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Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702 (print); 1467-8519 (online) doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00603.x
Volume 22 Number 2 2008 pp 130–136

DEBATE

CLONING AND ADOPTION: A REPLY TO LEVY AND LOTZ

CARSON STRONG

Keywords
reproductive cloning, ABSTRACT
genetic offspring, In previous articles I discussed the ethics of human reproductive cloning,
procreative freedom, focusing on a possible future scenario in which reproductive cloning can be
infertility accomplished without an elevated risk of anomalies to the children who are
created. I argued that in such a scenario it would be ethically permissible for
infertile couples to use cloning as a way to have genetically related children
and that such use should not be prohibited. In ‘Reproductive Cloning and a
(Kind of) Genetic Fallacy’, Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz raise objections to my
conclusions. They disagree with the view, for which I argued, that some
couples can have defensible reasons for desiring genetically related chil-
dren. They also offer several new arguments against reproductive cloning,
including an argument that it would diminish the number of adoptions,
thereby adversely affecting the welfare of children who need to be adopted.
In this paper I point out that Levy and Lotz’s criticisms misconstrue my
arguments and that there are serious problems with their arguments for
prohibiting infertile couples from using cloning, including their argument
from adoption.

In several writings, I have defended reproductive cloning technology of cloning might make it possible to create
as an option for infertile couples, with qualifications.1 At children with no increased risk of anomalies compared to
present there is a compelling reason to prohibit attempts procreation by sexual intercourse. I have argued that, if
at human reproductive cloning; namely, there is evidence reproductive cloning could be performed with such a
that there is a high probability that the child would have relatively low risk of anomalies, it would be ethically
congenital anomalies so severe as to make the procre- permissible for infertile couples to use it as a way to have
ation wrongful.2 But in the future, advances in the genetically related children and that such use should not
be prohibited.3
1
C. Strong. Cloning and Infertility. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 1998; 7: Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz have raised objections to
279–293. C. Strong. The Ethics of Human Reproductive Cloning. my defence of such cloning, and they have offered new
Reprod Biomed Online 2005; 10, Suppl. 1: 45–49. C. Strong. Reproduc- arguments against it.4 In doing so, they have made a
tive Cloning Combined with Genetic Modification. J Med Ethics 2005;
31: 654–658.
2 3
For a discussion of what counts as wrongful procreation, see C. Strong, Cloning and Infertility, op. cit. note 1, pp. 279–293.
4
Strong. Harming by Conceiving: A Review of Misconceptions and a N. Levy & M. Lotz. Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic
New Analysis. J Med Philos 2005; 30: 491–516. Fallacy. Bioethics 2005; 19: 232–250.

Address for correspondence: Carson Strong, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Human Values and Ethics, College of Medicine, 956 Court Avenue,
Suite B324, Memphis TN 38163, U.S.A. (phone) 901/448-5686, (FAX) 901/448-1291, (email) cstrong@utmem.edu

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
 Cloning and Adoption: A Reply to Levy and Lotz 131

