engine shut down in flight, burst tyre
Spain Damage on departure

20-02-03 Boeing B747-400 N703CK Kalitta Air Los Angeles TOF Freighter Jet Substantial Rejected takeoff due to trash bin on
International, CA. Damage runway

20-02-05 Boeing B737-800 TC-IZK Pegasus Sabiha Gokcen, LND Passenger Jet Hull Loss The aircraft overran runway, impacted
Turkey wall and broke up into three parts

20-02-07 Boeing B757-200 TF-FIA Icelandair Keflavik, Iceland LND Passenger Jet Substantial Main gear collapse on landing
Damage

20-02-09 Boeing B737-500 VQ-BPS UTair Usinsk, Russia LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft landed short of runway,
Damage gear collapse and runway excursion
on landing

20-02-21 Airbus A320 CC-AWA JetSmart Puerto Montt/Ad El LND Passenger Jet Substantial Hard landing at about +3.6G
Tepual , Chile Damage

20-02-24 Fairchild Metro C-GJVB Perimeter Dryden - Regional, TOF Passenger Turboprop Substantial The aircraft lost directional control
(Swearingen) Ontario, Canada Damage during takeoff roll and exited the right
side of the runway.

20-02-25 Boeing B737-300 PK-YSG Trigana Air Jayapura - Sentani, TOF Freighter Jet Substantial Runway excursion on backtrack
Indonesia Damage

20-02-27 Airbus A321 TC-JSH Turkish Istanbul, Turkey LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft dropped both nose
Airlines Damage wheels on landing

20-02-28 Airbus A300B4- UP-A3003 Sigma Sharjah International TXI Freighter Jet Substantial No.1 engine collided with a tug which
203F Airlines UAE Damage was parked in the equipment area

20-03-08 Boeing B767-300 N477AX Omni Air Shannon, Republic LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a hard, bounced
International of Ireland Damage landing

20-03-21 Boeing B757-200 N193AN American Las Vegas/Mccarran LND Passenger Jet Substantial Tail strike on landing
Airlines International, NV. Damage

20-05-19 Boeing B737-800 N820TJ iAero United States Of CRZ Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft dropped parts of vertical
America Damage tail

20-05-22 Airbus A320 AP-BLD Pakistan Karachi/Jinnah Int'l , APR Passenger Jet Hull Loss The aircraft crashed on a residential
International Pakistan area during final approach
Airlines

ANNEX 3 – ACCIDENTS SUMMARY IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 233

 DATE MANUFAC� AIRCRAFT REGIS� OPERATOR LOCATION PHASE SERVICE PROPUL� SEVERITY SUMMARY
TURER TRATION SION

20-06-14 Airbus A320 VP-BDL Ural Airlines Sankt-Peterburg/ TXI Passenger Jet Substantial Ground collision between two Airbus
Pulkovo, Russia Damage A320

20-07-14 De Havilland Dash 8-400 5Y-VVU Blue Bird Beledweyne, LND Freighter Turboprop Hull Loss Aircraft collided with runway
(Bombardier) Aviation Somalia obstacles and bursts into flames

20-07-22 Boeing B777-200 ET-ARH Ethiopian Shanghai/Pudong PRF Freighter Jet Substantial The aircraft burned down on apron
Airlines , China Damage

20-08-03 Antonov An-74 RA-74044 UTair Cargo Gao , Mali LND Freighter Jet Hull Loss The aircraft suffered a total electrical
failure, overran runway on landing

20-08-06 Airbus A321 VT-IUD IndiGo Delhi , India LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft suffered a hard landing
Damage

20-08-07 Boeing B737-800 VT-AXH Air India Calicut , India LND Passenger Jet Hull Loss The aircraft overran runway and fell
Express into valley

20-08-13 Aircraft Let L-410 9S-GEN Doren Air Bukavu-Kavumu, APR Freighter Turboprop Hull Loss Aircraft impacted forest on approach
Industries Congo Democratic Repub.
(LET) of the Congo

20-08-19 Boeing B767-300 N146FE FedEx Los Angeles LND Freighter Jet Substantial Left main gear did not extend
International, CA. Damage

20-08-22 Antonov An-26 EX-126 South West Juba , South Sudan ICL Freighter Turboprop Hull Loss Lost height after departure
Aviation

20-08-28 Boeing B767-300 N423AX Omni Air Bucuresti/Baneasa- LND Passenger Jet Substantial Left main gear collapse on landing
International Aurel Vlaicu , Damage
Romania

20-09-19 Fokker Fokker 50 5Y-MHT Silverstone Mogadishu , Somalia LND Freighter Turboprop Hull Loss Runway excursion on landing
Air Services

20-10-14 Antonov An-32 OB- Aer Caribe Iquitos/Intl. Coronel LND Freighter Turboprop Hull Loss The aircraft went off runway
2120-P Peru Fap Francisco
Secada Vignetta
, Peru

