Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702 (print); 1467-8519 (online)
Volume 17 Numbers 5–6 2003
PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS FOR
AND AGAINST HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE
CLONING
MATTI HÄYRY
ABSTRACT
Can philosophers come up with persuasive reasons to allow or to ban human
reproductive cloning? Yes. Can philosophers agree, locally and temporar-
ily, which practices related to cloning should be condoned and which should
be rejected? Some of them can. Can philosophers produce universally con-
vincing arguments for or against different kinds of human cloning? No.
This paper analyses some of the main arguments presented by philoso-
phers in the cloning debate, and some of the most important objections
against them. The clashes between the schools of thought suggest that
philosophers cannot be trusted to provide the public authorities, or the
general public, a unified, universally applicable view of the morality of
human reproductive cloning.
Some people, mostly legislators, have thought that prohibitions on
cloning can be based on philosophical arguments, that is, argu-
ments which are ultimately founded on the ability of all human
beings to use reason, or their intellectual faculties.1 Others have
thought that the reverse is the case – that such prohibitions can
be conclusively rejected by philosophical arguments.2
1 G.J. Annas, L.B. Andrews & R.M. Isasi. Protecting the Endangered Human:
Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations.
American Journal of Law & Medicine 2002; 28: 151–178; P.F. Frisneda. Clonación
Humana: Una Lucha Contra el Tiempo. Tiempos del Mundo 2002; September 5–11.
2 J. Harris. ‘Goodbye Dolly?’ The Ethics of Human Cloning. Journal of Medical
Ethics 1997; 23: 353–360; J. Harris. 1998. Clones, Genes, and Immortality. Oxford.
Oxford University Press; J. Savulescu. Should We Clone Human Beings? Cloning
as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25:
87–95; J. Savulescu. The Ethics of Cloning and Creating Embryonic Stem Cells
as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation: Time to Change the Law in Australia.
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Medicine 2000; 30: 492–498.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
448 MATTI HÄYRY
My aim in this paper is to show that both these groups are
wrong, and that philosophy, or reason, does not provide sufficient
grounds for settling the cloning issue in a way that should be rea-
sonably accepted by all people in all cultures and schools of
thought. If governments want to ban the practice in its entirety,
or to allow it in its entirety, they should recognise that the justifi-
cation for such a decision must be sought elsewhere.
THE QUESTIONS
There are many arguments against human reproductive cloning,
but only one in favour of it. The one argument for the practice is
easy to state and easy to support initially, but difficult to defend
conclusively. Its simplest formulation is:
Human reproductive cloning is likely to actualise some value,
and all arguments that can be presented against it are either
invalid or unsound.
I will explore, in this paper, how this argument can be explicated,
supported, and defended against philosophical criticisms levelled
at it. I will proceed by answering five questions, namely:
• What is human reproductive cloning?
• What values is it likely to actualise?
• What sorts of outcome-based arguments can be presented
against it?
• What sorts of ‘deontological’ arguments can be presented
against it?
• What sorts of ‘teleological’ arguments can be presented against
it?
I will then conclude by summarising what I see as the limitations
of philosophical arguments in the cloning debate.3
3 A word of caution is appropriate here. There are two common mistakes in
cases like this, and we should try to avoid both. On the one hand, some people
may think that since there are so many arguments against human reproductive
cloning, one of them must be sound. This, of course, does not follow. No matter
how many objections there are to a given practice, they can all, logically speak-
ing, be mistaken. On the other hand, others may think, conversely, that since
many arguments against human reproductive cloning are weak, inadequate, and
unconvincing, none of them can be sound. This is equally untrue. Even if the first
fifty objections to a practice were misplaced, argument number fifty-one could
still be good. (This is why it is so difficult to defend any controversial policy or
course of action conclusively – I can make a solid case today, but tomorrow
someone may come up with a lethal criticism.)
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FOR AND AGAINST HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING 449
WHAT IS HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING?
There are many ethically interesting forms of human cloning, and
not all of them are reproductive. These include:
• the splitting of early human embryos for pre-implantation
genetic tests (this is not usually thought of as cloning at all);
• the production (that is, the isolation and in vitro multipli-
cation) of human stem cells, which may have the ability to
develop into full-fledged human beings (this is sometimes but
not always associated with cloning in other senses); and
• the creation of babies by the use of somatic cell nuclear trans-
fer techniques (in which case the new individual roughly dupli-
cates the genome of only one of its parents, instead of bringing
together, for the first time, the genomes of two parents, which
is the norm in sexual reproduction).
