760 PHIL.

625

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 167975, June 17, 2015 ]
GILDA JARDELEZA, (DECEASED),
SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS,
NAMELY: ERNESTO JARDELEZA, JR.,
TEODORO MARIA JARDELEZA,
ROLANDO L. JARDELEZA, MA.
GLENDA JARDELEZA-UY, AND
MELECIO GIL JARDELEZA,
PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES
MELECIO AND ELIZABETH
JARDELEZA, JMB TRADERS, INC.,
AND TEODORO JARDELEZA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The petitioner directly appeals the order of January

31, 2005[1] dismissing her complaint for
reconveyance and damages, and the order of April 7,
2005[2] denying her motion for reconsideration,[3]
both issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 23499, contending that
the dismissal was grossly erroneous under the law
and pertinent jurisprudence.

The antecedents follow.

On March 7, 1997, the Spouses Gilda Jardeleza and

Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. (Ernesto) commenced
Civil Case No. 23499 against respondents Spouses
Melecio and Elizabeth Jardeleza, JMB Traders, Inc.,
and Teodoro Jardeleza (Teodoro) respecting several
parcels of their conjugal lands. Civil Case No. 23499
was raffled to Branch 33 of the RTC. On January 13,
2004, during the pendency of Civil Case No. 23499,
Ernesto died. Hence, administration proceedings
(Special Proceedings No. 04-7705) were
commenced in the RTC (assigned to Branch 38), and
Teodoro was appointed as the administrator of the
estate. The other heirs questioned the appointment in
the Court of Appeals (CA).

Meanwhile, Teodoro, in his capacity as the

administrator, filed a motion to dismiss in Civil Case
No. 23499 on the ground that because Melecio, one
of the defendants, was also an heir of Ernesto, the
properties subject of the action for reconveyance
should be considered as "advances in the
inheritance," and, accordingly, the claim for
reconveyance should be heard in Special
Proceedings No. 04-7705 by Branch 38.

Branch 33 issued the first assailed order dated

January 31, 2005 granting the motion to dismiss,
viz.:

Considering that the Motion to Dismiss

dated December 15, 2004 carries with it
the signature of all parties and their
respective counsels in the above-entitled
case, the prayer for the dismissal of the
complaint and the counterclaims in this
case are hereby granted.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Gilda sought reconsideration, arguing that she had a

personal cause of action of her own distinct from
that of Ernesto; that she neither signed nor consented
to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 23499; and that
Teodoro should have first sought the approval of
Branch 38 as the intestate court considering that the
estate could potentially recover properties belonging
to it.

On April 7, 2005, Branch 33 issued the second

assailed order denying Gilda's motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, Gilda has directly appealed the adverse

rulings of the RTC. Did Branch 33 err in dismissing
Civil Case No. 23499?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Firstly, although Branch 33 based its dismissal of

Civil Case No. 23499 on the fact that the motion to
dismiss[5] filed by Teodoro, in his capacity as
administrator, bore the signatures of all the parties
and their respective counsel, the records show that
the motion to dismiss carried only the conformity of
Teodoro. In addition to the cited ground being
obviously a misrepresentation, Teodoro's conformity
to the dismissal would stand only for the intestate
estate of Ernesto, and did not bind Gilda without
whose express conformity the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 23499 was ineffectual. Gilda's express
conformity was not merely necessary but
indispensable considering that the properties sought
to be reconveyed pertained to the conjugal
partnership of Gilda and Ernesto.

Secondly, Gilda correctly posits that the action for

reconveyance, which survived the intervening death
of Ernesto as co-plaintiff, should be maintained
independently of Special Proceedings No. 04-7705.
Indeed, whether an action survives or not depends
on its nature.[6] In a cause of action that survives, the
wrong complained of primarily and principally
affects property and property rights, the injuries to
the person being merely incidental; in a cause of
action that does not survive, the injury complained
of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental.[7] This rule is
applicable regardless of whether it is the plaintiff or
the defendant who dies, or whether the case is in the
trial or in the appellate courts.[8] Verily, Civil Case
No. 23499 survived the death of Ernesto.