20-10-16 Airbus A321 VN-A639 VietJet Air Quang Binh/Dong LND Passenger Jet Substantial Hard landing at +4.27G
Hoi , Vietnam Damage

20-10-23 De Havilland Dash 8-400 JA845A Oriental Air Fukue , Japan LND Passenger Turboprop Substantial Hard touchdown and tail strike
(Bombardier) Bridge Damage

20-10-24 Embraer ERJ145 N674RJ Envoy Air Grand Bahama LND Passenger Jet Substantial Runway excursion upon landing
International Damage

20-11-13 Antonov An-124 RA-82042 Volga-Dnepr Novosibirsk/ LND Freighter Jet Substantial The aircraft overran runway after
Airlines Tolmachevo, Russia Damage uncontained engine failure and
communication failure

20-11-16 ATR ATR 72 VT-TMM Trujet Chennai, India LND Passenger Turboprop Substantial Hard landing and go around in Mysore,
Damage gear collapse in Chennai

20-11-26 ATR ATR 72 C-FAFS Calm Air Repulse Bay, NU, LND Freighter Turboprop Substantial Runway excursion on landing
Canada Damage

20-11-28 Embraer EMB110 CU-T1541 Cubana La Habana/Jose LND Passenger Turboprop Substantial Gear up landing
Marti Intl., Cuba Damage

20-12-02 Boeing B737-500 EY-560 Air Djibouti Garowe, Puntland LND Passenger Jet Substantial The aircraft touched down short of
State of Somalia Damage runway, gear collapse on roll out

234 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  ANNEX 3 – ACCIDENTS SUMMARY

LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

Accident Category Abbreviation

Abbreviation Full Name

CFIT Controlled Flight into Terrain
G UP LDG/CLPSE Gear-up Landing/Gear Collapse
GND DAMAGE Ground Damage
HARD LDG Hard Landing
IN-F DAMAGE In-Flight Damage
LOC-I Loss of Control — In-flight
MID-AIR COLL Mid-Air Collision
OFF AIRP LDG Off-Airport Landing
OTHER Other End State
RWY COLL Runway Collision
RWY/TWY EXC Runway/Taxiway Excursion
TAILSTRIKE Tail Strike
UNDERSHOOT Undershoot

List of Acronyms

Acronym Meaning
AAPA Association of Asia Pacific Airlines
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ACTG Accident Classification Technical Group
ACyS Aviation Cyber Security
AD Airworthiness Directive
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
ADX Accident Data Exchange
AFCAC African Civil Aviation Commission
AFI Africa
AFM Aircraft Flight Manual
AFRAA African Airlines Association
AGL Above Ground Level
AGM Annual General Meeting

LIST OF ACRONYMS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 235

List of Acronyms (Cont’d)

Acronym Meaning
AHM Airport Handling Manual
AIAG AFI Incident Analysis Group
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
AIRPROX Air Proximity
ALAR Approach and Landing Accident Reduction
ALTA Asociación Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Transporte Aéreo
AMDAR Aircraft-based Meteorological Data Relay
AME Africa and Middle East
ANAC National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil
ANSPs Air Navigation Service Providers
AoA Angle of Attack
AOC Airline Operations Center
AOV Areas of Vulnerability
APRAST Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Team
APV Approaches with Vertical Guidance
ARC Abnormal Runway Contact
ASPAC Asia-Pacific
ATAC Air Transport Association of Canada
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCO Air Traffic Control Officer
ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information System
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATMB Air Traffic Management Bureau
AUPRTA Airplane Upset Prevention and Recovery Training Aid
CA Collaborative Arrangement
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CAAC Civil Aviation Administration of China
CAAS Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
CAB Cabin Operations
CANSO Civil Air Navigation Services Organization
CART Council Aviation Recovery Task Force

236 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  LIST OF ACRONYMS

List of Acronyms (Cont’d)

Acronym Meaning
CAST Commercial Aviation Safety Team
CAUC Civil Aviation University of China
CBTA Competency-based Training and Assessment
CBTA-TF Competency-based Training and Assessment Task Force
CCRD COVID-19 Contingency Related Difference
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDFA Continuous Descent Final Approach
CEs Critical Elements
CICTT CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CMA Continuous Monitoring Approach
CNS Communications, Navigation, Surveillance
CoPA IATA Charter of Professional Auditors
COSTG Cabin Operations Safety Technical Group
CRM Crew Resource Management
CSTs Collaborative Safety Teams
DAQCP De/Anti-icing Quality Control Pool
DCSs Departure Control Systems
EADI Electronic Attitude Director Indicator
EASA European Union Aviation Safety Agency
EASPG European Regional Aviation System Planning Group
EBT Evidence-based Training
EC Extenuating Circumstances
ECAM Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring
EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
EI Effective Implementation
EICAS Engine-Indicating and Crew-Alerting System
EMAS Engineered Material Arresting Systems
EUR Europe
EUROCAE European Organization for Civil Aviation Electronics
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAPFH Fatal Accidents per Flight Hour