I will concentrate here on the third form, human reproductive
cloning, which became topical a few years ago with the successful
cloning of other mammals. To my knowledge, nobody has so far
produced babies by this method, but laboratories in many parts
of the world have announced that work is under way to complete
the procedure.4
Some opposition to human cloning is based on mistaken
beliefs regarding the result of the procedure, once completed.
Contrary to popular belief, the method will not create copies of
existing human beings. Genetically speaking, it comes very close
to creating a later identical twin to an already existing individual.
Socially and psychologically speaking, it produces an entirely
new individual, whose biological features just happen to be quite
similar to somebody else’s.
WHAT VALUES IS HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING
LIKELY TO ACTUALISE?
Depending on their ethical views, defenders of cloning can say
that it would be valuable in at least three ways.
In the first instance, it would help childless couples and indi-
viduals to have children ‘of their own’ in a genetic sense that has
always been important to people. It would thereby meet needs,
fulfil desires, satisfy preferences, promote well-being, and reduce
suffering. These values are particularly important to philosophers
4 J.B. Cibelli, R.P. Lanza, M.D. West & C. Ezzell. The First Human Cloned
Embryo. Scientific American 2002; 286: 44–51.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003
450 MATTI HÄYRY
who think that the outcomes, or consequences, of our actions are
the only or primary consideration in our ethical decision making.
Secondly, since cloning would promote the well-being of some
individuals without violating anybody’s autonomy as a person, all
rational agents ought to (at least) condone it, and (possibly even)
think that it is their duty to encourage it. The value of personal
self-governance, or self-determination, underlying this line of
thinking has often been emphasised by traditions in which the
liberty and freedom of individuals is seen as important. This idea
has also been incorporated in international declarations which
state that people’s reproductive choices should not be interfered
with.
Thirdly, reproduction can be counted among the ‘natural incli-
nations’ that human beings have, which means that it is ‘natural’
(and therefore presumably good) to try to produce offspring by
any means available to humanity. This is basically the argument
evoked by scientists who want to experiment with cloning. Tech-
nology, according to this view, may add an element of artificiality
to reproduction, but this should not be a cause of concern
(because, after all, most things people do in modern societies are
more or less removed from nature, traditionally perceived).
In sum, the values actualised by human reproductive cloning
can include human well-being, personal autonomy, and the satis-
faction of our natural inclinations. Not everybody, however, thinks
that this is the whole story. So let me proceed to the arguments
presented against the practice.
WHAT SORTS OF OUTCOME-BASED ARGUMENTS CAN BE
PRESENTED AGAINST HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING?
Appeals to the harmful outcomes and consequences of our
actions take many forms, depending on:
• the definition of ‘harm’ employed;
• the degree of directness expected; and
• the extent of certainty required.
Let me explain what I mean by sketching the main variations on
this theme, and their implications for cloning.
John Stuart Mill, the nineteenth-century English utilitarian,
believed that laws and social policies should be devised to prevent
harm to innocent third parties. His starting point was that people
ought to be left free to do whatever they like, as long as they do
not harm others by their actions. If competent individuals want
to hurt themselves, or agree to be hurt by others, their actions
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FOR AND AGAINST HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING 451
should not be restricted in the name of ‘their own best interest’,
or in the name of ‘rationality’, or ‘morality.’ If they do not
harm others, their liberty should not be interfered with.5
Mill recognised that people can be harmed psychologically as
well as physically, and indirectly as well as directly, but for legal
purposes, he argued for a narrow understanding of harm. Since
people can be irrationally offended by other people’s doings, and
since it is difficult to assess the long-term consequences of our
actions, he thought that only the concrete and relatively imme-
diate infliction of harm should be publicly regulated.6
The Millian view on liberty and harm gives rise to three norms
as regards human reproductive cloning:
• Since the technique is, as experiments with other mammals
show, unsafe, the production of babies by cloning should not,
for the time being, be allowed.
• Since, however, research on freely donated embryos, where no
new individuals are born, does not harm anybody, it should be
allowed.
• And if, in the future, the technique becomes reasonably safe,
then the production of new individuals by cloning should also
be permitted.
Other ‘outcome-oriented’ ethicists have, however, thought that
Mill’s notion of harm is too limited. Even Mill himself conceded
that our actions and policy choices could have effects which are
indirect, or cumulative, or which will only be felt in the future.
And he understood that our actions could cause offence, anguish,
and mental suffering (which may be difficult to assess but none
the less real). So why regulate only actions which lead to imme-
diate physical damage?