useful contribution to the ongoing international debate support of such desire.8 Rather than simply accept that
over the ethics of human reproductive cloning.5 One main view, I suggested that we should consider whether there
thrust of their criticism is to reject the idea, for which I are defensible reasons that could be given by persons for
argued, that the desire to have genetically related children having such a desire. Because having children by means
can be defensible. They hold that the view that it can be of the common form of procreation involves having
reasonable to desire genetic children is not only ‘errone- genetically related children, I suggested that some insight
ous’ but also ‘pernicious’ because it leads to undesirable could be gained by asking whether good reasons can be
consequences. One of the bad consequences, they claim, given for valuing procreation in the common situation. I
is that the availability of cloning will diminish the number identified six reasons that persons could give in support
of adoptions and thereby adversely affect the interests of of a desire to procreate in the common scenario. This was
children who need to be adopted. To examine their criti- not intended as an exhaustive list of reasons, but to show
cisms, it will be helpful to begin with their arguments that reasons can be given that merit consideration and
against the view that it can be reasonable to desire geneti- that are neither trivial, vain, nor confused. These are
cally related children. To provide a context for this reasons that, for some people at least, can contribute to
discussion, let me briefly summarize the arguments I had the personal meaningfulness of having children. These
given. reasons are as follows: having a genetic child in the
common scenario involves participation in the creation of
a person; it can be an affirmation of a couple’s mutual
CAN THERE BE GOOD REASONS TO love and acceptance of each other; it can contribute to
DESIRE GENETIC OFFSPRING? sexual intimacy; it provides a type of link to future
persons; it involves experiences of pregnancy and child-
In discussing whether it would be ethically permissible for birth; and it leads to experiences associated with child
infertile couples to use cloning, assuming it could be per- rearing. I held that some couples might attach some of
formed without an elevated risk of anomalies, I posed the these meanings to their procreation, and that these mean-
issue as follows: ‘Which is weightier, infertile couples’ ings can promote the well-being of some couples by con-
reproductive freedom to use cloning or the arguments tributing to self-identity and self-fulfillment. I shall not
against cloning humans?’6 In addressing this question, I repeat that discussion here, but the interested reader can
drew upon earlier work in which I had examined the more find some elaboration on these matters in the earlier
general question of why we should consider procreative work.9 The fact that there are such reasons supports the
freedom to be valuable. I had asked, ‘Is it solely because view that freedom to pursue ordinary procreation is valu-
freedom in general is valuable, or is there special signifi- able not simply because freedom in general is valuable,
cance to the fact that the freedom in question is reproduc- but also because ordinary procreation has features that
tive?’7 To explore this question, I focused on the type of can give it a special significance to procreators.
procreation commonly referred to as ‘having a child of In exploring whether the freedom of infertile couples to
one’s own’, sometimes stated simply as ‘having a child’ or use cloning as a way to have a child genetically related to
‘having children’. Specifically, I used these expressions to one of them should be valued, I summarized and cited my
refer to begetting a child by sexual intercourse whom one previous discussion of the value of procreative freedom.10
rears or helps rear. This is the common form of procre- I then considered the extent to which the six identified
ation in which parents raise children who are genetically reasons could be applicable to the cloning context.
their own. Among the reasons that deal specifically with there being
Although a desire for genetic children is widespread, a genetic or biological connection, I focused on two:
some have held that no good reason can be given in cloning would permit the couple to participate in the
5
creation of a person, and for some infertile couples doing
Selected examples from this debate include: F. Baylis. Human
so might have personal meaning; and for some couples,
Cloning: Three Mistakes and an Alternative. J Med Philos 2002; 27:
319–337; M. Häyry. Philosophical Arguments for and against Human the genetic and biological connection provided by cloning
Reproductive Cloning. Bioethics 2003; 17: 447–459; D. Birnbacher. might be regarded as giving their procreation a special
Human Cloning and Human Dignity. Reprod Biomed Online 2005; 10
8
(Suppl 1): 50–55; P. Herissone-Kelly. The Cloning Debate in the United A. Kahn. Clone Mammals . . . Clone Man? Nature 1997; 386: 119;
Kingdom: The Academy Meets the Public. Camb Q Healthc Ethics M.D. Bayles. 1984. Reproductive Ethics: Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
2005; 14: 268–276. Prentice-Hall: 3–5, 12–14.
6 9
C. Strong, Cloning and Infertility, op. cit. note 1, p. 280. For a more thorough discussion of these matters, see Strong, op. cit.
7
C. Strong. 1997. Ethics in Reproductive and Perinatal Medicine: A New note 7, pp. 11–26.
10
Framework. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: 4. Strong, Cloning and Infertility, op. cit. note 1, p. 292, footnote 20.