LIST OF ACRONYMS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 237

List of Acronyms (Cont’d)

Acronym Meaning
FDA Flight Data Analysis
FDM Flight Data Monitoring
FDX Flight Data Exchange
FFS Full-Flight Simulator
FIR Flight Information Region
FLE Full-Loss Equivalents
FMA Flight Modes Annunciator
FOQA Flight Operational Quality Assurance
FRMS Fatigue Risk Management Systems
FSTD Flight Simulation Training Devices
FTLs Flight and Duty Time Limitations
GADM Global Aviation Data Management
GAPPRE Global Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions
GDDB Ground Damage Database
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite Systems
GPS Global Positioning System
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System
GRF Global Reporting Format
GRSAP Global Runway Safety Action Plan
GSE Ground Support Equipment
GSPs Ground Service Providers
HLA High-Level Airspace
IAH IOSA Auditor Handbook
I-ASC IATA Aviation Safety Culture
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IDQP IATA Drinking Water Quality Pool
IDX Incident Data Exchange
IEs Instructors and Evaluators
IFALPA International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations
IFATCA International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Association
IFQP IATA Fuel Quality Pool

238 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  LIST OF ACRONYMS

List of Acronyms (Cont’d)

Acronym Meaning
IGOM IATA Ground Operations Manual
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IOSA IATA Operational Safety Audit
IPM IOSA Program Manual
ISAGO IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations
ISARPs IATA Standards and Recommended Practices
ISM IOSA Standards Manual
ISPM ISSA Program Manual
ISSA IATA Standard Safety Assessment
ITA IATA Turbulence Aware
ITOP IATA Tactical Operations Portal
ITU International Telecommunication Union
IVADO Institute for Data Valorization
KPIs Key Performance Indicators
LATAM/CAR Latin American and Caribbean
LHD Large Height Deviation
LOFT Line Oriented Flight Training
LoS Loss of Separation
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MTOW Maximum Takeoff Weight
NM Nautical Mile
NAM North America
NASIA North Asia
NAT North Atlantic
NOTAM Notice to Airmen
OEMs Original Equipment Manufacturers
OJT On-the-Job Training
OPS Operations
OTS Organized Track System
PA Pan-America
PA Passenger Address

LIST OF ACRONYMS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 239

List of Acronyms (Cont’d)

Acronym Meaning
PANS-TRG Personnel Licensing, the Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Training
PBN Performance based Navigation
PFD Primary Flight Display
POIs Principal Operations Inspectors
PTLP Personnel Training and Licensing Panel
PWS Predictive Wind Shear
RA Radar Altimeter
RA Resolution Advisory
RASG-AFI African Regional Aviation Safety Group
RASG-MID Middle East Regional Aviation Safety Group
RASG-PA Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan American
RCG Regional Coordination Group
RPTF Regional Recovery Planning Task Force
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
RTS Return to Service
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum
SAATM Single Africa Air Transport Market
SAF Sustainable Aviation Fuel
SAT South Atlantic
SATCCo State Air Traffic Control Commission Office
SCF-NP System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Powerplant)
SCF-PP System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Powerplant)
SEIs Safety Enhancement Initiatives
SEs Safety Enhancements
SFGOAC Safety, Flight and Ground Operations Advisory Committee
SFO Safety and Flight Operations
SG Safety Group
SIRM Safety Issue Review Meeting
SLOP Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure
SME Subject Matter Expert
SMS Safety Management System
SOPs Standard Operating Procedure

240 – IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020  LIST OF ACRONYMS

List of Acronyms (Cont’d)

Acronym Meaning
SPG Systems Planning Group
SPI Safety Performance Indicators
SRA Safety Risk Assessment
SSC Significant Safety Concern
SSGC Secretariat Study Group on Cybersecurity
SSP State Safety Program
STEADES Safety Trend Evaluation, Analysis and Data Exchange System
TA Traffic Advisory
TAWS Terrain Awareness Warning System
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System
TCC Temperature-Controlled Containers
TEM Threat and Error Management
TERR POS Terrain Position
TFSG Trust Framework Study Group
TLS Target Level of Safety
TSA Total Systems Approach
UA Unmanned Aircraft
UAE GCAA United Arab Emirates General Civil Aviation Authority
UCRs Undesired Condition Reports
ULD Unit Load Device
UPRT Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
UPU Universal Postal Union
USOAP Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program
UTM Unmanned Traffic Management
VASIS Visual Approach Slope Indicator System
VGSI Visual Glideslope Indicator
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
WICAP WMO IATA Collaborative AMDAR Program
WMO World Meteorological Organization

LIST OF ACRONYMS IATA SAFETY REPORT 2020 – 241

International Air Transport Association
ISBN 978-92-9264-412-3
Customer service: www.iata.org/cs
+1 800 716 6326

iata.org/publishing