Some contemporary followers of Mill seem to think that if
only ‘irrational people’ in ‘irrationally organised societies’ would
be hurt by the policies they advocate, this can be ignored.7 But
this is not a legitimate move in genuinely consequentialist, or
outcome-based, models. If people’s attitudes and social structures
cannot be changed without causing more harm than benefit, then
they should be taken on board in ethical assessments like any
other facts.
5 J.S. Mill. 1996. On Liberty (1859). In On Liberty and The Subjection of Women.
Ware, Hertfordshire. Wordsworth: p. 13.
6 Ibid. pp. 14–15.
7 Harris (1998), op. cit. note 2; J. Savulescu. The Embryonic Stem Cell Lottery
and the Cannibalization of Human Beings. Bioethics 2002; 16: 508–529.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003
452 MATTI HÄYRY
An extended definition of harm, then, would include psycho-
logical and indirect damage,8 and its acceptance could imply
stricter norms than the Millian notion.
• If the expected benefits of research into cloning are small, and
if the practice would cause considerable grief to a large number
of people, then it should probably be banned – at least for now.
• And this, of course, would mean that the production of babies
by cloning will not be safe in the near future, and cannot, there-
fore, be condoned.
The other side of the coin is that if illegal research into clon-
ing cannot be stopped, and if this activity, with its unavoidable
side effects, causes more suffering than legal research, then
the practice should be permitted even if it is offensive. Gen-
uinely outcome-based analyses can always, in principle, yield a
variety of results, depending on the facts of the case and their
interpretation.
Still others have thought that the definition of ‘harm’ should
be extended even wider, to include moral, spiritual, or symbolic
values, and consequences that cannot, for the time being, be
foreseen by those making the decisions.9 The values exceeding
physical and mental well-being, such as autonomy and dignity,
can, however, be more properly discussed in the context of
‘deontological’ and ‘teleological’ theories. And although widely
acclaimed anti-technological rules like the precautionary principle
seem to make appeals to unforeseen and unforeseeable conse-
quences, they are not really based on outcomes – it would, after
all, be difficult to assess actions by consequences we know nothing
about.
So let me turn to the other types of reasoning prevalent in
contemporary debates.
WHAT SORTS OF ‘DEONTOLOGICAL’ ARGUMENTS
CAN BE PRESENTED AGAINST HUMAN
REPRODUCTIVE CLONING?
The most prominent theoretical source of objections in the
‘deontological’ school of thought is the moral philosophy of
8
Cf. J. Feinberg. 1984. Harm to Others. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
9 Cf. M. Häyry & T. Takala. Genetic Engineering and the Risk of Harm.
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 1998; 1: 61–64; M. Häyry. Forthcoming.
Precaution and solidarity. In The Foundations of Health Care. D. Thomasma,
D. Novak & D. Weisstub, eds. Dordrecht. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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FOR AND AGAINST HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING 453
Immanuel Kant, the German eighteenth-century thinker who
stressed the ideas of ‘transcendental’ freedom and autonomy.10
To define his idea of the transcendental autonomy of human
reason, Kant presented several formulations of what he called the
‘categorical imperative.’ This is the moral law that he thought
people should obey without exceptions. I will outline, in the fol-
lowing, the general idea and two specific formulations of this over-
arching rule, and see how they can (or cannot) be employed in
objections to human reproductive cloning.
The general idea is:
Since we can be genuinely free, or autonomous, only in the
realm of reason, or intellect, we should always do what is
rational.
In a sense, this is Kant’s idea, but in its general form it is not par-
ticularly helpful in practical debates. This is because some people
say that it would be rational to ban cloning; while others say that
it would be irrational to do so; and since, in the absence of speci-
fications, this disagreement cannot be solved, the discussion
simply grinds to a halt.
Kant’s first formulation, which is of more use, was:
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law.11
This means that if I set a rule for my own behaviour, I must also
accept that everybody else will follow that same rule.
An argument against cloning can be built on this principle, as
follows. If I decide to produce offspring by cloning, then I must
accept that everybody else will also do the same. But if cloning
becomes the only form of human reproduction, then the human
gene pool will start to shrink. And since genetic diversity is good,
this should not be allowed to happen.
10 R.J. Sullivan. 1989. Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory. Cambridge. Cambridge
University Press; H.E. Allison. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge. Cam-
bridge University Press. The word ‘transcendental’ means ‘beyond the limits of
experience and knowledge’, so the freedom and autonomy in question have
next to nothing to do with liberty, self-determination, and self-governance as
they are understood in other traditions and ordinary language. See: J.B.