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

132 Carson Strong

significance as an affirmation of mutual love and have a biological child are – by dint of bringing about
acceptance.11 Admittedly, there are methods other than conception – engaged in the creation of a ‘person’.14
cloning, such as gamete or embryo donation, in which
Their statement is incorrect, for there certainly is a
infertile couples can participate in the creation of a
sense in which conception, assuming there is normal
person or affirm their mutual love. Cloning is a way to do
development, plays a role in the creation of a person.
these things, and the fact that it is a way might contribute
Conception – that is, the union of sperm and ovum fol-
to some infertile couples regarding cloning as a desirable
lowing sexual intercourse or during in vitro fertilization –
form of procreation.
brings into being an individual that, in the normal course
Thus, the freedom of infertile couples to use cloning
of events, will develop into a person. Without the initial
is valuable because freedom in general is valuable and
coming into being, the person in question would not
because reproductive cloning has features, similar to
exist.
those of the common form of procreation, that – for some
In cloning, the bringing into being takes place through
couples at least – can give it meanings that enrich their
somatic cell nuclear transfer. If a couple has a child
lives and promote their well-being. In considering the
through cloning, their decision to do so and their taking
main objections to human reproductive cloning, I argued
the necessary steps is certainly a participation in the cre-
that in the context of infertility none of them withstands
ation of a person. To provide the chromosomes and to
critical examination. I concluded that the freedom of
gestate are specific ways of participating. So, it is a
infertile couples to use cloning is weightier than the
mistake to think that those who create a child through
arguments against it.12
cloning are not participating in the creation of a person.
Perhaps the objection is based on the idea that the
conceptus is not yet a person. In a footnote, Levy and
OBJECTIONS TO VALUING A GENETIC
Lotz state:
CONNECTION
Of course, it is true that people who engage in procre-
Levy and Lotz object to my argument that cloning could ation are causally responsible for the existence of
have a special meaning for some infertile couples because beings who – all things going well – will become
it involves participation in the creation of a person. They persons. But since personhood develops gradually,
begin their argument by claiming that it is unclear what I after birth, this causal role does not have the moral
meant by ‘participation in the creation of a person’. They significance Strong imputes to it.15
opine that I might have simply meant ‘conception’ or that
In reply, the moral significance that I discussed is that this
I might have been referring to the influence of social
causal role in bringing into being individuals who will
parents on a child’s development. In reply, the term ‘con-
become persons can have special meaning to some people
ception’ does not seem to be apt, for it is commonly used
in ways that promote their well-being. Moreover, the
to refer to the union of sperm and ovum, which does not
claim that procreators participate in the creation of a
take place in cloning. Moreover, the question of what I
person can accommodate different views concerning
meant by ‘participation in the creation of a person’, in the
when in development personhood arises. Specifically, it is
context in question, was addressed in my article. I stated:
consistent with the view suggested by Levy and Lotz that
The person whose chromosomes are used would par- personhood arises during some stage of childhood.16 The
ticipate by providing the genetic material for the new reason should be self-evident – the bringing into being of
person. Regardless of whose chromosomes are used, if the individual who will become a person is part of the
the woman is capable of gestating, she could partici- creation of that person. In regard to an individual created
pate by gestating and giving birth to the child.13 through cloning, assuming that normal development
occurs until personhood is reached, cloning and gestating
Apparently overlooking this statement, Levy and Lotz
involve participating in the creation of that person.
argue as follows:
Levy and Lotz then argue as follows:
If by ‘creation’ Strong simply has in mind ‘conception’,
then there is no sense in which people who decide to 14
Levy & Lotz, op. cit. note 4, p. 243.
15
Ibid: 244.
11 16
Ibid: 281–282. Levy and Lotz suggest something along these lines when they state,
12
See Strong, Cloning and Infertility, op. cit. note 1; Strong, The Ethics ‘Many of the pre-conditions for personhood – such as a sense of a
of Human Reproductive Cloning, op. cit. note 1. distinct self and identity, a Theory of Mind, and the like – do not begin
13
Strong, Cloning and Infertility, op. cit. note 1, p. 281. to emerge until the second year of life,’ op. cit. note 4, p. 243.