Thirdly, the jurisdiction of the RTC as a probate

court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of a will of a
deceased person, and does not extend to the
determination of a question of ownership that arises
during the proceedings.[9] This is true whether or not
the property is alleged to belong to the estate,[10]
unless the claimants to the property are all heirs of
the deceased and they agree to submit the question
for determination by the probate or administration
court and the interests of third parties are not
prejudiced;[11] or unless the purpose is to determine
whether or not certain properties should be included
in the inventory, in which case the probate or
administration court may decide prima facie the
ownership of the property, but such determination is
not final and is without prejudice to the right of
interested parties to ventilate the question of
ownership in a proper action.[12] Otherwise put, the
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title by a court of competent jurisdiction.[13]

In this regard, it bears mentioning that Civil Case

No. 23499 had been instituted in 1997 and was
pending trial before Branch 33 prior to the bringing
of the probate proceedings in 2004. In dismissing
Civil Case No. 23499, Branch 33 shirked from its
responsibility to decide the issue of ownership and to
let the probate court decide the same. Branch 33
thereby did not consider that any decision that
Branch 38 as a probate court would render on the
title and on whether or not property should be
included or excluded from the inventory of the assets
of the estate would at best be merely provisional in
character, and would yield to a final determination in
a separate action.

Lastly, the comments of the heirs of Gilda, who had

meanwhile also passed away, and Ernesto reveal that
they had no longer any objection to the overturning
of the dismissal. In his comment,[14] Teodoro prayed
that the dismissal be undone. Rolando Jardeleza's
own comment[15] expressed his support for the
petition of Gilda to have the dismissal reversed so
that the properties allegedly donated to the
respondents would be brought back to the estate of
his late parents and be included in its final
settlement. In her comment[16] and consolidated
reply to comments,[17] Glenda Jardeleza manifested
her intention to substitute the late Gilda, her mother,
and prayed that Civil Case No. 23499 be remanded
to Branch 33 for further proceedings. With all the
heirs of Gilda and Ernesto having thus united to seek
the undoing of the dismissal in order to have a trial
on the merits on the question of ownership of the
affected properties, the dismissal should now be
undone.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition

for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the assailed orders issued on January 31,
2005 and April 7, 2005 in Civil Case No. 23499 by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, in Iloilo City;
REINSTATES Civil Case No. 23499; DIRECTS
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, in Iloilo City to
continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 23499
with dispatch; and ORDERS the respondents to pay
the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and

Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, p. 20, issued by Judge Virgilio M. Patag.

[2] Id. at 9; 20.

[3] Id. at 509.

[4] Supra note 1.

[5] Rollo, pp. 501-503.

[6] Bonilla v. Barcena, No. L-41715, June 18, 1976,

71 SCRA 491, 495, 496.

[7] Id. at 496.

[8] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1,

6th Rev. Ed., p. 93.

[9] Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947,

September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647, 672; Ramos v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42108, December 29,
1989, 180 SCRA 635, 647-648.

[10] Ongsingco, etc. v. Tan, etc., and Borja, No. L-

7635, 97 Phil. 330, 334 (1955); Adapon v. Maralit,
No. 46898, 69 Phil. 383 (1940).

[11] Cunanan v. Amparo, G.R. No. L-1313, 80 Phil.

227, 232 (1948); Vda. de Manalac, etc. v. Ocampo,
G.R. No. L-48753, 73 Phil. 661, 662 (1942).

[12] Alvarez v. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965,

14 SCRA 892, 898-899; Falcatan v. Sanchez, L-
9247, 101 Phil. 1238 (1957); Vda. De Paz, et al., v.
Vda. De Madrigal, et al., L-8981, 100 Phil. 1085
(1956).

[13] Baybayan v. Aquino, No. L-42678, April 9,

1987, 149 SCRA 186, 192; Pastor, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983, 122
SCRA 885, 895.

[14] Rollo, pp. 170-172.

[15] Id. at 160.

[16] Id. at 175-176.

[17] Id. at 229-233.

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