Schneewind. 1998. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philoso-
phy. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
11 I. Kant. 1994. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785, § 421).
Translated by J.W. Ellington. Reprinted in Ethical Philosophy. Second edition.
Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company: 30.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003
454 MATTI HÄYRY
I am not quite sure how this objection should be interpreted,
even assuming that I have presented it correctly in the first place.
But I think two readings should be distinguished.
One is to say that genetic diversity is good, because it is likely
to promote human well-being. It has, in the past, helped
humankind to survive diseases and changes in the natural envi-
ronment, and will presumably continue to do so in the future.
This definition of the goodness of genetic diversity does make
some sense, but it does not support the Kantian objection to
cloning. We can permit cloning in cases where people cannot
have children by any other means without allowing it to become
the only way of making babies – and without disturbing the
human gene pool in any way. Besides, it could be argued that
whatever accidental advantages the variety of genetic constitu-
tions has had in the past could in the future be secured by con-
sidered genetic enhancements.
The more Kantian way to proceed is to say that genetic diver-
sity is good, because it is natural, or intrinsically linked with
human reproduction.12 The starting point here would be that
human (sexual) reproduction naturally results in a combination
of two new genomes. Cloning, according to its defenders, is an
assisted form of human reproduction. But since it does not
combine two new genomes (which would result in increased
genetic diversity), it defies the natural purpose of reproduction,
and therefore contradicts itself. And since we cannot, according
to the categorical imperative, accept self-contradictory rules, we
must not allow cloning.
The critical element in this argument, which does presuppose
a rather strong commitment to the Kantian model, is the use of
the term ‘natural.’ I will return to this briefly in the context of
‘teleological’ arguments.
Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative was:
Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of another, always at the same time as
an end and never simply as a means.13
Some people have argued that cloning violates this rule by treat-
ing the humanity of the individuals produced ‘simply as a means.’
12 I. Kant. 1994. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (1797, § 7).
Translated by J.W. Ellington. Reprinted in Ethical Philosophy. Second edition.
Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company: 85.
13 Kant, op. cit. note 12, § 429, p. 36.
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FOR AND AGAINST HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING 455
They have said that the autonomy and freedom of the new individ-
uals are endangered by the procedure. They have also said that
the standing of these individuals as persons would be jeopar-
dised. And they have said that cloning violates human dignity.14
It is difficult to see what the point of these arguments is. Pre-
sumably, people produced by cloning (if it could be made safe)
would be as free and autonomous as people produced by more
traditional methods, they would be as valuable as persons, and
they would possess the same dignity as anybody else.15 At least,
this is true if we are talking about people as bodies and minds
that can be empirically observed.
But maybe the situation is different, if people are seen
primarily as spiritual beings. A look at the third line of ethical
thinking can cast some light on this.16
14
A. Kahn. Clone Mammals . . . Clone Man. Nature 1997; 386: 119; K. Labib.
Don’t Leave Dignity out of the Cloning Debate. Nature 1997; 388: 15; R.
Williamson. Human Reproductive Cloning is Unethical because it Undermines
Autonomy: Commentary on Savulescu. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 96–97.
15
Cf. M. Häyry. 1994. Categorical Objections to Genetic Engineering – A
Critique. In Ethics and Biotechnology. A. Dyson & J. Harris, eds. London and New
York. Routledge: 202–215; M. Häyry & T. Takala. 2001. Cloning, Naturalness
and Personhood. In Personhood in Health Care. D.C. Thomasma, D.N. Weisstub &
C. Hervé, eds. Dordrecht, Boston and London. Kluwer Academic Publishers:
281–298.
16
I should mention, at this point, some other deontological possibilities that
are not explored here. One is to say that embryos used in research leading to
cloning babies would be treated as a mere means. This, I suppose, is true, but
in what sense are they persons? Another is to say that women, who would in
some cultures be reduced to producing ‘copies’ of men, would be treated merely
as a means. This, again, is true, if the women in question are coerced into doing
what they do. But this point applies to all coerced human reproduction, and can
be directed against lack of sexual education and restrictive abortion policies, as
well. It is not a specific argument against cloning. Yet another deontological
option would be to abandon the Kantian model of intellectual individualism,
and to say that our emotions and feelings provide a reason against cloning, or that
society would collapse with the acceptance of cloning. I have examined this line
of thinking in more detail elsewhere, and concluded that it probably does not
provide a valid justification for a total ban on cloning. (M. Häyry. 2003. Deeply
Felt Disgust – A Devlinian Objection to Cloning Humans. In Ethical Issues in New
Genetics: Are Genes Us? B. Almond & M. Parker, eds. Aldershot. Ashgate: 55–67.)