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

 Cloning and Adoption: A Reply to Levy and Lotz 133

If, on the other hand, Strong’s intended emphasis is on logical parenting is the expression and affirmation of a
the parents’ participation in the (gradual) development couple’s love for one another’.19 That statement, which
of a person, then non-biological parents of adopted uses ‘is’ instead of a more appropriate phrase such as ‘can
children engage as surely in the ‘creation of a person’ be’, is mistaken because it implies that in all cases having
as do biological parents. . . . Taken in the second children has that significance for procreators.
sense, then, the desire to participate in the creation of They then present an objection, based on a switched-
a person cannot count as a reason specifically and baby case involving Ernest and Regina Twigg, to this
exclusively in favour of biological parenting (by means misconstrued version of my argument:
of cloning or otherwise).17
In 1978, two baby girls were born within hours of each
In reply, Levy and Lotz apparently are unaware that their other at a Florida hospital, the children of Robert and
statements echo a point I had made. I stated: ‘. . . rearing Barbara Mays and Ernest and Regina Twiggs [sic]. At
contributes to the creating of a person, just as begetting the age of nine, the Twiggs’ daughter died of a con-
and gestating do. Those who rear are instrumental in genital heart defect. However, blood tests revealed that
shaping the unique person that the child becomes.’18 A she wasn’t their biological daughter. The Twiggs’ [sic]
main flaw in this attempted rebuttal by Levy and Lotz is realized that the children must have been swapped in
that my argument does not make or depend on the claim the hospital, and sued for custody of Kimberly.20
that having genetic children is the only way that one can
Levy and Lotz claim that it follows from the argument in
participate in the creation of a person. Rather, I distin-
question (the incorrect version of my argument) that the
guished different ways of participating in the creation of
Twiggs ‘were making a mistake when they lavished affec-
a person and suggested that those differences can be
tion on Arlena Twiggs [sic]’.21 They then point out that
meaningful to some would-be procreators. For example,
this conclusion should be rejected, that the couple’s affec-
begetting and gestating involve participating in the cre-
tion for Arlena should not be characterized as mistaken.
ation of a person in ways that differ from rearing. Beget-
In their words:
ting involves the bringing into being of an individual
who, if all goes well, will become a person. Gestating But surely this is implausible. Surely a decade of
involves a special intimate role in the development of that raising a child has forged bonds more significant than
individual. These ways of participating in the creation of the mere biological, bonds that are more potent in their
a person can be meaningful to some people. Reproduc- capacity to affirm the Twiggs’ love for one another
tive cloning could have special meaning for some infertile than is the fact of biological relatedness.22
couples in part because it involves bringing into being,
gestating, and rearing an individual who will become a In reply, several points should be made. To begin with,
person. Levy and Lotz are confusing two things – Ernest and
In summary, Levy and Lotz seem to be arguing that the Regina’s affection for Arlena, and a presumed affirma-
only significant contribution to the creation of a person is tion of Ernest and Regina’s love for each other. More-
through rearing, that this contribution is independent of over, the conclusion in question (that the Twiggs were
there being a genetic connection, and therefore having a making a mistake in giving affection to Arlena) follows
genetic relationship plays no role in regard to participat- only if the argument being criticized claims that one
ing in the creation of a person. This argument is mistaken should give affection only to one’s biological children,
because begetting, gestating, rearing, and – by hypothesis not one’s nonbiological children. My argument, of
– cloning all are ways of participating in the creation of a course, does not make that assertion. In fact, I said
person. nothing about loving, or not loving, the child. I claimed
Levy and Lotz also object to my argument that cloning that one of the attitudes a couple might have toward
could have a special meaning for some couples who might procreation, along with other attitudes, would be to see it
view creating a child in this way as an affirmation of their as an affirmation of mutual love and acceptance of each
mutual love and acceptance. The attempted rebuttal, other. Levy and Lotz’s argument distorts this into a claim
however, goes off course at the very beginning because that the only basis for bestowing affection upon a child is
Levy and Lotz state my argument incorrectly. Specifi- having a genetic connection to her. Furthermore, the
cally, they characterize my argument as stating that ‘bio-
19
Levy & Lotz, op. cit. note 4, p. 244, emphasis added.
17 20
Levy & Lotz, op. cit. note 4, pp. 243–244. Ibid: 244.
18 21
Strong, op. cit. note 7, p. 13. This is part of the passages I cited in Ibid: 244.
22
footnote 20 of ‘Cloning and Infertility’. Ibid: 244.

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

134 Carson Strong

conclusion in question does not even follow from the adoption would be removed’.24 They then state that,
distorted version of my argument. From the claim that because there would be fewer adoptions, the result would
‘biological parenting is the expression and affirmation be ‘an overall diminution in the satisfaction of needs (or
of a couple’s love for one another’, nothing follows desires or preferences)’.25 In response, several points can
concerning love toward the child. Finally, their argument be made. First, there is a problem that often arises with
implies that if a couple can affirm their mutual love arguments that appeal to the long-term overall social
through jointly rearing a child, then they cannot affirm it consequences of a proposed public policy. Namely, it is
by a decision jointly to become genetic parents of a child. difficult to predict accurately what the long-term conse-
But this is mistaken, for it is possible for a couple to quences are going to be, and this problem is exacerbated
regard either or both of these undertakings as an affir- when the policy pertains to a technology that probably
mation of their mutual love and acceptance.23 will not be available, if ever, until quite some time into
Thus, although Levy and Lotz have perhaps defeated the future, as is the case presumably with reproductive
some arguments that I never presented, they have not cloning. Of course, the plight of children who could
provided any valid arguments that would even count benefit from being adopted is of great concern. But would
against, much less defeat, the arguments I actually gave. forbidding cloning really play an important role in
Therefore, their claim to have shown that there are helping such children? The answer would depend on a
no valid arguments supporting the use of reproductive number of variables that are difficult to predict: the
cloning by infertile couples is entirely unsupported. extent to which infertile couples would want to use
cloning; the extent to which, if cloning were prohibited,
infertile couples would turn to other forms of assisted
CLONING’S IMPACT ON ADOPTION reproductive technology (ART) instead of adoption; the
extent to which social problems that contribute to chil-
In addition to arguing that the reasons supporting repro- dren being given up for adoption are addressed; the
ductive cloning are unsound, Levy and Lotz offer several extent to which there are public campaigns to encourage
arguments for the view that such cloning is ‘pernicious’ adoption; and the extent to which rules for adoption are
because it would be harmful on balance and should not made less or more restrictive, among other variables.
be permitted. Of particular interest is their argument Given such uncertainties, is there really a basis for claim-
based on the impact of reproductive cloning on adoption. ing, as Levy and Lotz seem to do, that cloning would
Virtually every infertile couple who turns to assisted have a significant impact on adoption? Isn’t it at least as
reproduction has considered the possibility of adoption, plausible to think that, if cloning is forbidden, many
and Levy and Lotz should be commended for making this infertile couples would choose gamete or embryo dona-
option explicit in the debate. They assert that ‘[i]f cloning tion rather than adoption?
were to become widely available, the primary motive for Another problem is that their argument seems to
involve a misplaced focus if one wants to come up with
23
Levy and Lotz present another argument intended to show that a ways to help children who need to be adopted. There are
genetic connection is not always important, op. cit. note 4, p. 245. This more direct ways to do this, such as bringing the needs of
argument is based on a hypothetical baby-making machine: specific children to the public’s attention, offering more
The machine allows its operator to construct a viable embryo, which public resources to help adoptive parents rear difficult-
is then implanted into a uterus (natural or artificial) and brought to to-place children such as children with handicaps,
term. The operator can select the genotype of the embryo, gene for perhaps offering reduced-cost health care for adopted
gene. Thus she can build the baby from the ground up. She can even, children, reducing barriers to lesbian and gay couples
if she likes, make a genetic copy of herself.
who want to adopt, and so on. Such measures could have
The operator of the machine participates in the creation of a person, but an impact that might be felt long before we ever reach the
according to Levy and Lotz, ‘it is hard to endow her work with great
point of being able to clone people without an elevated
spiritual significance’, p. 245. In reply, it seems uncontroversial that
procreators do not always regard a genetic connection as important, risk of anomalies.
and the example of the hypothetical machine is not needed to see this. Yet another problem with Levy and Lotz’s argument is
Levy and Lotz’s pointing out that not everyone regards a genetic con- that it also applies to the various forms of ART. If cloning
nection as important cannot count as a rebuttal of my arguments, for I should be prohibited in an attempt to help children who
never claimed that a genetic connection is always important. My argu-
would benefit from adoption, then to be consistent should
ment is that a genetic connection can have a personal meaning for some
that contributes to their well being. That it is meaningful to some
24
provides a reason to value and protect procreative liberty in addition to Levy & Lotz, op. cit. note 4, p. 247.
25
the principle that liberty in general is valuable. Ibid: 247.