Finally, it has been argued that it would be unjust to pursue high-tech solutions
to minor medical problems in a world of poverty and other more basic issues.
While this is a tenet easy to agree with, proponents of cloning have countered
it by noting that research into cloning can be the key to many medical advances
in the future. (R. Winston. 1999. Cloning Technology will Yield Medical
Benefits. In Cloning: For and Against. M.L. Rantala & A.J. Milgram, eds. Chicago
and La Salle. Open Court.)
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456 MATTI HÄYRY
WHAT SORTS OF ‘TELEOLOGICAL’ ARGUMENTS CAN BE
PRESENTED AGAINST HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING?
I have already mentioned that some ethical concepts remain
enigmatic in the context of outcome-based and deontological
theories. These include:
• personhood;
• humanity;
• human dignity;
• transcendental freedom; and
• naturalness.17
Many authors have thought that they can bring these together
and explain them within ‘teleological’ theories which combine
elements of the ethical teachings of Plato, Aristotle, and some
early Christian ‘Church Fathers.’ The core of these theories is the
belief that human beings have a natural essence or goal (telos) which
they are supposed to fulfil or strive for in order to be genuinely
human. Among the natural human goals in these views are sur-
vival and reproduction, but objections usually focus on our
essence as spiritual beings.18
Within this model, arguments against cloning assume the fol-
lowing form:
• Human beings have an essence, and it would be wrong to
violate it.
• Cloning would violate it.
• Therefore, cloning would be wrong.
There are at least two official documents that have made direct
appeals to the teleological argument.
The German Enquete Commission stated in its Report to the
German Bundestag in 1987:
The starting-point of every evaluation must be that the human-
ity of human beings rests at its core on natural development,
17 Cf. M. Häyry. Another Look at Dignity. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare
Ethics forthcoming; T. Takala. The (Im)morality of (Un)naturalness. Cambridge
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics forthcoming.
18 T. Aquinas. 1988. On Law, Morality and Politics. W.P. Baumgarth & R.J.
Regan, eds. Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company: 47–48;
Pontificia Academia Pro Vita. 1997. Reflexions on Cloning. Vatican City. Libreria
Editrice Vaticana; Human Cloning – Position paper of the Catholic Medical
Association. Issues in Law and Medicine 2000; 15: 323–324; P.T. Schotsmans &
B. Hansen. Cloning: The Human as Created Co-creator. Ethical Perspectives 2001;
8: 75–87.
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FOR AND AGAINST HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING 457
not on technical production and not on a social act of recog-
nition. The dignity of human beings is based essentially on
their being born and on the naturalness of their origins, which
all humans share with each other . . . The fact that human
beings are not the project and the planned experiment of their
parents, but are the product of the chance of nature, secures
the independence of human beings from each other, their indi-
vidual worth . . . [To] make the formation of our genotype . . .
dependent on the caprice of other people is incompatible with
the essence of a free person.19
In this document, the humanity, dignity, and freedom of human
persons is linked with the ‘naturalness of their origins’, which
would be violated by practices like cloning.
Dignity and humanity are also central concepts in UNESCO’s
1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights,
which asserts:
The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all
members of the human family, as well as the recognition of
their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is
the heritage of humanity . . . Everyone has a right to respect to
their dignity and for their rights regardless of their genetic
characteristics . . . That dignity makes it imperative not to
reduce individuals to their genetic characteristics and to
respect their uniqueness and diversity . . . Practices which
are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning
of human beings, shall not be permitted.20
This declaration has attracted immediate attention, and is widely
seen as the most authoritative defence of humanity against exces-
sive genetic interventions.21
The critical point in the teleological model is to define con-
vincingly the ‘human essence’, and to explain how exactly it
would be disrespected, or violated, by reproductive cloning. The
quoted documents, it can be argued, declare that cloning, as an
19 A Report from Germany – an extract from Prospects and Risks of Gene Tech-
nology: The Report of the Enquete Commission to the Bundestag of the Federal Republic
of Germany. Bioethics 1988; 2: 256–263, at 257. The latter passage is quoted in the
report from: R. Loew. Gentechnologie: vom Können zum Dürfen – philosophis-
che Überlegungen. Die Neue Ordnung 1984; 38: 176 ff.