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

 Cloning and Adoption: A Reply to Levy and Lotz 135

not one also advocate the banning of donor insemination, ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS
ovum donation, controlled ovarian stimulation, and in
vitro fertilization? All of these provide alternatives to Levy and Lotz also argue that permitting cloning will
adoption. If banning cloning would increase adoptions, reinforce a mistaken ‘proprietarian’ attitude – that is, the
would not banning these forms of ART also increase view that genetic parents own their children. They state,
adoptions? Thus, Levy and Lotz’s argument seems to have ‘we might plausibly think that permitting cloning in a
consequences for procreative freedom that are more pro- context in which the genetic is over-valued will give pro-
nounced than one might initially think. prietarian attitudes more “leash” than is desirable’.27 In
Some might take seriously this expanded version of the reply, stating their argument more fully will show its
argument. Perhaps it is worth asking whether it would be weakness. Levy and Lotz seem to be claiming that people
reasonable to forbid all ART in order to attempt to will draw an inference that goes something like this: ‘Per-
increase the number of adoptions, independently of mitting cloning in part because it provides infertile
whether Levy and Lotz put forward such an argument. couples a way to have genetically related children sup-
Given the widespread use of ART by infertile couples, the ports the idea that genetic parents own their children’.
claim that forbidding ART would increase the number of The problem is that the inference in question is errone-
adoptions seems to be more plausible than the claim that ous. It is one thing to desire genetic children, and it is
forbidding reproductive cloning would do so. Does the something else entirely to believe that one owns one’s
potential benefit to children who need to be adopted genetic offspring. Thus, it is a mistake to think that a
outweigh the interference with procreative liberty that policy of permitting cloning in part because it is a way to
would be entailed by such restrictive measures? A main have genetically related children implies that genetic
objection to forbidding ART for this reason is that parents own their children. It is unclear whether Levy and
freedom to procreate by means of ART is worthy of Lotz recognized that the reasoning in question is illogical.
protection. The reasons that can make procreation in the If they did not recognize this, perhaps that is why they
ordinary scenario meaningful to couples can also be held that people would make the inference and that
applicable in the context of ART, as well as reproductive cloning would reinforce the proprietarian attitude. But if
cloning, as I have pointed out elsewhere.26 Depending on they did recognize it, then presumably they were claiming
the type of ART, for some couples procreation through that people would make this erroneous inference, which
ART can be personally meaningful for the following would have the effect of reinforcing the proprietarian
reasons: it involves participation in the creation of a view. In that case, let us assume for sake of argument that
person; it can be an affirmation of a couple’s mutual love the claim that people would make the erroneous inference
and acceptance; it can provide a type of valued link to is correct. The problem here lies in the view that a ten-
future persons; it can involve experiences of pregnancy dency of people to make an erroneous inference that
and childbirth; and it leads to experiences associated with would support an unjustifiable proprietarian viewpoint
child rearing. Given that these reasons contribute to pro- counts as a good reason for the restriction on procreative
creative freedom being valuable in the context of ordi- freedom in question, particularly when there are impor-
nary procreation, they also contribute to it being valuable tant reasons, discussed above, for not imposing the
in the context of ART. These considerations support the restriction. This type of argument could be given against
conclusion that forbidding ART would be a substantial practically any policy pertaining to any subject, for some
and undesirable intrusion upon procreative freedom. We people will find ways to infer erroneously that the exist-
should question a proposed policy for promoting adop- ence of some policy supports some unjustifiable view they
tions that moves directly to such a substantial invasion of hold.
procreative liberty. We should look first at alternatives, Another problem involves our limited ability to predict
such as those mentioned above, that do not involve inter- the consequences of a policy of permitting cloning on
ference with individual freedoms. Therefore, the argu- ‘proprietarian attitudes’. What impact the policy in ques-
ment that ART should be forbidden in order to increase tion at some time into the future might have on such
the number of adoptions should be rejected. These same attitudes would depend on several factors, including how
considerations support rejecting Levy and Lotz’s specific widespread the attitude would be at that future time.
argument that reproductive cloning should be forbidden Another factor is the extent to which people would draw
in order to increase the number of adoptions. the incorrect inference that permitting cloning supports

26
Strong, op. cit. note 7, pp. 96, 101; Strong, The Ethics of Human
27
Reproductive Cloning, op. cit. note 1, pp. 46–47. Levy & Lotz, op. cit. note 4, p. 249.

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

136 Carson Strong

the idea that genetic parents own their children. These reason for the restriction on procreative freedom in ques-
factors are difficult to predict. tion, particularly when there are important reasons for
Yet another difficulty is that the supposed harms that not imposing the restriction.
would arise from giving a proprietarian attitude ‘more And of course there is the difficulty in predicting the
“leash” than is desirable’ have not been stated by Levy consequences of a future policy of permitting cloning on
and Lotz. They would need to specify the nature of their beliefs about genetic determinism. Again, the impact of
concern in order to complete their argument. An ‘argu- the policy would depend on several factors, including
ment’ with crucial parts missing is not much of an how widespread the attitude in question would be in the
argument. future and the extent to which people would draw the
Another argument by Levy and Lotz is that permitting mistaken inference in support of their unjustifiable view.
cloning will reinforce the mistaken view that genes deter- Also, it is debatable that belief in genetic determinism is
mine who we are and how we end up in life, and that this one of the most important factors contributing to the
mistaken view ‘will be used to buttress opposition to, or failure to use public funds to help the disadvantaged.
at least a reduction in, the use of public funds to improve Because it is plausible to think that multiple factors are
the life prospects of the disadvantaged’.28 By ‘disadvan- involved, it is not at all obvious that reducing belief
taged’, Levy and Lotz seem to have in mind primarily the in genetic determinism will significantly benefit the
poor, but perhaps others as well. In reply, several familiar disadvantaged.
problems arise. Levy and Lotz seem to be claiming that In conclusion, Levy and Lotz have failed to show that
people will make an inference that goes something like there are problems with the arguments I put forward in
this: ‘Permitting cloning in part because it provides infer- support of the view that, with certain qualifications, use
tile couples a way to have genetically related children of reproductive cloning by infertile couples would be
supports the idea that genetic makeup, and not environ- ethically permissible and should be permitted. They join
ment, determines our characteristics.’ Again, the infer- others who hold that a genetic connection can have no
ence in question is mistaken. To desire genetic children is importance without giving good reasons for that view.
entirely different from believing that genes determine Moreover, there are serious problems with each of the
who we are. So, it is erroneous to think that a policy of direct arguments they give against human reproductive
permitting cloning in part because it is an option for cloning. So, they also join a large chorus who oppose all
having genetically related children implies that genetics human reproductive cloning without giving good
determines our characteristics. Again, it is not clear reasons.
whether Levy and Lotz recognized that the reasoning in
question is fallacious. As before, it is questionable that a Carson Strong, Ph.D., is a professor in the Department of Human
Values and Ethics at the College of Medicine, University of Tennessee
propensity of people to make a mistaken inference that
Health Science Center, in Memphis. He is coauthor of A Casebook of
would support an unjustifiable belief counts as a good Medical Ethics, published by Oxford University Press, and author of
Ethics in Reproductive and Perinatal Medicine: A New Framework, from
28
Ibid: 249. Yale University Press.

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.