20 Adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 29th session on 11
November 1997, articles 1, 2, 11. On the significance given to the document,
see, e.g.: C. Dennis, R. Gallagher & P. Campbell. Everyone’s Genome. Nature
2001; 409: 813.
21 Dennis et al., op. cit. note 20.
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458 MATTI HÄYRY
‘unnatural’ or ‘reductive’ practice, goes against the dignity,
humanity, uniqueness, and freedom of persons. But they do not
specify the notions of dignity, humanity, uniqueness, or freedom.
Nor do they explain how these would be attacked by cloning, but
not by more conventional modes of reproduction. If, for instance,
people are allowed to choose with whom they want to bear chil-
dren, then human planning and caprice have already entered the
process. And if, in addition, people are permitted to make repro-
ductive choices based on the medical histories of each other’s
families, then the reduction of individuals to their genetic char-
acteristics has surely begun.22
THE LIMITATIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS
Do we have reason to believe that the philosophical arguments I
have presented, or other arguments I may have overlooked, can
provide conclusive grounds for legislation on cloning in either
the pluralistic societies of the affluent West, or the more tradi-
tional societies of the rest of the world? I do not think so.
The main philosophical arguments for and against human
reproductive cloning proceed from many conflicting background
assumptions, which means that people who disagree on the defi-
nition or relevance of harm, or the nature and role of human
dignity and autonomy, will not be able to agree on the universal
validity of any given policy.
Local and temporary consensus is, of course, possible on the
practical level. None of the arguments I have examined would
22 One way to contrast some prevalent consequentialist and teleological views
is to draw attention to their different notions of ‘harm’ and ‘personhood.’ The
standard utilitarian reading is that harm can only be inflicted mentally or physi-
cally on sentient living beings. Personhood, in this model, belongs automatically
to all beings who are mentally alert enough to be aware of their own subjective
existence over time. If cloning produces healthy babies (prospective persons)
without inflicting concrete harm on others, it should be approved. But some
teleological ethicists, including the ones quoted in the text, seem to be more
worried about spiritual damage to the human soul. According to them, people
can harm themselves by acting in ungodly ways. One such way would be the pro-
duction of new human beings by cloning. I am no expert in these matters, but
I can think of two partly overlapping reasons for this. If personhood is inex-
orably connected with an immortal soul, and if immortal souls can only be issued
by God, then cloners would risk bringing into this world people without the
essential equipment for personhood. And even if God guaranteed that clones,
too, have souls, cloning could be construed as an arrogant attempt to force
God’s hand. The (theologically perplexing) idea in the latter case would be that
God somehow plans ‘natural reproduction’, whereas ‘unnatural’ reproductive
practices take him by surprise.
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FOR AND AGAINST HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING 459
condone reproductive human cloning now, and very few of them
would support unlicensed research into reproductive human
cloning before more is known about the biological mechanisms
and cultural issues involved. This consensus could be used as a
basis for restricted moratoriums and regulations.
Even here, however, we should not be lulled into thinking that
the practical consensus is a sign of an underlying, shared ratio-
nality. It is a happy constellation of many different rationalities
which, given the chance, will start pulling their advocates in dif-
ferent directions again. Furthermore, even the many rationalities
reflected in the foregoing philosophical arguments do not begin
to exhaust the ways in which cloning can be seen in those parts
of the world not excessively influenced by European thinking.
Philosophical arguments can be employed to encapsulate
ethical positions and standpoints, and this can further discussion
between people who hold conflicting views. But they cannot be
employed to justify universal policies on controversial issues like
human reproductive cloning. Philosophy is ultimately an uncom-
promising discipline, whereas political decisions in the real world
are often, of necessity, compromises between competing and
radically incompatible views.
Matti Häyry
Centre for Professional Ethics
University of Central Lancashire
Preston
PR1 2HE
UK
mhayry@uclan.ac.uk
Acknowledgements
My thanks are due to Peter Herissone-Kelly who helped me in the
preparation of this paper, and to Tuija Takala for her invaluable
critical comments. The first draft was presented at the Sixth World
Congress of Bioethics in Brasília, Brazil, 30 October – 3 Novem-
ber 2002, and I am grateful to all those who participated in the
discussion, and made it easier for me to improve the arguments.
This paper was produced as a part of the project Genes, Informa-
tion and Business, financed between 2000–2003 by the Academy of
Finland.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003
